5 The International Relations of Yugoslavia's Demise, 1991–1995

Yugoslavia's disintegration has frustrated Europe and the rest of the world.[1] Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia, had stood as a symbol of inter-ethnic cooperation. Sarajevo, where World War I began, served as a stark symbol of the conflict. The site of the 1984 Winter Olympics became a battleground. Olympic venues became gravesites. Once the conflict started, Europeans hoped and expected that they would manage this conflict due to the newly developing Common Foreign Policy of the European Community [EC].[2] These hopes were quickly dashed, as cooperation among EC states failed in two ways: it failed to deter the conflict in Yugoslavia, and dissension with the EC raised doubts about its ability to develop a common foreign policy. Other actors including the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] stepped in and struggled with the conflict. The world's frustration with this conflict, and ethnic conflict in general, may discourage future interventions, as the Congo Crisis caused the UN to retreat for awhile from intervening in internal conflicts.

Studying the international politics of Yugoslavia's disintegration serves several purposes. First, since Yugoslavia is the first post-Cold War secessionist conflict to involve the international community, academics and policy-makers may use it as an analogy for understanding future conflicts, as the Congo Crisis did for the postcolonization period. "Yugoslavia's fate may well serve as an exemplar for ethnic conflict elsewhere in Europe."[3] Consequently, it needs to be studied so that we can draw informed lessons.

Second, studying solely African secessionist conflicts would limit our ability to generalize this book's findings beyond less developed, weakly institutionalized states. We can use this more recent conflict to determine whether vulnerability, ethnic ties, or realist imperatives apply beyond 1960s Africa. Since most of the states reacting to the Yugoslavia conflict fall into two categories—advanced stable, institutionalized democracies, or states undergoing transitions—this case is likely to have stronger and clearer implications for today's international politics, expanding this book's relevance.

Third, this case provides more analytical leverage than the others since there are multiple secessionist movements with differing ethnic identities. While the plethora of separatist conflicts complicates the case study, making it harder to apply some of the hypotheses, it facilitates interesting comparisons, such as why did some states support particular separatist movements and not others. Very few states developed consistent, principled policies toward all actors in the conflict. Given the variety of ethnic identities at stake, such inconsistencies are not surprising, particularly if ethnic politics influences foreign policy.

Before going on, it is important to note the dimensions of the conflict's complexity. First, there were irredentist movements as well as secessionist movements: efforts for a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia. The focus of this book is how outside actors react ethnic conflicts, so irredentist states that generated the conflict (such as Serbia and Croatia) are not analyzed here.[4] Second, unlike the other conflicts studied in this book, there were several groups seceding from the host state, Yugoslavia, and groups seeking to secede from the seceding republics. The former category includes Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. The latter category includes Croatian Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats.

Below, the chapter addresses the roots of the conflict briefly, before discussing the role of various international organizations. I analyze the foreign policies of the major actors, which, in turn, largely explain the behavior of the relevant international organizations. The key questions to consider throughout this chapter are: were states inhibited by vulnerability to separatism? Were states motivated by concerns for their security? What role did religious and other ties between important constituencies and combatants play? Can we find some consistency among the complex, contradictory actions taken by states and international organizations?

To preview, vulnerability did not inhibit many states while security motivations played a more prominent role. Most importantly, states tended to

support the side with which their constituents had ethnic ties. Rather than following principled positions throughout the conflict, most states varied in supporting secessionists and host states depending on the ethnic composition of the combatants in question.

Roots of the War of Yugoslavia's Dissolution[5]

The original dispute between Serbia and its autonomous republic, Kosovo, increased tension between Serbia and Yugoslavia's other constituent republics. This caused Slovenia to secede after a short battle with the Yugoslav army and catalyzing a war between Croatia and Serbia, which eventually spread to Bosnia. While the combatants can trace their disputes back to World War II and before, the pivotal period was the mid-1980s. The circumstances were ripe for ethnic conflict. Economically, two factors essentially invited politicians to engage in ethnic politics: the extreme decline of Yugoslavia's economy in the 1980s and the uneven development of the republics.[6] Politically, incentives existed for elites to take advantage of ethnic identity. Because power was regionally focused, each republic having its own party system, resources, and political institutions, it made sense to play to a limited audience: only the key supporters within the existing republic boundaries.[7] This particular federal structure meant that politicians could gain and maintain their positions if they attracted support from only one ethnic group: Serbs in Serbia, Croats in Croatia, and Slovenes in Slovenia.

Specifically, the stage was set for the rise of Serbian nationalism, which resulted from Slobodan Milosevic's efforts to gain power in Serbia. In 1987, the League of Communists of Serbia was divided, facing the difficult problem of maintaining legitimacy in the face of economic disaster. Milosevic found a successful formula for providing the party with a mission and for his leadership of the party: defending Kosovo's Serbs against the Albanian majority. The approaching 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo gave Milosevic the opportunity to take stands on the Kosovo issue, creating a supporting coalition of nationalists and conservatives. Because Kosovo has a critical role in Serbian history and nationalism, Milosevic was able to purge the party of those who opposed his nationalist strategy.[8]

Milosevic's successful use of the Kosovo issue created increased insecurity for other ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, particularly as Milosevic's statements and actions threatened to alter existing institutions that gave other

ethnic groups some control over Yugoslav decisionmaking. Reasserting Serb control over Kosovo threatened to alter the balance of power within federal institutions, as Serbia could add Kosovo's vote to Montenegro's and its own (and later, Vojvodina's), giving Serbia the ability to block decisions at the federal level. The policies taken toward Kosovo were perceived to be part of a larger effort to recentralize the Yugoslav political system, which would lessen the ability of the various ethnic groups to control their destinies.

Ethnic conflict spread swiftly within Yugoslavia because changes in the federal structure threatened all ethnic groups. Slovenia and Croatia were threatened by any increase of Serbia's influence at the federal level. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia felt insecure in a Yugoslavia without Croatia and Slovenia, compelling them to secede as well despite their initial reluctance. War broke out when Slovenia and Croatia seceded in June 1991. Slovenia was able to defeat a half-hearted attempt by the Yugoslav army to maintain the country's territorial integrity. Croatia's secession was much more bloody, producing a UN-enforced stalemate that lasted until August 1995, when Croatia reconquered the territory that the Serbs had taken in 1991. The exit of these two republics left Bosnia and Macedonia with a difficult choice: remain in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia or try to become independent despite the probable costs. Both chose the latter, though only Bosnia has had to pay the price thus far. The Bosnian conflict defied the ambivalent efforts of the West and of the world at large to settle the conflict. Only in 1995, after the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnia Croats settled their differences, after a series of successful offensives by the Croatian army and the Bosnian Muslims, and after NATO's bombing campaign, did the three sides agree to peace and *de facto* partition.

Intervention by International Organizations: the EC, UN, and NATO

Interventions by the international community during Yugoslavia's dissolution were similar to the Congo Crisis, rather than the Nigerian Civil War. That is, the UN's mandate was unclear at first, and only as the crisis progressed did international organizations, particularly NATO, escalate to the use of force to end the conflict. International organizations facilitated and supported negotiations, cease-fires, sanctions, and the use of force, but these efforts did not provide consistent assistance to one side or the other. Cease-

fires and the introduction of peacekeepers assisted Serb separatists in Croatia, but may have allowed the Bosnian government to survive despite the best efforts of Bosnia's Serbs. Like the Congo Crisis, international involvement eventually assisted a weak state to defeat a separatist movement. In the Congo, the UN forces defeated the Katangan secessionists. In Bosnia, the United Nations and NATO gave critical assistance, making Bosnia's survival possible, though at grave cost. Below, I briefly detail the various efforts of several international organizations.[9]

"There was a strange initial reluctance within the Community to involve the United Nations. . . This was going to be the time when Europe emerged with a single foreign policy and therefore it unwisely shut out an America only too happy to be shut out."[10] The Yugoslav crisis was the first real opportunity for the European Community to apply its efforts toward a common foreign policy. At the outset, the EC was united, but ultimately this conflict caused Europe and the world to lose confidence—a common European foreign policy was not to be.

At first, the European Community and other actors encouraged the Yugoslav republics to remain united. Once Slovenia declared its secession and violence broke out between Slovenia and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav armed forces, the European Community took the lead, trying to broker a cease-fire. On July 8, 1991, EC representatives successfully brokered a cease-fire in Slovenia, the Brioni Accords. The Accords required Slovenia to delay any moves toward independence for three months in exchange for the removal of the Yugoslavia army from Slovenia. The deal essentially gave Slovenia *de facto* independence, but delayed *de jure* recognition. After July 8, the fighting shifted to Croatia.

EC representatives brokered a series of cease-fires between Croatia, the Yugoslav Army, and Serb paramilitary groups. These cease-fires did not hold up until Croatia and Serbia agreed in November 1991 to United Nations peacekeepers. These peacekeepers, UNPROFOR I, separated Serb-held Croatian territories from the rest of Croatia, allowing the Serbs to keep and consolidate the gains made through ethnic cleansing. Croatia defied the United Nations by reconquering these territories in 1995.

At the same time that the peacekeepers were considered for Croatia, EC members debated whether to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, with Germany pushing for immediate recognition. Resolving this debate, the EC agreed to a set of rules on December 17, 1991, clarifying the conditions for recognizing those seceding from Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Among these

conditions were respect for human rights, guarantees for ethnic groups in accordance with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and respect for all boundaries. To decide which Yugoslav republics met these criteria, the EC appointed the Badinter Commission, which eventually determined that Slovenia and Macedonia qualified. However, before the commission's decision, Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia, with the rest of the European Community following suit in January 1992. The EC withheld recognition of Macedonia due to Greek opposition.

After this debate, attention focused on Bosnia. War broke out in March 1992, and only stopped with the Dayton Accords in late 1995. Once the conflict spread to Bosnia, the EC played a lesser role and the United Nations played the leading role along with increased NATO involvement as the conflict continued. On April 7, 1992 EC and US recognized Bosnia in hopes that it would help stabilize the situation, but it did not. In May 1992, the UN General assembly admitted Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, but not the new Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. Then, the UN voted to levy economic sanctions against the new Yugoslavia (only China and Zimbabwe abstained). Eventually, the West European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sent ships to the area to monitor compliance. An arms embargo was placed upon the entire former Yugoslavia, which, in effect, assisted Serbia, since it had largely inherited the armed forces of Yugoslavia. The embargo hurt Bosnia, which was poorly prepared for war.

After the international media revealed the most significant atrocities in Europe since World War II, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for humanitarian aid to Bosnia—these efforts became UNPROFOR II.[11] The efforts to feed the Bosnians, particularly the Bosnian Muslims, essentially undermined the Serb separatists and helped Bosnia since starvation was part of the strategy of ethnic cleansing. This humanitarian endeavor required access to the countryside, so the peacekeepers often had to pay off the Bosnian Serbs guarding the roads. Thus, even attempts to feed the Bosnian Muslims had some positive payoffs for the Serbs. In the process of getting through the various blockades and getting food and medicine to the Bosnian Muslims, the UN eventually promised to defend particular areas where displaced Bosnians gathered—so-called safe areas, including Sarajevo, Bihac, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.[12] The UN made some threats and used force in response to the shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace, resulting in the monitoring of larger artillery near the city. The safe areas were hardly safe, as the Bosnian Serbs attacked each in turn, resulting in the massacres at Srebrenica.[13]

After the Bosnian Serbs took UN peacekeepers hostage in spring 1995, the European contributors to the UN mission became more assertive. France and Britain sent reinforcements, and then redeployed their troops to be less vulnerable. Once this occurred, NATO was much freer to use force, which it did in August and September 1995. Along with the Croatian reconquest of Serb-held territory, the Bosnian Muslims enhanced ability to wage war, and Milosevics decreased enthusiasm for the irredentist project,[14] the NATO bombing campaign brought the adversaries to Dayton and to a lasting cease-fire.

The policies of the various international organizations were not consistent. These efforts often had unintended consequences benefiting one side or the other, and they were rarely without controversy. To understand the behavior of these actors, we need to understand states' preferences. Hard bargaining between states shaped each international organization's actions, so we need to know why states chose their particular courses of action. An important factor shaping states' behavior was how they viewed the combatants, which, in turn, was shaped by the secessionists' efforts to define themselves.

Identifying the Separatists

In the case studies of Katanga's and Biafra's attempted secession, the ethnic definition of each conflict influenced how outsiders reacted. The same held true for the wars of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Many different identities overlapped during this conflict: democratic, multiethnic, Slavic, Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, Slovene, Serb, Croat, Bosnian, and Macedonian. Slovenia and Croatia positioned themselves as pro-Western and democratic, facing authoritarian Serbia. Bosnia appealed for support by arguing that it stood for the possibility of multiethnic society, but also sought support from Islamic states. Serbia appealed to its Slavic brethren, particularly Russia. While the conflict was not directly focused on religious differences, such identities mattered both within Yugoslavia (much of the violence targeted mosques and churches) and beyond as outsider actors supported those with whom they shared religious ties. Finally, each group's nationality was very important for the conflict's domestic politics: improving the economic opportunities of Slovenes; protecting Serbs outside of Serbia; empowering Croats in a Croatian state; defending the idea of multiethnic Bosnia; and maintaining Macedonia in the face of Greek opposition. Below, I briefly

discuss each ethnic group in turn to determine how these various identities came into play.[15]

Serbian Identity and Nationalism

While the various combatants and many outsiders trace the conflict's roots to events centuries ago, the violent decade began with the reassertion of Serb nationalism, which shaped the reactions and strategies of the other groups. Milosevic apparently emphasized every aspect of Serb identity to gain support. The Kosovo issue resonated deeply because of its place in Serb mythology.[16] Milosevic sought greater use of Cyrillic to make the language of Serbs more distinct from Serbo-Croatian.[17]

Most importantly, he allied himself with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Despite his communist past, Milosevic began to favor the Church in policy and in the media. Milosevic began a construction program to rebuild Orthodox Churches, gave the Church permission to distribute its publications, and replaced the teaching of Marxism in the schools with religious teachings.[18] The government-controlled media even declared that Orthodoxy was the spiritual basis for and the most essential component of the national identity [of Serbs].[19] Milosevic's embrace of the Serbian Orthodox Church was reciprocated, as the Church provided legitimacy to Milosevic's claims. As the Kosovo Crisis developed in the late 1980s, the Church defined any conflict with the Albanians as part of a deliberate anti-Serb Albanian master plan of genocide.[20] Historically and more recently, the Serbian Orthodox Church has been all but synonymous with Serbian nationalism.[21] While it is doubtful that Milosevic is a true believer,[22] it is clear that he has relied upon any and every Serb nationalist symbol to build support for his regime and to undermine his opponents.

The Serbs also tried to portray the conflict as one between Christianity and Islam, with the Serbs playing the role of defenders of Western Civilization. Serbian media sought to define those who supported the Bosnian government as Islamic fundamentalists, " 'Khomeinis.' "[23] This definition of the conflict aimed to attract support from Christian countries, particularly Orthodox ones, or at least deter support for the Bosnian government.

One of the most puzzling dynamics of this conflict was the identification of Serbs with Slavs, and other groups as non-Slavs, particularly the Bosnian Muslims. While the Albanians are not Slavs, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian

Muslims are. The Serbs defined themselves as Slavs and the Bosnian Muslims as non-Slavs, as Turks. While this runs contrary to history and to the demographic realities, the Serbs, for the past hundred years or so, have considered anyone who converts from Christianity to Islam to have not only changed their religion, but their race as well.[24] This matters, of course, because outsiders, particularly Russia, viewed the Serbs as Slavs and their enemy in Bosnia as non-Slavs.

Slovene Identification with Democracy

The two key ethnic divisions between Slovenia and Serbia are linguistic and religious, but the most important differences, the Slovenes would argue, is political—that they are genuinely democratic. Slovenian is distinct from Serbo-Croatian, and this mattered politically.

One of the key events driving Slovenia's secession was the trial of four Slovenians in 1988 for publishing military documents suggesting that the Yugoslav military was likely to crush the growing democracy in Slovenia. While the trial itself was seen as being anti-democratic, the fact that it was held in Serbo-Croatian despite being tried in Slovenia angered Slovenes. This trial led to large demonstrations, and spurred moves to democratization. A second identity also mattered. Slovenes are predominantly Roman Catholic. While the Catholic Church did not play as an important role in Slovenia as it did in Croatia as the Orthodox Church in Serbia, it still influenced politics, primarily through the Christian Democrats.[25]

However, the Slovene secessionist efforts focused on its political distinctiveness. The argument was that Slovenia was democratic while Serbia and Yugoslavia were obstacles to realizing true freedom. Slovenia was the first of the Yugoslav republics to allow multiple parties to compete. Its press seemed to be the freest. Slovene politicians and their supporters focused on liberalization, decentralization, and opposition to the draft, rather than strictly to nationalist identities. Indeed, Susan Woodward argues that this was a strategy to get international support: "for it [Slovenia] did not portray Slovenes' desire for self-determination in nationalist terms, but as a fight for 'liberty' and 'democracy.' "[26] The reality of Slovenian democracy and its efforts to define the conflict as one of democracy versus authoritarianism succeeded in shaping the views of outsiders, including the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia.[27]

Contradictions of Croatian Nationalism and Democracy

The Croats also sought to define the conflict as one between democracy and authoritarianism, and between "civilization and barbarism,"[28] but President Franjo Tudjman and his supporters clearly relied much more heavily upon Croatian nationalism to rally support. Unlike Milosevic, Tudjman did not come to nationalist beliefs recently as he had been arrested for advocating Croatian nationalism in the past and was considered obsessed with Croatian nationalism.[29] Tudjman's party, the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], has focused almost entirely on Croatian-ness, and promised in its campaigns to reduce the power of Croatia's Serbs.[30]

History and religion play key roles in Croatian identity, and the leaders of Croatian separatism focused on both. The Ustashe regime that ruled in Croatia during World War II served as an important focal point for Serbs and Croats alike. Serbs remembered the atrocities committed by the fascist regime, particularly those crimes committed against Serbs, arguing that they had good reason to fear an independent Croatia. Tudjman and his allies harkened back to the glory of the last independent Croatian state, and appropriated the Ustashe's flag and other symbols as their own. The HDZ also tried to tie itself to the Catholic Church. Just as Milosevic sought comfort and cover from the Serbian Orthodox Church, Tudjman argued on television that the Catholic Church had nurtured Croatian national consciousness.[31] These claims are not idle ones, as the Church has played an important role, trying to defend the Croatian nation.[32] Further, the Croats became more interested in the Catholic Church, which may have been more about feeling their Croatian identity than about faith.[33]

Like Milosevic, Tudjman and his government-controlled media tried to define the Bosnians as Islamic fundamentalists. American Ambassador Warren Zimmermann noted that the government-controlled presses of Croatia and Serbia "became nearly identical—the Muslims were trying to establish an Islamic state in the heart of Europe."[34]

Politics played an important role,[35] as Tudjman relied heavily on the "Hercegovina" lobby, who were largely wealthy émigrés living in the United States and Canada. They were significant contributors to Tudjman's Presidential campaign in 1990. This lobby's nationalist stance included a strong desire to annex parts of Bosnia to Croatia.[36] Tudjman's subsequent anti-Muslim statements and policies alienated outside actors and risked the loss of American support.[37]

Tudjman and Croatia's harsh policies toward Serbs in Croatia and Muslims in Bosnia weakened claims that Croatia deserved international support due to its democratic nature. Once in power, Tudjman and the HDZ acted in an authoritarian manner.[38] Government control of the media meant that the HDZ received favorable coverage, improving its electoral chances. Of course, rewriting electoral laws also benefited the HDZ.[39] Documenting repression of the media and severe policies toward Serbs, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe criticized Croatia. " 'There has been no progress in improving respect for human rights, the rights of minorities and the rule of law.' "[40]

The contradictions between Croatian nationalism and genuine democracy have perhaps become clearer since the end of the fighting. During the conflict, Croatia was able to justify its harsh measures due to wartime necessities, so countries predisposed to supporting Croatia focused more on its religious identity and its pro-Western orientation.

Complexities of Bosnia's Multiethnic Composition

Elections in Bosnia produced a multiethnic coalition, formed by three parties, each representing an ethnic group.[41] Quickly, the Serbs disagreed with the other two groups, and as Bosnia approached secession, the Serbs sought their own self-determination—independence from Bosnia. Consequently, Bosnia's claim to being a multiethnic state literally came under fire. Bosnian leaders faced an important dilemma: emphasizing the Islamic identities of many of their supporters might cause Islamic countries to give it support, but would weaken the multiethnic basis of the regime at home and potentially alienate Western countries.

Even after Bosnian Serbs announced their own independence, the Bosnian government was genuinely multiethnic, and saw this pluralism as crucial for Bosnia's survival.[42] As late as April 1994, the Bosnian cabinet had members from all three ethnic groups, although Muslims possessed the most important positions. The defense of Sarajevo was in the hands of a military that included many Serbs.[43] Sarajevo's population remained multiethnic, and non-Muslim groups gave significant support. Further, Bosnian leaders sought to use its multiethnic identity to get help from the West. By defining itself as the victim of ethnic cleansing and the sole multiethnic combatant, Bosnia hoped to gain international assistance. However, as the war endured,

domestic and international dynamics pushed Islam to the forefront. The war itself radicalized Bosnia's population, increasing interest in Islam.[44] As war broke out between the Bosnian government and the Croats, the ideal of a multiethnic Bosnia frayed further. "This shift to a more well defined Islamic identity paralleled the decision to rely more on military means, reflected disillusionment with Western protectors, and positioned the Bosnian government to seek money and arms from traditional Islamic states in the Middle East in the event that the strategy of mobilizing a higher level of NATO military engagement failed."[45] Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other predominantly Muslim countries, as I discuss below, were much more willing to give arms and sponsor volunteers to fight on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims.

Other actors defined Bosnia as a Muslim ethnic group, rather than a multiethnic state. Politicians in both Croatia and Serbia used fears of an Islamic government to rally support. "Militant Serbian nationalists spread the fear of an Islamic-Catholic ('Khomeini-Ustashe') conspiracy by the Moslems and Croats.' "[46] Tudjman argued that Islamic fundamentalists were to blame for the conflicts between Croats and Bosnia.[47] Whether these fears were real or created by politicians, Bosnian Serbs were concerned that Bosnia would become an Islamic Republic akin to Iran.[48] Further, support from Islamic countries also served to emphasize the religious identity of many, but not all, constituents of the Bosnian government.

Macedonia—What Is in a Name?

While the Bosnian government was ambivalent about the religious identity thrust upon itself, all of Macedonia's neighbors sought to deny Macedonia its identity. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia all deny that Macedonians exist as a separate nation. Bulgaria considers Macedonians to be Bulgarians, but have generally been much friendlier to Macedonia than the others. Serbs consider Macedonians to be South Serbs, which suggests that the territory called Macedonia should belong to Serbia (or the rump Yugoslavia). Greece, of course, has been the most hostile to Macedonia's existence, using nearly every possible foreign policy instrument to deny Macedonia its own identity, including embargoes, boycotts, and hard bargaining within the European Union.

Given all of this conflict, what does it mean to be a Macedonian? Macedonian is a distinct language (although Bulgaria considers it to be a dialect), spoken by seventy percent of the population, with most of the remaining population speaking Albanian. The Macedonia Orthodox Church became autocephalous in 1967 from the Serbian Orthodox Church, though the Serbian Orthodox Church opposed this.[49] The population is mostly Slav. Because of the large Albanian minority, Macedonia has been quite careful on nationality issues. President Kiro Gligorov had to balance the demands of Albanian parties with some of the extreme Macedonian parties.[50] Thus, he and other leaders could not focus solely on language or religion as a basis for Macedonia's identity. Instead, the focus has been on the history of Macedonia's territory, relying upon symbols from ancient Macedonia.[51]

President Gligorov asserted in an interview in 1992:

> We are Slavs who came to this area in the sixth century. . . . we are not descendants of the ancient Macedonians. We have borne this name [Macedonians] for centuries; it originates from the name of this geographic region, and we are inhabitants of part of this region. This is the way people can differentiate us from neighboring Slav peoples, the Serbs and the Bulgarians. Our country is called the Republic of Macedonia.[52]

Other countries proposed a variety of names, but either Macedonia or Greece found the various substitutes to be unacceptable. Macedonia was allowed into the United Nations as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM]. For Macedonia, the problem is if they are not Macedonians, then what right do they have to exist? If the territorial identity ceases to exist, then focusing on language or religion would probably result in the loss of the Albanian-majority regions to Albania.[53]

Summary

If the groups struggling during Yugoslavia's demise differed only because of nationality or language, it might still have been as violent, but outsiders would probably not have cared as much. However, multiple identities coexist, so both insiders and outsiders can consider certain identities as being important at the expense of others.

Analysts persuasively argue that "Religion here serves merely as a national identifier. Thus one can have a 'Christian' or 'Muslim' atheist."[54] In other words, Bosnia's conflicts were not really about religious dogma. Still, because the Bosnian government and its constituents were and are predominantly Muslim, the Croats are largely Catholic, and the Serbs are Eastern Orthodox, the conflict was widely viewed as a religious one. Clearly, without the religious dimension, no one could consider the conflict to be a "clash of civilizations."[55] Consequently, the wars resonated more deeply in some countries than others, resulting in countries taking certain sides.

The nature of the groups, the strategies of their leaders, the stances of their opponents, and the predilections of the outside actors determined which actors perceived which identities to be at stake. Because Croatia and Serbia were defined by their exclusive nationalisms, they had incentives to define the identities at stake in Bosnia to be ethnic ones and deny the existence of a multiethnic Bosnia. Further, outsiders assumed that Bosnia was essentially a construct of the Muslims, rather than an independent entity, of which the Muslims were merely a part. Debates between Macedonia, Greece, and other actors have shaped the very the meaning of what it is to be Macedonian. The relevance of these different identities become clear once we examine how states reacted to the conflict.

Understanding the Puzzling Behavior of Key Actors

To assess the competing arguments, and particularly the value of the ethnic ties approach, we need to examine the behavior of the most significant players. Since this conflict had three sides, this section is not organized as the previous chapters. Instead of focusing on the supporters of one side or another, I first examine the states that acted most unexpectedly, and then I discuss more briefly the remaining major actors. First, I consider France and Romania because they do less than what the ethnic politics argument expects. Then, I address Germany's policies since its role is clearly the most controversial. Third, Hungary's foreign policy is worthy of examination since we could have expected that Hungary would have been more assertive. By examining these "hard" cases, we can develop a better assessment of the roles played by ethnic ties, vulnerability and international organizations, and power. Later, I briefly analyze the behavior of Russia, Greece, Turkey, Iran, the United States, and the neighboring countries as well as some more dis-

tant actors. Including these observations facilitates comparison of this chapter with the other two case studies since each case study examines the most active supporters of each side and considers the behavior of neighbors.

France

French policy toward the Yugoslav conflict poses a challenge to the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy because of the religious ties between the French populace and the Croatian people and due to the apparently good fit with the vulnerability hypothesis's predictions. Since France is largely Catholic, one would have expected greater support for Slovenia and Croatia. Moreover, the case seems to provide evidence for the vulnerability argument since France's vulnerability to Corsican separatism may have deterred it. By considering the changes in French foreign policy, we can assess the competing arguments in a difficult case. Ultimately, because reigning French politicians faced little threat from the potential exit of Catholic voters, France could pursue its usual course of setting a foreign policy independent from the United States and others.

France's policy was inconsistent over the course of the conflict. Before and after Yugoslavia fell apart in the spring of 1991, France supported Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. At this point, France, along with Britain, led efforts within the European Community to provide incentives to Yugoslavia if it remained intact. Once war broke out and Germany began to push for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in fall 1991, France resisted these efforts.[56] France only relented in December after gaining concessions on the Maastricht Accords, which were negotiated at the time.[57] France provided the most troops to UN peacekeeping missions in Croatia and Bosnia. Throughout the Bosnian conflict, France was more willing to support partition and more reluctant to bomb the Bosnian Serbs due to the threats posed to the French troops in the area.

At first glance, vulnerability to separatism may have deterred France from supporting the Croats and Slovenes. "Acceptance of the dissolution of Yugoslavia was felt to have implications for France over Corsica."[58] Separatist violence in Corsica continued during the Yugoslav war, so it makes sense that France would want to avoid setting a precedent that might encourage separatism within its territory. There are two problems with this argument. First, Corsican separatism did not deter France from supporting separatist

movements elsewhere, such as Katanga and Biafra. While these more distant movements may not present such a clear precedent as a European conflict, the vulnerability argument does not make such distinctions. Second, France was among the first to support the partition of Bosnia, which would seem to contradict the vulnerability argument.

Analysts also argue that France did not want an unfortunate precedent set that might encourage the breakup of the Soviet Union.[59] France had supported Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to reform the Soviet Union, and feared that increased separatism might threaten his efforts. This worry had substance, as the Union Treaty allowing the Baltic Republics to secede spurred a coup to depose Gorbachev. While this helps to explain French reticence during the summer of 1991, this concern cannot account for French foreign policy after August 1991, when the Soviet Union's disintegration was a foregone conclusion.

Further, historical ties to Serbia, going back to World War I, might have caused France to give more support to Serbia than otherwise would have been expected. While some decisionmakers may have had ties to Serbia, how such ties could risk conflict with Germany and others is hard to understand. While the historical parallel of Germany opposing Serbia and France supporting Serbia to 1914 Europe is interesting, there must be something else at work, as France, like many others, has gathered and discarded alliance partners over the years.

A fourth and more likely approach is that the French wanted to develop a foreign policy independent from Germany's and from that of the United States. "Among the various principles guiding French policy, the most significant was probably 'difference.' A priority continued to be asserting itself on the international stage."[60] This is a historical tendency in French foreign policy that had implications for the other secessionist crises discussed in earlier chapters.[61] The desire to play a leading role in European institutions and international politics runs deep within French politics, so it should not be surprising that France attempted to take the lead in this conflict. In his attempts to control foreign policy and have foreign policies independent from other countries, President François Mitterand has been called " 'more Gaullist than de Gaulle.' "[62] Indeed, Mitterand's surprise flight to Sarajevo on June 18, 1992 opening the airport for humanitarian aid defied the United Nations and gave France a prominent role in the conflict.

Because French foreign policy greatly depends on the President's interests, it is important to note that Mitterand was President during almost the

entire conflict. François Mitterand was President until 1995, and as leader of the Socialist party, was less dependent upon devout Catholics for political support. He was also less constrained by political competition since his second term as president, 1988–1995, would be his last. While he might have had some concern for his party regardless of whether he was to run for reelection, tensions between Mitterand and the party before the 1993 elections may have lessened such concerns.[63] Further, the focus of domestic political debates over French foreign policy centered on the Maastricht agreement and deepening European integration.

Admittedly, ethnic ties did not play a great role in French foreign policymaking. This is in part because the pull of Catholic ties between the French and Croatia was lessened by the disdain the French had for Croatia's Ustashe past.[64] However, rising enmities within France toward its Muslim population might help to explain why France weakly opposed Serb aggression toward Bosnia.[65]

Regardless of the reasons why France placed troops in the region, their presence became the most important influence upon French foreign policy. Fears that French soldiers would either become targets or hostages inhibited the French government from supporting an end to the arms embargo or more decisive NATO action. NATO's bombing campaign in the summer of 1995 became possible only after France reinforced its troops and moved them out of harm's way.

The French case, therefore, does not lend support to the ethnic ties argument, but neither of the competing arguments accounts well for France's policies either. Vulnerability might have encouraged France to support Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, but cannot account for why France supported Bosnia's partition. None of the actors in the conflict could reasonably pose a threat to France nor serve as a valuable ally so it is hard to argue that security interests motivated France's policies. The traditional French desire to have an independent foreign policy is a key part of French identity, so French nationalism may have played a role in this conflict.

Romania

Romanian foreign policy is also a puzzle for those focusing on ethnic ties. Given the historical and ethnic ties between Romania and Serbia, we could expect that Romania would support Serbia, but instead, Romania

played more of a neutral role during the conflict. We can explain Romania's anomalous foreign policy by focusing on two different dynamics. First, Western pressure on Romania caused it to conform. Second, perhaps ethnic politics within Romania was so focused on other ethnically defined adversaries that politicians did not need to use foreign policy toward Yugoslavia to build domestic political support.

Before explaining Romanian foreign policy, we must specify what Romania did and did not do as Yugoslavia broke apart. As the conflict began to develop, Romania supported efforts to maintain Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.[66] At the same time, Romania allowed the smuggling of oil and other supplies to Serbia.[67] Romania clamped down on the smuggling after the West pressured Romania to comply. Romania was one of the few countries in the region to have diplomatic ties to the rump Yugoslavia while enforcing the sanctions. In a similar vein, Romania publicly took a stand for neutrality. "Foreign Minister Melescanu reaffirmed the intention to create 'very good relations with all of the republics that appeared as a result of the disintegration of the old Yugoslav federation,' explicitly noting that 'there exists no intention on Romania's part to be an ally of any one of the [post Yugoslav] republics against any other one.'"[68]

What caused Romania to change its policy and enforce the sanctions? How was this permissible in Romania's domestic politics? International pressures combined with domestic politics making it possible for Romanian leaders to stop the smuggling of goods via the Danube to Serbia. The 1992 G-7 summit meeting singled out Romania as a violator of the embargo against Serbia, and shortly after this meeting Romania more seriously enforced the embargo.[69] This pressure mattered because Romania greatly desired to a part of the European Union's integration plans.

Supporting the sanctions was possible, despite the severe cost of approximately $7–8 billion,[70] because Romania's nationalist politics focused on internal enemies and other neighboring states, and largely ignored Yugoslavia. The inheritors of post-Ceauçescu Romania, particularly the ruling National Salvation Front [NSF], showed few inhibitions toward using nationalism to gain votes and avoid the loss of supporters. All parties contained at least some extreme nationalists, and several parties relied on nationalism as their only major issue. While not as avowedly nationalist as the Romanian National Unity Party or the Greater Romania Party, the NSF also used ethnic appeals to gain support. "Whenever threatened in its control of political power, the government has resorted to populist, often chauvinist dema-

gogy."[71] Often, the NSF found it necessary to rely on these nationalist parties to form winning coalitions.[72]

Given the prevalence of Romanian nationalism and ethnic outbidding, how could Romania not support Serbia, its closest ethnic kin in the region? The answer is that Romanian nationalists had plenty of issues and targeted ethnic groups that mattered more to the average Romanian. Specifically, nationalists cared about and fought over two issues: the Romanian majority in Moldova and the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Moldova, or Bessarabia as it once was known, was one of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics, a slice of Romanian territory gained during World War II as the result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Roughly two-thirds of the population is Romanian. After gaining independence from the Soviet Union, the issue of whether Moldova would be reunited with Romania arose on both Moldova's and Romania's political agendas. A majority of Romanians in Romania wanted to annex the lost territory.[73] If politicians wanted to prove to their supporters that they were good Romanian nationalists, they could (and did) take strong stands on reunification with Moldova.

Similarly, rather than focusing on some relatively distant target, Romanian elites emphasized an apparently greater threat: Hungarians in Transylvania. Indeed, "The NSF began to frequently use the 'Hungarian threat' in order to divert attention from pressing issues of democratization."[74] Politicians used fears of Hungarian separatism and of Hungary's intervention to mobilize support. "With Romania politically calm in 1994 despite declining living standards, and the Yugoslav war an issue of relative unimportance, it was ties with Hungary and Moldova which focused attention on Romania's position in a region shaken by numerous internal and inter-state disputes."[75]

Romanian foreign policy provides strong support for none of the arguments that this book addresses. The presence of Hungarian separatism might have compelled Romania to support Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, but cannot account for its subsequent support of Serbia as Serbia was a force for disintegration. Realist accounts can make some sense of Romania's foreign policy, as Serbia (and Slovakia) could be seen as allies against the common Hungarian threat, but Hungary was threatening due to ethnic politics, not due to traditional realist concerns. An initial glance at Romania's ethnic composition would suggest support for Serbia, and this was Romania's policy at the outset. A somewhat deeper analysis suggests that the Romanian government did not have to take strong stands on Yugoslavia as long as it took strong stands on issues of greater relevance to Romanian nationalism.[76] Thus,

ethnic politics greatly influenced Romanian foreign policy, just not in the ways specified by ethnic ties alone.

Germany

Many have blamed Germany for the war in Bosnia, so it deserves special attention. The accusation is that Germany's early support for Slovenia and Croatia undermined efforts to keep Yugoslavia together, and encouraged the politicians in those two republics to push for independence. In the fall of 1991, after Slovenia was *de facto* independent and Croatia was in the process of being divided, Germany aggressively pushed for recognition of the two republics. Critics then argue that this pressure caused Bosnia to declare independence, which then produced war. Regardless of the accuracy of these accusations,[77] Germany's assertive push for recognition, even at the risk of aliening its most important partners, is something that needs to be explained. Below, I consider what Germany did, the various explanations analysts have posed, and I apply the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy after considering the competing arguments. The key to understanding German foreign policy toward Yugoslavia is its discrimination—strong support for Slovenia and Croatia, and much less support for Bosnia and Macedonia.

Policy Toward Yugoslavia Most accounts agree that Germany did not actively support Slovenia and Croatia until violence broke out at the end of June 1991. German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher met with Slovenian and Croatian officials earlier in that year, but did not encourage them to secede unilaterally.[78] Still, meeting with such officials may be considered implicit support and perhaps *de facto* recognition. Importantly, German officials did not meet with representatives from other Yugoslav republics at this time. Until the conflict broke out in Slovenia, Germany's official position supported the EC's efforts to maintain Yugoslavia. This quickly changed once violence broke out. Arguing that Serbia's aggression caused the conflict, German decisionmakers quickly seized upon recognition as a means to coerce the Serbs. As the Yugoslav Army began to use force in Slovenia, German reaction was strong. Once the conflict in Slovenia was settled, violence broke out in Croatia with the YPA strongly taking the side

of the Serbs, causing Germany to make clearer its threat to recognize the secessionist republics.

Throughout fall 1991, Germany tried to get the rest of the EC to act jointly in opposition to Serbia and in support of the secessionist republics. Chancellor Kohl promised to recognize Slovenia and Croatia before Christmas, resulting in a final push by German diplomats in December 1991. Shortly after the Maastricht meeting of the EC,[79] on December 16, 1991, the European Community agreed to follow the decisions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, who would determine which Yugoslav republics were worthy of recognition. Instead of waiting, German decisionmakers agreed on December 19 and announced on December 23, 1991, that Germany recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. It would open embassies in these two states on January 15, 1992, when the rest of the EC would be implementing whatever decision the Badinter Commission made. The Commission agreed that Slovenia and Macedonia met the various requirements, including guarantees to minorities, while Croatia fell short. German diplomats argued that Croatia was in the midst of implementing new policies that would guarantee the rights of Serbs, and therefore deserving of recognition.[80] It is quite striking that Germany was quite willing to go along with Greece in denying Macedonia recognition despite pronouncements of support for self-determination and democracy. "With respect to the recognition of Macedonia, the German government kept its promise to protect Greece's interests," Foreign Minister Genscher admits in his memoir.[81]

After recognition, Germany took a backseat to the U.S., Russia, Britain, and France. German diplomats argue that since the United Nations handled Bosnia, and not as much by the European Community, the responsibility shifted toward the permanent members of the Security Council. Once the question became one of military intervention, Germany could not take a strong position because their troops would not be at risk. "The fate of Bosnia was now exclusively in the hands of those powers willing to put their own troops on the ground, and they certainly would not have been enthusiastic about any German advice on how to make the best use of these troops."[82] Despite constitutional battles over the use of force outside of NATO's territory, Germany gave military support to the no-fly zone over Bosnia and later to the NATO forces enforcing the Dayton accords.

Dominance of the Region—Realpolitik or History Critics of Germany's policies have argued that a desire to dominate the Balkans motivated Ger-

many. These analysts tend to argue that both power politics and traditional German nationalistic attitudes cause this desire to be manifested in German support for Slovenia and Croatia. British officials apparently believed that Germany's efforts were "an attempt to reconstitute a special German sphere of geopolitical influence in the Balkans in collusion with Croatian heirs of the old Ustashi . . . with the Bavarian, Austrian, and German Roman Catholic hierarchies, and with suspect German nationalists at the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*."[83] Aleksa Djilas argues that "Germany will find it much easier politically to dominate Slovenia and Croatia than all of Yugoslavia. . . . Under the guise of Western democratic values and human rights during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, traditional German nationalistic prejudices reappeared."[84]

To address these arguments, I first consider the role of power politics and then deal with the focus on traditional nationalist tendencies. Does a desire for security or power explain Germany's foreign policy? This question ultimately depends on what is meant by security. The Balkans present an insignificant military threat, particularly since Germany is a member of NATO, and Serbia, Germany's supposed threat, is not. Germany is one of the most militarily capable countries in the world, and is backed by the world's most powerful alliance. While the Yugoslav military was sizable and well armed compared to some of its neighbors,[85] its disintegration and its geographic distance from Germany produce a very weak threat to Germany's security. If one means refugee flows, which most critics ignore, then security concerns might have driven German foreign policy. Germany has received more refugees from Yugoslavia than any other Western European country (at least 400,000). However, these refugees became quite numerous after Germany decided to support Slovenia and Croatia and after German public opinion shifted toward greater support.

Of course, if power motivated Germany, rather than security, then domination of the Balkans might make some sense. There are two problems with this assertion: a) that dominating the Balkans would really increase German power much; and b) Germany's policies toward Yugoslavia were not cost-free as they expended resources (power) to achieve their goals. What would domination of the region add to German power? It is not clear how this would advance German interests in the world. Given that Germany's economic interests are elsewhere, and there is no perceived need for conquering "living space," as was argued before World War II, asserting that Germany sought domination strains one's credulity. Further, Germany's as-

sertive support for Slovenia and Croatia damaged their relationships with other, much more important states: the United States, Russia, France, and Great Britain. Germany was apparently willing to compromise on the Maastricht Treaty to get support for recognition, but clearly the Maastricht Treaty is more likely to have an impact on German sovereignty and on its relative power than the status of Slovenia, Croatia, or Serbia. Moreover, if the European Union is a tool for maximizing German influence in the world (as some of Germany's critics would argue), then damaging the institution by acting unilaterally would be counter to Germany's long-term interests. Moreover, Germany's willingness to let the United States and others take the lead after December 1991 suggests that Germany is not so power hungry.

While arguing that ethnic politics shapes foreign policy, I do not aver that history simply repeats itself, as many seem to assert when explaining German foreign policy. Scholars arguing that traditional German nationalism motivated the country's foreign policy in the 1990s make two mistakes. First, they oversimplify by suggesting that German foreign policy was very similar to what it was before and after World War I. Second, they ignore the possibility that German nationalism then and now may be shaped by some other forces. During the Yugoslav conflict, Germany gave diplomatic recognition to Slovenia and Croatia, Germany perhaps looked the other way as private actors facilitated the transfer of arms, and it gave some direct military support to UN and NATO forces in the region. That is very different from what Germany did in the early twentieth century. Germany has not invaded Yugoslavia; it has not created puppet fascist regimes in Croatia; and its economic policies are not as domineering, intentionally or otherwise, as they were before World War II.[86]

Further, Germany supported Yugoslavia's territorial integrity before the outbreak of violence, and Germany had a very strong, very positive economic relationship with Yugoslavia before the conflict. "German traditional tendencies" cannot account for either of these predisintegration policies. Thus, while some notion of German traditional feelings toward the region might help explain some German perceptions of the conflict or some influence on public opinion, such arguments cannot account for German behavior. Second, these arguments fail to explain why Yugoslavia is a target for German traditional nationalism. They assert that this is a traditional tendency, but fail to explain why. Ethnic politics might provide some of the microfoundations for these broader generalizations, by showing how particular

political forces matter in German domestic politics then (which this book does not address) and now.

Support for Self-Determination Both German diplomats and American analysts argue that Germany was motivated by a sincere belief in self-determination. "The crucial motives for German behavior during the first two years of the crisis were rooted in a pervasive pattern of moral and political values. Outstanding among these was a particular affinity, enhanced by German unification, for the ideal of self-determination. . . . Equally important was the rejection of violence as a means of politics."[87] The timing of this crisis as the first European crisis after Germany's reunification made the principle of self-determination particularly salient. If Germany demanded self-determination for its own people, then it would have been hypocritical to deny the Croats and Slovenes. German decisionmakers viewed self-determination as applying to those decisions made democratically, which should not be altered forcefully. Thus, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia deserved international support since they made decisions through elections and elected bodies, whereas the democratic credentials of Milosevic, the Croatian Serbs, and the Bosnian Serbs were suspect. By using force, the old Yugoslavia government and the new Serbian leadership delegitimated their efforts to protect Serbs and to assert the rights of the Serbs in the seceding republics. Beverly Crawford asserts that "the self-determination principle was an important component of Germany's foreign policy culture; it was a central foreign policy norm."[88]

The problem with such arguments is that Germany did not support the efforts of every group desiring self-determination. While they did not oppose Bosnian efforts to get assistance, Germany certainly did not lead the way as it had with the Slovenes and Croats. Further, Germany assisted Greece in denying Macedonia recognition, and Germany did not significantly help the Albanians in Kosovo until its involvement in NATO efforts in 1999. Finally, Germany was not terribly sympathetic to the claims of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia for self-determination. Crawford addresses only the latter. She argues that Germany had not traditionally considered a unitary Yugoslavia as a solution to Serbia's self-determination problems since Germany did not help with the creation of Yugoslavia. In addition, the Christian Democrats did not view the Serbs as worthy of self-determination since they were associated more strongly with the communist authoritarian regime.[89] Libal argues that self-determination applied to the constituent republics of Yugo-

slavia, but that ethnic groups within each republic, such as the Albanians of Kosovo, the Muslims of Sanjak, and the Hungarians of Vojvodina would not receive international support.[90]

These claims still do not explain why Germany did not recognize Macedonia, especially since it, like Slovenia, met the Badinter Commission's standards for recognition. "At the governmental level, it [the pro-Croat bias] manifested itself in the contrasting attitudes of Bonn toward recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on the one hand, and FYROM [Macedonia] on the other."[91] Obviously, when it came to Macedonia, there were conflicts between principles and other interests, such as winning Greek support for Germany's policies. What is quite striking here is that Germany was quite willing to bear significant international costs (in the form of alienated allies and increased insecurity by potential foes) when it pushed others to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, and when Germany did so by itself, but was unwilling to bear such costs for Macedonia. Although conflict in Macedonia certainly poses a greater danger to international stability, Germany chose not to support self-determination in this case. What is also quite interesting is that there is no mentioning of German public opinion concerning Macedonia's plight.

Domestic Politics Analysts of Germany's policies have also stressed the importance of domestic politics in shaping German policy. These analysts focus on Croats in Germany; the German media; public opinion; and party politics. Each variant suggests that domestic politics influenced German foreign policy, and each suggests that ethnic ties matter in some way. The first claim is that Croats living in Germany were able to mobilize support for their ethnic kin.[92] The 500,000 or so Croats in Germany, it is argued, had strong ties to the Christian Social Union [CSU]—the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democrats, and influenced the party to support Croatia. There are three problems with this argument. First, the Croatian minority is not very large, so it is hard to understand how their preferences would override the desires of other groups. Second, the CSU did not push for recognition and greater support of Croatia until violence broke out.[93] Third, the CSU's support for Croatia is overdetermined. The CSU is more closely tied to the Catholic Church than other German parties, and while the Croats in Germany may have helped shape perceptions of the Yugoslav conflict, the CSU would have been likely to support the Catholic, anticommunist side regardless of Croat lobbying.[94]

The second line of argument is that the German media, particularly the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* [FAZ], shaped public perceptions and pressured politicians to support Slovenia and Croatia. Timothy Garton Ash goes so far as to argue that, the publisher of that particular newspaper "single-handedly did more than any politician to change Bonn's policy toward the former Yugoslavia."[95] Many analysts shared this view,[96] as did the British foreign office.[97] The FAZ and other media outlets portrayed the conflict in very stark terms—democratic Croats versus authoritarian Serbs. Interestingly, all accounts of the FAZ's influence focus on the conflict between Croatia and Serbia. Few, if any, analysts discuss the German media's coverage of Bosnia, Macedonia, or Kosovo. While one could focus on the personality of one publisher,[98] that would fail to address why other media outlets covered the Balkans as they did. This account also seems to exaggerate the role of the media—why were Germans receptive to the FAZ's coverage?

Policymakers and analysts agree that German public opinion influenced Germany's foreign policy. Libal argues that "the outpouring of German public sympathy" influenced the foreign minister's reactions toward the growing conflict.[99] Maull argues that the German public placed significant pressure on the government to give Croatia more diplomatic support.[100] Clearly, the German public supported Slovenia and Croatia. The question, then, is why? Germans' past experiences in the region and their reaction to the use of force shaped public opinion. The lasting effects of tourism are often cited when accounting for German public opinion.[101] Before the war, many Germans spent the vacations along the Dalmatian coast of Croatia. Consequently, Germans responded more passionately when the Yugoslav People's Army shelled Croatian historic sites they had visited, including Dubrovnik. The second major factor shaping German public opinion was the abhorrence of violence. Because of Germany's role in World War II, many Germans are opposed to violence, and to see artillery used against European civilians caused tremendous outrage. "The prevailing public sentiment was the desire to see the carnage stop."[102]

However, assessing public opinion's influence is difficult because, as Crawford points out, opinion polls tended to follow policy changes, not precede them.[103] This particular order of events may be interpreted in two ways. Either politicians shaped public opinion through their speeches and policies, or that politicians anticipated what the public wanted and gave it to them as the public began to realize what they wanted to government to do. To get at this question, we need to consider how German party politics played out during this conflict.

Crawford and many others make convincing arguments that competition among Germany's leading parties was important in shaping policy toward Yugoslavia.[104] The basic argument is that a few parties genuinely preferred particular outcomes in Yugoslavia, and the others "bandwagoned," as they did not want be the only ones opposing self-determination for Slovenia and Croatia. Two parties at the opposite ends of Germany's political spectrum, the Greens/Alliance '90 and the Christian Socialist Union, most clearly reacted to the growing conflict due to their ideologies, principles, and perceptions of the world. Because the Green Party has historically been opposed to violence, and because Germany's reunification produced the Greens/Alliance '90, when viewing Yugoslavia's spiral into conflict, this coalition supported the peaceful self-determination of Slovenes and Croats before any other German party. They called for recognition as early as February 1991.[105] The CSU is the second party that had very strong preferences, as its religious ties to the Croats, as well as historical ones, were quite deep.[106] With the Catholic Church already pushing for international support for Slovenia and Croatia, the CSU, with its strong ties to the Catholic Church, had a side in this conflict that it clearly favored, and pushed for recognition.

The other parties had a less direct stake in the conflict, but each eventually gave strong support for recognition as they felt themselves being outflanked by the other parties.[107] The Free Democrats, the Christian Democrats, and the Social Democrats all feared losing support to other parties, as the most recent election suggested that the party system was beginning to fragment.[108] The SPD had begun to lose votes to both the Greens/Alliance '90 and to the Republikaner Party, while the CDU/CSU was losing supporters to the Republikaners as well. Therefore, each party cared greatly about what the other parties were doing. With the Greens/Alliance '90 pushing for recognition, the SPD had to follow or else lose even more support. With the CSU pushing for greater support, and with the SPD then also supporting recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the CDU began to support greater efforts on behalf of the northwestern Yugoslav Republics. The Free Democrats, with Foreign Minister Genscher, were the last to cave in to these pressures, but as pressure increased, the FDP also began to call for recognition. Genscher later wrote that "we [German policymakers] were even considered too cautious—an attitude that became evidence especially in response to the request for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia."[109] The FDP could not stand alone against all of the other parties, despite whatever misgivings Genscher might have had. Having beaten the EC into submission on this issue in December 1991, Germany went ahead and recognized

Slovenia and Croatia before the EC timetable allowed as "a gesture for the domestic audience."[110]

Explaining Inconsistency: Ethnic Ties While domestic politics clearly drove Germany to alienate friends and potential foes by granting early recognition to Slovenia and Croatia, these accounts omit the discriminatory nature of its foreign policy. Libal and others admit that Germany's hands were tied over Bosnia, since Germany could not use its own military to assist international intervention (though it eventually did so in the face of constitutional challenges). Still, this fails to account for why Germany did not care about Macedonia or Kosovo. If Germany's foreign policy culture or its people at large were devoted to self-determination and nonviolence, then Germany should have given much greater support to Macedonia. What was different about the republics that gained German support and Macedonia? The Badinter Commission, as well as others, considered Slovenia and Macedonia to be deserving of recognition because of their superior treatment of minorities, so that fails to account for German policy. Serbia did not turn its armed forces on Macedonia as it did toward Croatia and Slovenia, so Germans did not see Macedonia on television as much as Croatia or Slovenia. However, the Greeks kept Macedonia on the European agenda by opposing recognition and levying economic sanctions. Thus, Macedonia was on the German political agenda, and deserved recognition according to the principles justifying recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. In the debates explaining German foreign policy toward Yugoslavia, little mention is made of Macedonia. Did the German people not care about Macedonia? Why did German politicians focus so much on Croatia but ignore Macedonia? Given that conflict in Macedonia presented then and continues to do so today a greater threat to international peace and stability, how could Germany give in to Greece? How could German leaders allow Greece to determine policy, given both Germany's relative power advantage and Germany's support for self-determination?

The most obvious distinction between Macedonia and the northwest republics is that Germans saw the Croats and Slovenes as being similar to themselves. Certainly, the CSU would consider the plight of the Catholics of Slovenia and Croatia as more important than the situation of the predominantly Orthodox Macedonians. While we have no direct evidence of religious and other ties having a direct role, it is hard, otherwise, to explain the discrimination in German foreign policy.

Germany played quite a controversial role in the Yugoslav conflict. It was more assertive in this conflict than in any other since World War II. Germany pushed allies into supporting particular groups, while allowing themselves to be pushed into denying Macedonia recognition despite its *de facto* independence. Arguments about history and desires for regional dominance have little credibility as Germany moved faster than the other European states, but slower than it could have in its efforts to support Slovenia and Croatia. The domestic debate clearly mattered, as German parties competed with each other, outbidding each other to be the best supporters of Croatian and Slovenian self-determination.

Hungary

Hungary's foreign policy evolved throughout the crisis. It began as one of the strongest supporters of Croatian and Slovene independence, but became more ambivalent over time. The foreign policy change did not coincide with changes in the composition of relevant constituencies, so the Hungarian case challenges the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy. While ethnic ties to Croatia and Slovenia and enmities toward Serbia motivated Hungary's early support for the two secessionist republics, ultimately concern for the Hungarian minority in Serbia's Vojvodina region constrained Hungarian foreign policy.

Hungary became embroiled in controversy even before Yugoslavia broke apart. In 1990, Hungary sold more than thirty thousand Kalashnikov rifles to Croatia. When the deal was revealed in 1991, Hungary claimed that the arms deal had been a mistake, but the situation implicated more than a few Hungary officials. Hungary was one of the states pushing for early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.[111] Hungary also enforced sanctions on Serbia once the international community imposed them, despite their tremendous cost.[112] Hungary even allowed NATO to base its planes on Hungarian territory.

However, as the conflict continued, Hungary supported Croatia and Slovenia much less, as its foreign policy became more ambivalent. The first arms shipment to Croatia was apparently the only one during the war. Furthermore, after Hungarian Foreign Minister Gáza Jeszenszky met with Serbia's President Milosevic in March 1994, Hungary indicated to NATO that

it did not want the planes based in Hungary to be used in airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs.[113]

Why did Hungary support Croatia early on and then lessen its support? Why did Hungary give less support to international efforts to punish the Serbs in Bosnia? Ethnic politics can explain both why Hungary initially supported Croatia and Slovenia, and then why it became less supportive than one might have expected. Hungarians tended to support Croatia's and Slovenia's right to self-determination,[114] as Hungary shares religious and historical ties to Croatia and Slovenia. While religion [Catholicism] is not a particularly strong component of Hungarian national identity,[115] it is still something that binds Hungarians to Croats and Slovenes, and serves as a cleavage between Hungarians and Serbs. Religious ties may also explain the discrimination in Hungary's foreign policy: Hungary gave support to Slovenia and Croatia early on, but was less inclined to support airstrikes aiding the Bosnian Muslims. Their plight might be less compelling to Hungarian politicians, so that the risk involved in supporting them probably outweighed any desire to help them.

The potential cost of supporting any secessionist republic for Hungary was the threat Serbia posed to the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. The salience of Hungarians abroad within Hungary's domestic politics would be high, given their numbers and the risks they face. This would be true even if Hungary had not been governed by a center-right coalition, relying on nationalist parties and strategies to gain and maintain its position.[116] Prime Minister Jozsef Antall "tried to enhance its [the coalition's] domestic political support by placing ethnic concerns into the focal point of its foreign policy agenda."[117] These concerns have focused on Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia.

The main Hungarian strategy for dealing with this problem has been to negotiate bilateral treaties with states inhabited by Hungarian minorities. Serbia's Hungarians have been less salient than Romania's because those in Serbia have "enjoyed rights, privileges, and a sense of security no other Hungarian minority enjoyed in Eastern Europe."[118] Indeed, analysts argue that the Hungarian minority has not tried to secede because their treatment has been relatively good.[119] Not only have the Vojvodina Hungarians avoided separatism, but they have also pressured the Hungarian government to take a neutral stance toward Yugoslavia's wars of dissolution.[120] This effort is probably the result of fear. Indeed, they seem to play the role of hostage in the Serbia-Hungary relationship—that the welfare of the Hungarians in Vojvo-

dina is contingent on Hungary's behavior toward the former Yugoslavia.[121] It is quite suggestive that Hungarian opposition to NATO airstrikes occurred after Hungary's foreign minister met with Milosevic about the treatment of Hungarian minorities in Serbia.[122] It seems that Serbian leaders threatened to harm the Hungarians in Vojvodina if Hungary continued to support NATO's air attacks, and, apparently, this blackmail worked at least in the short term.

The crisis occurred at a time when most parties were using nationalism as one of their appeals for popular support. The reigning government was particularly dependent on nationalist parties to hold onto their position. Hungarians generally preferred supporting Croatia and Slovenia due to their shared ethnic ties, but cared somewhat less about the plight of the Bosnian Muslims due to the absence of ethnic ties. As Serbia made the Vojvodina Hungarians appear to be hostages, Hungary became a less enthusiastic supporter of Serbia's adversaries.

Perhaps Hungary was better equipped to take the side of separatists since it is relatively invulnerable to separatism, but this invulnerability says very little about what Hungary might do. The imperatives of national security predict more support for Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia than actually occurred. Yugoslavia and then Serbia presented the most severe military threat, so we ought to expect strong support for efforts to weaken Yugoslavia and later Serbia. Further, Hungary was also strongly motivated at this time by the desire to join the European Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This desire does not explain Hungary's early support for Slovenia and Croatia, but it may account for the willingness to enforce sanctions later on, despite the risk posed to Hungarians in Vojvodina. Ultimately, Hungary was cross-pressured by its desire to maintain its security and its efforts to secure their ethnic kin in Serbia.

Brief Analyses of Other Major Players

While France, Germany, Hungary, and Romania appeared to be anomalous, during this conflict most countries acted according to the imperatives of ethnic politics. Most of the major actors in the conflict generally acted as if motivated by ethnic ties, and they less consistently met the expectations of the other approaches.

The Soviet Union/Russia

Soviet behavior toward Yugoslavia neatly reflected vulnerability's implications while Russian foreign policy more closely followed the logic of ethnic politics. Before he lost power and before it was a lost cause, Mikhail Gorbachev supported Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. The parallels between the federations were clear, as republics within both countries were seceding. Gorbachev was concerned about what precedents a violent secessionist conflict in Yugoslavia might set for the Soviet Union. Hence, he worked with the United States, even affirming Yugoslavia's territorial integrity in a joint statement in July 1991, when, arguably, the end of Yugoslavia was a *fait accompli*.[123] Both Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin lost their enthusiasm for Serbia and for Yugoslavia's unity when it became clear that Milosevic and his allies supported those who launched a coup against the both of them.[124]

Although the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Russia continued to play an important role in the Balkans, but was motivated differently. Ethnic ties and political competition shaped Russian foreign policy toward Yugoslavia instead of vulnerability influencing foreign policy. Domestic political competition between President Boris Yeltsin and nationalists within Russian legislature and elsewhere clearly shaped the patterns of support for Serbia. The more competitive pressure Yeltsin faced, the more Russia tended to support Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Russian support for sanctions against Serbia declined, and foreign policy became more conflictual with West. Most accounts of Russian foreign policy at this time agree that there were at least three distinct phases in policy toward Yugoslavia. At each stage, Russian foreign policy became increasingly assertive toward the West and protective of Serbia, and that these stages coincided with changes in the domestic political scene.[125]

The preemption of NATO airstrikes by the imposition of Russian peacekeeping troops to Sarajevo in the winter of 1994 illustrates the dilemmas and opportunities the Yugoslav conflict posed for Yeltsin and his competitors. This move allowed Yeltsin to appear to be defending the Serbs while acting in the service of peace. It not only preempted NATO, but also denied the nationalist opposition a key issue. While the reformers wanted a smooth relationship with the West, Yeltsin had to risk conflict with the United States and others to accommodate or anticipate the nationalist backlash. Russia took a strong stand against the Bosnian Serbs only after Serbia itself did, which then gave Yeltsin cover.

"The opposition objected to the Foreign Ministry's lecturing 'Slav brothers'; favoured unconditional support for fellow Slavs against Islam and the Vatican; was for lifting sanctions against Serbia and imposing them on Croatia; was against the Vance-Owen plan, which compromised Bosnian Serb interests."[126] The Slavic and Orthodox ties between Russians and Serbs may not be as deeply felt as the nationalists in both countries often assert. Still, it is clear that even if these ties served as merely a pretext for attacking the Russian government, they significantly influenced Russia's foreign policy during this crisis. Once Yugoslavia ceased to exist and once Russia was creating its own foreign policy, vulnerability did not influence policy as much as it influenced Gorbachev. As Russia combated Chechen separatists and had to deal with other groups seeking autonomy or independence, Russia gave significant political support to the Bosnian Serbs, who were seeking to secede from a former republic of a federal state. This is not something the vulnerability argument would expect.

Regarding realist accounts, Russia, even in its current state, is considerably stronger than Yugoslavia was or any successor, so one cannot argue that Russia supported Serbia because of Bosnia's, Slovenia's, or Croatia's threat. However, one realist argument would be that Russia needs as many allies as possible now, and that Serbia was a likely ally due to shared concerns about the West. Within domestic debates, members of parliament argued along these lines. However, it is hard to see how Serbia adds anything to Russian security, except as a diversion of NATO troops and material to the Balkans.

In sum, we can explain Russian support for Serbia, including its initial ambivalence, by focusing on Russia's domestic politics as nationalists pressured the Yeltsin regime to take stronger and stronger stands on behalf of their "brothers" in the Balkans.

Greece

Perhaps Greece's behavior exemplifies the dynamics of ethnic politics more clearly than any other state during Yugoslavia's disintegration. Greece has argued that Macedonia presents a threat to Greece's security, but Greek demands suggest that the real threat is one of domestic politics. Politicians who do not take strong stands against Macedonia lose power. Regardless of the sources of Greece's antipathy toward Macedonia, Greece's obsession

with it led to aggressive efforts toward Macedonia, threatening to destabilize the region.

Greece used its position within the European Union to deny recognition of Macedonia. After European states finally recognized Macedonia, Greece embargoed its goods. Since international sanctions limited Macedonia's trade with Serbia (rump Yugoslavia), Greece's embargo greatly damaged Macedonia's landlocked economy. In addition, Greece tended to support Serbia during the conflict, as it was seen as an ally against the common Turkish and Macedonian threats, including violating the trade embargo against Serbia.[127]

Greece's fears are not entirely imaginary as some important political movements within Macedonia, particularly the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, espouse irredentist claims toward Greece. However, if Greece truly worried about either a conventional invasion or subversive movements,[128] its policies would have been much different. Greece would have tried to negotiate security guarantees with Macedonia, and with outside actors to enforce the agreement. UN peacekeepers might have patrolled the border between Macedonia and Greece, rather than or in addition to guarding the boundary between Macedonia and Serbia. Greece might have engaged in positive economic policies to build support in northern Greece to reduce Macedonian nationalism's appeal. Instead, Greece's demands focused on Macedonia's name, its flag, and other symbolic issues.

Macedonia's name was objectionable since it laid claim to some of Greece's past and its identity.[129] "By proposing names for the republic that did not include the word 'Macedonia,' the Greek government was attempting to sever completely the symbolic ties between the republic and its people with anything Macedonian."[130] The use of the star of Vergina as part of the Macedonian flag upset Greeks since it was an emblem of the ancient Macedonian royal family, to which Greece laid claim. Macedonia, at the most, posed a threat to the identities of Greeks by "usurping" its history. As a result, ethnic ties do not explain Greece's policies, but ethnic enmities do.

"Greek politicians and diplomats have generally done their utmost to make life difficult for Macedonia, and have generally succeeded. Athens' fierce opposition to Macedonian statehood is based on disputed ethnic territory but essentially reflects domestic political needs . . . ."[131] Intense competition, due to a one-seat majority in the parliament,[132] caused politicians to outbid each other in proposing anti-Macedonia policies. The elections of

October 1993 brought socialist Andreas Papandreou to power, and he immediately asserted that Greece would close its border to Macedonia if a name change did not occur.[133] One key to Papandreou's recent success was his newfound popularity with the Greek Orthodox Church, which supported a hard-line policy toward Macedonia.[134] Macedonia was only allowed to enter the United Nations under the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Greece only relented and removed its embargo in 1995 once Macedonia changed its flag.[135]

The other approaches cannot provide as good an explanation than one focusing on Greek nationalism and ethnic enmities. Given Greece's alleged vulnerability to Macedonian irredentism, it should have opposed Serbian irredentism toward Bosnia, but it did not.[136] Likewise, Macedonia did not threaten Greece militarily, but Serbia might have since it inherited most of Yugoslavia's armed forces. The other components of threat—proximity, offensive capability (supporting opposition movements within Greece), and perceived intentions—suggest that Macedonia was a threat to Greece. However, domestic politics significantly influence the latter two indicators, and as discussed above, if Greece genuinely felt that its security was threatened, Greek demands would have been different.

Turkey

Given Turkey's antipathy toward Greece, it is not surprising that Turkey chose to support Greece's enemies. However, domestic politics may have driven Turkey's assistance to Bosnia and Macedonia as much or more than its rivalry with Greece.

Turkey pushed both NATO and the UN to give more support to Bosnia. Turkey designed and introduced a resolution calling for air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government, and confiscating Serbian heavy weapons.[137] Turkey donated more than 1,400 troops to UNPROFOR,[138] sent planes to help enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia, and sent ships to enforce the embargo. Turkey hosted the foreign ministers' meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1992, where it put Bosnia at the top of the agenda. Turkey was also among the first to recognize Macedonia, and began giving assistance in 1993.[139]

Why such active support for these two states? There are two competing explanations: enmity with Greece and the ethnic ties between Turkey and

Bosnia's Muslims. Rivalry with Greece helps to explain Turkish policy toward Macedonia. Given their history and the ongoing conflict over Cyprus, Turkey probably does seek out opportunities to frustrate the Greeks, and vice versa. Because the Greeks were obsessed with Macedonia, it is not surprising that Turkey assisted the Macedonians.

The better explanation for Turkish support for Bosnia is domestic politics. First, the Turkish people more intensely feel ties to minorities in Orthodox states and in areas once part of the Ottoman Empire.[140] The Bosnians fit both categories. Second, Bosnians and Turkish citizens have similar, relaxed attitudes toward Islam.[141] Because Turkey's citizens felt these bonds with the Bosnians, they pressured the government to support Bosnia.[142] Turkey has faced the difficult problem of maintaining a secular polity in the face of increasingly popular Islamic parties. During much of the Yugoslav conflict, a coalition government, including parties representing moderate Muslims, controlled the government. Even the Social Democrats who were more concerned with secular governance realized "that a lack of concern about Bosnia would hasten their political decline."[143]

Realism does provide similar predictions as ethnic ties in this case. The greatest threat to Turkey in this region is Greece, and Turkish foreign policy in this case aimed to thwart Greece's objectives and to assist Greece's enemies. Vulnerability is unclear here because supporting Bosnia and Macedonia before they were recognized as states is puzzling from this perspective as Turkey is vulnerable to separatism. However, once these two entities can be considered states, Turkey's support of their territorial integrity supports the vulnerability claims.

The United States

The United States moved from playing almost no role in the conflict to becoming the dominant actor, forcing the Bosnians and Croats to get along, leading airstrikes, and, finally, mediating the Dayton Accords.[144] The Bush Administration considered the conflict to a European affair, and gave primary responsibility for managing the conflict to the European Community. Bill Clinton promised to do more to help when he ran for President in 1992. Although his initial policies fell short of his promises, his administration eventually escalated American involvement from encouraging sanctions and enforcing a no-fly zone to bombing Serb positions and negotiating the Day-

ton Accords. Analysts explain American foreign policy by focusing on the lack of compelling strategic interests, conflicts with and deferring to allies, and the desire to avoid casualties. Ethnic politics did not strongly shape American behavior toward Yugoslavia, with one notable exception—the Greek-American lobby significantly influenced policy toward Macedonia.

Former Secretary of State James Baker's memoir makes clear that three factors drove American policy: "There was never any thought at that time of using U.S. ground troops in Yugoslavia—the American people would never have supported it. . . . The Bush administration felt comfortable with the EC's taking responsibility for handling the crisis in the Balkans. The conflict seemed to be one the EC could manage. . . . Our vital interests were not at stake."[145] Neither Bush nor Clinton wanted to commit ground troops and thereby risk American casualties. For Bush, the Yugoslavia conflict broke out very shortly after the Gulf War. For Clinton, much of the Yugoslavia conflict occurred after the debacle in Somalia, where the loss of less than twenty Rangers caused the United States to bail out. Further, the American military strongly opposed involvement in Yugoslavia.[146] A second important constraint was the desire to defer to the Europeans. During the Bush administration, it was felt that this was a European problem and that they should and could handle it. Once British and French troops were placed in harm's way as UN peacekeepers, Clinton frequently had to backtrack from promises to use force due to British and French resistance. Because their soldiers' lives were at stake, and American lives were not, it was quite difficult for the United States to overcome the opposition of its allies.[147] Finally, it was not clear what American interests were in the conflict. Baker, as cited above, flatly denied the existence of strategic interests in Yugoslavia. Now that Yugoslavia was not an ally against the Soviet bloc, it was less important to the United States.

The turning point in American foreign policy was the spring and summer of 1995. Clinton promised its NATO allies that the U.S. would commit 25,000 troops to facilitate the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers if the decision was made to pull these troops, primarily French and British, out of Bosnia.[148] Once this commitment was made and once the Bosnian Serbs briefly held UN troops hostage, the United States faced a choice. Either the U.S. could commit these troops to help withdraw the UN forces under fire, or it could more actively negotiate an agreement, which would then be enforced by 25,000 troops. Because this commitment was to help NATO allies, Clinton could then defend more aggressive action in Bosnia as part of America's

commitment to NATO, and, therefore, such actions would be in America's strategic interests.[149] It is important to note that the fall of several safe areas, most importantly Srebrenica, increased American interest and support for more assertive action.

Where does ethnic politics fit into all of this? Ethnic ties did not play much of a role in American foreign policy toward Bosnia, but shaped policy toward Macedonia. Croatian-Americans pushed President Bush to recognize Croatia, threatening not to vote for him if he did not grant recognition.[150] Serbian-Americans protested American support for Bosnia. Muslim groups protested the weak and erratic support that characterized American policy until late summer 1995. "Individual members [of Congress] were driven by ethnic constituents,"[151] but because each group had ties to more than a few Representatives, the overall effect was to cancel each other out. Since none of these groups, by themselves, was large or well organized, they could not influence politicians much.[152]

The influence of the Greek-American lobby indicates that ethnic ties can shape foreign policy if the ethnic group is well organized, has access to decisionmakers, and is focused on a particular objective. Greek-Americans supported Greece's opposition to Macedonia, including denying it recognition. When the U.S. was deciding whether to recognize Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, President Bush "was put on notice by the powerful Greek-American lobby that it would work against the president's reelection if the United States recognized Macedonia."[153] The U.S. recognized Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia in spring 1992, but refused to recognize Macedonia, even though it met the Badinter Commission's standards. Clinton, too, delayed recognition, finally announcing on February 9, 1994 that the U.S. would recognize Macedonia. However, Clinton changed his mind within a month due to pressure from the Greek-American lobby. Senator Paul Sarbanes, Representative Michael Bilirakis, and powerful Greek-Americans all pushed Clinton not to recognize Macedonia. Indeed, Bilirakis wrote a bill that would forever prevent the U.S. from having diplomatic relations with Macedonia.[154]

The concern for NATO suggests that some strategic concerns shaped American policy. However, the adjusted realist model cannot explain American policy since it is indeterminate. None of the actors seriously threatened the United States. Still, the spread of conflict to Greece and Turkey could pose a threat to the United States, but Bosnia never really threatened to spill over to other states. Kosovo was always thought to present that pos-

sibility, which explains American threats to Serbia in 1992[155] and actions in 1999.

Vulnerability cannot account for American policy since the U.S. did not face a serious separatist threat. This is ironic since the U.S. was the most devout defender of the principle of territorial integrity throughout the conflict.

Others

Other countries listed in the tables below tended to follow the patterns of countries discussed above. Countries with largely Islamic populations acted like Turkey and gave considerable support to Bosnia. Austria and Italy acted much like Germany. Albania and Bulgaria perceived their kin to be at risk and acted accordingly.

Aside from Turkey, Iran lent perhaps the most energetic support to Bosnia. Iran sent weapons and ammunition, facilitated the recruitment of volunteers (veterans of Lebanon's and Afghanistan's wars),[156] and led the Islamic community in criticizing the United Nations. Egypt, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and others gave assistance as well. For Iran, this conflict served to emphasize the divisions between the Islamic world and the West. For more secular countries with largely Islamic populations, public opinion compelled leaders to take strong stands against Serbia and for Bosnia.[157] Ignoring the public's support of Bosnia would have strengthened the Islamic fundamentalists that several of these states faced.

Austria and Italy focused their efforts in support of Slovenia and Croatia, and played a much lesser role during the Bosnian conflict. Austria and Italy, like Germany, were among the first to push for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Austria introduced resolutions and pushed for action both within the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations Security Council. While Austria did not face any serious conflict of its own, separatism was rising in Italy, so support for Croatia and Slovenia conflicts with the vulnerability argument. Realists could claim that Serbia/Yugoslavia was a threat to both, and the independence of Slovenia and Croatia would create a buffer between the most threatening state to the East, Serbia, and themselves. Of course, supporting Bosnia and Macedonia as aggressively as they supported the other two secessionist republics would have also weakened their adversary. Yet neither Austria nor Italy were as energetic in their support of Bosnia and Macedonia as they were of Croatia

and Slovenia. Given the largely Catholic populations of these two states, it should not be surprising that they tended to take the same side as the Vatican throughout the conflict.

Albania has focused on the plight of ethnic Albanians next door, and Bulgaria has concentrated on Macedonia, a group it considers ethnically Bulgarian. Albania has supported ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia. Given the weakness of Albania's political system, the government has had few resources to give to its kin. However, the government's breakdown in 1997 and the seizing of guns from its armories resulted in the arming of the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA]. In the spring of 1999, Albania ceded control over its airspace to the NATO forces bombing Serbia. Exactly when Albania became a base for the KLA is not clear, but during the most recent strife, it became quite clear that the KLA were free to operate quite openly in Albania.

Given Greek claims on Albanian territory, Albania should not be supporting either the secession of Kosovo or attempting to annex it. Clearly, Greece and Serbia present the most severe threats to Albania, so it makes sense that it supports separatists within Serbia, but Macedonia could have been Albania's ally against the twin menaces they face. Instead, Albania has risked a good relationship with Macedonia due to the plight of Albanians in Macedonia.

Bulgaria was first to recognize Macedonia. It has tried to help develop Macedonia's economy to bypass Greece's stranglehold. Bulgaria considers Macedonian to be a dialect of Bulgarian, and that Macedonians are ethnically Bulgarian. This does lead to some conflict between the two countries, but there are groups within Macedonia that want it to be annexed to Bulgaria. This view of Macedonia as ethnic kin produces predictions that dovetail with realist ones. Macedonia is both kin and potential ally against the greater threats of Greece and Serbia, so support for Macedonia and opposition to Greece does not discriminate between realist and ethnic political explanations. Vulnerability cannot explain Bulgaria's policies because its groups at risk are not separatist, so Bulgaria is not very constrained.

Applying the Competing Arguments

Because of the complexity of this conflict, it is harder to apply some of the hypotheses developed in chapter 2. Since Bosnian separatists were se-

ceding from Bosnia as it seceded from Yugoslavia, it is less than clear who are the separatists and who are the host states from the standpoint of supporting international norms. Likewise, the relative power of the various actors is hard to determine because the different actors inherited parts of Yugoslavia's military and economic capabilities. Even understanding the ethnic ties in play here is not simple since there are a variety of identities that might matter.

Applying Realism

To consider realist arguments, we need to assess which countries posed the most significant security threats to whom. Before war broke out in 1991, Yugoslavia did not pose a dangerous threat to its neighbors, nor was it a significant ally of anyone. Since Yugoslavia was not a part of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, no country depended upon it for their security. Once the Berlin Wall fell, Yugoslavia played an even lesser role, as countries in the region focused on the intentions of the United States and NATO. Still, Yugoslavia was stronger than many of its neighbors and certainly was more threatening than any one of its constituent republics. The Yugoslav army was stronger than anything Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, or Macedonia could throw at any external enemy. None of the separatist republics had a significant ability to engage in offensive military actions or to intervene in the politics of neighboring states, even to throw support to separatist movements, with the possible exception of Macedonia. However, as discussed above, Greece's reactions were not those a realist would predict.

Consequently, at the outbreak of the conflict, most states, particularly Yugoslavia's neighbors, should have supported separatists that would weaken Yugoslavia's ability to pose a threat. This expectation is partially met by nearly all states within the region: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Italy. These states supported some of the separatist republics, but did not support every seceding republic. Realism cannot account for this inconsistency. Austria, Hungary, and Italy supported the separatist movements, Slovenia and Croatia, that could pose the most significant threat if they successfully seceded. Slovenia and Croatia had the most modern and developed economies, and they were the closest to these supporters. On the other hand, helping such states might create potential friends and a buffer zone between Serbia on one side and Austria and Italy on the other. Realists would argue that as long as the enemy's

capabilities decline, the effect on intentions is relatively unimportant. Still, the following question goes unanswered: why did these countries give much less support Macedonia and Bosnia as this would weaken Serbia further, as well as lessen Croatia's ability to pose a threat?

Relative threat cannot account for the reactions of the more powerful states, as none of the actors within the conflict posed any kind of threat beyond the region. Realists cannot not make determinate predictions about American, British, French, German, or Russian foreign policy toward Yugoslavia, because the Balkans mattered much less to these countries in 1991 than they did in 1914. Since none of the major powers had committed to the defense of Yugoslavia or of any of its component republics, none were motivated by the potential loss of other allies if they did not come to the aid of one or more Yugoslav republics. Outside actors were not tied to each as if they were in 1914.[158]

During the conflict's second stage, realists would expect that neighbors would generally support Serbia's enemies as Serbia inherited most of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, and therefore presented a greater threat than the other republics. Further, since Serbia was actively supporting separatism in its neighbors, it was viewed as having hostile intentions. Again, support for the seceding republics was more selective than realism would have predicted, as Austria, Hungary, and Italy were much less supportive of Bosnia and Macedonia than they were of Slovenia and Croatia. Most puzzling is that none of these countries gave significant assistance to separatists within Serbia. Instead of supporting the Hungarians of Vojvodina, Hungary limited its support for the anti-Serb coalition, essentially considering their kin to be hostages held by Serbia. Likewise, support for the Albanians of Kosovo was much less than one would expect, given the threat Serbia presented.

Realists would argue that alignment decisions would also depend upon other adversaries within the region, and that states might choose to align with certain former Yugoslavia republics against these other enemies. Romania may have supported Serbia, or at least, been ambivalent about Serbia because Romania may feel more threatened by Hungary because of their tense relationship over the condition of ethnic Hungarians residing in Romania. Likewise, Greece may have supported Serbia because they faced one or more common foes—Turkey and perhaps Bulgaria and Macedonia. However, even these alignment choices are in large part based on histories and politics of ethnic ties and enmities—Hungarians versus Romanians, Greeks versus Turks, and the like.

TABLE 5.1 Realism and Yugoslavia's Disintegration

Country	Power Relative to Yugoslavia/ Serbia	Which State or Group Is Threat	Neighbors of Yugoslavia	Predicted Policy	Actual Policy
Albania	Weaker	Yugoslavia, then Serbia	Yes	Support all seceding from Yugoslavia	**Supported Albanians in Kosovo** *and Macedonia*
Austria	Weaker	Yugoslavia, then Serbia	Yes	Support all seceding from Yugoslavia	**Supported Croatia and Slovenia***
Bulgaria	Weaker	Yugoslavia, then Serbia	Yes	Support all seceding from Yugoslavia	**Supported Macedonia and Serbia's enemies**
France	Stronger	No security threats	No	Indeterminate	Supported Yugoslavia, then Serbs, then Bosnia
Germany	Stronger	No security threats	No	Indeterminate	Supported Croatia and Slovenia
Greece	Weaker, Stronger than Serbia	Turkey, Macedonia	Yes	Support enemies of Turkey, Oppose Macedonia	**Support for Serbs; Oppose Macedonia**
Hungary	Weaker	Yugoslavia, then Serbia	Yes	Support all seceding from Yugoslavia	**Support for Croatia and Slovenia,*** *changing to ambivalent*
Iran	Stronger	No security threats	No	Indeterminate	Supported Bosnia
Italy	Stronger	Yugoslavia	Yes	Support all seceding from Yugoslavia	**Supported Croatia and Slovenia***
Romania	Stronger	Hungary	Yes	Indeterminate	Ambivalent, Neutral
Russia	Stronger	No security threats	No	Indeterminate	Support for Yugoslavia, then Serbs
Turkey	Stronger	Yugoslavia then Serbia, Greece	No	Support Bosnia, Macedonia	**Supported Bosnia, Macedonia**
U.S.	Stronger	No security threats	No	Indeterminate	Ambivalence, changed to supported Croatia, Bosnia

*Indicates that country did not support Bosnia or Macedonia
Bold indicates correct predictions
Italics indicates incorrect predictions

Overall, realism, with its focus on power and security, can explain some of the policies states followed during the conflict. However, realism cannot provide clear predictions about what actors outside the region might do, as they faced no clear threat. Further, states made choices about which separatist movements to support, and their selective support, including efforts by Albania, Austria, Hungary, and Italy poses challenges for realist arguments.

Vulnerability and International Organizations

If fears of vulnerability motivate states, vulnerable states would have followed consistent policies. Such states would have supported Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and then the integrity of its constituent republics once Yugoslavia's disintegration was a *fait accompli*. The United States, perhaps more than any other country, took such a stand, supporting Yugoslavia's unity until it was no longer possible, and then supporting Bosnia's territorial integrity for most of the conflict. Of course, vulnerability cannot account for this, since the U.S. faces no significant secessionist threats. Great Britain and France, who have experienced some separatism (Northern Ireland and Scotland, and Corsica respectively), supported Yugoslavia's integrity, but quickly accepted various plans to partition Bosnia. Russia backed the Bosnian Serbs despite its secessionist conflict in Chechnya and potential ones elsewhere. Of the thirteen observations in this case, vulnerability predicts four wrongly out of six, is indeterminate in six, and cannot really address Romania's policies, either. The norm of territorial integrity did not bind states as they supported the secessionist movements they liked and opposed those that they did not like.

However, the timing of the European Community's recognition policy suggests one constraint that the various actors felt: they did not want to set a precedent that might encourage the Soviet Union's disintegration.[159] After the coup in August 1991, the Soviet Union fell apart, and, consequently, fears of encouraging such an outcome no longer restrained Germany nor the rest of the EC.

Did the involvement of international organizations limit external support for the various secessionists? Most clearly, the United Nations arms embargo, which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization enforced, decreased the amount of arms reaching Bosnia and Croatia, though arms continued to flow. Yet, the United States condoned arms transfers from Iran through Cro-

TABLE 5.2 Vulnerability and Yugoslavia's Disintegration

Country	Vulnerability	Vulnerability Predictions	Actual Policy
Albania	High	Support for Yugoslavia, then new states	*Supported Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia*
Austria	Low	No Prediction	Supported Croatia and Slovenia
Bulgaria	Low	No Prediction	Supported Macedonia and Serbia's enemies
France	High	Support for Yugoslavia, then new states	*Supported Yugoslavia, then for Serbs, then Bosnia*
Germany	Low	No Prediction	Supported Croatia and Slovenia
Greece	Low	No Prediction	Supported Serbs; Oppose Macedonia
Hungary	Low	No Prediction	Supported for Croatia and Slovenia, changing to ambivalent
Iran	High	Support for Yugoslavia, then new states	**Supported Bosnia**
Italy	High	Support for Yugoslavia, then new states	*Supported Croatia and Slovenia*
Romania	High	Support for Yugoslavia, then new states	Ambivalent, Neutral
Russia	High	Support for Yugoslavia, then new states	**Supported Yugoslavia,** *then Serbs*
Turkey	High	Support for Yugoslavia, then new states	Supported Bosnia and Macedonia*
U.S.	Low	No Prediction	Ambivalence, changed to Supported Croatia, Bosnian Muslims

* Indicates that initial support ran counter to vulnerability, but subsequent support for their integrity supports the vulnerability hypothesis.

Bold indicates correct predictions

Italics indicates incorrect predictions

atia to Bosnia despite its membership in both NATO and the UN's Security Council. Still, the arms embargo impeded the United States, as domestic actors wanted to give more assistance to the Bosnians. Significantly, international organizations themselves supported certain separatists, enabling them to continue their fight or maintain their holdings. The introduction of UN peacekeepers into Croatia essentially ratified the Serb conquest of one-third of Croatia, which Croatia altered forcefully in August 1995. The expanding UN role in Bosnia from providing food and medicine to guaranteeing safe areas was significant in maintaining the Bosnian regime and its ability to separate from Yugoslavia. Of course, one can interpret this as support for an existing state as it fought off separatists (the Bosnian Serbs).

Apart from direct assistance or blocking such support, international organizations also served as forums for supporters of various separatists. Because of hard bargaining over the EC integration project, Germany could leverage the entire European Community into recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Without the European Community and the coinciding dispute concerning the Maastricht accords, other members might not have recognized the seceding republics. Of course, the EC also strengthened Greece as it sought to prevent Macedonia's recognition. This particular international organization did not consistently support secessionists or host states. The United Nations enhanced Russia's ability to support the Bosnian Serbs by opposing expansion of UN intervention. The United States and its allies were only able to use force extensively once decisionmaking was moved from the UN to NATO in the summer of 1995, cutting Russia out of the loop. Therefore, international organizations mattered as they constrained some states and empowered others. Still, no international organization could develop a consistent policy during the crisis due in part to the complexity of the conflict (groups seeking to secede from seceding republics), and in part to bargaining among member nations, which generated the international organizations' policies.

Besides stressing international organizations, neoliberal arguments consider reciprocity to be an important influence on states' behavior. Reciprocity suggests that a previous history of cooperation will lead to continued cooperation, while a past of conflict would lead to more conflict. How does this play out in the international relations of Yugoslavia's disintegration? Germany had a previous relationship of cooperation with Yugoslavia, but was the first to support Slovenia and Croatia. Certainly, within the European Community, ongoing efforts to develop a common foreign policy caused its

members to cooperate with each other over the crisis. Bitterness over Germany's assertiveness and the EC's failed efforts has diminished the likelihood of future foreign policy cooperation. On the other hand, while the West and Russia were creating a variety of cooperative efforts in other issue areas, such as arms control, trade, and financial assistance, cooperation during the Yugoslav conflict was less consistent. Despite the increasing web of interactions between the United States and Russia, cooperation during the Yugoslav wars was difficult at best, as Russia tended to support Serbia, while the U.S. tended to support Bosnia. The most damning evidence for reciprocity arguments is that the efforts at international cooperation were inconsistent, as the various external actors cooperated and conflicted with each other. While resentments developed, states did not reciprocate the past moves of the other external actors.[160]

Applying Ethnic Ties

The theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy predicts that domestic political imperatives motivate states, and that states give support to the side with which the important constituencies had ethnic ties or against the side with whom the relevant supporters had ethnic enmities. This conflict is complex, in part, because there are multiple ethnic identities at work: religious, racial, and linguistic. The Slovenes and the Croats are primarily Catholic. The Serbs are primarily Orthodox. Bosnia is multiethnic, but the Muslim community has dominated the government, and its enemies defined Bosnia as an Islamic movement, so we can interpret support given to Bosnia as support for the Muslims. Macedonia consists of both Muslim Albanians and orthodox Macedonians, but the latter govern Macedonia. Most frequently, the various identities reinforce each other, as Albanians speak a different language than Serbs or Macedonians and follow a different religion as well. Where the identities do not reinforce each other, elites create distinctions. Much of the region's population is Slavic, but the Serbs were relatively successful in defining themselves as Slavs and the Bosnians as "Turks." In general, we expected states with Catholic constituencies to support Slovenia and Croatia, states with Muslim constituencies to support Bosnia, and states with Orthodox constituencies to support Serbia. Likewise, states with Slavic populations should support the Serbs more than the Bosnian Muslims or the Albanians. Because Slavic populations and Orthodoxy

tend to coincide, states characterized by these populations should be less confused and more consistent than others.

As Table 5.3 illustrates, these expectations were fulfilled, and the theory

TABLE 5.3 Ethnic Politics and Yugoslavia's Disintegration

Country	Ethnic Ties To:	Ethnic Competition	Ethnic Politics Predictions	Actual Policy
Albania	Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia	High	Support Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia	**Supported Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia**
Austria	Slovenes, Croats	High	Support Croatia and Slovenia	**Supported Croatia and Slovenia**
Bulgaria	Enmity with Serbs, Ties with Macedonians	High	Support Macedonia and Serbia's enemies	**Supported Macedonia and Serbia's enemies**
France	Croats, Slovenes	Low	Support Croatia and Slovenia	*Supported Yugoslavia, then Serbs, then Bosnia*
Germany	Croats, Slovenes	High	Support Croatia and Slovenia	**Supported Croatia and Slovenia**
Greece	Ties with Serbs, Enmities with Macedonia	High	Support Serbs; Oppose Macedonia	**Supported Serbs; Opposed Macedonia**
Hungary	Ties to Croats, Enmities with Serbs	High	Support Croatia and Slovenia	**Supported Croatia and Slovenia**, *changing to ambivalent*
Iran	Muslims	High	Support Bosnia	**Supported Bosnia**
Italy	Croats, Slovenes	High	Support Croatia and Slovenia	**Supported Croatia and Slovenia**
Romania	Serbs	High	Support Yugoslavia then Serbia	*Ambivalent, Neutral*
Russia	Serbs	High	Support Yugoslavia then Serbia	**Supported Yugoslavia, then Serbs**
Turkey	Muslims	High	Support Bosnia	**Supported Bosnia, Macedonia**
U.S.	weak to all sides	Low	Ambivalence or neutrality	**Ambivalence**, *changed to supported Croatia, Bosnia*

Bold indicates correct predictions
Italics indicates incorrect predictions

of ethnic politics and foreign policy provided the most accurate predictions of the three competing explanations. Croatia's and Slovenia's most energetic supporters were countries where politicians relied significantly on the Catholic vote. However, not all Catholic countries gave support to these two republics, as many stayed out and France assisted Serbia at times. Orthodox countries, including Greece and Russia, tended to support Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Muslim countries were among the distant states to get involved, giving diplomatic and military assistance to the Bosnian government. Of the thirteen countries examined, ten acted in ways predicted by the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy. Only France, Romania, and the United States behaved in unexpected ways, if one focuses narrowly on ethnic ties alone. France supported Yugoslavia and then Serbia against the Catholic Slovenes and Croats, although France's positions were not consistent during the Bosnian conflict. Romania's largely Orthodox population suggests that Romania would have supported Serbia, but instead, Romania policy vacillated between ambivalence and neutrality due to Western pressures to support sanctions. Domestic politics permitted Romanian leaders to play a lesser role in this conflict, since they could focus the attention of their supporters on more salient ethnic issues, particularly the Hungarian minority in Romania and the irredentism toward Moldova. Ethnic politics predicts the initial ambivalence of American foreign policy, as no leader depended solely or crucially on voters with ties to one combatant. What the theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy cannot readily predict or explain are the more active and interventionist steps the U.S. took later in the conflict, including bombing the Serbs to the bargaining table.

The theory of ethnic politics and foreign policy also makes predictions about the behavior of the combatants, as they try to identify themselves in ways that maximize domestic and international support. The Serbs and Croats went to great efforts domestically and internationally to define their fight as one between Western Civilization and Islamic fundamentalism. The Serbs also sought to define the conflict as one between Slavs and "Turks." The former strategy could play well in Western Europe, while the latter was aimed at Russia. These strategies mattered, as important actors in the West emphasized the Islamic-Christian division in the conflict, weakening support for Bosnia.[161] The Serb emphasis on their Slavic identity was a tactic to gain Russian support, and it armed Russian nationalists with more criticisms of the Yeltsin regime. The Bosnian government was left in an awkward position. Emphasizing Islam as a binding force would alienate Serbs and

Croats who still supported it, and such a strategy would alarm the West, while attracting support from the Islamic states. Ultimately, Bosnia tried to have it both ways, as it appealed to support from the Middle East and elsewhere at the same time, it reemphasized its secular identity. The Macedonians were stuck, as they could not identify themselves as anything but Macedonians for their domestic audience, no matter what Greece demanded.[162] The Macedonia-Greece conflict illustrates the dynamics and dilemmas leaders face because ethnic ties and political competition create very strong incentives and constraints.

Clearly, the leaders of the seceding republics knew that their identity mattered for both domestic and international audiences, and were quite careful in trying to emphasize those aspects that would lead to greater support. Once again, though, it becomes clear than any effort to define oneself not only attracts support but also enemies. The efforts of the Serbs to define the conflict as a religious one, including the destruction of mosques, attracted Russian assistance, but also caused other states to give more aid to the Bosnian government.

Summary

The previous case studies suggested that vulnerability was a poor predictor of foreign policy, that realism was somewhat better although often indeterminate, and that ethnic politics accounts better for the behavior of states than the competing explanation. This chapter indicates that these findings hold true today, for both developed democracies and states undergoing transitions to democracy.

While ethnic politics explains many actors' policies better than vulnerability or realism, it is also important to note that ethnic politics also provides a better explanation of international relations of Yugoslavia's demise than simply the "Clash of Civilizations" or affective motivations.[163] If either the Clash thesis or the affective argument was correct, then all Orthodox states would have supported Serbia, all Muslim states would have supported Bosnia, and all Catholic countries would have supported Croatia. Other ethnic identities came into play, so that Bulgaria opposed both Greece and Serbia, despite the dominance of Orthodox Christianity in each. Likewise, Romania should have strongly sided with Serbia, but did not. Similarly, France did not strongly support Croatia at the outset, as its politicians did not rely

strongly on appeals to Catholic voters. Where politicians did require such support, such as Austria and Italy, they gave much more support to Croatia. While no Muslim country gave serious support to Serbia, not all Muslim countries gave material assistance to Bosnia.

Finally, it is important to note that ethnic politics is not new, as the reactions of outsider actors to the Yugoslavia conflict were quite similar to how states behaved toward the Congo Crisis and the Nigerian Civil War. Leaders supported those with whom their constituents had ethnic ties, opposed those with whom a history of ethnic enmity was shared, and were ambivalent or neutral if ethnic ties existed with more than one side.