GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGED

CONVICTION, CONFLICT, COMMUNITY

LEONARD HASTINGS SCHOFF
MEMORIAL LECTURES

UNIVERSITY SEMINARS

LEONARD HASTINGS SCHOFF MEMORIAL LECTURES

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FOR ALEX, LEO, KAI-LIN,
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PREFACE

THIS BOOK IS EMBLEMATIC OF MY TRANSITION from a base in university settings to my current location in a humanitarian relief and development organization. When I announced my decision to conclude my time as president of Columbia University, I had no firm idea of what I would do next. In my own thinking and in my public comments, I ruled out only becoming the president of another university.

One clear alternative was to return to full-time teaching and writing. After twenty-five years of very much full-time administrative positions, that prospect certainly had its attractions. In particular, I was eagerly anticipating the opportunity to have my first academic leave in twenty-seven years! It was while I thought about the range of projects on which I would work during a year away that Bob Belknap approached me about offering the Schoff Lectures for 2002, the autumn immediately following the conclusion of my time as president. I happily accepted the invitation but allowed as how I would have more to say if the lectures came after rather than before my leave. Bob generously agreed to my becoming the Schoff Lecturer for 2003.

As it turned out, I never had that leave because instead of returning to full-time teaching and writing I accepted my current responsibilities as president of the International Rescue Committee. In the second and third lectures, I talk a little bit about the work of the IRC. But beyond the

presence of the IRC in their content, my new work has shaped the form of the lectures in both their oral and written versions.

These lectures and the resultant book are quite clearly not the result of fresh, library-based research, as the absence of footnotes or other specific documentation indicates. Instead, I draw on several decades of reflection on the nature of commitment in the context of pluralism, with special attention to how convictions inform our practical actions. This set of issues has been central to much of my teaching and writing, and it has also figured prominently in my other activities as an institutional leader and a participant in the broader society.

In my current position at the International Rescue Committee, this connection of thought to action is no doubt more direct than is usual in the context of the university. In this respect, I feel that I have returned to a form of the activism that characterized my engagement in the civil rights movement in the early 1960s and the Vietnam debate in the mid 1960s. In any case, I am finding the work of the IRC both stimulating and satisfying, as I expect is evident in my references to it in the lectures.

How conviction shapes action invites special attention in our increasingly interconnected world and indeed assumes a sense of urgency in the face of terrorist attacks. It is crucial that we in the affluent and highly secularized West appreciate the extent to which the views that we take for granted generate opposition, antagonism, and even hatred in large segments of the world's population. Only with greater awareness of such starkly different attitudes can we hope to address the deeper threats to the health of our planet of which terrorism is a superficial symptom.

This book is a study of traffic patterns at the busy intersection of conviction, conflict, and community. The traffic moves in all directions, and perhaps its most frequent pattern is that of collision. It is therefore all the more important to examine the prospects for relatively more inclusive communities as we confront fervent and divergent convictions in the context of the processes of globalization.

I am grateful to Bob Belknap and his colleagues for the invitation to deliver the Schoff Lectures, including the flexibility as to timing. I appreciate as well the commitment of Wendy Lochner of Columbia University

Press to turn three brief lectures into a book. I also appreciate the careful attention that Michael Haskell has devoted to copyediting and producing this book. Finally, I thank my three faculty colleagues—Jagdish Bhagwati, Wayne Proudfoot, and Jeremy Waldron—for their astute and constructive responses to the lectures. To have the benefit of reactions from broadly engaged intellectuals who approach the issues I raise from a base in economics, philosophy of religion, and law is tremendously helpful. I trust that the concluding chapter makes clear how much I value their help in moving deliberation on the issues forward.

I dedicate this book to my grandchildren: Alex, Leo, Kai-Lin, Erika, and Kai-Shan. The issues addressed in this book will continue to challenge their generation. May they be better able to rise to the challenge than we or their parents have so far succeeded in doing!

GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGED

CONVICTION, CONFLICT, COMMUNITY

PART I

CONVICTION, CONFLICT, COMMUNITY

1

CONVICTION IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

CONVICTION IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD

Convictions matter. At least our own convictions—the affirmations, commitments, and practices that are central to our personal and social identities—matter to us. Yet because we live in an era of unprecedented global interaction, the convictions of people everywhere also matter to all of us whether we know it or not.

We all read about—and probably know personally—people who are passionately convinced that their convictions are absolutely right and all others are unquestionably wrong. We also have friends, neighbors, and colleagues who decline to debate such convictions and call for a stance of tolerance toward them all. But in an age of globalization, neither of these positions is viable—even if both may have been serviceable in more provincial times.

The standoff between these two positions is illustrated in our everyday experience and etched into our awareness through the media. We see fervent convictions in the headlines. The perpetrators of the horrific tragedy of September 11, 2001, are an extreme example, even among extremists. But there is an ample supply of others: for instances across a range of traditions, think of recent conflicts in Ireland, Chechnya, and

Sri Lanka. Over against this awful carnage, we cannot but sympathize with the call of Western secular liberalism: religious and other ideological views should be tolerated but must remain private convictions that do not shape public outcomes.

To be blunt, in this secular liberal view religion and its ideological equivalents must be kept in the closet. Individuals may decide to participate in communities based on authorities that are not generally accessible. But such individuals should not expect their private preferences to determine public policies.

This secular liberal view has been the predominant one in U.S. history. Fervent conviction has typically found expression privately or in small supportive communities. More public testimony and larger-scale evangelism have at times been prominent in our history, in particular in awakenings or revivals like those of the middle of the eighteenth century. In our own time, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews united in pressing for the civil rights of African Americans and in advocating disengagement from Vietnam. More recently, Evangelical Christians have become a core constituency of Republican electoral strategy and have thereby gained substantial leverage for advancing their positions on such issues as abortion and public expression of religious beliefs. Yet even with this growth in influence of the so-called Christian Right, the more characteristic American pattern has been one of reticence in imposing particular views on the broader public.

The words of William Butler Yeats in "The Second Coming" resonate through the intervening decades and are hauntingly apt for our own troubled time:

> *The best lack all conviction, while the worst*
> *Are full of passionate intensity.*

For Yeats as for us, "conviction" is a telling word. Its Latin stem means to overcome, to conquer, to be victorious. "Conviction" is the state of being persuaded, convinced, convicted in the sense of having any doubts rebutted. Yet "conviction" also refers to the act of finding someone guilty of an offense, convicted of a crime. So the word connotes confidence,

certainty, corroboration of views that opponents dispute. But the word is deployed to identify perpetrators of what is taken to be evil as often as it is used to designate advocates of worthy causes.

At a time when terrorism has become so salient a threat, it is hard to argue against any attempt to keep passionate conviction under whatever control is available. Yet attractive as the plea for tolerance may be, it cannot appeal only to virtues of openness to all views and acceptance of multiple perspectives. Instead, any viable response to our current challenges must also be prepared to acknowledge, engage, and appraise the core values that animate and motivate all parties to the controversies.

This requirement is admittedly asymmetrical. It accepts the fact that more than one perspective may be worthy of attention, which means it rejects any claim to exclusive truth without further debate that allows appeal to generally accessible authorities. At the same time, this approach recognizes the extent to which personal convictions not only express private preferences but also legitimately influence public policies.

To return to Yeats's poetic formulation, neither a lack of all conviction nor an overflow of passionate intensity is adequate. Passionate intensity alone does not settle the matter—if only because there are multiple candidates who can base their claim on this consideration. And the lack of all conviction is not only unfair as a characterization of secular liberal pleas for tolerance but also in any case incapable of holding its own against passionate intensities.

THE NEED FOR COMPARATIVE APPRAISAL

The imperative that results from this standoff calls for a more robust public appraisal of views that we in the West have relegated to the status of private preferences for too long. We all know that personal convictions have social ramifications. We can no longer afford the luxury of pretending this is not the case, even if the alternative is less comfortable than an ethos that simply tolerates any and all positions.

In an age of globalization, this need for more robust public appraisal is all the more acute. Appeals to allegedly absolute authorities somehow

are less dispositive or immediately compelling in the face of competing claims that seem similarly grounded. The invocation of inerrant texts loses some of its punch when the Bible of the Fundamentalist Christian confronts the Qur'an of the Wahhabi Muslim or the Pali Canon of the Theravada Buddhist. The retreat to inaccessible private experience—"you just have to know Jesus"—is less overwhelming as a strategy when it encounters the very similar maneuvers of other pietistic and mystical traditions.

The context of globalization presses us toward a comparative perspective that entails public attention to what otherwise might remain private. This comparative perspective is almost unavoidably critical—and at its best is also self-critical. As we become aware of comparability among ostensibly quite disparate communities, we also cannot help noticing the enormous variety within nominally unified traditions. This variety is evident historically: even the most stable traditions change over time. But there are also great differences even at a single point of time—including, of course, the present.

We see this variety in our own communities both over time and in the present. Consider fourth-century Catholic Christianity in North Africa, fifteenth-century Christian Orthodoxy in Constantinople, eighteenth-century Deism in England. Or recall an Evangelical Baptist and a high church Episcopalian whom you may know. Or think of the enormously rich and diverse streams of Jewish tradition simplified as Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform.

Similar and if anything even more variety is evident in Hindu and Buddhist communities. In the case of what we homogenize as Hinduism, the diversity is all the more remarkable because it developed for most of its history within the single (admittedly large and variegated) country of India. In contrast, Buddhists moved out from India across Asia and more recently to Europe and America and developed a virtually limitless array of permutations and combinations with other traditions.

Along with Buddhism and Christianity, Islam is the third great missionary religion in human history, and it too has become rooted in a re-

markable range of cultures. Islam has resisted complete indigenization, in particular through its refusal to allow the Qur'an to be translated from Arabic to local languages. Yet there is still great diversity in Islam, far more than is suggested by our tendency to identify it almost exclusively with the Arabian Peninsula. After all, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, and India has the largest Muslim minority of any country. And even within the Arabian Peninsula, there is the considerable diversity and tension that the division between Sunni and Shia communities represents.

PUBLIC RELIGION AND SELF-CRITICAL SECULARISM

All of this diversity within religious traditions calls attention to a fact too easily overlooked in periods when the prevailing ethos calls for tolerance: religious people themselves have almost never deemed their convictions to be private preferences that can be divorced from deliberations about public policies. Instead, they have engaged in vigorous debate among themselves as to the most adequate understanding of their shared traditions because they believed it to be of utmost importance to be right in their convictions. And they have also been prepared to be public advocates for what their convictions imply for society as a whole.

At a time of social antagonisms that are in part religiously based, this public face of religion is perhaps unwelcome. Surely the world would be safer if such fervent convictions were kept out of the public square. But this option, so attractive to secular liberalism, is—to repeat—simply not acceptable to those whose deepest convictions would be relegated to the status of private preferences without any relevance to public policy.

As challenging as is the insistent presence of religion and its ideological equivalents in public life, it also represents a great opportunity because the recognition of disagreements within a nominally unified tradition opens the door to self-criticism. This process is in fact always under way. But greater awareness of it can encourage support that allows muted or minority or suppressed views to be voiced with greater vigor.

An example of this encouragement that is especially attractive to the West at the moment is the call for proponents of moderate Islam to become more vocal over against their extremist coreligionists. There certainly are such moderate voices: Muslims who affirm jihad as the struggle to live faithfully, who exemplify peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims, who reject suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism. As in other religious communities, there is a contest always under way for the right to claim the designation "Muslim." This internal contest should not, however, obscure the extent of common ground across a great range of Muslims in opposition to prevailing trends in the West. Indeed, in this respect Muslims also speak for large numbers of religiously serious adherents to other traditions.

Here we return again to the contrast between passionate intensity and lack of all conviction. Even those of the religiously committed who oppose exclusionist extremism and hostility to all outsiders are often strongly critical of what they see as the cultural domination of the West. That this cultural domination may come in religious as well as secular forms only amplifies and intensifies the opposition: for the religiously committed person, unqualified secularism may well be resisted in any case, but pervasively secular views advanced with rhetorical flourishes from another religion is doubly unattractive. Thus, even in the view of the religiously committed who oppose exclusionist extremism and hostility, to accommodate passively to the hedonism and materialism of secular Western culture is to lack all conviction. The sense of such accommodation in turn generates further support for the passionate intensity that the most extreme positions represent.

Just as we encourage debate within the Muslim world, we must, therefore, also welcome vigorous criticism of prevailing trends in the West. Only if we resist our own tendencies to provincialism and triumphalism will we be able to acknowledge, engage, and evaluate the multiple streams in our own traditions. And on that basis, we can perhaps also recognize points of contact with the very different perspectives of the outsiders who criticize and even attack us.

A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT TRENDS

To illustrate social patterns that invite criticism from friends and foes alike, I propose a consideration of two: the growing disparity between the rich and the poor both in the world as a whole and also within the Untied States itself; and the tendency to favor private interests over public goods.

It is not surprising that the enormous gap between the wealth of the United States and the relative poverty of most of the rest of the planet's population would generate admiration—and also envy, antagonism, and hostility. The envy, antagonism, and hostility are not lessened when people learn that we, who claim to be more generous than others, in fact come in dead last among the developed countries in the percentage of our total economic output devoted to publicly funded foreign assistance. But even apart from this dubious distinction, there is the escalation of the spread between the well-to-do and the disadvantaged in the United States itself over recent decades.

As Paul Krugman has documented in his columns and articles, almost 40 percent of the wealth of this country is now in the hands of 1 percent of our population—an increase in concentration of more than 70 percent in the past two decades. The same trend is evident if we look at current income. In the mid-1970s, the very top tier in terms of total income—one-hundredth of one percent of the population—received 70 times as much as the average family. Today this top tier receives 300 times as much as the average: the already very large gap of the 1970s is more than four times as big now. And this gap is between the top and the average: it would of course be much larger still if the comparison were between the top and the bottom.

While Americans not only claim exceptional levels of compassion but also take pride in the egalitarian traditions that have served the country well, the United States at the same time allows a distribution of economic benefits that is both far more uneven than in other developed countries and also much less generous in providing assistance to

developing countries. This state of affairs may be defended as the outcome of equality of opportunity in the context of unfettered competition. But this defense serves only to call attention to a second set of issues that the nation must address, namely, the relationship between private incentives and public standards, between market mechanisms and governmental policies.

Markets are crucial for efficient economic development. Data from the past two decades on an increasingly worldwide basis bear powerful witness to the dynamism of freer markets. Still, markets work best when there are rules to the game that all the players accept.

Airport security is a telling illustration of what happens when public services are contracted out to private firms without adequate attention to performance standards. Profits for the vendor can be high even if costs to the purchaser are low, as long as there is little concern for quality control. The solution to this problem is certainly not simply to make airport security personnel government employees. It is instead to design a system that preserves incentives for service providers while at the same time insisting that publicly imposed standards of quality be met.

The same position holds for such services as health care, education, and welfare. Private contractors, profit motives, and other incentives may well have a constructive role to play in fostering efficiency and countering complacency. But important though such means be, the end to be achieved is a public good; and in each case even private vendors must be held accountable to publicly monitored standards of quality.

Here, too, the issues have an international as well as a domestic dimension. Even friends abroad who admire the dynamism of our society may question how low our standards are for publicly guaranteed services, while they nonetheless view such decisions as our business. But in the international arena, our national predilection for unrestrained private initiative over public accountability can translate into a tendency toward unilateralism that disparages the interests or concerns of others. Recent examples include our abrogation of the Kyoto protocol, our move toward a missile-defense system apart from discussion even with allies, and our announcement of a policy of preemptive attacks wher-

ever and whenever we deem justified. This tendency toward preemptive unilateralism is no doubt dangerous for our enemies, but it is also damaging to our relationships with the allies whom this approach, in effect if not in intent, disparages. As those of us who have traveled abroad in recent months know all too vividly, the result is that the United States is now more isolated—and more reviled—perhaps than ever at any time in our history.

These two patterns—a large and still growing gap between the rich and the poor and a vigorous advocacy for private interests even at the cost of public goods—illustrate tendencies in Western societies that their self-declared enemies deplore. Globalization as it has been pursued under the leadership of the United States and transgovernmental institutions like the International Monetary Fund has in some ways contributed to both sets of developments, as Joe Stiglitz argues in his *Globalization and Its Discontents*. Yet neither pattern is a necessary correlate of greater international integration—a fact that invites examination of how processes of globalization may be recalibrated to give fuller consideration to the criticism of its most convinced antagonists.

GLOBALIZATION AND COMMUNITY

Globalization in its current forms presses toward international integration into the patterns of Western secular society. Production processes, management practices, financing systems, accounting standards, and so on are all adopted or adapted from the established approaches of multinational corporations. At its best, this arrangement leads to the gradual upgrading of the compensation of employees and even the rights of disadvantaged groups, including in some cases women. But too often the larger impact of this exposure to Western social patterns is ignored. The result is a dangerous divide between the processes of globalization and the local communities involved. To bridge that divide—to engender a sense of community that is inclusive without simply submerging particular convictions into a generically global and predominantly Western world culture—is a challenge that faces every society in the twenty-first century.

One way to frame this challenge is to refer to an admittedly oversimplified dichotomy that has figured in Western social-scientific discussion for almost two centuries: the contrasting conceptions of *Gemeinschaft* (more or less, community) and *Gesellschaft* (more or less, society). These terms have a long history in philosophical reflection, a pivotal role in late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century social theory, and continuing currency as ordinary German words. But the various uses have a shared reference to the stereotypical contrast of provincial town versus cosmopolitan city, intimate community versus bureaucratic society, personal bond versus impersonal market. In this overall sense, intellectual reflection and popular wisdom join in identifying a basic contrast between traditional communities and modern bureaucratic societies.

In this contrast, *Gemeinschaft* presumes shared beliefs and practices nurtured in close-knit communities, while *Gesellschaft* assumes that such communities cannot simply be taken for granted. If the stereotypical contrast is pushed to caricature, *Gemeinschaft* becomes the tribe, the band, the closed world that is accorded loyalty, respect, and support over against outsiders, who are the enemy. If similarly pushed to extremes, *Gesellschaft* becomes a society in which individuals relate to one another only through markets and bureaucracies and that therefore is impersonal and devoid of traditional values—in short, the consumer society and mass culture of the modern West.

The challenge that this contrast of caricatures poses for all societies in the twenty-first century is to institutionalize ways to incorporate the strengths of both *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. There are great virtues in *Gemeinschaft*: a sense of belonging; the recognition of loyalties beyond individual interests; an affirmation of responsibility for family, for neighbors, for those in the larger community who will inherit what has been passed on from previous generations. There are also great values in the ideals of *Gesellschaft*: respect and tolerance for all individuals, including those who hold starkly different views; appreciation of the richness of cultural diversity and the capacity to allow participation in a shared polity even from those who disagree on important matters; institutionalization

of voluntary associations that may welcome people of all backgrounds to collaborate on causes that they have come to share.

Confronting attacks on globalization requires embracing a sense of community that integrates the virtues of *Gemeinschaft* with the values of *Gesellschaft*. *Gemeinschaft* alone defines itself as particular and self-protective against the other, the outsider. In the terms of Yeats's "The Second Coming," it is "passionate intensity," sure of its rectitude. *Gesellschaft*, in contrast, is tolerant of diversity and thereby at least potentially inclusive, but it fears and therefore resists all uncompromising commitments. In the terms of Yeats's poem, it is to "lack all conviction."

The challenge for the twenty-first century is to develop a version of *Gesellschaft* that allows for the flourishing of *Gemeinschaft*: a pluralistic society that incorporates individual and cultural diversity in a shared polity and yet also at the same time encourages the vitality of communities committed to particular beliefs and practices. Such a social order is inclusive and tolerant. It resists every form of absolutism, but without subscribing to a relativism that views all positions as of equal validity.

To develop the social institutions and cultural mores that support this inclusive sense of community is a core challenge that confronts our world as it grapples with globalization. I will address this challenge as it arises in particular in the context of persistent and enormously destructive local conflicts that generate large populations of displaced people. Such conflicts uproot individuals from their communities. At the same time, the absence of a viable larger society accentuates the disorder, disease, and death to which displaced populations are subjected. In short, these conflicts etch in sharp relief the enormous costs of the collapse of both *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*—of both community and society. Against the backdrop of this stark reality of devastation wrought by conflict and the elusive hope for reconstruction, I will return to the theme of globalization and community, including further consideration of the character of conviction in a pluralistic world.

2

LOCAL CONFLICT, GLOBAL MIGRATION

UPROOTED PEOPLE ON THE MOVE

In chapter 1, I examined the nature or character of conviction in an age of globalization. Conviction about very particular tenets and the communities that embrace those tenets is fertile ground for antagonism to the globalization that in the first instance reflects and embodies Western secular culture. To engage that antagonism is one of the challenges that confronts the proponents of globalization.

Compounding this challenge is the threat of instability that results from myriad local conflicts. These conflicts are typically the effect of the collapse of viable government in so-called failed states—and are the cause of the massive uprooting of traditional communities, which in turn produces substantial displaced populations. Insofar as there is a generalizable trend, such conflicts have become perhaps even more vicious and intractable with the demise of Cold War competition for client states. More basically, such conflicts differ very significantly from the template of war in the era when the antagonists were nation-states.

In that era, wars were typically fought between nations or coalitions of nations. The opposed parties tended to be states that had relatively advanced economies. The duration of such wars was usually a matter of

years rather than more protracted periods. And the casualties of these more traditional wars tended to be military combatants more than civilians, by some estimates as high a ratio as nine to one.

In contrast to this pattern of the past, the local conflicts of recent years have tended to be civil wars within a single nominally unified state—even when outside countries formed alliances with one or another of the internal opponents. The conflicts also extend for much longer periods: decades or even generations rather than single-digit numbers of years. These conflicts therefore constitute an enormous long-term burden on economies that are already weak and poor. Finally, casualties in these local conflicts tend to be disproportionately civilians, up to 90 percent as compared to 10 percent for the military combatants.

This pattern is, of course, not altogether new. Indeed, it has analogues in the era when modern nation-states were being established—in particular, to the Thirty Years War in seventeenth-century Europe. In the second half of the twentieth century, it was anticipated to a significant degree in the serial conflicts in Vietnam, including the extension of those hostilities to Cambodia. The example of Indochina is apt because it calls attention to the ways in which these conflicts not only were fueled by Cold War rivalries but also traced their roots to the impact of Western colonialism. Yet even when world geopolitics exacerbated hostilities, as in Afghanistan during the 1980s, in the end these conflicts were struggles among competing local groups that spiraled out of control largely because there was no widely accepted and basically competent government to assure civil order. The collapse of Yugoslavia illustrates this pattern. So do many of the recent conflicts in Africa: Sudan, the Congo, and Liberia among others.

Such conflicts impose substantial human and material costs on the countries directly involved. But the impact is not simply local, if only because global media bring even the most remote areas of conflict into homes around the world. Beyond this general awareness, local conflicts contribute substantially to the displacement of people worldwide. In this sense, local conflict is among the causes of global migration.

Certainly not all of the people on the move across the globe are fugitives from conflict in their local communities. No doubt the largest numbers are workers who are seeking new economic opportunities. But apart from voluntary economic immigrants, there are also some 35 million involuntarily displaced people. If they have crossed an international border, they are officially designated as refugees, according to international law and United Nations definitions. If they remain within their country of origin, they are typically referred to as internally displaced persons. But all 35 million have been driven from their home communities and are seeking refuge wherever they can find it.

These millions of displaced persons figure prominently in our sense of dislocation on a global scale: throngs of people clutching their belongings as they flee conflict; long lines of supplicants who wait for food or shelter or application papers; circles of family members who rejoice as they are reunited after years of separation. Such refugees and asylum seekers are also salient in American traditions from the Pilgrims on. But these people on the move often pose an even more demanding challenge than immigrants who leave their homelands voluntarily to seek economic opportunities. The organization I lead focuses its efforts on these dislocated individuals and communities. So I would like to tell you a little more about them—and in the process also describe some of our work.

RESETTLEMENT HERE AND ABROAD

The International Rescue Committee was founded in 1933 at the suggestion of Albert Einstein. Its first governing board included John Dewey, Reinhold Niebuhr, and other luminaries. It had a straightforward mission: to rescue refugees from Europe and to help them get resettled here in the United States. To that end it had operations in Europe to expedite escape from Germany and countries under Nazi occupation and an office in New York to assist refugees in becoming reestablished in this country.

The IRC continues this double tradition: we are often the first on the scene of a human disaster through our emergency response unit, and

we work with refugees as they resettle in this country. In the work of resettlement, we have twenty offices across the United States, including one in New York, located in our headquarters on Forty-second Street. Through those offices, in normal times we help to resettle about 10,000 refugees annually as they seize the new opportunities that admission to the United States affords them. It is exhilarating work, which we do with ten times as many volunteers as employees. Most of our employees are themselves former refugees, who are perfectly placed to press our agenda of tough love: a new start within six months, including a place to live, language training, a job, and school for any children.

It is enormously rewarding to witness how the refugees with whom we work make the most of every opportunity offered to them. It is therefore all the more disheartening to see the sharp contraction in refugee admissions since September 11, 2001. Over the two decades before 9/11, even the target number for refugee admission had declined from a high of 231,000 to 70,000. In his first year in office, President Bush committed himself to increasing the number steadily to get back to 90,000 over a four-year period. But here again, 9/11 changed, if not everything, then at least a lot. Since 9/11, security concerns have drastically curtailed refugee admissions. Even family reunifications of husband and wife or parents and children have taken over a year to adjudicate. Overall, the numbers have dropped to a third of the rate called for in even the lower presidential determination.

I cannot resist two observations. First, any potential terrorist who intended to perpetrate a heinous attack on the United States would have to be exceedingly stupid or extraordinarily ill informed to try to enter our country as a refugee. He would almost certainly have to wait several years even if he had relatives here, and he would have to provide exhaustive background information in the process. Why not simply come in on a tourist visa? Second, it is for this reason misguided to move refugee adjudication processes into the Department of Homeland Security, where every applicant for entrance is viewed in the first instance as a potential terrorist.

We should move expeditiously to return to historic levels of refugee admissions. But even if—or better, when—we do, the challenge of displaced persons cannot come close to being met through resettlement of refugees in this country. If, for example, we were to reach our present presidentially established target, the 70,000 refugees admitted would account for only two out of every thousand displaced people worldwide. It is wonderful to provide opportunities for those two, and the IRC is proud to contribute to making the most of those opportunities. But that leaves 998 out of every 1,000 who have no hope of resettling here.

This arithmetic—998 out of every 1,000 displaced persons have no hope of resettling in the United States—is why the IRC is also engaged in dozens of countries around the world. We do there what we do here: we seek to help displaced people to gain a new start. For a tiny fraction of the total, this new start will be in other developed countries. But for the vast majority, it means becoming integrated into the place where they have taken refuge or, at some point, voluntary repatriation to their homeland.

To provide some texture to this highly generalized characterization of the plight and the prospects of refugees and internally displaced persons, I will describe the situation in two of the 25 countries in which the IRC has programs. The two countries are Sudan and Afghanistan. I hope that even a quick look at these two places will provide a bifocal view of the struggles and the triumphs of displaced people worldwide.

SUDAN AS AN INSTANCE

Sudan has been wracked by its most recent civil war for twenty years. The main lines of conflict are between the overwhelmingly Muslim north and the more traditionally African and partly Christian south. Decades of war have produced millions of refugees and displaced people who are scattered inside Sudan and in surrounding countries: as many as 4 million inside Sudan and more than 400,000 in surrounding countries, with the largest numbers in Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The challenge is to provide immediately needed support to those displaced people while

also laying the groundwork for the rehabilitation of individual lives and the redevelopment of decimated communities.

The IRC assists Sudanese refugees who have fled to Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. We manage refugee settlements and provide water, sanitation, health care, and education. A central concern is preparing people to return to productive living rather than letting them acquiesce in what all too easily can become long-term maintenance in a refugee camp.

A small number of these Sudanese refugees will be resettled in the United States. An example that has received considerable attention is the lost boys of Sudan, children—now young men—who walked 300 miles across Sudan to the Kakuma refugee settlement located in northern Kenya, a settlement for which the IRC provides health services. This settlement is now home to more than 80,000 refugees. You have heard of the lost boys of Sudan, and maybe even the Kakuma refugee settlement, because the State Department made the remarkable decision to accept 3,800 of these young men for resettlement across the United States. The IRC has been proud to participate in this resettlement effort through our network of offices across the country, and we cherish the impressive successes that these refugees are achieving in work and in school, including substantial participation in higher education.

We are, however, also concerned with assisting the vastly larger number of displaced Sudanese still in Africa to relaunch their lives. To that end, in addition to our programs with Sudanese refugees in Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, we are also active in Sudan, in both the north and the south. We work with local communities to develop water and sanitation projects, local health clinics, and improved schools. Our hope and expectation is that, as peace is restored in Sudan (which now seems more likely, in part because of the effective mediation of former Senator Jack Danforth on behalf of the Bush administration), displaced people will be able to return to revitalized communities.

There is one very modest program that neatly sums up the orientation of our efforts in Sudan—and in many of the other countries where we work. It is an education course for traditional birth attendants, or TBAs. Childbirth in southern Sudan typically occurs in the company

of local women experienced in providing advice and assistance. These women, the TBAs, are highly respected in their communities. There are, however, some traditional practices that can lead to serious infections and other complications. For example, after cutting the umbilical cord, the widespread practice is to seal it with cow dung.

In the process of developing improvements in health care, the IRC launched an educational program aimed at achieving better health outcomes for mothers and newborns. The temptation might have been to announce new Western gynecological, obstetric, and pediatric programs as an alternative to the traditional birth attendants—a temptation that was resisted. Instead, an educational course was designed to allow TBAs to enhance their traditional skills through acquaintance with some Western approaches. Local communities were invited to nominate one candidate each for this nine-month program. Not surprisingly, most villages nominated their highly respected TBA.

There are now hundreds of these TBAs who have completed the nine-month course and are delivering improved health care to mothers and babies across southern Sudan. These women have become even more highly regarded and influential in their villages and are, I am told, often asked for their views before decisions are made on community issues. One of the highpoints of my visit to Sudan last year was the chance to meet with dozens of the TBAs whom the IRC has trained; and among the photographs on my office wall is one of me with perhaps twenty-five TBAs. Women from their own areas who are providing enhanced health care to tens of thousands of people in hundreds of villages—these successful graduates are a hallmark of our efforts to build local capacity that in turn allows the rehabilitation of individuals and the revitalization of communities for refugees and displaced people.

THE EXAMPLE OF AFGHANISTAN

Like Sudan, Afghanistan has been in turmoil for decades. Also like Sudan, Afghanistan has been a prodigious producer of displaced persons for almost all of that time, with a peak in the early 1990s, when more

than six million Afghan refugees were outside the country, mostly in Iran and Pakistan. And, as in Sudan, the IRC has been involved over the long haul: in Afghanistan itself, with Afghan communities in Pakistan, and in resettling Afghan refugees in the United States.

The IRC first became engaged in Afghanistan more than twenty years ago, when the Soviet invasion began to generate large numbers of displaced people. All through the tumult of two decades we have worked with Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and for the past dozen years we have also had programs inside Afghanistan. In fact, our system of small, house-based schools continued even during the rule of the Taliban. And we educated girls as well as boys, which the Taliban tolerated because the parents insisted on it.

As in Sudan and most of the other countries where we are active, our programs include water and sanitation, housing, health care, and education. The educational programs have been especially important because they have prepared a generation of leaders, some who have been in Afghanistan for years and others who are now returning from Pakistan. Interestingly, the former deputy director for IRC programs in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Haneef Atmar, is now the minister for rural development in the transitional administration. And President Hamid Karzai himself once taught English in our school for Afghan refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan, as he proudly reminded me when we met in Kabul.

Our programs for Afghan refugees in Pakistan illustrate the range of alternatives for refugees as they start over. A small number succeed in relocating to another country, either to the United States, where most of this relatively small number go, or to Canada, Australia, and various European countries. A substantial fraction, perhaps one-half, eagerly embrace the opportunity to return to their homeland. In the fall of 2003, almost two million refugees seized this opportunity—significantly more than had been expected, which resulted in a very hard winter for many of them.

But not all of the refugees who do not resettle to a third country will return. Instead of voluntary repatriation, they will opt for local integration, especially in the ethnically similar Northwest Frontier Province of

Pakistan. The IRC has been actively engaged with refugee settlements in this region for about twenty years. The children who have grown up in these settlements are now adults who have never lived in Afghanistan. Their villages are relatively well integrated into the social and economic patterns of that part of Pakistan. In some respects, notably education and health care, their situation is more favorable than that of the local Pakistanis. We are, therefore, increasingly opening up access to our programs to the Pakistani population as well, so as to facilitate the full acceptance of Afghan refugees into what has become their new home.

Back in Afghanistan, IRC staff are focusing intensively on continuing to develop the infrastructure that returning refugees will require. During my visits, I have found it enormously gratifying to see the water and sanitation systems that we developed in cooperation with Afghans and to hear again and again how important has been the education received in IRC schools. A special pleasure was to have local residents point to orchards and to stands of fast-growing poplars used for ceiling beams in the mud-brick houses we helped to build and be told that the IRC provided the seedlings planted ten or more years ago.

One initiative that focuses directly on the need to establish both a viable national government and sustainable local communities is called the National Solidarity Program, funded primarily by the World Bank. The IRC is an implementing partner for this program and has two further connections to its development: first, the driving force for the initiative in the Afghan government is the former IRC staff member Haneef Atmar in his role as minister for rural development; and second, the IRC sent a team from Rwanda to advise on the design of the program based on a similar effort in that country. In any case, the program as it is being implemented in Afghanistan begins with the empowering of local village councils and then works to provide national and international support for development priorities established through deliberations at that level.

Afghanistan is not yet safely beyond the turmoil of the past. It is still on a knife edge and could again fall back into chaos. That is why it is crucial that the United States and other developed countries follow through on

the assistance we have promised. If we do, and if the Afghans rise to the enormous challenges they still face, we will all have reason to be proud.

As for the IRC, Afghanistan illustrates our strategy for building local capacity. We now have about thirty-five expatriates—most of them from countries other than the United States, all of them specialists whose skills are needed. Those 35 international staff have 675 Afghan colleagues. And this team in turn works with some 1,500 other Afghans who are employed by local nongovernmental organizations that we have helped to create over the years and to which we subcontract many of the water, sanitation, agricultural-development, health, and education projects that we undertake. That is a ratio of more than sixty Afghans per expatriate—an infrastructure of talented workers that will remain when the IRC departs, which we will.

LESSONS LEARNED

During my first years at the International Rescue Committee, one lesson has been reinforced again and again: violent conflict that leads to displaced populations is disastrous. This lesson is inescapable not only in Sudan and Afghanistan but also in the Balkans, East Timor, Myanmar, the Middle East, the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Ivory Coast. With the prospect of peace in Afghanistan and Sudan, the IRC is eagerly anticipating the restoration of security that will allow local communities to flourish. Here again it is evident that viable government for the larger society is indispensable for the flourishing of local communities. This point is expressed compellingly in the recent report of the commission that Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen cochaired: it examines a host of issues in development under the apt title *Human Security Now*. An emphasis on how crucial competent government is for the vitality of local communities will also be central in my consideration of the Democratic Republic of Congo in chapter 3.

Looking forward, a further lesson is inescapable: catastrophe prevention is preferable to emergency intervention. The International Rescue Committee and our fellow humanitarian relief organizations will

continue to intervene when prevention fails. But the production of escalating numbers of refugees and displaced persons is one growth industry that the world does not need.

It certainly will not always be evident how to achieve the goal of anticipating and countering local conflicts before they spiral out of control. But to pursue this goal is crucial if globalization is to be genuinely inclusive. I therefore turn to this challenge in chapter 3.

3

GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF INCLUSIVE COMMUNITY

GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CRITICS REVISITED

The term "global village" seems woefully inapt today—in contrast to the promise it seemed to hold when Marshall McLuhan coined it in his 1964 book *Understanding Media*. Yet in principle, the processes summed up with the buzz word "globalization" do have the potential to bind all of us together more closely than ever before in human history. We are, in fact, more frequently, more speedily, more intensively in contact with others all over the world.

For the most part, we take those processes for granted. After all, rapid transportation over great distances and virtually instantaneous and relatively inexpensive telecommunications have been with us for a couple of generations. But as Marshal McLuhan anticipated, the frequency, the pace, the intensity have accelerated in recent years, marked by the cumulative impact of more extensive international radio and television coverage, less expensive transportation and telecommunications (including fax machines and cell phones), and the explosion of e-mail and the Internet.

Beyond the impact of the media, telecommunications, and the Internet, globalization also entails increasingly efficient transfers of money,

goods and services, and ideas across social and cultural borders. We take international financial transactions for granted—though the magnitude of capital flows is staggering in comparison with even the recent past. Similarly, international trade is scarcely a new development, even if the scale of the movement of global goods and services is unprecedented. Likewise in the case of ideas, the global impact not only of communications and the media but also of cultural expression and intellectual property of all kinds has reached new heights.

To refer again to the issues examined in chapter 2, people are moving across borders from more directions and with more diverse motivations than ever before in human history. This movement no doubt poses even greater challenges than the other forms of transfer. But even in this case, as the history of the United States indicates, there are great potential benefits.

These complex processes that the term "globalization" captures in summary form have, as we are all too aware, received vociferous and often also cogent criticism. There is, however, no necessary connection between the noted inadequacies and globalizing processes themselves. Indeed, more inclusive global integration offers the prospect of ameliorating many of the deficiencies that critics of globalization identify.

The single most glaring deficiency of globalization as it has been practiced under United States and International Monetary Fund leadership in recent decades is the failure to recognize and institutionalize a constructive role of government beyond its support of unfettered markets and unimpeded capital flows. There is no compelling reason why globalization should necessarily accentuate the gap between the rich and the poor and exacerbate the erosion of public goods in favor of private interests. But globalization that focuses almost exclusively on support for unfettered markets and unimpeded capital flows will in fact contribute to this outcome. Similarly, globalization can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem when it comes to the myriad local conflicts around the world. But to do so, it must look beyond the need to establish market economies and also recognize the need for the sound government that such markets presuppose.

In executing my responsibilities at the International Rescue Committee, I have visited more than twenty countries that illustrate the disastrous consequences of persistently bad government. The Democratic Republic of Congo is a vivid example. I will refer in some detail to this particular case to exemplify the general pattern, in part because I have access to sobering data that the IRC has painstakingly gathered over more than half a decade.

THE CASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The terrible state of what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo has a long history that includes voracious colonial exploitation from King Leopold II on and the corrupt postcolonial rule of Mobuto Sese Seko. But its most recent turmoil stems from 1994, when many of the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda fled into eastern Zaire. By 1996, violence and unrest led Rwanda and Uganda to join with Zairian rebel groups to establish control over eastern Zaire. In a matter of months, these invading forces together with their Zairian allies overthrew the government and installed a replacement, which renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwandan and Ugandan forces then withdrew briefly, only to return in August of 1998, invoking the need to control the insecurity on their borders. In the next six months, other forces became involved, with the result that by early 1999, troops from seven countries in the region, allied with various Congolese factions, were fighting in the five eastern provinces of the DRC.

The fighting was intense and continuous from August 1998 until February 2001, when an accord between Rwanda and the DRC resulted in significantly decreased tensions and the pulling back of troops from the frontlines. This accord in turn prepared the way for peace talks in South Africa. An agreement in principle was signed in Pretoria in July 2002, followed by a framework for power sharing and the withdrawal of Rwandan troops in December 2002.

During precisely this period, the IRC was conducting a series of surveys in the DRC. The surveys recorded a very basic measure of health,

namely, mortality rates. Because of the parallels in timing, these surveys provide powerful documentation of the disastrous human consequences of such long-term conflicts.

Using standard sampling techniques, an IRC team conducted surveys in 2000 and 2001. Based on those data, the team—led by epidemiologist Les Roberts—estimated that approximately 2.5 million deaths occurred in eastern DRC above the million or so that would have been expected under stable, nonconflict circumstances. (The 2.5 million is an approximation because a sensitivity analysis of plausible assumptions about the baseline mortality rate and the extrapolations inherent in the estimation process in fact yield a range of 2.1 to 3.2 million excess deaths.)

In 2002, the IRC team conducted a third survey. This survey estimated mortality for the first ten months of 2002—the period during which a ceasefire was established and both United Nations observers and humanitarian relief agencies were able to gain greater access to populations victimized by the conflict. This third survey also included comparative data from a parallel survey of western DRC.

The third survey for 2002 reports more bad news: the excess mortality rate continued to be awful. For the entire period of the war—from August 1998 to the end of 2002—the IRC estimate of deaths above the expected baseline level is 3.3 million. This death toll has exceeded that of the Biafran conflict and is therefore the highest total for any war in Africa. Indeed, it is higher than the total for any war anywhere since World War II. To put the point sharply, this death toll is the equivalent in loss of life of a World Trade Center disaster every day for over three years. For those of us who experienced the impact of 9/11, this comparison cannot but shock us into a sense of the enormity of this tragedy: total deaths that equal the number of lives lost in the twin towers—but every day for more than three years running.

Yet as awful as this news is, there is also good news in the 2002 survey. Comparing the figures in the third survey to those in the first two, the mortality rate declined by more than a third. The rate is still extremely high—and continues to be higher than the rate for the western part of the country, which has had far less violent conflict. But the

peace accord, the introduction of 4,400 United Nations observers, the withdrawal of Rwandan troops, and greater access for humanitarian assistance have all contributed to a reduced level of violent conflict. While the eastern DRC does not, by international standards, have an effectively functioning government, and while the relatively subdued level of conflict could certainly explode again, as it did in the Ituri region in the spring of 2003, even this limited peace is correlated with a significant decrease in mortality rates.

The challenge is to continue this modestly positive trajectory. To do so requires the further consolidation of protection and security. It also calls for the positive provision for adjudicating conflicting claims and establishing social order acceptable to opposed parties. In short, it entails the authority that sound governance provides to well-ordered communities.

INDIVIDUALISM, WESTERN LIBERALISM, AND WORLD RELIGIONS

I offer this extended example of the situation in the Congo to illustrate the enormously damaging ramifications of unstable or inoperative government and thereby to underscore how imperative it is that proponents of globalization consider not only markets and capital flows but also government capacities and such public goods as health care and education. I am delighted that this imperative is increasingly recognized in the U.S. government agencies responsible for development assistance. The World Bank also in recent years has focused more on this need for competent government. But among many of the most vigorous proponents of globalization, notably at the International Monetary Fund, what George Soros and Joe Stiglitz among others call "market fundamentalism" continues to dominate deliberations.

This preoccupation with unfettered markets and unimpeded capital flows is often presented as integral to the traditions of individual freedom that in turn elicit much of the convinced antagonism to secular Western culture. Market fundamentalism and unconstrained individualism reinforce each other; and the two together galvanize critics opposed to the

processes of globalization around the world. I will not rehearse the inadequacies of market fundamentalism that Joe Stiglitz so powerfully summarizes in his *Globalization and Its Discontents*. But I will take some time to elaborate the equally basic flaws of unconstrained individualism.

The flaws of individualism as it is represented in modern Western free-market ideology are evident even if this position is evaluated in terms of its own historical antecedents. Central to the patrimony of this tradition are the powerfully influential figures of John Locke and Adam Smith in Britain and Immanuel Kant on the Continent. Yet none of these thinkers provides support for the kind of uncritical individualism that characterizes the rhetoric of so many of those who invoke their names.

As a matter of historical fact, Locke—notably in his *Letters on Toleration* (1690, 1693) and the second of his *Two Treatises of Civil Government* (1690)—certainly gave considerable impetus to the traditions that have come to characterize the political and economic orientation of Western liberal democracy. In particular, in the second *Treatise* he delineates his view of humanity in the state of nature. In contrast to the position of Thomas Hobbes, who held that humans originate in a state of hostility and antagonism, Locke envisions equal and independent individuals who enjoy a natural happiness. Yet even though he is far more positive about human nature than is Hobbes, Locke too moves quickly to the formation of the state as a protection against the excesses of individualism. Thus the social contract is required to guard against any who might attempt to live outside the law of nature.

Like Locke, Kant is appropriately arrayed with those who have shaped modern Western individualism. His central concern—preserving human freedom and moral autonomy while also acknowledging the power of scientific understanding—places him squarely in this tradition. Indeed, his preoccupation with establishing a solid foundation for personal moral agency and responsibility in the impersonal world of modern science is emblematic for Western individualism even among those who have scarcely heard of him and certainly are not aware of the intellectual revolution that his thought constitutes.

Yet, like Locke, Kant is far from advocating an uncritical individualism. Knowledge, for Kant preeminently exemplified in Newtonian physics, can never be a matter of individual idiosyncrasy but rather must be universal and necessary. Similarly, moral action—reason in its practical employment, to put it in terms of his conceptual apparatus—presupposes a shared context of meaning and common criteria for adjudicating alternatives. (In Kant's technical terminology, the postulates of practical reason constitute the shared context of meaning, and the categorical imperative in its various formulations specifies the criterion for determining which actions are moral.) This embedding of attention to human freedom and moral autonomy in more inclusive contexts is integral to the analyses of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1787). But it becomes ever more central in Kant's later writings: the *Critique of Judgment* (1790), *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), and such occasional pieces as the extended essay *Perpetual Peace* (1795).

Like Locke and Kant, Adam Smith is appropriately enlisted in the cause of Western individualism. His thought also represents the close historical connection between this tradition of individualism and modern Western laissez-faire economic theory. Yet what Smith actually wrote lends little support to the arguments for unconstrained markets and unrestrained individualism on behalf of which his name is so often invoked.

In his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), Smith certainly did argue that individual pursuit of self-interest can contribute to the public good and general welfare. But he also recognized that the ambitions of individuals and private groups might be opposed to the public interest and in such cases would require restrictions imposed by the state. More fundamentally, Smith, whose academic appointment was as a professor of moral philosophy, affirmed the pursuit of individual interests only in the context of a network of social relations, as is clearly articulated in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759).

In affirming the role of the community in constraining the excesses of individual self-assertion, Locke, Kant, and Smith in effect stand with

the vast preponderance of human wisdom and experience over against only the modern West that so often invokes their names.

Perhaps the most radical insight into the inadequacy of idealizing the individual is the Buddhist tradition that there is no self. This teaching of *anatta* or *anatman* is shared across a remarkable range of Buddhist communities, from Theravada traditions in South and Southeast Asia, to their Mahayana counterparts in East Asia, and to all of their offspring in the West. To construe the self as an individual entity is to fail to apprehend the codependence of all of reality. It is to be captive to an illusion and therefore to live delusionally.

Other religious traditions express this position in various ways. Traditions as disparate as Confucianism on the one hand and Judaism and Islam on the other agree in deeming individuals to be constituted through their social relationships. In short, for Confucians, Jews, and Muslims, the community has logical, temporal, and normative priority over the individual.

Even those religious conceptions that seem to glorify the individual in the end subordinate the self to a more encompassing normative structure or reality. I offer two examples. The Hindu affirmation that *atman* is *brahman*—that the self is identical with the ultimate—does celebrate the dignity of the human person. But for Hindus this equation precisely does not exalt the discrete individual as separate from the finally undifferentiated whole of which it is an integral part. A second example is the Greek and then Christian idea of the soul. This conception confers enduring worth on the individual, and unlike the Hindu affirmation of *atman*, it does not then dissolve this individual into the ultimate. Yet even when the soul is construed as an enduring individual entity, its end is to love, to enjoy, to worship the divine reality for which it is destined.

THE CHALLENGE OF INCLUSIVE COMMUNITY

I have taken us on a quick tour that has included brief stops to survey the recent history of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to review

some highpoints of the late-seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century European intellectual history, and to look ever so quickly at a panorama of major world religious traditions. While I apologize for the demand for sustained attention to often unfamiliar terrain that such a wide-ranging tour imposes, I assure you that the stops along the way are intended to build toward a single sustained line of argument. I have noted the particular turns in that argument along the way. But I would also like to summarize how the pieces fit together—I hope into a whole that is more than the sum of its parts.

Unconstrained individualism and market fundamentalism not only reinforce each other but in combination also support trends toward both increased gaps between the top and the bottom of the distribution of income and wealth and toward the elevation of private interests over public goods. These trends lead to increased burdens on those least able to bear them. But beyond the deprivation of individuals, the single most negative institutional result of this confluence of effects is the systematic undermining of any positive conception for the role of government. An extreme instance of the situation that results from this absence of public authority is the devastation of the Democratic Republic of Congo over the decades of its despoliation—an instance that represents all too many other similar, if less extreme cases.

While the processes of globalization certainly can serve to accentuate these perverse trends, greater global integration may also point in another direction. Among the signposts for this alternative orientation are not only the overwhelming preponderance of the testimony of the major world religions but also the admonitions of such central thinkers in the tradition of Western liberalism as Locke, Kant, and Smith. The goal toward which this alternative orientation points is an international community that focuses attention and concentrates investments on the imperative of including the vast numbers of people who so far have been excluded from the benefits of globalization.

This goal of an inclusive global community is no doubt very far in the future. Indeed, trends of recent decades have resulted in its receding

even further into the distance. Consequently, moving toward the goal requires not simply further steps in the direction we are already going but rather a basic change in orientation. In particular, we must shift away from our preoccupation with market fundamentalism and the unconstrained individualism that is its frequent correlate.

Despite their differences on a host of issues, Locke, Kant, and Smith agree on the role of community and the broader society in constraining individual self-assertion. In this respect, they join in the virtually unanimous testimony of the world's religious traditions. The challenge is to integrate this imperative with the dynamism of modern, secular economic life—a challenge that can be met only if public goods are valued along with the productive capacity of private interests, if the indispensable role of government is acknowledged along with the dynamism of markets, if the virtues of community are affirmed along with the initiatives of individuals.

Rising to this abstractly stated challenge in ways that are concrete will require a host of public policy initiatives. In terms of domestic priorities, we as a country must shift fundamentally from proposals that disproportionately favor the very top stratum of society to programs that redress the escalating gap between the rich and the poor. That means support for legislation like the earned income tax credit and a rejection of tax cuts that are indefensibly targeted on the wealthiest citizens. In the international arena, what is called for is a round of trade agreements that in fact delivers on preferences for the poorest countries and increased aid that is targeted on people and communities ready, willing, and able to move forward on the basis of their own efforts as those efforts are stimulated and reinforced through foreign assistance.

I will not pretend to lay out a full agenda of legislative proposals for either domestic or international programs. But the shift from the perverse approach that currently dominates our public life could not be sharper. Instead of initiatives that favor the already privileged, we must move toward policies designed to enlist the promise of globalization for the promotion of a worldwide community that benefits not only the rich but also the poor.

CONVICTION IN THE CONTEXT OF INCLUSIVE COMMUNITY

An approach to globalization that breaks with uncritical adulation of private interests over public goods, markets over governments, and the individual over the community also affords the prospect of reconsidering the character of conviction in the context of inclusiveness. Globalization need not entail acceptance of Western secularism to the exclusion of the traditions of other communities. Precisely because some societies have developed ways of appreciating diversity and allowing participation in a shared polity even among those who in other respects disagree on basic issues, the goal of inclusive community does not require cultural or religious homogeneity.

The achievement of such multicultural or pluralistic societies is certainly fragile. In some cases, particular convictions of those "full of passionate intensity" flare up with horrible consequences, as in recent violence over holy sites in India. In other cases, relative tranquility is maintained in significant part because large segments of the population are more or less indifferent—might be claimed to "lack all conviction"—as in much of Western Europe. But the fact remains that large-scale societies have been able to develop social institutions and cultural mores that support an inclusive community. In this sense, an ordered social system (*Gesellschaft*) has allowed space for the convictions of more than one particular community (*Gemeinschaft*) to be expressed.

As the examples of India and Western Europe suggest, the context for this pluralism or multiculturalism is often a secular society that offers a stable setting for the expression of diverse traditions. But that need not be the case. Even in the instances of India and Western Europe, the setting is certainly not simply neutral, as is evident from the historical dominance of Hindu and Christian traditions, respectively. China offers another pattern: Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist traditions have coexisted through a considerable range in the orientation of governmental authorities.

This historical variety is significant because it calls attention to the need to resist a provincialism that might take our current situation to be

normative. This attitude would assume that modern global and predominantly Western social and cultural patterns constitute the default setting within which more particular communities may be able to flourish. But this assumption is problematic not only because of its unacknowledged provincialism but also because it overlooks the extent to which the interactions between particular communities and the larger society can be effective in both directions.

Especially for those individuals and communities that are vehemently opposed to the dominant patterns of the secular West, it is crucial that the prospect of change in prevailing tendencies not be foreclosed. Here antagonists of the West and opposition from within may share common ground, even if there is no overt collaboration. For the consumer society and mass culture that the West in general and the United States in particular have produced invites vigorous criticism.

This consumer society and mass culture is too often little more than *Gesellschaft* minus its ethical or normative grounding. Such passive accommodation to the hedonism and materialism of secular Western culture cries out for a reconnection to the roots of the more particular communities that *Gemeinschaft* represents. Such more particular communities may be grounded in a substantial range of traditions—religious, ethnic, cultural, educational, political, vocational. In each case, the communities affirm internal norms that guide their shared practice. This pattern is most readily recognizable in religious communities, especially if they represent a minority within the larger society. But it is also evident in other voluntary associations, whether ethnic, cultural, educational, or political. It may also be realized in professional or vocational associations, in which definite values or commitments—sometimes formally articulated, at other times only tacit—govern standard or acceptable behavior and frequently also energize participants to exertions that far exceed any ordinary occupational requirements.

What such particular communities have in common is more or less self-conscious resistance to accepting the conventional patterns of the

prevailing culture as adequate to their own deepest convictions. Put positively, such communities hold out the promise of a richer, fuller *Gesellschaft* that affirmatively incorporates *Gemeinschaft* within it. A society so ordered would be a worthy achievement of globalization and could rightly claim to be an inclusive community.

PART II

CRITICAL RESPONSES TO *GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGED*

4

ARGUING FOR PLURALISM

JAGDISH BHAGWATI

George Rupp's beautiful lectures rest on two legs. One is reflective and confronts Western pluralism, which encourages and indeed requires relativism and acceptance of multiple beliefs with equal regard and equanimity, with the tradition that regards one set of beliefs as superior to others. The other is activist, reflecting his experience with the phenomenon of internal (within-nation) and cross-border flows of refugees and the attempts at making their lives better, a task that he has been actively engaged in since his leaving the presidency of Columbia University and taking charge of the International Rescue Committee. The two issues are tied together somewhat tenuously by acute reflections on globalization, a phenomenon that seems to be defined by him as the interaction of nations, perhaps on economic and on cultural and political dimensions.

The lectures can be enjoyed on their own, of course, and I offer some reactions, not in the spirit of critical commentary but largely to complement Rupp's thoughts. I shall concentrate on three themes: the question of pluralism or relativism, the view to be taken on the ethical aspects of globalization, and the phenomenon of international flows of humanity.

CONVICTION VERSUS RELATIVISM

First, Rupp correctly identifies the clash of convictions that contact between communities and nation-states occasionally brings about. In fact, he notes quite correctly that such clashes (which sometimes erupt into violence) often exist *within* nations that are multireligious: as with Hindus and Muslims in India and Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. How does one then reconcile belief in one's own religion (including secular humanism) and associated values with tolerance of beliefs opposed to one's own? I am unsure where exactly Rupp comes out on this, except to pose the dilemma eloquently.

I frankly do not think that we have any realistic choice except to opt for pluralism and that any religion that seeks to set itself up, and encourages its followers to think of it, as the only way to reach salvation lacks some of the humanity that it must have, simply because it is likely to encourage dissension and strife. I therefore prefer Hinduism, which, at its best, encourages us to believe that, as the famous verse goes, all religions lead to the same God just as all rivers flow into the same ocean. We have an apocryphal story in India that, when a Hindu had been converted to Christianity, the missionary found that he had put Jesus on the cross alongside all the Hindu gods. So the missionary said that only Jesus should be kept, which left the Hindu convert badly puzzled. And we cannot forget that proselytizing religions have often allied themselves with the sword and to imperial conquest, marching alongside the marauders who went out of Europe worldwide and created empires and Christians in earlier centuries.

This is not to deny that the values that happen to be associated with any particular religion, in a specific historical and geographical context, may have particular salience to modern sensibility that cuts across differences among religions. In this context, I have always admired *Things Fall Apart*, the great African novel by Chinua Achebe, which is the tragedy of the central character, Okonkwo, a great African, whose inhumane practices (such as human sacrifice) are rooted in tradition but clash with the mores and morality that Christianity spreads, admittedly thanks to

the conquest of Nigeria and the accompanying penetration of Nigeria by Christian missionaries.

Indeed, the practices prevalent in many parts of the world have become modified as a result of values that were so spread, but these values, especially the equality of one and all, often transcend the actual practices of all religions. No particular religion seems to have the monopoly on all virtue in the public realm. For example, suicide bombers have come from Shinto and Buddhism in Japan, which had kamikaze bombers at the end of the Second World War; Tamil Hindus in Sri Lanka; and Islamic fundamentalists in Palestine and Iraq. Buddhist monks have been known to go berserk; the Christian Germany of Beethoven and Goethe produced the Holocaust, and the Vatican was guilty of complacency, if not collaboration in this great crime against humanity. Humility and pluralism are therefore called for.

But then Rupp's excellent discourse also leads me to discuss more frontally the question of *public affirmation* of one's religion. I shall therefore proceed now to discuss some of the issues that a surrender to conviction in favor of one dominant religion can raise and to say why I think that a pluralistic approach is necessary.

This issue rose in France when the French flag was lowered to half-mast over the Catholic Pope's death despite French secularism, which led to many protests. In the United States as well, two cases have recently come before the Supreme Court—*Van Orden v. Perry* from Texas, relating to the public display of the Ten Commandments on public land and *McCreary County v. ACLU* of Kentucky, concerning the display of the Commandments in county courthouses.

This conflict in the United States has traditionally been between secularists—who insist that religious displays on public lands or spaces rather than on private property violate the First Amendment—and religionists. The former hold that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which says that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," implies a strict separation of church and state, while the religionists retort that this strict interpretation is not appropriate.

It is fair to say that in the United States, the secularists have a great deal of jurisprudential tradition on their side. That, in fact, led to the disposition of these cases mostly in their favor (with a weasel judgment in favor of the public displays when the context was supposedly not religious: an excuse that can almost always be made by those in the religious majority on grounds of tradition, history, etc.).[1] In my view, however, the truly important principle is not the firewall separation of religion from the state. Rather, most important is the principle that public religious displays in states with large majorities composed, traditionally and currently, of one religion can be argued to be truly offensive to the original conception in the United States (and India) that secularism requires that the nation should not be a theocracy, such as many of the Islamic states today. Why?

Such public displays will likely occur only when sanctioned by legislatures or executives, whether federal, state, or local. These are then essentially political decisions. If so, with 82 percent of the population self-identifying as Christian, these displays can be confidently expected in the overwhelming number of cases to belong to the Christian tradition, extended perhaps to the Judeo-Christian tradition—as, in fact, displays of the Ten Commandments are. This public affirmation of the predominant religion of the country is then tantamount to an affirmation of theocracy in the public space.

While, in theory, such displays can belong to any religion, in practice they do not and will not. The equality among the nation's religions that one could assert by arguing that no particular religion is being directly favored by these displays is only apparent, what lawyers call facial, whereas the true effect is certainly discriminatory in favor of the predominant Christian religion of the country.

If the United States were almost wholly Christian, as it was at the founding of the nation and the writing of the Constitution, this would be an empty objection. But it is no longer so. Today, the largest religions (as distinct from cults) in the United States include Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism and Zoroastrian faiths. The United States today is a multireligious society.

In fact, this is why I argued when the two cases were before the Supreme Court that in place of theocracy, which would be sanctioned if the Court were to find in favor of public displays under a relaxed view of the Establishment Clause, the Court needed also to use the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require that no displays of only the predominant religion be permitted. The Court should require that, if Christian displays are permitted, then they must be matched by simultaneous displays by all leading religions of the country and possibly also by a tablet for the humanist doctrine of the nonbelievers.

One can be sure that the sectarian twice-born religious activists on the issue of public displays would back off if they realized that the issue was not theocracy but a respect for all religions, a sine qua non in today's world. And just as well.

The question of public displays raises deeper philosophical questions about what we mean by religious freedom, a cornerstone of our political beliefs. The conventional American view of religious freedom considers it to be what I might call, borrowing philosophical terminology from the debates on liberty, *negative* religious freedom: that we permit the free exercise of religion. But we also need to consider what should be called *positive* religious freedom: that no religion be favored in public space, which would effectively dominate and marginalize other religions.

While theocracies typically elevate the dominant religion to a status that compromises positive religious freedom, there is no excuse for self-described nontheocratic societies like the United States to do so. And yet, because of historical reasons dating back to when the voting population was virtually monoreligious, this is what one sees. Even in quasi-public spaces, such as university convocations, one typically sees Christian ministers delivering benedictions, with an occasional rabbi thrown in: where are the Hindu and Buddhist priests and invocations? President Bush now makes an occasional nod to Islam, but that is a feeble response to the political need to demonstrate that we are not anti-Muslim as Islamic fundamentalists scream otherwise in the turbulent Middle East.

The Supreme Court had a unique opportunity in the two cases before it to shift us toward a firm embrace of positive religious freedom,

grounding it in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since many of the justices now draw on foreign jurisprudence for ideas and have cited, on affirmative action, the Indian Supreme Court, a pioneering court on public-interest litigation, perhaps it may be relevant to note that its rulings under the Indian constitution's Article Fourteen on equal protection can also be drawn upon. Alas, mired in the way that the issues of secularism have been framed historically in this country, the justices failed to exercise enough imagination and philosophical and social awareness to use the Fourteenth Amendment in quite the forthright way that I have suggested here.

I should also add that perhaps the best example the Supreme Court could have learnt from is the practice of Mahatma Gandhi, one of the greatest figures of the last century in this regard. He began his public meetings, given his own and the nation's religiosity, with prayers drawing on the sacred texts of India's principal religions, among them the Bhagavad Gita, the Qur'an, the Old and the New Testaments, and the Granth Sahib of the Sikhs. He is known to have borrowed civil disobedience from Thoreau. It is time for Thoreau's country now to borrow from him.

THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

I would be remiss if I did not take issue with some of the erroneous arguments of antiglobalization economists such as my colleague Joe Stiglitz, which George Rupp, not being an economist, has accepted at face value. I do not believe that these are critical to his arguments, but these misconceptions are so widespread and so insidious in their impact on influential intellectuals such as Rupp that it is important to dispel them.

First, the notion that economic globalization is unethical in that it leads to widening inequality is incorrect. As I point out in my book *In Defense of Globalization* (2004), the work of my Columbia colleague Xavier Sala-i-Martin shows that, by several different measures, inequality among nations has declined. Again, within nations, it is not clear what measures we should use to discuss inequality: this depends on each society.

In New York, as I sit at Columbia, if I look south, I see Park and Fifth Avenues with their immense riches, and if I look north, I see Harlem with its misery. If George Soros, Robert Rubin, and their rich friends triple their income, the share of the total income belonging to the top 5 percent in New York will rise, and that of the 5 percent at the bottom in Harlem will naturally fall. Inequality as occasionally measured will therefore have significantly increased. But frankly, will anyone in Harlem care? Much will depend on whether this skewing of incomes will result in conspicuous consumption or in quiet accumulation.

Again, I believe that inequality is more offensive in the same workplace than it is across occupations and industries. Thus, Rupp will recall the unholy (in both senses of the word) anger of some of the faculty, especially in the lower-paid disciplines like English literature and sociology, over the big discrepancy between their pay and that of the president of Columbia: an anger not shared by the economists who also happen to be much better paid than them! And mind you, this pay inequality within Columbia had nothing to do with globalization.

In any event, what is the connection between rising inequality and globalization? That connection must also be established. In fact, I argue in my book, in a chapter on gender, that globalization has been helpful in reducing gender-based pay discrimination against women. It turns out that in the United States, over two decades, the wage differential against women fell faster in the trade, industries where fierce international competition forced firms to hire more of the less-expensive (but equally productive) women and fewer of the more-expensive men.

In any event, many of us correctly worry about poverty rather than inequality. What is the record of economic globalization in form of trade and direct foreign investment on poverty? It is now widely accepted that in India and China, which have had the lions' share of the world's poor, a shift to more outward-oriented policies, implying greater globalization, helped them attain higher growth rates on a sustained basis. In turn, higher growth rates enabled these countries to pull more of the poor into gainful employment and hence to reduce

poverty much faster. Globalization helped, rather than not harmed the assault on poverty.

Rupp also cites with approbation Stiglitz's attacks on "market fundamentalism." But one could equally well call Stiglitz names and attack him for "interventionist fundamentalism." I find ad hominem attacks on "neoliberals" when I talk about economic reforms; so I respond by saying that if my opponents insist on calling me by that pejorative epithet, I will be happy to respond by calling them "Neanderthals." More seriously, Stiglitz has no idea that the shift to a more judicious and greater use of markets is a *pragmatic* move away from an *ideological*, knee-jerk interventionism in the postwar policies of developing countries and *not* an ideological move to markets by a bunch of libertarians from a position of pragmatic use of markets and intervention! I used to say for many decades, having studied many developing countries and worked in India on policies to reduce poverty since the early 1960s—my 1966 book, *The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries* had a photo of a malnourished African child (which startled many economists at the time) and chapter 1 was titled "Poverty and Income Distribution," well before my fellow economists like Amartya Sen and now Jeffrey Sachs discovered poverty—that a major problem in the developing countries was that Adam Smith's Invisible Hand was nowhere to be seen!

Nor is Stiglitz anything other than naïve in castigating the Bretton Woods institutions—he is much kinder to the World Bank, where he worked, than to the IMF—for imposing market fundamentalism, globalization, and privatization through conditionality on the developing countries. Anyone who has studied conditionality in a nuanced way knows that many countries manage to evade it and that, in any event, there are "policy reversals" going on all the time as the situation unfolds. Besides, as one accumulates experience and know-how, one *should* change the advice one gives. Can it be denied that, while many of us started thinking that dirigisme and autarky were good policies, we concluded (often through learning by undoing) that this was not so. Bretton Woods institutions followed the changing science on this with the usual lags.

But even if one could wean Rupp away from the Stiglitz-style fallacies on markets and on globalization, I find that he has a different worry about the spread of markets and globalization: namely, that it reinforces individualism at the expense of community. But why should a peasant who can turn to export markets and earn more become less communitarian than when he was poor? Is it not more likely that, given extra income, he may do something for his village? In fact, there is evidence that remittances are already being used for such communitarian purposes. Again, what kind of community are we talking about? Surely, family and community are values that are often based on the exploitation of women as a class in traditional societies. As young women earn more money in, say, export processing zones, they break out of the cycle of patrilocal and patrilineal societies and secure some autonomy: the breakup of such a community is not to be deplored but applauded. This is why, when some traditional country rails against Americanism, my wife (Padma Desai, an Indian also teaching at Columbia) wants to open a bottle of champagne!

INTERNATIONAL FLOWS OF HUMANITY

Rupp is at his most moving, and indeed most compelling, when he writes about the international flows of humanity and the enormous amount of good that the IRC, other NGOs, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have been doing. His description of the many ways in which the IRC is helping refugees also shows the many ways in which refugees, displaced by strife and wars and not just fleeing from persecution, are being assisted. I would only add that the problem is compounded by the fact that asylum today is being used in Europe for illegal immigration. (In the United States, illegal immigration occurs either through illegal entry across borders, such as the Rio Grande, or through legal entry and illegal stay. This leads to attempts at distinguishing between "good refugees" and "bad refugees," attempts that pose dangers to the right to asylum, a time-honored practice that is one of mankind's major achievements.)

I would only add that the international flows of humanity now increasingly embrace legal flows and, with the declines in rich countries' populations, we can expect that immigration restrictions will ease in the next few decades. This is all to the good, since migrants' remittances have now become a major source of earnings for poor countries. These are a wonderful "trickle-up" form of income enhancement since they typically go to the villages from which the unskilled migrants come.

There is now, in a knowledge-driven world, also an increasing flow of skilled labor, with rich countries generally competing for talent worldwide. For countries such as India, China, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil, where the skill supplies are substantial, such out-migration to the rich countries offers an opportunity, not a threat. It has also led to a revival of an old idea of mine: extending income tax jurisdiction to nationals working abroad. This is the "Bhagwati Tax" that was widely and discussed in the 1970s, when the flows were nowhere like they are today.

But for countries in Africa, the out-migration of their few skilled people can be a threat, not an opportunity. There is no way to keep their professionals, given the conditions at home and the opportunities abroad. I have therefore decided that until there are much larger numbers of skilled Africans, developed countries such as the United States must supply the necessary skilled manpower, maybe for the next fifteen years. I have suggested that we do things like start a Gray Peace Corps so that the skilled among our aging population are offered programs and opportunities, at suitably high salaries, to spend time in African countries, which will also help ease the bottlenecks in all kinds of occupations here.

I have also been revising, with some success, also the idea that I developed in 1992 in the *Christian Science Monitor* and in the Eyskens Lectures I gave in Belgium, of finally addressing the fact that there is a lacuna in international organizations: we do not have a World Migration Organization. There is now an ongoing discussion of such a WMO: of its functions and structure. I hope to live to see the WMO established. I have little doubt that George Rupp would be delighted also if it materialized in our lifetime.

NOTE

1. Thus, a massive public display of the Ten Commandments was upheld by a majority because it was part of an evolutionary display of historical events in the state. In my view, this is perfectly disingenuous, as the American experience has been inclusive over time of several ethnicities and religions; the Court could well have used the Fourteenth Amendment to require that the Ten Commandments display, if retained, be augmented forthwith by displays from other religions that happen to be found in the state in question.

5

SECULARISM AND THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY

JEREMY WALDRON

PRESCRIPTIVE SECULARISM AND RELIGIOUS FAITH

"Convictions matter," says George Rupp, whether we share the basis of those convictions or not. People need to say what they really think on issues like globalization, poverty, and social justice, and they need to listen to all the other convictions that are expressed on these matters even if the content and premises of these convictions challenge the secularism that some philosophers prescribe for the exercise of public reason.

I am heartened by Rupp's argument against prescriptive secularism. I use the term "prescriptive secularism" rather than his term "secular liberalism," because I think some people who deny that religious convictions have any place in politics would not describe themselves as liberals, and others call themselves liberals but have grave misgivings about any prohibition on the use of religious arguments in articulating and defending their liberalism. I number myself among the latter group, and in this essay I would like to explore the idea that liberal views on inequality, social justice, and concern for the poor of the world might prove harder to promote politically if the secularist prescription were adopted. A secular political culture is not necessarily a friendly place for liberalism,

at least on the issues I have mentioned. Purged of all trace of the view that there is something sacred in the poorest individual and something blasphemous in our indifference to human need, politics quickly becomes a playground for selfishness: it becomes much more hospitable to self-satisfied prosperity and self-righteous disdain for those who have not attained prosperity than a political environment ought to be.

I do not want to sell short the position of those who respond affirmatively to need without a grounding in religious faith. There are secular liberals, and there have been fine and fiery secular theories of social justice in the liberal tradition: John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* is the best known example from recent years.[1] But just because there *can* be a liberalism not grounded in faith does not mean that the restraints of prescriptive secularism are politically neutral. They are not. Prescriptive secularism deprives social justice of some of its most powerful advocacy, advocacy of a sort that is politically, if not philosophically, indispensable in the effort to open the eyes of the well-off to the plight of those who are marginalized by the very structures that guarantee our prosperity. In his book *The Needs of Strangers*, Michael Ignatieff suggests that the great enemy of religious belief is not skepticism but the silent and pervasive plausibility of a life lived entirely in the glow of material comfort.[2] The converse is also true: material well-bring in a prosperous market economy is always liable to remain lethally indifferent to the ocean of need that surrounds it unless it is challenged by something that transcends its plausible comforts. The religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have been in the business of mounting this challenge, bitterly and persistently, in the name of God for a thousand generations:

> For the needy shall not always be forgotten; The expectation of the poor shall not perish forever.
>
> He will bring justice to the poor of the people; He will save the children of the needy, [a]nd break in pieces the oppressor.[3]

To say now, at this late stage, that challenges like these are to banned from the public square, that they are to be heard only in the churches,

mosques, and synagogues, never in the marketplace and never in the legislature, is to yield the world to those who wallow heedlessly in their own contentment and are untroubled by purely philosophical theories of justice.

So far I don't think I am adding much to Rupp's analysis. He aims to broaden the terms of our debates about globalization. He is worried about the flattening of value and the deadening of concern that are features of a landscape of market individualism dominated entirely by material considerations. He thinks, as I do, that if we silence our deepest convictions, we deprive ourselves of the resources we need to think richly and responsively about these matters. What I want to emphasize in addition, however, is the one-sidedness of this flattening of value, this deadening of concern. The philosophers that I talk to often take it for granted that prescriptive secularism is neutral. They assume that conservatives will suffer at least as much as liberals as a result of the exclusion of religious interventions from politics. Or they think perhaps that conservatives will suffer even more. I think this is an illusion, born of obsession with a very small range of cases—abortion, gay rights, and so on—in which religiously based politics have been all too prominent. I think it is born, too, of a neglect of the role that religious arguments have played historically in upholding the claims of labor and welfare, in insisting on the demands of justice, and in making the case for those who live impoverished on the margins of a world of market prosperity. In the American context, Reinhold Niebuhr's book *Moral Man and Immoral Society* is as good a starting point as any to remedy this neglect.[4]

COMMUNITY AND INCLUSION

There are parts of Rupp's analysis that I am less comfortable with. Rupp believes that in order to address the situation of those who are marginalized in the modern world we have to find a place for the language of *community* in the discourse of globalization. What he calls "unrestrained individualism and market fundamentalism" are of little use to people who are poor, deprived, despised, and displaced; these concepts make a

mockery of their predicament. What we need is a greater sense of community, he says, and the strength of a community depends in large part on the convictions with which the world's religious traditions have managed to constrain the excesses of economic self-interest. This is widely shared view, and there is surely something to it. Religion and community often go together; deprived of religious support, the claims of community can come to seem like quaint and obsolete luxuries in the face of the implacable logic of market individualism.

But I want to register a warning about this view and take a slightly different tack. Often the problem for those who are poor and marginalized is *not* that there has been insufficient assertion of the claims of community in the face of market individualism. The problem is rather one of exclusion or expulsion from community. For there are, in fact, forms of community that are perfectly at home with market individualism and that sometimes repudiate any responsibility for deprived people in their vicinity. Let me take some time to explain what I mean, for it is not the usual point about different conceptions of community.

In his lectures, Rupp distinguished between two meanings of community, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*: *Gemeinschaft* is the community of deep solidarity and a shared way of life, whereas *Gesellschaft* is community constituted by the nexus of abstract toleration and mutual respect. Rupp's discussion of *Gesellschaft* is extremely interesting, particularly in its suggestion that market-consumer society represents *Gesellschaft* stripped of its ethical underpinnings. But when I talk about forms of community that exclude the poor and the displaced and that take no responsibility for the despised and the marginalized, I am not talking about *Gesellschaft* (stripped or unstripped). I am talking about the cozy forms of *Gemeinschaft* community in which those who are privileged as members enjoy one another's company, take responsibility for their neighborhood, get to know newcomers, are loyal to one another and to a shared way of life, look out for the interests of their neighbors, cherish the same values, support the establishment of public goods, pursue communal ends and activities—all the stuff that we are supposed to most admire about thick communal solidarity. They do all that, yet they still recoil

(as a community) from the presence of (say) homeless people, and they will do everything in their power—including mobilizing the ideology of "community" itself—to ensure that those who are naked, shivering, filthy, unemployed, sick, foreign, and destitute come nowhere near their gates and nowhere near the public places where they walk their prams or hold their barbecues.[5] They will campaign against the establishment of homeless shelters in their vicinity; they will protest about low-income housing if it is likely to affect their property values; they will wrap their children in a cocoon of protective outrage at any attempt to settle sex offenders in their municipality after they have served their sentences; they will campaign to deny state and municipal services to illegal immigrants; they will look askance at those who question their traditions; and on and on. And they will do all this together, as a community, with great sensitivity, solidarity, loyalty, and mutual concern. These are small-scale neighborhood examples, but they have their counterparts at a national level. Here I have in mind people who bind themselves together in political community to defend their own jobs and industries, no matter what the cost to poor people beyond their borders, who set up a fortress mentality to deny the benefits of their economy to those they regard as outsiders, and who treat refugees with suspicion rather than compassion.

That, I am afraid, is the real logic of community in the modern West, and it's a logic that *reinforces* market exclusion. This comfortable form of community is not antagonistic to the prosperity that a market economy can secure. It depends upon market economy, and it will uphold its prosperity against outsiders as the precondition of its own solidarity. It is a form of community that circles the wagons to defend those who are privileged as its members against any concerns beyond the community itself that might threaten the basis of its prosperity. This sort of community is incapable of mitigating the tendency of markets to neglect a whole range of interests.

I know George Rupp used the term "inclusive community" to refer to the kind of thing he had in view, and he did so with the best of motives. He had no intention of associating his argument in these lectures with communities that exclude people or cast people out. But whatever his

intent, we cannot take the phrase "inclusive community" for granted. In the real world, the word "community" is found more commonly in the company of terms like "gated." And this is not surprising. Communitarianism has an inherent "us"/"them" logic, a tendency to define itself by contrast with an "other." Rupp said at the end of his lectures that he had in mind an inclusive *global* community, relative to which there would be no "them," no "other." I am with him on that. But the tendency of such inclusiveness is to challenge the very logic of community itself and replace it with the idea of humanity, much as the idea of cosmopolitanism challenges our conventional idea of polity and citizenship and replaces it with something that transcends boundaries and franchises. The principle of Rupp's global community has to be understood in this light: "Nobody is to be left out, not even those whose inclusion tends to unsettle community (in the conventional sense), not even those whose exclusion would make communal goods easier to achieve." In other words, Rupp's community is dominated by the principle of humanity, and as such it is quite antithetical to the familiar *communitarian* idea of humanity having been sorted already into a number of separate and mutually exclusive communities.

What does all this have to do with the debate about secularism? My hunch is that familiar forms of exclusive community—comfortable neighborhoods of prosperity and solidarity among the well-off—need very little assistance from religious conviction. No doubt, within such groups it is important to motivate people's concern for one another and their concern for the neighborhood, so to speak; it is important to dissuade them from the logic of pure unmitigated self-interest that economists pretend is the building block of market economy. Most of the time, however, very little persuasion is necessary. People are naturally concerned for others who live as they do, especially their countrymen, and for those who do not already have that concern there is such an evident congruence between prosperity and medium-term self-interest that the specter of blinkered selfishness doesn't really need much confronting. In other words, market individualism versus communal altruism is not the issue. It is the *limited altruism* of community that is the hardest to overcome for

the sake of the outcast and the marginalized because challenging it flies in the face of the conditions of shared communal comfort.

Challenging the limited altruism of comfortable community has been one of the great achievements of the Western religions. I know the Jewish and Christian traditions best, and what I have in mind are the prescriptions of the Torah, the uncompromising preaching of the Prophets, and the poetry of the Psalmist aimed specifically to discomfit those whose prosperity is founded on grinding the faces of the poor, on neglecting the stranger, and on driving away the outcast.[6] I have in mind, too, the teaching and example of Jesus Christ in associating with those who were marginal and despised and in making one's willingness to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, take in the stranger, and visit those who are in prison a condition of one's recognition of him.[7] And it's not just scripture: it is the whole edifice of (say) Catholic natural-law reasoning about need and church doctrine on the perils of complacent and exclusive community.[8]

The claim that religion challenges community in this way may seem odd to those who are accustomed to thinking of religious groups as themselves self-satisfied communities of belief, condemning all outsiders as damned. Certainly, the exclusiveness of some of the communities I have been fulminating against has a tinge of religious self-righteousness. And it cannot be denied that religion is often associated with intercommunal violence, as believers band together against nonbelievers. Usually, however, in order to do that they have to ignore or sideline most of the teaching of their respective faiths, which insist in fairly uncompromising ways on the importance of not casting people out but rather taking care of outsiders, loving one's enemy, and responding positively to others' needs even at the risk of the conditions of one's own earthly comfort and solidarity. Anyway, my point is a more modest one: even if religious conviction is no guarantee of an inclusivist mentality, it is well-nigh indispensable for it in regard to most people.

I suppose that on some interpretations of community, the religious injunctions of inclusion that I am referring to can be read as reinforcing the claims of community against the claims of the individual. But the

better way to see them is that they add up to an uncompromising insistence on our duty to people and families, individuals and masses, who may seem to us to be beyond community, or outcast from community, or uncongenial or unpromising for the purposes of community building. It is the ethic of the Good Samaritan, confronting the need of a injured Jewish traveler with the charity of a Samaritan, that is, the charity of a member of a despised and outcast group—a story designed to shake the complacency of those who are sure they know what "neighbor" means.[9] It is an insistence on seeing the human and discerning the sacred in the most derelict and despised individual. And it is the presentation of all that not as a moral luxury, nor as a matter of self-congratulatory charity, but as a primal issue of justice and respect, inseparable from the meaningfulness of one's life, the fate of one's society, the destiny of one's soul, and the integrity of one's relation with God. To see in a new and compelling light what one owes not to community but to the outcasts of community—that is the work of religious teaching and conviction. And that is what we stand to lose—at least in part—if we acquiesce with secularism in imposing a prescription against religious interventions in politics. It is not the bonds of community that will evaporate if the secular prescription is upheld. The ethic of community is based on the plausible comforts of shared prosperity. What is lost—or what is in danger of being lost—as a result of prescriptive secularism is the ability to shake up and challenge those comforts.

I said at the beginning that we should not sell short the position of those whose humanity is its own motivation and those who have developed secular theories of social justice that take into account the interests of all humans in the world, not just the members of a given community.[10] That needs to be repeated. Intellectually, cosmopolitan theories of justice *can* be built on purely secular foundations. Despite the recent turn to communitarianism, the claim that the needs of the stranger, the outcast, and the migrant are entitled to as much consideration as those of the most privileged member of our community is still sometimes heard in moral philosophy, and its logic is impeccable. But the whole life of social justice is not logic. It is also a matter of what is felt, what can

be made appealing, and what—as I have said—can be put up to challenge the comfortable evasions of prosperity. In the book I referred to earlier, Michael Ignatieff remarks that the bare claim—the naked philosophical proposition—that because one is human, one deserves to live, often turns out to be the weakest, not the strongest claim that people can make to one another.[11] Ignatieff thinks that outside a context of community, this claim is but words in the wind. I am saying that if ever such a claim has to be used to *challenge* community, then one will want something richer and more transcendent behind it than the abstract idea of humanity.

RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL ARGUMENT

Many of those who listened to George Rupp's Schoff lectures asked questions at the end that reflected considerable unease about what public debate on these matters would be like if people of faith were to become less hesitant about expressing their religious convictions on issues such as markets, poverty, globalization, exploitation, and development.

That unease is the core of prescriptive secularism. Public debate, say the secularists, should be conducted using forms of reasoning that are accessible to believers and nonbelievers alike, accessible to everyone irrespective of the tenets of their personal faith. They say that this means sometimes biting our tongue on certain matters and suppressing arguments that we would be otherwise inclined to make. As John Rawls put it in his 1993 book *Political Liberalism*, "In discussing matters of basic justice we are not to appeal to . . . religious or philosophical doctrines—to what we as individuals . . . see as the whole truth. . . . [C]itizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of . . . values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse."[12] In public life, we need to talk and listen to another, we need to be able to understand the positions that we oppose, and we need to hold ourselves ready to compromise on some occasions and on other occasions to live generously with outright political defeat. Bringing religious conviction into politics undermines all that, say the prescriptive secularists. Religious fanatics scream at one another, but they are not known for their listening.

Rival claims of revelation are mutually unintelligible, like the mysteries of competing theologies; they mean nothing except to their adherents. And if we make public policy a matter of religious conviction, we raise the stakes far too high: we pose fundamentalist obstacles of creed and conscience in the way of the moderation and compromise that are the hallmarks of responsible democratic politics.

These arguments are worth our consideration; certainly, they should not be dismissed out of hand. My own view, however, is that the unease they express is based on a caricature of religious interventions or on a generalization from a very small and distorted sample.

The secularist view seems to be that a person of faith engaged in a political debate will—if he is allowed—simply cite some verse of scripture that he finds dispositive of the issue and then stand pat, impervious to argument. Not only that, but the passage of scripture in question—his "contribution" to the debate—will often be nothing but an aphorism or a commandment, not something in itself that one can engage with or argue with. For example, when an opponent of gay rights quotes a passage from Leviticus—"If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination"[13]—there's not much one can say in response. There doesn't seem to be any point of access here for argument to the effect that homosexual intercourse is not an abomination at all but actually rather pleasant and loving and fulfilling and valuable. The scripture saith to the contrary, and that seems to be that so far as the biblical fundamentalist is concerned. That's the sort of thing the prescriptive secularist is worried about.

I wonder, though, how typical this is. When I read the Catholic case against gay marriage, for example, I am not convinced by it, but I find there is very little Leviticus quoting or invocation of papal authority. What I read are elaborate tissues of argument and reason, open to disputation and vulnerable in the usual way to quibble, rejoinder, and refutation.[14] Certainly, the arguments have an infuriating quality—they read, as Richard Posner once said of John Finnis's writings, as though they had been translated out of medieval Latin.[15] But what's actually infuriating about people like Finnis is not any adamantine fundamentalism

but their determination to actually *argue* on matters that many secular liberals think should be beyond argument, matters that we think should be determined by shared sentiment or conviction. My experience is that many who are convinced of the gay-rights position are upset more by the fact that their argumentative religious opponents refuse to take the liberal position for granted than they are by the more peremptory tactics of the "bible-bashers."

Something similar is true of arguments about abortion. Occasionally you get fundamentalists trying to defend a pro-life position along the lines of the Leviticus condemnation of homosexuality. But at least on the basis of Christian and Jewish texts, it's a hopeless enterprise. There is a bit about unborn children in Exodus, but it is basic tort liability for injuries to pregnant women, which most pro-choice people are perfectly happy with (apart from its being exploited ideologically by pro-life advocates).[16] I am not saying there is no religious case against abortion, nor am I saying that it has no biblical element. But most commonly it is an *argued* position not a biblical one, and the doctrine about (say) the sacred personality or humanity of the fetus is a rationally made case about something that is presented as an important moral as well as religious idea.[17] Again, I don't mean that is necessarily a compelling piece of argumentation. But *argument* is what it is and what it purports to be, and as such it is something that can be engaged with argumentatively in response.

I have focused so far on religiously defended positions (on gay marriage and abortion) that are not normally associated with liberalism. But what I have said against the caricature of religious fundamentalists' simply screaming dogma or passages of scripture at one another (and at us) applies, I think, very clearly to the liberal positions I talked about in the second section of this essay.

When we turn to religiously grounded interventions on poverty and inequality, we are also dealing with argumentation—rich arrays of argument that include some specifically religious elements, some religious enrichments of more familiar moral elements, some religiously motivated reminders of inconvenient factual truths, and some religiously

scrupulous and uncompromising inferences from premises that we all pretend to accept. It is really not much different from any body of value-laden political argument. Sure, there are elements in these arguments that may be unfamiliar to nonbelievers, elements whose resonance they may struggle to understand. But this is true of every argument premised on basic values. If I base my politics on the conditions of Kantian autonomy, my case will not be easy to engage with for a materialist who is uninterested in autonomy. Yet in arguments of this kind, we all do the best we can: sometimes we understand fully the concerns of our opponents, sometimes we understand imperfectly, sometimes we understand very little. It happens as much in secular politics as in religious politics. Argument is rarely a linear progression from shared and pellucid premises. It goes back and forth between disputable claims of fact and often unfamiliar claims of value. And it is none the worse for that.

I actually think it does no harm to introduce into discussions about poverty, or about the obligations of our community to outsiders, something like the majestic passage from Matthew's Gospel about the sheep and the goats.[18] But this is not because such citations are going to *conclude* anything or dispose of the matter; it is because the passages may stop us in our tracks for a moment, give us pause, and (as I argued in this essay's second section) perhaps shake up the deadly combination of contentment and self-righteousness that often characterizes the response of a prosperous community to the poor and the outcast.

One way these religious passages may help is by complicating and enriching the normative vocabulary that we use in discussing these matters. In practical deliberation, we don't just present propositions to one another or evaluate one another's evidence or logic: we try to affect the way things are seen, the connections that are made, the value language that is used, even the gestalts that are part and parcel of our estimations of the facts we are considering. For example: liberal philosophers and their opponents sometimes argue about whether we have strict or "perfect obligations" to the poor, which is also supposed to be a way of asking whether the poor have rights to our assistance. These juridical terms—"rights" and "obligation"—are the common currency of secular

normative discourse. They have the advantage of looking toward the legal context in which policy outcomes might eventually be phrased, but, by the same token, they represent a rather flat, one-dimensional discourse. Either something is a perfect obligation (in which case there is a right to it) or it is not; if it is not, then no matter how important it is, it falls into the realm of the optional. Though the biblical materials do sometimes present concern for the poor as a matter of justice (in which case the language of rights and obligations is appropriate), often they present it as a matter of love. Our impulse is to say, "Well, then it is optional, voluntary, a matter of charity, not compulsory." The religious materials shake up that logic by presenting the claims of love as compelling in ways with which secular moral philosophy may not be comfortable but that may more accurately capture our sense of what is required of us than the flat logic of rights and perfect obligations.

Such presentation is not itself beyond challenge, and those who speak in the dry terms of rights and obligation are entitled to retort that the religious concerns are equivocal or confused. But just as progress can be made in theological thinking by subjecting it to the rigor of analytic philosophy, sometimes progress is made in moral argument by developing new normative conceptions on the model of certain religiously inspired concerns. I think, for example, of Ronald Dworkin's attempt to develop a secular notion of the sacredness of life and of the ambiguities in that notion in his book *Life's Dominion*.[19] There are many other examples of religious argument enriching secular argument (and vice versa), and I think it would be a shame to deprive ourselves of that enrichment because we feel we have to suppress the interventions of those whose religious rhetoric is shrill and conclusory.

A POLITICS OF MODERATE CONVICTION

I have one other point to make about the real-world effects of all this. I said earlier that the concerns of the prescriptive secularists should not be dismissed out of hand. Prescriptive secularism looks for a public discourse that is tolerant and mutually respectful and does not simply *batter*

people with slogans. These are reasonable concerns. But how are they likely to be received?

Some of those who are initially inclined to make religious interventions in politics will be dissuaded by these concerns; others will not be. Rupp says that prescriptive secularism is "simply not acceptable to those whose deepest convictions would be relegated to the status of private preferences without any relevance to public policy." Maybe this is true across the board. But my bet is that those who are silenced by prescriptive secularism are likely to be disproportionately liberal and disproportionately those whose religious arguments are complex, moderate, and open to engagement in the way I have just described.

In other words, there are certain religious interventions that are really not going to be excluded whatever the prescriptive secularists say. Religious extremists and religious fanatics are unlikely to be convinced by anything as delicate as Rawlsian political liberalism or secular theories of public reason. They will keep on shouting. Those, on the other hand, who *are* kept quiet in public by strictures of this sort are most likely to be those who are already convinced of the importance of moderation, tolerance, and compromise. They understand what the secularists are saying, and they appreciate what underlies their view of public discourse. But there's the irony: it is exactly these moderate voices that need to be heard in politics, as a counterpoint to the dogmatism of their more fundamentalist coreligionists. Here I am absolutely at one with the case that George Rupp is making. We need to hear from moderate and thoughtful Christians as well as those who simply shout and wave their Bibles. We need people like Reinhold Niebuhr as well as Jimmy Swaggart. We need the voices of those Muslims who are willing to listen and learn from other traditions (including secular traditions as well as other Muslim and other religious traditions). What we don't need is a doctrine of public reason that silences them but not their fundamentalist counterparts. We need religious views in politics that are sensitive to the uses of criticism and compromise, and we should not trade on that sensitivity to exclude them.

These are strategic matters, not matters of principle. But Rupp is right: one way or another, we have to try to broaden the terms of public

debate about markets, globalization, and social justice. If our code of civic principles—our methodology of public reason—has the effect of making things worse, then it is time to rethink it. And if it makes things worse in fact, even though it makes things better in theory, it still needs to be rethought. I hope that what I have said here will be read as supporting and reinforcing George Rupp's call for a politics of moderate conviction, open to participation by people of faith under a discipline of reason and mutual engagement. I have expressed some doubts about the communitarianism of Rupp's approach, but I have no doubt at all that the core of his case is powerful and compelling: the predicament of the poor is too important to left to the mercy of a purely secular reason.

NOTES

1. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

2. Michael Ignatieff, *The Needs of Strangers* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1984), 77.

3. Psalms 9:18 and 72:4.

4. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner's, 1932).

5. I was involved briefly in the politics of homelessness in San Francisco in 1996, filing an amicus brief in opposition to "communitarian" groups who were seeking to reclaim public places for ordinary families against the homeless inhabitants of those public places who had nowhere else to go. For a discussion, see Jeremy Waldron, "Homelessness and Community" *University of Toronto Law Journal* 50 (2000): 371–406.

6. I don't want to cite chapter and verse here; the passages are very familiar. See, for a very small sample: Deuteronomy 15:1–11; Isaiah 3:13–15; Psalms 72, 82, 109, etc.

7. Again, for a sample, see Matthew 9:10–13, and most particularly Matthew 25:31–46.

8. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *Pastoral Letter: Economic Justice for All* (1986). The text of the bishops' letter is available online at http://www.osjspm.org/cst/eja.htm.

9. Luke 10:25–37. See Jeremy Waldron, "Who Is My Neighbor?—Proximity and Humanity," *The Monist* 86 (2003): 333–54.

10. See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).

11. Ignatieff, *The Needs of Strangers*, 51.

12. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 225–6.

13. Leviticus 20:13.

14. See, for example, John Finnis, "The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 42 (1997): 97.

15. Richard Posner, *The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 77.

16. Exodus 21:22–23.

17. For example, John Finnis, "Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning," *Valparaiso University Law Review* 32 (1998): 361.

18. Matthew 25:31–46: "When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, . . . [a]ll the nations will be gathered before him, and he will separate them one from another, as a shepherd divides his sheep from the goats. And he will set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left. Then the king will say to those on his right hand, 'Come, you blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: for I was hungry and you gave me food; I was thirsty and you gave me drink; I was a stranger and you took me in; I was naked and you clothed me; I was sick and you visited me; I was in prison and you came to me.' Then the righteous will answer him, saying, 'Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you drink? When did we see you a stranger and take you in, or naked and clothe you? Or when did we see you sick, or in prison, and come to you?' And the king will answer and say to them, 'Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me.' Then he will also say to those on the left hand, 'Depart from me, you cursed, into the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels: for I was hungry and you gave me no food; I was thirsty and you gave me no drink; I was a stranger and you did not take me in, naked and you did not clothe me, sick and in prison and you did not visit me.' Then they also will answer him, saying, 'Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not minister to you?' Then he will answer them, saying, 'Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to me.'"

19. Ronald Dworkin, *Life's Dominion: An Argument About Euthanasia and Abortion* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 68–101.

6

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE

WAYNE PROUDFOOT

George Rupp tells us in his preface that this book and the lectures on which it is based took the form that they did as a consequence of his moving directly from the presidency of Columbia University to the presidency of the International Rescue Committee. His new position left him without an anticipated sabbatical leave and led him to devote a good part of the lectures to the work of the IRC. That move was a fortunate one because the lectures have benefited from the combination of his longtime interest and scholarship in comparative religious thought and his recent work with the committee. The IRC's focus on basic needs that are thrown into relief in times of crisis provides a good complement to recent literature on the proper place of religious conviction in political argument. In particular, it provides a cosmopolitan counterbalance to the communitarian cast of much of that literature.

Rupp proposes that religious convictions and their ideological equivalents be critically examined and vigorously debated in public discussions of the benefits and problems of globalization. Though these convictions are deeply held, they are often set aside in debates on the topic. They are considered to be private preferences in contrast to public reasons, and their exclusion from the discussion renders them immune to criticism. Rupp thinks that critical attention to religious and philosophical commitments

might help correct the bias toward private interests at the expense of public goods that has impeded attempts to extend the benefits of globalization to those who are now excluded from them.

Religious convictions that are thought to bear on public policies, including those of globalization, ought to be expressed and subjected to criticism as thoroughly as any other reasons or commitments that motivate people. But there is also a risk involved in bringing those convictions into the discussion. Religious commitments vary greatly. In some cases, they contribute toward more inclusive ideas of global community, but in others they serve to establish more parochial identities that set one community with its particular doctrines and practices over against another or against all others. The work of the IRC in providing refugees with housing, food, healthcare, clean water, education, and employment contributes a practical and a cosmopolitan focus around humanitarian concerns that is independent of parochial identities of any kind, whether religious, national, ethnic, or cultural.

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

There is currently a lively debate over the proper role of religious reasons in discussions of public policy in a liberal and pluralistic society.[1] The debate is concerned with a single constitutionally established democratic society such as the United States, but the issues are similar to those that arise in a larger global setting. Should a citizen engaged in public debate refrain from appeal to religious commitments as reasons for her political positions, especially her support for coercive laws? Should she restrict herself to reasons that could be endorsed by any of her fellow citizens, or should she feel free to express the reasons that actually move her?

Respect for the beliefs of others might be thought to require citizens to confine themselves in public argument to reasons that everyone would be able to endorse. But why should a religiously committed citizen be required to give reasons for her position that differ from her actual reasons? I want to consider two contributions to this debate: John Rawls's claim that citizens should restrict themselves to reasons that could be

endorsed by everyone, and Jeffrey Stout's argument that it is enough for a citizen to give her reasons for a position, ask others for their reasons, and then criticize those reasons from the points of view from which they come. Both Rawls and Stout provide resources for a cosmopolitan approach to religion and public discourse in a global context, but they place some restrictions on appropriate criticism of religious doctrine. Rupp reinforces this cosmopolitan approach and places no restrictions on criticism.

John Rawls proposes in *A Theory of Justice* that the principles by which the justice of basic institutions of a society are assessed be arrived at by means of a thought experiment (the Original Position) in which the people choosing those principles are assumed to be ignorant of their positions in the society (e.g., ancestry, wealth, race, gender, religion, occupation), their talents, and their particular interests. This procedure would ensure that the principles chosen would be fair to all and would not discriminate on the basis of any of these differentiating characteristics.[2]

Some critics argue that it is too restrictive to require that those choosing the principles of justice be ignorant of their religious commitments or other comprehensive conceptions of the good.[3] These commitments are essential to the identities of those who hold them and bear substantively on the principles that they might choose. Not taking them into account privileges a secular liberalism that is unfair to those who hold religious commitments. Rawls addresses this issue by arguing for a political conception of justice that is independent of religious or nonreligious views but might be supported by an overlapping consensus of people who differ in those views. He advances an idea of public reason, the kind of reason that should be used by legislators and public officials and that citizens in a democracy ought to give one another when fundamental political matters are at stake. He says also that reasonable religious or nonreligious doctrines might be introduced into political discourse on these matters as long as they are later backed up with arguments from public reason.[4]

Rawls distinguishes public reason from a background culture in which unrestricted discussion is permitted. Public reason is neutral with respect to religious doctrines and other substantive ideas of the good, and he assures his readers that public reason "neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a democratic polity."[5] This restriction shelters religious convictions from thoroughgoing critical inquiry and appraisal and is therefore an example of the separation between public and private that Rupp opposes.

Jeffrey Stout argues, in contrast to Rawls, that it is unlikely there would be common reasons that could be accepted by those holding different comprehensive doctrines and that reasonable conversation and convergence on matters of policy are possible without them. Religiously committed citizens should be encouraged to give free expression to their convictions when discussing matters of public policy and to present their religious reasons in detail and in depth.[6] Each person may express her convictions directly and offer criticisms and reasons that the other could accept from her own standpoint. This can be done without assuming a common core, an overlapping consensus, or a public reason to which all can subscribe. Stout does not try to identify a public reason that leaves religious doctrines untouched. He encourages vigorous expression of one's commitments and asking for and giving of reasons, but he restricts criticism of the commitments and reasons of another to immanent criticism, criticism that arises from within that person's point of view.

Rupp does not set any constraints at all on the kinds of criticism he wants to encourage. It need not be confined to immanent criticism or to conflicts with public reason. His aim is chiefly to encourage vigorous criticism and appraisal of religious convictions rather than to discover a way of deliberating and reaching common decisions that will leave those convictions largely untouched, as Rawls's idea of public reason seems to do. Religious commitments ought not to be sheltered from the ongoing criticism and evaluation to which we should subject beliefs and values in other realms of culture.

Critical study of religion must be comparative. Close attention to any religious tradition reveals a diverse collection of doctrines, practices, and internal debates. Traditions that seem monolithic and doctrines and practices that are said to have remained unchanged are often historical products of very recent vintage. The distinguishing marks of a tradition and its boundaries are all historically contingent. Both adherents and outsiders constantly create and revise narratives, names, and categories that are meant to confer unity on changing doctrines, practices, and institutions.

Comparative study reveals similarities across traditions that are as great as the varieties within them. Some forms of Christianity, for instance, have more in common with particular strands of Buddhism than they do with other kinds of Christianity. Earlier in his scholarly career, Rupp engaged in exactly this kind of comparative analysis and appraisal, with particular attention to conceptions of the self, society, and their environment in a number of Christian and Buddhist texts.[7] This recognition of varieties within and similarities across traditions undermines naïve "clash of civilizations" views and shows the limitations of understanding a plural society, either domestically or globally, as consisting of independent and clearly specifiable communities.

Comparative analysis leads to self-criticism. Rupp calls for critical engagement with "religious and other ideological views." Following Joseph Stiglitz, he describes the commitment to unrestrained markets held by some economists and officials at the International Monetary Fund as an ideology of market fundamentalism. Stiglitz refers to this as an ideology because it is held without regard to empirical confirmation and despite evidence to the contrary.[8] While globalization and free trade have brought benefits, a preference for private interests over public goods and a conviction that the chief role of government in the global economy is to support open markets have skewed those benefits toward the wealthy and away from those who need it most. Rupp views this preference for private interests over public goods as reflecting a bias toward individualism and away from community. Comparative analysis

across different traditions will bring these ideological commitments into relief and raise critical questions about them.

COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE IRC

Between his call for criticism and appraisal of religious and ideological convictions and his reflection on complementary ideas of community in philosophical and religious traditions considered to be individualistic, Rupp includes a brief introduction to the work of the International Rescue Committee. As the name indicates, the committee intervenes in crisis situations, working with refugees and other displaced people who have been deprived of such basic conditions for survival as housing, food, clothing, clean water, sanitation, and health care. The IRC first supplies these necessities in emergency settings and then works to resettle people either in their countries of origin or in third countries. The IRC also provides language and job training and helps find employment for those it resettles.

When the IRC responds to a crisis in Aceh, Afghanistan, or Darfur, it addresses immediate human needs. The work of the committee or of any analogous nongovernmental organization is premised on recognition of such needs and a determination to meet them, a kind of practical form of human rights, independent of whether any member of the organization subscribes to a doctrine of rights. Shelter, food, water, clothing, basic health care, and a means of economic subsistence are necessary for everyone. No national, religious, ethnic, or communal identity of any kind is relevant to the judgment that these needs should be met.

The IRC must pay careful attention to particular national, religious, and cultural identities in order in order to develop a strategy for meeting these needs. Rupp tells us that in order to reduce a high rate of infant mortality in the Sudan caused by infections contracted at birth, his staff decided to train traditional birth attendants in methods that would help them prevent those infections. This was more effective than it would have been to replace those traditional attendants with Western medical

programs. Staff must be familiar with the languages, beliefs, and practices of the people with whom they are working and take those into account in designing the most effective programs. But the judgment that these people need and deserve shelter, food, sanitation, health care, education, employment, and, as Rupp makes clear, competent government, is a judgment that is independent of any particulars about the country, the religion, or the cultural identity of the people.

This cosmopolitanism ought to inform moral and political reflection on globalization and on the justice of the institutions that shape it. Rawls's theory of justice, with parties in the original position representing individual people regardless of their specific characteristics or places in society, would seem to dictate a similarly cosmopolitan view. But when he extends his theory to international relations, Rawls stipulates that the parties in the original position represent not individuals but "peoples," with "their separate languages, religions, and cultures."[9] These representatives establish the laws and institutions that will regulate global interaction and exchange for a society of peoples. This society includes constitutionally established democratic societies as well as "decent nonliberal societies" that diverge from liberal ones in ways that Rawls indicates.[10] Justice between individuals is determined by the laws and institutions that obtain in the societies in which these individuals are ensconced. Rawls's focus on a people as the basic unit gives a communitarian character to his assessment of justice in the international case. The justice of international institutions and laws is a matter of fair relations among peoples, not fairness across the individual persons who make up those peoples.

Even as an idealization, the identification of a people as a group with a separate language, religion, and culture is highly dubious. The idea that one can distinguish peoples in that way is somewhat analogous to Rawls's assumption that it is possible to individuate separate religious and nonreligious comprehensive schemes that are distinct from the idea of public reason. But even if one could identify separate peoples, this approach would still produce a conception of justice for international

relations with no direct reference to the political, social, or economic conditions of individual persons.

Thomas Pogge argues convincingly that by extending his theory of justice to the international sphere in this way, Rawls sacrifices a central commitment of that theory, its individualism.[11] Rawls argues powerfully in *A Theory of Justice* that no utilitarian theory can give an adequate account of a just distribution of liberties and social goods over individual people. His broadly Kantian theory is based on respect for people and on equal liberty and fairness among them, with no regard to the particular characteristics that differentiate them.

Pogge shows that the law of peoples Rawls endorses permits arrangements in which wealthy and powerful countries can strike bargains and make treaties with poorer and weaker ones that exacerbate the inequalities between them. He argues that the best way to think normatively about global justice is to extend the Rawlsian paradigm directly rather than to distinguish between two separate procedures, one for assessing justice within a society and a second one for assessing it in a society of peoples.[12] The principles that are to govern social and economic relations between countries, as well as those within them, ought to be chosen by representatives of individual persons who remain ignorant of their particular places in the world, including the societies of which they are a part as well as their positions within those societies.

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls set out two principles of justice for the domestic sphere, the first of which establishes basic liberties and the second equality of opportunity and a requirement that changes in distribution of economic and social resources provide the greatest benefit for the least advantaged.[13] Pogge suggests that these principles would have their analogues in a set of rights and liberties similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in a principle for assessing the justice of agreements among countries, financial institutions, and other corporations that would consider the effects of those agreements on social and economic inequalities between people, with particular attention to the situation of the least advantaged. This second principle need not be

as strict as the one Rawls proposes for the domestic case, but it would still make reference to inequalities between people and to the condition of the worst off. As Rawls does in the domestic case, it would be important for those designing the rules and institutions that regulate global exchange to recognize the benefits of free trade and the incentives it provides while also attempting to reduce inequalities and to improve the plight of those who are the least advantaged.

Institutions for regulating global exchange are arrived at by negotiations among nations, and it is nations that are members of the IMF and the World Bank. Pogge's proposal would develop principles for negotiations among nations and for the creation of independent institutions to regulate exchanges among them as well as the actions of multinational corporations. Those principles would be developed with attention to and would contain reference to the social and economic situations of individual persons without regard to the particular peoples of which they are a part or the nations of which they are citizens. Though the IRC intervenes in crisis situations, there are many in the world who are not refugees but who lack basic conditions for subsistence and who may be worse off than those who have been involuntarily displaced. A global version of Rawls's conception of justice that maintains its reference to the plight of the least advantaged would incorporate and extend the spirit of the work of the IRC.

INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY

Rupp sometimes seems to suggest that individualism and community are related on a spectrum and that what is needed is a restoration of the balance between the two. He is careful to make clear that the object of his criticism is unconstrained or excessive individualism. But as he has argued in his comparative studies of religion and culture, an emphasis on community need not require a move away from individualism but rather a different way of articulating it both in conception and in social structure.

A normative individualism is central to Rawls's theory of justice, as we have seen, even though he pays insufficient attention to that component of this theory in his proposal for a law of peoples. The idea of human rights, both rights to political liberties and to the social and economic conditions that are required for those liberties, is premised on an emphasis upon individual people. Kant and Rawls each place respect for people and concepts of freedom and equality across people at the center of their theories of morality and justice.

Rupp's earlier studies of ideas of individual and community in religious and philosophical thinkers show that this is not a spectrum in which a move toward one end necessarily diminishes the other.[14] There he draws on the work of Hegel and others to argue that a robust conception of the individual and one of community require each other. They are not mutually exclusive. A normative individualism that favors human rights and the reduction of inequalities of wealth and opportunities is not inimical to community or to public goods. It requires, as Rupp argues, good government and laws and institutions that will enforce those rights and provide those goods.

Pogge's proposed extension of a Rawlsian conception of justice to the global order by attending to the consequences of particular institutional arrangements for those who are least advantaged, regardless of the countries in which they are located or their religious or cultural identities, provides a good start for thinking about these matters. How can institutions and laws governing global exchange be designed so as to extend the benefits of the global economy to those who have not yet been included and at the same time establish and protect political liberties while working to reduce inequalities both within and across borders?

CRITICAL STUDY OF RELIGION

Convictions matter. They ought to be made explicit, critically engaged, and opened to public appraisal. Religious convictions in particular are often exempted from this kind of inquiry. Even historically sophisticated

academic scholars of religion perpetuate this exemption when they claim that they are interested in questions of description and explanation but not normative questions. As Rupp says, critical inquiry requires that no appeal be made to a locus of authority that is inaccessible to others or is declared to be beyond the bounds of criticism. Questions can legitimately be raised about any experience, text, or other authority, whether they be historical questions, questions of interpretation, or questions of relevance to the issue at hand. Criticism need not be immanent criticism, though to be effective it must have some purchase that makes it accessible to the person to whom it is directed.

Rupp hopes that critical and comparative analysis of religion will help to dissolve parochialisms and to build a more unified global community. But it is not clear that it will have that effect in the short run. During the past century, social and economic deprivation combined with perceived threats to traditional beliefs and values have often led to reactive responses that have given rise to fundamentalisms with new narratives intended to unify by excluding all outsiders. These are responses to change and insecurity, including the changes that globalization names or has brought about.

Rupp is right to call for criticism not only of religious commitments but also of the ideological commitments that shape much of the discussion on globalization and the entrenched interests that help to explain these commitments. Stiglitz argues that the IMF's policy that in the case of a financial crisis, creditors ought to be paid first is not the result of some disinterested economic analysis.[15] The relevant creditors are banks and other financial institutions in the United States and allied Western countries, exactly the constituency most represented by the IMF. Identification of the position of the IMF as ideologically driven, if indeed it is, as well as criticism of that ideology, requires attention to empirical evidence and not only to conceptual analysis. That is also true of the study of religion. Critical analysis of the role of religion in society, and of attributions of religious motives to actors and of religious explanations for events, is important for the evaluation of religious doctrines and practices and for the prospects of promoting religious tolerance and community.

One consequence of the critical analysis of religion may be to decenter it from our explanations. For example, on the basis of a comprehensive study of suicide attackers from 1980 to the present, the political scientist Robert Pape argues that the attackers were not motivated chiefly by Islamic fundamentalism or by any other religious doctrines but had relatively specific political goals.[16] In almost all cases the aim of the attackers was to force a government to remove its troops from a region that the attackers considered to be their homeland. This includes members of Al-Qaeda as well as the Tamil Tigers, a secular group in Sri Lanka whose members come from Hindu families.

Pape may or may not be correct, and further study is called for. But the critical study of religion clearly should include the attribution of religious motives to agents. Such attributions are often as indicative of the motives of the observer as they are of those of the agent. This is an instance in which critical analysis of religious conviction is best accomplished by attention to factors other than religion.

Preoccupation with religious identities can divert attention from other descriptions and motivations. For instance, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have criticized the widespread conception of Indian literature as predominantly mystical or spiritual.[17] The fact that this conception is held by Indologists from India as well as those from the West does not alter the fact that it can be misleading. When those adjectives are used to characterize Indian culture and values generally, they divert attention from important and extensive contributions to epistemology, mathematics, political analysis, and economics and to the wide range of topics treated in the literary tradition, especially in the great epics, the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*. That skewed view of a rich and diverse cultural tradition can be used by conservative groups within the culture and others outside to impose a false unity and to divert attention from more complex descriptions and explanations of actions and events.

In a recent contribution to the secularization debate, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart use a large database from eighty societies to argue that members of all advanced industrial societies have moved toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years, while the number

of people in the world with traditional religious views is greater than ever before and is growing.[18] That seeming discrepancy is due to the fact that people in less developed societies have much higher fertility rates. Those in poorer and less developed societies face much greater insecurity from famines, disease, political conflicts, natural disasters, economic hardship, and ineffective government. This difference in conditions of what Pippa and Norris call existential security between the richer and more developed societies and the poorer ones correlates strongly with the salience of religion in people's lives, and it interacts with cultural traditions that have shaped particular societies to provide an explanation of different rates of secularization and religious worldviews. People who are less exposed to existential insecurity may profess belief in God or in religious doctrines in other traditions, but that belief is less likely to play a prominent role in their identities and their actions than it does for those who are less advantaged.

Religious traditions, like other parts of culture, contain ideas and practices that can be useful in working toward a more unified global community, with institutions that function to secure political rights and a more equitable distribution of economic resources and opportunities among members of that global community. But they can also be used to oppose those rights and to perpetuate and increase inequalities. Rupp is right to ague that these convictions and this important dimension of culture ought to be subject to more direct and vigorous study, criticism, and appraisal than they are now receiving. This kind of study and criticism, though, must be complemented by the kind of work in which the IRC is engaged.

The expression and criticism of religious convictions occurs in situations characterized by particular material and social conditions. Those conditions, especially great inequalities in the social and economic well-being of those engaged in the exchange of convictions and criticisms, will affect the outcome of those exchanges. The political and economic relations among groups will in part determine whether mutual criticism leads to the widening of horizons and increasing tolerance or to a reac-

tion in which members of a community set themselves against those of another group or all outsiders.

The kind of work that the IRC and related organizations are doing both serves as a model for a cosmopolitan conception of global community and also helps to advance the conditions that are necessary for such a community. Religious responses to criticism are more likely to be constructive rather than detrimental in a context in which progress is being made to extend human rights and to reduce social and economic inequalities. Rupp makes clear what the committee has been able to achieve and also how the difference it can make even on the problem of refugees is dwarfed by the needs of displaced people worldwide. This shows the need for a variety of overlapping institutions and laws that would regulate global exchange in a way that would contribute to the goal of a unified global community. The extent to which religious convictions and practices contribute to this goal remains to be seen.

NOTES

1. For a critical survey of this literature and a constructive position of his own, see Christopher Eberle, *Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

2. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 136–42.

3. See esp. Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 47–65, 165–74.

4. John Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," in *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 129–80.

5. Rawls, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," 132.

6. Jeffrey Stout, *Democracy and Tradition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 65–77.

7. George Rupp, *Christologies and Cultures* (The Hague: Mouton, 1974).

8. Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 222.

9. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 112.

10. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 59–78.

11. Thomas Pogge, "Rawls on International Justice," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 51 (2001): 246–53; Pogge, *Realizing Rawls* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 211–80.

12. Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*, 240–80.

13. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 302–3.

14. See, for example, George Rupp, *Beyond Existentialism and Zen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 47–71.

15. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, 195–214.

16. Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 343–61; Pape, *Dying to Win* (New York: Random House, 2005).

17. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, "Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions," in *Relativisim, Interpretation, and Confrontation*, ed. Michael Krausz (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 299–325.

18. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

PART III

GLOBALIZATION CHALLENGED—AGAIN

7

ANOTHER LOOK AT CONFLICT, COMMUNITY, AND CONVICTION

As I indicate in my preface, I am grateful to Jagdish Bhagwati, Wayne Proudfoot, and Jeremy Waldron for their astute and constructive responses to my lectures. They offer insights from their different yet complementary perspectives—insights from which I have learned in ways that I will elaborate even if I at times also register some disagreement. I hope and expect that readers will concur in appreciating how their contributions enrich the overall discussion.

I will begin with the points that Bhagwati registers in regard to globalization. I will then consider the observations of both Waldron and Proudfoot on notions of community. And I will conclude with an examination of the arguments of all three colleagues—first Proudfoot, then Waldron, and finally Bhagwati—on questions in regard to the status of commitment or conviction in the context of a pluralistic global society.

GLOBAL PROCESSES/LOCAL IMPACTS

In his response, Jagdish Bhagwati overstates the disagreements between his position on globalization, on the one hand, and those of Joe Stiglitz and me, on the other. Bhagwati includes Stiglitz among "antiglobalization economists," which of course seems to register a stark contrast to the

author of *In Defense of Globalization*. In dismissing Stiglitz's use of the term "market fundamentalism" as mere name calling, he indicates that he could reciprocate and attack Stiglitz for "interventionist fundamentalism."

Such rhetorical flourishes exaggerate the differences between Columbia colleagues who are also rivals. To appreciate the extent to which Bhagwati's characterizations overlook common ground, consider how much both of them differ with across-the-board critics of globalization. Unlike such critics, Stiglitz as well as Bhagwati recognizes the indispensable and positive role of markets, even as both of them also endorse regulation of markets to protect the most vulnerable populations. Indeed, over against Bhagwati's admittedly tongue-in-cheek attribution of "market interventionism" to Stiglitz, both caution about unwarranted controls on markets and yet also recommend nonmarket mechanisms to achieve outcomes that are otherwise unlikely. Examples include not only Stiglitz's praise for controlled transitions to open markets (as in Poland and China) but also Bhagwati's ideas of extending income tax jurisdiction to nationals working abroad (the Bhagwati Tax) and supplying skilled people for Africa through subsidized training opportunities abroad.

As Bhagwati points out in excusing my susceptibility to Stiglitz's arguments, I am not an economist and therefore do not claim special expertise on such issues. But on the broader policy questions, I agree with both Bhagwati and Stiglitz that markets must be allowed to exercise their remarkable efficacy and efficiency even as they must also be subjected to regulation on behalf of the larger global society, including in particular the most vulnerable strata of that society. Any normative position that seeks to balance this double commitment to market forces and social regulation is exposed to threats from opposite directions. On the one hand, there is the danger of unduly constraining the liberating power of markets—the danger that Bhagwati seems most concerned to counter. On the other hand, there is the likelihood that market regulation will do little more than soften the corrosive impact of markets as materialist and consumerist standards undermine the values that have supported

traditional communities and even work against social patterns that have allowed long-term environmental sustainability.

For those of us who are engaged in humanitarian relief and development, both threats are serious. As I describe especially in chapter 3, we work in situations where failed states testify to the horrific results of badly functioning markets bereft of even the most minimal regulation. Such circumstances desperately need economic development. But as much as market mechanisms will be crucial in the long run, the establishment of security and stable governance is an even more basic requirement.

The task confronting humanitarian relief and development organizations is to design emergency assistance so that it also builds long-term capacity at all levels from local communities to larger units of governance. As Stiglitz and Bhagwati both recognize, such interventions—especially in the context of postconflict development—must take into account indigenous traditions rather than simply imposing systems evolved by and for developed economies. Also imperative are protections so that international financial interests and the indigenous elites who are their partners do not reap all the benefits at the expense of impoverished local populations.

Such requirements call not only for sound economic policies but also for regulation with a base in social and political institutions that must be built up from the local community level. Without sound economic policies, developing countries will not be able to benefit from the dynamism of the global economic system, including the contributions that outside investment and trade can make to overcoming poverty in general and discrimination against women in particular, as Bhagwati argues. But without regulation of both international investors and their local partners, the wealth that participation in the global economic system generates may well accrue only to investors from the developed world and a small fraction of a developing country's population.

Bhagwati correctly notes that I take a broad view of globalization. It includes not only economic but also political and cultural dimensions. All of these global processes have substantial effects on the prospects of

local communities. In the worst-case scenario, global actors in effect exacerbate local tensions and play rival groups against each other in seeking to exploit natural resources or enlist political support for an only tangentially related agenda. But international inducements and pressures can also, in better-case scenarios, contribute to the amelioration of local disasters. The challenge for the international community is to move from too many worst-case scenarios to more better-case scenarios.

The situation in Sudan in recent years exemplifies the crosscurrents and therefore is relevant to the issues that Bhagwati raises. Since I delivered the Schoff Lectures in the fall of 2003, there have been two significant developments: conflict has expanded and intensified in the western province of Darfur, with tension also increasing in the northeastern provinces near the Red Sea; and a peace agreement has been signed to end the twenty-one-year war between the government of Sudan based in the northern capital of Khartoum and the rebel forces in control of much of southern Sudan. These countervailing developments may serve to illustrate the impact of global economic, political, and cultural processes on local conflicts.

The north-south peace agreement, signed in January 2005, is a major achievement. Pressure from the international community was indispensable to finalizing a deal that was under negotiation for more than three years. The United States played a pivotal role, in part in response to advocacy from evangelical Christians, who viewed the conflict as a war by the Muslim north to control the Christians and other non-Arab Africans in the south. Inducements included the assurance of substantial assistance to develop the south, which never has had an infrastructure of roads and electricity or even health care and education. Now that a peace agreement has been attained, delivery on those promises is crucial. And with the tragic death of the most prominent southern leader, John Garang, in July 2005, making good on assurances of support is even more urgently required.

The expansion and intensification of the conflict in Darfur has constantly threatened to derail the north-south peace process. The two conflicts are discrete, though not without connections. In both cases, the

fight has been between the Arabic and Muslim government and its allies against groups on the peripheries of the country. In the case of Darfur, the religious dimension of the conflict is not salient, since almost all of the contestants are Muslim. But the self-characterization of the government-allied militias, called *janjaweed*, has contrasted their claims to be Arabic with their depiction of their adversaries as blacks or Africans.

Whether or not the conflict is designated ethnic cleansing (as the U.N. has done) or genocide (as the U.S. Congress and administration have done), there is no doubt that horrible massacres of innocent victims have occurred. *Janjaweed* militia, often with the support of the Sudanese military—including attacks from the air—have depopulated wide swaths of Darfur. They have killed men and boys, raped women and girls, poisoned wells with carcasses, and burned village after village to the ground.

In the second of my Schoff Lectures, I noted that there were some 4 million people who were displaced inside Sudan and another 400,000 who were refugees in surrounding countries—Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even as Darfur became a new battleground, those uprooted people eagerly anticipated returning to their homes upon the conclusion of a north-south peace accord. Now they are in fact beginning to return to the south in substantial numbers. But in the meantime, the Darfur conflict has generated almost two and a half million more uprooted people: some 200,000 refugees across the border in Chad, and 2.2 million people displaced from their homes but still in marginally more secure areas of Darfur.

Since delivering my Schoff Lectures, I have been in Sudan twice—most recently in May 2005 as part of a small delegation led by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. From those visits, I have a vivid sense of how deeply the people of southern Sudan yearn for the security that will allow them to rebuild their communities. I also am acutely aware that the international community is offering Sudan a staggering instance of perverse incentives—incentives that send all of the wrong signals as far as other actual and potential conflicts are concerned. In the ten years before the peace accord was signed, the international community sent between a low of $150 million and a high of $300 million per year in

humanitarian assistance to southern Sudan. In the first year after the peace accords were signed, the commitment is $120 million. So much for a peace dividend!

In fairness, there are not limitless funds, and the total that the international community has committed to Sudan has not decreased. But much more of it has gone to Darfur. The message is loud and clear: war pays; peace does not—a message that is precisely the opposite of what should be sent, for example, to the volatile region of northeastern Sudan. To counter that message, the international community must in fact make good on its promised peace dividend for the south. And it must also broker a peace agreement in Darfur.

As for Darfur, I offer two images from my most recent trip to indicate the only viable avenue to settling the conflict: the Kalma Camp near Nyala and the town of Labado, both in southern Darfur.

Kalma Camp is located in an arid stretch of land that was formerly virtually uninhabited and therefore available as a temporary haven for some men but mostly women and children fleeing destroyed villages. It now shelters some 110,000 people. The residents of Kalma Camp are certainly more secure than if they were scattered across the countryside and therefore completely vulnerable. They also have adequate supplies of food and potable water. Basic health care is also available. To take the example of the IRC's clinic in the camp, it employs eighty Sudanese health care workers, is open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and sees between 700 and 1,000 patients a day.

But while the protection and support available in Kalma Camp bear testimony to heroic efforts at providing emergency humanitarian assistance, these arrangements are adequate only as a stopgap measure. No matter how good the intention, the effect of such settlements can only be to engender dependency on the help of outsiders. In contrast to this pattern, the adequate long-term solution to the problems so clearly illustrated in Darfur is to enable these uprooted people to return to their villages and rebuild their lives and their livelihoods.

That alternative brings me to my second image of Darfur. The town of Labado is at the center of an agricultural region and until December

2004 had a population of about 25,000 people. In late December—long after a ceasefire agreement was nominally in place—*janjaweed* militia invaded the town, pillaging and burning. When we visited in May 2005, we still saw many of the burned-out remains of their mud-brick homes. But two months after the attack, a small contingent of the much-maligned African Union peacekeepers arrived to provide security for the town. By the time we visited, about half of the former residents had returned to rebuild their homes and replant their fields. A large majority of those returnees gathered in the center of the town to greet our delegation with cheers of welcome to Kofi Annan. There was no way for the secretary general to address the enormous throng, since there was no amplification system; so our delegation simply walked around the central square and reciprocated the generous greetings of people grateful to have been allowed to return home to support themselves. We also met with the commander of the African Union contingent, who both reported and exemplified the pride of his troops in enabling the reestablishing of a destroyed town.

Kalma demonstrates an unavoidable emergency intervention at a time of crisis, but Labado represents the only durable solution to this devastating conflict. In both cases, we see how global processes shape the local effects. Clearly, the humanitarian assistance provided at Kalma Camp is almost totally dependent on outside resources. But the Labado alternative also is attainable only with the involvement of international actors.

I came home from my May 2005 trip to Sudan modestly encouraged. In my Schoff Lectures, I expressed cautious optimism that the north-south peace process would lead to a successful conclusion. That first step has now been taken. What remains is for the international community—especially the United States, which has been so forceful in its support for the peace process—to deliver the substantial reconstruction and development assistance long promised as a dividend of the end of hostilities. But my (admittedly less than euphoric) encouragement extends to Darfur and also the northeast of Sudan as well.

The grounds for my encouragement include the new specific moves toward providing greater security assistance to the African Union so that

its troop strength can increase from just over 2,000 to almost 8,000. In Addis Ababa, also in May 2005, Canada pledged substantially increased aid toward this end. At the same time, Norway promised thirty mobile police facilities, and NATO pledged troop transport and other logistical support.

But beyond such specific security measures, the grounds for my encouragement also extend to—and perhaps even are to a large extent based on—the ways in which broader global processes may shape the resolution of local conflicts. Pressure on the government of Sudan to end the warfare in Darfur has been complicated because of international economic interests in Sudan—for example, the interest of China in the development of Sudanese oil reserves, which has certainly complicated U.N. Security Council deliberations. Such economic and therefore also political interests have their counterparts in the cultural and therefore also political spheres, as is illustrated in the influence of American evangelical Christians on the north-south peace process in Sudan. Yet as much as such global interests and concerns may compound local conflicts, they also provide leverage to move toward their resolution.

To focus on the local situation, the government of Sudan has only a very narrow slice of its own population on which it can rely for support. That slender base is Arabic-oriented, Islam-focused, and Khartoum-based. There is almost no support for the central government in southern Sudan or in other regions at the periphery—for example, in the northeast, where tribal groups consider themselves consistently disadvantaged in their relations with Khartoum. If opposing parties in Darfur fail to reach an acceptable accommodation, that region as well will not be supportive of the central government.

The result is that the Khartoum government will survive only if it can present itself as the party of prosperity, which means also the party of peace. At the moment, Khartoum is in the midst of an economic boom—or at least a frenzy of construction. It is fueled by the prospect of economic development, at least in part dependent on the exploitation of oil reserves, which in turn assumes the sustainability of the north-south peace process. Similarly, support for the government

as the party of peace and prosperity requires at least minimal security and stability in Darfur. A comprehensive peace along the lines of the north-south accords may not be mandatory. But at the least a stable truce similar to the armistice achieved in the Nuba Mountains between northern and southern forces needs to be achieved, as do similar arrangements in northeastern Sudan. None of those outcomes will be easy to attain. But global pressures bilaterally and through the U.N. will certainly enhance the prospects of local reconciliation or at least accommodation.

The ongoing, multifaceted crisis in Sudan is arresting in its own right. It certainly exhibits graphically the enormous costs of local conflicts. But it also illustrates dramatically how global processes not only may exacerbate local conflicts but also may contribute to their resolution—even if little or no benevolent intention is required to achieve this effect.

The situation in Sudan illustrates as well the virtues of the hybrid solutions to social problems that both Stiglitz and Bhagwati favor. In contrast to Kalma Camp, which is utterly dependent on the generosity of the international community, Labado may be taken to represent a healthy mix of global resources and local initiatives. The African Union peacekeepers, along with all the regional and international support that undergirds their efforts, are indispensable to the revival of this town. But so too are the entrepreneurial energy and individual agency that result in the rebuilding of homes and the replanting of fields. Only such combinations of public and private efforts afford any prospect of effective global contributions to resolving deeply entrenched local conflicts.

THE CHALLENGE OF INCLUSIVE COMMUNITY

In his response, Jeremy Waldron offers impressively clear and compelling observations on the relationship between secular and religious convictions and then proceeds to consider parts of my analysis that he is "less comfortable with"—namely, my communitarian tendencies. He raises objections based on both empirical and logical grounds. He is astute in focusing on core issues in both respects.

The empirical case rests on the indisputable fact that more and more of the life of the affluent in modern secular societies in general, and certainly the United States in particular, is lived within communities of the privileged who are relatively insulated from their less well-to-do fellow citizens. As Waldron pointedly notes, "the word 'community' is found more commonly in the company of terms like 'gated' " than in conjunction with "inclusive." Even more pointedly, he refers to "the cozy forms of *Gemeinschaft* community in which those who are privileged as members enjoy one another's company, take responsibility for their neighborhood, get to know newcomers, are loyal to one another and to a shared way of life, look out for the interests of their neighbors, cherish the same values, support the establishment of public goods, pursue communal ends and activities—all the stuff that we are supposed to admire about thick communal solidarity."

Waldron combines this empirical point with a conceptual critique. He notes that I invoke "an inclusive *global* community, relative to which there would be no 'them,' no 'other.' " After agreeing with this intention, he argues that "the tendency of such inclusiveness is to challenge the very logic of community itself."

I agree with Waldron on both his empirical and his conceptual points. Gated communities are a direct and powerful challenge to aspiration for nonexclusionary associations. And the term "inclusive community" does indeed strain the logic of the very conception of community. My intention in enlisting the phrase "inclusive global community" is precisely to push against the prevailing tendencies registered in the conceptual argument as well as in the empirical trends.

Waldron's proposed solution to the problems he correctly identifies is to drop the notion of inclusive global community and "replace it with the idea of humanity, much as the idea of cosmopolitanism challenges our conventional idea of polity and citizenship and replaces it with something that transcends boundaries and franchises." The idea of humanity that Waldron invokes is rooted in the traditions of the Western Enlightenment that, from the eighteenth century on, have been central to advocating human rights and to attacking entrenched privilege and

unquestioning superstition. While these traditions are themselves the product of a particular historical era, they continue to be influential, especially in the West but also with an increasingly worldwide reach.

Here again, Waldron and I agree in the direction we both commend. The thrust is toward transcending boundaries and franchises. But as a means toward this end, the idea of humanity strikes me as deficient in two respects.

First, in replacing the notion of community, the idea of humanity in effect rejects or dispenses with it. Here, as I have argued at length in a number of books and articles, I find the position that Hegel represents so powerfully to be compelling: transcending entails not only moving beyond but also preserving. I therefore press for a conception that explicitly incorporates more local communities within it rather than implying that discrete individuals are related directly to humanity as a whole.

The second respect in which I find "the idea of humanity" deficient is its exclusive focus on the human. Especially in Western secular societies that are often quite removed from their religious roots, a recurrent challenge is to construe the human in contexts more inclusive than humanity alone. Even for thoroughly nonreligious humanists, this challenge remains—for example, in relating human societies to the natural world. And for religiously committed individuals and communities, such broader contexts include the cosmic or the divine or any one of a number of other holistic images or concepts. These more inclusive contexts serve to relativize human tendencies toward self-glorification and thereby undermine or criticize the temptation to absolutize the human in both its individual and collective forms.

The conception of inclusive global community recognizes the extent to which most if not all humans relate to the human race or the cosmos or the divine or the ultimate through less comprehensive circles: families within local settings, mediating institutions within a single society, national traditions within international associations. These more local communities are cultivated as valuable even if provisional—in short, preserved even when it is recognized that they are limited, provincial, penultimate. Thus, particular communities are affirmed even as, for

certain purposes, it is crucial to move beyond them, an orientation or approach intentionally distinguished from those forms of humanism that at least seem to move from particular individuals directly to the idea of a universal humanity.

As I note in the final sections of both the first and the third chapters, the ways in which local and particular communities relate to more inclusive communities pose a major challenge worldwide. In much of the developed world, a large fraction of the secular urban population is uprooted or even alienated from such traditional mediating institutions as religious organizations, social clubs, and even extended families. Consequently, individuals increasingly relate to one another and to the larger society through such impersonal vehicles as markets, big bureaucracies, mass communications, and the media. In such settings, reinvigorating appropriate mediating institutions is or at least should be a major priority.

But as I argue in the course of all three chapters, this issue of relating particular communities to more inclusive contexts is not confined to the developed world. I focus attention—in addition to Sudan—on Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo to illustrate the work of the International Rescue Committee with uprooted people in conflict and postconflict settings. Looking again at those settings may serve to reinforce how tough and unrelenting is the challenge of moving from local to more inclusive communities in the context of developing countries.

Afghanistan and the DRC continue to be extremely volatile countries that are not yet past the danger of falling back into a downward spiral of conflict. The force of U.N. peacekeepers in the DRC has grown to more than 15,000 and is now the world's largest such deployment. Even so, security is uncertain, and sporadic conflict continues to erupt, especially in the northern and eastern border regions. In Afghanistan as well, peace and stability are precarious. As in the DRC, regions not in close proximity to the capital continue to be only very partially under government control.

In Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Program continues to be a model for what needs to be achieved. The program extends to thousands of villages. The IRC is now working in more than 600 of them, often in

still-volatile areas. In each place, local village councils are identifying priorities for development, formulating specific proposals, and implementing projects with World Bank funding provided through the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. The resulting water and sanitation systems, health clinics, schools, and other facilities connect very basic community development to a government that in other respects seems to villagers to be remote and confined to Kabul.

In the eastern DRC, the IRC does similar work. There, too, water and sanitation systems, basic health care, and, to a lesser extent, education are at the core of our activities. In each case we collaborate closely with local communities in setting priorities and in seeking to assure sustainability—for example, through programs that train local residents to maintain water systems or through a sliding-scale schedule of fees that provides support for community-based health clinics. In contrast to Afghanistan, we do not work closely with the central government of Congo for the simple reason that there is not yet a competent administration that reaches the areas where we are active. So we focus on local communities and struggle, certainly not always successfully, to find ways to institutionalize and thereby sustain initiatives that those communities value.

In both Afghanistan and the DRC—as representative examples of developing countries around the world—the issue of relating particular communities to more inclusive contexts looks quite different from the way we see it in the West. To put it pointedly, appeal to the idea of humanity is not the place to start. Instead, the only way to begin is to focus on local communities, usually homogenous in terms of language and therefore also of ascribed ethnicity, and to build from there to less exclusive social collectivities.

The challenge is to move from deeply held loyalties to those most closely related in terms of extended family, language, and ethnicity to increasingly inclusive communities. In nations like Afghanistan, that challenge is already enormously difficult. It requires negotiating among multiple regional divisions and language groups. But there is at least the beginning of a government that may over time command the allegiance

of all Afghans. In contrast, in countries like Congo, there is still a longer way to go to the establishment of a viable government. Yet the challenge remains the same: to build from the bonds of highly particular communities to more inclusive allegiances.

Looking at the developing as well as the developed world helps to bring into focus the extent to which those who address this challenge must not denigrate particular communities, however limited and provincial they may be. Only by starting with respect for such communities is further movement in a constructive direction achievable. In sum, any attainable inclusive global community must incorporate local and highly particular communities in ways that affirm what is admirable in their core values, commitments, and identities, even as their tendencies toward exclusion are called into question.

In his response, Wayne Proudfoot calls attention to the ways that I argue for this intentional building from the particular to the more universal or inclusive, from the provincial to the more cosmopolitan. He helpfully contrasts this approach to the line of argument that John Rawls advances when he extends his theory of justice to the international sphere. In considering international relations, Rawls expands from the individuals on whom he focuses in generating his theory of justice to a consideration of peoples with their separate languages, religions, and cultures. Proudfoot rightly notes that even as an idealization this identification of a people as a group with a separate language, religion, and culture is highly dubious. In terms of the history of Western thought, this reference to unified and homogeneous peoples is, ironically, more consistent with the Romantic impulse of continental philosophy than with the Enlightenment traditions with which Rawls more characteristically aligns his thought. Indeed, if one considers its expression in Nazi ideology, to term it "highly dubious," as Proudfoot does, is worthy of a prize for understatement.

Proudfoot quotes Columbia colleague Thomas Pogge to the effect that, by appealing to the law of peoples when he extends his theory of justice to the international sphere, Rawls not only undermines the normative individualism that is fundamental to his approach but also per-

mits arrangements in which wealthy and powerful countries can strike bargains and make treaties with poorer and weaker ones that exacerbate the inequalities between them. This outcome is directly contrary to the injunction of *A Theory of Justice* that particular attention be paid to the situation of the least advantaged. As Proudfoot and Pogge maintain, this outcome can be avoided if the procedure for thinking normatively about global justice is analogous to the procedure that Rawls develops for such thinking within a society. In both cases, reflection would proceed behind a veil of ignorance: individual people would know neither their position within a society nor of which society they were a part. As a result, the needs of the least advantaged on a global scale would be accorded the attention they emphatically do not now receive.

Proudfoot rightly infers that my references to inclusive global community intend to embrace this holistic aspiration—whether based on a Rawlsian theory of justice or other normative frameworks. As Proudfoot argues, such normative reflection should find expression in specific rights and liberties and should also inform assessments of the justice of international agreements and the impact of financial and other institutions. In this respect, Rawls's theory has special force because it so centrally considers the effects of such arrangements on social and economic inequalities among people, with particular attention to the situation of the least advantaged.

While I agree with the line of argument that Proudfoot and Pogge develop in their criticism of Rawls's distinction between justice within a society and internationally, I would like to underscore my view—which Proudfoot also calls attention to in his response—that a concern for the well-being of individuals, including in particular those who are least advantaged, need not and should not entail a focus on those individuals apart from the communities in which they participate. Put positively, as Proudfoot does in characterizing my position, robust conceptions of the individual and of community are not mutually exclusive but instead require each other. Indeed, the conception of inclusive global community is precisely a heuristic ideal that points to the goal of integrating equity among individuals with social belonging.

Any such abstract heuristic ideal must, of course, be related to the realities on the ground. That is why it is necessary to address the concrete human needs and often corrupt institutional patterns that afflict far too many individuals and communities. It is also why the challenge is to move from highly particular communities to more inclusive ones in ways that affirm what is valuable in each of them even while acknowledging what is limited and criticizing what is inadequate. A commitment to moving in that direction is entailed in affirming the goal of inclusive community. I am therefore grateful to Proudfoot for his careful elucidation of my contention that the communitarianism I espouse is entirely consistent with appropriately construed forms of individualism.

COMMITMENT IF NOT CONVICTION

I am grateful as well to Wayne Proudfoot for his elucidation of my position on the appropriate relationship of religious and other ideological convictions to deliberations on public policy. Specifically, I appreciate his illuminating comparison of my approach to this set of issues to the positions of John Rawls and Jeffrey Stout. Indeed, if Stout's extremely judicious book, *Democracy and Tradition*, had been available at the time of my lectures (it was not published until 2004), I would have been pleased to draw directly on his argument—instead of coming to very similar conclusions without reference to his thought.

I agree with Proudfoot in finding Stout's critique of Rawls's position compelling. In attempting to delineate the idea of public reason, Rawls indefensibly constrains the range of considerations that may be brought to bear on public policy deliberations. As I argue repeatedly, especially in chapter 1, it is simply unacceptable to religiously committed people to disallow their deepest convictions from influencing their positions, including the formulation and advocacy of those positions, on social issues.

Against Rawls, Stout insists that religiously committed citizens should be allowed and even encouraged to present the religious considerations that shape their policy prescriptions. Stout deems this presentation of the religious or other rationale for a position as the beginning

of a respectful conversation. At times he seems to imply that disagreement with a position should be confined to immanent criticism—that is, criticism based on the proponent's own premises or values. As a tactical matter, this deployment of immanent criticism may be advisable in the sense that it probably enhances the prospects of reaching agreement or at least achieving change in the views of the conversation partner. But, as Proudfoot correctly notes, I see no reason in principle to constrain criticism in this way. Instead I argue for comparative appraisal that does not shelter religious views any more than beliefs and values in other realms of culture.

While I recognize that in the short run such comparative appraisal will almost certainly not result in agreement on particular religious tenets, I still see at least two substantial gains from encouraging the exchange. First, the underlying reasons for positions on policy issues will become public and therefore subject to analysis and assessment. This process may in itself result in feedback loops that over time lead to changes within otherwise closed circles or unexamined lines of reasoning. In the most constructive exchanges, these modifications or revisions may well occur in the positions of all the participants. A second potential gain is that coalitions on policy issues may be built. Such coalitions may agree on a specific issue even as members acknowledge quite different bases for taking the position or note sharp disagreements on other issues. Those of us who have been involved in political or social movements over the years know full well that, at least in pluralistic societies like the United States, only such broad-based coalitions can command the support required to effect change in established policies.

Like Proudfoot, Jeremy Waldron is critical of positions that follow Rawls in excluding religious conviction from the exercise of public reason. He recognizes that he and I agree in this view, and he notes that he is "heartened" by the exposition I provide. But he then proceeds to offer an incisive argument against the terminology I employ in framing my position and proposes an alternative that he deems less problematical.

At issue is my use of the phrase "secular liberalism" to designate the position that opposes religious participation in public policy

deliberations. I confess to having used the term quite uncritically for several decades. I have employed it as a shorthand way of characterizing a set of views very prevalent in, for example, university settings for at least the past thirty-five years. This worldview considers religion an anachronism in economically developed modern societies—a cultural vestige of a premodern past. As such, religion is at best irrelevant to serious thought and at worst dangerous in its potential to support backward or atavistic social impulses.

I am aware that, at least in this extreme form, the worldview I am describing has become less prevalent in more recent years. While perhaps the dominant position among intellectual and cultural elites in the 1970s, it is no longer as unquestioningly accepted—in part no doubt because religion has not atrophied in the way this narrative expected. But the position continues to be influential even if it is less frequently and vigorously expressed, and when it is articulated, it argues for keeping religious considerations out of public policy debates.

But Waldron argues (to my mind, persuasively) that it is not helpful to designate the position so described as "secular liberalism." I have my favorite secular liberals, most of whom I count as dear friends. While the term fits those favorites well, it does not aptly characterize all those who espouse the views I am criticizing. As Waldron notes, some of those who deny that religious convictions have any place in politics would not describe themselves as liberals and others who consider themselves liberals do not favor prohibiting the use of religious arguments in policy deliberations. I will therefore work at eschewing the term "secular liberalism."

While I will not commit to using the substitute that Waldron commends in all contexts, his "prescriptive secularism" does aptly capture the position I am criticizing in chapter 1 when I refer to "secular liberalism" and does allow the positions that he and I share to be more coherently formulated. In particular, I agree completely with his very helpful emphasis on the ways in which core religious texts—notably in the prophetic literature that Jews, Christians, and Muslims share—offer powerful testimony to the imperative of working for social justice. Put more pointedly, as Waldron does, prescriptive secularism deprives advocates for social

justice of the most compelling authorities they can invoke, an indication that, in effect if not in intention, prescriptive secularism is not neutral.

As he observes, if the focus is on a small range of cases in which religiously based politics have been all too prominent—abortion and gay rights—then one could conclude that the exclusion of religion from politics would disadvantage conservatives. But if larger issues of social justice, especially viewed globally, are at issue, then prescriptive secularism does indeed deprive liberal advocates of crucial resources. I am therefore happy to agree that for this range of issues, "prescriptive secularism" is a more adequate designation than "secular liberalism."

What is also impressive about Waldron's response is his showing how the position of prescriptive secularism all but collapses when specific cases are examined. No doubt there are instance of religious zealots who invoke texts or practices claimed to be absolutely authoritative and then contend that therefore no further discussion is allowed. While Waldron concedes that there are such instances, he trenchantly adduces examples of religiously based argumentation that can and should be included in policy deliberations, even on such charged issues as abortion and gay rights. As a result, his brief essay demonstrates that prescriptive secularism is a dubious and perhaps not even a viable position. I agree with and applaud that conclusion, a conclusion supported with more detailed argument and illustration in Stout's *Democracy and Tradition*.

Jagdish Bhagwati engages my position on the role of religious conviction in society at two points. The first is the issue of the appropriate relationship between religion and politics, especially in a pluralistic society and even more particularly in the United States. The second point is the question of how religious positions relate to one another—or, as he formulates it, how relativism affects conviction.

In examining the first point, Bhagwati focuses on the question of religious freedom. He proposes a distinction between negative and positive religious freedom. The former, in his terms, refers to the authorization of free exercise of religion; the latter asserts that no religion should be favored in public space. I would prefer to reverse his nomenclature and designate the free exercise of religion as positive religious freedom—

and not favoring any one position as negative religious freedom. But whatever the terminology, I agree with him that both what he calls the conventional American view (namely, free exercise of religion) and the position he advocates (namely, no favoritism to one religion over others) should be affirmed.

As I have done in other settings, I will invoke the metaphor that has informed and bedeviled American discourse on this issue. I am prepared to endorse the Jeffersonian proposition (albeit only in a letter) that there should be a wall of separation between church and state. But it is a wall that should block traffic in only one direction. I therefore agree with Bhagwati that there should be free exercise of religion, including full participation in all dimensions of political life. And I agree as well that government should not give preference to one religious community over others.

Both the positive and the negative dimensions of religious freedom (whether as Bhagwati assigns the terms or in the reverse as I would prefer) will, I am quite confident, come to prevail in the United States whatever the short-term ramifications of court decisions. I do not state that confidence casually, because I know that we are still far from according equal status to Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and other minority traditions. The issues are, however, far more challenging in societies that have a clearly dominant religious tradition but that have no pattern of separation of the religious from the political.

In such societies, the short-term objective should be to secure the free exercise of religion so that religious communities are not deprived of participating in their own traditions. In the longer term, the goal should be the end of preference for any one tradition. But that goal is still quite far in the future—even in the United States, which has so longstanding a commitment to the separation of church and state.

As for the second point, I appreciate Bhagwati's generous observation that I pose the dilemma between conviction and relativism eloquently. But I also had hoped to be clearer about where I "come out"—to use his terms. While Bhagwati notes that I call attention not only to conflicts among religious communities but also to disagreements within nomi-

nally unified traditions, he does not fully realize how crucial that fact is to my overall position.

Bhagwati is quite clear in the position he himself prefers:

> I frankly do not think that we have any realistic choice except to opt for pluralism and that any religion that seeks to set itself up, and encourages its followers to think of it, as the only way to reach salvation lacks some of the humanity that it must have, simply because it is likely to encourage dissension and strife. I therefore prefer Hinduism, which, at its best, encourages us to believe that, as the famous verse goes, all religions lead to the same God just as all rivers flow into the same ocean. (42)

I certainly agree with Bhagwati that we have no choice except to opt for pluralism. Indeed, pluralism is not a choice at all but rather a fact that can be denied only through willful ignorance. The question is how we interpret the fact of pluralism: as a contest between the only true way and all the false pretenders or as an unqualified relativism that sees all of the alternatives as equally valid or as an array of positions that must be compared and critically appraised.

As I trust is clear from chapters 1 and 3, I strongly favor the third approach. For emphasis and, I hope, greater clarity, I will state my view in terms of a variant of the Hindu aphorism that Bhagwati invokes. He quotes the version that has all rivers flowing into the same ocean; a perhaps even more frequently cited metaphor is that all paths up a mountain lead to the same peak. In any case, both aphorisms are fundamentally mistaken. It would be more accurate to claim that each of the major world religions encompasses multiple ways to different goals.

This disagreement with Bhagwati is not simply a matter of metaphorical interpretations. Religious traditions disagree with one another, and each disagrees within itself, not only on arguably minor doctrinal issues and matters of symbolic representation but also on how to interpret the most basic aim or goal of religious discipline or devotion and the way (in the sense of method or path) to reach that goal. And these

differences in turn have fundamental ramifications for the relationship of religious convictions to public life.

As Proudfoot notes in his response, I have elaborated these contentions in some detail in my *Christologies and Cultures: Toward a Typology of Religious Worldviews* (1974) and also in *Beyond Existentialism and Zen: Religion in a Pluralistic World* (1979) and *Commitment and Community* (1989). In chapter 1, as well, I call attention to the diversity within all of the major world religions. Here I will not repeat or even attempt to summarize the extensive analysis and illustration available in my earlier writings but rather will confine myself to showing how the diversity I refer to in chapter 1 extends to the relationship of religion to the broader society.

Within each of the world religions there are positions—often the dominant one—that affirm the goal of the religious life to be liberation from this world for salvation in another realm. Such positions in all of their variety tend toward an orientation to the broader society that does not assign a high priority to shaping historical institutional patterns. Indeed, in some cases mundane history is denigrated as evil or even ultimately illusory. Yet within all of these traditions there are also strains that affirm the goodness of creation or the whole of reality or being as such. In some instances, the religious community itself is called to exercise responsibility for shaping the historical order for all of society. Clearly, in such cases, concern for historical patterns and institutional arrangements is a matter of much greater urgency.

I am simplifying the complexity of the various religious traditions drastically in order to restate and underscore a crucial point in regard to Bhagwati's line of exposition. Insofar as there are substantial differences not only among but also within religious traditions, the recommendation that we "opt for pluralism" is not an adequate or even a coherent proposal. But the fact of pluralism does indicate the direction from which this complex of issues can most constructively be engaged.

In the context of globalization, religious communities may be more aware than ever before of the variety of other religious and also secular traditions. Members—and perhaps even more, leaders—of religious communities have never been reluctant to identify and criticize positions

within their own traditions that they deem to be deficient or even erroneous. As I note in chapter 1, religious people have always engaged in debate among themselves as to the most adequate interpretation of shared traditions because they are firmly convinced that getting their convictions right is of utmost importance. But in an era of increasingly globalized communications, members of religious communities also come to recognize what appear to be similar debates in other traditions.

This greater awareness may cause some adherents of religious traditions to embrace a relativism that simply retreats into the position of accepting all views as equally valid, even when some of them contradict one another! But increased knowledge of other traditions may also have at least two potentially more salutary effects. First, as I note in chapter 1, greater interaction with other communities may lead to healthy self-criticism, in which adherents of a tradition recognize areas where their own commitments can be strengthened or allegiances enlarged. And second, minority or submerged tendencies within one tradition may find resources and perhaps even allies as they seek to affirm the claim that their interpretation of the tradition is a more adequate representation of their community.

In our world today, such interactions among traditions certainly can be threatening, but they also hold out the promise of alliances across communities and more adequate interpretations of established traditions. To return to the line of argument I advance in chapter 1 and pick up again at the end of chapter 3, the relentless hedonism and materialism of Western secular society can surely benefit from increased awareness of the great spiritual attainments embodied in religious traditions that are more prevalent outside the West—including, increasingly, Christianity. At the same time, in the case of Islam in particular, greater awareness and acceptance of diversity within Muslim traditions and of analogous variety in other traditions may open up avenues for constructive change.

In all such cases, what is involved is a struggle for representation of a community and also for the most adequate interpretation of its core symbolic resources. The passionate intensity of fervent commitment is indeed an unsettling fact of our shared life at a time when terrorism

may be religiously motivated. Yet lacking all conviction is neither an attractive nor a viable alternative. As a result, we are confronted with the opportunity to examine our own commitments and, when we find compelling reasons, to enlarge our allegiances so as to incorporate those who are now too easily excluded. Seizing this opportunity is not so different from the tasks our forebears faced—though we are more aware of the process than many in the past. As we engage in what is unavoidably a lifelong process, we will move toward building an increasingly inclusive community. In our globalized era, we can do no less.

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