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Science Technology and the Economic Future edited by Susan Raymond
Michel Oksenberg, President
East-West Center
Based on remarks delivered at the New York Academy of Sciences on November 3, 1994. In August 1995, Dr. Oksenberg moved to Stanford University, where he is professor of political science and senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Research Center.
The search for an intersection between steadfast support for human rights abroad and the economic and security interests of the United States is neither a new nor an easy undertaking for U.S. policy makers. In the case of China, however, finding that intersection is of critical and immediate importance. China is, and will remain, a significant, even massive, global force. Indeed, the world faces a range of issues that cannot be successfully addressed without China's active involvement. Fortunately, there is a great deal of compatibility between the pursuit of human rights and the pursuit of many other objectives of the United States with regard to China.
Defining U.S. Interests
It is important, first of all, to be clear about the definition and range of U.S. interests vis-à-vis China. One of the most important is to see the emergence of a China that contributes to the peace and stability of the Asia/Pacific region. To take one example, U.S.–China cooperation is essential to maintaining stability, especially on issues of nuclear proliferation, in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
The successful management of a range of problems confronting humanity in general, and the U.S. in particular, also hinges on Chinese behavior. The environment is an obvious area in which the choices China makes will affect the world's people. Emerging disease patterns also provide sobering examples of problems which defy national boundaries. The progress of communicable diseases, and global prospects for control of diseases such as HIV, will be significantly affected by the control efforts of China. Similarly, the spread of narcotics cannot be slowed, let alone halted, without Chinese cooperation.
In the realm of economics, China has become, and will remain, a global economic and trading leader. China's economic growth has averaged 10 percent a year over the last few years, with some provinces in this vast subcontinent averaging nearly 20 percent a year. This represents the most rapid and extensive economic growth in human history. China is also a critical site for foreign investment and the world's largest market. More than 30 percent of all foreign investment in developing countries in 1993 occurred in China. Much of that investment was U.S. in origin. Moreover, nearly 40 percent of all Chinese exports are destined for U.S. markets. Hence, the United States has an interest in seeing that China's growing economic role occurs in an orderly and positive fashion on the global economic stage.
Human Rights: A Working Definition
There are many within and outside of Asia who would argue that the term "human rights" encompasses a range of human welfare and economic issues. Within this broad context, economic development and social programs become important indicators of human rights assessments.
For the purposes of policy discussion, however, a more useful approach narrows the term to apply to political human rights—the basic yearnings for freedom and security that are not simply Western in origin. Such a definition focuses on fundamental issues such as detention without notification of kin or notification of charges, detention without a time limit of release if no charges are filed, torture, summary execution, and equal access to the law. It is these basic aspects of human rights that are normally linked to U.S.–China economic relations.
Under the broad definition, it must be acknowledged that many conditions in the West, and in America, lead Asians in general to perceive strident human rights advocacy as arrogant. It is important to remember that the human rights restrictions attached to U.S. foreign aid abroad would have prohibited federal aid to the U.S. itself until 1964. Therefore, while the human rights values of the U.S. are noble and worthy, they should be put forward with a certain humility.
Human Rights in China: An Emerging Opportunity far Change
Until recently it has been very difficult to broach basic human rights issues in China with any success. But change is afoot. Indeed, the time has come to pursue an enlightened policy of engagement with China in the sphere of values and institution building. As in many other countries, the scientific community in China would be among the most receptive to such an approach. The reasons for the emergence of an opportunity for renewed action are many. The logical consequence of China's opening to the outside world has been a renewed recognition of the importance of basic political rights within ever larger portions of the population. While "freedom" would be too strong a term to describe the current state of social organization, there is, nevertheless, a growing open expression of private opinion that drives in the direction of political change. This is not surprising. Economic growth of 10 percent a year cannot help but unleash social forces and popular expectations.
The Importance of Institutional Reform
The very real problem is that fundamental institutions in China remain too weak to adapt to these new expectations and to channel change in the direction of stable and humane government policy. Instead, economic growth has led to a general erosion of authority in China, to corruption, nepotism, and a splintering of political control. In this context, both human rights and economic growth, not to mention any intersection between the two, are at risk. The following examples will serve to illustrate the likely implications of weak institutional development for China's overall future.
The Military
In the realm of national security, civilian institutions for guiding the military are relatively underdeveloped. The formal chain of command runs from the Communist Party's Politburo to the Party's Military Affairs Commission to the chiefs of staff The military is under Party control, and a major purpose of the military is to keep the Party in power. But the authority of the Party is being eroded by explosive economic growth; hence, the single buffer between the military and civilian rule is weak. There are no alternative institutional mechanisms capable of ensuring civilian control over the instruments of coercion in China. The implications are obvious and probably disastrous.
The Legal System
The legal system in China is another example of an underdeveloped institution. China is basically a country without an extensive legal system or a well–developed, independent judiciary. This state of affairs has deep historical roots: while there is considerable precedent for administrative law within large bureaucracies, the basis of economic transactions was through well–developed interpersonal relations, not by enforceable contract law.
Without an independent, enforceable system of law and adjudication, human rights will never be fully secured. Individual citizens will always be vulnerable to the arbitrary rule of political leaders. Advocacy for human rights, to be ultimately successful, must also become advocacy for the development of legal systems and institutions.
The Environment
China voluntarily adheres to a number of international environmental accords, including the Montreal Accords on the reduction of ozone–depleting substances, and international treaties on the protection of endangered species, ocean dumping, and the preservation of cultural and national heritage. Relative to other developing countries, China is actually in the forefront of global responsiveness to such agreements.
Enforcement, however, is quite another matter. While groups of scientists and policy makers in China are committed to environmental enforcement, institutional mechanisms to implement that commitment are insufficient.
When China enters into a treaty, Beijing provides little or no budgetary support and relies upon the voluntary cooperation of thirty provinces for enforcement. The provinces, on the other hand, are predominantly concerned with economic development. Environmental regulatory enforcement does not rise very far up the provincial priority list.
Weak Institutions = Missed Opportunities
Weaknesses in China's institutional structures limit the opportunities to integrate China more fully into international efforts to resolve global problems. Indeed, given the narrow institutional base in China, successful efforts to assist China in enforcing its global commitments often have perverse effects in other areas, including human rights. A few examples will illustrate the problem.
Beijing has committed itself to the protection and preservation of endangered species. Of particular concern are the Siberian tiger and the rhinoceros. Both have medicinal values in China and Taiwan, especially for the elderly. Therefore, a vibrant market exists for tiger bone and rhinoceros horn. Indeed, tiger bone is part of the Chinese pharmacopoeia. However, under these circumstances, there are virtually no enforcement mechanisms in China with sufficient resources or influence to enforce species protection. The combination of dispersed provincial responsibility for enforcement, insufficient resources to support that responsibility, and a vibrant and profitable market for the product itself combine to limit the opportunity for capitalizing on the global environmental commitment that Beijing has made.
Institutional problems become even more complex when environmental issues cross over into the national security sector. In the Montreal Accords, for example, halons are specified as a major ozone–depleting substance. Halons, however, are also a major substance for fighting electrical fires. In China, the public security ministry is in charge of fire–fighting. Hence, improving Chinese capacity to implement the Montreal Accords entails improving the technological base of the very ministry whose human rights behavior is in question.
Both these examples serve to illustrate the general point that weak institutional development stands in the way of translating the logical social implications of growth and openness into more humane and responsible political structures.
Dividing the Labor of Human Rights: A Rule for the U.S. Government
There is, nevertheless, a growing opportunity to work with individual Chinese who are themselves interested in enhancing the effectiveness of institutions. These individuals encompass the Chinese judiciary, parliament, and journalism—areas in which both China and the U.S. have a mutual interest. Well–developed institutions are at the heart of effective governance, which itself is essential to sustaining China's economic growth.
Clearly, China is at a crossroads. The basic question is whether it will emerge as a chaotic, corrupt, disorganized, but still economically vibrant nation with a weak central government, or whether it will develop as an orderly society with a humane government responsive to popular will. In this context, the emphasis of the United States government should be on working cooperatively on the development of a whole range of institutions which underpin a civil society. Unless this task is undertaken soon, a China that resembles the first alternative is more likely than one that resembles the second.
And A Role for Private Advocacy
At the same time, private organizations have an essential role to play in edging China toward developing a more humane and effective government. Past experience has taught that the government–to–government tool becomes a blunt instrument in China when arguing for individual human rights abuses. Government exertion of pressure often results only in deeper distrust, and sets back larger institution–building agendas. Yet, such individual cases exist and must be argued.
Private effort, such as that of the Committee on the Human Rights of Scientists of the New York Academy of Sciences, is essential and often very effective in pursuing individual human rights cases. As China opens, the country's need to be perceived as globally responsible grows. Private organizations, in providing solutions to China on human rights abuses, become a mechanism for making a clear link between China's behavior and its global reputation.
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