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Science Technology and the Economic Future edited by Susan Raymond
James A. Thomson
President and Chief Executive Officer, RAND
Based on remarks delivered at the New York Academy of Sciences, February 5, 1997
With the end of the Cold War, there has been considerable discussion of the opportunity for shifting defense resources to domestic programs. The process of that change, however, may be longer than most observers anticipate due to the pacing of technological change. The Department of Defense now faces a need to plan for replacing those systems that were purchased in the 1970s and 1980s, systems which are now coming to the end of their technological lives. Looking out to the year 2010, there will be a tremendous procurement need even with a smaller military force. The key question is, how do we think about such decisions? Given that there is no vital U.S. national security interest directly and immediately threatened on earth today, on what basis do we plan?
Getting the Definitions Right
First, clarification of definitions is important. When I use the term "national interest," I refer to interests beyond our shores. This is not a matter of domestic tranquillity or safety in the streets. Moreover, the term "vital" also needs to be clarified. Politicians seem to find it necessary to attach the adjective "vital" to everything in order to justify their actions. But the word has a precise meaning.
The Commission on National Interest recognized that there are a hierarchy of national interests, with "vital" being the most important. The vital interest of the United States of America is to continue to exist and to maintain intact the political institutions that protect the freedoms and lives of its citizens. These are the interests for which the nation would be willing to spill American blood and spend vast amounts of its treasure, even if no one else in the world thought it was a good idea and was willing to join the cause.
This is a tall order. We would act no matter what others thought, and secure these interests above all others. Using such a definition, what are America's vital interests? The Commission identified five:
The last of these five is debatable as a vital national interest. As Lord Palmerston remarked, nations have no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Classifying allies as an interest confuses means and ends. Alliances are not ends, they are means that we use to secure our interests.
Are Vital Interests Now Threatened?
What is the situation today with regard to vital national interests? Although we face potential threats, there is no adversary that has the capability and the intention (that is, the predisposition) in a potential crisis to strike the United States with nuclear weapons The Soviet Union has detargeted its nuclear weapons. The Chinese have the capability to launch attacks to strike American soil, but the relationship between China and the united States is such that this is not a current threat. Other countries do not have a combination of capability and desire.
Terrorism, of course, always lies in wait. But terrorism requires both national security and domestic planning. Similarly, there appear to be no nascent hegemonic powers on the scene. Economics impede such desires on the part of most nations. As for American borders, there is not even a sign of a potential threat. With respect to global systems, clearly the one of most concern is the energy supply from the Gulf, with a dependence by the West that is likely to spread to Central Asia. In the near term, concerns revolve around Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Iran. Over time, Russia and China also may pose dilemmas. But these are extremely hypothetical and long-term scenarios.
From the point of view of current defense planning, the United States is very secure. So, again, if there is no direct threat, how do we plan for national defense?
Planning for Defense When There Is No Threat
The initial approach, developed in the Bush Administration and taken up by the Clinton Administration, is called Major Regional Contingencies. Defense plans and programs would be constructed around two nearly simultaneous threats, one over oil in the Gulf and a second in Korea. The advantage of this approach is that it is clear and understandable to traditional threat-based planners Second, the scenario was fairly stressing: the military would have to plan to mount a major response in far away locations, and on a rapid time frame, against foes with not insignificant military capabilities. The disadvantages of this approach are also clear. First, the scenarios are incomplete in that they do not match the current distribution of American forces worldwide. There's no obvious explanation as to why we have forces in Europe. Second, and most importantly, these scenarios end when the particular threats disappear. If North Korea and/or Iraq collapses, what then for defense?
A more complex approach to threat-based planning would have created a whole portfolio of scenarios against which we would test capabilities. The problem with that approach is that the scenarios, if ever made public, would create foreign relations headaches between the U.S. and the hypothetical scenario foes (e.g., Brazil, Russia, China, and the like). Leaving an ally with the impression that you are planning for a contingency in which they would be an adversary does not promote smooth diplomatic relations. It is very difficult to place your foreign policy and defense planning on the same basis because of the possible negative interaction between the two.
An Alternative: Deterrence-Based Defense Planning
Is there a broad concept instead of major regional contingencies to guide our defense planning? Recalling the earlier definition of "vital national interest" and the current state of security, I believe that the highest goal of foreign policy and defense policy is to keep it that way—no direct and immediate threat to vital interests. The defense planning basis, then, is not threat-reaction, but deterrence. U.S. policy needs to focus on shaping policy environments around the world. There are two immediate consequences of thinking in these terms.
First, the presence of American troops overseas is essential. Second, the U.S. should constantly strive to ensure that American technology is at the cutting edge. History teaches that technology has an important political effect; it deters initiatives from potential foes at both the military and the political level. Recognition of a rival's technological superiority leads one to negotiate not to attack. Strategies for deterrence should also be applied to the approach to proliferators; the will and capacity to act could act as a deterrent should any proliferator seek to evolve into a threat to the United States.
A third issue raised by a deterrence approach to planning is the revolution in military affairs. The military is being changed fundamentally by technology, particularly information technology. The ability to use technology to strike from a great distance leads to quite different notions of what military forces should look like, especially on the ground. There are those who would bet now on new technologies and fundamentally change weapons and military organization using the next generation of procurement resources. But caution is in order. When I first began in military analysis in 1974, a new generation of technology was thought to be on the horizon. Some of those "new" technologies are still not in the field, nearly a quarter century later. Military forces and organization are not simply a matter of technology. They are also a matter of adapting technology to the military environment. That is often neither simple nor easy.
Changes, NATO, and Allies
Finally, two related issues face military planning. First, what will be the effect of NATO expansion on military organization and deployment? If the U.S. military, through NATO, takes on the role of maintaining ground force capability in Europe to defend countries east of Germany, the issue is not necessarily one of U.S. force size. More troops may not be needed. But such an expanded NATO does imply that those forces present in Europe are strategically nailed down; they cannot be used elsewhere. Today, those forces are expected to be available for conflicts elsewhere, principally in the Gulf. If expansion means they cannot fulfill that role, then the U.S. needs a bigger Army. This is a very serious planning, and political, issue which virtually no one wants to discuss. It is, however, very real.
Second, post-Cold War, what is the role of U.S. allies. Defense planning over the last forty years has assumed that America's allies would help defend joint interests. However, our allies have cut their defense budgets much more deeply than America has. They have sharply reduced procurement and R&D has dropped equally sharply. The effect is beginning to be felt throughout European forces. The U.S. is now in a situation in which our allies may in fact be technologically obsolescent. If a military action is required, the U.S. may not want its allies to assist because they could be more of a problem than a help. Obviously, that is not an acceptable solution. But the status and prospects for allied technological capability is a serious issue, and a concern which must be addressed in both military and foreign policy hallways.
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