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The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary, by Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen J. Rosow
7. The Managerial State:
Sovereignty
Neither the Russian communist state, the German fascist state, nor other antiliberal states such as Musollini’s Italy, Franco’s Spain, and Salazar’s Portugal, rejected industrialization. Although all rejected capitalism in name, all retained key features of it. Fascists did not eliminate private ownership, and major corporations continued to play significant roles in fascist states. When the Soviet Union eliminated private ownership and many aspects of a competitive market, it retained key elements of the capitalist organization of work, including the concept of wage labor; it was the state rather than the market, however, that set wage rates and production targets.
In this chapter we examine a form of the state that retains explicit commitments to capitalism and liberalism, although significantly modified and subordinated to a new form of state management. The formal organizational characteristics, internal operations, and basic purpose of the state have converged dramatically in the late twentieth century. 1 Indeed, a singular form, which we call the managerial state, seems to be the most prominent form of the state in the late twentieth century. While managerial states continue to rely on a liberal ideology to frame citizen understandings of the government and social world, this ideology does not adequately describe the character of state power and thereby hides the operations of state power, making it appear that managerial states either have no state at all or have one that is very weak and that “intervenes” in a civil society. Liberal ideology assumes that a private sphere—the economy, the family, the individual—is prior to the state. But as we will show in our discussions below of Fordism and the “consumerization” of citizenship, the relations of state and civil society, of public and private, are themselves constituted by the techniques, especially bureaucratization, through which the state promotes order.
The managerial state continuously monitors, organizes, controls, and regulates the social, economic, and political activities within it. Unlike antiliberal states, the managerial state maintains the liberal distinction between the state and civil society. It does not seek to absorb the economy and national culture directly and completely into the state’s bureaucratic apparatus. 2 But the distinction between state and civil society in managerial states is a tenuous and fragile one because the state diffuses its power throughout civil society. In the words of one scholar, the managerial state “assumes responsibility for the entire condition of contemporary society—the condition of the air, the food and water; the relationship its citizens must be involved in; the habits they develop; their education; their health; and their ability to make a living.” 3
Rationalization and the state
Early in the twentieth century, states began to develop mechanisms and strategies to gain some control over the contingencies of industrialization. One way to do so was to develop a knowledge of industrialization and its consequences; such knowledge facilitated direction and control. New social sciences—economics, sociology, political science—developed based on the idea that industrialization and societies in general comprised systems or structures; that is, they were wholes that were more than the sum of their parts. The individual parts could be understood and made somewhat predictable by understanding the laws of the whole. Systems came to be seen as coordinated through instrumental rationality ; that is, reason came to be seen as the efficient application of means, or the invention of new ones, to a given end. The end was given by the nature of the system: war/victory; economy/prosperity; polity/social order. Viewing what were complex sets of contingent events as integral wholes that could be planned gave to those in power a new sense that the effects of industrialization could be mitigated and their outcomes controlled. In short, the rationalization of knowledge about politics and society helped to make the managerial state possible. What this meant for politics was that the state came to be seen as the coordinator of all of the complex systems that were said to compose society, such as the economy, polity, class structure, and value system. Intervention in each subsystem was limited to coordinating them with the others in managing the whole of the state.
The greatest theorist, and critic, of the way this new form of knowledge transformed the state was the German historian, legal scholar, and sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920). Weber saw the rationalization of the state as inevitable because of the breakdown of the status-based solidarity of feudalism and the emergence of the industrialized and urbanized states of the late nineteenth century. The most important aspect of this development for Weber was the advance of bureaucracy because of its purely technical superiority over other methods of administration. Bureaucracy broke down the complex functions of organizations, such as governments and large corporations, into individual decisions, all coordinated in terms of laws and the instrumental rationality of the whole. According to Weber, compared to other types of social organization, a bureaucracy is the most efficient means of exercising control over a large number of human beings. 4
Bureaucracy, from the French word bureau, meaning desk or office, refers to the sum of individuals who are engaged in administering the public services that must be rendered each day if a state is to survive. As was discussed in Chapter 3, bureaucracy was developed by medieval monarchs in order to extract directly the men, money, and matériel necessary to fight wars and maintain a standing army. The first administrators, or civil servants, were from the king’s household—his steward, reeves, chancellor, and constable—who collected his revenue, provided his justice, and maintained his peace. Gradually, two parallel sets of hierarchically organized institutions (financial and legal), staffed by individuals trained in the law and accounting, came into being. Within these institutions clerks and scribes developed and preserved routine ways of drafting orders and issuing instructions. Thus, a group of individuals appeared who spent their entire working lives in the service of the king. The development of a staff of full-time judges, lawyers, tax collectors, clerks, and scribes gave the medieval king not only the ability to rule his realm directly without the assistance of the aristocracy but also the ability to bypass the estates.
Initially, those who occupied positions within the developing administrative structures regarded their offices as private property that they owned outright, derived income from, and bequeathed to their heirs. In other words, offices were hereditary. During the nineteenth century a gradual rationalization of the administrative organization in every major European state took place, and the idea that such offices were private property gave way to the notion that they were public positions to be filled on the basis of ability and training. This rationalization involved organizational reform and the creation of a merit system for recruiting administrators. The novel idea developed that all of these offices and functions were related to one another in a complex system, a bureaucracy, and that state sovereignty was, in part at least, dependent on the ability to coordinate and manage these complex systems of relations. For this, a scientific knowledge of the laws of bureaucratic systems was necessary.
For Weber the bureaucratic system was efficient because it rationalized human interactions in the following ways. First, it depersonalized them; that is, it treated all interactions without regard to the personal characteristics of the actors, such as gender, age, race, appearance, and ethnicity. 5 Second, it neutralized them; that is, it eliminated all emotional feelings of love, hate, desire, envy, and so forth, from nonfamilial human interactions. Third, it universalized them; that is, it disregarded social position, privilege, status, rank, and so on, in personal interactions. Fourth, it qualified them; that is, it eliminated friendship and family connections in interactions involving hiring and promotion. Finally, it organized them; that is, it arranged human interactions into a series of offices and roles with clear lines of domination and subordination between them. 6
To Weber, bureaucratization and rationalization were systems of social control whose historical roots reached back to the Protestant Reformation. 7 Although he was interested in questions of why they developed, much of his work explained how they worked as systems of domination, not why they came about. Although Weber’s use of a methodology of ideal types may have led him to overstate the coherence and consistency of the bureaucratic system, and to ignore ways in which bureaucracies drew on noninstrumentally rational forms (e.g., personal loyalty, social prejudices), his idea that rationalization and bureaucratization constituted forms of subjectivity distinctive to the modern state and society, and legitimated the state on a new basis, is extremely important. The modern political subject has come to be constituted through the rationalizing systems of bureaucratic domination. People in the managerial state abhor rank, honorific preferences, and privilege because they come to know who they are as political subjects through the institutions of the state.
The managerial state, then, appeared to represent progress toward a political order free of domination because it was based on the rule of law and liberal ideals of individual rights and freedoms, but it came to exercise its control through familiar institutions and routine practices. In other words, the subject population of the managerial state came to accept domination by the state and willingly complied with it insofar as the state was perceived as legal and rational—that is, had been constructed by some rational procedure of which the subject was himself or herself a part. 8 This was a far cry from the medieval state in which domination was accepted by reference to the personal status or position of the order-giver.
Weber was convinced that the rationalization and bureaucratization of both state and civil society were necessary and inevitable. However, rather than a new realm of freedom, as liberals saw these processes, they represented for Weber a new mode of domination that gave the state, and other bureaucratized and rationalized organizations such as economic corporations, tremendous powers of control. According to Weber, modernizing the state and society comes with significant costs. While rationalization eliminates personal and emotional elements such as love, hate, and desire from human interactions, it also results in widespread disenchantment and alienation manifested in various kinds of antibureaucratic activities and resistance, ranging from grumbling about “red tape” to violent attacks on administrative offices. 9
Rationalization also separates means and ends, so that the determination of the latter was removed from rational judgment. For Weber, this amounted to the impoverishment of human spirituality and moral life. In a famous essay he argued that modern science, for all its methodological sophistication and explanatory power, could never justify the choices it had to make about the ends to which society ought to use its knowledge. The spiritual and moral guidance human beings once took from religion and culture was thoroughly disempowered by the rationalization and disenchantment of the world. What was left was an “iron cage,” a neat, highly structured, law-governed, objective order that, by seeking to eliminate contingency, eliminated much of the human spirit that made life worth living. 10
The Consumerization of the Citizen
As the managerial state has expanded in the twentieth century, individual citizens have increasingly come to be treated less as bearers of rights, as in liberal states, and more as efficient contributors to and consumers of the outcomes of bureaucratic state practices. In the managerial state, the political consciousness of the citizen becomes that of the rational consumer, who looks at the state through the lens of a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. Taxes, for example, come to be seen less as necessary contributions to the public good and more as the price of government services. The managerial state becomes the “producer” of public “goods” (“good” slipping in meaning between a normative “good”—what should be done—and a “good” in the sense of a commodity) that are “sold” to the citizenry through the industrialized mass media. As will be shown in Chapter 9 (on nationalism), one of the most important political “goods” that the state “sells” to the public is a set of images of a homogeneous national identity sufficient to establish the individualized consumer/citizen as part of a unified, political, and moral community.
As we saw, in the liberal state political information circulated in a public sphere consisting of newspapers, magazines, clubs, scientific societies, commercial book publishing, and so on. 11 Although the liberal public sphere was never as egalitarian or rational as it is often presented, liberal citizenship presupposed the public circulation of ideas and knowledge that managerial states transform in important ways. 12 Although information continues to circulate in similar ways in managerial states, technology and the industrialization of media industries and the concentration of ownership have reconstituted the relation of citizenship to the public sphere. Political information is increasingly managed and mediated by (1) political parties, which are interested primarily in winning elections; (2) industrial capitalist media, which are interested primarily in profit; and (3) state bureaucracies, which are concerned with producing rational outcomes.
In the liberal state of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political information and imagery were mediated by political parties in which organized elites set out interpretations of the state’s needs and shared goals according to class affiliation, political ideology, or other group identities. As the industrialization of the mass media has increased during the twentieth century—especially through radio and television, which reach subjects in the “privacy” of their own homes—political parties have declined as mediators of political information and interpreters of political needs.
With the decline of parties, the public character of political discussion and debate has also declined. People in managerial states receive their information and interpretations of politics as spectators outside the forums for political discussion and debate, such as union or party meetings or civic organizations, through which citizens used to receive much of their political information. In the managerial state, political information and images are produced and circulated as industrial products like soap and cars. To be successful as capitalist corporations, television and newspapers must reach wide audiences and, therefore, seek to present images and information tailored to the “average” consumer of information. Increasingly, the attitude prevails that one can be a good citizen and gain the knowledge one needs to vote by “keeping up with the news,” but not by actively engaging in political activity and debate; this attitude has routinized the citizen as a consumer and has caused political values and ideologies to become merely images to be consumed rather than subjects of political discussion and debate.
The tenuousness and fragility of the distinction between the state and civil society are apparent in this industrialized construction of the citizen as consumer of media-presented information. The media are both public and private. Although the state does not own and directly control the media, it does intervene to limit and at times direct the way in which information is presented. This is clearest in times of war, as was the case recently with the U.S. military’s manipulation of information about the Gulf War. 13 Election campaigns that take place primarily through the media adopt the same kinds of strategies for controlling the images of candidates, devising and strategically placing advertisements, and controlling the timing of statements. The aim of these efforts is to manage the electorate by carefully regulating, according to the expert knowledge of professional media consultants, the images and information it consumes.
This new language of citizenship appears to reinvigorate a republican political imaginary insofar as information about government and society is made more widely available in the public media. But this mode of publicity actually deepens the passivity of citizenship, even as it allows some citizens to become more well-informed about public affairs. The language of citizenship in managerial states maintains the appearance of popular sovereignty while allowing room for the autonomous operations of bureaucratic and managerial structures under conditions in which the mediations of citizenship and power are opaque to most citizens. One is either “inside” the system, the “insider” being a government official, a lobbyist, or some other functionary privy to and presumed to be knowledgeable about the inner workings of the system, or “outside,” a consumer of the outcomes of a system that appears as an opaque box. Moreover, even those inside the state are subordinated to the logic of spectatorship.
In other words, in the managerial state, citizenship is constructed in a new way. Most citizens must be outside the governing apparatus of the state for it to function smoothly according to the criteria of bureaucratic and instrumental rationality. Citizens who do manage to move inside participate only in those specific areas in which they can claim some special competence or some proprietary interest, such as lobbyists and “special interest groups.” The managerial state must unify this distribution of insiders and outsiders, making them all appear as members of a single, territorial community. It does so through association with the “nation,” a ritualized performance that invokes an abstract, imagined community created through public imagery in the mass media.
Corporatization of the Capitalist Economy
Perhaps the most important change that undermined the social conditions of the liberal state and encouraged the formation of managerial states was the reorganization of the capitalist firm, which brought about a shift in the form of capitalist individualism. Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, the dominant form of organization of capital was the individual firm, that is, the business owned by an individual, a family, or a small partnership. In most cases, those who owned the business participated directly in it. From the point of view of enhancing profits in an industrial system, however, this individualist organization was quite restrictive. It limited the amount of capital that could be invested to that owned by the individual owner or family. It also entailed considerable risks for the owner: if the business went bankrupt or was sued, the personal assets of the individual owners were at risk.
By the end of the nineteenth century, first in the United States and then throughout the industrial capitalist world, the individualist entrepreneur was replaced by the corporation. Incorporation was a highly useful tool that overcame the limits of individual or family ownership. Unlike the latter, the “corporation as a form severs the direct link between capital and its individual owner.” 14 Risk of failure and loss of capital were now borne not by the owners but by the corporation. This made possible vast combinations of capital.
One cultural historian of the post–Civil War United States describes the new economic form of capitalism this way:
The corporation embodied a legally sanctioned fiction, that an association of people constituted a single entity which might hold property, sue and be sued, enter contracts, and continue in existence beyond the lifetime or membership of any of its participants. The association itself was understood as strictly contractual, not necessarily comprised of people acquainted with each other or joined by any common motive other than profit seeking. 15
He goes on to assess the cultural significance of the idea of the corporation as follows:
With the corporate device as its chief instrument, business grew increasingly arcane and mysterious, spawning new roles intermediary between capital and labor, in middle management, accounting, legal departments, public relations, advertising, marketing, sales: the entire apparatus of twentieth-century corporate life was developed in these years and clouded the public perception of the typical acts of business. Organization and administration emerged as major virtues, along with obedience and loyalty. At the same time the rhetoric of success continued to hail the self-made man as the paragon of free labor, even as the virtues of that fictive character grew less and less relevant. 16
The idea of the corporation—the large hierarchical and bureaucratically organized combination of capital—would become the standard organization of private property and production during the twentieth century in managerial states; in some, however, the corporations were direct arms of the state and in others they were owned and managed by private capital. In many states, corporations were owned, either entirely or in significant parts, by foreign capital.
The corporation allowed for ever greater concentrations of capital, which dramatically increased productive capacity. During the first half of the twentieth century a new social system emerged in which workers were increasingly seen as consumers of the products of the industrial economy. Workers increasingly came to be seen as individual consumers whose identities as human beings were tied to the products they consumed, as participants in a consumer culture. 17
In the early twentieth century the industrialist Henry Ford (1863–1947), founder of the Ford Motor Company, pioneered a new social system for an industrial economy. This system has become known as Fordism, and describes the network of political, economic, and social relations that dominated managerial states increasingly from the 1930s to the 1970s.
In his automobile factories, Ford improved techniques for mass production to the point where he could produce large quantities of identical automobiles at greatly reduced cost. The first automobile to be so produced was the Model T, which was the first “world car,” a standardized product that would appeal to “ordinary” people everywhere. Of course, the “ordinary” person who needed or wanted his or her own automobile had to be created, in part through advertising but also through changing the rules of industrial society. Ford realized that he could improve profits by selling these cars to the very workers who produced them. This meant paying higher than subsistence wages, contrary to the norm of nineteenth-century capitalist firms. In effect, Fordism amounted to a class compromise in which workers accepted loss of control in the factories in return for sufficient wages to live a comfortable, private life. Of course, this only applied to workers in some factories and in industries in which higher wages could be wrested from often intransigent employers. Fordism was in practice inequitable, creating divisions within the working class. Nevertheless, after World War II, and in part because of the war, the Fordist reconstitution of the worker as consumer became the norm that determined the aspirations of even the poorest workers. For liberals, Fordism came to be seen as a worthy system of industrial relations, which the state should and could manage by manipulating economic policies. To Marxist critics, Fordism, although it produced certain isolated gains for some workers, entrenched the alienation of the industrial capitalist system deep into social life and relegitimized the domination of the bourgeoisie over industrial society. 18
In the Fordist compromise, workers became consumers who compensated for the loss of control over their work with consumption of material goods during leisure time. Increasingly, workers would be represented by labor unions—representation that led to increased wages, safer and better working conditions, and a shorter workweek. Unions and workers would turn to the state to guarantee the gains won in organized labor struggles. In return for legalizing unions and for the state’s acceptance of its role as guarantor of labor’s hard-won gains, unions gave up the aspirations of socialist and more radical workers’ movements to redirect investments toward social needs rather than corporate profit, or democratizing control over the factories. Essentially, mid-twentieth-century labor unions, especially in the United States, accepted the class compromise of Fordism, and organized the patriotism and support of workers for a form of the state that managed the Fordist industrial system. 19
Fordism became entrenched in the U.S. economy during the 1930s as an antidote to the Great Depression, and in the 1940s as a facilitator of the massive war production of World War II, during which vast numbers of people had participated as either workers or soldiers. After World War II, the consumer aspect of Fordism became deeply entrenched. This was in part for the economic reason of absorbing the tremendous productive capacity that the war had produced, and in part for political reasons: to control and pacify workers and soldiers whose expectations had been heightened by participation in the war. The state came to function as the instrumentally rational guarantor of the Fordist class compromise and the consumer society.
Gendering the Management of Economic Prosperity
One result of Fordism was that responsibility for ensuring the well-being and continued prosperity of the economy was transferred to the state. The working class looked to the state to cement the gains it had won through unionization and collective bargaining with private capital. Private capital looked to the state to oversee the general conditions of accumulation of wealth in the national economy, managing the money supply through its treasury and central bank, regulating the stock market, ensuring competition by regulating monopolies, and providing or guaranteeing investments in infrastructure such as roads, ports, electrical grids, and telephone systems. Of particular importance was the state’s role in providing general security and stability through the police, the courts, the prisons, and the social services (at home) and through military interventions (abroad) to stabilize opportunities for investment and trade.
Fordism also depended on a particular division of work between men and women. Early on, Ford required that workers in his automobile factories maintain a stable, healthy, and traditional family life. By this he meant that women would care for the children and do housework while men worked in the factory for wages (of course, women were not paid for their work), and that the family would go to church regularly and would avoid alcohol and drugs. Antisocial or disruptive behavior, even in “private” life, could be cause for dismissal from the factory. Although unions were able to fight and defeat many of the social restrictions placed on male workers, they left the division of labor between men and women intact.
The family, then, played a distinctive role in Fordist economies and in the regulation of the industrial citizen. It provided the “private” infrastructure of emotional support and organized consumption that kept men happy at work and, above all, self-disciplined. That is, they were disciplined to support the family, a responsibility that they accepted because of the services women provided for them outside the factory by taking care of household work, raising children, planning family consumption, and providing sexual and emotional satisfaction.
World War II, paradoxically, deepened this divide; managing the division of labor between men and women became an important part of the managerial state. This was paradoxical given that during the war, as men went to fight, women took up industrial jobs. Rosie the Riveter became the symbol of a generation of women who ably demonstrated that they possessed the strength, intelligence, and character to do the “hard work” of mass industrial production, despite the contention of Fordist ideology that they were naturally unsuited to do so.
After the war, government programs guaranteed returning soldiers their old jobs and required women to return to “private” life. These programs not only managed the supply of workers by ensuring against the massive unemployment that might be expected to follow the demobilization of millions of soldiers, but they also reinstituted the structure of Fordist discipline. Government programs to aid education also helped manage the labor supply, giving male workers the skills for the next generation of industrial jobs by providing ex-soldiers with grants to attend college in programs such as the G.I. Bill in the United States. The return to domesticity in the larger culture of the 1950s and 1960s can then be seen as a strategy within the context of managerial states, which blended elements of state and civil society together in a diffuse network of regulatory power.
To accomplish their objectives, twentieth-century managerial states have come to rely increasingly on experts in economics, law, psychology, organizational science, and various substantive areas of public policy. For women this meant the promotion of scientific approaches to “home economics” and the inclusion of this subject for girls in public schools. This has led not only to the retaining of professionals and experts within a state’s own bureaucracy, but also to the development of close interconnections between experts in private industries and in universities, whether public or private. Lawyers still dominate in government positions, as Max Weber argued they would in modern states, 20 but to manage late capitalist industrial economies, states have generated networks of experts and bodies of expertise that cut across the boundaries of state and civil society.
Managing National Economic Life
Under some circumstances, the managerial state would intervene directly in the industrial capitalist economy by nationalizing industries that failed as private enterprises but provided the public goods the system as a whole needed (for example, railroads and utilities); by subjecting private corporations to environmental regulations; by providing social services; and by energizing the economy with spending on the military. In some cases the state would manage the economy indirectly by adding incentives and disincentives to the tax code or by passing tariffs or subsidies to favor some industries or forms of investment over others. The specific strategies used depended on situational factors in specific states, such as the history of bureaucratization within them; the roles of war and the military in the development of state institutions; the strength, ideology, and character of political parties and unions; and the relative position of the national economy in the world economy. 21
Even states that continued a strong ideology of economic liberalism, and professed allegiance to nonintervention by the state in markets, developed into managerial states. In France and Germany some of the institutions created to direct mercantilist economies provided fertile ground for the growth of managerialism. In both cases, the state took responsibility for developing the infrastructure and pioneered national systems of education, in part to produce well-trained civil servants with managerial and engineering expertise.
Both France and Germany have gone through periods when certain industries were nationalized, that is, taken over and managed by the state. In the nineteenth century, the German state continued to industrialize by importing British machinery, then the most advanced in the world, and British technicians to train German workers in their proper operation. During the period of the German Empire (1871–1918), industries owned by the nobility, such as breweries in Bavaria, porcelain factories in Meissen and Berlin, and cigarette manufacturing facilities in Strasbourg, were nationalized. Agriculture and mining also came under state regulation and control during this period. 22 After World War II, the West German state denationalized certain industries, relaxed economic controls, and gave market forces (supply and demand) more significance. Nonetheless, the West German state continued, and continues, to intervene very actively into economic life. Subsidies were made available in order to encourage postwar reconstruction, especially in housing. Tax exemptions were given in order to increase savings and reduce personal consumption. The state subsidized the production of fertilizer and controlled certain agricultural prices by regulating imports and exports. In general, the approach was and continues to be state intervention in order to manage market forces to achieve specific ends.
In France, nationalization occurred after World War II and continued into the 1980s, when U.S.- and British-inspired neoliberalism (see Chapter 12) began to influence even the socialists away from state ownership of industry and toward more indirect forms of market management using tax and fiscal policies. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the railroads, electricity production, telephone communications, petroleum production, aircraft manufacturing, and some automobile manufacturing were taken over by the state because state ownership was seen as necessary for economic development or, as in the case of the Renault automobile manufacturer, a punishment for collaborating with the Vichy régime during the war. After the war, national economic planning was introduced. 23
It was not until the twentieth century that active state regulation and management of the economy began in Britain. As will be shown in Part 3, during the nineteenth century, Britain dominated the world economy as the strongest and most innovative capitalist economy. Liberal economic policies were a crucial factor in its dominance. During the 1920s, when Britain no longer dominated the world capitalist economy, the price of coal began to be regulated and industries were encouraged by tax-abatement schemes to locate themselves in economically depressed areas. During the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), an economist teaching at Cambridge University, argued that the Great Depression could be overcome and prevented if the state actively intervened by using monetary and fiscal policy to encourage economic growth. The key to economic growth, he argued, was full employment to be attained by careful management of markets.
After World War II, the British state began to nationalize certain industries, such as coal, steel, electricity, and transportation; institute a series of economic development councils that offered technical and financial incentives to key industries; and use Keynesian-inspired monetary and fiscal measures to attain full employment. Systematic economic planning was introduced in the 1960s with the establishment of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC), which brought together representatives from government, industry, and labor to monitor the performance of the economy, consider plans to foster economic growth, and agree upon methods to improve economic performance. Other measures were taken to improve economic productivity and managerial efficiency. In essence, the British state guides a largely privately owned economy by manipulating market mechanisms. 24
In the United States, where liberalism has also had a significant impact, state management of the economy developed out of different historical conditions than those in Britain. In important ways the growth of managerialism in the United States owes much to direct mobilization for war by a state whose ideology and geographical location inclined it to avoid a permanent large military force, at least until after World War II.
The necessity of mobilizing economic resources in order to fight the Civil War (1860–1865) and reconstruct the South after the war marks the first significant intervention of the American state into the economy. From 1860 to 1877, the state became a major purchaser of iron, textiles, shoes, and meat. The state established and operated its own manufacturing facilities for clothing, pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, and firearms. The state also instituted the first U.S. income tax, as well as other taxes, including excise, luxury, and inheritance, during this period in order to supplement revenues from customs duties. 25
Several acts of Congress passed during the Civil War were designed to encourage industrial growth and westward expansion. The Homestead Act of 1862 gave land in the western states to those who were willing to settle and farm it. The Morrill College Act of the same year granted land for the building of universities dedicated to the improvement of agriculture and mining. The Immigration Act of 1864 allowed millions of immigrants to flood into the United States in order to provide labor for the new factories serving its rapidly industrializing economy. The Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads were founded as federally chartered companies and given land in the West in order to construct a transcontinental railroad. 26
During World War I, the U.S. state intervened in the economy in order to boost the production of war matériel. It regulated industries, imposed price controls, and involved itself in labor disputes. It set up a complex of boards and agencies that mobilized U.S. workers and industry for the war effort. The income tax, which had been abolished after the Civil War, was revived and made permanent with the passage of the Income Tax Amendment in 1913. The War Industries Board regulated industrial production according to wartime needs. 27
After World War I, the state did not significantly intervene in the economy until the Great Depression of the 1930s. Faced with the collapse of the economy, Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945), who had been elected president in 1932, initiated a program called the New Deal, which sought to revitalize the economy by stimulating aggregate demand through government spending on public works and other types of projects. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 established the National Recovery Administration and the Works Progress Administration, which, by means of price supports for agricultural products, bulk purchasing of manufactures, regulation of credit and interest rates, monetary controls, and jobs programs (which built roads, bridges, dams, schools, libraries, and houses), stimulated the economy to recover from the depression. 28
During World War II, the U.S. state again intervened in the economy in order to mobilize it for the production of war matériel. Throughout the war the executive branch held unfettered control over the economy. The Office of War Mobilization, the Office of Price Administration, and the Office of Economic Stabilization together managed the economy by controlling prices, wages, rents, and profits, and by rationing consumption. 29
After the war the U.S. state relaxed its grip on the economy but did not release it completely. As in other managerial states such as Britain, France, and Germany, state management of the economy has become permanent. The principal tools for this task were Keynesian-inspired monetary and fiscal policies and a host of regulatory agencies and commissions, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The state also subsidizes major sectors of the economy, such as agriculture. 30
As the dominant power on the Western side of the war, the United States engaged in massive military spending—which took the form of contracting for weapons from private arms producers. During the Cold War, military spending became a form of economic management, not unlike the way military spending during World War II had helped to pull the economy out of depression. The arms race during the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s and under President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s became the main engine of economic growth and spurred technological development in the economy as a whole. A policy of military Keynesianism, which blurred the lines between state and civil society by generating a military-industrial complex, remains central to managing the U.S. economy.
Managing Welfare
One of the most significant areas of state management of industrial capitalism is social welfare. Welfare programs such as health insurance, social security, unemployment insurance, and aid to the poor are important tools used by the state to manage prosperity and maintain public order. These programs are often used to channel money to consumers to ensure sufficient aggregate demand for the mass-produced goods of industrial corporations, and to redirect labor to the new jobs that the economy requires. They are also important components of the management of general social order by disciplining recipients of aid through stipulating program requirements and by ameliorating and confining the worst effects of the dislocations of the capitalist marketplace.
Concern for the welfare for the entire subject population did not, however, begin with the managerial state. Such programs paralleled the development of the state in Europe. During the medieval period it was the duty of the Catholic Church to assist the poor and to provide education, which it did primarily to educate its own priesthood. Over time, these responsibilities and many others were gradually shifted to the state. Three epochs in the process of transference can be identified. The first includes the period before the Industrial Revolution, when the primary concern was poverty among the rural peasantry. The second epoch begins with the Industrial Revolution, about 1750, and lasts until the the beginning of the twentieth century; during this epoch the social and economic problems created by industrialization and urbanization were addressed. In the third epoch, which began in the early decades of the twentieth century and extends to the present, the state has taken on the responsibility of maintaining the education, health, and safety of the entire subject population. 31
In the first epoch, the state sought only to rescue the rural poor from destitution. The most developed system for providing poor relief, as it was called, appeared in England during the Tudor period (1536–1603). During this time several poor relief acts were passed by Parliament. Under these acts every destitute person was to receive relief and each parish was to raise money in order to pay the indigent an allowance to supplement their meager wages. Poor relief programs were administered by county justices of the peace. By the end of the eighteenth century this system of poor relief came under heavy criticism because it depressed rural wages and reduced the mobility of the poor, who could not seek better employment elsewhere without losing their allowances. Therefore, Parliament passed the Poor Law Amendment Act (1834), which removed poor relief from the justices of the peace and gave it to elected local boards operating under central authority. In 1929 the English Parliament passed an act that abolished poor relief and replaced it with a system of public assistance administered by county councils.
In France, until the French Revolution, the king relied upon the Catholic Church to provide poor relief through its hospitals, outdoor relief centers, and other charitable foundations. The king provided bread ( pain du roi ) to the beggars and vagabonds of Paris, and each of his intendants was permitted to use a small share of the king’s revenues to aid the poor in their généralités. The French Revolution abolished the charitable foundations of the Church and the royal revenues; hence poor relief fell to the new local authorities created by the revolutionary government ( départements and communes ). Préfects of the départements were required to deal with rural destitution and, after Napoléon seized power, undertook many public works projects, such as building roads, in order to provide jobs for the rural poor. In 1871 the French National Assembly passed a law that required each départements to provide public assistance to all who were unable to work because of old age, mental illness, or sickness. 32
During the second epoch the idea that the state’s responsibility to provide poor relief as a temporary concession to the indigent, working poor was replaced with the idea that the state could regulate its workers by providing a panoply of social services. The new conditions that caused this change in thinking were industrialization, urbanization, and modern warfare. It began to be recognized that beyond the rural worker’s basic right to life, which poor relief laws recognized, workers of a state’s population had to be provided a minimum standard of health and physical well-being. This recognition was connected to the necessity of maintaining a healthy subject population for the dual purposes of providing recruits for the armed forces and boosting morale. 33 Thus, the state began to concern itself with standards of sanitation in the new industrial towns, to regulate the conditions of employment in the new factories, and to guarantee a decent standard of subsistence by insuring against sickness, unemployment, and old age. These programs were designed to discipline or otherwise minimize the restlessness of workers and the poor as a first line of defense, so to speak, against radical political parties and movements as well as general social disorder, which would disrupt the industrial economy.
The first such regulation was initiated in Britain. In the nineteenth century, Parliament passed the Factory Act (1833), which created a system of factory inspection. The Mine Regulation Act of 1842 protected miners; the Factory Act of 1847 limited the workday to 10 hours; the Merchant Shipping Act of 1876 protected merchant seamen; and the Regulation of Railways Act of 1889 protected railroad workers. In 1848 Parliament passed the Public Health Act, which guaranteed minimum levels of sanitation in places of work and in dwellings. 34
The first system of insurance against sickness, unemployment, and old age was started in Germany. In the 1880s, German Chancellor Bismarck pushed a series of laws through the Reichstag that he hoped would destroy the Social Democratic Party (SPD) by making the state responsible for the provision of social insurance for the working class. The first of these laws, which insured workers against sickness, was passed in 1883. Workers paid two-thirds of the cost and their employers the other one-third. These premiums were collected and paid by special insurance societies approved and regulated by the state. A second law, which insured workers against accidents, was passed in 1884. Premiums for this insurance were paid by employers, who were permitted to form industrial associations to collect the premiums and pay claims. The third and last law of this series was passed in 1889 and insured workers against invalidity and old age. Workers and employers contributed equally to this fund, and the state made a contribution to the pension ultimately paid. 35
The German system spread to other industrializing European states. In Britain, Parliament passed the Workmen’s Compensation Act in 1897, which required that employers insure employees against the dangers of their employment. In 1908 the Old Age Pensions Act introduced a pension system paid for entirely by the state for workers over the age of 70 who were unable to support themselves. In 1909 Parliament passed the Trade Boards Act, which established a minimum wage for workers in jobs that did not provide trade union representation. In 1911 the National Insurance Act introduced a health insurance scheme to which workers, employers, and the state paid equal premiums. This act also provided for unemployment insurance in certain industries such as ironfounding and shipbuilding. 36
Social insurance for workers advanced much less rapidly in France. The first such act was not passed until 1905, when pensions were provided by the state for the aged poor and incurably ill. In 1910 the National Assembly passed the Old Age Pension Act, which provided pensions for wage earners from a fund contributed to by employees, employers, and the state. In 1913 the National Assembly passed an act that gave aid to families with more than three children in order to encourage population growth and to fight a high infant mortality rate.
In the United States the advent of social insurance was even slower than in France. Although perhaps as much as 30 percent of workers had workmen’s compensation insurance required by different states, only 2 percent had old-age insurance in 1915. Not until the depths of the Great Depression did the American state introduce accident, unemployment, and old-age insurance for wage earners. Industrial accident insurance was introduced in 1930. The Social Security Act of 1935 introduced retirement and unemployment insurance. In 1950 the portion of the Social Security Act that provided aid to blind and needy children became an aid-to-children program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which paid benefits to one parent in a family where children were beneficiaries. In the same year aid was extended to the totally disabled. In 1972 a uniform federal system of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) was set up for the aged, blind, and disabled. 37
In the third epoch the idea that the state’s responsibilities were to provide social services to the working class was replaced with the notion that the state was responsible for insuring the health, safety, and retirement of the entire subject population. Again the aim was to discipline and regulate the poor, to limit the political development of radical movements, and to promote general social order.
In Britain the Widows, Orphans, and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act of 1925 created a new social insurance scheme and extended unemployment insurance to cover most wage earners. A series of housing acts gave the state the responsibility of constructing housing. In 1928 France passed a compulsory social insurance law that gave sickness, maternity, invalidity, and old-age insurance to all citizens. During the Weimar Republic in Germany, unemployment insurance was expanded.
After World War II, in Britain the Family Allowance Act, which paid weekly benefits to families with two or more children under the age of 15, was passed by Parliament. In 1946 the National Insurance Act was passed; it provided substantial coverage for sickness and unemployment as well as maternity benefits, widows’ allowances, and retirement pensions for the entire population. The National Assistance Act, which was passed in 1948, required local governments to make accommodations available for the old, the infirm, and those in need of a place to live. Finally, also in 1948, the National Health Service was created; this placed all health services (private, local, and national) under the authority of the state and made it freely available to the entire subject population. 38
After World War II, the French state also strengthened and rationalized its social insurance scheme such that the vast majority of its subject population became covered by social insurance paid for by contributions from employers and employees. French social insurance covers sickness, disability, retirement, widowhood, and death. It also includes generous benefits for families. The larger the family, the greater the benefits. An additional allowance is paid to families if the mother does not work. In addition, large families receive income tax rebates, reduced fares on public transportation, and increased pensions. France also provides an extensive system of hospitals, orphanages, retirement homes, and asylums. Although the French state does not have a national health service, it does contribute to an individual’s medical expenses under a fee reimbursement plan. Patients are free to choose their physicians, and the state insurance system reimburses the patient for 80 percent of the bill. 39
The German state has also broadened its coverage since the end of World War II. Social security legislation passed in 1954 allowed retired persons to maintain the standard of living they enjoyed during their working years by indexing pensions to reflect earnings and taking inflation into account. The Federal Unemployment Office makes payments and grants low-interest loans to workers to cover travel expenses incurred during their searches for new jobs, moving expenses, interview expenses, vocational retraining, and counseling. Since 1959 German construction workers have received subsidies from employment offices, known as “bad weather money,” for rainy, snowy, or subzero winter days. In 1996, these payments were replaced with a system guaranteeing workers 75 percent of their gross pay per hour for inclement days during the months from November to March. Germany continues to provide health insurance through the system established by Bismarck in the 1880s, although it was overhauled in 1955. The scheme is still supported by joint contributions from workers, employers, and the state, and is still administered by welfare funds that pay the physicians of the patients’ own choosing. 40
The U.S. state did not introduce health insurance until 1964 with the passage of the Medicaid program, which provides joint federally and state-funded health insurance for the poor, and the Medicare program, which provides federally funded insurance for the elderly that covers hospitalization and subsidized outpatient care. 41 Unlike European states, the American state still does not provide health insurance for the general population.
Contemporary liberals consider welfare programs as entitlements, that is, as programs justified in part because they are equally available to all citizens as individuals, regardless of race, class, or gender, and in part because they are seen as providing the prerequisites for all persons in the society to live a dignified life. All persons, liberals argue, are entitled to receive adequate medical care, to avoid destitution, to be able to provide for their own and their family’s economic well-being, and to receive unemployment compensation when they are thrown out of work. Entitlements, for liberals, then, are legitimate functions of the state in an industrial economy. But the liberal ideology does not fully recognize the extent to which these programs intervene in the recipient’s private life. In other words, liberals want to maintain a clear and inviolable distinction between state and civil society and between public and private; but these programs actually render the distinction, at best, fragile. Conservatives who challenge the legitimacy of these programs also promote a sharp distinction between civil society and the state, public and private, which does not accord to the realities of welfare programs.
In practice, the management of social services for the poor, the elderly, or the unemployed involves the state deeply in the regulation of people’s everyday lives. Moreover, in spite of the attempts to maintain the universality and equality of entitlement programs, wealthy and privileged groups have been able to avoid the more intrusive forms of intervention entailed by them. Feminists have recognized the disciplinary aspects of social services most clearly.
Women and men become subjects of the state’s management of social services in different ways and to different extents. 42 This is especially the case in states, such as the United States, where women have been relatively unsuccessful in obtaining child-care programs, maternity leave, and equal pay for equal work, all of which would help make them equal to men in the public world of civil society and the world of work. Although all social service programs require recipients of benefits to conform to certain rules, some programs intervene into the private lives of their recipients more intrusively than do others. To receive unemployment insurance, for example, one of the few social service programs in which men participate more than women, one must actually be looking for work, going to school, or enrolled in a job-training program to receive compensation. But the state relies on the recipient to provide evidence; it does not send an agent of the state out to follow the individual around to see if he is actually looking for work or going to school.
On the other hand, the programs in which women participate in greater numbers than men often subject recipients to far more state scrutiny and intrusion into their lives. Single mothers receiving state aid for their children may be required to live with their parents, and those receiving food stamps are limited in the choices of what they can buy with them. More significant, women in these programs are often subjected to constant surveillance by social workers and other agents of the state, such as the police, who have the power under some circumstances to remove children from their mothers. These programs fall disproportionately on women because of the traditional prejudices and social structures that see women as primarily responsible for the home and “private” life. As we mentioned above, these customary prejudices were an important part of Fordism. In practice, the man’s private life in managerial states is more inviolable than is the woman’s. The poor, which often includes high numbers of racial and ethnic minorities because of prejudice and structural inequalities in the provision of education and work opportunities, are also often subjected to intrusive forms of state intervention that blur the lines of public and private.
Managing Political Participation
As we discussed above, the managerial state reconstitutes citizens according to a logic of insiders and outsiders, and relocates sovereign unity and indivisibility in the nation. This political distribution is managed by the formalization and routinization of procedural democracy.
The principal way that people participate in politics in the managerial state is through regular elections, which channel participation away from unpredictable, disruptive, and spontaneous forms of participation such as demonstrating, rioting, and throwing bombs. Elections “domesticate” and pacify participation and transform it into a routine, peaceful public activity. Through rules that (1) regulate the composition of the electorate and (2) transform voters’ choices into electoral outcomes, the managerial state controls when, where, how, and which individuals will participate.
From the early nineteenth century in the United States, for example, the composition of the electorate was regulated by property-owning and tax-paying requirements, poll taxes, literacy tests, and franchise laws that denied women, blacks, and youths, the right to vote. Although these restrictions have been abandoned in the twentieth century, the inconvenience and expense of registering to vote (furnishing proof of identity, residency, and citizenship, and taking time off from work to appear at the registrar’s office) still regulates the composition of the electorate by depressing the electoral participation of the poor and poorly educated. Thus, in the United States, personal registration skews the electoral process in favor of better-educated, higher-income people. 43
In the managerial state, elections are increasingly understood as electoral “systems.” Elections make sense, and are made sense of by the press and the academic discipline of political science, as part of a rational system of rules and regulations the aim of which is to produce predictable outcomes. Crucial to regulating this system is the manipulation of the outcomes of elections by regulating the way in which individual votes will be translated into seats in a representative body. Two sets of regulations are crucial to managing this system: (1) those that establish the criteria for winning and (2) those that define the electoral districts. 44
There are two ways to regulate winning. One is to award victory to the candidate who receives either a plurality or a majority of the ballots cast. Another is to award victory to competing political parties in rough proportion to the votes each has received of the ballots cast. For example, a party that received 40 percent of the vote would receive about 40 percent of the seats in the representative body. Systems of proportional representation are advantageous to small and weak social groups; majority and plurality systems are advantageous to large and powerful groups. This is because in an election to a representative body, proportional representation reduces the number of votes that a political party must receive in order to win seats; and majority and plurality rules increase that number. Thus, the choice of the rules that regulate winning will have a substantial impact on the number and nature of the political parties within the state. 45
Britain and the United States both manage the participation of their subject populations through regular elections for representative bodies such as Parliament, Congress, state legislatures, and city and county councils. Elections for Parliament must be held every five years, and elections for one-third of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Congress every two years. Neither state controls the composition of the electorate through property-owning requirements, poll taxes and the like, although in the United States, residency requirements of varying amounts of time are still used by individual states.
The composition of the electorate is regulated primarily through personal registration laws, especially in the U.S. state, where the political parties are weak. Winning has been regulated by the use of plurality electoral systems, which favor large, powerful groups and have produced two dominant political parties both in Britain and the United States. Although other parties exist in both states, they have had difficulty surviving—especially in the United States, because the electoral system and state laws create difficulties for “third-party” candidates attempting to gain access to the ballot. In the United States especially, the outcomes of elections can be influenced by gerrymandering (manipulating the geographical boundaries of districts in order to increase one outcome over another), named after an early nineteenth-century governor of Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry (1744–1814), who allegedly redrew the lines of a district in the shape of a salamander in order to increase the vote for his party. Because different distributions of voters among districts produce different outcomes, those who control the lines of the districts are able to manipulate the results. Gerrymandering has been used extensively in the United States to dilute the voting strength of racial minorities. 46
The French and German states have also managed political participation by regulating the composition of the electorate and manipulating the transformation of voters’ choices into electoral outcomes. In the nineteenth century both used property-owning and tax-paying requirements and restricted the franchise to men. In the twentieth century the franchise has been granted to all individuals over 18 years old, who are, by law, required to register. From 1871 to 1958, France used proportional representation, which produced 10 to 20 parties, none of which was large enough to win a majority of seats in the National Assembly. When Charles de Gaulle came to power in 1958, he changed the electoral law to a majority system that requires a second ballot if no candidate, including in elections for the presidency, receives a majority on the first ballot.
Germany has used both plurality and proportional systems. During the Weimar Republic proportional representation was used, which produced a plethora (about 40) of small parties. During the Third Reich only one party was permitted, the Nazi Party, and no elections were held after 1933. After World War II, the German state instituted a combined plurality-proportional electoral system. One-half of the seats in the Bundestag are elected by plurality from single-member districts and one-half by proportional representation.
The trend in managerial states has been toward fewer large parties that do not differ much from one another in terms of ideology. 47 Such catchall parties seek to capture as many voters as possible by appealing to prudent administration, managerial ability, technical expertise, or personal morality, as well as appealing to what is good for the “nation” or “the people” as a whole.
Thus, elections in the managerial state have become ritualistic confrontations between candidates and parties who claim to be able to manage the state more effectively and efficiently than their opponents, rather than occasions for serious public debate and discussion about pressing issues. Increasingly, parties control their images by employing the marketing techniques of consumer manipulation used in commercial advertising in order to mobilize or demobilize voters. Public opinion polling is also used extensively. Recent trends in such management of participation have produced significant political disenchantment among voters and a general apathy toward public affairs, which is reflected in marked declines in the percentage of eligible voters who actually vote in all managerial states.
Summary
In the managerial states of the twentieth century the relation of subject and sovereign has been reconstituted, and the state has developed new powers of surveillance and social control. One of these new forms of control stems from the relocating of sovereignty in the nation, an imagined community of all citizens within a particular territory. Part 3 discusses nationalism and the nation as part of modern state practice and the spread of the state as the hegemonic form of political organization throughout the world. Part 4 examines the question of whether the recent trends toward neoliberalism—a revival of economic liberalism in the context of a globalizing capitalist economy—are transforming the managerial state or whether this trend can best be understood as a retooling of managerialism.
Endnotes
Note 1: Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990). Back.
Note 2: Giandomenico Majone, “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe,” in Wolfgang C. Müller and Vincent Wright, eds., The State in Western Europe: Retreat or Redefinition (Newbury Park, CA, and Great Britain: Frank Cass, 1994), 77-101. Back.
Note 3: Szymon Chodak, The New State: Etatization of Western Societies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 17. Back.
Note 4: Henry Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the World (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 147-149. Back.
Note 5: This claim has been challenged by feminist scholars who argue that the instrumental rationality, historically situated in male positions in society and reinforcing values and norms considered by Western states to be masculine, has rendered bureaucracies as gendered institutions in which women occupy lower-level, subordinate jobs while men occupy the more authoritative, higher-level positions. See especially Kathy Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1984). Back.
Note 6: Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958). Back.
Note 7: Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner’s, 1958). Back.
Note 8: Robert A. Solo, The Positive State (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western, 1982), 26. Back.
Note 9: Jacoby, The Bureaucratization of the World, 181-190. Back.
Note 10: Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber. Back.
Note 11: On the liberal public sphere, see Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). Back.
Note 12: On this, see “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere,” in Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). Back.
Note 13: See John R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992). Back.
Note 14: Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capitalism: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 258. Back.
Note 15: Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982), 83. Back.
Note 17: Stuart Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976). Back.
Note 18: Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capitalism. Back.
Note 19: Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Back.
Note 20: Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber. Back.
Note 21: On the Asian version of the managerial state, see David Martin Jones, “Democratization, Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle Class Culture in Pacific Asia,” Comparative Politics 30 (January 1998): 147-169. Back.
Note 22: Stanley Rothman, European Society and Politics (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 734-745. Back.
Note 23: Ibid., 760-768. Back.
Note 25: Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1994), chap. 7. Back.
Note 31: Barker, The Development of Public Services in Western Europe 1660– 1930 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966), 68-70. Back.
Note 33: On the influence of war on the development of social services, see Richard M. Titmuss, Essays on the Welfare State, 2d ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), chap. 4. Back.
Note 34: Barker, Development of Public Services, 73-74. Back.
Note 37: Robert T. Kudrle and Theodore R. Marmore, “The Development of Welfare States in North America,” in Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of the Welfare State in Europe and America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 91-107. Back.
Note 38: Barker, The Development of Public Services in Western Europe. Back.
Note 39: Rothman, European Society and Politics, 767-768. Back.
Note 41: Kudrle and Marmore in Flora and Heidenhimer, eds., The Development of the Welfare State in Europe and America, 94. Back.
Note 42: On women in the welfare state, see Nancy Fraser, “Women, Welfare, and the Politics of Need Interpretation,” in Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Susan Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, eds., Mothers of a New World: Maternalistic Politics and the Origins of Welfare States (London: Routledge, 1993). Back.
Note 43: Theodore J. Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg, American Government: Freedom and Power, 3d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 416-423. Back.
Note 47: Otto Kircheimer, “Germany: The Vanishing Opposition,” in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). Back.
The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary
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