

## VI CONCLUSION

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There are only two forces that unite men – fear and interest.

*Napoleon Bonaparte*

The post-Cold War era started with new challenges to international peace and security – the focus shifted from the traditional concern with inter-state conflicts to a new preoccupation with intra-state conflicts. Of 27 major conflicts around the globe in 1999, all but two occurred within national boundaries.<sup>396</sup> Some of the most serious threats to international peace and security were posed by the breakdown of domestic order, with consequences such as refugee flows or economic crises which spread well beyond the borders of the state itself.

The international community responded with new types of military interventions – interventions that go beyond pure military engagement to encompass a whole range of state building tasks.<sup>397</sup> An important benchmark in implementing civilian aspects of a peace agreement has been creation of an institutional structure that secures peace, stability and prosperity of a war-torn society. Constitutional arrangements are important elements of a peace process and it may take long periods of time for the parties involved to negotiate the text of a constitution. The interest of the international community has not been a proliferation of new states and a frequent redrawing of the world map. Therefore, the international community always tries to induce parties to the conflict to

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<sup>396</sup> Paul Collier, “Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy” (World Bank, 15 June 2000).

<sup>397</sup> This challenge has transformed the role of military interventions. First, at the level of state and international institutional practice, military intervention has become central to policy making. Second, at the level of public activism, peace movements in the West opposed to military interventions have been displaced by NGOs and professional associations concerned with peace education and conflict resolution programs. See David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul. Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 157.

find the *modus vivendi* formula acceptable to all and guaranteed by the constitution and renounce the change of state borders.<sup>398</sup> International lawyers often refer to this as ‘internal self-determination’: the right of national groups within a multiethnic state to preserve their cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, to participate in the national political process, and possibly to exercise a degree of self-governance or regional autonomy.<sup>399</sup> To this end, in defining the international role in solving internal conflicts around the globe, international experts bring to the negotiating table a range of tools, from ideas of consociational democracy<sup>400</sup> to electoral systems designed to promote moderate political behavior.<sup>401</sup>

In practice, however, the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction is not solely, or even primarily, one of constitutional design. Whatever constitutional model is adopted, there is a significant risk that the new institutions and political processes will not take hold. As the World Bank found in a recent study, immediately after the settlement of a civil

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<sup>398</sup> All subjects in multinational societies must be allowed to take part in changing the founding legal act that determines the rules of the political game, namely, the constitution. Liberals such as Rawls who spoke of constitutions (of constitutional essentials, to be exact), believed that the constitution could not be subject to political debate because it embodies the essential values of a society. However, it is no longer assumed that the norms of membership within a constitutional democracy can be determined outside the political process itself, by theoretical reasoning aimed at discovering the *a priori* forms of universal membership. It is now widely argued in theory and in practice that those identities worthy of recognition must be worked out and decided on by the members of the association themselves. See, for example, Alain-G Gagnon and James Tully (eds.), *Multinational Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>399</sup> See for example Antonio Cassese, *Self-Determination: A Legal Reappraisal* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

<sup>400</sup> ‘Consociational democracy’ contains a range of techniques designed to ensure that a majority ethnic group cannot exclude a minority from power, including regional autonomy, proportional representation in legislative and executive posts. The classic statement of the theory is in Arend Lijphart’s 1971 article “Cultural diversity and theories of political integration. See also Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

<sup>401</sup> For examples, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

war, the risk of conflict breaking out again is around 40 per cent.<sup>402</sup> Even where an extensive international peace mission is deployed to prevent a return to armed conflict, the obstacles to building an effective state are substantial. The question of whether it is possible for external actors to guarantee a new constitutional order by building and supporting institutions from the outside is one which is now being tested in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan.

This chapter first provide a summary of how the Bosnian state functions seven years since the beginning of the intervention and then looks at the criticisms and assessments of this intervention. The second part of this chapter assesses the intervention in relation to the five criteria initially stated and creates a limited, but coherent list of lessons learned from the Bosnian state building experiment. It ends with a hope.

### ***VI-1 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BOSNIAN MODEL***

Those who opposed the state integration viewed the Dayton Agreement as a guarantee of far-reaching entity independence vis-à-vis the state.<sup>403</sup> Those who opposed partition criticized the Agreement for granting too large powers to entities.<sup>404</sup> The lack of consensus over the interpretation of the Dayton Agreement slowed down the peace process. The disagreement between those who wanted to preserve the state and those who wanted to partition it did not end in Dayton. Radovan Karadžić, the war-time leader of Bosnian Serbs and indicted war criminal, was not discouraged by the Dayton peace implementation: “Our final goal is a unified state of all Serbs,” whether that occurs “in one, two, or three steps.”<sup>405</sup>

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<sup>402</sup> Paul Collier, “Economic causes of civil conflict...”

<sup>403</sup> Mladen Ivanić, at the time prime minister of Republika Srpska, in addressing the RS National Assembly stated that the Dayton Agreement guaranteed the preservation of Republika Srpska, despite calls for its dissolution. BH Press, May 20, 2001.

<sup>404</sup> Haris Silajdžić, former Bosnian prime minister and the founder of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for years called on the international community to revise the Dayton Agreement and dissolve the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His Party’s slogan during the 2000 election campaign was “Bosnia Without Entities.”

<sup>405</sup> Quoted in the Balkan Watch, September 11, 1995, p.1.

In contrast to the situation in post-war Germany where the Allied powers canceled even the remotest possibility of any political group continuing the program of the National-Socialist party, the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina tolerated different options.

Unwilling to impose a solution on the parties that would reverse the war's partition of Bosnia and equally unwilling to abandon international norms – for example, that borders cannot be changed by force or war crimes rewarded – that require commitment to a multiethnic, single state, the Dayton accord chose both. As a result, it does not provide the minimal condition for translating the parties' signatures into peace: an end to the uncertainty over the political future of Bosnia.... Because the Dayton accord does not finish the job, the peace operation cannot depend, as it must to succeed, on the political will of the parties involved... To the extent that they support the accord and its implementation, they are not all supporting the same aspects and goals.<sup>406</sup>

Richard Holbrooke, the chief architect of the peace plan, was aware of the shortcomings of the Agreement:

The most serious criticism of the peace agreement came from those who questioned its central premise that Bosnia should, or could, be reconstructed as a single, multiethnic country... While Dayton was a successful cease-fire agreement, this argument went, its political provisions – giving refugees the right of return and affirming a single country and a central government – could never be implemented... [A]s implementation slipped seriously behind the schedule... some criticized Dayton as a partition agreement, while others criticized it precisely because it was not one... The negotiating team did not share this view. It was not that we underestimated the difficulties of getting the leaders of the three ethnic groups to cooperate... But every other choice was worse. Dividing the country along ethnic lines would create massive new refugee flows... Thus, contrary to the arguments of the partitionists, the chances of fighting would be increased, not decreased, by partition and relocation that would follow. In

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<sup>406</sup> Woodward, Susan, "Policy Brief # 2", The Brookings Institution (July 1996).

addition, there was a moral issue: the United States and its European allies could not be party to creating more refugees and legitimizing the Serb aggression.<sup>407</sup>

Thus, the struggle between partition and integration and the effort to design the constitution acceptable to all continued. Some authors warn, however, that in the search for a compromise formula which encourages all parties to participate in a new institutional structure, the possibility of creating a democratic, viable and self-sustainable state can be lost.<sup>408</sup>

Unwilling to intensify the seething conflict, the international community opted for an evolutionary approach to state building. Under the Dayton constitution, the state had authority over a limited number of policy areas. But even within the few areas to which the state government was initially circumscribed to, the international community managed to expand and strengthen the central state institutions. Thus, the state was authorized to conduct the process of European integration and to ensure Bosnian compliance with international regulations and standards. A legal opinion issued by the OHR, concerning state competence in telecommunications, illustrates how significant this power can be:

The international obligations of the State form a framework within which the State's domestic regulatory arrangements must fit. Without attempting a specific analysis of all such obligations, it suffices to note as examples that telecommunications related to air traffic control is largely governed by international agreements, and that ITU regulations establish basic parameters which circumscribe the domestic allocation of frequencies for broadcasting and other telecommunication purposes. The international obligations associated with such agreements and regulations are those of the State, and it is the responsibility of the State to ensure that its

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<sup>407</sup> Holbrooke, Richard, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 363.

<sup>408</sup> See, for example, Ian S. Spears, "Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing", *Journal of Democracy* 13(3): 123-136 (July 2002).

domestic regulatory system fulfills and is in conformity with those obligations.<sup>409</sup>

However, this evolutionary approach<sup>410</sup> had to be occasionally ‘stirred up’. The High Representative imposed a number of decisions and laws to speed up the peace implementation and strengthen the central state structure. In December 2002, he passed a decision that allowed for the reorganization of the Council of Ministers. From the earlier model with six ministries, a rotating chair, and two deputies for each minister from a different ethnic group, the High Representative decided that the new Council of Ministers would have eight ministries, a permanent chair and one instead of two deputies per minister.<sup>411</sup>

Step by step, state building gained momentum over the years. A critical benchmark that would represent a point of no return has not yet been met, but the impression is that it is not far away.

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<sup>409</sup> OHR Legal Opinion 1999/3, “On the competence of Bosnia and Herzegovina to regulate the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for telecommunications and broadcasting”, quoted by Marcus Cox in “State building and post-conflict reconstruction...”, p. 16.

<sup>410</sup> An example of the evolutionary approach to state building is the creation of the audit offices in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The project on creating the supreme audit office and the entities’ audit offices started in 1999 with the extensive assistance from the World Bank which closely coordinated and monitored the establishment of the offices. In 2000 the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO) accepted the concept of institutional cooperation and technical assistance to the Bosnian audit offices. Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) was in charge of managing the 5-year assistance program. The first year (2000) SIBA and SNAO representatives traveled to Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka to meet with Bosniak, Croat and Serb auditors respectively. The following year, after three such separate meetings, the three sides agreed to hold a joint meeting. After this first meeting, they realized they had a common agenda and decided to hold joint sessions. In 2003, the third year since the beginning of the project, Croat, Serb and Bosniak auditors cooperate, the supreme audit office is in full operation, as well as the two entities’ audit offices. Through conversations (July 2003), auditors said they believed Bosnia-Herzegovina had the future as one state and that they would have began to cooperate sooner or later, but it was easier and quicker with the help from the Swedes.

<sup>411</sup> “Law on the Council of Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, High Representative’s Decision relating to State Symbols and State-Level Matters, *OHR Documents*, December 2, 2002; available at [www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content\\_id=28609](http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=28609)

## VI-2 CRITICAL VIEWS

### VI-2a Traditional and postmodern imperialism

In assessing the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the imperialist argument has to be briefly mentioned. Some observers saw the intervention in traditional imperialistic terms, while others as a necessary postmodern imperialist paradigm for dealing with problematic states.

To an outsider who naively stumbles across them, such political arrangements bear an uncanny resemblance to a form of governance that has long gone out of fashion – namely, that of an imperial power over its colonial possessions... Of course, there are obvious differences between Bosnia and the imperial colonies of the nineteenth century – chief among them the fact that Bosnia's international administration was established with the agreement of the Bosnians as part of a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the similarities of style and substance are astonishing. Vast ambitions, the fervent belief in progress, the assumption that outsiders can best interpret the true interest of a subject people – all these are hallmarks that the international administration in Bosnia shares with the British East India Company and the Utilitarian philosophers who staffed it in the early nineteenth century.<sup>412</sup>

Bosnia-Herzegovina was not seen as a type of a classical colonial model where the colonizer occupied territory with the intention to domesticate itself.<sup>413</sup> Adherents of the 'traditionalist' view argued that the intervention was a subtype of the 19<sup>th</sup> century imperialism and claimed

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<sup>412</sup> Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, "Travails of the European Raj. Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina", *Journal of Democracy*, 14(3): 60-74 (July 2003), pp. 61-2.

<sup>413</sup> Thus, English colonization of both Wales and Ireland or the colonization of the New World by European settlers was colonization in the classical sense. Today, the descendants of early colonizers feel themselves to be as much a part of the colonized territory as those whose ancestors they displaced.

that the real incentive for the intervention came from the concern to protect Western interests.<sup>414</sup>

I think that there is grand imperial design. To celebrate its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary, NATO has announced a new doctrine under which it would be permitted to operate outside of its area to defend what it defines as its interests... If that doesn't sound like imperialism I'm not sure what does. Certainly the idea of eliminating

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<sup>414</sup> “To the extent that the media maintained its monomaniacal focus on the theme of ethnic cleansing, it deterred an examination of the more substantial and essential reasons for the decision of the Clinton administration to launch its assault against Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, with only a few honorable exceptions, U.S. academic experts in the field of Balkan history and international politics showed little inclination to publicly challenge the propaganda campaign. Indeed, they lent a degree of intellectual credibility to the U.S. government's humanitarian posturing by dismissing the very suggestion that any significant material interests were at stake in the Balkans...Of course, the presence of such resources cannot, in and of itself, provide an adequate explanation for the war. It would be too great a simplification to launch a war to the presence of certain raw material in the targeted country. However, the concept of material interests embraces more than immediate financial gains for one or another industry or conglomerate. The financial and industrial elites of the imperialist countries determine their material interests within the framework of international geopolitical calculations...The Balkans do not float above a sea of oil; nor is it a barren wasteland. But its strategic significance has been a constant factor in imperialist power politics. If only because of its geographic location, either as a critical transit point for Western Europe toward the east, or as a buffer against the expansion of Russia (and later the USSR) toward the south, the Balkans played a critical role in the international balance of power.” David North, “After the Slaughter: Political Lessons of the Balkan War”, June 14, 1999.

“The importance of Yugoslavia to this twenty-century superhighway is evident from its position straddling the Danube along the Danube-Main-Rhine canal connecting the Black Sea with the North Sea. Remarkably, Yugoslavia was the only country west of the Ural Mountains that was quietly, but deliberately, excluded from TRACECA and INOGATE programs. It is obvious that Yugoslavia was perceived as an island of nationalism in a sea of pan-European globalism. Somehow Yugoslavia would have to be pacified and assimilated to ensure a safe economic climate for ‘free trade’” J. Robbins, “Wagons East – NATO oil trade route war”, June 23, 1999.

Both articles, among many others, were a contribution to the Balkan War Forum, published by the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI) at the World Socialist Web Site, [www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org)



Russian influence from the Balkans is part of what's driving this.<sup>415</sup>

The last American ambassador to Yugoslavia, also reported that Milošević “claimed that, moving up from Albania, the United States intended to turn the Balkans into a sphere of influence, sharing domination with Germany.”<sup>416</sup> Those who advocated the traditional imperial argument explained that the inability of the international community to stabilize the Balkans was not a result of their benign incompetence, but actually the result of their fundamental intention to preserve instability since it served their interests. Thus, the lack of any serious attempt to objectively define the causes of the conflict, to determine the basis for the integration processes, or to prepare the constitutional and legal framework conducive to peace and stability was the result of a deliberate decision on the part of the international community.

Every initiative [to achieve these objectives] has been obstructed by the world centers of power which are now holding a monopoly on the use of force for the simple reason that a stable region would reduce the need for their engagement and therefore the centers of power would lose their own *raison d’être*.<sup>417</sup>

However, does the late-twentieth-century intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina resemble the interventions of late-nineteenth-century imperialists who conquered large tracts of the globe to find themselves ruling, in Kipling’s phrase, ‘new-caught, sullen peoples, | Half-devil and half-child’?<sup>418</sup> Some, as already mentioned, argued that the Balkan

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<sup>415</sup> Interview with Robert Hayden, the Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, “A Very European War”, *Left Business Observer*, 89 (April 1999).

<sup>416</sup> Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Random House, 1996), p. 24.

<sup>417</sup> Gostimir T. Popović, “Conference on the Balkans. The way out for the Balkan peoples and an opportunity for long-term organization of states in the Balkans and throughout southeastern Europe”, *Republic of Srpska News*, July 2001. E-mail of the author: prota49@hotmail.com.

<sup>418</sup> Rudyard Kipling, *The White Man’s Burden*.

intervention was no different from colonial ventures into exotic wonderlands.<sup>419</sup> The difference was one of form, not of substance, as it allowed for an unwarranted sense of superiority towards the local peoples. To be certain, the set of beliefs, attitudes and practices that sprang from such sense caused much of the suffering in the history of humankind. It was argued that racism and xenophobia are colonialism brought home. There were situations where Bosnians described some foreign officials as demonstrating a belief in their inborn superiority vis-à-vis the local tradition and customs.<sup>420</sup>

Although appealing to some, the imperialist hypothesis fails to account for three important elements. First, the intervener as a postmodern conqueror had a range of options to exert domination rather than physically occupying the country. Bosnia's geographic location is strategically relevant, but is not crucial to make the intervention self-understandable. There is no oil or gas, the Balkans is not the cradle to any of the worlds' religions, nor is the local Mafia armed with nuclear weapons.

Advocates of the imperialist hypothesis, however, would claim that this fact is irrelevant and would use the "crossroads of civilizations" argument to underscore their view. The notion of a dividing line or a crossroads of civilizations was extremely popular in the Balkans, an inclination in reasoning to which Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* gave enormous succor.

In a section of his book with the subtitle 'Islam's Bloody Borders,' Huntington argues that the "fault line" between Islam and the West tends to produce wars all over the world, and not just in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is an important observation for

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<sup>419</sup> Apart from Gostimir Popović (quoted above), there was a range of similar opinions distributed by Republika Srpska newsgroups, on Pale television during the war, and within Internet chatrooms. Although it is obvious that such opinion was not prevalent and that it was openly biased against any international involvement in the former Yugoslavia, it did exist.

<sup>420</sup> Local media reported a number of such stories. See also Lindsey German (ed.), *The Balkans: Nationalism and Imperialism* (London: Bookmarks, 1999).

establishing an international context for apprehending what occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s.<sup>421</sup>

A number of foreign officials who shuttled between Zagreb, Belgrade, and Sarajevo in the 1990s reported being lectured on the relevance of the Bosnian war for the future of humanity. The Croats would claim they were defending Christian Europe from Orthodox barbarism and Islamic fundamentalism in the east.<sup>422</sup> Further to the east, the Serbs claimed they were fighting Ustashas<sup>423</sup> and Islamic fundamentalists.<sup>424</sup> In-between, the Bosniaks claimed they were defending the very European values of tolerance and multiculturalism.<sup>425</sup>

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<sup>421</sup> Expert testimony by dr. Stjepan G. Meštrović at the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Hague, June 4, 2000, Ir-15-14/2-T, D17597-D17095, Appendix B submitted by the witness, "Samuel Huntington's views on the cultural East-West divide", pp. 15-16.

<sup>422</sup> "To us Croats, Yugoslavia was built on an illusion. Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes are products of different civilizations, different cultures. Croats are Catholic and Europeans; Serbs are not. Croats and Serbs never even lived together until 1918; the longer they've lived together since then, the more difficult their relations have become." Franjo Tudman, quoted by Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe*, p. 72.

<sup>423</sup> The Ustasha regime established a Nazi-puppet state in Croatia and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Second World War.

<sup>424</sup> He [General Veljko Kadijević, the last Yugoslav defense minister] told me with fire in his eye that the danger came from Germany, which was spreading its economic and political tentacles around the Balkans [that is through Slovenia and Croatia] in an effort to dominate the area. In the heat of his hostility he might have been back in the World War II bunkers battling the panzers and the Luftwaffe... The Germans had been defeated then; now they had to be kept permanently down. In his view, the Federal Republic of Helmut Kohl was no different from the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler..." You like to praise democracy, Mr. Ambassador, but in Yugoslavia democracy has revived the Ustaše and other forces that we defeated in World War II. Democracy is leading to bloodshed and to an abyss for our people." Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe*, pp. 89-90.

<sup>425</sup> "Izetbegović wore the mantle of Bosnian president with extreme discomfort. When I went to see him after the election, he told me he bore a double weight on his shoulders. 'I have to ensure that Bosnia remains a multiethnic community,' he said. 'The constitution calls for the executive power to be divided among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Our prime minister is Croatian, and the president of our assembly is Serbian. They're being pulled toward extreme positions by the nationalist leaderships in Belgrade and Zagreb – outside forces that we can't control.'" Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe*, p. 115.

Although popular during the war in the region and in the international media, this civilizational crossroads argument cannot justify the intervention. The rationale of occupying a small and devastated state to invest money in its rebuilding is not the logic of the imperialist mind. Hegemonic powers have less obtrusive and more powerful methods of 'colonizing' nations whom they want, rather than propping up the 'colonizing' project and then using the investment-already-made argument to justify further investment. Those who see the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a replication of the earlier colonizing experience reason with a nineteenth-century frame of mind.

The second element which the traditional imperialist hypothesis does not account for is the division among the local population. The cleavage is not between the foreign occupier and domestic population, but between segments of the locals. On one side are pro-integration locals and the interveners, while on the other are pro-partition locals and their sponsors in the neighborhood. Thus, the dividing line is not between the foreigners and the locals, but between those who are for the Bosnian state and those who oppose it. The colonizing argument comes from those who oppose the integration and accuse the interveners of colonizing their land and taking away the right of the people to decide their future. Those who support the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina want the international community to stay. If the presence of the international force is colonization, they want to be fully colonized.

The third element not accounted for in the hypothesis is the identity issue. The division between 'us' and 'them' in Bosnia-Herzegovina is volatile. Internal divisions mean that local population identify with those who support their respective group goals. To the leadership in Sarajevo, Washington and Brussels were for years closer than Banja Luka.<sup>426</sup> Similarly to Pale, the wartime Bosnian Serb stronghold, Belgrade, Athens and Moscow were closer than Sarajevo.

However, the Western involvement in the Balkans has some imperial elements. Although the policy of the international community does not replicate old models and although the international presence has been

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<sup>426</sup> Banja Luka is the capital of Republika Srpska.

supported by segments of the local population, there are some elements of the imperialistic logic that are built into a postmodern global security paradigm and thus into the intervention in Bosnia.

The interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s, the war on terrorism, the humanitarian, financial or political measures to tackle security issues – they are all part of the ongoing search for an international order.

The challenge is to harness globalization to advance our enduring objectives of democracy, shared prosperity and peace – to build a foreign policy for the global age. Some of the most hopeful recent developments in the world have come about because of how we chose to do that, not because globalization preordained them.<sup>427</sup>

Robert Cooper's chapter from the 2002 Foreign Policy Center publication *Re-Ordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11<sup>th</sup>* caused a stir with its call for 'a new kind of imperialism'. Cooper explained that the world today is divided into pre-modern, modern and postmodern states. Pre-modern states are failed states, they are zones where the state has ceased to exist and where "a Hobbesian war of all against all is under way." Postmodern states are those that view their security challenges through a plethora of issues, rather than through strictly military terms. And there are modern states in the traditional sense of the word, states that follow Machiavellian principles and *raison d'état*.

In Cooper's view, the origin of the change in the state system is that "the world's grown honest."<sup>428</sup> A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer. It is this that, according to Cooper, gives rise to both pre-modern and postmodern worlds. Imperialism in the traditional sense is dead. Within the postmodern world there are no threats in the traditional sense, but threats are posed by the modern and pre-modern worlds. How the postmodern world decides to manage

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<sup>427</sup> Samuel R. Berger, "A Foreign Policy for the Global Age", The Twenty-first Oscar Iden Lecture, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, October 19, 2000, p. 2.

<sup>428</sup> Ibid.

these threats represents a new security dilemma. Cooper here proposes the strategy of “double standards”. When dealing with issues within itself, the postmodern world should operate upon the premises of laws and cooperation. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states, the postmodern world needs to revert “to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself.”<sup>429</sup>

The author suggests a new kind of imperialism – an imperialism which aims to bring order, but which rests on the voluntary principle. It takes two forms – the voluntary imperialism of the global economy and the voluntary imperialism of neighbors. The first form of imperialism is managed by the international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. If states wish to benefit, they must open themselves up to interference by these institutions, by international organizations, and by foreign states. The second form takes place when instability in a particular region threatens the postmodern world. Where misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime threaten the postmodern world, as was the case in the Balkans, the response is to create voluntary protectorates.

The ultimate end state of voluntary imperialism is a cooperative empire. The postmodern European Union offers such vision – a cooperative empire of common liberty and common security without ethnic domination and centralized absolutism. Like in the Roman Empire, the cooperative empire “would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.”<sup>430</sup>

To use Cooper’s vocabulary, voluntary protectorates have been implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1995 and in Kosovo since 1999. Will they succeed and end up in a cooperative empire remains to be seen.

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<sup>429</sup> Ibid.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid.

### ***VI-2b Some doubts about the Dayton agenda***

A number of authors have advocated the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a way out of a protracted international engagement with limited prospects of success. Partition, according to this argument, would offer the international force a way out of the Bosnian imbroglio. Peace could be guaranteed in such a way that the side that would lose most through partition, namely the Bosniaks, could be compensated by attractive financial and security arrangements with the West. The Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs would attach their territories to Croatia and Serbia respectively. In such a situation, the argument goes, even if the conflict were to occur again, its negative effect on Europe could be contained, as there would be no engagement on the part of the world powers to remedy the destruction brought by the local parties themselves.<sup>431</sup>

It now seems necessary for the international community to admit that the Dayton solution was not a solution. It was a way to end a war. It did not provide the foundation for a modern state. It did not offer a structure conducive to national reconciliation. It may be that the constructive response now is simply to concede the failure, to concede to the nationalists what the international community was mobilized to deny them.<sup>432</sup>

Stephen Stedman, a scholar of post-Cold War interventions who recognizes that interventions are an inescapable feature of the current international system and who is therefore preoccupied with building a model for a successful intervention, puts the blame on Americans for the failure of Dayton.

The Americans were not willing to make an additional effort to guarantee the full implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

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<sup>431</sup> See Thomas L. Friedman, "Something strange is going on", *International Herald Tribune*, January 24, 2001 (referred to in the previous chapter). See also the arguments for partition made by Chaim Kaufmann and John Mearsheimer that are discussed in the theoretical chapter. Finally, see articles by Ted Galen Carpenter on the Balkans (for example, apart from the one quoted here, see also "The Balkans: International Mission Is Now a Mockery of Democratic Principles", January 8, 2001 and "Waist Deep In the Balkans and Sinking", April 30, 2001; available at [www.cato.org](http://www.cato.org)).

<sup>432</sup> William Pfaff, "Time to concede defeat in Bosnia-Herzegovina", *International Herald Tribune*, October 10, 2002, p. 9.

They were ready to use force to stop the war, but were unwilling to use this force to implement the civilian aspects of the Agreement. I think this was the biggest mistake from the beginning. There was a naïve belief that a simple separation of the warring sides would have led to the take-over by political forces in the country that wanted peace. Such approach was not only naïve, it was comical.<sup>433</sup>

Ted Galen Carpenter, from the conservative Cato Institute also criticized Americans, but not because they put too little effort to build the Bosnian state, but because they put too much. He mocked the “veritable obsession” of the U.S. negotiators to preserve a single Bosnia.<sup>434</sup> Although Carpenter mentioned that several high-level U.S. officials privately stated that Bosnia would continue to exist as a country only in theory, as there would be a de facto partition,<sup>435</sup> he was still perplexed by the insistence of President Clinton and of State Secretary Christopher to stress repeatedly the importance of maintaining Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as it suggested “that they may be serious about that objective... Countries do not exist in theory; they exist in reality or not at all. A Bosnia with two political heads may be theoretically innovative, but it is utterly impractical.”<sup>436</sup>

The convoluted nature of the all-Bosnia institutions, combined with the supposed autonomy of the self-governing entities, does not represent an experiment in enlightened democratic federalism. Rather, it has all the earmarks of an arrangement drafted by State Department functionaries who specialize in abstract political theories. To work at all, such a complex scheme would require an extraordinary degree of goodwill on the part of all parties and a willingness to compromise – qualities that have not been abundant in Bosnia and are not likely to be in the foreseeable future... The Clinton administration’s insistence that any peace settlement must maintain at least the appearance

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<sup>433</sup> Interview with Stephen Stedman “Amerikanci su krivi za Dayton” (Americans are to be blamed for Dayton), *Dani*, No. 284, November 22, 2002, p. 32 (translation mine).

<sup>434</sup> Ted Galen Carpenter, “Holbrooke Horror: The U.S. Peace Plan for Bosnia”, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 37, October 27, 1995.

<sup>435</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>436</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.



that Bosnia will be a unified state is puzzling. It is not as though the country had a lengthy history of independence and a sense of nationhood.<sup>437</sup>

“The tendency of U.S. policymakers to build elaborate, gossamer political structures for Bosnia did not begin with the latest political offensive. Nearly two years ago Washington exerted tremendous effort to help create a Muslim-Croat federation. The remarks of a ‘senior official’ shortly after the parties signed the agreement in March 1994 illustrate the continuity of U.S. thinking. ‘What we have in mind is that the central government would be weak, but the Muslim-Croat part would be stronger. The links to Croatia on the outside could be stronger than those to the Serbs within the country of Bosnia. You’d end up with an asymmetrical federation in Bosnia.’”<sup>438</sup> Carpenter succinctly points out that “the notion of a country in which the constituent population groups have stronger political ties to outside powers than they do to each other is, to put it charitably, peculiar.”

He finally offered his vision of a stable settlement: “The notion of a united Bosnia was a utopian fantasy from the outset. There is no Bosnian nation; Bosnia is little more than a battleground for contending ethno-religious factions. An official partition, negotiated by the belligerents and reflecting their respective battlefield fortunes would merely confirm a reality that has existed for more than three years... [A] multiethnic Bosnia in which toleration is practiced is not a realistic expectation; there is simply too much ingrained hatred on all sides.”<sup>439</sup>

The international community was heavily criticized during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina for not doing more to stop the fighting. After it intervened, critics shifted their focus from the international community doing little to the international community doing it the wrong way.

As it stands, the international community policy in Bosnia appears self-defeating. Rather than working from a clear long-

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<sup>437</sup> Ibid.

<sup>438</sup> Ibid., p. 7. The quote is from Roger Cohen, “Washington Might Recognize a Bosnian Serb State,” *New York Times*, March 13, 1994, p. A10.

<sup>439</sup> Carpenter, pp. 9-11.

term strategy, the international community keeps readjusting its focus according to what is politically expedient. In this vein, civil society development is a last attempt to compensate for the lack of effectiveness of economic incentives and political direction. However, civil society can do little in light of the structural problems Bosnia faces. Ethnic division, internal political stalemate, insufficient refugee and minority return, corruption and cronyism, and a general feeling of political, economic, and social insecurity are the unresolved challenges that loom darkly on Bosnia's future.<sup>440</sup>

I mentioned criticism of those who objected to the intervention on the grounds that the international community had no strategic interest to waste resources on irrelevant places like Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the following paragraphs I shall in some detail present the view of those who do not necessarily object to the international community entering Bosnia-Herzegovina, but who vehemently object to the approach the international community has taken.

According to Robert Hayden:

Despite all the rhetoric about human rights, democracy, and other nice phrases, the Dayton agreement amounts to trying to create a state when its creation is rejected by a large portion of its putative citizens. It is for this reason that the constitution could not be conditioned on acceptance by the Bosnian people themselves. The Dayton peace plan attempts to create a state without the consent of the governed, which is the logical outcome of a regime of negative sovereignty.<sup>441</sup>

Hayden compares the "dictatorial approach" of the High Representative to that of the leadership of the League of Communists, which invited

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<sup>440</sup> Roberto Belloni, "Building Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina", Paper presented on Panel 42-6, 'Political Economy, Cultural Hegemony, and Democratic Civil Society,' Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Washington, DC, August 31 – September 3, 2000, p. 17.

<sup>441</sup> Robert M. Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided. The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 133.

nationalism by creating an unworkable constitution and then largely ignoring its provisions.

The High Representative and the international community that he serves have faced a frustrating contradiction. In order to gain Serb and Croat consent to inclusion within Bosnia, the Dayton agreement provided that there would be, in fact, no real Bosnian government...In order to overcome this contradiction and to make the state real, the High Representative finally decided to dispense with consent. Yet this seems unlikely to be a winning strategy, because the High Representative's actions themselves reinforce the message that Bosnia is a creation of the international community, not of Bosnians themselves. The more that the High Representative ignores the need for the people of Bosnia themselves to consent to be governed by a Bosnian state, the less legitimate that state is likely to be to those whose consent was conditioned on its being illusory.<sup>442</sup>

David Chandler questions the assumption that democracy can be taught or imposed by international bodies as if some cultures were not rational or civil enough to govern themselves. One of his claims is that "the more rights and freedoms are granted to the Bosnian people by their international administrators the less freedom they have to reach negotiated compromises over disputed issues, as every aspect of Bosnian society from media content to housing policy is imposed by external regulators."<sup>443</sup>

His argument is that the driving force of the international action is the widely held belief that building democratic institutions is not enough – what a prospective democratic society needs to have (according to this belief) is also a will to democracy and a democratic culture as these are indispensable supporting conditions to the establishment of democratic institutions. Chandler's conclusion with regards to the efforts of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina is two-fold. First, it is detrimental to the prospects for autonomous democratic development in

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<sup>442</sup> Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided*, pp. 138-9.

<sup>443</sup> David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London: Pluto, 2000, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), p. 3.

Bosnia. The intervention kills local initiative, breeds disillusionment among the local people about their own capacity to solve their problems, and undermines their self-confidence in overcoming mistrust and fear in their society. Second, it is no surprise that the international community is doing such a bad job when the real goal of the intervention was not to improve life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but to reinforce cohesion and cooperation among key intervening states.

The Dayton process has been one of international target-setting in which the coherence and legitimacy of international institutions have had to be constantly affirmed. As soon as the original targets are met new ones have been constantly placed on the agenda as new mission statements for these institutions. This is why the UN High Representative's office has constantly expanded its powers at the expense of Bosnian self-government, NATO have been compelled to play a civilian role and the OSCE have acquired unique powers to ratify elections on the basis of post-election policy-making.<sup>444</sup>

The importance of Bosnia-Herzegovina came with the timing in which the problems erupted. The end of the Cold War initiated changes in international relations and Bosnia came as a ready-made testing ground for international institutions to redefine their political and strategic objectives. According to Chandler, Bosnia-Herzegovina has become a parody of democratization because international action in Bosnia appears to be geared towards the democratization process as opposed to democracy. Chandler's final verdict is that the problem faced by the Bosnian people is one that is not of their own making.<sup>445</sup>

The democratization process, through linking democratization to international institutional mechanisms, has ensured that the international administration will be prolonged for as long as it is

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<sup>444</sup> Ibid., p. 192.

<sup>445</sup> For more of Chandler on the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see "Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies", *Democratization* 5(4): 78-102 (Winter 1998); *From Kosovo to Kabul. Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

in the interests of the major international powers to use Bosnia as a focus for international cooperation.<sup>446</sup>

The solution according to Chandler is to “allow people in the region greater autonomy to develop their own solutions.”<sup>447</sup>

Chandler is extraordinarily lucid in some of his observations and comments. He has made a convincing and thorough criticism of the role of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their underlying motives for entering this war-torn state and the consequences of their policies.

However, in order to make his argument more appealing and convincing, Chandler goes too far in the direction of not acknowledging any local mistake and blaming it all on the foreigners. In his analysis, Bosnians come out as inherently good and peaceful people who happened to make the mistake of waging war at the wrong time, since their problems came to serve the strategic interests of powerful states who appeared to be willing to help them, but who in reality only used the Bosnians to solve their own problems. He takes it for granted that Bosnia-Herzegovina would solve its problems if it were not for the internationals who make the mess.

If the international community is indeed investing huge resources into an intervention that is doomed to failure, then certainly the intervention should be abandoned. However, the problem with this kind of criticism is twofold. First, it has been made while the intervention is still underway and its final outcome is not yet known.<sup>448</sup> Second, the critic assumes that the local population is collectively disadvantaged by the intervention and does not take into account a substantial portion of the

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<sup>446</sup> Ibid., p. 189. For criticism on democracy promotion see, for example, Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 5-21 (January 2002).

<sup>447</sup> David Chandler, “Bosnia: The Democracy Paradox”, *Current History*, March 2001, p. 119.

<sup>448</sup> Of course, this argument applies to all attempts to analyze the ongoing intervention, including this thesis.

local population that support the intervention and reintegration of the state.

If the question *why intervene* was answered prior to the entry of the international force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, much of the criticism would have been avoided. Since it was not, the interveners made themselves easy targets. The first High Representative, Mr. Carl Bildt, criticized international efforts for not having an 'entry strategy' in Bosnia, which is why any serious discussion about an 'exit strategy' was unable to get off the ground.

[At the beginning of the war] the EU... had nothing that could resemble a common foreign policy or a common security policy. Disagreements over the Yugoslav conflict were deep and the decisions in most cases were made out of concern for domestic politics rather than assuming a common European responsibility. Of course, it should be added that the EU had almost no instruments with which to exert authority and credibility for action in such a sensitive and complicated situation. Europe had ambitions, but, unfortunately, not much more.

NATO was a different story. There were military resources, but there was no ambition to use them. In the military sphere, NATO, which actually meant the United States, was confused, just as Europe was in the political sphere.<sup>449</sup>

However, as the intervention evolves the focus of criticism shifts from *why* to *how*. There is no doubt that the underlying rationale for the intervention has to be examined. However, criticism is valid only if it takes into account the complexity of the problem. Those critics that deliberately reduce the complexity may gain at clarity but at the expense of reality.

The international community is not acting out of selfless humanism, but if their efforts can also benefit Bosnians then their mission has to be evaluated for its positive aspects too.

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<sup>449</sup> Carl Bildt, *Misija mir (Mission Peace)*, (Sarajevo:Zid, 1998), pp. 525-6.

### ***VI-3 ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERVENTION***

In relation to the five conditions for the success of an international intervention as defined in Chapter II, the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be assessed as follows:

The first condition was that interventions are costly and therefore they should be undertaken for clear goals. The reason is logical: a strong political will to realize one's goal is essential to overcome the obstacles and to bear the cost of engagement. Without the will to sustain the effort, the intervention does not stand much prospect for success. The cost is accumulated in a large number of ways, involving the engagement of personnel, equipment, time, political capital and much more.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the goal and the political will to support that goal crystallized over time. It was certainly not there unambiguously in the first year of the intervention. NATO officially went in with a one-year mandate, although it was clear that if anything were to be achieved, the mandate of both the military and civilian forces would have to be extended.

There was too much unnecessary maneuvering. Nonetheless, such an approach was probably the only possible way to go since decision-makers were aware of the cost of such an engagement and thus reluctant to make long-term commitments without leaving open the option of reconsidering their policies. From their perspective, it was legitimate and logical to reassess their objectives and pledges on a regular basis. How much this approach impeded the effectiveness of the international forces on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina is another issue.

Despite the many problems in peace implementation, the general conclusion regarding the initial phase of the international engagement is that the military, with a clear mandate and a strong will, was decisive for the peace process to commence and be sustained. The initial

determination was not wide in scope, but it was crucial for setting the whole process in motion.<sup>450</sup>

The second condition was that once inside, the intervener becomes, in a certain sense, a party to the conflict. This means that there is no safe neutrality if one is engaged in altering the dynamic of a conflict. Implicit in any decision to enter a conflict is responsibility for the actions one takes.

In the literature on international interventions, especially that which deals with post-Cold War interventions, the neutrality of the intervener is taken as a precondition for a successful intervention. This has contrasted sharply with the Cold War experience and those earlier interventions in which the intervener was conducting an intervention in order to secure one or more of its strategic goals. The end of the Cold War created, for a limited period of time, the impression that any intervention in another state for any reason other than purely humanitarian was impermissible. Furthermore, neutral humanitarian interventionism became the only alternative to the normative premise of non-interventionism.

Neutrality on the part of the interveners permits impartiality when addressing short-term threats to the ceasefire, usually the result of localized disputes or misunderstandings. In this regard a neutral force allows the third party to act effectively as the 'go between,' or arbitrator, in efforts to diffuse challenges to the peace. Since a neutral intervener does not disproportionately coerce any one side in the conflict, the climate should be such that the resort to violence is at best only a final option and no longer an immediately accepted tool of policy. This will increase the cooperation of all parties to the dispute. In effect, neutrality of the part of the outside party may contribute to a change in the

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<sup>450</sup> In the beginning, the psychological factor was even more important than any realistic assessment of how much safety to an ordinary citizen the NATO presence could guarantee. NATO forces were heavily armed and one look at their regular daily patrols underscored their claim that they were uncompromising about their job. Thus, the belief that these soldiers were prepared to respond to the challenges they faced deterred anti-Dayton forces from demonstrating their dissatisfaction by military means.



structure of the payoffs resulting from cooperation with and defection from the status quo.<sup>451</sup>

Neutrality understood as a determination by the intervening force to pursue its goal, which in most cases at least means securing a ceasefire regardless of the ambitions or actions of the local actors, is almost always accepted. However, neutrality as defined in the above paragraph presents an unlikely scenario whose direct consequence is the creation of unrealistic expectations both on the part of the potential intervener and also on the part of potential recipients of the intervention. The position of an intervener in an internal conflict contains an element of interest to achieve a certain outcome towards which the intervener cannot be neutral.

Multilateral interventions have been perceived as more conducive to humanitarian goals than unilateral interventions because they appear less capable of inflicting harm since partners in the intervention serve as a corrective to each other's ambitions and interests. Some argue that they are also less effective, but that is open for discussion. In situations where the intervener has to be engaged for years to realize its goals, sustaining the commitment is easier when the cost is shared among a number of actors rather than endured by a single actor.

Thus, regarding the second condition – the neutrality of the intervener – the Bosnian case demonstrates that those who did not insist on formal neutrality were more effective in carrying out their mandate than those who were reluctant to reveal their preferences. Thus, the military seemed to have an easier task because it was openly non-neutral towards any attempt at renewing hostilities. Civilian implementers were more tolerant towards any kind of political behavior by the local actors and were thus less successful.

The third condition – the issue of winners and losers – is a timeless category. Any change produces outcomes that are valued differently by different participants. Even wars, generally perceived as harmful to all

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<sup>451</sup> Patrick M. Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 112.

affected, are nonetheless deemed beneficial by some. A criminal may increase his wealth by operating in the war zone, a politician may find himself globally known through the misery he represents, a refugee may leave not only her house but also her bad marriage, etc.

The one caveat regarding the issue of winners and losers is that these may not be permanent categories. That is, since the intervention itself is a process and causes perpetual change, it may affect the recipients of the intervention in different ways as time passes. A local actor who is supportive of the intervention in the beginning may not remain so till the end. A local side may judge the arrival of the international force as serving its interests. After some time, however, if the actions of the international force come to threaten these interests, for example by threatening its illegal business activities, it may change its attitude towards the interveners. Thus, the intervener can expect success only if it is ready to pursue its goal regardless of any temporary distribution of supporters and opponents.<sup>452</sup>

The fourth condition suggests that a robust beginning saves time, exerts respect, and gives credibility. The opposite sort of beginning is muddling through, and this is the most expensive and the least successful strategy.<sup>453</sup> Of course, the question that any prospective intervener will raise is how much is enough, i.e. how much resources and personnel have to be engaged in order to prevent muddling through, but at the same time avoiding too large a force when a smaller one would suffice.

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<sup>452</sup> When it entered Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community had two clear opponents who favored the partition of the country, namely the SDS and the HDZ. The third local actor, the SDA, welcomed the arrival of the international forces, but only as long as the interveners did not threaten their political survival. As the goal of the international community expanded towards instilling a non-nationalist democratic regime, the attitude of the SDA changed towards the international community.

<sup>453</sup> The dilemma of the cost to benefit ratio has to be solved by any potential intervener before deciding to engage in something as risky and as costly as entering another state and initiating change. In multilateral interventions, benefits are not necessarily distributed equally. Where there is high success in the intervention, every participating state can claim success, even if its contribution consisted of voting in favor of the policy. However, if the success is only marginal, it becomes easier for states in a multilateral framework to play down their individual responsibility and distance themselves from failure.

The ratio of costs to benefits, therefore, would tend to increase quite substantially the longer the time frame under which the intervention is planned. If the planning stage of the intervention suggests a long-term involvement, then the relative costs to benefits might quickly overwhelm the capabilities – or interests – of the potential intervener. Spreading out these costs across a larger number of actors should increase the likelihood of orchestrating an interventionary force.<sup>454</sup>

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the intervention was launched, among other reasons, to strengthen international cooperation. The cost of non-intervention to the international community at one point became too high to be tolerated further. Thus, to help itself the international community helped Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As U.S. Policy was lurching, like a punch-drunk boxer, from one crisis to the next, the president met with his senior advisers on June 14, 1995...The discussion made clear the president's growing frustration with his inability to control developments in Bosnia – or even his own policy. Clinton accurately put his finger on the problem: "We've got no clear mission, no one's in control of events." Vice President Al Gore joined in, seizing an opportunity to make his case for tougher action. "It's the issue from hell," he said. "The Europeans are self-delusional" in rejecting strong NATO action to back up the UN force. NATO was weakened and the United States, as NATO's leader, looked even weaker. "The need for us to protect and preserve the alliance is driving our policy," Gore said.<sup>455</sup>

Daalder explains how the essential component of the U.S. *endgame strategy* for Bosnia-Herzegovina was a deep concern about the preservation of the Western alliance.

They [Lake and Albright] maintained that the stakes went far beyond the particulars of Bosnia. The issue was not one state or

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<sup>454</sup> Patrick M. Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*, p. 106.

<sup>455</sup> Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton. The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 90-1.

two, three, or none. Rather, the issue was U.S. credibility as a world leader, its credibility in NATO, the United Nations, and at home.<sup>456</sup>

For these reasons, it was easier to sustain the cost of the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina over the years, where the international community intervened for itself as much as for Bosnia, than, for example, in Somalia where the international interests were limited.

The fifth condition for the successful intervention emphasizes that people are the key. The significance of this condition is self-evident. In the previous chapter I discussed problems stemming from poor staff management in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rapid turnover of seconded staff limits expertise, dissipates momentum, and undermines institutional loyalty and memory. The described recalibration also addressed organizational issues which should result in better staff management.

### ***VI-3a Where to go from here***

Seven years of international engagement in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina provoked some strong criticism. I have already mentioned some of it and argued why some of the criticism is unwarranted. In this last section I look at the lessons that can be drawn from the Bosnian intervention and how they can be applied elsewhere.

Robin Cook, the former British Foreign Secretary, in his first public statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, emphasized the relevance of the international intervention not only for Bosnia itself but also for the wider region: "The basic political rights of democratic pluralism are now needed in Eastern Europe to combat totalitarian nationalism as much as they ever were to challenge communism."<sup>457</sup> Other authors underscored the relevance of the intervention beyond the Balkans and the East European region.

Perhaps one of the most useful functions of the Balkans in the 1990s is to be a mirror to the face of a West European nearly-

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<sup>456</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>457</sup> Robin Cook, "Bosnia: What Labour Would Do", *Guardian*, 10 December 1994, quoted in Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy...*, p. 186.

union which has lost belief in the federalist idea and the policies of a economic and social consensus that fuelled its progress. If Europe was now a vital political concept rather than a geographical expression, then the problems of South-Eastern Europe, far from being a nightmare from hell, might instead be viewed as a marvelous preparatory ground for diplomats, administrators, politicians and NGOs imbued with the need to promote a post-nationalist agenda across the continent.<sup>458</sup>

In the end, results of the intervention will be larger than the sum of various policies. For example, the policy of anti-nationalist democracy, one of the key aspects of the intervention, easily translates itself into nation building although this may not seem obvious at a first glance. Nation building, as defined in the previous chapter, is premised upon the notion of a functioning state. Thus, if the international community succeeds in building a stable and functioning Bosnian state, it will also succeed in building a perhaps circumscribed, but evident Bosnian identity.

At a press conference after the 2002 general elections, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown made the following assessment. “The priority after the war,” said Ashdown, “should not have been the strengthening of democracy through frequent elections, but the strengthening of the rule of law. This lesson is even more important if one considers that Bosnia today faces a bigger threat from criminals than nationalists.”<sup>459</sup> The solution to nation building depends upon structural preconditions, that is the existence of an efficient and functional state, and thereafter, the willingness and interest of the elites to build a Bosnian identity.

Somewhere along the road from Vietnam – where it [nation-building] was once the proudly proclaimed mission of the United States, including its military – to Somalia, this once important

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<sup>458</sup> Tom Gallagher, “A Culture of Fatalism Towards the Balkans: Long-Term Western Attitudes and Approaches”, paper presented at the British International Studies Association, 22<sup>nd</sup> Annual Conference, Leeds, 15-17 December 1997, quoted in Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy...*, p. 184.

<sup>459</sup> “Ashdown: Uspjeh nacionalnih stranaka je rezultat razočaranja”, *HINA*, October 10, 2002.

part of our national security policy became a dirty word. By the mid-1990s everyone in Washington was proclaiming that we were not nation building...Euphemisms were substituted...[like] post-conflict reconstruction. But whatever we call it, nation building is an essential part of our policies in the Balkans...<sup>460</sup>

Some lessons of the Bosnian state building have been obvious, others not so. Devising the effective and functional framework for a collapsed state is a 'job from hell'. Since there are no ready-made solutions, the entire state building consists of a sequence of experiments, some of which work and others do not. The key to success is to sustain the will, that is the will to tolerate the cost, to continue experimenting.

Nation building [i.e. state building] has now become a key U.S. foreign policy mission. But it won't work without high-level attention and a budget to match.<sup>461</sup>

The first lesson of the Bosnian intervention concerns institutional arrangements. The Dayton Agreement, it has been argued, empowered 'spoilers' while it disempowered moderates since the power-sharing arrangement has not translated into a stable governing formula in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although aware of the shortcomings of power sharing, the international community has not yet articulated a different governing formula.

The second lesson is that the international community was slow to address the economic issues which impeded state building and thus contributed to corruption and criminality. The economic strategy has

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<sup>460</sup> As explained earlier, the term "nation building" in the U.S. usage equals state building. Thus, when Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton Agreement, rhetorically asks "What's wrong with nation building anyway?" he does not mean that the international community should build a Bosnian identity, but rather a Bosnian state. However, it should be reiterated that the successful state building carries in itself the element of identity building. Richard Holbrooke, "Rebuilding Nations...", *Washington Post*, April 1, 2002; at

[www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/us/2002/holbrooke.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/us/2002/holbrooke.htm)

<sup>461</sup> James P. Rubin, "Start honoring the nation-builders", *International Herald Tribune*, October 22, 2002. At the same time, there is no shortage of critics. For example, see Gary Dempsey with Roger W. Fontaine, *Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute Press, 2001).

been revised on several occasions, but the reforms undertaken have not yet yielded success.

The third lesson relates to regional issues. Although the international community underscored the relevance of the regional approach for the success of its mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its regional policy has been neither coherent nor constant. It has been basically reactive in responding to emerging crises and unable to develop a pro-active approach that would certainly deliver more success.<sup>462</sup>

The most important lesson that is drawn from the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that a change is possible. There are no 'impenetrable' societies with fixed identities, permanent relations and predetermined cultures. Interventions inevitably bring about change in a society in which they take place. The question only is what kind and how much change an intervener wants to make. This is not to say that interveners possess omnipotent power and that they can model other societies according to their liking. For all logical reasons, this is not and cannot be the case. However, what I want to stress is that a lot can be achieved through a determined and focused effort. The half-hearted approach delivers meek results, while focus and determination lead to triumphs.

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<sup>462</sup> Javier Solana, at the time NATO Secretary General, suggested seven most important lessons that the international community learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina that are relevant for the NATO agenda and "in the way we think and prepare in future for peacekeeping and crisis management. The lessons are the following:

- Local conflicts can become an international problem;
- Interventions require military flexibility;
- Crisis management requires the broadest possible coalition of contributing nations;
- For a NATO operation to be successful, Russia must be engaged;
- Effective cooperation between military and civilian institutions is essential;
- Europe must play a more visible role in maintaining peace and stability on its own continent; and
- Resolute action can bring results.

Speech by dr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, "Lessons learned from Bosnia", delivered at the Instituto De Defesa Nacional, Portugal, March 12, 1999; available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990312a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990312a.htm)

History will look back on our engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the first faltering step toward a doctrine of international community. Bosnia will be seen as a new model for international intervention – one designed not to pursue narrow national interests but to prevent conflict, to promote human rights and to rebuild war-torn societies. We are already applying the lessons of Bosnia in Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. Perhaps they will be applied in Iraq as well.<sup>463</sup>

On the basis of seven years of international engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, three key points can be drawn that underscore the possibility for success in a state-building intervention:

- State building is possible;
- It is possible with the commitment of the intervener; and
- Follow-through is the key.<sup>464</sup>

People say that hope dies last. The hope for Bosnia is that the locals take over the state building process. A dream is this: a critical mass of pro-Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens begins to share the same goal. They are willing to carry out reforms and reduce the general fear. They become agents of change not subjects of international engineering. They are smart enough to envision the future and brave enough to translate the vision into reality.

Will it realize? Let us hope (but in the meantime continue implementing the state building agenda).

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<sup>463</sup> Paddy Ashdown, “What I Learned in Bosnia”, *The New York Times*, October 28, 2002.

<sup>464</sup> On the international experience in Kosovo, see, for example, John Lloyd, “We came here to build a state, that’s all”, *Financial Times*, December 31, 2002. Also the interview with Michael Steiner, Head of UN Mission to Kosovo, with Tim Sebastian at Hardtalk, BBC World, January 30, 2003.