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Philipp H. Fluri

PREFACE

Democratic institution building in and democratic governance of the security sector continue to pose challenges to all governments which have emerged from the former Soviet Union. Sustainable democratization, however, presupposes not only a general willingness and informedness, but also operational knowledge which can only come from democratic practice.

European and Euro-Atlantic institutions have engaged Central Asia in a discourse on the comprehensive reform of state and societal institutions. The invitation to reform the security sector has as its objective an improvement of the security institutions and security-providing services as a change of the very 'culture of security'. What is at stake is a shift from the 'culture of state security' to a 'culture of cooperative security', embedded in the Euro-Atlantic system.

This again implies not only a process of insightful adaptation to Euro-Atlantic standards, norms and procedures. It also implies a process of 'un-learning' the past. *Accountability* – the construction of transparent lines of responsibility for each individual regardless of their position in government – will need to replace the expectation of collective responsibility. *Parliamentary and public democratic oversight* of the security sector budgets and personnel will need to replace the expectation that state security comes before individual security, and that budgets are therefore best kept secret and security-providing services best kept beyond the reach of parliamentary and public control. *Civil-military relations* with a strong accent on civilian political leadership structures within Ministries of Defence, and the successful integration of the General Staff within them, will have to replace the expectation that the military forms a state within the state. *Civil society organizations* will develop the sufficient competence and expertise to independently assess security sector governance, replacing the organizations that previously disseminated ideas to the public (for good or ill, as vested

political interests dictated). *Collective cooperative security*, as provided by an alliance of sovereign states, will replace the expectation of a rigid system of artificially homogenized and integrated states and their militaries, as well as expectations of Darwinian battles of nation against nation. The concept of *human security* will replace the concept of security for one's nation – or one's office.

Though almost every Central Asian state is engaged to some degree in a discourse on security sector reform, democratic oversight of the security sector, and civil-military relations, it would be incorrect to assume that the joint efforts of European, Transatlantic, regional and national actors (including the media, civil society and academia) have led to homogenous or at least sustainable progress. The added challenge of joining the global coalition in the 'fight against terrorism' has accelerated development in some departments of the security sector. It has, however, at the same time led to a standstill if not a backlash in the evolution of a culture of human and civil rights, not to mention international humanitarian law. As security sector reform unfolds in Central Asia, human rights and will need to triumph over all supposed justifications to curb them. Security Sector Reform is not about making repression better.

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FORMS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the five Central Asian former Soviet Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) appeared as one region. Though it is scientifically debatable if “Central Asia” consists of only these five states or if others should be included as well (e.g. Afghanistan, Mongolia), my findings will basically deal with the five former Soviet Central Asian republics – sometimes, where appropriate, with references to adjacent countries.

In distinction to other parts of the former Soviet Union, e.g. the Baltics or the Southern Caucasus, independence came unexpectedly to Central Asia. Statehood as such was gained and developed in most all cases rather easily – the phenomenon of “failed states” was to be encountered less in Central Asia than in some other former Soviet republics – it initially seemed for them more difficult to put themselves as real, initiative actors on the international arena – also due to a lack of own foreign policy experience during Soviet times. But comprising a territory of a size comparable to Europe – although populated only by a small percentage of the European population (some 50 million) – and being resource rich and strategically located between Europe, China, Russia and South East Asia (some of them on the shores of the Caspian Sea) to make their voices heard on the international arena became a stringent necessity. Should this goal be pursued on an individual basis or through common efforts?

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union all five Central Asian states became – next to the United Nations (a special UN ECE programme was - though so far not very successfully - started for Central Asia) – members of the **CIS** as well as the OSCE. In contrast to other former Soviet Republics, CIS membership was never really put into doubt, although Uzbekistan pursued a sometimes more hesitant

policy towards certain CIS sub organisations like the CIS Collective Security Treaty (initially even called “Tashkent Treaty”), becoming also member of the GUAM thus enriching this organisation not only with a Central Asian outlook but also with one more “U” in its name, thus becoming **GUUAM** – an organisation originally formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (all states that at this specific time had territorial problems with Russian involvement). In retrospective one could argue that today, in 2005, the CIS and relations with Russia are more important for Uzbekistan than its membership with GUUAM which was anyhow suspended for some time due to lack in progress in expected enhancement of trade and communication relations (for Uzbekistan being a double landlocked country a very important aspect) in favour of territorial questions (Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria) with which Uzbekistan did not want to get involved and harm its relations with Russia for nothing.

Concerning **OSCE** membership of the five Central Asian States in this Euro-Atlantic organisation it was at the beginning questioned by some countries (also and foremost by Russia), but applying the approach of equal opportunities to all former Soviet Republics geography was not taken as a membership criteria. OSCE membership gave the Central Asian States a “European” outlook on the one hand, but in the course of time their membership also transformed the OSCE into an organisation with a Central Asian emphasis. The OSCE with its field missions played its most important role in Central Asia in Tajikistan in helping to surmount the traces of the civil war. OSCE field missions were opened in all five Central States. During Austria’s OSCE chairmanship in the year 2000 Central Asia became for the first time in CSCE/OSCE history an explicit priority of a Chairmanship – the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs visiting the region four times within less than two years. Trying to put equal emphasis on all OSCE matters – democracy/human rights, economy/environment and security – the Central Asian states themselves felt that too little importance has been put on the last two aspects and, supported (if not instigated) by Russia, asked for a reorientation of OSCE policy not only towards Central Asia but in general which found expression in the non acceptance of Russia of the OSCE budget 2005 if no redistribution of OSCE funds and interests

would occur. It was also in the OSCE that the five Central Asian states – as different as they are in their developments – started to appear sometimes as speaking with one voice in an international organisation – e.g. similar to GUUAM or EU statements. Kazakhstan’s application for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009, so far supported by all Central Asian States and Russia, is an expression of this “common Central Asian voice” within the OSCE, a sign of further transformation of the OSCE agenda (an expression of the Central Asian states’ will to be treated equally to the Euro-Atlantic members) and also an expression of the leadership role aspired to by Kazakhstan in Central Asia not only in the economic but also in the political field.

After having introduced Central Asia within the CIS and OSCE – both organisations with specific Central Asian aspects – as organisations in which the five States became members more or less automatically, I would like to follow up with regional organisations that have either been formed by the Central Asian States themselves or others but with an important involvement of the Central Asian states. Though we are constantly talking about the “region” of Central Asia, we have to admit that the five countries differ enormously from each other – on the domestic as well as foreign policy front. Though most observers expected a kind of regional cooperation to make the Central Asian voice heard better on the world arena, it was regional competition that prevailed for a long time to come – competition opposing Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and – for cultural and civil war reasons – Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Only slowly – after it was also felt that the CIS as such was not in a position to satisfy (mainly economic) needs of the Central Asian states and that other actors beside Russia were intrigued by the geostrategic importance of the region - different forms of regional cooperation appeared. I would like to enumerate the most important ones of them without being exhaustive and try to evaluate their aims, achievements, goals, etc. I will divide these organisations into roughly two groups: the first one being “indigenous” Central Asian, i.e. founded by Central Asian states, the second one being forms of cooperation in which Central Asia plays an important role but without having founded them themselves.

CICA (Conference on Interaction and Cooperation in Central Asia) – a Kazakh initiative dating back to 1992, elaborating along the example of the OSCE confidence building and conflict preventing measures in Central Asia and its surroundings. The “Almaty Act” of 2002 is to be considered the ground work for the creation of a real international organisation. Until the creation of a real Secretariat the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Heads of States will meet on a regular basis as well as senior officials and specific working groups. As of today, members are besides the four Central Asian states (Turkmenistan usually does not participate in regional organisations) also Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia and Turkey. The CICA agenda concentrates on security (e.g. disarmament, nuclear weapons free zone) and stability questions (against separatism, illicit trafficking) and in the aftermath of the Afghanistan events also on the fight against terrorism (use of religion as pretext). The abovementioned CICA aims are as such noble ones and complement the Kazakh initiatives in the field of dialogue of civilisations and religions, but the efficiency of CICA is sometimes to be doubted – especially after the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation with similar aims (see below). It should also be noted that although the four Central Asian countries signed the Almaty Act and had been elaborating this document for 10 years, relations among themselves were sometimes less than confidence building (mining of borders, interruption of flow of goods and persons – visa introductions, etc).

Central Asian Cooperation Organisation – created under a different name in 1996 (Central Asian Union), comprising the four Central Asian States (except Turkmenistan; Tajikistan since 1998 - after the end of the civil war) and since 2004 also Russia – Secretariat and bank in Almaty, Parliamentary Assembly, rotating chairmanship. The main aim was to enhance economic cooperation, but so far not very successfully. Uzbekistan was often reluctant to participate, but felt itself obliged on the occasion of the organisation’s summit in Almaty in May 2004 to suggest Russia to become a full-fledged member of the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation – a fact that was enacted on the organisation’s October summit in Dushanbe the same year. Whether the accession of Russia will develop further the original aims of the organisation remains

to be seen, but it testifies on the one side of the gaining economic strength of Russia due to high oil prices – and thus the hope of more Russian economic support (which has already been seen on bilateral level in relations with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) - and on the other side of the fostered Uzbek-Russian relationship which did not always exist unimpededly.

In addition to the abovementioned two “indigenous” Central Asian organisations, one should also mention that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have signed “**Treaties of Eternal Friendship**”. Taking the sometimes very cumbersome relations between individual Central Asian countries into consideration, one wonders what the aim of such treaties should be.

I think that we could move on now towards the second group of organisations:

In this case I would like to start with organisations that **comprise only former Soviet republics**, moving on to organisations comprising also other countries.

Eurasian Economic Community – created under a different name in 1996 (customs union), renamed Eurasian Economic Community in 2000, comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Decision making capacity is weighed with 40% Russia, 20% Belarus and Kazakhstan each, 10% Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan each. The main aim is a full-scale customs union and common economic space (stressing also energy, banks) - similar to the EU. The composition of this organisation – with the inclusion of Belarus - can be seen as a “club” of Russia’s closest allies in the former Soviet Union. So far the results achieved were also rather modest, which might have given impetus to the creation of the

Single Economic Space in 2003, comprising the four most important economic powers on the territory of the former Soviet Union and in this way trying to enhance economic cooperation within smaller formats than

the overall reaching CIS that could hardly boost any success in any field so far. Hence, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine are to be the quintessence of the CIS integration process – Kazakhstan thus being the only Central Asian member in this organisation – a role Kazakhstan deserves more than ever, having the best developing economy on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The main aim of the grouping is again a customs union with free movement of goods, services, persons and capital as well as a unified policy on foreign trade, duties, banks, credits and currency (this being so far unacceptable for Kazakhstan). After the recent developments in Ukraine it remains to be seen if the cooperation will continue under the same format. On the occasion of the latest visit of President Putin to Kazakhstan in January 2005, discussions centred very much on questions related to the Single Economic Space, especially in the field of energy/pipelines.

With the exception of Turkmenistan the Central Asian countries also concluded **Strategic Partnership Agreements with Russia**.

Among the cooperation forms that **comprise also other countries than ex Soviet ones**, one could cite the following ones:

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – created 1999 on Chinese initiative, comprising all Central Asian states bordering China (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and Russia; Uzbekistan joined in 2002. The main aim was to build confidence building measures on the Western/Northern Chinese borders thus interrupting eventual irredentist Uighur/Turcic movements – an aim that China is also trying to achieve through enhanced economic cooperation with Central Asia. Due to Chinese interests and strong pushing from its side the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has maybe become the best working regional organisation in Central Asia with clear cut policies that were the more so underlined after the Afghanistan events. The organisation boosts an anti terrorist centre that was – under Russian initiative - transferred from Bishkek to Tashkent in order to convince Uzbekistan to actively participate in the organisation and as a trade-off for Uzbekistan's proposal to include Russia into the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation.

ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) – created in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan, Turkey for promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation, joined by Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 1992; Secretariat in Teheran with Permanent Representatives. For the Central Asian countries the ECO is also important as a donor organisation doing many, including infrastructure, projects (communication – important for land locked Central Asia) in the recipient countries and has gained in importance after new inclusions in 1992. Today's priorities are fostering regional trade, a data bank for trafficking, a common energy system, the creation of an own commercial bank, and a scientific fund. The ECO is a comparatively well functioning organisation without big political aspirations (which are eventually streamlined by parallel membership of Iran and Turkey), but more on the side of economic, technical development.

Turk Cooperation – created in 1992 by Turkey and comprising the Turkic-speaking former Soviet Republics Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Turk Cooperation was especially driven by late President Demirel who tried to pursue through this organisation the relationships with brotherly, newly established countries – relationships that have been almost non-existent during the Soviet Union. Cooperation centres mostly on cultural aspects were created, though differences have become visible more markedly since as funding for more complex political/economic projects were not available. Cooperation is also seen more in the relations of Turkey with the individual member countries and not so much among the other Turk-speaking countries, given the sometimes strained relations among the Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus.

Caspian Cooperation – initiated originally by Iran among the states bordering the Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan) in order to counterbalance Turkish influence through the Turk Cooperation and to have an important say in the delimitation of the Caspian Sea in connection with which Iran very soon appeared to be on the losing side. Today the Caspian Cooperation as outlined has practically ceased to exist.

Despite the abovementioned organisations, which all include actors immediately adjacent to Central Asia, one should also mention **cooperation forms including outer-regional actors.**

PfP/EAPC: All countries of the region (except Turkmenistan) participate. The EAPC Istanbul meeting in 2004 clearly defined Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus as priority areas. The Afghanistan events with the following stationings in the framework of the Antiterror Coalition in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan not only contributed to an increase in geostrategic importance of the whole region, but also enhanced relations within the EAPC, giving these relations sometimes also a regional approach.

EU: The EU signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with all five Central Asian states. Also in its case the Afghanistan events triggered a more thorough approach towards the region: doubling of TACIS budget for Central Asia, enhanced exchange of visits, elaboration of documents relating exclusively to Central Asia. The main aim of the EU is to cooperate with Central Asia in the fight against terrorism, drugs and international crime, to secure access to energy, to improve political dialogue and trade and investment, to support democracy and human rights and regional cooperation to solve problems in the field of water, energy and environment. Especially regional cooperation is one of the EU's important interests, as many problems Central Asia is facing today can only be solved on the regional level.

The most important project in this respect is the BOMCA project (Border Management in Central Asia) under Austrian lead that tries to help the Central Asian states to better handle their border regimes – for which regional cooperation is essential. Other important EU projects in which Central Asian states also participate are INOGATE and TRACECA. Through the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the New European Neighbourhood Policy Central Asia also moved closer to Europe's borders. Kazakhstan whose territory also lies partially in Europe is already thinking loudly about its application to the New European Neighbourhood.

But as described on many occasions above, regional cooperation is not self-evident in Central Asia. Many countries prefer to go the bilateral, individual path or to establish themselves as regional leaders that do not want to be hindered by outer-regional influences. In general, one can say that the smaller Central Asian countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are more open to regional cooperation as they are also more in need of help due to their poor economic performance.

On the other end of the scale we find Turkmenistan that – bound by its neutrality – rejects almost any form of regional cooperation, followed by Uzbekistan that is also very cautious towards regional cooperation – be it that it could get a prestigious role or significant help out of it (see antiterrorist centre of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). Kazakhstan, though being the richest country in the region, has always promoted regional cooperation and was also the first that tried to present coherent foreign/regional policy approaches in world politics. Thus Kazakhstan is aspiring not only to a leadership role in the field of economy, but also in politics (see also OSCE chairmanship 2009).

To **sum up** one could state that regional cooperation in Central Asia has never been easy. Too diverse are the interests leading the individual countries. But being aware that the international community somehow awaits regional cooperation at least in certain fields and that for home consumption approaches towards regional cooperation seem necessary, the Central Asian states have founded many regional organisations or the individual countries have become members of other organisations with a regional outlook or of those that put a certain emphasis on Central Asia. These organisations centre mainly either on economic or security cooperation. The role, number and content of regional organisations and their members are an important indicator of the state of world politics. In no other place in the world the competition between the three/four most important individual global players can be seen more clearly than in Central Asia.

After its independence Central Asia was seen as a backyard of **Russia** with undisputed Russian influence from the outside – but sometimes its

influence is seen as a rival to local leadership aspirations – but the energy question and first of all Afghanistan put Central Asia on the world competition map – by creating new regional organisations or remodelling already existing ones. Overnight, we have seen the arriving and joining of the Antiterrorist Coalition forces under US lead with stationings in Kyrgyzstan (where Russia was to open an own basis shortly after) and Tajikistan (next to the 201st Russian division – probably making Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the only countries in the world to find US inspired and Russian forces stationed close together in the same country).

The stationings of the Antiterror Coalition forces were very much welcome by the respective countries as they contributed at least at the outset to diminish the threat of an eventual Islamic-inspired upheaval (Afghanistan) and also brought large economic gains which Russia could not deliver anymore in 2001/2002.

Since then the situation has changed in so far as that due to the rise in oil prices Russia feels economically more confident combining this with the use of geographic proximity and better understanding of the mentality of the region. This is seen best by Russia's inclusion into the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation, its huge economic investments especially in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the opening of a Russian basis in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (transfer of the 201st division in permanent stationings).

Talking about Central Asia one should in no way forget the influence of China. The main interests of China towards Central Asia are economic - being in dire need of energy (China did its greatest ever foreign investment in the oil field in Kazakhstan) – and political-strategic: first to halt any signs of support for eventual autonomy drives of the Moslem, Turk Uighurs and – especially after the stationings of the Antiterror Coalition - to watch closely US infiltration of the region.

The Chinese-inspired Shanghai Cooperation Organisation with its strong antiterrorism content (the fight against terrorism, drugs, crime has developed into a well beloved trio since the first international conference

on this matter under Austria's OSCE chairmanship in October 2000 in Tashkent, but is sometimes also misused for other aims) tries to accommodate these Chinese foreign policy goals. As mentioned above, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation seems today the best working regional organisation in Central Asia – which is not only a proof of China's foreign policy abilities, but also of the fact that the regional organisations in Central Asia work better if there is a foreign interest behind or a foreign country pushing it.

For me, Central Asia has a unique geostrategic position: Lying

- between Russia and China – as a kind of buffer zone and having thus to accommodate aspirations of two huge world powers
- between the Southern Caucasus and China/Afghanistan (some countries bordering the Caspian Sea) – being a transit area for all kinds of goods and persons (including drugs, arms, human beings – trafficking)
- between Russia and Afghanistan – having had to deal with the Afghan neighbourhood and tragedy in all its aspects (civil war in Tajikistan, drugs, terrorism)
- between Russia and Iran/Afghanistan – being confronted with different models of Islamic statehood
- bordering Iran and Turk-speaking countries (Azerbaijan) - having thus to feel the influence of two different linguistic groups/cultures – Turk (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and Persian/Farsi (Tajikistan)
- between Russia and South East Asia – the India-Pakistani rivalry is also felt here

Complemented by rising interests of the US and Europe (Antiterror Coalition, energy) - all these factors are reflected among others in the different regional groupings and their form of cooperation. Rarely – with some exceptions - Central Asia is a successful player on its own initiative, but more a reacting one. It is to be hoped for that Central Asia will continue to find its geostrategic role in the world acknowledged and that it will not fall into oblivion once the world caravan moves on.

The views elaborated above represent the author's personal views and in no way the official position of the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

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FORMATION OF CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEMS OF ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIAN STATES - UZBEKISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN AND TURKMENISTAN

Today, the regional security of the Central Asian region can be considered only as a complex mosaic being formed and consisting of various bilateral and multilateral agreements in the sphere of security between the countries of the region. It is obvious that up to now in the Central Asian region there is no unique system forming the regional security. Moreover, there are different approaches to the formation of the national security policy in each republic, determining as a whole a military policy of the state. The following factors influence the formation mechanism of views on and approaches to security issues:

- Mutual relations between parties (if they have political power or influence);
- Relations between the clans inside the state and the level of their presence in the security sector;
- The personality of the political leader and his capability, the old fashioned views of the leadership in a context of bipolar apprehension of the world and incapability to change quickly for assessment of the political forces and new realities;
- Interrelations with neighbouring countries;
- Presence and influence of a strong security sector.

The lack of a unique system of views to the vitally important interests in the sphere of the states' security in the Central Asian region does not lead to the "bar component" system which would provide the necessary level of protection from potential and existing threats and risks.

The activity of international terrorist groups, religious and extremist movements on a background of increasing social differentiation of the population, unsettled international problems, and uncertainty of political priorities of the further development of countries is widely acknowledged today as the basic threat to Central Asian security.

Let us consider in this regard the formation mechanism of conceptual views on the problems of national security and their realization by the Central Asian countries - Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Kyrgyzstan

The President of the Kyrgyz Republic is at the same time commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and the Defence Council Chairman. Direct management is assigned to the Ministry of Defence. Coordination of actions for all security sectors of the state is assigned to the general staff of the Armed Forces. The Defence Ministry, by way of the Defence Council, carries out the task of elaborating conceptual views on the formation of armed forces and the defence doctrine.

The Kyrgyz parliament, due to a variety of political parties, unions and groups, is incapable to be operatively engaged and to settle the problems of military formation. Therefore, all issues of a military character are to be considered by the Ministry of Defence which prepares the relevant documents for their approval by the President. The parliament of the country tries to control the defence budget, without getting involved into the Ministry's activity.

The concept of national security and the military doctrine have a declarative character without taking into account realities of the present. The country's leadership is more looking ahead to the "Collective Security Treaty Organization" where it basically relies on the Russian military power. At the same time, due to financial difficulties, issues of the Armed Forces are also considered. The way they do it emphasizes

the lack of professional advisers and the narrow military and theoretical views of the commanders.

The countries' security services do not take part in the military policy formation process.

Kazakhstan

The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Security Council Chairman – a special body of a collective leadership dealing with defence and security issues of the country.

In the “Kazakhstan – 2030” Strategy, adopted in 1997, national security is proclaimed as the first priority. In 1999 - 2000 Kazakhstan adopted the Strategy of national security for the period 1999 - 2005, the military doctrine, the concept of military reform and the state program for military formation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

In his activities for the formation of the state military policy, the President of Kazakhstan relies above all on “Barlau” (the national security service) as the “main consultant” for the country's security service. The Security Council implements instructions of the President on the formation of the state military system, commencing with the priority directions of foreign policy. In foreign affairs, Kazakhstan conducts its policy by taking into account interests of Russia and China, preferring the first.

Tajikistan

Nominally, the President of Tajikistan is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the country. But in fact the country is divided into areas which are controlled by military troops of different (mostly criminal) leaders. The state Security Council (SC) considers conceptual issues surrounding national security and military formation. The SC also deals with the problems of threats and risks to the vital interests of the

Republic, working out the measures of adequate and appropriate reaction to them.

At present, the leadership of the country has just begun seriously studying the creation of the state military system in full. The period of national reconciliation, which put an end to civil war, has not yet ended. The parliament of the country is broken into fractions – “us” and “them” and neutral groups. In these circumstances the most important task is not defence against outside aggression (which is improbable and of a hypothetical character), but the stabilization of the internal political situation in view of the struggle between clans for spheres of influence and political power. The main military ally of Tajikistan is Russia who supports the government of President Rakhmonov.

Given this fact, the military system of the state is based first of all on holding power and maintaining control over key areas of the state. There is neither a national security concept nor a military doctrine in the Republic. There are only separate Presidential decrees and orders for times of military danger.

The Parliament is beginning to study the questions of centralizing the military power from isolated groups and units to an united system.

Turkmenistan

In connection with the proclaimed neutrality of 21 December 1995, the President of the country – the supreme commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces - determines state military policy alone. The Parliament and the security service can only make recommendations on some issues. Other states have no success in their attempts to make Turkmenistan participate in any collective regional security system.

Turkmenistan conducts its foreign military policy only on the basis of bilateral agreements, having the big ambition and plan to create a powerful, modern Armed Forces. There is no clear programme of the military system formation.

Uzbekistan

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the President is the supreme commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. He also appoints the National Security Council and its chairman. Under the President, there is the position of state adviser on the coordination of the activities of law enforcement bodies.

The security sector (Ministry of Defence, of Interior Affairs, the State Border Guard Committee, the National Security Service and MEM) submits its recommendations on the state's military system formation to the National Security Council. At the same time, the President discusses interior and foreign policy affairs with the Cabinet of Ministries.

The basic conceptual conclusions on the realization of the state's military system formation are to be considered carefully by experts in each part of the security sector and thereafter by the analytical divisions of the President's Administration.

They systematically analyse the presence of internal and foreign policy risks and threats and work out measures of adequate reaction to fully eliminate or mitigate these negative influences. The Security Council plays the main role in this activity.

The states of the region are involved at various degrees of intensity in the activities of the "Collective Security Treaty Organization" (CSTO), and also of the "Shanghai Organization of Cooperation" (SOC) which claim to play the role of guarantors of collective security in the region. Regional antiterrorist centres have been created within the framework of these organizations, and forces of quick reaction within the CSTO. All this determines one of the basic directions in the process of the creation of an unique security system for the Central Asian region. The logical result of it could be the formation of a military-political block of states (like NATO for example).

But proceeding from the analysis of existing approaches of the Central Asian states to the issue of the creation of a regional system of security

(RSS), it is more likely to assume that in the near future there will be no unique approach to the assessments of threats of national character and no mechanism of unique military system formation. Bearing in mind the strategic interests of the USA, Russia and China in the region, there is no hope for the early creation of a regional security system.

It is necessary to consider that, at present, the states of the region are undergoing difficult stages of statehood formation and of national identity determination, and are searching for the conditions to create a common economic area and for integration at a regional level. A number of local analysts think that the degree of military-political cooperation in the region depends on the efficiency of the economic integration process. However, this process is complicated by some factors including the realization of various models of internal political and economic reforms, the differences in foreign political and economical orientations and priorities, and also a certain rivalry for leadership in the region.

The following conclusion can be drawn from the above. In Central Asia, the problems of maintaining security at national and regional levels mostly depend on the efforts of the countries of the region and their cooperation with foreign partners in the domain of security.

Governance of the Security Sector in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian republics - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan have started independent ways of development, each one according to its own model. Each state has its own system of protection of the vital interests of the country. In this initial stage, the set of values for each republic was being determined and the creation of their own systems of protecting national interests was being studied.

The majority of countries in the region realize today that, for a secure development of the states, it is necessary to create conditions under which neighbouring countries would also be secure. The concept of “mutual security” under present conditions brings countries to the

understanding that even more attention should be given to economic, social, internal political, ecological, demographic intensity problems, etc. than to foreign affairs and military problems.

The national interests of the Central Asian countries are formed by the influence of internal and external factors, by the specificities of independent development models and are results of the changes that took place in international relations after the collapse of the bipolar system. The internal factors are the negative consequences of the processes of statehood creation, which at different speeds and in different forms use elements of the market economy and democracy for sovereign development. As a result of this process, and first of all at its initial stage of independent development, the states of Central Asia have faced up to the challenges of an economic crisis and a slump in production, growth in unemployment and social discontent of citizens, powerful migratory waves and the outflow of the Russian-speaking population, a sharp increase in the feeling of national consciousness and of religious identity, etc. These factors already challenged themselves the national security of the states and emphasized the necessity for their prompt settlement which, however, must also consider external factors.

The formation of the new structure of international relations has brought about new problems for the countries of the region. Attempts of re-considering the long time existing global order in international relations are always connected to changes in the understanding of the new situation, which leaves behind the old principles of the bipolar world.

At that time, the national interests of each republic were determined in general and the national security protection system which helped to make first steps towards statehood was also formed. The legislative base was created and the priority directions of development were determined. In this initial period the country needed the formation of the new security sector as an element of the state defence system.

The absence of military protection after the collapse of the Soviet Union made the independent republics start from zero. The first step was the

formation of armed forces and of national security systems by the creation of national security sectors.

Parts of the Soviet Defence Ministry, the KGB and the Interior Ministry in the Central Asian region were taken under the jurisdiction of the republics, which began transforming elements of the national security system.

In the period after the bipolar system, approaches to both global and regional stability had also changed. Hence, security keeping measures at different levels - global, regional, and national - had to be re-considered.

In the Central Asian region today, there are rather favourable conditions for spreading ideas of a radical Islam. Unemployment and an impoverishment of people is the very social ground which allows youth to become involved in a large number of extremist organizations.

Under these conditions, Central Asia may become the sphere of interest of international terrorism and religious extremism. Their leaders openly declare the necessity to establish a new Islamic order in the region and to capture the Muslim relics of Samarqand and Bukhara. Destabilization and military actions in Central Asia are becoming the real threat to development in the region.

It is obvious that this problem can not be settled in the framework of one single state. Therefore, the integrational aspect of cooperation has repeatedly been declared as a main condition for maintaining security in Central Asia. All countries in the region seriously consider threats to security such as international terrorism, drug smuggling, destabilization and military actions on neighbouring territories, illegal migration and a mass wave of refugees, influence of Islamic extremism, and coming to power of military - dictatorial Islamic regimes in the states of Central Asia.

The revision of the purposes and tasks of the security sectors in these new realities lead to the conclusion of necessary joint actions to decrease or fully liquidate external and internal threats at the regional level.

Working out the principles for the practical realization of coordinated actions of security sectors of the CIS countries against international terrorism and taking preventive measures become more and more the most important tasks at present. The joint operation against terrorists in the Ferghana Valley in autumn 1999 demonstrated not only the necessity of collective action but also illustrated their efficiency.

Two military manoeuvres named "the Southern borders of Commonwealth" (October 1999 in Kyrgyzstan and in April 2000 in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) showed that the Armed Forces of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are able to operate together in the case of an aggravation of a situation on southern CIS borders.

The Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils (CSSC) of the participating states of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) met in April 2001 in Yerevan. It was the beginning of the formation of new directions in security measures in the CIS and Central Asia in particular. The CSSC really became one of the supreme advisory bodies of the Council of collective security together with the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Council of Defence Ministers, focusing attention on the consideration of the current problems of international terrorism, drug-trafficking, illegal spreading of weapons, and also of situations in crisis areas.

Reflecting the strategic concept of the CST, the committee organizes its work along three operative directions: Western, Caucasian and Central Asian. The last direction is considered as the most dangerous one to the CIS countries. Participants do not exclude the chance of Uzbekistan joining the CSSC too as the situation in the Central Asian region is significantly aggravating, creating a real threat which Tashkent can not settle alone. The recurrence of events "in the Chechen way" in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan represents an essential threat to the region as a whole and also to Russia. Therefore, issues of actions against international terrorism, of the formation of regional systems of collective security and of the creation of collective special forces of the CST countries for Central Asia were discussed in Yerevan.

The system of operative information exchange between intelligence and other security services which gather and process data on enemy actions and the coordination of security sectors activity against aggressive actions were also discussed. Such measures were legally approved: in October 2001 the participating countries of the CST signed two agreements - "About the status of formations of forces of a collective security system" and "About a deepening of military-political integration within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty and measures on the formation of regional systems of collective security".

It was decided that a collective force would be created in the summer of 2003 and that each participating country would prepare a battalion for counteraction to extremists. Permanent collective forces would consist of 1,500 - 1,700 troops in addition to the already functioning antiterrorists centre whose regional branch would open in Bishkek in 2003. It is supposed that the agreement on the status of the forces of the regional collective security signed by the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan in Bishkek would contribute to the further development of military cooperation of the CIS countries, to the strengthening of integration and to joint efforts against the attempts of destabilizing the situation in Central Asia.

Regarding the struggle against terrorism there are some hopes of a CIS Antiterrorist centre being organized in Moscow by joint efforts and of a regional antiterrorist centre of "the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation" which is planned to be opened in Tashkent. According to the experts' opinion there will not be an overlap in the activity of these two centres but an augmentation in the joint efforts in the struggle against the common danger.

All this gives reason to think that the military cooperation of the CIS countries bears prospects to include joint efforts against the threats operating from the territory of Afghanistan.

One basic element of the national security systems of the Central Asian states is that the military component, the state control system,

infrastructure and other communications of the countries integrally entered into regional systems of communications.

In this context it would be useful to observe a military component of each state of the Central Asian region.

Republic of Uzbekistan

Since independence in 1991, the question of the creation of its own Armed Forces has become of the highest importance for the Republic of Uzbekistan. For the practical realization of social and economic reforms, Uzbekistan, as an independent state, vitally needed the strengthening of social stability and of state security. The necessity to create its own Armed Forces was also dictated by the complexity of military-political conditions in the region.

Conflict zones on the southern borders of Uzbekistan were potential sources of military danger. This circumstance put forward the defensibility of the state as a major condition for maintaining national security and stability, not only for the country but also for the region as a whole.

Until 1999, military security of Uzbekistan was understood as the provision of protection of the country from external aggression. Now political extremism, terrorism, organized crime of a trans-national character, illegal arms and drug trafficking, migration or the so-called "new dimensions of security" draw more attention. Changes in the understanding or the recognition of threats and in the character of modern military conflicts have been pointed out in official documents of the Republic of Uzbekistan concerning its military policy. In February 2000, the National Security Council under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan approved the defence doctrine and, in May 2001, a new edition of the law «On Defence» was adopted.

When forming a military-political course, Uzbekistan proceeds by considering the possibility of regional and local wars and military conflicts in Central Asia. In this regard, military conflicts of limited and

average scale along with diversion and terrorist forms and methods are considered as more probable.

In official documents, it is underlined that Uzbekistan may be under strong pressure given existing and potential conflicts in the region and near its borders. There is also the possibility of guerrilla war with the purpose of creating conditions for external aggression and intervention or the involvement of forces from outside the region into the conflict. Thus, attempts to create centres of conflict in several strategically important zones provoking large-scale extreme situations are probable.

Reform of the Armed Forces

Military reform in Uzbekistan is carried out with the purpose of optimising the structure of the Armed Forces and of the formation of a relevant military infrastructure.

The First Stage of Reforms - 1992-1997

The first stage in the construction of the Armed Forces began in January 1992. Until the end of 1997, the Armed Forces functioned in the newly developed organizational-regular structure in which the creation and the balanced development of different Armed Forces units in view of the Central - Asian specific character (battlefield) were a basic element.

The system of a disposition of military units, divisions and other objects with their dispersal throughout administrative-territorial areas of Republic of Uzbekistan was simultaneously improved.

The principles of national security and the basic directions of military formation and management of the Armed Forces were fixed in the military doctrine of the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted by Oliy Majlis (parliament) in August 1995.

The Second Stage of Reforms - 1998-2001

The basic directions of the further modernization of the military system of the country were actively discussed in all government structures.

The following directions were determined as the second stage of reforms in the Armed Forces:

- Firstly, to create military-administrative units of the Armed Forces throughout the country's territory with a view to improving management efficiency and their concentration on the most important strategic directions and the formation of a territorial defence system.
- Secondly, to reduce the number of the Armed Forces without damaging their battle capability with a view to the formation of an army of reasonable quantity, good structure and of professional quality.
- Thirdly, to continue the modernization of the organizational structure, the management of the Armed Forces system based on the experience of foreign armies.
- Fourthly, to develop the programme of military-technical modernization of armaments.

Four military-territorial formations (military districts (MD)) and one operative command point were created in 1998. It was done within the framework of military reform with the purpose of further modernization of the management of the Armed Forces, i.e. the increase of their efficiency of application and the improvement of interaction of power structures.

- Northwest military district - Nukus city.
- Southwest special military district - Karshi city.
- The central military district - Dzhizak city.
- East military district - Ferghana city.

In 2001, the Tashkent garrison was transformed into the fifth MD - the Tashkent military district.

During this period, the military-political situation in the region continued to become more complicated. Afghanistan, as the main source of destabilization of the borders of the state, has turned into a preparation camp for international terrorists and religious extremists and into the main supplier of drugs. In August 1999, parts of the extremist organizations invaded the Batkent area in Kyrgyzstan from the territory of Tajikistan, took hostages and tried to break through to the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan.

In November of the same year, they repeated their attempt to invade the Yangiobod area in Uzbekistan but were counterattacked. Taking all this into account and a more effective realization of the use of the Armed Forces against international terrorists, the leadership of the republic decided to carry out a step-by-step reformation of the arms management system and of the coordination of the interaction within the security structure of the state – the Ministry of Defence, the Committee on protection of frontiers (CPF), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), the National Security Service (NSS) and the Ministry of Emergency Measures (MEM).

The creation of military formations with the necessary mobility, self-sufficiency and which are equipped with modern combat technique, able to act effectively and reliably in any potential zones of military operations became the basic task of reforming the Armed Forces.

In 2000, when international terrorists made new attempts to invade the territory of Kyrgyzstan and the mountain areas of the Surkhan-Darya and the Tashkent areas, special assignment divisions of Uzbekistan's security sector effectively attacked the bands.

With a view to the modernization of the management system, the main staff of the Defence Ministry was progressively transformed into the general staff, and onward into the joint staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Powers, functions and tasks of the Defence Ministry and the joint staff were divided.

All this occurred within the framework of the first two stages of reforming the Armed Forces. All basic models and mechanisms of the new organization were examined during military exercises and antiterrorist operations.

The Third Stage of Reforms - 2001-2005

The results of the first two stages of reforming the Armed Forces allowed for a step to be made towards the next issue – the modernization of the Armed Forces management system. The purpose of this stage is to reform and to separate the management functions of the operative, strategic planning and the fighting application of troops on the one hand and the administrative management of the Armed Forces on the other hand.

The first function of planning and of organising interaction is realized by the joint staff of the Armed Forces, and the second – the control and the administrative management of troops - by the Defence Ministry.

The strategic course of the construction of the Armed Forces was determined by the President of Uzbekistan who said that «our military doctrine has a defensive, preventive orientation».

The defensive doctrine (till 1998 the military doctrine) of the Republic of Uzbekistan is based on the principles of the military doctrine adopted earlier and on the concept of national security. It represents a system of officially accepted views, principles and approaches for providing national security to the Republic of Uzbekistan in the military domain.

According to the constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the President is the supreme commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. He also appoints the Council of National Security and its chairman. The new post of the President's state adviser on the coordination of the activity of law enforcement bodies was created in 2000.

The heads of the ministries, the state committees and other bodies possessing military formations included in the Armed Forces manage these forces.

Structure and Number

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan started their formation in 1992 on the basis of the former Turkistan military district abolished in June 1992 in connection with the USSR collapse.

The date of creation of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan is 14 January 1992. Later, this day was declared the Day of the Defender of the Fatherland.

The military-power and militarised structures of Uzbekistan include:

- The divisions of the Defence Ministry;
- The troops of the Committee on protection of frontiers;
- The internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- The military formations of the National Security Service;
- The divisions of the Ministry of Emergency Measures.

The divisions of the Defence Ministry include land forces, air forces and anti-aircraft troops, forces of special assignment and the national guard. A constant reduction of their number has been observed since 1999. If in 1998 the total number of people in the divisions was estimated at 80,000, in 2002 it was between 50,000 and 55,000. The total number of people in the armies of the Defence Ministry will be decreased to 45,000. According to the International Institute of Strategic Researches (London), the number of land forces is 40,000 people organised in one tank core, ten motorized, one easy mountain, one air-landing, three air-assault and four engineering brigades, and also one brigade of national guards. The number of people in the air forces and anti-aircraft troops of the Republic of Uzbekistan is over 10,000 organised in seven aviation and helicopter units.

The basic forces of the Defence Ministry are concentrated in the area of Tashkent and Termez. Divisions of the national guard of 1,000 people protect strategic bases and objects. The basic military air bases are located in the area of the cities Karshi (Hanabad) and Andijan.

The airdromes in the area of the cities of Termez (Kokayda) and Chirchik can also be used as military air bases. However, the operative capacity of the majority of the airdromes is insignificant. In 2001 - 2002, during the preparation and the carrying out of operations in Afghanistan, the airdromes used by the antiterrorist coalition were renovated and modernized.

Forces of Special Assignment

After the collapse of the USSR, the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan were left with the 15th brigade of special assignment, 459th separate unit of special assignment (the separate group of special troops is formed on its base) and also the educational troop of the special assignment, who prepared staff for fighting divisions during the war in Afghanistan. These divisions have been kept until now in some transformed option.

Border Armies of the Committee on Protection of Frontier

The committee of protection of frontier (CPF) incorporates five boundary districts with one or two border groups. The total number of CPF comes up to 5,000 people.

Internal Troops (the Ministry of Internal Affairs)

The number of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs amounts to 19,000 people. Brigades and groups of protection are deployed in industrial and administrative areas. The serious role in providing military security is played by the Office of struggle against terrorism of the MIA.

Divisions of National Security Service

The national security service of the Republic of Uzbekistan is estimated as highly effective. In its structure there are divisions on the protection of especially important state objects, and also the divisions on struggle

against terrorism. The total number of the NSS divisions makes 5,000 people.

Acquisition and Professional Training

The principle of regular army personnel is now guiding the formation of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan following a recruitment problem due to the loss of officers from the Soviet army at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.

However Uzbekistan was able to use studying-training objects available in its territory and also to create new educational institutions for the training and preparation of national military staff. In 1995 the Academy of Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan was set up for the preparation of command staff for all security sectors of the country. Preparation of officer staff is also carried out by the Tashkent supreme combined-arms command-, the Chirchics supreme tank command-engineering-, the Samarqand supreme automobile-artillery- and the Dzhizak supreme aviation military schools. In addition, the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, NSS Institute, Military school of border armies, Customs College and the Supreme fire-technical school of the MIA are preparing relevant specialists. Part of the military staff (military medics, signal men, experts of air defence) is being prepared at specialized faculties in civil high schools. The military faculties of civil high schools also prepare reserve officers.

Preparation of military staff is also carried out at foreign educational centres with the participation of foreign experts. Foreign experts take an active part, especially in the preparation of special assignment divisions. From the end of the 1990s instructors from the USA were invited for these purposes. In 2000, during the creation of the Antiterrorist Centre of the CIS, when it was presumed that security services and special assignment divisions of Uzbekistan would participate in its activities, they had training with the Russian "Alpha" division. In June 2002, unconfirmed information reported the possible assistance of Turkish and British specialists in the creation of special divisions for Uzbekistan and that some officers are already studying at NATO educational centres in Italy and Germany.

Military-Economic Maintenance

The defence budget of the Republic of Uzbekistan is based on the economic opportunities and real needs of the country and proceeds from a principle of conformity of the level of military-economic maintenance to the security needs of the country in the military sphere. Expenses of the Republic of Uzbekistan on defence constantly grow. For example, defence expenses in 2001 in comparison with 2000 increased by 2.8 %. And in 2002, accounting for rates of growth, these charges came to over 107 million dollars.

Fragmentary military-industrial base of Uzbekistan and its discrepancy to needs of defence has an essential value for providing military security. Industrial enterprises involved in military production assignments were part of various components of the military-industrial complex of the USSR, depended on partners from outside of the republic and were not connected with each other.

In most cases they are unable to produce armaments and military technical equipment independently. In this regard, the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan is fully dependent on other states for its technical equipment.

International Military and Military-Technical Cooperation

In the field of providing military security, Uzbekistan has partnership relations with countries of the Central Asian regional complex of security. It takes part in international structures having a military-political component such as the CIS, the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation (SOC) and the NATO Program «Partnership for peace». At the bilateral level, relations with Russia and the USA are most significant for Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan - CIS

Despite the fact that the Collective Security Treaty was created on the initiative of Uzbekistan, in 1999 Tashkent refused to prolong the participation in the CST because of its inefficiency.

Uzbekistan holds a specific position in the work of the CIS Antiterrorist Centre which is intended to coordinate the interaction of Commonwealth states in the struggle against international terrorism and extremism. Uzbekistan participates in exercises held by the Centre ("South-Antiterror-2001"), however at the same time it does not take part in its financing nor in the work of the operative group of the Centre in Bishkek.

Uzbekistan also has a special position regarding the Coordinating committee on issues of air defence under the Council of the Defence Ministers of the CIS states-participants. This body is considered the most effective among all the collective structures of the Commonwealth. Since 1995, exercises and command-staff training of air defence forces of the CIS countries have been carried out almost every year. In 2001, Uzbekistan took part in command-staff training on a bilateral basis without participating in shootings in the framework of the exercises "Fighting Commonwealth-2001".

Uzbekistan – SOC

Participation in the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation allows Uzbekistan to belong to a regional policy and therefore avoid accusations of refusing to participate in collective security systems in the region. On the one hand, Uzbekistan manoeuvres between the interests of Russia and China, on the other hand it tries to control and influence their policy in the region. The participation in the organization of two regional powers at once eliminates the risk that the forum will be dominated by the interests of an outside regional centre.

Uzbekistan-NATO

Cooperation of Uzbekistan with NATO is carried out through the PFP Program and on a bilateral basis. Uzbekistan is a PFP participant since 1994, and began actively participating in international peace-making exercises organized in the PFP framework in 1995. Apart from that, some divisions of the Uzbekistan Armed Forces participate in training preparation in the USA, Germany and Norway in the same framework.

The American and German military instructors assist in the retraining of the Armed Forces of republic. Officer staff are being trained in Turkey, the USA and Germany.

Until October 2001, NATO activity in Uzbekistan, as well as in Central Asia as a whole, was limited to questions of non-proliferation, gathering intelligence information about the Uzbekistan security policy and information on the NATO strategy and peacekeeping measures in the regions where NATO is not interested to send troops. Cooperation also concerned non military aspects, such as the protection of the environment etc.

After the beginning of the US military operation in Afghanistan, NATO member states asked Uzbekistan for help in the military-technical sphere for the preparation of some projects. Basic attention is paid to the struggle against terrorism and drug trafficking with the preparation of special operations forces, explorative and mountain divisions. The Memorandum of military and military-technical cooperation with Turkey was signed in June 2002- the Agreement on military cooperation with Poland had been signed in March 2002. Cooperation with Germany actively develops with the Bundeswehr using the airbase "Kokayda" for the maintenance of its peace-making contingent International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan-Russia

Until 1999, relations between the two states were in many aspects determined by processes inside the CIS and their positions on regional conflict settlement in Tajikistan. Tashkent toughly reacted to any strengthening of positions of Russia in this country. However, actions of illegal armed formations on the borders between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 1999 - 2000 brought a strengthening of the military-political role of Russia in Central Asia and also changed Uzbekistan's position.

Tashkent does not doubt the necessity of the development of relations with Russia, however bases it exclusively on bilateral relations, refusing

to participate in regional multilateral cooperation. In relations with Moscow, Tashkent takes «a special position».

In February 1999, Uzbekistan decided to exit the CST however, in the autumn after Putin's visit to Tashkent, Uzbekistan and Russia signed the Treaty for the further deepening of widespread cooperation in military and military-technical areas.

In the summer of 2000, at the summit of heads of the CIS participating states, the President of Uzbekistan declared that it was necessary for all «to recognize openly the long-term interests of Russia in this region» and called Russia to give more attention to Central Asia.

In March 2001, Moscow and Tashkent signed agreements on deliveries from Russia of artillery systems, helicopters (including - Ka-50-2 «the Black shark»), items of air defence and ammunitions. They also agreed on increasing quotas for Uzbekistan in the Russian military high schools, especially in the pilot schools and academies. In May 2001, the Treaty on cooperation on border questions was signed.

Uzbekistan - the USA

150 officers of the Uzbek army were trained in the USA in 1995 - 2000 according to the program of the international military education and preparation. In turn, the American militaries took part in exercises in the territory of Uzbekistan ("Balance -2000"). The USA also assisted the Uzbek militaries and frontier guards in purchasing military equipment and a permanent group on military-technical cooperation was created.

At that time, the USA was not ready to act as the guarantor of security in Central Asia. They considered the region at best as an object of minor interest coming from a wider understanding of security, connected with Russia, China, Southern Asia and global problems such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drug trafficking.

The situation changed after the beginning of military operations in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. President Karimov was one of the first

to support American actions in Afghanistan. In a communiqué from a session of the National Security Council (1 October 2001) it was declared that Uzbekistan was ready to contribute to the liquidation of terrorist bases and camps in Afghanistan and to make available its national air space for these purposes.

On 7 October 2001, Uzbekistan and the USA signed an agreement on the provision of air space and also a necessary infrastructure of one of its air bases by Uzbekistan. The agreement did not determine the terms of US military presence and concerned the use of the air base only within the framework of antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan.

In to the Agreement, US Armed Forces acquired air base "Hanabad" for humanitarian purposes and also for search and rescue operations. According to the International institute of strategic researches, approximately 1,200 US militaries (within the framework of operation "Enduring Freedom") have been deployed on the base.

It is presumed that the divisions deployed on the air base are the 720th tactical group of the US Air Force Command of special operation forces, the 10th mountain division whose militaries participated in the exercise "Centrazbat-2000" and the 96th battalion on communications with civil authorities and investigations. On the same air base are military-transport planes, search and rescue helicopters, planes of radio-electronic and psychological struggle (EU - 130 «Commando solo») and also pilot-less plane-scouts "Predator". At the same time, Uzbek military planes continue to be deployed here.

In exchange for the American presence in Uzbekistan, the USA will give Tashkent financial help and investments estimated at 8 billion dollars. This includes the re-equipment of the Uzbek Armed Forces to bring its armaments and military technical equipment up to NATO standards and the repair and release of some types of armaments and military technical equipment. It is also planned to develop the unique integrated system of communication and to start the development of a new system of anti-aircraft defence.

Besides operations in Afghanistan, the USA continues to pay attention to questions surrounding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, in October 2001 the USA and Uzbekistan signed the agreement on which Americans have to destroy the biological weapon buried on the island of Vozrozhdenie in the Aral Sea.

In March 2002 during the visit of president Karimov to Washington, the USA and Uzbekistan signed the Declaration on strategic partnership and cooperation in political, economic and legal areas and also in the sphere of security and the Cooperation agreement on the non-distribution of nuclear technologies. To date, military-political cooperation is the basic component in Uzbek-American relations and in many respects determines their dynamics.

Republic of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is a participant of the CST of the CIS, supports the creation of a system of collective security in Asia and has held meetings on confident building measures in the Asian continent (this idea was put forward in 1995 by the Kazakhstan President at the 47th session of the UN General Assembly). Kazakhstan supports the creation of a Joint Armed Forces (JAF) based on armies of union country-members.

Kazakhstan supported the Agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth joint system of anti-aircraft defence, the concept and Treaty on the cooperation of CIS countries on the protection of external borders (formation of unique command, creation on an equal footing of the common material base of boundary parts, professional training under the unique program in base educational institutions of participating states).

Kazakhstan has guarantees of security from such nuclear powers as Russia, the USA, Great Britain and China, fixed in the Memorandum from 5 December 1994.

Foreign policy activity of Kazakhstan is directed by the expansion of contacts with strong states that are capable to provide economic

assistance and to foster independent development. The Republic of Kazakhstan cooperates with NATO since 1994.

Strategy of National Security

In the Strategy adopted in 1997, «Kazakhstan-2030», national security was proclaimed the first priority. In 1999 - 2000, Kazakhstan approved the Strategy of National Security for the period of 1999 - 2005, the Military doctrine, the Concept of military reform and the State program of military construction of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The Military Doctrine

The first Military doctrine of Kazakhstan adopted in 1993 had been focused on the maintenance of military security at the stage of formation of the sovereign state. Changes in means, methods and the character of military actions during the last years have necessitated the development and adoption of the new Military doctrine.

The new Military doctrine of Kazakhstan (10 February 2000) proved for the first time the necessity of adequately developing the Armed Forces to be able to respond to new tendencies and threats in the military sphere. It is oriented towards the creation of a compact, high level capability, mobile army with advanced forces of rapid reaction, special troops knowing anti-guerrilla tactics, mountain and desert wars. It determines the basic parameters and stages of military reform. Considering the most probable threats and new tasks, the Armed Forces are undergoing a change in structure and the introduction of a new organizational principle of construction based on the triad «one battalion-one brigade-one core».

Participation in the International Antiterrorist Coalition

Kazakhstan is participating in antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. The leadership of the republic declared its readiness to contribute to the restoration of Afghanistan by providing territory for the storage and transit of humanitarian cargoes.

Astana plans to transfer 3,000 tons of wheat to Kabul and to become in the near future one of the main exporters of grain to Afghanistan.

Up to now, the contracts on delivery to this country of 70,000 tons of grain are concluded and more than a third of it has already been delivered. Kazakhstan also declared its readiness to direct experts on the development of the gas sector, agriculture, the restoration of its transport infrastructure, irrigational systems etc. to Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan sent its peace-making battalion "Kazbat" to Afghanistan for what the political decision of the country's leadership deems necessary. "Kazbat" will consist of engineering-sappers, a medical unit and a unit of communication.

The government of Kazakhstan is developing a program of rendering assistance to Afghanistan which has four basic directions: firstly, deliveries of humanitarian help; secondly, sending civil experts of different structures to Afghanistan for restoration of the country; thirdly, providing warehouses for the storage of humanitarian cargoes and the operation of mini-enterprises which process raw material in southern regions of Kazakhstan; lastly, Kazakhstan is ready to consider the sending of peace-keeping forces to Afghanistan.

Regarding the granting of territory to foreign armies of participating states of the antiterrorist coalition, Kazakhstan, taking into account the opinion of Moscow, has declared the granting of an air corridor and airdromes for the use of military contingents of Great Britain and the USA. According to official representatives, it will only occur within the framework of the carrying out of antiterrorist operations.

Kazakhstan coordinates its actions with the USA within the framework of antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan.

Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of Kazakhstan were created on 8 May 1992.

The President is Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The Security Council, a special body of joint administration on questions of defence and security, includes the Prime Minister, the first assistant to the Prime Minister, the State Adviser on state-legal issues and the chairman of the State commission on extreme situations.

On 7 May 1994, the State Committee of Defence of the Republic of Kazakhstan was transformed into the Defence Ministry.

In November 1997, the functions of the Defence Ministry and the Joint Staff were divided. The military-political management, the organization of defence construction in the country and management of the Armed Forces were assigned to the Defence Ministry. Operational and strategic functions of the Armed Forces were assigned to the Joint Staff. The principle of three-specific structures of the Armed Forces was approved: general purpose forces (GPF), air defence forces (ADF) and forces of protection of frontiers (FPF).

The number of Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 1 January 2003 totalled 69,000 including GPF - 46,800, ADF - 10,000 and FPF 12,000. Mobilization resources of the country stand at 3.55 million people.

General purpose forces (GPF) form the backbone of the Kazak Armed Forces. The GPF includes motor-shooting and tank troops, ALA, rocket troops and artillery, air defence troops and also divisions of special troops (engineering, chemical, communications, radar-tracking and others).

The organizational principle is based upon battalion, brigade (the same troops but with an additional battalion of stored technical equipment), division, corpus. The corpus is the supreme operative association within the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan. The structure of GPF is as follows:

two army corpuses, two divisions (tank and motor-shooting) and five separate brigades with a separate landing-assault brigade in Kapchagay and a separate landing-assault battalion in the Southern district.

Air Defence Forces (ADF) have been created by uniting the air forces and air defence of the country. The ADF possesses more than 540 units of aviation technical equipment of which the most part is concentrated in warehouses including 100 anti-aircraft missile launchers (including C-300).

The supreme collection of aircraft is at the Air Forces base (it is equated to an air division).

Russia delivered 3 PU anti-aircraft-rocket complexes C-300PMU to Kazakhstan and plans the delivery of another 3 units (for the debts for rent of Baikonur and testing grounds). The Armed Forces of the country have also up to 100 units of other mobile anti-aircraft-rocket complexes. Kazakhstan has plenty (up to 500 pieces) of portable anti-aircraft-rocket complexes "Strela" and its modifications.

The capital of Kazakhstan is equipped with a system of air defence consisting of a modern aviation base with up to 36 planes, the MIG-35 and also anti-aircraft-rocket battalion C-300. In the area of the capital, there are two starting rocket-anti-aircraft installations on constant duty with the possibility of their immediate using during an aggravation.

Forces of Protection of Frontier (FPF)

FPF were formed on 18 August 1992. The number of border troops of the Republic of Kazakhstan totals 12,000 persons.

The protection of the frontier is carried out by border groups (BG), frontier posts (FP) and commandant's offices (CO). The average number of FPF divisions is as follows: BG - 300-320 persons, FP and CO - 25-35 regular. FPF protects the Uzbek-Kazakh border.

In the last two years, additional parts and divisions and more than 10 new control-check points were deployed on the southern border of Kazakhstan.

The Navy (Naval Forces)

Since November 1997, the Naval Forces are a part of the FPF deployed on the Caspian Sea. The total number is about 1,000 person (it is expected to increase to up to 3,000). Actually, the Naval Forces consist of 10 coast guard boats, 2 small hydro graphic boats, 3 helicopters Mi-8 and 6 helicopters Mi-2 which are based in the ports of Aktau and Atirau.

All sea zones, within the limits of the national border, are now under control of the special operative service "Bars".

Preparation of the Naval Forces military staff of Kazakhstan is carried out by the Supreme Naval School.

The Republican Guard (RG) is a separate military formation of the Armed Forces under the President of the Republic. Recruitment to RG is carried out on a voluntary basis and consists of 2,500 people.

RG possesses armoured troop-carriers BTR-80, small arms, communication facilities and special and automobile technical equipment.

Internal Armies (IA of the Ministry of Internal Affairs)

The number of IA is about 20,000 persons. Brigades and troops of protection are deployed in industrial and administrative areas (Almata, Shymkent, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Leninsk) and also on borders. Divisions of so-called operative troops are located in potentially "hot" spots - in the cities of Shymkent, Uralsk, Aktyubinsk and Petropavlovsk.

Reform of Armed Forces

Military reform in Kazakhstan is carried out with the purpose of optimizing the structure of the Armed Forces and the formation of a relevant military infrastructure. It includes three stages:

1998 - 2005: the creation of legislative and normative bases for the construction of future armies and the gradual transition to contract-alternative services.

2006 - 2015: the re-equipment of the army with the newest weapons and combat material.

2016 - 2030: the achievement of an organizational and qualitative level of army comparable with the advanced countries of the world.

District structure: four military districts within the limits of administrative and territorial units of the country have been created since 6 July 2000: the Southern based in Taraz, the Eastern based in Semipalatinsk, the Central based in Astana and the Western based in Aktau.

Admission of staff is carried out on the basis of the laws «On comprehensive obligations and military service» and «On contractual military service».

Principles of Admission under the Contract and Obligation

The service term is 18 months except for the Air Forces which has a service term of 24 months or 12 months for persons with a high level of education. Mobilization resources are about 3.5 million people.

The military reserve in Kazakhstan consists of 1.3 million people, including 120,000 officers. Another 78,000 including 9,000 officers can be additionally mobilized. Due to mobilization opportunities, the republic can also form two motor-shooting, one tank divisions and one reserve artillery and antiaircraft-rocket brigades.

Military Education System

For the formation of the officer corpus of the republic, the following military educational institutions have been created:

The Academy of Armed Forces was formed by decree of the head of the state on 11 February 1997. It has the following faculties: combined-arms, artillery, communications and transport. The education process offers eleven areas of specialisation. The post graduate course

specializes in general tactics, the operation of armament and military technical equipment and military history.

The Aktyubinsk High Military Aviation School prepares cadets for a command-tactical front, army aviation, tactics, management, engineers for the service of planes and engines, aviation equipment, radio-electronic equipment and aviation armaments.

In the Almaty Military Institute of Border Armies, cadets are trained in four faculties: border troops, internal troops, governmental communication and officers' education and improvement of professional skills.

The Supreme Naval School was formed in 2001. 180 cadets are studying in this institution.

The military faculty under the Academy of Civil Aviation prepares engineers for the operation of communication facilities and radio engineering maintenance.

Defence Expenses

In 2000, defence expenses of the Republic of Kazakhstan amounted to 17 billion tenge (101.7 million dollars) instead of the planned 12 billion. In 2001 expenses were 211 million dollars and in 2002 approximately 200 million dollars.

The budget for 2002 also included the last year's debts, medical treatment of military pensioners, scientific research, some works of defensive character, protection of military objects, formation of information control system and the realization of interstate agreements on renting of military and space testing grounds.

New budgetary programs have been adopted: the modernization and purchase of communication systems, cartographic-geodetic maintenance, creation of an automated system of accounting and reporting, combat training and the provision of accommodation for military personnel.

Manufacture and Delivery of Military Assignment Production

Condition of a military-industrial complex

The basic capacities of a military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union are still kept in Kazakhstan. The high degree of economic integration of the republic with other CIS countries makes Kazakhstan dependent on the importing of products.

Before 1991 there were about 100 enterprises in the defence sector. Kazakhstan produced small armaments, rocket systems, components of anti air force systems and equipment for Naval Forces (up to 95 % of some products made in the USSR).

Petropavlovsk in the north of the republic, Shevchenko in the west, Ust-Kamenogorsk in the east, Celinograd in the centre and Almaty in the south were the regional centres of the Kazakhstan defence sector.

Currently 24 enterprises of military-industrial complex (MIC) of Kazakhstan continue to deliver to Russia torpedoes, rocket complexes, onboard equipment and shooting armaments etc. About 60 Kazakhstan enterprises in total make up to 400 kinds of products (basically accessories for weapons and military technical equipment) for 200 orders from the Russian defence sector.

The above-mentioned 24 enterprises include the following specialized branches: shipbuilding - 5; radio industry - 3; armament industry - 7; space-rocket industry - 7; electronics - 5; aviation industry - 2; industries of a communication facility - 1.

Delivery of Weapons and Military Technical Equipment

Less than 20 percent of defence sector production is now for really military assignments which are used for the needs of the national Armed Forces.

In 1999, the defence sector industry income from the export of military-technical production amounted to 13 million dollars. In 2000, Kazakhstan considerably expanded its markets for military production and defence sector income came to more than 20 million dollars; in 2001 24.4 million dollars and in 2002 some 30 million dollars.

Military export of the republic increases and Kazakhstan currently exports its production to 15 countries. Except for armoured technical equipment and planes, the defence sector of Kazakhstan, with foreign investments, is capable to develop programs on production of anti-aircraft, tactical and operational-tactical rockets, and modern systems of air defence. Ural large-calibre infantry machine gun NSVT-12,7 and the "police" automatic gun PP-90 have drawn much attention of Russia, China, etc during the international military exhibition IDEX-2001 in the United Arab Emirates.

Astana offers the old but reliable Soviet aircrafts: Su-24 (the first unsuccessful contract between Kazakhstan and Syria for delivery of this plane was signed in the middle of 1992), fighters-bombers MiG-21, the MiG-25 and helicopters Mi-4 and 8-8.

The more expensive types of military production made in Kazakhstan are torpedoes and underwater mines, and also the multi-purpose underwater devices "Omar", "Meduza" and «Complex». These units allow to carry out the most various tasks - from inspection of underwater pipelines and raising of fragments from depth of 1,000 meters to inspection diving to drifting submarines.

Military and Military-Technical Cooperation

The Kazakh-Russian Relations

The Friendship, Cooperation and Military Assistance Treaty of 1992 guarantees Russia's help in the formation of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan. It legalizes the further staying of Russian military personnel in Kazakhstan, provides many of the Russian troops with accommodation and allows them to carry out their movements across Kazakhstan to the South. The contract mentions an acute problem that is the use by Russia of strategic testing grounds and other military constructions from Soviet times.

The Treaty on military cooperation signed in March 1994 determines a principle of common use of the Caspian Sea by the Navies.

The Russian-Kazakh strategic agreements have found further amplification after the adoption of the new Russian foreign policy concept (28 June 2000) concerning the CIS participating states. According to this document and in view of the geopolitical position, Kazakhstan is obliged to consider Russia as its main strategic partner and to adhere to regional agreements on security.

The agreement of 16 January 2001 on the Russian military testing grounds in Kazakhstan creates a legal basis for timely staying of the Russian troops in Kazakhstan.

Cooperation on Border Protection

In the beginning of 2001 the Council of the Federation of Russia ratified the Treaty between Russia and Kazakhstan on cooperation in the protection of external borders. The document determines the basic directions of cooperation border protection between the two countries: the possibility for the militaries of both countries to serve in border troops of any of the two countries, constant exchange of information on the situation, cooperation in operative, intelligence and counterintelligence activity, rendering of assistance in professional training for border troops.

Joint Military Preparation

In August 1992 Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation signed the agreement on the training of a big group of Kazakhstan militaries in Russia. Russia agreed to do it without any compensation.

According to agreements between Kazakhstan and Russia, the senior and junior officers of the Kazakh Army continue their studies in Russian military high schools. At present 700 students of Kazakhstan's Armed Forces are being trained in 39 Russian military high schools, more than 100 of them graduated from military academies, including the Academy of Joint Staff of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation.

The Joint System of Air Defence

The Russian Government has approved the jointly prepared five-year draft agreement with Kazakhstan on the sharing of military testing grounds by the Russian air forces and the air defence of Kazakhstan. One of the purposes of the agreement was the improvement of interaction between the air defence forces of the two states. The project was prepared on the basis of the bilateral Contract on military cooperation (26 March 1994) and the Concept of joint air defence of the CIS (19 January 1994).

The joint patrolling by forces of Russia's and Kazakhstan's air defences began on 1 May 1996 according to a bilateral agreement and the agreement of the CIS on the organization of the integrated system of air defence (10 February 1995). This system of joint Russian-Kazakh patrolling is considered to be the basis for the realization of the initiatives on the organization of a joint regional system of air defence in Central Asia.

Cooperation in the field of manufacture and deliveries of arms

In January 1993, Russia and Kazakhstan signed the agreement on mutual military assistance. The subsequent agreements provided joint planning and training, coordination of military intelligence, support of military-industrial communications including cooperation in military trading with third countries.

Kazakhstan is planning to use capacities of its military-industrial complex within the framework of military-technical cooperation with Russia and already conducts negotiations in this field. In February 2002, both states set up the special subcommittee on military-technical cooperation which determined as primary goal the development of the program on military-technical cooperation of defence-industrial complexes till 2010.

Kazakhstan - CST

Kazakhstan is a member of the CST. Due to the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan, the focus of CST activity is moving towards the

strengthening of the coordination of the CIS participating states' military-technical cooperation by Moscow. Russia promises to deliver armaments and military-technical equipment to CIS countries on favourable terms.

The leadership of the Council of Collective Security notices an active role of Kazakhstan, both in performance of treaty obligations and in military-economic integration.

Kazakhstan - NATO

The political administration of Kazakhstan considers the close cooperation with the NATO member states, including cooperation within the framework of the PfP-program, as a condition for the country's military security.

In the last years the administration of Kazakhstan has considered the USA, Germany and Turkey as alternative sources of modern arms. Within the framework of military assistance Kazakhstan received 6 patrol boats from the USA and 4 patrol boats from Germany. Kazakhstan is planning to receive from Germany also radio engineering equipment and from the USA communication facility and devices for the control and protection of nuclear materials.

Kazakhstan and the USA signed a number of agreements in the field of defence and security.

Within the framework of the program of military financing, the USA rendered to Kazakhstan a military financial assistance of 2.75 million dollars in August 2002. Currently, Kazakhstan is purchasing American military-technical equipment for mobile forces, various models of "Hammer" army automobiles and "Bell Textron" helicopters. In the framework of the same program in 2003 additional 3 million dollars will be rendered to Kazakhstan. Apart from American training of Kazakh officers in the leading military high schools, 1.8 million dollars will be assigned for these purposes during the next two years. At this time, some

30 Kazakh officers are studying in the USA (National University of Defence, Academy of the Air Forces and Academy of West-Point).

In April 2001 Turkey rendered military-technical assistance of 1.2 million dollars to the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan. For these funds, military equipment and 30 automobiles were purchased from. The same year, the Turkish side presented to the Kazakhstan's Defence Ministry a patrol boat which is used as an educational vessel in Naval school.

The opening ceremony of the military-technical representation of Joint Staff of the Military Forces of Turkey took place in August 2001 in Astana. The primary goal of this representation is the coordination of military cooperation between the defence sectors of Kazakhstan and Turkey.

Kazakhstan and Turkey signed more than 11 agreements on military-technical cooperation. Within the program of military interaction between both countries, assistance of 10 million dollars is supposed to be rendered to Kazakhstan's Armed Forces till 2010.

During the last few years Kazakh military experts have studied mainly in four high schools in Turkey and three high schools in Germany. At the same time the administration of Kazakhstan inquires for study possibilities in educational institutions of other countries. In the beginning of 2002 the group of experts of the department for military education of the Defence Ministry of Kazakhstan visited the Sevastopol (Nakhimov's) Naval Institute.

In 1998 - 2002, the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan took part in the CIS «Fighting commonwealth» and «the Southern shield of Commonwealth» military exercises and the PfP-program "Centrazbat". In the near future Kazakhstan's peace-making battalion "Kazbat" is supposed to be given certification of the UN and NATO which will testify "Kazbat's" readiness for actions in any region of the world after five months of preparatory training including language courses abroad.

From 12 – 28 July 2001 Kazakhstan's militaries participated in the command-staff computer exercises «the Shield of the world-2001» in the Yavorovsk's educational centre (Ukraine).

From 7 – 30 August 2002 on the Kokchegaysk's base of a landing-assault brigade in Kazakhstan, the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan and divisions of the American Forces of special assignment held joint tactical exercises under the code name «Balance Bar». Other joint exercises of Kazakh and US Armed Forces with the participation of 300 militaries are planned for summer 2003.

Republic of Kyrgyzstan

The General Data on Armed Forces

In 29 May 1992 according to the Decree of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, units and parts of the Armed Forces of the USSR located on Kyrgyz territory were taken under the jurisdiction of Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan has never considered any state or coalition of states as its enemy and has opposed the use of military force for achieving political and economic targets. However, it has recognized as necessary the country's preparation to protect it against possible military attack. These obligations are determined in the military defence concept of Kyrgyzstan and fixed in the law on defence. They mean to keep military potential at a level of providing military security and capability of the Armed Forces which allows repulsing a possible aggression.

The obligations of Kyrgyzstan in the framework of the CST of the CIS rather than the negative development of the military-political situation and of military threats to Kyrgyzstan's security were the stimulus to the creation of own Armed Forces. Originally Armed Forces were perceived only as an obligatory attribute of statehood.

However, practical measures in view to strengthen the country's defensibility were limited by the establishment of number of the armed forces without any feasibility study and calculations. Thus, the state's

needs regarding maintenance of military security and its economic opportunities were not considered.

While the states of the world community spend 3 - 5% of their GDP for defence, Kyrgyzstan spends less than 1%. Moreover, there is a clear tendency towards the reduction of its military budget. If in 1995 it made 0.68% of GDP, in 1997 - only 0.56% and in 2000 - 0.50%.

According to international criteria, the army should annually update 9 - 10% of its arms and military-technical equipment. After the collapse of the Soviet Union up to today, Kyrgyzstan has hardly spent any funds for the needs of the Armed Forces because of financial restrictions nor is the republic is planning to update its armament. At present, more than 50% of its arms and military-technical equipment has become worthless.

The legal documents on a military policy have mainly declarative character and do not determine the directions of the development of the state's military organization, mechanisms of legislative, legal regulation and realization of a military policy.

The military leadership of Kyrgyzstan is planning to compensate the lack of finance by reducing the regular Armed Forces down to a level provided with economic opportunities at preservation of existing military expenses.

The troops' structures haven't been changed much, mainly towards a staff reduction. They still represent the typical structure of the Soviet Army, specialized more in acting in desert areas.

The management of the Armed Forces is not organized properly. Even today, Kyrgyzstan doesn't have an office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The existing structure of the Defence Ministry, its technical equipment, notification and communication systems do not allow to carry out a qualitative management of troops during the mobilization period or in case of times of war.

Due to insufficient financing of the army, operative, fighting and mobilization preparation of troops are conserved. As a result the professional ability has considerably decreased.

All the above-mentioned clearly shows that today the Armed Forces as a basic component of the military security system and of all systems of the security sector do not satisfy the needs of the country. The small number of the Armed Forces, their low fighting ability, their poor and weak technical equipment, and their insufficient mobilization potential do not guaranty military security.

Today, the number of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is 25,600 people. In the Ministry of Defence, the number is 12,600 people, including: the Land Forces of about 10,500 people, the Air Forces and air defence of up to 2,100 people. The Border Force has about 10,000 people and the Internal Forces include up to 3,000 people.

Supreme Commander-in-Chief is the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

The Data by Types of Armed Force

Land Forces

Land Forces of Kyrgyzstan have one motor-shooting division and a separate motor-shooting brigade (mountain).

The motor-shooting division (permanent location is a suburb of the city Bishkek, the village Rybachye) consists of three motor-shooting regiments, tank, anti-aircraft artillery and artillery regiments.

The structure of the Defence Ministry also includes three separate machine-gun artillery batteries, two bases for the storage of armoured technical equipment, military hospital and a separate group of special assignment called "Scorpion".

Arms and combat technique are mostly old. Kyrgyzstan doesn't have any resources for the creation of a modern army and that is the reason why it addresses Russia, China, Kazakhstan and some European countries with the request to render military-technical help on a barter basis for delivery of electric power, uranium and other raw metals.

Military Air Forces and Air Defence

The military Air Forces of the republic consist of two aviation brigades: a separate fighting aviation brigade stationed in the city of Tog-mak, and a separate transport aviation brigade stationed in the city of Kant; one helicopter brigade and a military air base both in Bishkek.

Air Forces and Air Defence are equipped with: warplanes - 66, including combat planes - 10; helicopters - 30, including combat helicopters- only 12. Russia started to re-equip divisions of Kyrgyzstan's air defence by complexes PK C-75,125. The Russian Defence Ministry conducts negotiations on the long-term leasing of some other air defence systems, including the "C-300".

Border Service of the Kyrgyz Republic

On 1 October 2002 the unique Border Service was created under the Chief Directorate of border service of the Defence Ministry and the Chief Directorate of border control of the National Security Service of Kyrgyzstan with the office in Bishkek. Today, the formation of an independent force department – the Border service (BS) of the Kyrgyz Republic has been started.

The border service will be an executive body of the state management under the government that promotes state policy in the field of border protection. It will be headed by a chairman appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister. The border troops consist of approximately 5,000 people: six border groups stationed in the cities of Osh, Naryn, Prijivalsk, Batken, Isfana and Haydarkan. Each border group, depending on length and complexity of a protected site, consist of 8-12 frontier post with 650- 950 people each. Approximately 70% of the

militaries in the border groups serve on contract basis. The basic arms of the frontier posts are RPG-7, PKM, RPK, AK-74, PNV, GAZ-66, KShM, stationary RS "Barret", and portable RS "Aselsan". Russia, China, Turkey and some other Western countries actively assisted Kyrgyzstan by rendering technical and mountain equipment and communication facilities.

Admission to and Training in the Armed Forces

The collapse of the system of military-patriotic education has led to a fall in prestige of military service, to growth of anti-army mood, attempts of the youth to avoid military service. The Parliament of Kyrgyzstan approved that recruits for military service would be released if they pay an amount equivalent to 500 dollars, and the term of service was shortened from 2 years to 1 year, but at the same time the maximum age of recruits was raised from 27 to 35 years.

Kyrgyzstan doesn't have the basis for preparing its own military personnel. The militaries study mainly in Russian military institutions and in some Western countries. On the one hand, it can lead to further misunderstandings between militaries with different points of view on purposes, tasks, structure of armies, ways of conducting operations, etc. On the other hand, the Western military experts do not take into account the specific features of battlefields in Kyrgyzstan.

At the same time, the leadership of the republic, bearing in mind Batkents events and antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, is planning to reform the Army (on a contract basis) and to pass over to a professional, mobilized and technically re-equipped Army.

This is the reason why on the international arena the administration of Kyrgyzstan tries to balance between the interests of such states as Russia, China and the USA. With the financial assets granted for providing the antiterrorist coalition with air base, Kyrgyzstan purchases from Russia arms and military technical equipment to be delivered on specially favourable terms (low prices or long-term credits like for the members of the Collective Security Treaty).

The military reform is planned to be carried out in three stages with the completion date in 2010.

Military and Military-Technical Cooperation

Kyrgyzstan – Russia

Russia takes all necessary steps for delivering military-technical equipment to Kyrgyzstan on most favourable terms. In May 2002 Russia rendered to Kyrgyzstan military-technical assistance amounting to 770,000 dollars (communication facilities and security equipment for the modernization of the Kyrgyz-Chinese and Kyrgyz-Tadjik borders).

The Russian naval units testing technical equipment for torpedoes and long distance communication still stay in Kyrgyz waters. A group of Russian military advisers consult local specialists on issues of protection of the CIS's southern boundaries. The Russian atomic energy ministry cooperates with Kyrgyz enterprises on enrichment of uranium for military purposes. The renovation of some Kyrgyz military enterprises also draws much attention of Russian investors.

The second session of the Kyrgyz-Russian commission on military-technical cooperation took place in Bishkek in November 2002. Kyrgyzstan expressed readiness to give up some industrial enterprises (joint-stock company "Dastan" producing arms for navy fleet, joint-stock company "Janar" producing technical systems for border protection, joint-stock company "Aynur" and the Bishkek stamping factory producing bullets for automatic weapons) to Russia as repayment of debts.

According to Kyrgyz analysts, military cooperation between Bishkek and Moscow is nowadays based rather on political than on economic aspects. Both sides try to demonstrate that the opening of the military base near Bishkek for the US and coalition forces cannot influence their military cooperation.

However, the present state of affairs shows that military cooperation with the West brings more political and economic dividends to Kyrgyzstan than the same cooperation with CIS countries.

In 2002 Kyrgyzstan agreed on the prolongation of deployment of Russian military objects on the territory of Kyrgyzstan for at least 7 - 15 years (the communication centre of the Russian Navy 50km from Bishkek and the military exercise ground "Ozero" on Issyk Kul lake, where new types of naval arms are tested).

The Russian specialists restored air bases which provide defence (by complexes C-125) of the air space over Bishkek. They are also planning to use the enterprises of Kyrgyzstan's military-industrial complex for mutual needs.

Since 1998 the Russian Defence Ministry has delivered technical equipment amounting to 14 million roubles (466,000 dollars) for Kyrgyzstan's air defence, in 2002 - equipment amounting to 4,1 million roubles (136,000 dollars). Accessories for the system RK worth 3,5 million roubles (116,000 dollars) and several systems of RK C-300 will also be delivered to Kyrgyzstan in the near future.

Within the framework of interaction between the NSS of Kyrgyzstan and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, at the end of 2001 special automobiles with mobile radio finders (for tracking radio signals) and control of radio-electronic situation were delivered to Osh, Batkent's and Jalal-Abad's areas of Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan's debts to Russia are estimated at more than 150 million dollars.

Kyrgyzstan – CST

In accordance with the decision approved by the CST in December 2002, the Russian Air Forces transferred three Su-27 warplanes and two Su-25 from the Russian aviation group in Tajikistan to the air base in

Kant (20km from Bishkek). Earlier, two military transport planes (Il – 76) landed at the same base.

The joint aviation group located at the Kant air base will consist of five Su-27 fighters, five Su-25, two An-26, two Il - 76, five L-39 training planes, and also two multi-purpose helicopters Mi-8. Approximately 700 militaries and civil personnel are supposed to be deployed as well.

In interaction with Su-25 located near Dushanbe this group is now able to cover practically all areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

From the military point of view the Kant air base is strategically very important. It is 600km closer to Russia than Dushanbe where Russian warplanes are deployed. It enables to strengthen a group without intermediate landings in the Central Asian airdromes. Kant is one of two bases available in Kyrgyzstan for warplanes to land. The international airport "Manas" is occupied with contingents of the US and its allies providing aviation support to the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Initially, the Kant air base was suggested to the Americans for this purpose. However, the US refused referring to the lack of necessary equipment on this air base.

Kyrgyzstan – USA

In February 2002, the USA and France started to re-equip “Manas” international airport for the military air base "Gansi". At "Manas", hangars for fighting aircraft technicians, warehouses for fuel and ammunition are under construction. A total up to 60 military planes can be deployed at this base.

Accommodation of the military contingents of the US and its allies at the airport Manas and the creation of “Gansi” base showed to the administration of Kyrgyzstan to what «vein of gold» a foreign base can turn (for the take-off and landing of a military transport plane the owners get 7,000 dollars, each flight of a warplane costs 2,000 dollars, and 20 million dollars were spent by the coalition states for renovation works).

The West is interested in the creation of a multipurpose centre on the territory of Kyrgyzstan for providing control over a group of troops in Landjousk military district NOAK and the rocket troops of this district, as well as over the rocket exercise ground "Shuanchenczi" and the nuclear ground "Lobnor" (desert Takla-Makan).

Signing agreements with 13 states that participate in the international operation against terrorism on the deployment of militaries to support the US was also very important for Kyrgyzstan.

Of the 95 million dollars which are supposed to be rendered by the US to Kyrgyzstan within the assistance program, 37.4 million dollars will be invested into security and law enforcement bodies.

The help also provides support to the development of infrastructure of border guards and of the security services working between various ports of import including purchase of the modernized helicopters, aviation electronics, systems of supervision and communication, border systems, devices of night vision, vehicles, armoured jacket, communication facility and spare parts for helicopters and planes.

The US State Department increased financial assistance to the security sector from 0.5 million dollars in 2001 up to 1.25 million dollars in 2002 so that the Scientific Centre and Fund of civil researches and developments would help Kyrgyzstan to re-educate former Soviet military scientists for peace civil researches.

Kyrgyzstan – Germany

In 2002 Kyrgyzstan and Germany signed the arrangement on rendering military-technical assistance to the military forces of Kyrgyzstan by delivering special equipment, instruments of night vision and other technical systems. The parties also agreed on opening a joint centre in Bishkek for studying the seismic, geological and ecological situation in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan – Turkey

Turkey expressed readiness to render military-technical assistance to the military forces of Kyrgyzstan amounting to 1.1 million dollars by delivering communication facility and equipping military personnel. Since 1999, Ankara has rendered assistance worth 3.5 million dollars to Kyrgyzstan.

On 15 June 2000 the Defence Ministry of Kyrgyzstan and Turkish Armed Forces signed the Protocol on the preparation of divisions of special assignment. Since July 2000, this program has been carried out and up to date, 339 militaries have already had training and studies.

Countries such as France, India and China also rendered military-technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan. Only the Chinese help made up to several million dollars.

Republic of Tajikistan

Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of the CIS states in Central Asia were formed in the beginning of the 1990s on the basis of the former Soviet Army located on their territories. In comparison with all of them in Tajikistan the Armed Forces consisted mainly of guerrilla groups.

Definitely, the Presidential Guard created in May 1992 was the first rather regular division of Armed Forces of Tajikistan. It consisted basically of Kulyabians and was supposed to act against demonstrations of the opposition. The same year a brigade of special assignment was created and a separate battalion under the President also consisting of Kulyabians. In the period following these divisions became a basis of the fighting formations of the People's Front.

The next stage of the formation of national Armed Forces began in December 1992 after the People's Front had occupied Dushanbe. It is considered that at this time the administration of the country started

forming regular parts of Tajikistan's Army from groups of the People's Front.

The third stage is connected to the process of peace settlement in the country. In June 1997 the government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) formed the Commission on National Reconciliation. They signed the "General agreement on peace and national consent". According to this agreement the government started the process of formation of the incorporated army from divisions, groups and gangs appeared during the civil war. It was agreed that the UTO would have 30% of the posts at all levels of the government. On 27 June 1999 the UTO and the government of Tajikistan signed the conciliatory Protocol on disarmament of the illegal armed formations. It was a very important and decisive step in the creation of a regular army.

Structure of Armed Forces

Nowadays, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan represent poorly integrated formations scattered throughout various parts of the country with the purpose of providing security in "hot" areas. They have neither a stable regular structure nor a precise concept of their formation. The administration of the country relies on a combination of security forces divisions, militia and militarised supporters of the former People's Front and also on UTO armed formations that begin to support the government.

Divisions of the Defence Ministry, border troops of the Committee on the protection of the frontier, units of the directorate of interior troops of the Ministry of the Interior, divisions of the Ministry of Security, formations of the Ministry of Emergency Measures, the Customs committee and the Presidential Guards can be related to military-power and militarised structures (Armed Forces) of Tajikistan.

Divisions of the Defence Ministry

It is difficult to estimate the situation in the Defence Ministry due to lack of true information. Different sources have different data.

According to Russian experts, the number of the governmental forces consists of approximately 7,000 people equipped with 40 tanks, 125 fighting machines, 24 artillery systems and 21 fighting helicopters (Mi-24 and Mi-8). According to the International Institute of Strategic Researches (London) the number of the Army of the Republic of Tajikistan consists of 6,000 people forming two motorized brigades (one training), mountain and artillery brigades, brigades and units of special forces and rocket troops.

Border Armies of Committee on the Protection of the Frontier (CPF)

The border troops include the Headquarter (Dushanbe) and five border brigades (BB). Three brigades provide protection of the Tajik-Afghan border (2nd, 3rd and 4th BB), two brigades (5th and 6th BB) supervise the Tajik-Uzbek border in the area of Leninabad. The CPF consists of about 2,000 people. A significant number of frontier guards is concentrated mainly along the Tajik-Uzbek border in the area of Leninabad and composed of former UTO fighters.

Units of the Directorate of Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior

For the last decade the basic threats to the present regime in Tajikistan do not come from the outside but exist within the country. This is the reason why the military forces are mainly based on the units of the Directorate of Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior consisting of 15,000 people rather than on the Army. Armed Forces are equipped with 15 fighting helicopters (five "Mi-24" and ten "Mi-8").

The first operative brigade of special assignment possesses the key position among the units of the Directorate of Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior. The brigade was formed in 1994 from operative troops (up to 1993 – Dushanbe's OMON). The basis of the brigade is a group of self-defence formed in Dushanbe in 1992. In 1998, the brigade took part in the suppression of the coup in the area of Leninabad. The brigade is estimated as the best organized, trained and equipped division

in Tajikistan. All divisions of the brigade are equipped with satellite communication.

The organization structure includes 4 battalions (operative, special assignment, motor-shooting, patrol), 4 separate units (intelligence, commandants, automobile and communications) and 2 special groups (mountain and skiers). Its staff consists of 2,300 militaries.

Experts consider the brigade as a part of the opposition to the present President Rakhmonov.

Divisions of the Ministry of Security

According to experts the Ministry of Security of Tajikistan remains one of the strongest security services in the CIS area and it is actively supporting the idea of an integration of the security services of the CIS countries. The staff of the Ministry does not exceed 3,000 people. The structure consists of a separate motor-shooting troop (Kulyab), a separate motor-shooting brigade (Kurgan Tyube), some educational divisions, an unit on the protection of the commodity base of the joint venture "Zarafshan" (gold mining) and the group "Alpha" of about 150 persons.

Formations of the Ministry of Emergency Measures

The Ministry of Emergency Measures was formed from an analogue committee in July 1999 in order to give to one of the most influential UTO field commanders M. Ziyoev an illusion of power. The Ministry had formally no power to interfere in confrontations and internal disorders. However, M. Ziyoev doubled the number of employees and expanded the power of the Ministry. The present formations of the Ministry of Emergency Measures consist of 2,000 – 2,500 fighters supervising key sites of the Tajik-Kyrgyz and Tajik-Uzbek borders. During the civil war the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Juma Namangani, was the commander of M. Ziyoev's staff. In January 2001, M. Ziyoev tried to let the members of the IMU pass from Tajikistan to Afghanistan.

Irregular Armed Formations of the Opposition

There is reason to believe that leaders of the UTO are at least neutral to President Rakhmonov. However, in Tajikistan the regular armed formations are opposed to the government. Although the majority of the UTO commanders supported the peace process, not all of them could join the power structures of Tajikistan. Some of them refused to accept the peace agreement of 1997.

At the end of the 1990s the UTO consisted of about 5,000 armed fighters. By March 2000 according to the agreement of 1997, one part of 4,498 UTO fighters were integrated into the Army and the other part into security structures. In the Garm and Gorny Badacnshan regions, practically all former members of the armed opposition were integrated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs and are forming a significant part of it.

On the one hand, the integration of the opposition into the armed structures passed more or less successfully. On the other hand, the authorities had difficulties in financing the army. On 23 June 2000 the government declared that 4,000 former UTO fighters who had joined the army would be demobilized by August 1. However, in the end only 1,500 people demobilized. Some of them joined again the irregular armed formations. Since 1 August 2000 Tajikistan had cancelled the institute of contract service. This action reduced the number of former UTO fighters in the power structures of the state.

Zones of Influence and Control

Darband (sphere of influence of Mullo Abdulo), Garm (sphere of influence of M. Nizomov), Dgirtatal (sphere of influence of M. Iskandarov - chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan), Tavildara (M. Ziyoev's zone), Kalaliy-Humb (S. Muhabbatov's area - chairman of the Committee of Oil and Gas), Kulyab (the zone of the Cholov brothers), Dangara (President Rakhmonov's native land), Kofarnihon (zone of influence of the first vice-prime minister A. Turadzhonzoda), Kurgan Tyube (M. Hudoberdiev's former area, now sphere of influence of groups controlled by M. Ziyoev), Varzob (S. Kasymov's zone).

The largest part of the Garm area and the Karategin Valley, and Kofarnihon where field commanders support the first vice-premier Hodzhi A. Turadzhonzoda have got out of control. All of them, as it is considered, are neutral to the government in Dushanbe. The Gorno-Badahshan autonomous region presently conducts independently from the central authority. The authorities in the area are represented by self-defence groups of 3,000 people. The Council of Badahshans Jihad headed by Salam Muhabbatov operates in the area of Pamir.

It is quite difficult to estimate the number of these armed formations as they are mixed with the local population and can freely recruit new members.

Dushanbe tries to bring the situation under control by carrying out local operations of liquidation of the illegal armed formations.

In Darband in September 2000 (Central Tajikistan) the operation against a group of Mullo Abdullo led to the result of about 28 fighters being killed and 40 being captured. In spring of 2002 Mullo Abdullo was detained in the mountains of Kandahar by American special troops. The groups of Rahmon Sanginov and Mansur Muakkalov (150-200 people) were attacked in August 2001. During the operation both leaders and another 36 fighters were killed, 66 were detained.

Admission and Professional Training

The Armed forces of the Republic of Tajikistan are organized on the principles of a regular army. Since 2000 admission to army has been carried out exclusively on obligatory appeal.

There is a tendency to local and family-related principles in the formation of divisions: commanders try to select fighters from the local district. The determined service period for soldiers and sergeants is two years.

The military-engineering college based in Dushanbe prepares officers. There was also opened the military lyceum (analogue Suvorovs schools).

Militaries of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are trained on the mountain educational bases "Navruz" and "Sharvoda".

The military educational institutions of Russia, which annually accept about 100 cadets from Tajikistan, train Tajik officers. At present about 500-600 people are studying there. These centres also prepare junior officers for the Tajik Army. Cadets from Tajikistan are trained in Ukraine and in China as well.

A good tactic manoeuvre capability, experience of fighting in mountain areas, and knowledge of explosives are considered to be the high fighting qualities of the Tajik Armed Forces. In general, the army leadership recommended themselves as good tacticians, satisfactory managers of the operative level and week strategists.

Military-Economic Maintenance

The military budget of the Republic of Tajikistan is rather stable and amounted to 82 million dollars in 2000 (10.9% less than in 1999). The limitation of defence costs is dictated by the economic situation in the country. In view of the economic situation Tajikistan cancelled the contract service and reduced the number of its Army. Till now the country has been suffering from shortage of technical equipment, weapon, ammunition, military property, etc. The essential negative fact is the absence of military-industrial base in Tajikistan.

The International Military and Military-Technical Cooperation

International military and military-technical cooperation of Tajikistan formally began with the deployment of collective peace-making forces (PMF) which later left the country. At the moment of their deployment in September 1993 the PMF included a Russian division (about 6,000 people) and Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz battalions (500 people each). Till September 1994 the number of peace-making forces had been increased up to 16,000 people. However, in 1995 - 1997 Kyrgyzstan removed its battalion from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan remained with

only one unit (100 people) which left Tajikistan in November 1998. Later, Uzbekistan removed its frontier guards from Tajikistan's territory. In February 1999 the Kyrgyz border battalion was also removed from Tajikistan, and in 2000 Kazakhstan did the same.

Thus, only Russian troops represented by the 201st motor-shooting division, several separate parts, a unit of the space monitoring system (all of them should be included into the structure of the Russian military base) and an operative group of the border armies remained in Tajikistan. The 201st motor-shooting division includes motor-shooting units, artillery units, a tank battalion and divisions of fighting maintenance, including a separate aviation squadron. The division is stationed in three large settlements - Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab - and consists of 6,000 people. The division is involved in operations in 11 directions of the Tajik-Afghani border, in the protection of some important Tajik and Russian objects and it possesses forces of air defence.

The Russian frontier troops are represented by an operative group of border forces (with the headquarters in Dushanbe) structured in the 48th (Pyanj) and the 117th (Moscow) border groups providing protection of the frontier with Afghanistan. The total number amounts up to 14,500 people. Thus, the Russian militaries are mainly command personnel. The basic personal consist of Tajik citizens. The group was formed on 19 October 1992.

The administration of the chief military adviser, which directly participates in the military reform in the republic, was organized under the Defence Ministry of Tajikistan on the basis of intergovernmental agreements with Russia.

Tajikistan is a participant of the CST of the CIS and of "SOC". On 20 February 2002 Tajikistan, the last of the Central Asian states, joined the PfP-program of NATO.

A joint military-tactical training of divisions of the Tajik and French Defence Ministries located at the airport of Dushanbe was organized

from 3 – 6 August 2002 at the military exercise ground "Farhabad" (45 km from Dushanbe). Warplanes of the Air Forces of France were involved in the manoeuvres. At the present time more than 250 militaries and about 10 military-transport planes of France are deployed at the military airdrome of Dushanbe.

On 27 August 2002 Tajikistan signed the agreement on granting to the US military contingent in Tajikistan immunity from the International Criminal Court of the United Nations known as Clause #98. Thus, Tajikistan became the fourth country after Israel, Romania and East Timor, guaranteeing immunity to the American contingent in its territory.

Republic of Turkmenistan

The Republic of Turkmenistan considers possible local wars and confrontations in the neighbouring countries as the main military danger. Military security of the country is being provided in the three basic directions - Caspian, Afghan and Uzbek.

The security system of Turkmenistan is under significant influence of the clan structures of the country. President Niyazov's internal policy tries in many respects to weaken the existing clan-tribal connections and at the same time to balance between them.

The military-political course of Turkmenistan is based on the principle of "positive neutrality» meaning that the republic: does not consider any state as enemy, will not join any collective block, will not use the Armed Forces against any state except in case of self-defence, will not deploy foreign armies in its territory, will support the world community in the prevention of war and confrontations.

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Turkmenistan the President is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces who gives orders for general or partial mobilization, uses the Armed Forces with the subsequent approval of these actions by Parliament, appoints

supreme command of the Armed Forces. There is a Presidential Council of Defence and National Security under the President.

In June 2001 the Council of National Security was renamed into «the Security Council of the Turkmen State».

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Turkmenistan started its reformation on the basis of parts and divisions of Turkistan military district deployed in the territory of Turkmenistan at the moment of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

At present, the Ministry of Defence, the division of the state border service, the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the division of the Ministry of National Security and the Service of personal protection of the President can be related to military-power and the militarised structures (Armed Forces) of Turkmenistan.

The Ministry of Defence

Divisions of the Ministry of Defence include the Land Forces, the Air Forces and the troops of air defence. They consist of approximately 17,000 – 19,000 people. The territory of Turkmenistan is divided into 5 military districts.

The number of the Land Forces makes 14,000 – 16,000 people organised in four motor-shooting divisions (one educational), an artillery brigade, troops of jet systems, an anti-tank artillery, engineering-sapper units, two brigades of anti-aircraft-rocket complexes and a separate landing-assault battalion, parts and divisions of the brigade of rocket complexes, a helicopter squadron, and divisions of communication and intelligence. The road car inspection and fire brigades are also submitted to the Defence Ministry.

Turkmenistan started transformation of divisions into brigades, and actually the Land forces have the mixed structure. As a rule, divisions (brigade) are completed (basically by protection and service forces). Exception is the 84th elite motor-shooting division named Niyazov.

Military-air forces and troops of anti-aircraft defence are considered as the most efficient structure in the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan. Their further development, connected to the strengthening of the bases in Ashgabat and Marah, is called to provide reliable protection of the country's energetic interests in the Caspian Sea. Aircrafts are used for patrolling the Caspian Sea thus compensating the insufficient power of the fleet.

The number of the Air Forces and the troops of air defence organised in three aviation regiments, one anti-aircraft-rocket brigade, three anti-aircraft-rocket regiments, and two separate radio engineering brigades is about 3,000 people.

Since 1 March 1999 air defence forces of the country have started to cover the air space of the capital Ashgabat.

The group of the forces of air defence has the systems RK "Kub", "Krug", "C-75" and "C-125". The Defence Ministry is planning to purchase the additional system of Russian RK C-300. Preparation of experts for 3RK C-300 will be carried out in the educational centre of Tedzhen which is still under construction.

70% of the military helicopters and planes on the air bases Mary-1 and Mary-2 need general renovation because of theft of parts made of nonferrous metals. The anti-aircraft-rocket unit which should protect the air space over the border with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan is partly destroyed.

Turkmenistan prepares the military reform with the purpose to «create a mobile army equipped with advanced weapons». According to official documents the government of Turkmenistan is planning to form a small but efficient army, «capable to protect state integrity and national sovereignty against possible aggression». At the same time President Niyazov declared that the main task of the Army will be the prevention of interior conflicts.

Divisions of the State Border Service (SBS)

After the announcement of the cancellation of the Agreement on joint protection of the frontier between Russia and Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan started to strengthen its border forces. The number of the SBS staff consists of 16,000 people including 10 border groups (BB), 60 frontier posts (FP) and two border commandant's offices (BCO). There is a separate helicopter squadron supporting actions of the Border Service.

Four border divisions operate on the borders with Afghanistan (Kushka and Koytendag), Afghanistan and Uzbekistan (Kerki) and Kazakhstan. The Navy fleet of Turkmenistan is also subordinated to the command of the border armies.

The SBS structure also includes the battalion of border patrol ships (20 fighting boats of class "Grif" and "Kalkan") and the battalion of the surface ships (trawler, sanitary boat, diving boat and four hydrographic courts) deployed in Turkmenbashi (former Krasnovodsk).

The number of the staff of the fleet together with the shore services consist of about 2,000 people. The fleet's main base (300 people, 7 boats and one trawler) is located in the port Turkmenbashi. The base of a river flotilla is located in Kelife on the Amu Darya river. Despite of the small probability of military operations in the Caspian Sea, there is a possibility of mutual provocation because of its uncertain legal status. This is the reason why the development of the fleet was named by the government of Turkmenistan to be one of the priorities of military construction.

On the initiative of the Ministry of National Security of Turkmenistan 9 "Dgeyhun" groups were created under the SBS. Commanders of the groups "Dgeyhun» were given practically unlimited power: the right to detain, to independently carry out searches, to arrest and keep in custody persons crossing the border till expiry of the term of preliminary investigation. Staff training was conducted by experts of the border armies of Russia. Functional duties of the division "Dgeyhun" also

included the control over border groups deployed along the whole border of Turkmenistan.

In mid-March 2002 President Niyazov ordered to subordinate the State Border Service of Turkmenistan from the control of the MNS directly to the President administration.

Divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of National Security and Service of Personal Protection of the President (SPPP)

Bearing in mind that the main threats don't come from the outside but from the inside of the country the general reform of the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan led to the strengthening of the role of the SPPP (2,000 people), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2,000 people) and the Committee of National security (CNS) (2,500 people).

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, its divisions and the CNS were mainly based on the structure of militia and the KGB of the Soviet Union. Their primary goal is the struggle against criminality. The CNS concentrates on political crimes.

In June 2000, President Niyazov proposed to create a council controlling the CNS, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and supervising the movements of foreigners in Turkmenistan. The creation of such council was considered as a strengthening of the control over the negative exterior influence on the people and as a minimization of crimes having external sources. On 17 May 2001 the Committee of National Security was transformed into the Ministry of National Security (MNS). Divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the MNS were developed throughout the territory of the country with the basic groups in Ashgabat, Kyzyl-Arvat and Tashauz.

By autumn 2001 the number of the MNS staff was increased up to 2,500 people (new personnel came mainly from the Defence Ministry). President Niyazov declared that the MNS should be more concentrated on internal security (struggle against drug trafficking and control over

foreigners in Turkmenistan) and that all secret agents abroad should return.

The head of the MNS, Nazarov, was appointed at that time as the adviser of the President on national security and the coordination of law-enforcement activities and activities of military bodies. Furthermore, he was empowered to control the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

By that time some foreign mass media mentioned contacts of Turkmenistan's representatives in diplomatic missions with drug smugglers. Probably the MNS wanted to take control over the most powerful monetary stream. At the same time significant steps were taken for strengthening discipline in security service, the promotion of employees to "civil" organizations, cleansing in police, army and state bodies.

By 2002 former employees of the MNS involved in the different state organizations had practically created a "shadow" vertical of power.

Cleansing of the MNS, the Defence Ministry and the State border service began in spring 2002. The report on the activities of the MNS was on the agenda of the session of the Cabinet of ministers on March 5, 2002. President Niyazov said that security services had to be absolutely honest and clear in front of the people what couldn't be said about the MNS. The Heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Office of Prosecutor and the Supreme Court accused the MNS of interfering into investigations by the militia and the Office of Prosecutor, as well as judicial hearings in courts and brought the relevant evidences and proves to the attention of the session. It was also argued that the MNS went out of any control. Performance of the Ministry was recognized as unsatisfactory; approximately 80 percent of its leadership was fired. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Berdyev, became a new minister of the MNS.

Admission to Armed Forces

The formation of the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan is based on the principles of a regular army. According to the new edition of the law on military service, the age for military service is determined from 18 to 30 years. However, the military service can be begun at the age of 17, provided a personal statement. In comparison with the law of 1993, the service period for soldiers and sergeants has increased from 18 to 24 months (18 months for persons having a higher education). In the fleet and in sectors of coastal maintenance, the service period is 30 months.

Postponement for high school students and the alternative service are cancelled. Military faculties at universities and institutes are closed. Due to the lack of financial resources, contract service has been cancelled since 2001. Experts reckon that the needs of the Armed Forces can be covered thanks to a general conscription. It is supposed that the annual contingent of recruits can reach 100,000 people. As ordered by President Niyazov all contracts with militaries have been cancelled since the end of 2001.

Like in other states of Central Asia, the system of military-patriotic education in Turkmenistan was destroyed, the prestige of military service has decreased, and recruits of the Armed Forces are mostly weak, have health problems and are not prepared for military service. Their educational level is very low.

In order to decrease the influence of clan, tribal and regional groups and to strengthen national identity, admission to the Armed Forces is carried out by an outer-territorial principle: as a rule, militaries serve outside of the district from which they were called.

Since August 2002 special military units which were in close contacts with different branches of the national economy have been created within the Armed Forces. More than 20,000 soldiers work on cotton fields, in hospitals, trade, motor transportation inspection and committees on tourism.

Today, not only young people having reached the age of 18 but also those who have already served and were demobilized in the ranks of sergeants and soldiers with high education till the age of 35 could be called to the Army. On Niyazov's opinion due to these measures militaries could practice civil specialties and get jobs after demobilization. He also proposed to devote one week per month to military service and the rest of the time to civil professions.

Training and Preparation of Military Staff

The outflow, for various reasons, of officers of the Soviet Army from the republic at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s created a problem of admission of staff and of professional training of the Armed Forces. In this regard in October 1992, the military faculty preparing officers for tank, infantry, and aviation divisions and officers of echelon and communication was opened at Turkmen Mahtumkuli State University in Ashgabat. In September 1993, 600 people graduated from Ashgabat Military Institute.

Preparation of the military staff is also carried out in foreign educational centres according to intergovernmental agreements with Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Pakistan. Foreign centres prepare more than 450 experts (200 in Turkey, 200 in Ukraine and many more in Pakistan and Russia). Training, as a rule, is carried out in exchange for deliveries of natural gas or on account of the debts. Assistance in the preparation of military experts is rendered also by the USA within the framework of NATO programs. Thus, in 1999 - 2000 within the framework of the program on International Military Education and Training, 13 military men of Turkmenistan were trained in the US Defence Ministry.

Turkmenistan proclaimed as a main criteria for the selection of manager personnel a "cleanliness of the family tree in three generations". In consequence, personnel selection led to the replacement of persons of non-Turkmen nationality within the system of the government. Such practice led in many cases to the selection of incompetent but people loyal to the President.

In September 1998, the Turkmen President ordered to reduce the number of admissions to the military institute to 150 cadets. The certification of people for officer posts was cancelled. As a result, units and parts of the Armed Forces didn't exceed 15 - 20% from their regular number.

Turkmenistan is considering the creation of the first military school in Chardjev for the education of aviation technicians and experts of air defence and is planning to transfer Ashgabat Military Institute to Mary where the so-called "Arabian Centre of air defence" has been deployed since the Soviet Union times.

International Military and Military-Technical Cooperation

The neutral status proclaimed in 1995 allows Turkmenistan to abstain from decisions of many international political and economic problems both at a level of the sub-region and at the international level. The country is not a member of any military or military-political organization.

Turkmenistan abstains from multilateral cooperation in the military and military-technical field stipulated by the Charter of the CIS preferring the development of the bilateral level. Representatives of power structures of Turkmenistan participate in many meetings within the framework of the CIS in the role of observers. A unique exception is its participation in work of the Co-coordinating committee on questions of air defence in the Council of Ministers of Defence of the CIS participating states.

Like the majority of the states of Central Asia, Turkmenistan does not produce any arms or military technical equipment. Therefore, most of its contacts within military-technical cooperation result in purchase, or repair of arms and equipment, sale of some arms remained in the country after the disintegration of the USSR, and re-export. Turkmenistan conducted a number of intermediary operations in the 1990s on the international arms market. Some types of arms and military technical equipment were bought in Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania,

Belarus, and Ukraine and were sold to Turkey, Iran, Russia, Southern Yemen and Sudan.

Turkmenistan has a contract on the repair of warplanes Su-25 in Georgia in the joint-stock company "Tbilaviastroy" on account of debts of this state for Turkmen gas. 22 planes were repaired in 2001. The Georgian experts participate in the training of Turkmen pilots on an air base of Mary-2.

Turkmenistan – Ukraine

Turkmenistan actively develops cooperation with Ukraine where the sphere of mutual interests includes barter deliveries. According to the Turkmen-Ukrainian intergovernmental agreement of 2001 "Turkmenoilgaz" is to carry out deliveries of natural gas to Ukraine during the period till 2006. Up to 50% of the cost of gas Ukraine reimburses by delivering military technical equipment and accessories to Turkmenistan and carrying out training of military experts.

With a view to the maintenance of the State border service with necessary combat material, in 2001 20 sea fighting boats of the "Grif" and "Kalkan" classes were received from Ukraine delivered on account of a commodity part of payment of Turkmen natural gas. In 2002, Turkmenistan already received four boats "Kalkan-M". At the Lvov aircraft-repair factory it is planned to repair four MiG-29.

Turkmenistan – Belarus

In 2002 Belarus has left with the initiative to the Turkmen administration about the sale of modern military technical equipment for Turkmen Armed Forces.

Turkmenistan-NATO

Cooperation of Turkmenistan with NATO is carried out through the PfP-program and on a bilateral basis in the usual format for Central Asian states. Thus it is interesting to note that Turkmenistan was the first state

of Central Asia to join the program (May 1994). Within the framework of cooperation the preparation and retraining of military experts, and also deliveries of technical equipment (all in insignificant volumes) are carried out.

Turkmenistan - USA

During 1992-2001 the US government has allocated from the budget about 217.42 million dollars on the financing of programs in Turkmenistan, and has also given to this country material surpluses of the Ministry of Defence and humanitarian goods by private organizations for the sum of 45 million dollars. Of the last receipts it is possible to note the patrol boat of the Point Jackson class handed to Turkmenistan by the Central Command of the Ministry of Defence of the USA.

In the budgetary year of 2002 the corresponding divisions of the US government allocated means at a rate of 16.9 million dollars on help programs for Turkmenistan, including help on security of 8.3 million dollars.

In 2002 Turkmenistan has received 7 million dollars from the Fund of extreme reaction within the framework of the help program for questions regarding export control and border security.

Within the framework of this program there is support to Turkmenistan's border service, the Ministry of Defence and other force departments with a view to the maintenance of operative interaction and the amplification of the control outside the country. The purpose of the program will consist in the prevention of transit transportations of weapons of mass destruction, of technologies connected to it and other illegal kinds of weapons. Since 1999, American instructors have been working in Turkmenistan on the formation of a special division of border armies for the struggle against drug smuggling.

Besides, in 2002 the USA has allocated 450,000 dollars on the international program of military preparation and training.

The amount spent for the humanitarian programs for Turkmenistan includes the deliveries of goods by the transport program of the State Department. Within the framework of this modest program, which will provide delivery of humanitarian cargoes amounting to almost 5 million dollars, the State Department carries out transportation and distribution of medical goods, clothes and foodstuffs for the most requiring groups of the population.

The most intensive contacts in military matters in Turkmenistan exist with Russia and Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan-Russia

In order to solve the problems of the creation of own Armed Forces in conditions of shortage of manpower, funds and absence of educational objects, Ashgabat has not taken an ordinary decision as it has created the incorporated command with Russia.

On 31 July 1992 Russia and Turkmenistan concluded the Treaty about joint efforts in connection with the creation of Turkmenistan's Armed Forces. According to this document Russia represents itself as the guarantor of Turkmenistan's security. Also it was marked that parts and divisions of the Border Armies, the Air Forces and air defence remain under Russian command and are organizationally part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Other military formations pass under the incorporated command with a gradual transfer of administration to Turkmenistan within 10 years. In a transition period Russia was to render to Turkmenistan military-technical and operational and tactical support, and also to pay indemnification for the right of accommodation of the equipment on the territory of Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan covered the expenses under the maintenance of parts of joint submission. In 1992 in the Ministry of Defence of Turkmenistan, the operative group of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (a disposition of management in Ashgabat), providing cooperation and coordination of actions of the two states in the military sphere began to operate. Till

1994 there were two Russian regiments of launchers of anti-aircraft-rocket complexes in Turkmenistan.

On 23 December 1993 the Russian-Turkmen Treaty about the joint protection of Turkmenistan's frontiers and about the status of military men of the Border Armies of the Russian Federation on the territory of Turkmenistan was signed. In accordance with the Treaty of March 1994 the operative group of the Federal Border Service (FBS) of Russia (a staff in Ashgabat) has been created. It provided protection of overland and sea borders of Turkmenistan (the sea border with Iran was protected by two patrol ships with mixed Russian - Turkmen crews). Russia's FBS also conducted training of officer staff and younger experts for the Border Armies of Turkmenistan. The number of Russia's FBS operative group in Turkmenistan was 2,000 up to 3,000 people (1,500 of them were officers and ensigns). The structure of the group also included a separate signal battalion (Ashgabat), sergeant school structure (Ashgabat), the 170th separate aviation regiments (Mary) and the 46th separate battalion of border patrol ships and boats (Turkmenboshi).

However, differences in the understanding of processes of military construction and a military-political rate have resulted in January 1994 in the dissolution of the incorporated command. On 20 May 1999 the administration of Turkmenistan declared the decision to terminate the contracts of 1993. By 20 December 1999 the Russian frontier guards had completely left the territory of the republic. Some analysts connect the withdrawal of the Russian frontier guards with Turkmenistan's reorientation towards cooperation with the USA. However, it can also be connected with its desire to independently supervise the financial and trading streams that are taking place across the border with Afghanistan.

In 2002, Russia and Turkmenistan developed the joint program of long-term cooperation in the military area for five years. Russia is going to deliver weapons and combat material to Turkmenistan in exchange for gas.

Within the framework of the developed program Russia will provide deliveries of arms and combat material of the newest sample and carry

out modernization of available technical equipment. The specified services will be paid by Turkmenistan with natural gas.

Today, Turkmenistan has more than 22 contracts and agreements with Russia, military communications providing a wide spectrum. Among them are about the cooperation between the main intelligence service of the Joint Staff of Russia and the intelligence service of the Ministry of Defence of Turkmenistan, about the preparation of military staff of Turkmenistan in educational institutions of Russia, about the joint aerodrome-technical maintenance of air courts, and about military-technical cooperation. There is especially large military cooperation of Turkmenistan with Russia in the field of use of military infrastructure.

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan

Till October 2001, there was an active military-technical cooperation of Turkmenistan with opposing groups in Afghanistan, consisting in deliveries of combustive-lubricating materials and of small arms including ammunition. Since the winter of 1994 the branch line from Kushka up to Turgundi has been operating. Since 1997, deliveries have been carried out regularly. Thus, it is stressed that Turkmenistan adhered to neutrality in the Afghani conflict and maintained close political and economic relations both with B. Rabbani's government and with Taliban movement. Turkmenistan considered it wrong to divide Afghani people in groupings and to search for ways of settlement beyond the framework of the peace negotiating process with the help of means of compulsion. Ashgabat expressed its interest in the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, and character of a mode to which it appears under force, did not play for it special role.

S. Niyazov repeatedly declared that all events in Afghanistan are the internal business of the Afghani people and that Turkmenistan « does not test the threat from the party of the Taliban. In Turkmenistan's opinion, economic projects involving the conflict parties in Afghanistan together with neighbouring countries could bring huge benefits. The chosen position allowed Ashgabat to act as an active intermediary in the attempts of an intra-Afghani settlement.

As Russian special services approve, the basis of the close relations of Ashgabat and groupings in Afghanistan consists in traffic in drugs and weapons. In the opinion of experts of the United Nations, Turkmenistan became one of the basic routes for illegal drug traffic from Afghanistan.

Besides it, on a position of Turkmenistan the opportunity to realize put forward in 1994 the American company United Oil of California (UNOCAL) and Saudi firm Delta the civil-engineering design of the gas main connecting Turkmenistan with Pakistan and, probably, India influenced. The gas main in the extent about 1,500km intended for delivery of the gas extracted on Dovletobod a deposit in the south of Turkmenistan, through territory of Afghanistan up to distributive system in the Pakistan city of Multan.

With the beginning of military operations in Afghanistan S. Niyazov, referring to Turkmenistan's neutral status, refused to make the country's air bases available to the forces of the antiterrorist coalition. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan distributed the statement in which it was emphasized that the republic was not going to offer either its territory or military objects to foreign states for carrying out military actions. The air space of the republic was not open for flights of military planes of the alliance, either. Thus, the administration of the country gave ground and air corridors for the delivery of humanitarian cargoes to Afghanistan. As a result today Turkmenistan became the second country after Pakistan regarding the volume of transit of humanitarian help for Afghanistan.

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BORDER SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

Political changes which took place at the end of the 20th Century made the formation of a principally new regional security system in the Post-Soviet Central Asia necessary. Part of a huge, politically, economically and ideologically homogeneous state, cut off from the external world by the Iron Curtain, the region has gained importance due to its key strategic situation and vast supplies of raw materials. At the same time it has become a sphere of interests for external forces, such as China, the EU, Iran, Russia, Turkey, the USA and others. The combination of internal and external problems, which have arisen in the post-Soviet era require new approaches to safeguard the region's security which has an impact on other regions, as shown by the events of September 11 which have had a global impact on regional security issues and turned Central Asia into an actual or imagined battlefield of the international community.

The borders between the Central Asian States are one of the key factors for regional security. From previously nominal administrative lines dividing Soviet republics, they have become major attributes of state sovereignty, considered in many cases the most important barrier against external threats of both military and non-military origin. In many cases these borders remain permeable for different kinds of illegal transboundary flows. Border security in Central Asia is one of the key dimensions of any strategy aiming at combating terrorism and other non-traditional challenges, especially drug-trafficking and illegal migration. At the same time, the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan created new possibilities for transboundary cooperation and is regarded as a way to regional security. Taking into account these considerations, the author would like to focus on the changes in border issues that took place after September 11.

Before September 11

Being established by the Russian Empire and later the USSR, the boundaries in Central Asia were determined by a balance of power (as it existed between the USSR and its southern neighbours Iran, Afghanistan, China), or by administrative decisions imposed from above. For the first time, administrative borders between the Soviet Republics of Central Asia were established from 1920 to 1930.

The new administrative division established the ethnic principle of state formation in Central Asia through the creation of the Commission for the Division of Middle Asia. Because of the difficulties of this task, the short terms for its realization, and in many cases of political reasons, the administrative decisions proved to be far from ideal, taking into account the landscape and the historical and ethno-cultural features of the region. For example, landscape and transport routes sometimes compel a traveller to cross a border twice in order to reach a place in the same country. This may happen in the Western and North-western areas of the Russian-Kazakh border, the Northern part of the Uzbek-Turkmen border, in the Kazakh-Uzbek borderland and especially in the Fergana Valley and its contiguous areas. It is more convenient, for example, to go from Tashkent (Uzbekistan) to the valley through the territory of Tajikistan, while the optimum route between the Kyrgyz cities of Osh and Jalalabad passes through Uzbek territory. At the same time, it should be remembered that these dividing lines were intended for administrative-territorial formations within one country, but by no means of future independent states which would base their legitimacy on nationalist ideology.

Less significant changes of borders were made during the entire Soviet period. These changes and transfers of territories from one republic to another were initiated by the central authorities in order to optimize the economic specialization of the border territories according to state, republican or local needs. At local level the lines of delimitation were often a product not of administrative demarcation, but of needs of neighbouring farms, whose borders were frequently marked simply by plough and could be specified by mutual consent.

After the breakdown of the Soviet such contradictions aggravated dramatically. Mutual accusations of neighbouring states concerning the illegal usage of their territory became to be common. The post-Soviet Central Asian borders have a strong legal foundation (Almaty Declaration and the Agreement on the CIS Formation of 1991), making large-scale territorial claims unlikely, but unable to avoid small territorial disputes

Furthermore, transnational criminal groups took advantage of the weakening of control and increasingly used the huge space for illegal transactions. After the USSR collapsed, they built up channels for illegal transit operations (smuggling of drugs, weapons and radioactive substances, illegal migrants and militant extremists). Often, these groups' activities are more effectively and better organised than those of the national security forces and their cooperation more efficient than the one between the states of the region.

Thus, before September 11 the Central Asian states faced very serious transborder security problems. In this respect several key points, shaping the regional agenda, can be stressed.

The withdrawal of the Russian border guards and the establishment of national border guard services were a key point for regional border security before September 11. After the disintegration of the USSR the newly independent states have accepted normative acts regulating their borders' status, and have begun to create border guard and customs services. The process of replacing the Russian border guards was launched at the borders with Iran, Afghanistan and China. Most technical and organizational assistance for the build-up of the Central Asian border troops was rendered by Russia, while some technical and other help was given by the USA and NATO. At the same time, Russian servicemen continue to protect the most difficult areas of the former Soviet borders, especially the border with Afghanistan.

The establishment of national border guard forces has been a very long process which is yet not finished. Also, the processes didn't begin at the same time: in Kazakhstan, the service was set up in 1992 while in

Uzbekistan the process began in January 1998. But in fact, most of the post-Soviet borders were controlled only in 1999. Since then, the border guards have undergone several changes: in Kazakhstan they were temporarily moved out of their subordination to the State Security Committee, but in 1998 this status was restored; in Kyrgyzstan, border security related matters were supervised by the Chief Department for Border Protection in the Ministry of Defence and the Chief Department for Border Control in the National Security Service. In 2003, these structures were replaced by the autonomous Border Guard Service.

The second key point was related to Chinese territorial claims which created tensions in the relations between Beijing and the Central Asian governments (particularly the Kazakh government). The roots of these disputes can be found in the Sino-Russian and Sino-Soviet relations of the 19th and 20th century, including the armed conflict of 1969. The problem was settled by an agreement regarding the Kazakh-Chinese Border (1994), and additional border agreements about the border (1997, 1998). According to these documents the disputed territories were divided, China obtaining about 43% of the area in forest highlands. In 1997 Russia, Kyrgyzstan, China, and Kazakhstan signed the Agreement on Confidence Strengthening in the Military Sphere and Mutual Armed Forces Reduction in the Region. This agreement stipulated that troops (except border guards) and arms must respect a distance of 100 km from the border. From 2002 to October 2003 border demarcation was accomplished.

The settlement of territorial disputes between China and Kyrgyzstan was achieved by the treaties of 1996 and 1999, according to which Bishkek ceded about 125'000 hectares of Kyrgyz controlled territory. The second agreement was ratified by the Kyrgyz parliament in 2002 despite of mass protests in the South. The potentially most complicated territorial conflict between China and Tajikistan is not solved yet, but significant concessions from Dushanbe are expected by observers.

The third factor were the Taliban, the radical Islamic movement that came to power in Afghanistan in 1996. Because of its military successes and the Islamist attacks on the territory of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

the military cooperation between the Central Asian states and Russia has intensified. The Russian Federation stressed its strategic interests in the region by repeatedly making sharp declarations addressed to the Taliban as well as by joint military exercises, like “The Southern Shield” manoeuvres which were held with the participation of Russia and all states of the region except Turkmenistan. In fact, till 2001 the Russian presence was, at least, one of the main reasons that kept the Taliban from attacking the Central Asian neighbours of Afghanistan.

The fourth crucial point for regional transboundary security was in events of 1999-2000 when multi-national Islamist groupings invaded the territories of Kyrgyzstan and (in 2000) of Uzbekistan. The latter responded by strong security measures including tightening its border regime. It required delimitation of its boundaries at a time when Uzbekistan had territorial problems with almost all its neighbours except Afghanistan which, however, was also a very serious trouble spot. Tashkent tried to solve its border security problem unilaterally and started construction works in contested areas and mining some border zones with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan regarded as vulnerable to the penetration of militant extremists. Such measures provoked conflicts with neighbouring countries and violence against civilians. These events stimulated difficult negotiations between Uzbekistan and its Central Asian post-Soviet neighbours, but so far only the talks with Kazakhstan (2001, 2002) and Turkmenistan (2000) have proven to be successful.

The hardening of border regime in such zones has a sensitive effect on the economic and social situation on the contiguous side and creates serious problems at interstate level. There were already precedents of how the difficulty of transborder transport interaction was used as a means of political or economic pressure on a neighbour party. Such measures, like the hardening of the control over people’s entrance and departure, or over transit passage of transport, were applied by countries (Uzbekistan in particular) dependent on water or power resources of contiguous states (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan correspondingly). On the other hand, Kazakhstan, for example, in response to Uzbekistan’s “gas pressure” stopped in 2000 the transit of Uzbek trains through its territory under the pretext of Tashkent’s debts.

Though the national border services were already created in 1993-94, the real process of arrangement of formerly internal borders began only at the end of the 1990s. In 1997-98 Russia started the process of frontier guards' service creation and strengthening of customs at its border with Kazakhstan, justifying these actions by the necessity of the struggle against smuggling and illegal migration.

A little later, Uzbekistan launched established checkpoints and customs at its borders with other states of Central Asia, restricted passport control and customs examination, and sped up (sometimes by unilateral order) demarcation for the purpose of legitimising the territorial frameworks of its border regime. Moreover, Uzbekistan began to close the passages at its border with Kazakhstan by setting up constructions and it mined some areas of its border with Kyrgyzstan.

Hence, the situation in the matter of border security before September 11 was tense and in many respects unpredictable. The sudden weakening of the security system created favourable conditions for transnational activity of criminal organizations and extremist militants. The main territorial problems combined with the strengthening of extremist forces. These forces were able to lead transborder activity, using the gaps in the national border security systems. Financial resources of the very Central Asian states and help from abroad were insufficient to bring the situation under control. Before September 11, the region was in the periphery of the West's attention, and this circumstance didn't let expect effective support of the US, NATO and the EU.

The Changing Security Agenda

The events of September 11 and the further operation by international forces in Afghanistan were the turning point for the regional security agenda. Since then international terrorism was declared to be "the main challenge" while all other threats have been perceived as less important. Their significance is often connected with the "problem number one". Such perception of the situation is favourable for the most important actors in Central Asian international relations, giving to them additional serious arguments for justifying their interests in the region or repressive

internal political measures. The author supposes that the constructed hierarchy of challenges (with terrorism at the top) does not reflect adequately the existing reality: drug smuggling, for instance, seems to us a much more serious challenge, taking into account its destructive consequences.

In the new conditions border security became one of the corner stones for regional security. Its main priority is the suppression of transborder activity of extremists and criminal groups (especially of narcodealers) that nourishes extremism. Sorting out residuary territorial problems would reduce the risk of instability in the region. The settlement of the status of previously indefinite border areas would bereave extremists of chances to use them as ground for their illegal activity.

It seems that the most dangerous terrorist groups (especially the Islam Movement of Uzbekistan) have weakened and that restrictive security measures were to a certain extent fruitful: among the very serious problems only the events in April 2004 in Uzbekistan can be mentioned. The relative success in this field can hardly be explained by an increase in border security effectiveness: the system still has a lot of disadvantages and is much corrupted. Nevertheless, the strengthening of border security, probably, became one of the factors which helped avoid the repetition of the events in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000.

One of the most difficult and potentially dangerous territorial problems for Central Asia was settled: the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was delimited in 2001 which to some extent was unexpected for observers. According to the agreement between them, 96% of the border was delimited, but the belonging of 4 sections was not defined. The question concerning the border settlements of Baghys and Turkestanets, populated mainly by Kazakhs, was much discussed in Kazakhstan's mass media. The populations of these villages, trying to attract the authorities' attention to their situation, declared the Baghys Kazakh Republic and established their own government. According to the agreement signed on 9 September 2002, Baghys with adjoining territory and the Arnasayskaya dam passed to Kazakhstan (Uzbekistan got an equal sections of land as a compensation); Turkestanets and three

settlements populated by Uzbeks and situated at the border between Kyzylorda oblast and the Republic of Karakalpakstan assigned to Uzbekistan. In April 2004, the demarcation of borders was started and is planned to finish in 2008.

Since the end of 2001 Kazakhstan has managed to settle most of all other territorial issues. In 2002 the demarcation of its border with China was started and was finished in October 2003. The Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan delimitation finished in 2001 with the corresponding treaty and went on without serious conflicts. The Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan border delimitation was the easiest one. In Astana on 5 June 2001, the Presidents of both states signed the treaty on delimitation and demarcation of the border, ratified in 2003. The treaty didn't stipulate the delimitation of national sectors in the Caspian Sea, but the principal territorial problems were solved. The delimitation of the Kazakhstan-Russia border, which is the longest continuous land boundary in the world (about 7000 km long), goes on without any serious conflicts and at the turn of 2004 approaches its end.

The border problems of Uzbekistan with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, together with the border issues between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, remain the most difficult regional ones. The solution of these problems are complicated by the different interpretations of the Soviet borders and by the presence of a mixed ethnic population. A positive step toward stabilization was the promise given by Tashkent in 2004 to clear mine fields at the Tajik and Kyrgyz borders. The mining, which proved to be ineffective and caused numerous victims among civilians, is expected to be replaced by more effective measures taken with the assistance of the USA, NATO and the EU.

Delimitation and demarcation led to the fortification of border infrastructure along the lines fixed by international agreements, but in some cases such infrastructure is built along the lines of real control (for instance at the borders between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). Border fortification which takes place almost everywhere in the region still hasn't solved the problem of illegal transborder operations, first of all drug smuggling and illegal migration.

Its development and provision is too hard for the post-Soviet Central Asian states, but Russia, the US, the EU and other countries and international organizations interested in stability in the region help them.

Russia spends the largest amount of money on the support of the Central Asian border forces in the post-Soviet period. Its main use was covering the maintenance costs of 11 000 border troupes (annual expenses make up 12 million dollars). Besides, Russia trains personnel and supplies equipment. For instance, Russia provided the Kyrgyz-Chinese border with equipment amounting to 700 000 dollars¹, and essential assistance was rendered for equipping the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border.

The Council of Border Guard Troops Commanders working within the CIS (in which Russia has the key position) is also contributing to the strengthening of border services. It coordinates the cooperation in the working out, production, exploitation, maintenance, and modernization of special equipment, arms and personnel training.

At the same time, Russian border troupes are withdrawn from the region and the national border services are more and more helped by the US, EU and NATO. In 2002, the agreement according to which the control of the Tajik-Chinese border passed to the Tajikistan Committee on State Borders Protection was signed and in June 2004, the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border was planned to be passed under the control of the same department before 2006. Establishing Tajikistan's sovereignty over its borders can be perceived as a positive event, but there is the serious question whether the national border guard forces can effectively counteract huge-scaled drug smuggling and the penetration of armed extremists, given their relative inferiority to Russian forces in technical and financial respects. Meanwhile, Russia annually spent 3 000 tons of fuel on heating for the Russian border detachment situated in the Murgab area in very difficult climatic conditions (the temperature can be 60 degrees below zero for 9 months of a year). The cost of the fuel is several times more than the funds marked out by state budget for the

¹ *Rossiia okazhet voennuyu pomoshch' Kirgizii* (Russia will Render Military Help to Kyrgyzstan). In: *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 November 2001

total Tajikistan border services support². Therefore, in order to preserve at least the level of border protection provided by Russian troupes, the OSCE, NATO (which supported the withdrawal of Russian troops) and all interested countries and international organisations should increase many times over the financing of the Tajikistan border guard forces, which are still in the process of their formation.

After September 11, American and European programmes for financing border policy in the Central Asian states and for settling border disputes increased. The EXBS programme (US State Department's Export Control and Border Security), working in Central Asia since 2000, is especially important in this light. Due to its activity, the border forces in Central Asia got equipment (cars, radio-locating devices, communication facilities, navigation systems, night-vision devices; prefabricated houses having autonomous supporting systems, devices for customs examination, devices for recognizing radioactive materials and chemical and biological weapons, computers, uniform, medical equipment, patrol vehicles and boats, etc.) and the possibilities for personnel training (e.g. of methods of tracking trespassers, including drug-dealers) The highest expenses within the programmes (equipment costs of \$ 7 million before April 2004 and \$ 6 million more in June of the same year³; equipment amounting to 5,8 million is planned to be granted in 2005) have been intended for Uzbekistan; more than \$ 5,8 million (in the period from April 2001 to February 2004) for Kazakhstan⁴; \$ 2,9 million (from June 2002 to March 2004) for Tajikistan.⁵; and several millions of dollars for Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. The main purpose of the program is to suppress

² *Omyne tadjhisko-kitai'skuyu granitsu bydut ohranyat' tadjikstiyе pogranichniki* (Henceforth the Tadjikistan-China Border Will be Protected by Tadjikistani Border Guards). In: Intergovernmental Company "Mir", <http://www.mirtv.ru>, 26.12.2002

³ *SshA pomogli Uzbekistanu v ohrane granits yesche na \$ 0,5 mln.* (USA again have Helped Uzbekistan in the Field of Border Protection with \$ 0,5 mil.). In: RBC News, www.rbc.ru, 4.05.2004; *SshA peredali Uzbekistanu oborudovanie i tehniku dlia ohrany granits na 6,09 mln. doll.* (USA gave Uzbekistan Equipment and Machinery Costing \$ 6,09 mil.). In: RBC News, www.rbc.ru, 16.06.2004.

⁴ *Panorama*, 2004 (8), www.panorama.kz

⁵ *Posol SshA podaril avtomobili pogranichnoy i tamozhennoy sluzhbam Tadjhikistana* (The Ambassador of the USA Gifted Motor Vehicles to the Border Guard and Customs Services of Tajikistan). In: *CentrAsia*, www.centrasia.ru, 5.03.2004

smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and trespassing of territories of the countries in the region.

A significant help for the development of the Central Asian border guard structures is provided by NATO. First of all, this help covers the training of the personnel of border guard services. For example, the former General Secretary of NATO, George Robertson, during his trip to Dushanbe in September 2003 announced that the Alliance together with the OSCE intended to open a training centre for Central Asian frontier guards in Tajikistan.

A broader range of issues is covered by the help rendered by the EU. In some cases, it is provided for the areas insufficiently covered by other projects. For instance, Tajikistan was given € 12 million by TACIS (that is significantly more than by EXBS) for strengthening its borders⁶. Since 2004 the key project of the European Union in the relevant field is the Central Asian Border Management Programme (BOMCA) essentially intended to improve the work of border guard structures and their direct interaction. Within the programme 15 different projects will be realized; among them are training of personnel and improving the level of special knowledge; collection and exchange of information between border guards, development of corresponding legislative base, work with local communities for “the reinforcement of the long-term effect”, and equipment delivery. Within BOMCA the establishment of joint customs checkpoints and of training academies for border guard forces in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are also planned. It seems to be significant that the programme lays the key stress on the struggle against drug-trafficking⁷.

The toughening of border regimes having taken place throughout the entire region still doesn't allow to solve the problem of illegal

⁶ Vladimir Mukhin, “*OBSE i NATO vydavlivaiut Rossiyu s tadjhisko-afganskoy granitsy* (OSCE and NATO force Russia from Tajik-Afghan Border)”, Olo.ru, <http://www.olo.ru>, 2.12.2003

⁷ *Panorama*, “*ES pristupil k realizatsii novogo proekta po resheniyu pogranychnyh problem stran TsA* (EU Has Started the Project on Central Asian Borders Management)”. 2004 (1), www.panorama.kz

transboundary operations, first of all of drug-trafficking and illegal migration.

A wide range of possibilities of hiding goods from border control and the transit location of all Central Asian states make them a key part of drug-trafficking routes by which heroin, opium, hashish, marijuana, synthetic drugs are smuggled. There are resources for drugs production throughout Central Asia, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (which are among the largest pot producers), but Afghanistan is the main source of heroin, the most dangerous narcotic.

In the 1990s the country became one of the main centres of world drug production and the leader in the production of heroin. At present, Afghanistan produces 75-80% of world opiates⁸. Holding a record in 1999 (4600 tons), opium producers reduced manufacture to 190 tons (in 2000 they produced 3300 tons) because of drought and the Taliban's campaign of fight against drugs planting. However, after the international operation in Afghanistan in 2002, the production volume was completely restored (3400 tons). On the whole, planting of and trade in narcotics became the key industry in the national economy as a result of conflicts and devastation in the last decades. According to the UN Secretary-General Deputy Special Representative in Afghanistan N. Fisher, the fight against poppy planting will be won no earlier than in 5 or 10 years⁹.

There are several transport routes of opium. On the way (in Afghanistan and abroad), it is converted to heroin. The main routes are the Balkan route (through Iran or Pakistan to port Karachi and then by sea to Turkey, the Balkan countries and after that to Southern and Central Europe and to The Netherlands) and the Northern route (or "the Silk route"). The latter includes routes crossing borders between Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics. One of them passes through Tajikistan,

⁸ Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (booklet). N.Y., 2004

⁹ Cit. by: Azhdar Kurtov, "Narkobiznes v Tsentral'noy Azii: istoriya bolezni i puti izlecheniya (Narco-business in Central Asia: the Case History and the Ways of its Treatment)", Analiticheskoye obozreniye, Almaty, 2004 (1): 21

Kyrgyzstan and the Uzbek part of the Fergana Valley. After that most of the opiates are smuggled through the territory of Kazakhstan to Russia (being itself one of the largest heroin markets) and further to Eastern Europe, Germany and The Netherlands. The other branches of the Northern route pass through the Afghan-Uzbek border and Kazakhstan, or through the Afghan-Turkmen border and Kazakhstan/Azerbaijan, in most cases then running through Russia or going a roundabout way, particularly through Turkey. The “Silk route” attracts narcodealers because of permeable borders between the CIS states. One more possible reason is that they have more chances to establish transborder tribal and ethnic contacts (for instance between the representatives of ethnic groups living in Northern Afghanistan and in the CIS states – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and other states of the former USSR). The economic crisis in the post-Soviet states caused economy stagnation, growth of economic shadow sectors and pauperisation of the population. More and more people start working in drug smuggling and corruption in different fields increases. According to many viewpoints, the degree of amalgamation between corrupted state structures and narco-business is especially high in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

More and more experts and state officials in Russia, Central Asia and other countries discomposedly speak of the growing importance of the Northern route. During the last decade opiates consumption in post-Soviet Central Asia increased by 6 times, this is the highest rate in the world. About 1% of population at the age of 15 and more are drug addicts. This index is 3 times as big as in Europe. According to statistical data on opiates consumption, a sudden rise was registered in the Central Asian countries bordering on Afghanistan: Iran, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan¹⁰. According to official statistics the largest proportion of opiates consumers in the total population live in Iran (2,8%), Kyrgyzstan (2,3%) Kazakhstan (1,5%), Tajikistan (1,3%); while in Russia this share is 2,1%¹¹. It should be noted that this data is not always complete and accurate, in many cases the total number of consumers is estimated to be several times as big as than according to official statistical data.

¹⁰ World Drug Report 2004 (Draft). Multimedia version. N.Y.: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004: 21-22

¹¹ Ibid., p. 341, 342

Global conjuncture of cannabis drugs turnover is different. They are relatively cheaper (in the states of CIS they cost from 0.3 to 0.4 dollars per gramme)¹², this is why larger lots of the product are transported across the border and therefore, the risk is higher. The geographic zone where cannabis grows wild or can be planted is vaster and transport routes are shorter than the ones of opiates. In this case, the Middle East and Central Asia don't influence the global market, providing only a small part of global supply. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are themselves large-scale producers of cannabis drugs, the valley of the river Tchu (Shu) is known for especially big cannabis fields. According to an UN research, hashish production in the Kazakh part of the valley amounted to 53 tons on 2500 hectares, and in Kyrgyzstan to 24 tons on 770 hectares in 1998¹³. Naturally, the main cannabis routes originate in the mentioned countries. In 2002, 30 tons of cannabis were detained in Russia, 17 tons in Kazakhstan, 2,5 tons in Kyrgyzstan, 1 in Tajikistan, 0.4 in Uzbekistan¹⁴. The number of cannabis consumers in Russia and Central Asia (with the exception of Uzbekistan) according to official data is stable, but the rate is much higher than of opiates addicts (in Russia 3,9% in 1999)¹⁵.

Drugs are not the only kind of smuggling across Central Asian borders. According to a high-standing representative of the Russian Customs Service, about 30% of the goods transported to Russia from Kazakhstan is smuggled¹⁶; among them are scrap metal, woodworking of industrial production, building materials, agricultural goods, food, spirit, tipples, mass consumption goods, combustive-lubricating materials. Car spare parts are also smuggled to Russia; while food, illegally produced tipples and mass consumption goods are trafficked in return. Raw materials, metallurgic output, natural stuff (including horns and other parts of animals, including rare species) are smuggled to China from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan while the production of the Chinese light industry is illegally delivered in return. Cattle, fish, mass consumption goods are

¹² Ibid, p. 328,329

¹³ Ibid., p. 70

¹⁴ Ibidem

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 111, 346

¹⁶ *Novye Izvestiya*, "Tret' tovarov, postupayuschih iz Kazahstana v Rossiyu, - kontrabanda (One Third of Goods Coming from Kazakhstan to Russia is a Contraband)", 4 December 2003

smuggled from neighbouring countries to Turkmenistan; corn and petrol to Kyrgyzstan, base metals and petrol to Uzbekistan. Most of the contraband operations are transit. For instance, Kazakhstan's travel facilities are used for transporting Chinese goods to Russia, because the access for Russian lorries to China is limited. There are also cases of smuggling of dangerous items (arms and military equipment) and substances (radioactive materials).

The relative permeability of the Central Asian borders, the difficult economic situation, disparities between prices in contiguous countries, and poverty in the border areas are factors favouring contraband operations of different kinds including drugs, arms and radioactive materials smuggling. Small-scale smuggling is often the main source of income for the populations of some border areas while illegal groups carry on well-organized and rather profitable business. Contraband operations deprive the state of a substantial part of its income and seriously damage some sectors of the national economies.

Drastic degradation of the social-economic situation, threats to life and other basic human rights as a result of ethnic conflicts and official policies infringing upon essential personal or group interests intensify migration processes in Central Asia. The countries of the region are very vulnerable to illegal penetration in their territories for different kinds of purposes: settling, transit migration, criminal operations, smuggling, and participation in the activities of illegal extremist groups and so on. In some border areas, illegal crossings committed by people engaged in transboundary economic operations are usual. Such cases particularly often occur in the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan borderland, where the boundary cuts some settlements. Some cases of trespassing are caused by local economic needs (cattle pasture, plants collecting etc).

Most of illegal border crossings are committed by labour migrants who go to "richer" countries especially to Kazakhstan and further – to Russia and the EU. Since 2000, the channels of illegal migration from South and East Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iran, China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), and even from African countries across the borders of China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, have been developing intensively. This

kind of migration is a well-organized business of transnational criminal groups, using defects in national legislation and in the system of Kazakhstan's international cooperation with the neighbouring countries. In particular, many illegal migrants go through a staging point (for instance from Sri Lanka through The United Arab Emirates), enter the country from a state (in particular, from Kyrgyzstan) having no visa regime with Kazakhstan, and then try to penetrate to Russia and the countries of the EU. The poorly guarded Kyrgyz-Kazakh border can be crossed by train, by car (with help of inhabitants), or even on foot. Illegal migration from Asian states is fairly active in the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan borderland. Most of the Chinese citizens come to Kazakhstan legally, but according to Kazakhstan's Border Guard Service officials the threat of illegal mass migration across the Chinese boundary is very serious¹⁷.

The flow of illegal labour migrants from the CIS countries is much stronger. Kazakhstani experts suppose that about 50 000 illegal migrants from the neighbouring country work in Almaty and Jambyl oblasts while Kyrgyzstan's experts estimate their number at 10 000 people.¹⁸ Many migrants work in Southern Kazakhstan like slaves, being punished by their masters for any attempt to escape. Women are removed for sexual exploitation and smuggled across the Kyrgyzstan border to Kazakhstan and further to Russia. High salaries in Kazakhstan attract illegal migrants from the neighbouring provinces of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan: for instance, Turkmen workers try to penetrate into Mangistau oblast while thousands of illegal Uzbek labour migrants work in Kazakhstan's southern regions¹⁹.

The efficiency of the fight against smuggling is reduced by corruption and insufficient coordination between the actions of the contiguous states' customs services. As a result, there are many cases like the

¹⁷ M. Kirzhak, "Rodina-mat' ne dast (Motherland won't allow to do ...)", *Ekspres-K* 95 (7 June 2000)

¹⁸ Sadovskaya

¹⁹ Igor Rotar, "Granitsa mezhdru Kazahstanom i Uzbekistanom prohodit po chastnym domam (The Border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Passes through Private Households)", *Novye Izvestiya*, 27 August 2003

transport of cargo in guise of another one or the omission of the declaration of some kinds of goods.

The problem of corruption is one of the most serious challenges. Corruption causes state budget deficiency, obstacles for normal transboundary communication, creates prerequisites for penetration of criminals and illegal migrants to the country. In some cases corruption is a result of unjustified border regime restrictions and, at the same time, the mechanism helping to keep an acceptable level of transboundary communication for local population and small business.

Corruption prospers at all Central Asian borders, especially in the areas having active transboundary communication. It can be illustrated by the statement of Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) who in March of 2002 criticized the work of the Customs Service at Kazakh-Chinese border, declaring that “criminals overwhelmed state structures”²⁰.

Among the border areas most infected by corruption are the boundary between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (and in particular the area of the settlement and the checkpoint of Zhibek Zholy), and between Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan in the area of Osh etc.. High density and economic activity of the borderland’s population, combined with unjustified restrictions in the border regime, hurt the interests of the local inhabitants whose key source of income consists in transboundary activities. In such conditions, the relations of corruption with the representatives of the border guard and customs services is often the sole way to carry on cross-border business. According to numerous evidences, border guard and customs officers of both neighbouring countries have considerable income from conniving at mass illegal

²⁰ *Kazahstanskii’ institut strategicheskikh issledovaniï*, (29 March 2002), “V Astane sostoyalos’ rasshirennoye zasedaniya rukovoditelei’ pravoohranitel’nyh organov s uchastiyem Prezidenta stany (The Broadened Meeting of the Heads of Law-enforcement Bodies with Participation of the President of the Country Took Place in Astana)”, www.kisi.kz/Parts/News/offic_news/o2002/o03/03-29-02/o03-29-1.htm

border crossings. The numerous cases of blackmail under threats of punishment for petty or invented infringements are also mentioned²¹.

In order to solve this problem, the Central Asian countries took measures showing results. These results are particularly evident in Kazakhstan where in 2004 the customs dues amounted 27% of the country's budget revenue²². But the conditions generating relations of corruption (including insufficient transparency of the rules of the border regime, in some cases its unjustified rigidity, the low salaries in controlling bodies etc.) still exist in every country of the region.

The second aspect of Central Asian transborder security is the problem of normal transboundary communication. Unfortunately, the toughening of the border regimes of all countries in the region causes higher barriers for economic structures and individuals involved in transboundary interaction. For the states in the region, a border regime with superfluously barriers can cause losses of state profit, a decrease of its citizens' loyalty, loss in the guests' confidence, and even a destabilization of the situation in the border areas. According to some estimates, prolonged closing of the border can cause a reduplication of prices of Chinese mass consumption goods while the fall of economic activity at Uzbek-Kazakh border can reduce Kazakhstan's national income by up to 3,5 billion dollars a year²³. Meanwhile, the duration of the border guard and customs inspections don't meet the requirements accepted in the EU and in some other countries, and the procedures of Central Asian border crossings by motorised transport can last 5 days²⁴ and even more.

²¹ *Internet-gazeta "Navigator", "Vymogatel'stvo na kazahskoi' tamozhne stalo obychnym yavleniyem. Pis'ma chitateley (Blackmails has Become Usual at Kazakhstan's Custom-houses. Letters from the Readers)", <http://www.navi.kz/articles/?artid=3496>, 27 May 2003*

²² Larissa Mostovaya, "*Tamozhnya ob'edinyayetsya (The Custom Service is been Uniting)*", *Izvestiya Kazahstan*, 15 June 2004

²³ Aleksei Bantsykin, "*Obstanovka na kazahstansko-uzbekistanskoy granitse spokojnaya (The Situation at Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan Border is Quiet)*", *NOMAD*, www.nomad.su/?a=3-200301230017

²⁴ *Regionalnoye ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo po Afganistanu: Tsentral'naya Aziya, Iran I Afganistan. Bishkek, Kyrgyzskaya Respublika, 10-12 maya 2004, "Tranzitnaya i transportnaya struktura Afganistana (Transit and Transport Structures of Afghanistan)", www.iimp.kz/produkt/pdf/10_mai.pdf: 4*

From time to time the countries of the region restrict their border regimes for reasons of economic, political, social, sanitary, and epidemiological kinds. In 2000, Turkmenistan introduced visas for the citizens of the post-Soviet states making partial concession (the right of stay for 5 days without a visa) to the citizens of border areas; in 2004 Turkmenistan started to build a barbed-wire fence along its border. Uzbekistan periodically restricts the order of entrance and importation of goods from Kazakhstan and other neighbours. Many experts suppose that Uzbekistan tries to put political and economic pressure on the neighbouring country. Such action was made under the pretext of fighting against plagues and cholera, but according to an unofficial version the real reason was the prevention of currency drain for purchasing cheaper goods in Kazakhstan. The passport control at the border between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was restricted repeatedly because of an increase in illegal migration; in spring 2003 the borders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with China were closed because of SARS. After terrorist actions in Uzbekistan in March 2004 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan restricted the entrance regimes from their neighbouring countries.

Many incidents involving the use of arms by frontier guards and police forces at Uzbekistan's borders were provoked by the fact that the contemporary regime of admittance (there are 29 check-points) and import of goods doesn't meet transboundary communication needs. During 9 months in 2003, Kazakhstan's frontier guards registered 1127 cases of trespassing by citizens of the contiguous state²⁵. Such cases often take place in the areas having a complex ethnic composition, close relative ties between the populations in the border areas and even transboundary settlements.

Meanwhile, the overthrow of Taliban regime has potentially opened broad possibilities for transboundary transport communication with Afghanistan and South Asian countries. Border infrastructure has been developed at the Uzbek-Afghan and the Tajik-Afghan boundaries; the

²⁵ Nikolay Zhorov, "Vystrely na granitse (Shots at the Border)", *Argumenty i Fakty Kazahstan*, 24 September 2003

bridges across the Panj River are constructed. The corresponding projects are financed both by Western countries and organisations (especially by the USA and the EU) and from other sources. For example, in 2002 the Aga Khan Foundation declared its decision to finance the construction of five bridges²⁶. It is believed that the development of transboundary cooperation will become one of the main conditions for regional security and probably will prove more effective than measures on tightening the border regimes.

Conclusion

After September 11 and related events in Afghanistan, the agenda of regional transboundary security has changed essentially. The region has turned out to be in the cynosure of the USA and the EU and the problem of militant extremists' transborder activity has become one of the most actual ones. Central Asian countries have begun to receive significant help (comparable to Russian one) for the strengthening of their border security forces which together with some other factors led to the diminishing of the Russian border guards' presence in Tajikistan – the key country for regional border security. The growing attention of international community has influenced on the diminishing of border problems' acuteness and the potentially most dangerous of these problems which the delimitation of Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border, was resolved. The new prospects for transboundary cooperation, including opening of transport communication with South Asian countries, have been arisen.

However, many serious questions are still unsolved. Among them are territorial problems between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; weak material and personell resources of the regional countries' border guard forces (in this light the weakening of the Tajik-Afghan border protection is of special anxiety) and the high level of corruption within them; rigid border regimes and the existing practices of their strengthening in order to put pressure on neighbouring countries. The

²⁶ *CentrAsia.ru*, “*Tadzhiksko-afganskaya granitsa: Aga Han stroit pyat' mostov cherez reku Piandzh* (Tajikistan-Afghanistan border: Aga Khan Builds Five Bridges through the River of Panj)”, <http://www.CentrAsia.Ru/newsA.php4?st=1016314620>

main issue is an unprecedented growth in drug-trafficking as the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has created favourable conditions for producing drugs while the measures for their reduction are still ineffective. It seems that even the strengthening of border regimes could not bring sufficient effect as according to relevant international experience it may provide suppression of smuggling only up to 10%.

The solution of these and other related problems depends on many factors among which are not only military measures and measures taken by the police, but also internal socio-economic and political reforms as well as the development of cross-border cooperation. Central Asian countries themselves have very limited resources to solve their border problems while the financial and technical resources of the border control structures are weak and the required expenses are not feasible for the national budgets. Therefore, the countries of the region are hardly able to carry out their border policy effectively without close cooperation with the neighbouring countries and foreign organisational and technical assistance. The success of such policies, which could require long-term efforts, would be a very important one for the regional stability in Central Asia and the development of effective Euro-Asian transnational links.

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ВЛИЯНИЕ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ ВОЙНЫ ПРОТИВ ТЕРРОРИЗМА НА РЕФОРМАЦИЮ ВС КЫРГЫЗСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

«Война – это великое дело
государства, основа жизни
и смерти, Путь к
выживанию или гибели.
Это нужно тщательно
взвесит и обдумать»
Сунь Цзы.

Abstract

The most important centre of international terrorism remains Afghanistan, where terrorists and rebels are still being trained. In general, terrorist organizations in Central Asia pose a threat to Kyrgyzstan. Several precautions have to be taken on different levels against this menace, mostly preventive measures, for example actions on the socio-economic level and a judiciary reform. The article also deals with those state-institutions responsible for the fight against terrorism (for example: the Ministry for National Security); organizations, programmes and initiatives which Kyrgyzstan is a member of and which are of relevance in the fight against terrorism (e.g.: ‘*The Shanghai Organization for Cooperation*’, the NATO PfP-Programme); and the reform of the armed forces of the republic from 2002 until 2010, which concerns the MOD, troops of the Interior Ministry, the National Security-Service, the Ministry for Ecology and Extraordinary Situations, the National Guard, the Service for State Security, the Border-Control-Service and the Justice Ministry’s Protection Department.

Общие причины и условия проявления терроризма в Средней Азии

С распадом двухполярной системы и исчезновением с политической арены СССР, мир вступил в полосу перераспределения экономического наследия гигантской территории с населением более 250 миллионов человек.

Внутренние реформы в СНГ переросшие в последующем в «парад» суверинизаций выявили ряд не решенных проблем за всю историю советской власти. К ним можно отнести межгосударственные, межрегиональные, этнокультурные и этно-конфессиональные конфликты. В последующем ставшим питающей средой экстремизма и терроризма в Средней Азии.

По мнению политолога Дж. Демко, эксперта Рокфеллеровского центра по общественным наукам, одной из наиболее распространенных причин возникновения межэтнических конфликтов выступают территориальные споры. Типологию конфликтов в СССР и потом в СНГ можно представить следующим образом:

- 1) Конфликты по поводу исторических спорных территорий (примером здесь может послужить Нагорный Карабах);
- 2) конфликты между этническим большинством и компактно проживающим этническим меньшинством (проблема русских в Прибалтике, русских и гагаузов в Молдавии);
- 3) конфликты, вызванные властным произволом в преобразовании административных границ;
- 4) конфликты связанные с отсутствием у народа своей национальной государственности и рассеченностью его этнической территории политическими или административными границами;
- 5) конфликты (реальные и потенциальные) в результате изгнания народа со своей территории и возвращения депортированных людей на свою историческую родину.

В подтверждение вышеуказанной типологии на территории Кыргызской Республики произошли в 1989 году пограничные и земельно-водные конфликты с Таджикистаном, в том же году на сопредельной территории Кыргызской Республики в населенном пункте Кувасай Ферганской области Республики Узбекистан произошли организованные националистами этническая чистка турков месхетинцев. В 1990 году в Ошской области Кыргызской Республики, на почве сепаратистских течений (ФАНО) поставивших своей целью создание Узбекской культурной автономии на территориях Ферганской, Андижанской, Наманганской, областей Узбекистана и Ошской области Кыргызской Республики, породившие массовые и затяжные межэтнические конфликты с охватом многих крупных населенных пунктов юга Кыргызской Республики. В результате террористических акций экстремистов более 350 человек погибли, телесные повреждения получили более тысячи человек, без вести пропали 89 человек. Зарегистрировано 573 поджога, в том числе 411 жилых домов, 54 государственных объектов. В этих событиях террор стал методом к которому прибегли организаторы конфликтов – политические, националистические и религиозные силы вахаббистского толка. Что было в последствии подтверждено заключением Оперативно-следственной бригады Генеральной Прокуратуры СССР.

В последующие годы в мире определились шесть основных типов современного терроризма:

- Националистический терроризм;
- религиозный терроризм;
- терроризм с поддержкой государства;
- терроризм левых экстремистов;
- терроризм правых экстремистов;
- терроризм анархистов.

Террористические образования, как правило, зарождаются в мононациональных меньшинствах и радикальных течениях религиозных общин. На территории Кыргызской Республики да и в Центрально-азиатском регионе к таковым относятся «Братья мусульмане», «Аль-Кайда», «Хезбе Ислами Туркестан», (Исламская

партия Туркестана», «Исламское движение Узбекистана», «Хизбут-Тахрир», сепаратистские движения уйгур «Восточно-туркестанская партия». Уйгурские сепаратисты-радикалы избрали путь борьбы на сопредельных территориях против Китайских властей, а также устрашения местных уйгуров не желающие поддерживать эту бессмысленную борьбу так были организованы террористические акции как убийство в Бишкеке, лидера общин уйгуров «Иттипак» Базакова не пожелавший финансировать сепаратистов, нападение на официальную делегацию правоохранительных органов КНР с применением боевого огнестрельного оружия тяжело ранив нескольких человек, также же была организованы убийства работника посольства КНР и его водителя, боевики террористических организаций организовали взрывы на базаре «Оберон» и в одном из банков г. Ош. Спецслужбами Кыргызской Республики своевременно была захвачена группа террористов состоящих из граждан Центрально-азиатских республик, намеревавшихся провести террористический акт на авиабазе «Ганси», где базируются коалиционные силы для поддержки операции «Несокрушимая свобода». Представителями организованной преступности были расстреляны полковник милиции Салимбаев, ранее занимавший посты начальника межрегиональных отделов борьбы с организованной преступностью МВД Кыргызской Республики, и полковник милиции Тукешеев, начальник Главного управления борьбы с должностными преступлениями МВД Кыргызской Республики. Преобладающее большинство организаторов террористических акций в Кыргызской Республике являются представителями террористических организаций и прошедшие курс подготовки в лагерях инсургентов в Чечне или же у Талибан в Афганистане.

Частота террористических акций в стране происходит в силу «однополярной мягкости» демократической системы и с жесткими ограничениями притока в правоохранительно-судебные органы кадров новой формации в результате бессменного политического режима установившегося в стране.

Одним из условий проникновения международных террористов в республику является либерально-демократический режим в Кыргызстане. До настоящего времени Кыргызская Республика практически не может выполнить условия Конвенции «О статусе беженцев» в полном объеме в силу определенных причин. Как результат под прикрытием статуса беженцев республика наводнена незаконными «беженцами» из стран с избыточным населением. Высокая коррумпированность государственных служащих приводит к легализации беженцев: Приобретение гражданства становится вопросом обладания достаточных средств на подобное «лоббирование госслужащих». Только в Комиссии по вопросам гражданства при Президенте Кыргызской Республики через подкуп технических работников незаконно получили гражданство 28 иностранцев за 2004 год.

В силу таких обстоятельств, страна является транзитной территорией для различных категорий людей среди которых немало представителей международных организованных преступных групп, сепаратистов, экстремистов, террористов и т.д., что соответственно вызывает озабоченность у соседних государств входящие в СНГ а также стран дальнего зарубежья. К примеру, Государственный Департамент США, разделяя данную озабоченность с Международной организацией по миграции, проводит проект по обмену национальных паспортов и реформирования паспортной системы. Плоды данной акции еще не ясны до конца, так как проект на стадии реализации. Тем не менее текущая ситуация в стране для международных радикалов и террористов открывает новые возможности легализации в Кыргызской Республике, затем возможность легализоваться в европейской части СНГ, далее их путь лежит в страны Западной Европы и Америки. Существует огромное количество примеров изъятия у организаторов террористических акций не только в Кыргызской Республике, но и в странах СНГ национальных паспортов Кыргызской Республики. Эти участники террористических акций, представляющие заграничные террористические организации и имеющие задачи легализации в Кыргызской Республике с целью создания сети легальных

учреждений бизнеса и расширения своего воздействия в Центрально-азиатском регионе, успешно решают свои стратегические задачи.

Профилактические меры снижения угроз терроризма в стране

Региональный анализ распространения терроризма позволяет констатировать несколько закономерностей.

В большинстве своем использование методов терроризма сопряжено с территориальными спорами между государствами, основой которых является несовпадение их границ с реальным расселением религиозных и этнических групп. Наряду с этим самостоятельную роль может сыграть и политический фактор – борьба власти и оппозиции, а также угроза падения режимов в результате усиления религиозно-экстремистских настроений. В этой связи в республике принимаются адекватные меры реагирования на возникающие точки социальных конфликтов и анализ процессов, которые способны привести к возникновению терроризма и его распространению в Кыргызстане. Прежде всего, следует говорить о целом комплексе предпринимаемых мер и проблем, которые стоят перед государством и обществом в связи с возрастающей угрозой терроризма в современном мире.

Во-первых, это решение социально-экономических проблем. Основной причиной проявления социальной агрессии, в том числе и в форме терроризма, является низкий уровень жизни населения (около 70% безработных или людей с доходом менее 2 долларов США в день).

Сегодня в Кыргызстане уделяется определенное внимание социальной сфере. Однако сдвиги в экономике еще в достаточной мере не позволяют решать такие острые проблемы, как безработица и низкий уровень социальных выплат.

- Во-вторых, это работа по снижению уровня политического радикализма и экстремизма в обществе.

- Так, в феврале 2003 года в Кыргызстане был принят новая редакция Конституции, согласно которой роль и функции политических партий и общественных движений повышаются. Осуществление функции представления интересов граждан и участие в выборах теперь является главной обязанностью партий. Другие общественные организации в большей степени сконцентрированы на решении социальных задач.
- Во-третьих, в республике исключена возможность образования политических партий на этнической и религиозной основе. Недопущение дестабилизации отношений между этническими группами – залог предотвращения терроризма и экстремизма, основой которых был этнонационализм.
- Во-четвертых, это интеграция Кыргызстана в международные и региональные институты безопасности (ОДКБ и ШОС).
- Во-пятых, это принятие специальных законодательных мер, направленных на борьбу с терроризмом.
- Во-шестых, это принятие мер против распространения организованной преступности, нелегальной миграции, наркобизнеса, отмыwania денег и незаконный доступ к оружию. Как показывает анализ, Кыргызстан представляет собой в большей мере территорию транзита чем производства наркотиков. В связи с этим приобретает актуальность борьбы с пресечением каналов поставок наркотических веществ через территорию республики в условиях увеличения потребностей в данном виде преступных услуг. Следует отметить открытие Агентства по контролю за наркотиками при непосредственной помощи Правительства США и Агентства по контролю за наркотиками ООН, которое уже за несколько месяцев своего существования показывает хорошие результаты.
- Во-седьмых, большое значение имеет вопрос об обустройстве государственной границы Кыргызстана, подписаны соответствующие договора о делимитации и демаркации границ с Таджикистаном и Казахстаном, не решен окончательно вопрос с Узбекистаном в этом направлении.
- И наконец, важное значение в плане противодействия терроризму имеет формирование в Кыргызстане военной структуры, способной отражать угрозы военного нападения. С

учетом имевшего места вооруженного вторжения международных бандформирований в 1999 и 2000 гг., Республика уделяет особое внимание укреплению южных границ. С этой целью была создана Южная группировка войск а также развитие сил специального назначения и организации связи.

Реформа нормативно-правовой базы борьбы с терроризмом

В 1999 году, когда была осуществлено вторжение международных бандформирования ИДУ под предводительством Джумы Намонгани на юге Кыргызской Республики, объективной причиной этому были происходящие события негативного характера в сопредельных государствах с Кыргызской Республикой.

А именно наблюдались рост религиозного экстремизма, фанатизма и исламского фундаментализма, разгула международного терроризма, межклановые противостояния, открытая гражданская война оппозиционных, религиозных, неформальных сил и движений с официальными властями в этих республиках, что напрямую коснулось Кыргызстана оказавшиеся на пути разрешения этих проблем в силу своего географического расположения.

На сегодняшний день центром и источником международного терроризма в Центрально-Азиатском регионе остается Афганистан с его многочисленными центрами и базами по подготовке боевиков. Известно, что в рядах талибов сегодня против правительственных сил воюют кроме пакистанцев и арабов и узбеки, казахи, кыргызы и уйгуры, граждане России и Европы. Кроме участия в боевых операциях в Афганистане, последующими их задачами являются подрывные действия на территории Центральной Азии. В этой связи Баткенские события 1999-2000 гг. можно назвать очередной попыткой исламской экспансии вооруженным путем и с далеко идущими планами дальнейшей дестабилизации Узбекистана, Кыргызстана и Таджикистана с целью последующего установления Исламского Халифата. С началом операции США в Афганистане в

2001 году вероятность прямого вторжения повстанцев была снижена в несколько раз, однако планы проведения операции террористическими организациями в регионе являются реальностью. И тому подтверждение взрывы 2003-2004 годах в Кыргызской Республике а также 2004 года в Ташкенте (взрывы около дипмиссий США, Израиля и здания Верховного Суда).

Для организации борьбы с проявлениями терроризма и различных видов экстремизма в стране имеются действующие Законы Кыргызской Республики «Об органах внутренних дел», «Об оперативно-розыскной деятельности», «О внутренних войсках», «Об органах национальной безопасности» и Уголовный кодекс. Перечисленные акты дают правовое поле для осуществления работы против деятельности террористических организаций.

В Кыргызской Республике в октябре 1999 г. был принят закон «О борьбе с терроризмом», который определил правовые и организационные основы противодействия возникновения терроризма в стране.

Статья 2 Закона Кыргызской Республики «О борьбе с терроризмом», дает определение слова «Терроризм» гласит: «Терроризм – совершение взрыва, поджога или иных действий, создающих опасность гибели людей, причинения значительного ущерба либо наступления иных общественно опасных последствий, если эти действия совершены в целях нарушения общественной безопасности, устрашения населения с целью подрыва или ослабления существующей государственной власти либо устрашения или принуждения государственных органов, международных, коммерческих, общественных и других организаций для совершения или отказа от совершения того или иного действия в интересах террористов или террористических организаций, а также угроза совершения указанных действий в тех же целях». Таким образом в понятие терроризма включены весь набор тактических действий международных террористических организаций и террористические акции имевшие место на территории СНГ.

Субъекты борьбы с терроризмом определяет статья 3 Закона Кыргызской Республики «О борьбе с терроризмом»: «Основными субъектами обеспечения безопасности Кыргызской Республики от посягательств террористов является государство, осуществляющее свои функции в этой области через органы законодательной, исполнительной и судебной власти».

Органом, осуществляющим непосредственную борьбу с терроризмом, является Министерство национальной безопасности Кыргызской Республики (в настоящее время Служба национальной безопасности при Президенте Кыргызской Республики).

Органами, осуществляющими взаимодействие с Министерством национальной безопасности Кыргызской Республики в области борьбы с терроризмом, являются:

- Министерство внутренних дел;
- Министерство обороны;
- Министерство юстиции;
- Управление государственной охраны;
- Национальная гвардия;
- органы, осуществляющие борьбу с терроризмом, решают стоящие перед ними задачи самостоятельно и во взаимодействии между собой, а также другими министерствами, государственными комитетами, административными ведомствами, учреждениями, организациями и гражданами Кыргызской Республики.

Руководители министерств, государственных комитетов, административных ведомств, предприятий, учреждений и организаций Кыргызской Республики оказывают содействие и необходимую помощь органам, осуществляющим борьбу с терроризмом, в реализации возложенных на них задач в соответствии с действующим законодательством.

После отпора международным бандформированиями в 1999-2000гг. органы государственной власти определили, что ответственность за

деятельностью по предотвращению терроризма будет в ведении и ответственности органов СНБ. Такой шаг определен условиями и спецификой организации борьбы с терроризмом.

Развитие сотрудничества Кыргызской Республике в многостороннем формате можно представить следующим образом по степени важности. Кыргызская Республика является членом Организации договора о коллективной безопасности (ОДКБ) и Шанхайской организации сотрудничества (ШОС), а также участвует в программе НАТО «Партнерство ради мира» (ПРМ).

ОДКБ ведет свое начало от Ташкентского договора о коллективной безопасности (ДКБ), подписанного в мае 1992 г. Членами были Азербайджан, Армения, Грузия, Белоруссия, Кыргызстан, Казахстан, Россия, Узбекистан и Таджикистан. В 1999 г. Азербайджан, Грузия, и Узбекистан вышли из договора. Потом ДКБ был преобразован в ОДКБ на основе максимальной преемственности по отношению к нормативно-правовой базе ДКБ. Главными целями ОДКБ являлось создание системы коллективной безопасности на постсоветском пространстве и военно-политическая интеграция государств-участников, а именно Армении, Белоруссии, Казахстана, Кыргызстана, России, и Таджикистана, для противостояния угрозам безопасности. При этом принимаются меры по созданию коалиционных (региональных) группировок войск и обеспечению их кадров необходимым вооружением и военной техникой. Государства члены ОДКБ координируют свои силы в борьбе с международным терроризмом и экстремизмом, незаконным оборотом наркотиков и психотропных веществ организованной транснациональной преступностью. Финансирование деятельности ОДКБ осуществляется за счет бюджета, состоящего из долевых взносов государств-членов. Ежегодно проводятся командно-штабные и полевые учения «Южный щит Содружества», участниками Договора созданы Коллективные силы быстрого реагирования (КСБР) и Антитеррористический центр СНГ. Регулярно проводятся на территориях участников Договора антитеррористические учения и командно-штабные тренировки. Так, с 23 по 26 сентября 2003г.

проходили командно-штабные тренировки КСБР. В мероприятиях принимали участие офицеры штаба КСБР, военнослужащие управлений национальных формирований, входящих в состав КСБР, а также сотрудники отделения Антитеррористического центра СНГ. Основной целью тренировки были отработка форм и методов взаимодействия силовых структур в случае проведения антитеррористических мероприятий, а также совершенствование навыков офицеров штаба при планировании, перегруппировке и управлении силами быстрого развертывания в ходе выполнения боевых задач.

Шанхайская организация сотрудничества

Хартия ШОС была разработана в соответствии с декларацией о создании этой организации 15 июня 2001 года. Подписание хартии состоялось 7 июня 2002 году в Санкт-Петербурге. Статьями документа определены цели и задачи, членство, органы, а также привилегии и иммунитеты должностных лиц ШОС. Странами-членами ШОС являются Казахстан, Кыргызстан, КНР, Россия, Узбекистан и Таджикистан. В Московской Декларации глав государств ШОС от 29 мая 2003 г. Заявлено: «Государства-члены ШОС считают, что от современного терроризма, наркоугрозы и других трансграничных вызовов, в условиях нарастающей глобализации политических, экономических и социальных процессов, не может отгородиться ни одна страна в мире... Государства-члены ШОС, признавая транснациональный характер современного терроризма, находясь на передовой линии борьбы с его конкретными проявлениями, следуют курсу на взаимное сотрудничество и активное участие в условиях мирового сообщества в борьбе с терроризмом, включая перекрытие каналов его финансирования. В этом они отводят важную роль тесному взаимодействию правоохранительных органов и спецслужб, а также оборонных ведомств государств-членов ШОС». Секретариат ШОС находится в Пекине, Региональная антитеррористическая структура ШОС (РАТС) в Узбекистане.

Партнерство ради мира: рамочный документ

Кыргызская Республика присоединилась к ПРМ в 1994 году. За 11 лет проведены двусторонние мероприятия в области расширения сотрудничества в соответствии Рамочного документа ПРМ. Продолжается обучение представителей Правительства, Парламента, Администрации Президента в Колледже по изучению вопросов безопасности и международных отношений имени Джорджа Маршалла. Основной костяк слушателей составляют офицеры МО, Службы национальной безопасности, Национальной гвардии, Министерства экологии и чрезвычайных ситуаций и дипломаты МИДа, что несомненно способствуют взаимопониманию в области сотрудничества и развития партнерских отношений. В ответ на необходимость увеличения подготовки специалистов в области безопасности после событий 9/11 Колледж оптимизировал свои программы в целях увеличения количества и качества подготовки специалистов для стран участниц ПРМ.

По программе ПРМ в республике проведены многочисленные семинары, затрагивающие проблемы военной, реформы, развития демократии и гражданского общества. Организации миротворческих операций в период гуманитарных катастроф, защиты экологии, развития своды слова и защиты прав человека.

Академия управления при Президенте Кыргызской Республики в рамках программы ПРМ проводит исследовательские работы. Проведены совместные учения ПРМ и МЧС Кыргызской Республики по спасательным операциям при природных катастрофах в горных условиях, а также при техногенных катастрофах в городских условиях. В последние 2-3 года программа ПРМ усиливает свое участие в развитии и подготовки антитеррористических сил, противодействию наркотрафики, и т. д.

Реформа вооруженных сил Кыргызской Республики

В Кыргызской Республике необходимость в военной реформе за прошедшие 4 года стали назревшей проблемой особенно после рассмотрения итогов отражения международных бандформирований ИДУ вторгшихся на территорию юга страны в 1999-2000гг. Проводимая в настоящее время военная реформа не в полной мере отражает традиционные и классические понятия военной реформы.

При этом необходимо отметить, что во многих случаях в документах понятийные аппараты терминов даны не четко или не достаточно правильно с точки зрения военной науки. С выработкой политической задачи в виде перехода на новую военную (оборонительную) доктрину, Вооруженные Силы должны приступить к соответствующей ко времени перестройке. Между тем в силу новизны военной реформы и отсутствия опыта к таким действиям в структурах Администрации Президента и Правительства Кыргызской Республики, реформу полностью возложили на Министерство обороны, тем самым теряя признаки гражданского контроля за самим процессом реформирования. В сущности, военная реформа является прерогативой государства, но отнюдь не только Министерства обороны. Само слово «реформа» означает преобразование, проводимое законодательным путем, усовершенствование какой-то области государственной или общественной жизни. В большинстве своем правовая база выработана на компилятивной основе без учета реальных экономических возможностей страны и не самых лучших моделей коллег по СНГ.

И тем не менее в законодательном порядке подготовлены к военной реформе следующие Законы (с 1999 года):

- «О прохождении воинской службы гражданами Кыргызской Республики»;
- «О статусе военнослужащих»;
- «О военно-оборонительной концепции»;
- «О Вооруженных Силах»;
- «О внутренних войсках»;

- «Об обороне»;
- «О государственной границе»;
- «О пограничных войсках Кыргызской Республики»;
- «О терроризме».

Важным является Постановление Правительства Кыргызской Республики от 28 августа 1998 года (№ 570), которым утверждены мероприятия по реализации решения Совета безопасности Кыргызской Республики от 31 июля 1998 года (№ 1) «О ходе проведения военной реформы в Кыргызской Республике и мерах по ее активизации». Согласно этим мероприятиям в течении 1998-2005 годы, штатная численность МО подлежит поэтапному сокращению и доведения численности до 9 тыс. человек. Также подлежат рассмотрению проекты основных направлений военной доктрины и мобилизационный план подготовки экономики Кыргызской Республики. Значительно способствуют проведению военной реформы оказывают США, КНР и Российская Федерация, представляя финансовую и военно-техническую помощь и особенно после вторжения международных бандформирований ИДУ на юге Кыргызской Республики в 1999 году. Эта помощь усилилась после событий 11 сентября 2001 года, когда была осуществлена террористическая акция «Аль Кайды» в США. С учетом вызовов и угроз в 2001 году Президент Кыргызской Республики увеличил военный бюджет на 30%. Рост военного бюджета в странах Центральной Азии вызваны реальными угрозами вероятных конфликтов.

Узбекистан в 2002 году получил в порядке помощи от США 59,8 млн.долларов на программу обеспечения безопасности и ещё 25 млн. долларов из фонда чрезвычайного реагирования на приобретения аппаратуры связи в целях повышения оперативной совместимости с вооруженными силами других стран, а также 1 млн. долларов в рамках программы военной подготовки и обучения.

Основные направления строительства Вооруженных Сил Кыргызской Республики

В соответствии с Военной доктриной, главной целью военного строительства в республике является создание небольших, способных к ведению боевых действий в горных условиях компактных и мобильных войсковых подразделений Вооруженных сил. Особое внимание уделяются на оснащение современным вооружением, военной техникой, для ведения военных действий в условиях высокогорья для обеспечения защиты территориальной целостности, конституционного строя, суверенитета и безопасности граждан государства.

Строительство Вооруженных сил осуществляется поэтапно, в соответствии с задачами обеспечения военной безопасности и экономическими возможностями.

Военная реформа должна охватить три периода:

1. На первом этапе (с 2002 по 2003 год) предполагалось создание эффективной законодательной базы в области обеспечения военной безопасности, завершение оперативного планирования, материально-технического обеспечения Вооруженных сил, а также совершенствование подготовки сил быстрого реагирования.
2. На втором этапе (с 2004 по 2007 год) предполагается осуществить подготовку Вооруженных сил, способных после отработки мобилизационной готовности решать задачи в вооруженных конфликтах малой интенсивности самостоятельно или в составе КСБР Центрально-Азиатского региона, ОДКБ и ШОС.
3. На третьем этапе (с 2008 по 2010 год) повышать боевую готовность Вооруженных сил, способных самостоятельно или в составе Коалиционных Вооруженных сил государств-участников ОДКБ и ШОС выполнять задачи в вооруженных конфликтах регионального масштаба.

В состав Вооруженных сил Кыргызской Республики входят следующие войсковые части и соединения:

1. Министерство обороны;
2. Внутренние войска МВД;
3. Служба национальной безопасности;
4. Министерство экологии и чрезвычайных ситуаций;
5. Национальная гвардия;
6. Служба государственной охраны;
7. Пограничная служба;
8. Департамент охраны и конвоирования Министерства юстиции.

Численность и состав Министерства обороны (общ. 9 тыс. чел.):

Сухопутные войска 6,5. тыс. чел.

Состоит из:

- одной мотострелковой дивизии;
- двух отдельных горнострелковых бригад (1-я Койташская и 3-я Ошская, образованные в 1998г.);
- одной зенитно-ракетной бригады;
- одного зенитно-ракетного полка;
- трех батальонов специального назначения.

ВВС и ПВО (2,4 тыс. чел.):

- три авиаполка;
- одна зенитно-ракетная бригада;
- три зенитно-ракетных полков;
- две отдельные радиотехнические бригады.

Внутренние войска МВД Кыргызской Республики (3 тыс. чел.):

По международным стандартам права ВВ относятся к полицейским силам, в республике им возложены задачи согласно законов Кыргызской Республики, «О внутренних войсках», «О терроризме», «Об органах внутренних дел». Основными из которых являются:

- Охрана общественного порядка и общественной безопасности;
- охрана особо-важных объектов;
- локализация и пресечение массовых беспорядков;
- участие в освобождении заложников;

- участие в карантине при эпидемиях, эпизоотиях для обеспечения санитарной безопасности.

При массовых конфликтах с использованием оружия и иных поражающих средств внутренним войскам возлагаются задачи:

- Участие в поддержании правового режима чрезвычайного положения;
- локализация и блокирование района конфликта;
- участие в разоружении и ликвидации незаконных вооруженных формирований, террористических групп и организаций, уничтожение их баз (складов) и коммуникаций;
- пресечение внутренних вооруженных столкновений и разъединение противоборствующих сторон.

Служба национальной безопасности Кыргызской Республики (1 тыс. чел.)

Законодательной базой для СНБ является Законы «Об органах национальной безопасности», «Об оперативно-розыскной деятельности», «О терроризме». Основными задачами СНБ являются:

- Достижение экономической стабильности и снятие социальной напряженности;
- законодательное обеспечение эффективного парламентского контроля за деятельностью институтов обеспечения безопасности;
- установление и контроль источников внешних и внутренних угроз безопасности государства и общества, прогнозирование и оценка экстремальных и чрезвычайных ситуаций в рамках Конституционных гарантий Кыргызской Республики;
- планирование, реализация и контроль комплекса оборонных, политических, контрразведывательных, нормативно-правовых, оперативных и технических мероприятий, направленных на профилактику и предупреждение опасности возникновения экстремальных и чрезвычайных ситуаций на территории Кыргызской Республики;

СНБ выведен из состава Правительства Кыргызской Республики и переподчинен Администрации Президента Кыргызской Республики.

В настоящее время СНБ имеет территориальные органы - областные, городские, районные управления и отделы, а также органы военной контрразведки. В своем составе также имеет антитеррористическое подразделение «Альфа» и Отдел боевых операций.

Главное управление Гражданской обороны Министерства экологии и чрезвычайных ситуаций Кыргызской Республики (около 2,5 тыс. чел.):

Хотя и включается в состав Вооруженных сил Кыргызской Республики, эти войска гражданской обороны не могут быть применены в вооруженных противоборствах в силу Дополнительного протокола к Женевским конвенциям от 12 августа 1949 года, касающийся защиты жертв международных вооруженных конфликтов (Протокол 1). Руководствуется Законами Кыргызской Республики «О гражданской обороне», «Об обороне», «О воинской обязанности граждан Кыргызской Республики».

Национальная гвардия (1,5 тыс. чел.):

Осуществляет свою деятельность на основе Указов и распоряжений Президента Кыргызской Республики. Комплекуются хорошо образованными и физически крепким контингентом призывников. Оснащена бронетехникой, современными средствами связи и стрелкового вооружения, офицеры прошли переподготовку в США, Турции, КНР. Регулярно получает военно-техническую помощь из США, КНР, Турции, Южной Кореи, РФ. Имеет три полностью подготовленных боевых подразделений специального назначения, подготовленные для ведения боевых и поисковых операций в горной местности. Обучены тактике локализации массовых беспорядков, в том числе и вооруженных. Национальная гвардия – самостоятельная военная структура, входящая в состав Вооруженных сил Кыргызской Республики и находящаяся в

непосредственном подчинении Президента-Главнокомандующего Вооруженными силами республики.

Пограничная служба Кыргызской Республики (6,5 тыс.):

Образован как самостоятельный вид Вооруженных сил с октября 2002г. Пограничная служба выполняет служебно-боевые задачи на внешних границах (в основном на государственной границе с КНР). Внутри страны и во внутренних границах она принимает под охрану делимитированную и демаркированную части границ с сопредельными государствами Казахстана, Узбекистана, Таджикистана. Он осуществляет контрольно-визовую работу на КПП межгосударственных границах, аэропортах, железнодорожных, автовокзалах. С целью организации борьбы с организованной и международной преступностью на Пограничную службу распространено действие Закона «Об оперативно-розыскной деятельности», также созданы тактические мобильные силы специального назначения для прикрытия государственной границы на стыках пограничных участков вероятного прорыва.

Заключение

Реформа, проводимая в целом в Кыргызской Республике с учетом вызовов и угроз продвигается. Усиление внешнеполитического курса России в Центрально-Азиатском регионе дают свои плоды, идет интенсивные консультации по всем вопросам интеграции и сотрудничества. Она также характеризуется согласованностью действий в рамках двусторонних отношений в вопросах военно-технического сотрудничества, укрепления экономических и культурных отношений с Российской Федерацией, а также Центрально-Азиатскими государствами.

Такой формат стратегических отношений в рамках межгосударственных договоров «О вечной дружбе», дают возможность консолидированного противодействия вероятным вызовам угроз со стороны радикально-террористических организаций, рассматривающие возможность реставрации исламских государств но под эгидой строителей халифата.

Тем не менее было бы не правильно оценивать реформы в Кыргызской Республике без участия США и продвигать под их лидерством глобальной войны против терроризма.

Именно быстрее в истории военной науки развертывание и применение сил и вхождение в зону Российско-Китайских интересов сделало возможным получение своевременной технической помощи от США и их союзников. Этот же фактор побудил Россию и КНР не оставаться в стороне и усилить свое внимание к Центральной Азии и к Кыргызской Республике в частности. Именно при помощи Правительства США, ВС Кыргызской Республики получают современные оборудования для горных и антитеррористических операций, средства управления, транспортные средства и т.д. Уже сейчас можно говорить, что в Кыргызских ВС используются в большей мере средства связи произведенные по западным стандартам. Закладываются элементы для полного перехода на профессиональную армию как открытие Школы для сержатского состава, что в будущем позволит готовить персонал для многонациональных операций в различных форматах. Проводятся на регулярной основе совместные учения по разным тематикам.

Однако несмотря на весь спектр оказываемой помощи, многие аспекты борьбы с терроризмом остаются не решенными. И в решении проблем усиления работы по предотвращению деятельности запрещенных организаций, усиление работы спецслужб, включая их переоборудование и обучение, эффективного прямого обмена информацией, борьбе с коррупцией, дальнейшей подготовке спецподразделений и т.д. должны участвовать США, КНР, РФ а также ЕС и другие заинтересованные стороны.

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TAJIKISTAN: EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY SECTOR AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Introduction

Tajikistan is a country whose image has been tarnished by the civil war of the 1990s, but which managed to pull itself together and overcame the consequences of violence and destruction relatively quickly.²⁷ People of Tajikistan and its leadership deserve much credit for these achievements, uncommon in post-conflict situations. The War on Terror brought new attention to the security sector in Tajikistan and proliferation of external players and influences. This facilitated the transfer of expertise and equipment, and brought much needed financial resources, but also created opportunities for competition and political manoeuvring. The challenge for a young state is to absorb all the Great Powers' attention in the best interests of the country.

This paper is concerned with the functioning of the security sector in Tajikistan. It argues that many aspects of security are outsourced to external players – most notably Russia, - while the regime can concentrate on the tasks it is most interested in. Heightened attention of other players made this tendency even more pronounced, as offers to 'share the burden' started to come in. The paper concludes with a reflection on prospects for change and what they might mean for stability in Tajikistan.

²⁷ For the background see Accord: International Review of Peace Initiatives, Conciliation Resources? London, 2001

Security Framework

Outsourcing of Security

From an outside perspective, Tajikistan is a country experiencing serious security problems, with drugs and terrorism dominating the discourse. It is strategically positioned on the border with Afghanistan, and instability of its neighbour has affected Tajikistan long before September 11 and the US-led War on Terror. The rest of the regional neighbourhood is also a cause of concern: Uighur separatist groups in China, Uzbekistan as a magnet of terrorist attacks and Pakistan with pockets of Islamic radicalism are all located in the immediate proximity. Moreover, there are challenges inside the country, as real or perceived Islamist movements are raising stakes at home.

However, although the regional challenges are numerous, they currently affect domestic security only to a limited extent. For the leadership, the crucial issue is the security of the regime, and most of its efforts are directed at fulfilling this objective. Moreover, for a small and weak state, such as Tajikistan,²⁸ it is hard to deal with external threats, while terrorism and drugs affect other countries more directly. Border security, protection from attacks of militants from abroad and fight against drugs can be outsourced to the concerned external powers, who are keen to fight drugs and terrorism. From Dushanbe's point of view, this is rather convenient, as it allows it to concentrate on the challenges it considers important.

Internal Agenda

The real challenges are related to securing power of the President and his entourage and ensuring that the system of patronage works smoothly and brings tangible benefits to those co-opted into it. Gradual elimination of power barons, who came into prominence during the civil war period, constitutes an integral part of the regime's security agenda. This is

²⁸ The World Bank Poverty Assessment Report Update for Tajikistan for 2003 names it the poorest of the CIS countries where 64% of population lives on \$2.15 a day, - ITAR-TASS, 28 October 2004

supplemented by a degree of fear spread over the population by means of harassment and police brutality. The purpose is two-fold: to ensure that any popular unrest is halted at its initial stage (unlike in 1991 in the run-up to the civil war when rallies and protests were allowed to go unchecked before violence unfolded) and to make it easier to extort money from civilians (it is better to pay than be beaten at the police station).

The Role of Security Agencies in the Political System

Despite the fact that the security sector looms large in the life of Tajik citizens and in the political system as a whole, individual agencies or their leaderships do not carry significant political weight. In other words, civilian control over the military and other power agencies is firmly entrenched. This in itself is an important achievement of the post-war period, since until recently field commanders-turn-legitimate figures in the power establishment enjoyed almost a free reign. Gradually, one by one, such leaders from the (former) pro-government and opposition sides have been either detained or forced out of the country. In 2004 the arrest of Gaffur Mirzoev, former chief of the Presidential Guard²⁹ and the extradition of former Interior Minister Yakib Salimov, both close Presidential allies in the past, confirmed that there are no untouchable personas. The President and his immediate entourage are keen to ensure that none of his security ministers is too powerful and capable of playing an independent role, if there are further upheavals.

Corruption

Corruption lies in the heart of the security sector; as one local observer noted, 'security sector exists to be corrupt'. Given the lack of financial resources at the disposal of the state³⁰ and subsequent poor funding for the state sector it is unsurprising that security agencies have to provide for themselves. Moreover, a culture of corruption and bribery is widespread in society. Transparency International has rated Tajikistan

²⁹ for profile of Mirzoev see 'Tajikistan: Fall of Praetorian Guardsman', IWPR, RCA, no. 306, 10 August 2004

³⁰ The foreign debt of Tajikistan is estimated at \$1 billion.

among the five most corrupt countries in the world.³¹ Corruption in the security sector can flourish more easily since very little information is in public domain. Those affected complain very seldom out of fear and there are few NGOs or media outlet to press with investigations. Those who are supposed to protect the law are sometimes involved in crime.³²

Individual Agencies

Since the regime is mostly interested in dealing with internal stability and security of its own rule, unsurprisingly the Ministry of Interior is the largest and most powerful body. It numbers up to 30,000 servicemen³³ broadly organised along the old Soviet structure. It has got two militarised units designed for combat action which can be used both internally and externally: OMON (police special task force) and the rapid reaction regiment of General Sukhrob Kasymov, one of the last remaining field commanders on the governmental side. Kasymov's unit is based in Varzob, about 40 km from the capital.

On suffice, police capacity to deal with crime is rather remarkable: crime statistics has been consistently going down and violent crime has reduced considerably.³⁴ In contrast to a recent post-war period, fresh in memory of the citizens, Tajikistan again became a safe place to live. However, the way security is provided increasingly becomes a conflict-generating factor. The police, in the same way as other ministries, are desperately underfunded having to turn any source of income available, including extortion and racketeering.

The population remains remarkably pliant and the only protests that took place were of immediate supporters of detained former commanders in Gharm. This may be explained by a combination of factors, such as war fatigue and belief in the state's monopoly of violence, the fact that the

³¹ Quoted in 'One of the World's Most Corrupt Countries Struggles to Create a Fairer Business Environment', by Nargis Zokirova, IWPR, RCA no. 293, 15 June 2004

³² For instance, a Ministry of Justice senior inspector was detained in the border area of Kyrgyzstan, trying to sell 92 kg of heroin, - Asia-Plus, 19 October 2004.

³³ Figures courtesy of UNTOP

³⁴ Minister of Interior Khumdin Sharipov reported that over 130 criminal gangs and bandit groups have been suppressed for the last five years, - Asia-Plus, 22 October 2004.

most active – and angry – representatives of the society largely leave to work abroad, and fear of police brutality and the lack of belief in a possibility of redress.

The Ministry of Security

The Ministry of Security is a successor to the KGB, but does not enjoy the same standing as its much feared predecessor. After the Ministry of the Interior, this is the most powerful body. In the post-war period it was loosing out to the former, but gradually managed to re-build its position. In this it is greatly helped by its ability to gather – and to use at the right moment – compromising information on other agencies and figures in the government. As parliamentary and presidential elections near (to be held in 2005), the Ministry of Security services may become invaluable.

The Ministry is dealing with such issues as Islamic political activities, for instance, *Hizb-ut-Tahrir*, but does not harass religious believers *per se* or attempt to spy in mosques as its counterparts in Uzbekistan do. It is nominally engaged in the fight against drug trafficking (there is a 200-strong unit belonging to the Ministry), but in reality drug issues are outsourced to the Drug Control Agency (DCA) established by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Previously, it dealt with the collection of weapons since proliferation of small arms and light weapons was widespread after the war, but as this job is largely accomplished, the routine work has been moved to the Ministry of the Interior.

It is unclear to what extent the Ministry is capable to combat Islamic. The Ministry used to rely on a network of agents of the criminal underworld with whom it traded favours and who could deliver valuable information on crime, movement of people, gun running etc. However, Islamic groups are largely organised around an ideological rather than a criminal agenda, and targeting them by the same methods may not deliver the desired results.

Armed Forces and Border Troops

The Committee on the Protection of State Border is vested with responsibility to deal with all border issues and is in charge of the Border Troops. The Army is supervised by the Ministry of Defence and numbers between 6,000 and 7,000 servicemen (as compared to 30,000 in the Ministry of the Interior) and is vested with responsibility to respond to large-scale military threats. Both are desperately underfunded state bodies, but increasingly in receipt of substantial Western aid in training and equipment.

Unlike other agencies, the Army and the Border Troops are conscript-based. Their structure carries a significant capacity gap in the middle: there are professional officers trained mostly in the Soviet days with years of career behind them, and a sea of uneducated rural youths who make up the conscripts. What is missing is an NCO level, i.e. a transmission belt between officers and conscripts who could train the soldiers and look after them.³⁵

The Tajik border troops are stationed on the borders with China (which is largely impenetrable because of high mountains), and the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The border regime imposed by the Uzbekistan leadership has negatively affected Tajikistan and neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, albeit to a lesser extent. However, with a passage of time, law-enforcement agencies stationed at the border have developed a pattern of cooperation between themselves designed to extract money from those crossing the borders. Presently, corrupt networks of border guards/policemen/customs officials are firmly entrenched and are interested in the preservation of a *status quo* of closed borders. They also have a lobbying capacity in the capital to argue the case for 'better security' which in reality means more barriers to the movement of goods and people, and more extraction opportunities. The constituency pushing for change, such as business people and people in need to travel, is inevitably coming into conflict with these corrupt networks.

³⁵ Interview with a Western diplomat based in Dushanbe, October, 2004, Dushanbe.

Customs

Customs is thought to be a better functioning agency compared to Border Troops and the Army. Still, customs' capacities to detect crime and stop illegal substances from crossing are fairly low, despite significant transfers of equipment by the Western donors. However, they are more advanced than those of the border guards, as the latter are staffed by conscript soldiers, while customs recruit professional officers who at least in theory have career jobs in the agency.

The Fight against Drugs and Terrorism

Drugs

The fight against drugs is largely outsourced to external powers. Despite declarations of commitment to combat the evil, the implicit attitude towards the drug issue is that it presents a threat to other countries. Drugs are mainly destined to the Russian and other European markets where there is a demand. Although large quantities of drugs are carried through the territory of Tajikistan, internal drug consumption remained low so far, drugs are not grown in Tajikistan, production facilities are negligent and prophylactic measures taken by the international community have been fairly effective. Moreover, should the struggle against drugs start in earnest, this would lead to violence and casualties among law-enforcement agencies, and deprive them of much-needed earnings out of which the whole families survive. Such trends are certainly worrying, as it may be only a matter of time until drugs are widely consumed and drug mafia is too powerful for the regime to cope with.

However, the main loser was Tajikistan's reputation, as Tajik citizens are routinely suspected to be drug-traffickers in other countries. Russia pays increased attention to the drug challenge coming from Tajikistan since it affects domestic supply, and so do gradually other CIS countries which host Tajik labour migrants. This leads to harassment of Tajiks travelling abroad.

The US and the UK are playing a significant role in the fight against drugs by committing their funds, equipment and expertise to Tajikistan. A Drug Control Agency (DCA) has been set up on the initiative of Western donors, while its institution-building was facilitated by the UNODC. The DCA was established in June 1999 directly under the Office of the President and does not report to any of the power ministries. It cooperates with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Security, both of them having their own anti-drug departments. The DCA is staffed by 350 personnel, 150 out of them are special forces bearing arms and capable of combating criminals. DCA officers are hand-picked through a thorough system of testing and background checks, and are paid between \$100 and \$400, a considerable salary by Tajik standards. It does not have a reputation for corruption. When drug seizures are reported, it is normally the DCA who is involved in the investigations and arrests.³⁶ For instance, over the first 9 months in 2004, the DCA Directorate for Kulyab seized 293 kilogram of drugs, including 37 kg of heroin.³⁷

Still, even the DCA is not immune to political pressure. When the President moved to dismiss Gaffur Mirzoev from his position of Head of Presidential Guards in January 2004, he was confronted by a rebellion of his former comrade-in-arms, who would not leave until a prestigious appointment was offered to him. To the dismay of the international donors who funded the agency, Mirzoev and the President settled on the position of head of the DCA. The way such an appointment would affect the fight against drugs was not a consideration for the regime concerned with finding a way out of a delicate political situation, especially since the DCA has more relevance for outside powers than at home. Soon after Mirzoev took the reigns of power, staff changes followed as some personnel had to go to make room for Mirzoev's appointees. During Mirzoev's period drug seizures by the DCA dropped by some 40%.

³⁶ For instance, drug traffickers were detained in Sughd province on the way to Novossibirskaya Province in Russia. In July 2004 FSB and Russian Customs intercepted 237 kilograms of heroin in the packs of juice which was transported from Khujand (Sudgh province) to Novossibirskaya province. The street value of the consignment in Russia was up to \$2,5 million, - Asia-Plus, 28 October 2004.

³⁷ Asia-Plus Blitz, 27 October 2004.

However, no lasting damage appears to have been done. The President could not afford to leave a commander in power who openly disobeyed his orders and threatened to take up arms, as he may become unruly in future. Moreover, the President suffered a public humiliation, which could not be forgiven. It was only a matter of time before Mirzoev was detained in August 2004. The previous head and members of staff dismissed by Mirzoev were re-appointed to their positions and the situation returned to what it was before.

The Regime's Perspective on Terrorism and External Threats

There are challenges coming from outside that the leadership is worried about, but it has its own perspective on them which may not always match the one of the 'partners in security'. While external players are far more interested in such threats as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and international networks of terrorists, the Tajik government is less concerned with them. This is understandable: incidents of violence that occurred in Tajikistan after the civil war stemmed from internal political rivalries and business competition. Unlike the US, Russia or Uzbekistan, it has not experienced random acts of violence against civilians designed to cause terror. Moreover, part of the population that fled to Afghanistan had been hosted by the Taliban who took care of them in time of need. Some 'terrorists' with money had been providing for the whole villages. Groups of IMU fighters, led by Juma Namangani, were well-behaved when they set up their camps in the Tavildara area, paid for goods and services rather than harassing traders into giving them everything for free, as the government troops often did when stationed in Gharm.

Given this background, the government rather goes through the motions to assure the international community that anti-terrorist measures are being taken, but whether they produce much impact is unclear.³⁸ The same stance applies to Russia: Tajikistan participates in the Russia-led

³⁸ For instance, on 14 October 2004 the Parliament has ratified three UN anti-terrorism conventions, including Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol for Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. Since Tajikistan is a landlocked country, relevance is not obvious, - *Asia-Plus*, vol. 8, no. 196, 15 October 2004.

CIS undertakings to combat terrorism, as these are hard to avoid. In its September 2004 summit meeting in Astana dedicated to countering terrorism a decision was taken to set up a unit for coordinating the fight against drug trafficking, and an operational group for Central Asia within the CIS Office for Combating Organised Crime was established. However, the understanding is that in case of a serious attack by ‘international terrorists’ it will be the Russian Armed Forces based in Tajikistan who would resist it.³⁹

In the leadership’s threat assessment, two considerations prevail: relations with Uzbekistan and with pan-Islamic movements such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir.⁴⁰

Relations with Uzbekistan

One external challenge which the regime feels that it has to confront it on its own are relations with Uzbekistan. Although the Karimov regime rendered military support to the governmental side during the civil war which contributed to its victory, fortunes have changed since then. Uzbekistan is believed to harbour supporters of Colonel Makhmud Khudaiberdiev who launched attacks from the Uzbek territory on Tajikistan in 1997 – 98 and retreated there after suffering defeat from governmental forces. It is unclear whether the rebellious colonel is alive or dead, but Tajik security officials believe that his lieutenants are still in Uzbekistan and have not abandoned their plans to invade their country once again, if an internal crisis in Tajikistan creates favourable conditions. In this light, the establishment of the Russian military base in Tajikistan has been interpreted by some on an assumption that the base would act as a deterrent against potential Uzbek aggression.⁴¹

Tashkent, in its turn, has its own scores against Dushanbe. In 1999 the militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) set up training

³⁹ 201st Division periodically holds military exercises together with Border Troops and Tajik security forces to resist penetration of combatants from the south. Last such exercise was conducted at Mumirak training ground in Khatlon province in September 2004.

⁴⁰ Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, Asia Report N°58, 30 June 2003, International Crisis Group, www.crisisweb.org

⁴¹ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, cited in www.fergana.ru, 18 October 2004

camps and bases in the territory of Tajikistan, loosely controlled by the government, crossed over into Batken province of Kyrgyzstan and entered Uzbekistan to start hostilities against Karimov's regime. Dushanbe is blamed for providing refuge to the IMU fighters and closing its eyes on their bases in Tavildara, for allowing the militants to cross the borders unchecked and more recently - for transiting drugs through the Uzbek territory. Moreover, while Tashkent classifies IMU as an international terrorist organisation, the establishment in Tajikistan has a different perspective on it, viewing it as an opposition movement against the leadership of Uzbekistan and therefore as an internal problem of Uzbekistan. Its relevance to security in Tajikistan is consistently dismissed. It has been pointed out that the IMU remained dormant since the US-led intervention in Afghanistan and it is unclear whether it still represents a credible force.⁴²

More recently, Uzbekistan came to be regarded as a cradle for a new and more dangerous anti-system Islamist movement - Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir

Tajikistan, as other regimes in Central Asia and unlike Western powers,⁴³ considers Hizb-ut-Tahrir a terrorist organisation and is determined to stop its spread across the country. Originally, this initiative came from Uzbekistan where the first cells of Hizb-ut-Tahrir activists appeared. For a while it was believed that ethnic Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are more susceptible to the Hizb-ut-Tahrir ideology and that the movement reflects a broad dissatisfaction with the policies of the regime, dressed in a religious cloak. However, when representatives of other ethnic groups, including Tajiks, began to join in and the movement spread to such unlikely places as Kazakhstan and Russia, it became evident that explanation of Hizb-ut-Tahrir as an anti-Karimov protest movement may be too simplistic.

⁴² Author's interviews with the senior Tajik officials in Dushanbe. A former presidential adviser noted that there is no real difference between the Islamic Renaissance Party in Tajikistan (former armed opposition to the government) and the IMU, apart from the fact that IRP is legalised and shares power with the government, while IMU is forced to operate underground.

⁴³ Hizb-ut-Tahrir operates legally in the UK

The officialdom in Tajikistan considers Hizb-ut-Tahrir a far more dangerous phenomenon than the IMU, despite the fact that the IMU has a record of violence and is known to have links to terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda. On the contrary, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has done little so far beyond recruitment of supporters and distributing leaflets. It insists that it adheres only to peaceful means in its goal to establish a caliphate to unite Muslims. This concept of a transnational entity that would contest the national borders and undermine the new nation-states is especially threatening to the Central Asian leaderships. Even the President of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, with his usually more liberal stance on the issue has made a statement to this effect, dubbing Hizb-ut-Tahrir as ‘manifestations of ideological terrorism’ and saying that ‘fanatics are openly speaking about the idea of creating an Islamic state in the Fergana Valley and of the expansion of ‘ideological jihad’ in the territory of Central Asia.⁴⁴

Stick-and-carrot policies have been employed by security agencies to combat Hizb-ut-Tahrir including anti-Hizb-ut-Tahrir propaganda through mosques and the local authorities, interception of religious literature, keeping an eye on those who returned from receiving Islamic education abroad and detention of suspected Hizb-ut-Tahrir members. Throughout 2004, arrests have been reported, starting in the Sughd province in the north of Tajikistan in the Fergana Valley where a large minority of ethnic Uzbeks live, and later proceeding to other, more homogeneously Tajik parts of the country, such as Kulyab. As there is no independent access to Hizb-ut-Tahrir detainees, it is hard to judge their motivation and agenda, and the validity of the Tajik threat assessment.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir is not the only movement expressing discontent along Islamic lines. A new group called *Bayat* appeared in the north of Tajikistan in Isfara district and claimed responsibility for violent incidents there, such as the murder of a Baptist priest in Chorku. It is unclear whether the group exists in reality or is merely an Internet voice.

⁴⁴ *Interfax*, 25 October 2004

External Players and Influences

As provision of many aspects of security is outsourced to outsiders, external powers play a huge role in politics of the country, in a way that limits its sovereignty. The War on Terror brought proliferation of actors, allowing the regime to play them off against each other and to gain institutional resources without seriously committing themselves to or implementing necessary policy reforms. Competition between powers sometimes gained momentum of its own, while security in Tajikistan became a secondary consideration.

Russia

Russia remains the most important actor. Since independence, it has played a major role in all aspects of life in Tajikistan, including provision of security. Russia is the country more directly affected by challenges stemming from Tajikistan, such as drugs, weapons and people smuggling, hence its interest in maintaining security presence. The 201st Motor Rifle Division of the Russian Armed Forces has been stationed in Tajikistan since its independence. In September 1993 it formed the backbone of the CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan (CIS/PKF) and stayed on, after battalions from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan withdrew. Russia also maintains a number of military facilities in the republic and up till now has been responsible for protection of the border with Afghanistan.

Border Protection

Borders of Tajikistan stretch for over 4,000 km, often across difficult mountainous terrain. The Afghan border has been a source of concern over the last decade. Russian border guards have been stationed on the border with Afghanistan since the break up of the Soviet Union. Throughout 2004 the leadership of Tajikistan has been advocating the withdrawal of the Russian border troops. Two sections, - 73 km stretch of the Tajik/Afghan border and the Murgab section of border with China, - have been transferred to the Tajik command earlier. Following this, China reinforced its border troops' presence on the Tajik border to maintain security in the area. Eventually an agreement between Russia

and Tajikistan on withdrawal was signed in October 2004. The transfer of the border to jurisdiction of Tajikistan and withdrawal of Russian troops is to begin in November 2004 from Khorogh section of the border and proceed to Ishkashim and Kalaikhumb sections in Pamir (Mountainous Badakhshan, or GBAO), handing over 700 km area. Moskovskii and Pianj detachments in the Kulyab area will be put under Tajik control in 2005 and the handover is to be completed in 2006. Russia is to transfer all military installations and equipment to the Tajik side. Russian experts are to stay behind as advisers to assist in capacity-building and information exchange, and increased numbers of Tajik servicemen are to be granted free training in border troops' colleges in Russia.

Until the Agreement, the Russian Border Troops numbered some 11,500 servicemen. In reality, only officers are from Russia, while conscript soldiers come from Tajikistan. Russian officers could select conscripts all over Tajikistan: in the time of the draft officers visit the regional draft centres and choose those most fit mentally and physically. There is no shortage of volunteers since soldiers are well-paid by Tajik standards.⁴⁵ Russia also provides supplies of food, fuel and maintenance of border installations and equipment. Moreover, it carries most of the financial burden for border defences: according to the 1993 Bilateral Treaty on the Joint Patrolling of the Tajik/Afghan border, the presence of Russian troops was to be financed 50/50 by Moscow and Dushanbe. However, Dushanbe made only 2.4% of its instalment in 2003, and not more than 5% in the previous years.⁴⁶

With the Russian withdrawal from the Afghan border provision of border security will lie with the Tajik state. As speculations over Russian border troops withdrawal were turning into reality, concerns mounted whether Tajikistan is ready to take up the burden of border defence. Implications for drug trade can be potentially serious, as Russian troops

⁴⁵ In the Russian border troops a soldier gets about \$40 a month, while the Tajik troops pay \$1. In the words of general Nazarov, 'contract soldiers in Russian forces get more than generals in the Tajik army', - Dushanbe, UNDP Border Management meeting, October 2004.

⁴⁶ Oxford Analytica Russia/CIS Daily Brief, 3 March 2004

at least intercept a share of what is going through.⁴⁷ Since 1992 Russian border guards seized over 29 tonnes of drugs on the Tajik-Afghan border.⁴⁸ Drugs are not the only dangerous commodity trafficked. Small arms and light weapons also get through: according to the Russian FSB Border Service press centre, in 2003 13 *Strela* SAMs and 3 missile launchers for them, tank shells and anti-tank missiles, mines, hand grenades and over 100 kg of explosives have been detained at the border, which is 5,3 times more than in 2002.⁴⁹ Since beginning of 2004 over 42,700 units of ammunition, including 5 missiles, over 1,400 tank shells and 600 mines were seized by the troops at the Afghan border.⁵⁰ It is also feared that hostage-taking of Tajik citizens by Afghan drug traffickers may intensify.⁵¹

The initiative of the Tajik leadership to ask Russian border troops to leave has been deeply unpopular in society, especially among the residents of the areas bordering Afghanistan. It has been pointed out that Tajik border troops are not ready to take up such a difficult task, and that salaries of servicemen in Tajik troops are so low that corruption is inevitable and it would be hard to attract high calibre personnel to work for such small remuneration.⁵² Moreover, the Russian troops play a role in the local economy, since they have a much better purchasing power than the locals and can pay for goods and services. There are no nationalist feelings on the popular level against the presence of the troops, especially since most soldiers are drawn from Tajikistan. The recent agreement has prolonged the period of transition to allow for better preparation, but the same concerns largely remain.

⁴⁷ For instance, 50 kg of heroin were taken in one seizure on a routine patrol from smugglers crossing the river, - 28 October 2004, Asia-Plus.

⁴⁸ ITAR-TASS, 15 October, 2004

⁴⁹ Cited in Vladimir Mukhin, 'Подводные Камни Российской Дипломатии', *fergana.ru*, 22 October 2004

⁵⁰ Russian Border Troops press service in Tajikistan, cited in Asia-Plus, 21 October 2004

⁵¹ For instance, Asia-Plus reported in November of a release of a hostage from Navochar village by the Russian border troops who was held for a year and a half in Afghanistan, - Asia-Plus, 1 November 2004.

⁵² 'Tajiks Alarmed by Russian Troops Withdrawal', by Gulnora Amirshoeva and Shamsiddin Orumbekov, IWPR, RCA no. 316, 28 September 2004, www.iwpr.net

Promotion of Central Asian Security Cooperation

Russia's efforts in military and security sphere in Central Asia have intensified in a drive to make the countries it has friendly relations with to cooperate better across the region between themselves and with Russia. In August 2004 troops of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which belong to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) held a large-scale military exercise in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan. The Rapid Reaction Force established in 2001 is the operational arm of counter-insurgency efforts, while the CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre based in Moscow is referred to as the 'brain' of such operations.⁵³ The next joint military exercise for CSTO members 'Border-2005' is planned to be held in Tajikistan in spring of 2005. Russia joined Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) at its summit in Dushanbe in October 2004.

Crime Prevention

Russia's growing preoccupation is crime prevention. Efforts in this sphere have been scaled up. Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev visited Tajikistan in October 2004. Officially, priorities for cooperation include the fight against terrorism, disruption of its sources of financing, such as drug trade, trafficking of people, arms and drugs. However, the issue of illegal migration and crimes committed by the Tajik citizens in Russia that, according to Nurgaliev have risen 63% in 2004,⁵⁴ dominated the talks between police officials. From the Tajik perspective, information exchange between the sides is not very effective: 'as information is mainly exchanged about committed acts of crime, rather than criminal suspects'.⁵⁵ This may be explained by the distrust between parties involved.

For the authorities of Tajikistan the important issue for law-enforcement cooperation is extradition of those wanted for crimes at home. Many of

⁵³ 'Central Asia: Joined-Up Security', by Leila Saralaeva, IWPR, RCA no. 307, 12 August 2004

⁵⁴ RFE/RL, vol. 8 no. 202, 25 October 2004

⁵⁵ Stated by Khumdin Sharipov, Interior Minister of Tajikistan, in an interview to the 'Щит и Меч' newspaper, 21 October 2004. He also pointed out that in the last two years over 160 Tajik citizens were killed in Russia, with 121 murders in 2004 alone.

the former regime's opponents, as well as those who fled Tajikistan after the civil war fearing revenge by relatives of their victims, found safe haven in Russia. Increasingly, Dushanbe is determined to get some of these people back. Until recently, Moscow resisted extradition requests from Dushanbe: since 2001 only 12 wanted criminals were handed over. However, Moscow arrived at a conclusion that it can win favours from Dushanbe for a minor price, and started to look more positively on extradition, including handing over the former Interior Minister Yakub Salimov in February 2004.⁵⁶

New Players

The War on Terror brought new players into security field in a country, previously viewed as a Russia's domain. Since 2001 the US and its allies in the Coalition of the Willing paid increased attention to security issues in the states bordering Afghanistan where regimes were agreeable to cooperation with the US, such as Tajikistan. Development aid to the country has gone up supplemented by provision of military aid in training and equipment.

The United States

As the intervention in Afghanistan was being planned, Central Asian countries became of interest to the US military and political establishment. New offers of support started to appear in exchange for support in the War on Terror. Rahmonov's visit to Washington in January 2002 provided impetus for development of a relationship in the security field. Throughout 2003 the envisaged withdrawal of the Russian border troops provided new hopes for the Western powers, notably the US and the EU, to get more closely involved in security sector in Tajikistan. Apprehensive that security vacuum could be created in the border area, the US and the EU sought to establish what kind of assistance would be most beneficial, since provision of ground troops or military instructors in large numbers to replace the withdrawing Russians was clearly out of question.

⁵⁶ Reportedly, the tacit agreement was made that the suspects would not be sentenced to capital punishment.

For the US security of the border with Afghanistan is relevant because of the anti-terrorist agenda and possibilities for smuggling of weapons, including that of mass destruction, as well as movement of people in and out of Afghanistan. Fight against drugs is important not that much because it affects domestic market in the US, but because of its interrelationship with other threats, such as provision of finance for terrorism and formation of global networks, capable of organising violent acts, smuggling of terrorists etc.

In the fiscal year of 2004, the US Departments of State, Defense and Commerce provided over \$50 million of assistance to Tajikistan. Military assistance in training and equipment constituted an additional \$2.3 million. One of the foci of the programme is to modernise communications' system and structure of the Ministry of Defence.⁵⁷ The beginning of a US Train-and-Equip operation is envisaged.

US military aid and political support for the Rahmonov regime may not have intended to drive Russia out of Tajikistan, but it has created this impression, and was interpreted by Russia as such. As security cooperation with the US proceeded with new offers of assistance coming in, Russian diplomacy was put into action.

The Europeans

France is the only Western country which maintains military presence in Tajikistan with an airbase in Dushanbe to provide technical support to its air operations in Afghanistan. The base is currently expanding: four more planes of French Air Force, i.e. K-135 refuelling plane and three *Mirage* fighters are to be deployed at the transit base for French military contingent.⁵⁸ UK has concentrated its aid on fight against drugs through provision of expertise in Customs, and technical and financial support to the UNODC and DCA.

BOMCA (Border Management Programme for Central Asia), initiated by Austria as a follow-up to the Austrian Minister of Interior situation

⁵⁷ Asia-Plus, 15 September 2004

⁵⁸ Asia-Plus Information Blitz, 3 November, 2004

assessment mission to Central Asia, and subsequently designed and financed by the EU with Austria in a lead role, deals with the borders with Central Asian states (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and is meant to provide support to the agencies responsible for border protection. It envisages to spend 5 million euros on Tajikistan in the five years of its operation. A related EU programme is CADAP designed for customs. The EU has signed a partnership and cooperation agreement with Tajikistan in October 2004. Both programmes are implemented by UNDP in cooperation with the governments and other partners.

China and Japan

China became a more active player, as Chinese-Tajik border gradually opens and more interaction is to follow. In May 2004 the Kulma Pass border crossing sealed since the Soviet times opened to connect Xinjiang and Tajikistan. In its turn, Japan grew interested in Central Asia concerned with a spread of Chinese influence in the region, Sino-Russian rapprochement and their combined influence through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, as well as transnational crime and terrorism.⁵⁹

Aid and Politics

Heightened interest and diversification of external players in the security sphere in Tajikistan gave the leadership a chance to solve their problems in fields other than security. The US, European powers and Japan has provided significant amounts of development aid under the conflict prevention and fighting terrorism through poverty reduction strategies.⁶⁰ However, aid started to impact on domestic political developments and cause increased concern to the leadership, such as the US support for political and civic groupings with agendas alternative to that of the ruling regime, opposition media and proliferation of US NGOs operating

⁵⁹ Oxford Analytica Russia/CIS Daily Brief, 10 September 2004

⁶⁰ \$900 million was pledged at a donor meeting in Dushanbe in 2003. US development and humanitarian aid to Tajikistan for fiscal year 2004 (1 October 2003 – 30 September 2004) totalled over \$50 million, - RFE/RL, Central Asian Report, 21 September 2004, vol. 4, no. 35. Over the past 11 years, USAID has provided over \$110 million of assistance to Tajikistan, - Asia-Plus, 15 September 2004.

in the political sphere. In the run-up to the elections such moves appeared dangerous and comparisons with Georgia were drawn where American organisations claimed to have played a significant role in overthrow of the Shevardnadze government. Tensions around US-funded organisations intensified and limitations of the US influence over domestic politics became more felt.

New Realignment

Back to Moscow

Finally, the leadership of Tajikistan arrived at the conclusion that Russia is the only country that can help the regime in case of civil disorder due to elections or a crisis of some kind. In the past it has been instrumental in pacification of anti-regime revolts, such as Khudaiberdiev mutiny in 1998. More recently, Rahmonov was able to order the arrest of Gaffur Mirzoev only after talks with President Putin in Sochi in June 2004, when assurances were given to Rahmonov that Russia would provide military support if his leadership was under threat.⁶¹ Tajik internal political dilemmas played into hands of Russian security interests and desire to counterbalance American influence in Tajikistan.

Despite significant US and other Western assistance, Russia may be a more relevant power for Tajikistan, as it holds tangible leverages over the country: Tajikistan's debt to Russia totalled \$300 million, while about 1 million Tajik citizens are in labour migration in Russia. Remittances they send home exceed the official budget and also act as a safety valve for the impoverished rural areas with no sources of income. Rapid and large-scale return of labour migrants could critically affect internal stability. Moreover, Russia is the only country which is prepared to invest long-term in large-scale infrastructure projects with uncertain market prospects, and is the main destination for Tajik exports. For Rahmonov, the choice was straightforward: either provide for Russia's security interests in Tajikistan and obtain some tangible benefits and security backing for the regime internally, or face uncertain prospects of

⁶¹ Tajikistan: Fall of Praetorian Guardsman', IWPR, RCA, no. 306, 10 August 2004

Western support tangled with demands for reforms and level-playing field for opposition. President Putin's visit in October 2004 sealed that choice.

According to the Rahmonov – Putin agreement Russia will maintain its military presence by keeping its ground troops in Tajikistan and important military installations. 201st Motor Rifle Brigade has been transformed into a Russian military base to be stationed on the territory of Tajikistan indefinitely and allowed ownership of land it uses for military training. It will be manned by a 6,000-strong contingent of mainly conscripts (presently it is staffed by contract soldiers). According to Russia's Ministry of Defence, the base will be equipped with up to 20 fighter jets and helicopter gunships in 2005, making it the third Russia's foreign airbase after Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.⁶² It will also take over the Nurek air surveillance centre, located 80 km south-east of Dushanbe, equipped with ten automated multi-purpose telescopes capable of searching objects at distances of up to 40,000 km. The construction of Nurek centre has begun in 1979, but it was only fully launched into operation in 2002. In return, some major concessions were granted, such as writing-off \$242 million part of the \$300 million sovereign debt to Russia, cash injection of \$200 million into ailing construction of Sangtuda hydropower station and relaxation of immigration regime for nationals of Tajikistan in Russia. President Putin even promised to invest \$2 billion into Tajik economy.⁶³

Western Reaction

Stakes of external interest in security in Tajikistan were raised, when Putin's visit was immediately followed by NATO's Secretary –General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer who came to sign a bilateral transit agreement on support for NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in

⁶² RFE/RL Newline, vol. 8, no. 200, 21 October 2004

⁶³ Rusal (Russian Aluminium) has undertaken to invest \$560 million in Roghun hydropower plant and over \$700 million in aluminium production facilities in Tajikistan. It will spend \$600 million to build an aluminium plant with a 200,000 tonnes a year capacity, - RFE/RL Newline, vol. 8, no. 197, 18 October 2004.

Afghanistan. Tajikistan is the first Central Asian country with which NATO signed such an agreement.

De Hoop Scheffer was at pains to deny that his visit had any connection to that of Putin: 'we are not in competition with Russia in this area. It is Tajikistan's unquestioned right to grant a base to Russia or any other country'.⁶⁴ The US Ambassador also played down the importance of the revamped Russian – Tajik alliance.⁶⁵

Conclusion

To sum up, does the security sector in Tajikistan represent a picture of strength or weakness? The answer is perhaps illustrative of the nature of the system being formed. It is strong enough in those segments that matter for the regime, i.e. police and increasingly – the Ministry of Security, in order to ensure law and order, suppress domestic opposition and project enough fear to discourage expression of popular discontent.

Those issues which bear little impact internally, are outsourced to external actors who are willing to help, often competing against each other with offers of assistance. From the regime's perspective, competition between regional powers and Cold War rivalry has not died yet, - despite rhetoric to the contrary, - and benefits can be had by playing various actors off against each other. Moreover, poor coordination between donors makes it easier for corruption to flourish, as it is not uncommon for assistance to duplicate each other.

Real or perceived competition between Russia and the West for influence in Tajikistan in the end undermines the very objective, i.e. maintenance of security and fight against drugs and international terrorism. Policies to create a security system alternative to one led by Russia are counterproductive and are likely to backfire. Only joint effort and genuine cooperation are likely to bring the desired goals closer. Moreover, it would be more difficult for the regime to get away with

⁶⁴ RFE/RL Newswire, vol. 8, no. 200, 21 October 2004

⁶⁵ 'it legalised what has been a reality for decades – the presence of the 201st Motor Rifle Division', Asia-Plus, 20 October 2004

corruption, mismanagement and prosecution of political opponents, if all external actors speak from a common platform.

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Геополитические изменения в Центральной Азии: взгляд из Украины

Abstract

Formerly, the Central Asian countries were considered objects of international pressure by Russia, China and Islamist fundamentalists. The region is rich in natural resources, predominantly energy resources. Until the US-campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan (2001) the region was stuck in a kind of weird impasse since it was under pressure from all sides and open to the pressure of the big neighbour-states. The United States has '*discovered*' Central Asia's energy resources for herself and the West as a whole. The American influence in the region is a crucial factor which plays a role in the resistance against fundamentalism and could diminish the influence of other actors like China (especially on the economic level) and Russia (military-politically). Russia tries to take countermeasures, like by opening of military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

It can be dared to predict that the attempts of the big powers from outside the region – mainly by the United States, Russia and China – to force one another and other countries out of the region will lead to unpredictable consequences.

Central Asia is also of strategic importance for Ukraine, mainly on the economic level (the region is a key energy-supplier and market for Ukrainian products) and for the strengthening of the international security: Central Asia is confronted with the challenge of terrorism, which can have effects going beyond the region. Therefore, Ukraine supports the fight of the International Community against this threat and takes part actively, and thereby strengthens its own security.

Активность ведущих мировых государств в Центрально-Азиатском регионе (ЦАР), как и ранее, остается ключевым моментом в понимании сложного геополитического контекста изменений, происходящих в регионе. В последнее время прослеживается усиление динамики формирования новой политической карты региона и выработке новых форматов участия в жизни ЦАР внерегиональных игроков.

Политическая карта Центральной Азии, в контексте участия региональных и внерегиональных игроков, за последний год существенно изменилась. По меткому выражению президента Узбекистана Ислама Каримова, 2004 год в отношении ситуации в ЦАР можно определить термином «стратегическая неопределенность».

Очевидно, что ситуация в ЦАР характеризуется наличием элемента непредсказуемости и неопределенности в прогнозах развития ситуации в регионе, что не может не затрагивать интересы каждого отдельного расположенного здесь государства.

Причиной такого положения вещей является сохранение высокого уровня угроз и вызовов региональной безопасности и стабильности, активизация подрывной деятельности террористов и экстремистов, которые смогли оправиться от потерь и перегруппироваться, а также сохранение масштабов наркотрафика и нелегальной миграции, отсутствие стабильности на сопредельных с регионом территориях. Ситуация в Афганистане, несмотря на усилия стабилизационных войск антитеррористической коалиции, остается достаточно сложной. В стране продолжается террористическая и партизанская война, вдвое, чем при режиме талибов, возросло производство наркотиков.

Среди причин, способствовавших возникновению такой ситуации, можно назвать и активизацию внерегиональных сил, которые рассматривают Центрально-Азиатский регион как зону своих национальных интересов.

С началом антитеррористической операции в Афганистане США удалось добиться качественного геополитического перелома в Центрально-Азиатском регионе. И это не может не повлиять на дальнейшую судьбу всех стран региона.

Ранее страны Центральной Азии были или, по меньшей мере, считались объектами потенциального давления со стороны России, Китая и исламского фундаментализма. В ЦАР сконцентрированы огромные природные ресурсы, в особенности энергетические. До войны с талибами эти государства находились в своеобразном геополитическом тупике: зажатые со всех сторон и восприимчивы к давлению со стороны больших соседних государств. США открыли их энергетические ресурсы для себя и для Запада в целом. Однако усиление позиции США в регионе является фактором, который может стать весомой силой для противостояния как фундаментализму, так и нивелированию усиления присутствия в ЦАР таких «внешних игроков» как Китай (преимущественно в экономической сфере) и Россия (преимущественно в военно-политическом измерении).

Доминируя в Афганистане и Центральной Азии, США в состоянии сами выстраивать конфигурацию энерготранспортных маршрутов, не всегда учитывая экономические интересы тех или иных компаний, традиционных операторов нефтяного и газового рынка ЦАР. Распространяя свое влияние далее на Кавказ, Вашингтон фактически берет в свои руки процесс формирования «Большого шелкового пути», по которому, в краткосрочной перспективе, пойдут энергетические ресурсы Каспийского региона.

Среди положительных последствий присутствия США в ЦАР важнейшими являются:

- устранение (по крайней мере временное) угрозы исламского терроризма через уничтожение или значительное ослабление «Аль-Каиды», «Талибана» и Исламского движения Узбекистана;

- расширение экономического и политического сотрудничества стран региона между собой и с другими странами;
- создание более благоприятных условий для проведения экономических и политических реформ в государствах Центральной Азии.

В то же время военно-политическое присутствие США несет в себе и определенные угрозы странам региона, поскольку оно:

- обусловило перегруппировку исламистских сил;
- стимулировало некоторые внутрирегиональные деструктивные силы к попыткам дестабилизировать обстановку в регионе;
- стимулировало страны региона к новому витку борьбы за лидерство;
- создало условия для возникновения новых и усилению некоторых старых экономических противоречий в регионе между региональными и внерегиональными силами, в первую очередь, относительно добычи и транспортировки энергоносителей.

Однако наибольшую опасность для стран региона могут нести взаимоисключающие попытки конкурирующих внерегиональных сил установить экономический и политический контроль над странами региона. В случае усиления этих попыток, собственно, нарастания противоречий между США Америки, Российской Федерацией и КНР, которые будут использовать в своих целях разные страны и разные внутрирегиональные силы, обстановка в ЦАР будет дестабилизирована, и все положительные моменты, которые привнесло западное присутствие в регионе, будут нивелированы.

Подтверждением этого тезиса служит динамика активности России в направлении возвращения ранее утраченных позиций. После закрепления в регионе военного присутствия США (база «Манас»), РФ предприняла ряд дипломатических мер для усиления своих ослабленных возможностей влияния на страны ЦАР.

Так, в ходе становления Организации договора о коллективной безопасности СНГ (ОДКБ) Кыргызстан дал первоначальное согласие на базирование на своей территории (на аэродроме в городе Кант) авиатехники, которая послужила бы базой для создаваемых в рамках ОДКБ сил быстрого развертывания. Затем эта авиабаза перешла под полный российский контроль, нормальное функционирование которой началось с октября 2003 года.

Основу авиабазы составляют российские истребители Су-27 (могут действовать в воздушном пространстве всей Центральной Азии, вплоть до Афганистана и Пакистана), штурмовики Су-25 и многоцелевые вертолеты МИ-8. Официальное назначение базы – противодействие угрозам военного и террористического характера, которые могут возникнуть по отношению стран-членов ОДКБ.

Однако наличие на российской базе современных истребителей и ее близость к авиабазе Антитеррористической коалиции в Манасе (расстояние между ними – 30 км), скорее говорит о возможном использовании ее военного потенциала в качестве противовеса усилению контроля над воздушным пространством Центральной Азии со стороны США и других стран-членов НАТО.

Противоречивым остается и вопрос о подчинении авиабазы. На дипломатическом уровне распространяется информация о том, что российская авиабаза в Кыргызстане, кроме выполнения приказов Министерства обороны РФ, будет решать задачи в интересах государств-участников ОДКБ и является компонентом Коллективных сил быстрого развертывания (КСБР) в Центрально-Азиатском регионе.

Военно-политическое присутствие РФ в регионе еще более усилилось после того, как 18 октября 2004 года в Таджикистане была открыта российская база. Она создана на основе дислоцированной в республике 201-й мотострелковой дивизии. До сих пор пребывание российских военных на территории Таджикистана определялось отдельными временными

соглашениями, и их юридический статус был не ясен. Договора, подписанные Владимиром Путиным и Эмомали Рахмоновым, узаконили военное присутствие российской группировки в республике.

Президенты также подписали важный документ, определяющий передачу комплекса космического слежения «Нурек» («Окно») в российскую собственность. Эта станция наблюдения позволяет вести наблюдение за космическим пространством. За этот объект Россия обязалась списать 242 млн. долларов США таджикского долга. Аренда же земли, на которой расположена база «Нурек», в течение последующих 49 лет будет обходиться России в символическую плату - 30 американских центов в год.

Значительные успехи российской дипломатии достигнуты и в вопросах формирования *многосторонних институтов межгосударственного сотрудничества в рамках ЦАР.*

Так, во время саммитов Центрально-Азиатского Сотрудничества (ЦАС), состоявшихся 28 мая 2004 года в Астане (Казахстан) и 18 октября 2004 года в Душанбе (Таджикистан), Россия заявила о политической поддержке этого интеграционного образования, а позже и присоединилась к Договору об образовании ЦАС. Этот шаг российского руководства стал достаточно неожиданным, поскольку ранее ЦАС не рассматривалась Москвой как заслуживающее внимания объединение в рамках СНГ. Комментируя причины такого шага, Секретарь Совета безопасности России И. Иванов сказал: «ЦАС становится важным институтом регионального взаимодействия, важным элементом формирования эффективной системы обеспечения стабильности в Центральной Азии, вносит свой вклад в усилия международного сообщества по противодействию таким угрозам современного мира, как терроризм, экстремизм, незаконный оборот наркотиков».

Тем не менее, анализ процессов, происходящих в Центрально-Азиатском регионе, дает основания предположить, что этот ход РФ свидетельствует о том, что она начала ощущать значительную конкуренцию в регионе со стороны других внерегиональных сил.

Показательным является тот факт, что присоединение России в ЦАС состоялось накануне подписания 1 июня 2004 г. рамочного соглашения о развитии торговли и инвестиций между США и четырьмя странами Центральной Азии: Казахстаном, Кыргызстаном, Таджикистаном и Туркменистаном (последняя не входит в ЦАС, мотивируя это своим нейтральным статусом, но является важной частью экономики Центрально-Азиатского региона и привлекательной для внерегиональных сил). Данный факт подтверждает опасения руководства РФ, что усиление военно-политического присутствия США в регионе спустя некоторое время может привести страны ЦАР к полной переориентации на Вашингтон и преобразование ЦАС в подконтрольное США интеграционное объединение.

Поэтому Россия для реализации своих интересов воспользовалась моментом возникновения определенного напряжения между странами ЦАР и Западом, вызванного критикой последним нарушений прав человека в странах региона и опасениями их руководства по поводу возможности перехода власти по сценарию «бархатной революции».

Другой причиной динамичного взаимодействия России со странами ЦАР является возрастание влияния в регионе Китая, которое стало очевидным после усиления роли этой страны в Шанхайской организации сотрудничества (ШОС). При этом российская сторона увидела угрозу в экономической экспансии Пекина в регионе. Речь идет о подписании между Китаем и Казахстаном долгосрочного соглашения о строительстве нефтепровода Атасу-Алашанькоу, что может стать вторым этапом строительства нефтетранспортного проекта «Казахстан-Китай», завершить который планируется к 2035 году. Такие процессы непосредственно угрожают политическим и экономическим интересам России в ЦАР, в частности ее намерениям контролировать транспортировку всех центральноазиатских энергоносителей за пределы региона. Кроме того, подобное давление, хотя и в меньшей степени, РФ ощущает и со стороны Ирана.

Еще одним аспектом углубления сотрудничества в рамках ЦАС является желание политических и экономических элит центральноазиатских государств обезопасить себя от чрезмерного влияния на внутривнутриполитические процессы со стороны Запада. По сути, речь идет о попытке создать определенную систему сдерживаний и противовесов: попросту уравновесить американское влияние российским. В этой игре руководство стран ЦАР идет на значительные уступки как России, так и друг другу.

По словам президента Узбекистана Ислама Каримова, при постоянной высокой заинтересованности сохранять свое присутствие в этом регионе, внерегиональные игроки еще не до конца раскрывают преследуемые конечные цели и задачи. Отсюда – попытки влиять на внутривнутриполитическую ситуацию, оказывать политическое и экономическое давление на высшем уровне.

Ведущие мировые державы зачастую не уделяют должного внимания местной специфике и предлагают «универсальные» по их мнению рецепты, критикуя тех, кто им не следует. При этом не обращается внимание на то, что в ряде стран данные рецепты себя не оправдали, а тем же, кто их предлагал, приходилось применять более радикальные методы для выправления ситуации.

Всё это указывает на живучесть в международных отношениях стремления использовать методы, базируемые на субъект-объектной парадигме, когда «другой» воспринимается исключительно как предмет приложения усилий, направленных на реализацию собственных интересов, а не как равноправный партнёр.

Определенные политические силы в США и ЕС высказывают несколько завышенные требования для молодых демократий ЦАР, что дает основания экспертному сообществу центральноазиатских стран подозревать наличие у Запада политики двойных стандартов, применяемой по отношению к отдельным странам Центральной Азии.

Поэтому страны ЦАР пытаются выработать механизм партнерских отношений с государствами, которые демонстрируют стремление к участию в развитии процессов региональной интеграции, а также выработать и согласовать общую политическую платформу в отношении формирования системы безопасности в Центральной Азии, что соответствует принципу интересубъектности и кооперативной безопасности. Именно в этом контексте следует рассматривать такие интеграционные проекты как ЦАС и ШОС.

Что касается Украины, то Центральная Азия является для нее стратегически важным регионом. В первую очередь это касается двух аспектов:

1. Экономическое взаимодействие – страны Центральной Азии выступают важными торгово-экономическими партнерами Украины, поставщиками стратегического сырья (в первую очередь энергоносителей), а также служат рынками сбыта украинской продукции.
2. Укрепление международной безопасности – Центрально-Азиатский регион часто сталкивается с проявлениями терроризма, которые могут выйти и за его границы. Поэтому Украина поддерживает борьбу международного сообщества с этой угрозой и принимает в ней активное участие, чем укрепляет и собственную безопасность.

Сотрудничество Украины со странами Центральной Азии в экономической сфере развивается по таким основным направлениям:

- совместные проекты в топливно-энергетической, машиностроительной, космической, агропромышленной областях, в сфере транспорта и коммуникаций;
- развитие производственной кооперации, инициирование создания совместных производств и стимулирование возрастания взаимного товарооборота;
- либерализация и расширение торгово-экономических связей, создание торговых домов;

- обеспечение регулярных поставок центральноазиатской нефти на нефтеперерабатывающие заводы Украины, увеличение ее транзита в европейские страны;
- организация поставок в ЦАР украинского бурового оборудования, насосных станций, железнодорожных цистерн для нефтегазового комплекса, а также поставок украинской сельскохозяйственной техники и организация ее общего производства в Центральной Азии.

Конечно же, в вопросе сотрудничества со странами Центральной Азии на первом месте для Украины стоят поставки энергоносителей. Создание эффективных механизмов сотрудничества в этой области создаст условия для диверсификации источников поставок энергоресурсов в Украину. Это необходимо не только для укрепления ее энергетической безопасности, но и служит важной составляющей ее интеграции в Евросоюз, который требует от своих членов импортировать не более 30% энергоносителей из одной страны.

Благоприятным моментом для Украины является тот факт, что центральноазиатские поставщики энергоресурсов (в первую очередь Казахстан и Туркменистан) также проявляют заинтересованность в диверсификации маршрутов их транзита на мировой рынок и потому всегда учитывают украинские инициативы в данном вопросе.

Украина как участник антитеррористической кампании решительно осуждает терроризм во всех его формах и проявлениях, делает весомый вклад в дипломатический, правовой, финансовый и прочие аспекты борьбы с ним. Важным компонентом участия Украины в этой борьбе является взаимодействие с руководством стран Центральной Азии и международными и региональными организациями, направленное на укрепление безопасности в регионе.

Украина наладила партнерские отношения с региональными структурами с целью укрепления мира и безопасности в

Центральной Азии, а именно с ЦАС, Совещанием по взаимодействию и мерах доверия в Азии, ШОС и ОДКБ.

Борьба с международным терроризмом не ограничивается операциями непосредственно против террористических групп. Это также и противодействие наркотрафику, контрабанде оружия и нелегальной миграции, которые создают для террористов материальную базу и облегчают им осуществление атак по всему миру.

Кроме того, для достижения мира и стабильности в ЦАР все игроки должны быть вовлечены в общие многосторонние механизмы согласования интересов и международного сотрудничества.

Риску предположить, что попытки внерегиональных сил, в первую очередь США, РФ и КНР, вытеснить из региона друг друга и остальных игроков, в особенности, если они будут предусматривать помощь региональным деструктивным силам с целью дестабилизации последними обстановки в регионе, в котором до сих пор сохраняется возможность возникновения конфликтов, могут привести к непредсказуемым последствиям.

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REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN AGAINST TERRORISM: APPROACHES, EXPERIENCE, PROSPECTS

The tragical events of the last years in the different parts of the world do not leave any doubts that in immediate prospects such a phenomenon as international terrorism will still keep mankind in suspense for a long time. Today practically nobody in the world is insured from actions of any kind of terrorism. Obviously, the Central Asian region is not an exception in this respect.

How strong is the threat of terrorism in Central Asia? In fact, the reply to this question will determine the level of adequate measures taking by the leaders and communities of the countries of the region facing this global challenge to security.

The Republic of Uzbekistan – Target of International Terrorism

From the first days of state independence (early nineties of 20th century) the leadership of Uzbekistan never had any illusions about the real threats to national and regional security. Constant clashes between military parties in Afghanistan and the civil war in neighbouring Tajikistan, contradictions between interests of the different ethnic and regional groups and growing religious extremism could be detonators of a big regional conflict in Central Asia.

Conflicts in the neighbouring countries had a negative influence on some categories of the population of Uzbekistan. The spread of slogans about returning to Islamic values and about establishing Islamic statehood in the region created preconditions for the appearance of persons like G. Namangani and T. Yuldashev who with the support of foreign Islamists

organised the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and became its leaders.

But the first and subsequent actions of the IMU demonstrated that its members will use only terror as the main method to achieve their political goals. It took some years and several large-scale terrorist actions organized by the IMU for the world community to recognise it as an international terrorist organisation.

The Uzbek government's assessment of reality, starting from the mid-nineties of the last century, recognised terrorism as the threat number one to national, regional and global security. There was the understanding in Tashkent that every new fact about terrorism and the threat of terrorism in different corners of the world are sections of the network and connected parts of the new global challenge to mankind.

The fears of the Uzbek leadership were not without cause. At the turn of the century, the young republics several times became the target of terrorist actions with destroying consequences and human victims (explosions in Tashkent in February 1999, attacks on Uzbekistan's border provinces by terrorist bands in 2000-2001, terrorist actions in Tashkent in March and July 2004).

Why did Uzbekistan become the Constant Target of Terrorists?

After the declaration of national independence, the leadership of Uzbekistan made clear its strategic orientation towards the creation of secular democratic statehood. In a state with an absolute majority of the Muslim population, all political organisations with religious extremist maintenance were banned at the legal level. In consequence, the political leadership and power structure of the Republic became the main targets of the Islamic extremists' terrorist threats.

While the internal conflicts continue in neighbouring Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan plays the decisive role of the stabilizing centre in the region. The leaders of terrorist organisations and their foreign sponsors understood that the strong and stable state in Uzbekistan is

becoming the main obstacle to the establishment of their own control in whole Central Asia.

Today, Uzbekistan commended itself as a trustworthy partner of the USA, Russia and other participants of the international antiterrorist alliance. Such position of the Uzbek leadership and society is also a serious disturbing factor for the international terrorists and their assistances at national level.

The general conclusion can be drawn that the Central Asian region, and Uzbekistan in particular, is the very important point where not only the future of an unique element of the Muslim world is being formed, but where also leading tendencies of world development appear which are not acceptable to the famous leaders of international terrorism.

Uzbekistan: Counteracting Terrorism

The Uzbek leadership, adequately assessing the real threat to national security, never neglected its attention to the problem of counter-action against terrorism and other potential distracting actions. But effective resistance to the threats to security first of all demands a new conceptional understanding of the role and place of Uzbekistan in a changing world.

Fundamental conclusions were drawn by the Uzbek leadership about the shape of the new world order, the new system of international relations, and about the nature of existing and potential conflicts. It served as a basis for the adoption of several key legislative documents, like the National Security Concept (1997), the Defence Doctrine (2000), the new redaction of the Law "About Defence" (2001), and some others.

The Uzbek leadership stimulated major changes in the military construction and changed the order of priorities in the activity of the Army, the Special Services and other state security forces. Today, military reforms in Uzbekistan are passing the third stage with the objective of strengthening the defensive and preventive orientation of the structures of the armed forces. At the same time, the role of

analytical structures where civilian experts have significant participation and which include National Security Council is increasing.

At the same time, there is understanding in the Uzbek Government that counter-action against terrorism demands constant attention to internal social and economic problems and measures to minimize the negative consequences of the transition period. It was very important to actively make propaganda among the population and especially among the young people (age up to 20) who represent more than 50% of the whole Uzbek population.

The measures of the Uzbek Government made possible (1) an effective and productive reaction against terrorist attacks, (2) the minimisation of the negative consequences of terrorist activity, (3) the limitation of the internal social base of terrorists.

But the main result of this work consists in fact that the overwhelming majority of the population did not support terrorist actions while its leaders tried to speculate on the problems and difficulties of the transition period.

At least Uzbekistan demonstrated its ability to resist terrorism, but the leadership of the state had deep understanding that decisive success in the struggle against terrorism is impossible without joint efforts of the world community. Official Tashkent recognises that participants of terrorist actions in the country mainly consist of citizens of Uzbekistan. But it is obvious that their activity was only possible due to the support of famous international terrorist organisations including al-Qaeda and others. Domestic terrorists in Uzbekistan used their style and methods including so the so-called “shackhids”, which have never been specific to the history and mentality of ethnic Uzbeks.

There were principal prognoses in Uzbekistan of increasing terrorist tendencies at all levels. It should be remembered that the political leadership of the country declared many times its fears in connection to the threat of terrorism in Central Asia. But for some years, the attention of the key world players has been focused on conflict resolution in the

Middle East, the Balkan crisis and the situation in the European part of the former Soviet Union.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 became a decisive argument for the necessity of pooling all counterterrorist efforts and special attention to all regions where international terrorism is active most.

Based on this, the Uzbek leadership is using any possibility of international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. Such pragmatical approaches clarify many steps taken by official Tashkent.

Particularly, Uzbekistan stopped its membership in the Collective Security Treaty (CST in the framework of the CIS) because this organisation was very ineffective during the counter-action against terror and the organisation itself was under strong influence of political priorities, which made some actions of the CST counterproductive.

At the same time Uzbekistan actively supported antiterrorist initiatives in other regional and sub-regional organisations. For instance, Uzbekistan is famous for its active position in the Shanghai Organisation of Cooperation (ShOC). During chairmanship of Uzbekistan in the ShOC (2003-2004) Tashkent prepared all necessary conditions for the processing of the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), whose Executive Committee was opened during the ShOC summit in Tashkent (June 2004).

New perspectives for regional security were opened in the framework of the Organisation of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC). Russia's membership in the OCAC (October 2004) can give strong stimulus to the struggle against terrorism and other threats to regional security. This is recognised by all members of the OCAC and has adequate reaction in Uzbekistan, on whose initiative Russia joined the OCAC.

Besides, Uzbekistan traditionally uses possibilities of bilateral cooperation for providing security and on this basis has successful relations with the USA, Russia, some European and other countries.

Lessons of the Struggle against Terrorism for Uzbekistan and Central Asia

The active measures taken by the international antiterrorist alliance in different parts of the world including Central Asia produced some results. The world became more secure but the threat of terrorism did not disappear. This conclusion also reflects the situation in the Central Asian region. The most important indicator of the level of national security in Uzbekistan is the development of the situation in neighbouring Afghanistan.

The first results of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan allowed many experts to come to the conclusion that the level of threat of terrorism had slightly decreased in the region. The failure of the Taliban regime and the destruction of al-Qaeda's basic military infrastructure visibly weakened the resources of the terrorist organisation IMU and made it and other extremists act deeply underground.

But the weakened position of radical extremist groups does not mean their disappearance and even less – their refusal to use terror as a method to reach political goals. In such conditions it is necessary not only to save responsibility but also to diversify methods of the struggle against terrorism and its causes.

The significance of this task is too important for Central Asia and Uzbekistan because today the situation in Afghanistan is still far from being stable and secure. The decisive military blow against terrorist organisations in this country has not yet been followed by enough political, social and economic measures. The reason is the lack of administrative management in the country and good conditions for restoring terrorist tendencies.

While assessing the importance of foreign threats, the Republic of Uzbekistan must also pay attention to the existing internal factors which are able to exert negative influence on the development of the situation as a whole. Although each country in the region has a different form and

speed of reforms, all of them are facing similar problems specific to the transition period.

Up to the present, each country of the region is still far from comprehensive political democracy and marked economy. Economic and social problems of a significant part of the population can be the reason for their dissatisfaction just as the case of possible mistakes in the personnel and ethnic policy of local administrations can give reason to an extremist form of protest.

This creates favourable conditions for the appearance of a recruiting environment for the leaders of terrorist groups. In the case of Uzbekistan with a dominating Muslim population such actions could be realized mainly by using Islamic slogans.

Thus terrorism as the key threat to Uzbekistan's security remains very actual and demands constant attention in order to localise its external and internal roots.

The leadership of Uzbekistan understands that the deep political and economic reasons form the basis for extremism and its most dangerous form – international terrorism. Religious slogans are only a cover in a region of a dominating Muslim population.

Experience of the last years showed that the Central Asian states must elaborate a **comprehensive strategic conception about the mid- and long-term aims of the system and its tasks regarding regional security and peace**. Common regional interests must give the general direction for the interaction between Central Asia and other states and international organisations.

By the way, in the region there is still a geopolitical pluralism which can play both a destructive and a contractive role. It is known that Central Asia's importance depends on various interests and is reflected in four geopolitical status: (1) buffer, (2) sanitarian cordon, (3) platts arm or the (4) centre of power.

But this diversity of approaches to the Central Asian role gives the opportunity to create a new security system that to all countries of the region offers the opportunity to participate in different coalitions on the basis of their own national interests. This system would not make existing contradictions more complicated as there would be no necessity to make only one geopolitical choice. Such system must guarantee strong attention to Central Asia not only from Russia or China, but also of the USA, the EU and international institutions even if their main attention is concentrated on other regions.

One of the important lessons for Central Asia after September 11 is that the region could and can avoid geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the USA and other western states and that a cooperation for mutual interests and benefit could be established in the region.

Another lesson for the Central Asian region is that participation in the international antiterrorist alliance will continue for a long time.

In this connection it must be considered that for some foreign forces, especially theocratic states, Islam was and will remain one of the main methods of ideological and foreign policy counter-action. Ten thousands of religious schools – madressa in the Muslim world - are occupied by radical Islamists and in fact play the role of “Jihad schools”, financially supported by different sources in Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Persian Gulf.

According to the opinion of different experts, during the last 20 years more than 4 million young people were educated in such madressa and more than 500.000 are presently visiting them. There are different figures about terrorists educated by al-Qaeda (from 20.000 to 100.000 persons). But any figure gives reason for fear and the necessity to take preventive antiterrorist measures.

Permeability of the borders between the Central Asian states allows terrorists to cross the border, to travel in the region and to use the territory of one country for terrorist actions in another country without any obstacles. Such situation always negatively influences mutual trust

between the states and interrupts the development of regional interactions.

This is the reason why cooperation on the basis of common threats must be the main priority for the Central Asian countries in a medium-term (3-5 years) perspective. Prior direction could be towards interaction between special services of the Central Asian states and other states and organizations involved in the war on terror. This would not only allow to draw the “general and unique picture” of international terrorism but it could also be very helpful for strengthening trust in bilateral and multilateral relations between different states.

An important lesson of the last years was the understanding that only a similar approach to the reasons of threats and challenges to security will make effective counter-actions against terrorism possible. But today, there is no general position among international experts and politicians about the nature and sources of international terrorism.

In fact, today’s world community deals only with the consequences of terrorism, but much less with its reasons and ideological sources. For instance, there are opinions that terrorism (1) is a product of the Third world, (2) the consequences of radical Islam, (3) an example of the clash of civilizations, (4) an element of psychological illness of some people, (5) a specific form of the struggle for freedom, etc.

A fundamental assessment of the phenomenon of terrorism is necessary because without such an approach there will be only some half measures, mainly military actions, but the expected order will be instable.

There is the point of view that the key reason for the spread of religious extremist ideas is the low level of education, poverty and social dissatisfaction of the population in some countries. It is possible to agree with such position but only partly. Indeed, it is impossible to exclude that in the Central Asian countries hard social position of some categories of the population is an assisting factor for participating in

religious extremist organisations and the involvement of local people in terrorist activities.

But in the Central Asian countries, the level of education of the population and the level of social protection are much higher than in many Muslim countries in the Middle East and many Asian states. Nevertheless, extremist ideology and attempts to start a terrorist war also take place in Central Asia. Even more, leaders and activists of extremist and terrorist organisations very often have good education including western education.

The conclusion to be drawn is that during a global struggle against international terrorism, security and stability can only be provided on the basis of a consensus on the nature and self-maintenance of terrorism and also on the methods of reaction to this threat.

The Fight against International Terrorism as a Contribution to the New World Order

The activity of the international antiterrorist alliance could be analysed in the context of shaping of the new world order. With respect to the different points of view about prospects of the new system of international relations, one must consider that Central Asia's and Uzbekistan's active participation in counterterrorist activity gives them the particular opportunity for their strong integration into the world community and therefore could be recognised as a contribution to the new world order which has already mainly determined its framework and key players.

During the last years the war has created several bilateral and multilateral mechanisms of interaction to strengthen security and stability in the Central Asian region. The current experience allows to follow the prospects of such cooperation in both frameworks: multilateral with international organisations and bilateral on an interstate level.

Today, the United Nations carry out some programmes in Central Asian countries to assist them in establishing democratic institutions and in carrying out reforms. There is also cooperation for the provision humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. But at the same time, the UN involvements in Ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq are strong arguments for the necessity to modernise some points of the international law and the decision-making process in this organisation dealing with peace-keeping operations.

The OCSE is trying to find for itself an adequate and effective role in connection to the creation of new structures for maintaining security. In this context, recognising the increased strategic importance of the region for European and international security as a whole, the OSCE considers the Central Asian states as one of its priorities in its new strategy. But even today the activity of the OCSE has no definite and clear understanding of the long-term role in the modern regional processes.

The present NATO is practically a unified international structure that has the necessary political, economical, military, scientific and other resources to provide security and stability on a regional level. NATO's engagements and its new links with Russia pushed the Alliance to new zones of NATO responsibility outside of the European borders. The global war on terror will raise NATO's role in the process of providing international and regional security including in Central Asia. The NATO mission in Afghanistan is obviously following this aim and this is the reason why the mission is supported by all countries of the region.

Geopolitical Interests of the World's Leading States

The Central Asian countries understand that the biggest states in the world like the USA, the EU, Russia, and China have both similar and contradictory positions in Central Asia. In an analysis of regional security in Central Asia based on the traditional position of the so-called "Big Game" with the corresponding principle "Or America, or Russia", the situation of the Central Asian countries would look very difficult because they would have to choose between two alternative orientations.

But today such approach is absolutely not correct even in the framework of the “Balance of Powers”. In fact, today it is impossible and very counterproductive to bring out either America or Russia from the geopolitical field of Central Asia because in any case competition between them will not be finished.

This means that the Central Asian countries must be interested in strategic partners who are ready to combine their potential in the long term in order to provide the region with security and sustainable development.

On the one hand, active cooperation in security issues both on bilateral basis with the leading powers (USA, Russia, EU, China, Japan) and in the framework of international organisations (UN, NATO, OSCE, ShOC) helps to balance out the outside players’ interests in the region, but on the other hand, it can have a negative bearing on the efficiency of the joint efforts of counter-action against threats to regional security.

It is difficult to make an analysis of Central Asian security without considering the interests of Russia as Russian interest can not be provided without considering interests of the Central Asian countries as well. But Russia should adopt a balance between its interests in the West and those in Central Asia like in the whole ex-soviet area. The USA and the EU can be helpful in this process but today the perspectives of the relations between Russia and West are not completely clear. This uncertainty influences the logic of the policy of the CIS countries.

In the context of the struggle against terrorism in Central Asia, Russia is acting in several directions: stimulation of the CIS integration, development of TCS, involvement in the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border, coordination of antiterrorist activities with the states of the region.

The inclusion of Central Asia in the global strategy of the USA became the key factor that determines the new geopolitical situation in the region. Washington is already closely cooperating with the Central Asian countries in the different programmes of security and military

cooperation. The USA is also strengthening its assistance to the region's countries by stimulating democratic and economic reforms which are recognised by Washington as the basic element of stability and security in the region.

The interests of the EU, and first of all of Germany, the UK and France, in Central Asia are determined by the growing recognition of the strategic importance of the region to the whole European security system. The EU is realizing the principle of a unified Eurasian continent and demonstrates its interest in the political and economic independence of the Central Asian states being neighbours to Europe and also in such hot spots as Afghanistan.

Leaders of the countries in the region several time declared their adherence to regional integration, but this process is obviously in need of new stimulus.

The basic document for the development of a cooperation on security issue between Central Asian countries is the Tashkent treaty (April 2000) named "About joint actions in the struggle against terrorism, political and religious extremism, transnational organized crime". This treaty, signed by Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, is one of the most important elements in shaping the regional security system.

The contracting parties are also working out some bilateral treaties about friendship and cooperation and some interstate and inter-organisational agreements in the specific area of interaction including between military forces and special services.

The official membership of Russia in the OCAC creates conditions for further regional integration in the field of antiterrorist activity. Uzbekistan and other countries of the region not only recognised Russian interest in the region but also perceive Russia as the big power who had resolved many problems in this part of the world.

In this way, the struggle against terrorism was raised to a new level and the first serious step must be the adoption of a list of terrorist organisations whose activities should be banned on the territory of all member states of the OCAC. This question is not only of practical, but also of conceptual importance. For example, there is a common understanding between Uzbekistan and Russia that organisations such as “Khezbut Tachrir” must be included in this list. This extremist Islamic party has its divisions in the Central Asian countries.

It is a fact that the foreign leaders of the party themselves insist on the ultimate goal of their propaganda which is the establishment of a new Islamic caliphate. But it is not only an ideological threat to the constitutional base of the countries in the region. The latest terrorist attacks in Tashkent showed that some people took part in these actions under the influence of the “Khezbut Tachrir”. In general, this question is connected with the absence of a visible barrier between Islamic radicalism and terrorism.

Today, regional integration in the fight against terrorism mainly depends on the level of the military cooperation. A new example for this is the decision in October (2004) to organise the Council of the heads of the national security services in the framework of the OCAC.

But the problem of regional security can not be solved separately from the questions of close economic cooperation. There is no doubt that long-term success in the struggle against religious extremism and terrorism will depend on the liquidation of Central Asia’s deep social and economic problems too.

What are the Objective Obstacles to Regional Integration?

First, the absence of resources for integration in the hands of any country in the region. Each country has to pay prior attention to domestic problems and uses for this its own limited internal resources. At this stage practically nobody is ready to offer a significant part of the national resources for the provision of regional integration programmes.

Second, differences in the conceptual approaches to the perspectives of regional integration. It is obvious that first of all common economic problems of mutual interest (use of hydro energetic resources, adoption of common trade conditions, etc) must be resolved. Nevertheless, the problem of political integration is still within the realm of a distant perspective.

Third, differences in the Central Asian countries' foreign orientations in their political and economic relations with foreign partners. While the Central Asian region feels competition between big foreign powers, there is an unhealthy rivalry between the regional countries themselves.

What are the Stimuli to Regional Integration?

First of all, political will and effective assistance from developed countries and their organisations. But today, such activity is mainly focused on political and military issues.

Today economic interest of the West and East in the Central Asian states is just limited to raw materials and energetic resources. Foreign investments are offered to the oil and gas industry making Central Asia heavily dependent on world prices. At the same time potential foreign investors prefer to deal with Central Asia as common market.

The list of foreign partners of the Central Asian region being able to play the role of "locomotive" for regional integration is very limited.

But at the same time:

- The strategic aim of Russia is restoring its own dominating influence in the Central Asian region;
- The USA did not elaborate a comprehensive strategy for the region and uses separately the different opportunities of the region's countries to assure very concrete national interests;
- The EU today is not ready to play the role of "locomotive" for Central Asian integration because it will be busy with the problems of the European enlargement in the near future;

- China while having global ambitions has not enough experience and traditions to work in the Central Asian region;
- Japan while having experience in stimulating integration in other regions and demonstrating its readiness to participate in the Central Asian processes is still passing the stage of elaborating its own concept of “Central Asia plus Japan”.

Nevertheless, there are no alternatives to comprehensive regional integration as a highly effective strategic direction of counter-action against terrorism and extremism. Efficiency and results of this direction on a decisive level will depend on the activity and mutual understanding between present and future political elites of the states involved in the Central Asian region.

General Conclusions

1. For a long time, international terrorism will remain a parameter of regional development in Central Asia, and Uzbekistan demonstrates adequate assessment of the level of its threat;
2. The Republic of Uzbekistan while mobilising internal resources against terrorism is ready for any form of cooperation with every member of the international antiterrorist alliance and is demonstrating this in practice;
3. The fight against terrorism demands an objective and unified assessment of the nature and reasons of international terrorism by the world community;
4. Joint fight against international terrorism could and must be way to the creation of a new and much more valid world order;
5. Integration in the Central Asian region as an important factor of regional security needs foreign support because meaning and importance of stability and security of this region go far beyond the Central Asian borders.

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PROTECTION OF POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA: USING TERROR AS A PRETEXT? A KYRGYZ NGO'S VISION

One of the major factors determining the policies of the international community in the Central Asian region is the fear of the possibility of this region turning into a centre of extremism, terrorism, and drug trafficking.

If economic and political reforms in Central Asia fail and domestic and cross-border conflicts develop and break out, the region may become a nest of terrorism, a fireplace of religious and political extremism and an arena of international violent conflicts.

Power in Central Asia

Speaking of the political reforms in Central Asia, one should note that the institutions of power in the region themselves were a product and successor of the Soviet totalitarian system of governance.

During the first years of independence the power in the region's countries was transferred to the former Communist Party members. Thus, not only did the old Communist cadre not leave the political arena, but the former political elite actually recaptured without any struggle their familiar niche under new political realities.

Having mastered the new structures of power, the former Party bosses gained access to virtually unlimited opportunities for the redistribution of material and human resources in their countries.

The main reasons for state formation for the new political elite became on the one hand the transformation of the entire social, political and

economic system, and on the other hand, the simultaneous adaptation of this system to new requirements.

Almost all constitutions of the countries of Central Asia define the current systems as “sovereign democratic republics” whose goal is to build a democratic and fair civic society. However, taking into account the formation of such independence, a certain trend toward totalitarianism emerged in the Central Asian countries. One can often hear that allegedly, the region’s population is not yet ready to accept the Western-type of democracy. Some observers compare the current situation with the system of “developed feudalism”⁶⁶, drawing an ironic analogy with the infamous “developed socialism” of the former Soviet Union.

One should note that almost all reforms of political systems and governance, such as the transition to the two-chamber parliaments in some countries of the region, relative decentralisation, etc, were primarily initiated to meet the requirements of a circle of international organisations and governments of Western countries which were providing support to the reforms in Central Asia.

One should also note that tribalism and nepotism became fixtures in today’s system of governance in the region, while a high level of corruption became a normal feature of all Central Asian countries.

International experts believe that corruption became most evident in Kyrgyzstan in 1994-1995 when representatives of the upper echelons of power started actively participating in profit-making, turning into either businessmen or stockholders of numerous formerly state-owned enterprises and started abusing their power and authority. As early as in 1996 President Akayev had to admit that corruption penetrated the higher echelons of power.

There is a common practice of getting government positions not on the basis of merits, but rather through personal connections or financial

⁶⁶ Davlet OZODI, http://www.rosvesty.ru/numbers/1721/sng/article_24.phtml

advantages. Corruption became particularly acute in law enforcement agencies, customs bodies and courts.

According to the Head of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan holds one of the first places among all Central Asian countries with regards to the level of corruption.

The campaigns against corruption, as a rule, are initiated as a response to the requirements of Kyrgyzstan's donors. The main goal of these campaigns is to attract new funding. In reality, the government merely imitates a fight against corruption.

Another bothering trend observed to be taking place among the leaders of Central Asian countries is their desire to retain power by any means. In order to do that numerous and various ways and means are used, from persecuting leaders of the political opposition to fabricating election results and/or initiating various referenda that serve the sole purpose of legitimising unlawful retention of power by certain individuals.

Context Factors Leading to Aggravation of Social Tension

In order to further consider the issue of protection of power in Central Asia one needs to take into consideration all the factors that essentially make up and characterise the Central Asian region.

The peoples of Central Asia have a lot in common: common history, religion, ethnicity (except for Tajiks), style of life, societal structure, mentality and world outlook.

Demographic Factor

One of the major factors affecting the region's development is the latter's demography. According to statistical data more than 57 million people live in Central Asia (Uzbekistan – 26 million, Kazakhstan – 15 million, Tajikistan – 6 million, Turkmenistan – 6 million, Kyrgyzstan – 5 million). If the current population growth rate stays the same, by the

year of 2025 more than 65-70 million people will constitute Central Asia's population⁶⁷.

The region's most populated area is the Ferghana Valley. The population density in the Ferghana Valley is 360 people per square kilometre, and in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley this figure reaches 500-600 people per square kilometre (higher figures in the world can only be found in South China and Bangladesh). The birth rate is very high. For instance, the annual population growth in Uzbekistan is about 450'000-550'000 people⁶⁸. According to the experts' forecasts, this subregion's current population of 11.2 million people will reach 14-15 million as early as 2010. At the same time, one should remember that every other resident of this subregion is under 18 years old.

A lack of economic resources, including land, water and energy, and the lack of international investments limit the opportunities of the governments of Central Asia to provide the Valley's population with jobs which results in a fall of the population's incomes.

Given the fact that the Kyrgyz parts of the Ferghana Valley are less densely populated and that the process of delimiting the state borders is uncompleted, unpopulated and underused lands of Kyrgyzstan can trigger a whole series of unlawful capture of these lands. To date one can witness so-called "creeping migration" as a tool of illicit occupation of Kyrgyz lands (purchase and settlement in empty Kyrgyz houses by citizens of cross-border districts of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan which experience an acute lack of lands).

In addition, the presence of overdensely populated areas aggravated by socioeconomic hardships entails an active migration of labour from the region. Officials in Bishkek don't even attempt to hide the fact that more than half a million of the entire Kyrgyz population of 5 million work in Russia alone. As for Tajikistan, of 6 million of its population about a million are in migration. This process commenced with the collapse of

⁶⁷ "Trud" newspaper, issue as of 04.03.2004

⁶⁸ International Institute for Humanitarian and Political Research, <http://www.igpi.ru/info/people/kulchik/uzb.html>

the Soviet Union and as sources evidence, has reached its culmination today⁶⁹.

Poverty

The transition to market economy in the Central Asian countries was accompanied by an increase in the scope and scale of poverty. The economic decline and disintegration of the region's countries resulted in a high level of unemployment and a decrease in the population's real income. According to some estimates the level of poverty in Central Asia is about 40-83% which is mostly linked to inefficient governance and corruption⁷⁰.

According to UN data in 2004, Tajikistan cannot provide for the basic needs of every sixth person of its 6 million people without external assistance. At the same time, about a third of all children don't have enough food causing their underdevelopment and of 1000 newborns about 72 don't get 5 years old. The 5-year civil war and the drought of 2000 and 2001 left about 83% of the Tajik population below poverty line.

In Kyrgyzstan today almost all social and demographic groups of the population are affected by poverty. According to the data of the Centre for Economic and Social Development of the Ministry of Finance of Kyrgyz Republic more than 55% of the population fall into the category of "poor". About 23% of the country's population live in conditions of severe impoverishment.

In Uzbekistan, the level of poverty triggered by relocation of population, unemployment and lack of land is growing as well as evidenced by the increase in the flow of illegal labour migrants to the neighbouring countries who oftentimes have to do the toughest job at minimum wages.

⁶⁹ Sultan JUMAGULOV, Navigator.Kz, 06.05.02

⁷⁰ Oleg SIDOROV, <http://www.gazeta.kg/view.php?i=776>

As a result of the deterioration of the populations' living conditions and the level of social protection the majority of the people doesn't have access to basic educational and medical services.

Despite the measures undertaken by the region's governments and the economic support provided by international organisations and the governments of several Western nations, the level of poverty remains steady and negatively affects social tension within the societies, thus, only enhancing the potential of violent conflicts.

Territorial Disputes

Inter-state relations in Central Asia are also negatively affected by territorial disputes. Administrative borders set rather arbitrarily during Soviet times do not correspond to the real distribution and physical location of the region's ethnicities. This factor is the reason for interethnic conflicts especially in the Ferghana Valley between the Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Tajik people. According to the opinions of analysts, the issue of territorial disputes represents a serious and real threat to stability and security in the region.

Thus, for instance, the length of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border is 1,295 kilometres. By the end of the year 2004, 1,000 kilometres of this border will be delimited. The Kyrgyz and Uzbek sides only have to delimit the rest of the 260 kilometres which include the Uzbek enclave of Sokh and the Kyrgyz enclave of Barak⁷¹.

Of the 970 kilometres of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border not a single kilometre was delimited. The negotiations between the two countries have been suspended twice already due to the inability to agree upon the negotiating principles.

To date, about 20 sectors with the total area of more than 40,000 hectares between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and additional 40 sectors between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are being disputed. The problematic

⁷¹ www.pr.kg/articles/n0211/00211.htm, a reference to the speech of N. Tanayev, the Prime Minister of Kyrgyz Republic

areas are mostly those which were given for temporary use by Kyrgyzstan, from which Uzbekistan extracts oil, gas, and on which it has built several industrial, agricultural and social objects. In addition, several sectors of land were given for self-sustainable farming to Uzbek military garrisons. Uzbekistan has repeatedly undertaken unilateral steps to demarcate several sectors of this land including mining of disputable territories. The victims of mine explosions in all three countries were ordinary civilians who resided in the cross-border areas of the Ferghana Valley.

It will be fair to note that the process of demining on the border of Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley which started in 2004 has contributed immensely to the reduction of tensions between the cross-border communities of the two countries.

Another aspect of the problem is the concealment of information on the negotiations on the delimitation of borders which creates a lot of rumours among the cross-border population and a public perception in the neighbouring countries that are often far from reality. This also seriously affects the increase of tension between the neighbouring countries and influences on the destabilization of the political situation in the region. A lack of objective information on the issues of disputable territories is viewed by the region's citizens as a violation of their right to access to information.

The border conflicts continue to be the primary source of tension among the three Ferghana Valley countries. Soviet authorities didn't take into consideration either geographic peculiarities or complex interethnic mix in the region when arbitrarily determining the borders of the Republics.

The establishment of customs and border checkpoints at the borders of the newly independent Central Asian states has significantly affected the freedom of transit that existed in this so recently economically and culturally developed region. One should note that despite the disintegration processes, the region still feels an acute need for economic and other cooperation.

However, contradictions and imperfection in the customs legislations and procedures of the countries lead to several demeaning and exhausting procedures at the customs and border control checkpoints. There are frequent cases of extortion and bribery by representatives of the law enforcement agencies. At the same time representatives of various ethnicities get discriminated. All this only aggravates the interethnic mistrust and hinders mutual respect and understanding.

Moreover, several cases of transformation of conflicts into open violent hostilities at the customs checkpoints have been reported. For instance, in the year 2003 about 300 residents of Isfara district in the province of Sogdiy in Tajikistan destroyed the customs checkpoint in province of Batken in Kyrgyzstan. During the assault, 2 Kyrgyz law enforcement officers were injured. In response about 100 local Kyrgyz residents destroyed a Tajik customs and border control checkpoint in Tajikistan. Only thanks to rapid response of Kyrgyz and Tajik special security services a further escalation of violence was stopped. Kyrgyz people, for example, started expressing discontent when Tajik authorities unilaterally established two border protection checkpoints in Isfara district in Tajikistan and started levying customs duties on local traders. As a response Kyrgyz authorities established a customs checkpoint of their own.

At the same time one Tajik media source says that the incidents called “provocative” actions are undertaken by Kyrgyz border guards who were inspecting Tajik buses and other vehicles for the purposes of getting the bribe.

Joint Use of Water Resources

The need for joint use of cross-border water resources is one of the major conflict sources that represent a real threat to regional security of Central Asian countries. A lack of water and energy in any country of Central Asia is perceived as a direct threat to national interests and security.

Due to a cease of centralized compensatory supplies for the irrigation operations of Toktogul Water Reservoir in Kyrgyzstan and the transition to mutual offsetting of carbohydrogen raw materials at international prices, Kyrgyzstan had to increase the production of hydro energy for irrigation needs of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan during the summer period.

One should note that Kyrgyzstan itself consumes only 7% of the water accumulated in its reservoirs. The rest of the accumulated water is used by the neighbouring states: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

At the same time, annual losses of Kyrgyzstan from underproduction of energy during the winter period connected to the accumulation of water for the vegetation period amount to \$61.5 million⁷². The compensatory supplies of carbohydrogen fuel by the bilateral inter-governmental agreements are often not executed in full.

The forced release of water during winter results in water logging of soil and an increase in the danger of destruction of the dams of Kazakh and Uzbek water reservoirs which hypothetically may result in a lot of victims and demolitions.

Another important cause of water problems is the unsatisfactory condition of the irrigation channels due to which the water doesn't reach the farmers' fields in its entirety.

One thing is certain – in order to effectively resolve this problem the region's governments need to abandon their approach of orienting solely on national interests and instead seek ways of satisfying interests of all of the region's countries affected by this problem.

The issues of disputable territories and joint use of water resources have often resulted in inter-community and interethnic conflicts between farmers of cross-border areas. Such conflicts may easily gain ethnic and political nature and become subject to an escalation of radical and

⁷² T. U. Usabaliev, "International Regulation on Water Management"

nationalistic moods which have repeatedly led to violent conflicts among the farmers.

Under the conditions of totalitarian rule the effect of these factors only aggravates social tension in the region. The populations of the Central Asian countries wishing to change the existing order and living conditions are forced to express their dissent with the policy pursued by their governments in various forms of protest.

At this point, it is appropriate to mention that people who are satisfied with their living conditions do not strive for any drastic change. Conversely, a lack of means and opportunities for the satisfaction of basic human needs results in active protests and activities aimed at changing the existing living conditions.

Total impoverishment of the majority of the people, toughening of political persecutions and a high level of corruption – these are the premises for the required future changes that are oftentimes uncontrollable for the incumbent authorities.

Forms of Expression of Dissent with the Authorities

It is widely known that one of the most important attributes of and conditions for the functioning of a democratic society is the institution of political opposition. In this case we are rather talking about the legitimate form of expression of political dissent with the government, about the constitutional ways of political struggle by opposition politicians, groups and political parties representing interest of certain layers of society.

The need for a presence of opposition parties has been confirmed at various times by the leaders of almost all Central Asian countries. Nonetheless, the process of development of political opposition in the Central Asian countries has been going at differing dynamics dependent on the real stances of official authorities, the overall development of the civil society, population's support and external factors capable of affecting the mode of political development in some countries and in the region.

The factor affecting the specificity of the development of opposition is the lack of historical traditions of a strong political fight in Central Asia which is mostly explained by peculiarities of this region's historical development.

Political oppositions of all countries in the region can be divided into two categories: the first being a so-called "secular" opposition and the second being the opposition formed on the basis of religious organisation putting pro-Islamic doctrine in the first place.

Let us have a look at the development of opposition in each Central Asian country separately.

Turkmenistan

Officials in Turkmenistan state that the country's development strategy is one of a democratic, secular state and declare a total absence of any political confrontation, thus, meaning an absence of opposition. However, it is no secret that the international community has long been expressing its concern about the absolute repression of any opposition in this Central Asian state. Political leaders of the country have artificially hindered this process and have actively prevented the legitimate political opposition from emerging in Turkmenistan, including any political parties or movements. Representatives of the West don't hide that "the leadership of Turkmenistan is one of the most repressive regimes in the world with an administrative economy of the Stalin era and a cult of personality similar to the one in North Korea"⁷³.

The late 80's and early 90's of the past century one can call the period of the newest Islamic renaissance. Uzbek people restored and built more than 5,000 new mosques with their own money while the sermons of young Islam specialists with independent views attract huge audiences in the mosques. It is at this point when Uzbekistan saw the emergence of a semi-religious and pro-Islamic opposition which was expressing dissent with the official authorities in Tashkent.

⁷³ Acting First Deputy Special Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of the State for CIS Affairs, Clifford Bond, September 4, 2001.

The response of the authorities was painfully clear-cut: the opposition, both secular and religious, was repressed. Mass arrests of heads and members of the religious wing of the opposition ensued. The leaders of the opposition left Uzbekistan and an armed Uzbek opposition started forming. In 1992 an assault on the **secular opposition** started and by the end of 1992 certain leaders of that opposition had to leave the country too. Eventually, not a single opposition party was registered in Uzbekistan.

Tajikistan

In Tajikistan the political opposition was initially formed around the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and a set of Islamic parties and movements. These parties were fighting against the old Communist cadre and were often called the Islamic-Democratic Opposition. Nonetheless, the fight for power that led to the civil war reflects intra-regional contradictions among the regional and political elite. As a result of the civil war more than 50,000 people died.

During the military standoff a need for an establishment of dialogue became clear. In 1997 the government (assisted by several international organisations) came to an agreement with Islamic and Democratic opposition groups and agreed to form a coalition government.

Kazakhstan

Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, admits that the existence of opposition parties in Kazakhstan is a sign of a healthy development of the society. Nevertheless, as mentioned in materials of the Islamic Commission for Human Rights⁷⁴, persecution of the opposition became a common practice in the country. The government keeps an eye on the movement and contacts of the opposition activists, political opponents are arrested and certain leaders of the opposition had to leave the country.

⁷⁴ S. Janomohamed, <http://www.kub.kz/article.php?sid=4239>

There is information about manipulation and intervention by the executive branch into the election process. The authorities are actively countering the attempts of the opposition to achieve accountability of the government and the leaders of the opposition get excluded from the elections. Complication of the requirements for the registration of political parties was a pretext for prohibiting the registration of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and the Republican People's Party of Kazakhstan. Moreover, independent media become subject to repressions as well⁷⁵.

Kyrgyzstan

In the early 90's of the past century Kyrgyzstan was often called "an island of democracy" in Central Asia. However, in the second half of the 90's the trend towards political repression of unwanted opposition politicians, parties and media became also evident in this country.

The Kyrgyz parliamentary elections of 1995 and 2000 showed that the abundance of parties in Kyrgyzstan (43 registered political parties) is not yet a sign of the formation of a well-functioning political opposition. The parliamentary elections of 1995 were held with serious violations of the legislation and were accompanied by clear and acute territorial tribalism, bribery and manipulations of the Central Election Commission's operations. In this connection the candidates who lost were discussing the possibility of having the election results annulled and holding another election based on a new election system.

The opposition parties Adilet and Ar Namys were not allowed to participate in the elections of 2000 based on the claims that less than one calendar year had passed since the date of their registration. The election commissions' dependence on the administration and prejudice on the part of the media allowed the creation of barriers and obstacles for certain political parties and candidates.

⁷⁵ S. Janomohamed, <http://www.kub.kz/article.php?sid=4239>

Thus, an arbitrary interpretation of the election code by the Central Election Commission led to the fact that candidates were deemed automatically elected in the second round of voting provided that his/her opponent from the first round decided to withdraw from the second round. That resulted in numerous opportunities of pressing the candidates and thus several prominent representatives of the opposition were disqualified from the election or their registration was simply eliminated even before the second round. The best example is the leader of the People's Party Daniyar Usenov who actually received more than 50% of the popular vote in the first round of the elections.

Those who declined to cooperate became object of the authorities' oppression. For instance, based on the fabricated evidence the chairman of the People's Party, Daniyar Usenov, the chairman of the Ar Namys Party, Felix Kulov, and the leader of the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, J. Jeksheev, were all arrested. Similar methods were used against the leader of the ErK Party, T. Turgunaliyev, and against the current Kyrgyz Ombudsman, Tursunbai Bakir uluu. Such practice with regards to the opposition leaders has unfortunately become a fixture in the politics of modern Kyrgyzstan.

The Parliament member A. Beknazarov who criticized the transfer of Kyrgyz lands to China was arrested as well. 317 people participated in the protest hunger-strike. One of the protesters Sheraly Nazarkulov died from the strike. 13 Parliament members made a statement that called for President Akayev's resignation.

The subsequent actions of protest resulted in police shooting at the peaceful demonstrators in Aksy district in Kyrgyzstan when 6 people were killed by police gun fire and several citizens were wounded. Still not a single official was held responsible for this tragedy.

The authorities have been fighting the political opposition by all available means as evidenced by a recent scandal that broke out in the Kyrgyz Parliament.

In May 2004, the Parliament Commission prepared a report on the political role of the National Security Service (successor of the former KGB). The report was developed as a result of the fact that at the end of 2003 wiretapping devices were found in the offices of certain Parliament members. The report included extracts of NSS documents that provided descriptions of political and business connections of certain Parliament members and listed their relations with informal leaders in their constituency areas who could support them. According to the report, the NSS had dossiers on all international organisations operating in the country such as the OSCE and the NDI in addition to dossiers on all particularly active members of the Parliament and human rights activists.

The suppression of the independent and free media is conducted using a rich arsenal of means. These include litigations over “damaging words and defamation” allegedly used against certain officials and the “entire Kyrgyz people”, huge fines, “purchasing” popular independent newspapers and TV channel, and etc.

There are reported cases of persecutions, illicit detentions and threatening of representatives of human rights activities (Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights and Civic Society against Corruption) and other organisations of the civil society on the basis of political motives.

Nevertheless, such selected facts of restriction of legal political opposition and examples of repressions against representatives of the public that disagree with the notions and policies of the authorities say a lot about the bothering situation in the area of the development of democratic institutions both in Kyrgyzstan and the Central Asian region as a whole.

One should note an important victory of the civil society in October 2004. Under the pressure of the public and based on the initiative of human rights activists the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic deemed unconstitutional and contradicting to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic several articles of the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Citizens’ Rights to Assemble Peacefully, without Weapons, and Freely Hold Rallies and Demonstrations”. The Constitutional Court confirmed

the citizens' constitutional right to hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations without any sanctions or permission from, and notification of, the authorities. Such a decision by the Constitutional Court is a positive impulse for democratic changes implemented in Kyrgyzstan and is supported by public and democratic forces.

Islamic Opposition

The phenomenon of Islamic opposition demands special consideration by the governments of the region. The region's predominant religion is Islam.

More favourable conditions for the emergence and development of activities of Islamic organisations exist in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan whose populations, unlike the historically nomadic and semi-nomadic Kyrgyz people, have approached religion more formally throughout history.

The experience shows that radical Islam normally emerges where the position of orthodox Islam is weak. The lack of the system of classical and religious education and upbringing and of sufficient intellectual layer among the clergy also factors in.

The ideas of the Islamic extremists find their supporters. This is also enhanced by the lengthy socioeconomic crisis, high unemployment and poverty, persecutions of free thought, repressions and an absence of forms of expression of protest.

In the conditions of separation of personality from the state, the ideology that positions itself as oppositional to the official ideology has all the chances to become the means of expression of protest against the perceived unfairness.

One should not forget that the ultimate (and the only real) goal of the leaders of extremism is the capture of power or at least getting a piece of that power. The politicization of Islamic movements resulted in a civil war in Tajikistan to which thousands of people fell victims. Currently,

representatives of the United Tajik opposition, formed around the Party of Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan, play an important role in the Tajik political arena.

A whole different situation emerged in Uzbekistan. Having faced severe repressions on the part of the authorities the religious and extremist organisations have escalated their activities significantly. The Islam that went underground became the only way of expression of protest against authoritarianism which has developed a very dangerous nature on the way.

One of the causes of instability in the region is the ongoing instability in Afghanistan and a growth of militant Islamic groups, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in particular. Armed invasions by Islamic guerrillas of the territory of Kyrgyzstan occurred from 1999-2001 which, on the one hand, strengthened the cooperation and coordination of security between the regions' governments, and on the other hand aggravated the tension among them due to differing interpretations and understanding of the issue of national security.

These invasions by Islamic extremists were deemed as expressions of international terrorism by the international community and again demonstrated the imminent link between terrorism and religious extremism.

Khizb ut-Takhrir

The declared goal of yet another religious movement called Khizb ut-Takhrir is a non-violent overthrow of the governments of Central Asia and the creation of an Islamic caliphate.

The stances of officials of Central Asia with regards to Khizb ut-Takhrir are identical – all Central Asian governments believe that Khizb ut-Takhrir is an evil that needs to be eradicated before it destroys peace and stability in the region and, following this policy, these governments have toughened repression directed at the members of this movement.

Moreover, according to the stance of official Tashkent, the members of Khizb ut-Takhrir are responsible for a series of explosions in Tashkent and other cities of Uzbekistan and for the attempt to assassinate President Karimov.

In his speech at the meeting of the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan in 2004, President Akayev called the propaganda of ideas by Khizb ut-Takhrir ideological terrorism and denied all allegations of persecuting dissidence.

Kyrgyzstan's ombudsman believes, however, that the authorities exaggerate the threat on the part of Khizb ut-Takhrir in order to justify their restrictions of individual rights and to obtain additional funds from donor nations.

Thus, society has seen the formation of a dual attitude toward this problem: on the one hand repressions by the authorities and informational pressing on public conscience through the media. On the other hand – human rights activists' organisations and proponents of legalisation of Khizb ut-Takhrir are against persecutions of this religious political party that seeks to achieve legitimisation.

From certain analysts' point of view, such oppression of individual liberties by the government only enhances the popularity of Khizb ut-Takhrir. The narrowing of opportunities and possibilities of expression of political dissidence directs the public discontent to the channel of religious extremism.

President Akayev in his speech at the meeting of the National Security Council in 2004 named yet another sign of extremism – ideological extremism.

In his speech the Kyrgyz President mentioned that “certain opposition groups, organisations, and media participating in the political struggle impose their own understanding and vision of the ways of development of the country and standards of democracy on society... And we are not talking about mere harmless propaganda here but about a determined

preparation for a capture of power. Certain printed publications that call themselves opposition newspapers immediately turn their pages into instructions on destabilisation as soon as a slightest opportunity to aggravate the situation presents itself’.

Some of the representatives of the civic society and international organizations became very concerned over this statement by the President. Probably the officials see the current trend as “a determined preparation for a capture of power” by opposition newspapers and certain representatives of the political opposition who dissent with “the vision of the ways of development of the country and standards of democracy on the society”.

The opposition members believe that the newspapers do not call for any violent “capture of power”; rather they merely express their dissent with the actions and stance of the current administration. In the meantime one of the major principles of democracy - pluralism and freedom of speech - probably became an obstacle on the incumbent administration’s way of protection and retention of their power.

However, it is clear that forced suppression of a conflict is not an effective or efficient solution. Neither air raids, nor captures of terrorist leaders, nor repressions are effective in eradicating the deep causes of Islamic terrorism in the region.

The Role and Policies of International Organisations

Speaking of security in Central Asia one can’t help but mention the role and policies of international organisations.

During the recent years governments of several Western countries and international organisations have maintained a dialogue with the region’s authorities on the need for political reforms and liberalisation. However, the actual policies of the leading Western countries in the region led to that the impression of circles of the ruling elite and the region’s population that these issues became of less importance to certain

Western countries. The following term is oftentimes used with regards to the policies of international organisations: a double standard.

According to the notion of certain region's analysts, Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia is more of a reaction to unfair power distribution and poverty rather than in any sort of a serious threat to the West.

The Western interpretation of this situation - the so-called threat to regional security – has resulted in overreacting on the part of the international community. International organisations started to actively participate in capacity building of military and government bodies.

Such international interventions – implemented for the sake of security – can inadvertently provide justification of human rights violations and repressions by the incumbent totalitarian regimes, thus only supporting the cycle of violence.

Such a focus on security facilitates the shift from state development-oriented programmes to defence-enhancement programmes. Thus, the climate of insecurity in the region only intensifies which hinders long-term investing in development programmes in the region.

Excessive focus on security can in the long run aggravate the hidden political and economic tensions in Central Asia. The security apparatus in each Central Asian country tends to strengthen its influence, oppressing political institutions and processes and simultaneously intensifying the repressions and thereby motivating the support of Islamic groups among ordinary citizens.

Contrary to this notion, according to the statements by the U.S. Department of State, during the meetings with the leaders of Central Asian countries the latter are consistently reminded of the need for keeping their promises given to their people as well as of the international pledges on ensuring human rights and democratic pluralism of opinion.

The problem is also rooted in the fact that Central Asian regimes, through the controlled media, present some whole different information to their populations, saying that everything “is just fine” and that there is no need for a change in the current political course.

Repressions and terror implemented by the government as well as political unfairness, economic inequalities and social disturbances are the main reasons for expressing through violence on the part of certain individuals once all other means use in order to change the existing situation proved to be ineffective.

Conclusions

- If economic and political reforms in the Central Asian countries fail to achieve success and domestic and cross-border conflicts develop and break out, the region will indeed become a nest of terrorism, a fireplace of religious and political extremism and an arena of international violent conflicts.

Reasons for the Support of Religious Extremism in Central Asia

- Radical Islam normally emerges where the positions of orthodox Islam are weak and the freedom of conscience is restricted by the prevailing regime.
- The security apparatus in each country of Central Asia only intensifies the repressions and its influence and oppresses political institutions thereby triggering support rendered to Islamic groups by ordinary citizens.
- The narrowing of opportunities and possibilities of political dissidence directs public discontent to the channel of Islamic extremism.
- The lack of trust in the government breeds the attitude of the population to see terrorists and extremists as “victims” of the violence on the part of the authorities.
- The suppression of individual liberties by the government only enhances the popularity of extremism.

- The dissemination of ideas of religious extremism is facilitated by the authorities' loss of image as in the eyes of the people they look like they had failed to meet the people's hopes and expectations.

Repressions by the Government as a Reason of Extremism

- Repressions and terror implemented by the government are the main causes for expression through violence on the part of certain groups and individuals.
- The existing corrupted governments are scared of retribution on the part of the people and, therefore, make all efforts to retain power by all means necessary.
- Some people believe that public discontent emerges due to actions of authorities rather than terrorists. Therefore, in order to change things in the lives of citizens one needs to struggle with inappropriate actions of the governments in the first place rather than of terrorists and extremists.

Authorities Using Terrorism as an Excuse

- The authorities knowingly exaggerate the threat of terrorism in order to shift public discontent from the actual causes of aggravation of the situation to the issues of terrorism and extremism.
- The struggle against "informational terrorism" and "political extremism" are just means of getting back at political opponents.
- The security services' statements that "radical politicians will go as far as to establish contacts with representatives of extremists in order to satisfy their election interests" provide an opportunity for legitimising repressions.
- The authorities exaggerate the threat on the part of Khizb ut-Takhrir in order to justify the introduction of restrictions of human rights and to obtain additional funding from donor nations.

Influence of Western Politics

- Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia is rather a reaction to unfair power distribution and poverty than a real threat to the West.

- International interventions undertaken for the sake of so-called security can also provide justification for human rights violations and repressions.

Effective Struggle

- Using force for the suppression of conflicts is not an effective or efficient solution.
- Terrorism is evil. The real fight against terrorism is possible only under conditions of mutual trust, popular support and the consolidation of efforts of both sectors of society: the authorities and the people.
- As long as the governments do not get votes of confidence from the population, they will have to fight against extremism and terrorism by themselves without any popular support, thus, dooming such a fight to ineffectiveness.

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SECURITY AS A HOLISTIC IDEA AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STATES


During the cold war security was a rather stable, even static and clear concept. Consequently, the divided but stable world gave the opportunity to defence forces to become static and divided bureaucratic organisations. The reality of the 21st century shows us that this situation is utterly obsolete. If we have learnt anything from the roaring 1990's and the post 11 September 2001 period it is that security became a holistic and dynamic concept. Not only the war in Iraq is showing us evidence of this observation, but also other parts in the world, where the media is not always undivided focused on, have to deal with this reality. In what follows I will explain what I mean by the concept of holistic security. Furthermore, I will explain what it means for security forces in general and lastly what the consequences are for the Central Asian states. But first I will say some words about the dynamics and the history of change of security organisations.

Change and the Security Forces

We can explain the question of why security organisations change or are sometimes forced to change by the triad model of organisational change which is illustrated in the following graph (Figure I). The three key elements, the 'environment', 'the organisation' and 'the actor' are represented as 'concentric' entities. Each element of the model of organisation has an active and a passive component. In the environment, the active component is political practice (political decision-making through political institutions, and possibly the process of institution building itself). The passive component comprises the structural environmental factors that influence the organisation. The organisation is a 'complex organisation' which is an 'open organisation' based on coalitions. The ideal model of the bureaucratic organisation as well as

the 'virtual' and the 'matrix' organisations represent the passive component of the organisation. Finally, the individual as a 'rational actor' is a component of the active interpretation of organisations. In contrast, the individual as represented in the ideal model of the 'modern personality' is a component of the passive interpretation. Hence, this 'triad' model is located in a central position in the 'actor-system' debate. It represents the modernization hypothesis as a heuristic model.

The complexity of this triad model as thus understood is schematized in Figure 1.



Clark Kerr's convergence theory postulates that industrial societies become increasingly alike and evolve as a whole because the character of the dominant technology enforces specific forms of social organisation, political life, cultural patterns, every day conduct and even

beliefs and attitudes.⁷⁶ This idea can be used to show that military organisations are in the long run a reflection of state and society. Furthermore, the open organisation hypothesis underscores the co-evolution between the military organisation and society. These insights lay at the basis of military sociology as an applied field of sociology. The idea of organisational evolution presented here fits the approach outlined during the 1960s by Morris Janowitz (who is regarded as the founder of this applied field of military sociology). Janowitz hypothesized that there was a resemblance between the evolution of civilian organisations and military organisations. This is the so-called 'civilianization hypothesis' which James Burk describes as follows⁷⁷:

“The central argument was that the boundaries separating the military from civilian society had progressively weakened since the turn of the century. It described a military organization that was forced to participate more actively in the life of the larger society and yet maintain its relative autonomy, competence, and group cohesion.”⁷⁸

In addition Jacques Van Doorn noticed a qualitative mutation in the character of military organisations. In a seminal article on 'the decline of the mass army', Van Doorn argued that military organisations evolved from a modern mass-army to a professional army.⁷⁹ Janowitz's and Van Doorn's ideas were visionary at that time. When many of their postulated ideas were realised, other military sociologists expanded and refined the idea of professional armed forces and they subsequently created the model of the post-modern army. Thus the evolving theoretical discourse on organisational change in business and government and the narrow

⁷⁶ Mentioned in Piotr Sztompka, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 133-135

⁷⁷ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait*, New York: Free Press, 1971 (second edition), pp. xii-xv

⁷⁸ James Burk, 'Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.19, No. 2, Winter 1993, p. 179

⁷⁹ Jacques Van Doorn, 'The Decline of the Mass Army in the West: General Reflections', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1975, pp. 147-157. Although Van Doorn spoke instead of an all-volunteer force (AVF) and never used the terminology of post-modernity. However, the context, referents and form of argumentation used in the article render the interpretation possible.

discussion on military change are now comparable. In fact, the similarities between business and military organisations were not accidental: they are both affected by profound changes in the external environment.

Environmental Aspects of the Post-Modern Military

The first contours of the post-modern military appeared in the 1960's, but it was during the Gulf War of 1991 and different peacekeeping and peace-making actions in the 1990's which can be seen as prototypical for this type of army.⁸⁰ The post-modern variant of the military organisation must be seen in the context of a fundamental change in the geopolitical situation in the world, rapid economic and technological changes, and changes in the world's populations' attitudes to war. This ever growing rapidity of change has made the organisational environment profoundly unstable. Instability and unpredictability are key characteristics to which the military organisations have had to find organisational answers.

⁸⁰ It is important to remark that the transition from the 'mass army' to the 'post-modern' army type took considerable time and in fact passed over a third, specific (transitory) type army. This transitory type of army is called in the literature of military sociology the 'force-in-being' and was related with the idea that armies evolved to a 'constabulary force' rather than the traditional fighting force (See: Morris Janowitz, *Op. Cit.*, 1971, p. li and pp. 417-442) Also Karl Haltiner stressed the transitory character in the evolution between the two extreme army types. Based on the quantitative variable 'Conscript Ratio', he stated that: 'the transition between the different types of force format is rather gradual, and the mass army format of the armed forces apparently rises *relatively continuously* in the transition from type 0 (all-volunteer systems) to type III (hard-core conscript systems [with a conscript ratio above 66%]' See: Karl W. Haltiner, 'The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Fall 1988, pp. 7-36. Charles Moskos made room for three periods in his famous post-modern typology, namely Early-Modern, Late-Modern and Postmodern periods. It implies also the 'force-in-being' idea. (See: Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, 'The Postmodern Military', in: James Burk (editor), *The Military in New Times, Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview press, 1994, p. 147 and Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-2) In the less accurate, but more generally used notion - especially in Russia- of the 'mixed army' type, the idea of a transitory army type is also suggested. The mixed army type refers to the fact that recruitment is based on both, compulsory conscription and contract basis. Conventionally and for matters of analytical explicitness, this study limits itself to the dichotomy between the mass army and the post-modern army type. It is important to bear in mind that this is a simplification of historical and social reality, but nevertheless applicable to Russia.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union led to the break-up of the certainty and predictability of a bipolar international system. The new security era could be characterised as one of risk, complexity and uncertainty in comparison with the relative certainty of the preceding four decades. The outbreak of total war, already in doubt by the introduction of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, changed fundamentally.⁸¹

Whereas deterrence was the core of the mission of the military organisation during the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union produced a completely different scale and set of threats and missions. The missions were called 'missions other than war' or 'low intensity conflicts' and were against such threats as terrorism, organised crime, and local nationalism. Humanitarian aid, refugee support and aid in areas of natural disasters became part of military missions.

The rapid changes in the nature of the threats facing Western militaries, when deployed on a particular mission, were also a notable characteristic of the new geo-political environment. A good example is provided by British forces deployed in Macedonia during May-June 1999. During the NATO air campaign over Kosovo they prepared and trained initially for a full-scale ground war. But after Kosovar refugees flooded Macedonia and Albania they changed their mission and became a humanitarian force. Finally, after a peace agreement, they entered Kosovo with a peacekeeping mandate. Thus, in a time frame of two months, the missions of these elite troops changed fundamentally. The tempo and the nature of the changes possible in the post-modern military environment have urged the British forces to become both more flexible and better trained.

Economically in the world today there is a trend towards globalisation. Predominantly national markets have evolved into global markets. This

⁸¹ See for instance: Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society, Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 19-23 and pp. 64-105; J. van der Meulen, 'Civiel-militaire betrekkingen in verandering: wisselwerking tussen maatschappij en krijgsmacht', in: H. Born, R. Moelker and J. Soeters, *Krijgsmacht en samenleving: klassieke en eigentijdse inzichten, [Armed Forces and Society: Classic and Modern Views]*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999, pp. 54-66

increased competition combined with technological and information revolutions have made organisations less labour-intensive and more capital-intensive. As a result of globalisation there has been a change from extensive to intensive growth, and the famous quantity-quality innovation has taken place. Firms have become smaller but their capacity and their ability to provide services have increased in inverse proportion.

These factors have also affected military organisations. The third industrial revolution, with computer technology as a key factor, allows armies to work with technological advanced weapons. This context has led to the so-called 'revolution in military affairs' with significant consequences, such as military organisations requiring on the one hand more and more highly trained personnel with higher educational qualifications; and on the other hand the least specialised military functions have begun to disappear because they can be automated or out-sourced; and the training of these military specialists takes too long and is expensive.⁸²

The ideas of materialism and individualism have also grown to extreme levels in post-modern society.⁸³ Consequently, values and attitudes have evolved in the direction of 'self realisation', consumerism and hedonism. The 'Welfare State' mechanism supports this situation as a safety net for those who cannot compete in this type of society. Within the overall societal dynamic people are no longer prepared to give up their privileges for reasons of state security. Carroll J. Glynn and others noted this in their paraphrase of Inglehart's ideas:

⁸² D. M. Snow, *The Shape of the Future: the Post-Cold War World*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991; and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Op. Cit.*, 1993

⁸³ See for example: Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution, Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977; and Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. For an application of this idea on the military organization see Fabrizio Battistelli, 'Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 467-484

“In the United States and Western Europe, the general increase of prosperity over most of the twentieth century had profoundly altered the balance between materialist and postmaterialist values. Each new generation tended to be less concerned about materialistic values such as prosperity and security. Postmaterialist values - such as more say in government, a less impersonal society, and freedom of speech-gradually rose in importance.”⁸⁴

In its attempt to cope with highly complex social problems, the state appears to be in crisis. It finds itself in a contradictory (post-modern) state of being too small and too big at the same time. On the one hand, states seem to be too large to cope with the individual problems of the increasingly demanding citizenry. On the other hand, given the growing trend of giving more authority to international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union, states are too small to handle classical state matters; and this perception is taking the efforts to create common defence (although political obstacles related to individual states' perceptions of their role in the world create stumbling blocks).

In this situation, the narrow relationship of citizenship and military services dominant in the modern era no longer exist. The status of the army changed dramatically. The allocated state resources for defence shrank proportionally and were re-allocated to what can be broadly called 'welfare matters'. The fall of the army's status, as an international phenomenon, can be explained by several interacting processes: the fundamental shift in state priorities in the 'post-nationalistic era'; the indifference and even hostility of the population toward military missions (except for peacekeeping and other humanitarian missions); and the cost-intensity of the technological revolution in military affairs meaning that maintaining a broad suite of capabilities is untenable for

⁸⁴ Carroll J Glynn, Susan Herbst, Garrett J. O'Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro, *Public Opinion*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p. 269

any single nation.⁸⁵ Bernard Boëne calls this last element 'structural disarmament'.⁸⁶

Security as a Holistic and Dynamic Concept

Security as a holistic and dynamic concept must be introduced in order to understand the post 11 September security situation. The idea of holism is understood in two different ways: firstly in a structural-organisational way and secondly in a geographical way.

If we want to understand what the consequences of terrorism are for the security organisation, we have to understand the nature of terrorism. I will evoke three key elements without being exhaustive. Firstly, there is **no frontline**. At the utmost, terrorist action can be catalogued as hit and run operations. The purpose of terrorism is not to fight but to install chaos. Moreover, terrorists hope that counter-terrorist action are self defeating and add to the installed chaos. In this sense a terrorist action is planting a seed of chaos which the state or the entity against which the terrorist action is focused is harvesting this chaos. Secondly, there is an extremist and violent ideology and/or religion supporting the terrorist actions. It is this ideology/religion which is a source of motivation for terrorists. Consequently, **terrorists are highly motivated** to the point that their own lives are used as a weapon against their target. Thirdly **terrorists are not real combatants** in the legal and military sense of the word. Legally, terrorists do not belong to a legal fighting force and do not wear uniforms. Therefore, they are not protected by the existing war jurisdiction that protects combatants in case of injury or imprisonment. Military terrorists are no real soldiers in the traditional sense of the

⁸⁵ See for instance: Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier, 'New Roles and Missions, Army Image and Recruitment Prospects: the case of Belgium', in: Philippe Manigart (Editor), *Future Roles, Missions and Structure of Armed Forces In The New World Order: The Public View*, New York: The Nova Science Publishers, 1996, pp. 8-12; Lucien Mandeville, Pascale Combelles and Daniel Rich, 'French Public opinion and new missions of the armed forces', in Philippe Manigart (Editor), *Future Roles, Missions and Structure of Armed Forces In The New World Order: The Public View*, New York: The Nova Science Publishers, 1996, pp. 55-59

⁸⁶ B. Boëne, "A tribe among tribes...post-modern militaries and civil-military relations?" paper presented at the interim Meeting of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee 01 (Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution), Modena, Italy, January 20-22, 1997

word. As there is no combat, no fighting and no frontline, the military is confronted with a very difficult and dangerous enemy. Conclusively, **we can say that the terrorist threat is everywhere and at the same time nowhere**. Moreover, **the war against terrorism is a cruel war without rules**. This makes the task of the security forces utterly complex. But one thing is sure: the importance of intelligence and the predominant place of intelligence services.

When we say intelligence it may be fruitful to stand still with the problem of intelligence gathering in what is called the intelligence cycle. We understand intelligence as a process of accurate information gathering that is presented in sufficient time to enable a decision-maker to take whatever action is required. The intelligence cycle is directed by a commander or a political leader, which states his intelligence requirement, usually in form of a question. The intelligence staff converts the commander's intelligence requirement into a series of essential elements of information and commissions the intelligence agencies using a collection plan. The intelligence staff collates all the information from the various sources into a readily accessible database. It is essential that all information collected can be retrieved. Interpretation is where the collated information is analysed and turned into intelligence. Finally, dissemination can take place.

What is important here to mention is that the different intelligence agencies have to collaborate intensively. It is upon this intense collaboration that our concept of holism is based. The traditional division of military forces, border troops and troops for internal security becomes diffuse in times of crisis. At the same time there is need for leadership. In organisational theory we can see two types of organisation that can fit our need, namely the virtual organisation and the matrix organisation.

Nohria and Berkley have attributed the following basic features to **the virtual organisation**⁸⁷:

⁸⁷ Nitin Nohria and James Berkley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 115

1. The disappearance of material files and the reappearance of them in flexible and electronic form by means of information technology;
2. The replacement of face-to-face communications with computer-mediated communication, and a concomitant increase in the role of informal face-to-face communication for purposes of maintaining organisational coherence;
3. The transfer of issues of organisational structure from the realm of the organisation of human beings to the organisation of information and technology in such a way that the functioning of the organisation appears spontaneous and paradoxically structure-less, while the functioning of information systems seems at once all-pervasive and faintly magical;
4. The networking of individuals from technically separate firms to the extent that clear boundaries of the organisation become difficult to establish in practice;
5. The implosion of bureaucratic specialisation into 'global', cross-functional, computer-mediated jobs to such an extent that individual members of the organisation may be considered holographically equivalent to the organisation as a whole.

Francis Fukuyama and Abram Shulsky have given another, less technological interpretation of the virtual corporation.⁸⁸ In their view, this type of organisation seeks to push as many routine functions outside the boundaries of its own organisation as possible. Consequently, one of the by-products of this trend is a general downsizing and breaking up of large integrated corporations. Companies examine all their activities and decide which constitute 'core competencies' where they are 'best in the world'. Everything else ought to be out-sourced to some other firm that is 'best in the world' for the production of a good or service. For Stoner and others, the virtual organisation is a temporary network of companies that come together quickly to exploit fast-changing opportunities.⁸⁹ The companies involved share costs, skills and access to global markets, with each partner contributing what he is best at. The key attributes for these

⁸⁸ Francis Fukuyama and Abram Shulsky, *The "Virtual Corporation" and Army Organization*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1997, pp. 14-16

⁸⁹ James Stoner, Edward Freeman and Daniel Gilbert, *Management*, London: Prentice-Hall, 1995 (Sixth Edition), p. 336

kinds of organisations are: high technology, opportunism, excellence, trust, and temporary boundaries.

Stoner and others state that the **matrix organisation** is based on multiple authority and support systems.⁹⁰ This means that there are two lines of authority: one running vertically (by functional department) and another running horizontally. As a result every matrix contains three unique sets of relationships: the senior manager who heads up and balances dual lines of authority; project managers or team specialists who share subordinates; and subordinates who report to two different managers (their department head and the project manager). This type of organisation allows employees from different functional departments to pool their skills when solving a common problem. It aims at increasing the organisation's ability to use human resources wisely and to adapt to a changing environment. It ensures flexibility and cooperation at all levels of the organisation. Therefore, it thrives on open, direct lines of communication. Managers and subordinates need special training to learn new skills. Thus, it is an organisation which is characterised by a strongly competitive environment, an enormous flow of information, rapid (if not instant) change, and is an entity in which resources are limited as cost efficiency is paramount.

Our concept of holism concerning security matters has another aspect, namely a geographical aspect. Globalisation was mainly understood in economic terms, but it has also security aspects. Different continents and different countries are interrelated with each other when we talk about terrorism, even when these countries are not always at the centre of attention of the media. Countries like Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Central Asian states, states in the Caucasus, and even states in Europe are named as refugee states for terrorists. Consequently, also regarding this aspect of security globalisation more intensive international collaboration is needed to overcome the threat of terrorism. It may be clear that political will is needed for collaborating in an international strategy against terrorism.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.333-334; See also: Jay R. Galbraith, 'Matrix Organization Designs: How To Combine Functional and Project Forms', *Business Horizons*, Vol. 14, No 1, January-February 1971, pp. 29-40

Consequences for the Security Forces

From an organisational point of view we have seen that the security forces have to evolve towards virtual organisations and to matrix organisations, that they have to work internationally and that political will has to exist to establish this collaboration. Now we can ask the question of what the consequence is for security organisations.

The Post-modern Military Organisation.

Parallel to the evolution from bureaucratic organisation to post-bureaucratic organisation, the military organisation in the West underwent a similar evolution. The modern organisation type (or the mass army) evolved over time to the post-modern military organisation. Dandeker has outlined the following features of the post-modern military organisation as distinct from its modern antecedent⁹¹:

1. Responsibility shifts to lower levels. Even the individual soldier at the lowest level has to take decisions autonomously, even ones with important political consequences.
2. The military job is intensive and very demanding, but also very rewarding, with increased responsibility for equipment, people and the success of the operation.
3. Flexibility means an emphasis on the multi-rolling of equipment and a consequent desire to recruit and retain personnel able to take on multiple roles, creating and necessitating a more flexible work force at all levels of the hierarchy and in all specialties.

⁹¹ C. Dandeker, "Flexible forces for a post cold war world: a view from the United Kingdom", *La revue Tocqueville/ The Tocqueville Review* Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1995, pp. 23-38 and C. Dandeker, "New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1994, pp. 637-654. See also: David R. Segal, *Organizational Designs for the Future Army*, Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Special Report No. 20, 1993 and Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-11 and 265-275

4. The 'mixing and matching' of components from different services and countries pose problems of establishing effective command and control links of lateral as well as vertical kind.

The following features can be added to this conceptual interpretation⁹²:

1. To work effectively, this system requires fundamental changes in the relationship between the military/political centre and the force commanders. Here, a new and contradictory situation is faced: the political control involves a shift away from detailed control to the acceptance of discretion within the constraints of the overall strategic objective. The omnipotence of the media leads to an overall and detailed control of the fourth force in modern society. Besides the media, non-governmental organisations control the military and even become concurrent in humanitarian operations. The autonomy of the military is fundamentally affected. The force commander thus receives on the one hand more autonomy but on the other is more controlled and constrained than ever by the media and non-governmental organisations.
2. Authority is based on manipulation.⁹³ This type of authority is based on explanation, competence of the leader and consensus in the group. Instead of negative sanctions, the leader uses positive stimuli. The military leader has to take into account the motivation and morale of the individual. The most brutal procedures for schooling and training are not tolerated anymore. Primary groups and leadership are key elements in the manipulation type of authority.

⁹² These features are borrowed from the literature and completed with some personnel insights. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait*, New York: Free Press, 1974. Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1, November, 1977, pp. 41-50; Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/ Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring, 1986, pp. 377-382; Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, 'The Postmodern Military', in: James Burk (editor), *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-162. Pascal Vennesson, 'Le triomphe du métier des armes: dynamique professionnelle et la société militaire en France', *La Revue Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1996, pp. 135-157

⁹³ Janowitz, *Op. Cit.*, 1971, pp. xvii-xxiv

3. There is an occupational perception of the military profession.⁹⁴ The military profession is a job like any other. The military personnel serve for economic reasons, not for patriotic reasons. The military profession is not a way of life anymore; it is a way of obtaining extrinsic rewards. Professional organisations as well as unions defend the collective interests of the members of the military organisation.
4. Diversity rather than homogeneity is the central characteristic of the AVF.⁹⁵ The introduction of women and ethnic minorities in the military is an example of this trend. In addition to tolerance, flexibility is rewarded in this kind of organisation.

Charles Moskos summarised his view on how military organisations are changing in a typology. This typology is based on the distinction between the institutional and the occupational interpretation of the military profession. The original idea was proposed in 1977 and it has been expanded and refreshed over the years.⁹⁶ Moskos's typology, represented in the following table, is a good summary of the change that is taking place in military organisations.

⁹⁴ Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.4 , No. 1, 1977, pp. 41-50; and Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 377-382

⁹⁵ Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen (editors), *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces, Experiences From Nine Countries*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999, especially pp. 211-221

⁹⁶ Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', in: *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.4 , No. 1, 1977, pp. 41-50. Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/Occupational Trends in armed Forces', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 377-382; 'Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Editors) *The Military: More than Just a Job?*, Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988. Charles C. Moskos and J. Burk, 'The Postmodern Military' in: James Burk (Editor), *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-162

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Institutional</i>	<i>Occupational</i>
Legitimacy	Normative values	Marketplace economy
Role Commitments	Diffuse	Specific
Basis of Compensation	Rank and seniority	Skill level and manpower
Mode of Compensation	Much in non-cash form or deferred	Salary and bonus
Level of Compensation	Decompressed; low recruit pay	Compressed; high recruit pay
Residence	Adjacency of work and residence locales	Separation of work and residence locales
Societal Regard	Esteem based on notion of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
Evaluation of Performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segmented and quantitative
Legal System	Military justice	Civilian jurisprudence
Reference Groups	“vertical”-within the organisation	“horizontal”-external to organisation

Table 1: Military Organisations: Institutional versus Occupational⁹⁷

As a final, but important remark, on the post-modern military organisation, it is necessary to stress the difference between the concept of an all-volunteer force and the idea of a post-modern All-Volunteer Force. An all-volunteer force is just a way of manning a military organisation. It basically expresses a recruitment policy. There are many examples of this recruitment system all over the world. In Africa, Asia,

⁹⁷ Source: adapted from Charles Moskos, ‘Institutional/Occupational trends in Armed Forces: An Update’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No 3 Spring 1986, p. 378 and Charles C. Moskos, ‘Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm’, in : Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, armed Forces after the Cold War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 15

etc., there are many (regular or irregular, state-controlled or mercenary) military organisations which recruit their soldiers on a voluntary basis. In this case, soldiers are just paid for their military services. The post-modern All-Volunteer Force, however, is a specific type of military organisation, which is found in Western post-industrial societies. In what follows, whenever the all-volunteer-force concept is mentioned, the post-modern variant of this idea is meant.

Consequences for the Central Asian States

After we have seen the evolution of security organisations in advanced industrial states, we have to investigate what the changing roles of the national security forces in Central Asia are and what the changing role of the international community in Central Asia is. The holistic idea first underlines the importance of collaboration beyond dividing organisation boundaries of the security forces. Structurally, there is need for a security council that strategically coordinates security information and security operations. In the case of a crisis, tactical task forces must be set up bringing together all possible security forces that can help to control the crisis. After the crisis is settled, this task force can again be unbound and continue its normal procedures. This is an application of the idea of the virtual organisation and the matrix organisation. Not only have these trans-boundary organisations to exist in the state, but also between the states of Central Asia and also between Russia, the United States, Europe and all Central Asian states. It is only by such close collaboration and exchange of trustworthy intelligence that terrorism can be countered. There is a real need for dry security exercises in order to test procedures. It is only through these exercises that virtual and matrix organisations can be tested.

It is also mentioned that first and foremost the political will must be present in order to realise such a thorough collaboration. In order to obtain this political will, there is a real need for high level conferences that bring political leaders together and put Central Asia on the map of world politics. This is necessary because the threat of terrorism is also present in Central Asia and because there is a real danger that this threat

spreads beyond the boundaries of the region and will have its effect in other states such as Russia, the United States and Europe.

Another issue is to find a balance between hard-line authoritarian rule and anti-terrorism measures without limiting the rights of the citizen. This balance is necessary in order not to give in to what terrorist acts are meant to, namely limit civil rights and create chaos whenever necessary.

Conclusion

The nature of terrorism made us conclude that security became a holistic concept to which the virtual and the matrix organisation are a possible answer. This means that highly intensive crises are altered with no crisis at all. In order to fight this kind of threat the need is expressed for flexible and willing actors in the security sphere and in particular in the Central Asian area. Thorough cooperation is needed on a strategical and tactical level in order to fight terrorism, especially in the sphere of intelligence. This is a first step in order to formulate an answer to terrorism in the region and in the world.

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THE TERRORIST THREAT AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN CENTRAL ASIA: THE UZBEK CASE

Introduction

"At Istanbul, we will enhance our Partnerships to deliver more. We will concentrate more on defence reform to help some of our partners continue with their democratic transitions. We will also focus on increasing our co-operation with the Caucasus and Central Asia – areas that once seemed very far away, but that we now know are essential to our security right here." - NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer June 2004.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer comments speak not only to an increased awareness in NATO and the West of the importance of Central Asia but also illustrate the importance of security sector reform as a component of the democratization process. The responsiveness of the security sector to reforms that inculcate civil and ultimately democratic control procedures is a measure of a state's progress toward democratization. Notwithstanding, it is widely admitted that there is no commonality among security sector reform. The security sector encompasses all state institutions that have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of a state and its citizens against violence and coercion. However, it may also include non-government armed political action

groups.⁹⁸ This study will assess the level of security sector reform within those organizations that traditionally have held the state's monopoly on the use of force, the military and the internal state security apparatus.⁹⁹

The progress in security sector reform is dependent, to varying degrees, upon a state's past experiences, both cultural and taught, the domestic relationship between society and the security sector including how of the state's military and internal security forces developed, and the geopolitical conditions under which reform currently is occurring including the influence of foreign countries. Each of these variables contributes to or detracts from the probability that successful reform will be accomplished. This article explains the development of Uzbekistan's independent security sector. It examines the extent to which reform of the security sector has occurred and the obstacles to further reform in Uzbekistan. It also analyzes the impact of American influence and renewed Russian engagement in its "near abroad" as a result of war on terrorism and Moscow's increased resources. Third, it assesses the potential impact that the war on terrorism has had on the security reform process. The goal is to provide an assessment of the current state of security sector reform in Uzbekistan, to discuss the opportunities for development in this area, and to evaluate which variables most directly influence security sector reform.

The importance of such a study is that democratically reformed armed forces represent an institution of stability, encourage social unification, reduce regional security dilemmas, and contribute generally to the democratization process. The importance of establishing democratic control of the armed forces and ultimately the entire security sector cannot be minimized. As a Defense Department official noted when asked to evaluate the effectiveness of American military assistance programs, the United States Congress does not have quantifiable measures but instead inquires whether officers, participating in a range

⁹⁸ See Hänggi, Heiner, "Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction" in Bryden and Hänggi (eds.) *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Transaction Publishers, Piscataway NJ 2004 page 5 - 6 for a range of definitions of the security sector.

⁹⁹ In Uzbekistan, the latter forces will include the *Sluzhba Natsionalnor Bezopasnosti* (SNB or National Security Service, the National Guard, the *Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del* (MVD) or internal troops including border guards, and police.

of training and education activities, return to their service and country with a better understanding of civil-military relations. Thus, the ultimate success of training programs is the extent to which they succeed, through a “leavening process,” in producing society’s new elites who gradually emerge to help shape ideas.¹⁰⁰ Events surrounding Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in November 2003 provide a poignant example. The Georgian Minister of Defense, a graduate of the US International Military Education Training (IMET) program, recognized that military involvement during the ouster of Eduard Shevardnadze would simply exacerbate an already inflammatory situation. As a result, he made the decision to keep the troops who had participated in the US-sponsored Georgia Train and Equip Program, the most reliable Georgian forces, in the barracks.¹⁰¹ The involved units responded with professionalism and commitment to civilian control that result in a peaceful transition of power. Why are democratic reforms so essential? Operationally, democratic reform improves the competence of the armed forces in securing territory thus reducing the flow of drugs, small arms, high explosives, and possibly the materials used in the development of weapons of mass destruction. They are more effective at combating terrorism and insurgency. They enhance the interoperability of regional forces with those NATO member units. Strategically, democratic reforms of the security sector can promote societal integration and raise the awareness of common societal objectives that ultimately enhance regional and domestic stability by eliminating regime separation, reducing regional security dilemmas, and promoting ethnic equality.

A Conceptualization of Military Reform Process

At a minimum, newly independent states face three levels of military development. The initial strategic level requires the creation of an independent military force. The development of autonomous and effective military forces and security policy provide independent policy options thus establishing the state as a viable international entity.¹⁰² With

¹⁰⁰ Author interview with informed Department of Defense source 6/03

¹⁰¹ Author interview with informed Department of Defense source 6/03 and 10/04

¹⁰² Allison, Roy, *Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States* Adelphi Paper 280 International Institute for Strategic Studies October 1993:56

no existing doctrine or military organization and limited qualified personnel and funding, this process can take a significant amount of time. In the case of Central Asia, a dependence on and the legacy of the former Soviet Union as well as a lack of regional bilateral security ties has further curtailed the process.¹⁰³ Prior to independence, decisions were made in Moscow. Thus, the economic and political resources needed to support the development of a military force were limited. For example, 90% of the Soviet Army's officer corps, including the units from Central Asian unit, had been Slavic with a large number being Russian.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, those military units that served in the Central Asian region focused on territorial defense and internal security.

The second stage of military development shifts the focus from strategic development to the creation of an operational organization. During this stage narrow civil control should emerge. In 1991, such a situation occurred in Russia when Yeltsin initiated a de-politicization of the military that included eliminating Communist Party control in the military and established government control over the armed forces. The most difficult process of the second stage is the de-politicization of the security sector in which its loyalty shifts from regime to a state concept. The Soviet legacy of multiple armed services as well as the regional leaders' desire to maintain their tight control over society have proven to be an obstacle to progress. Multiple services competing for limited resources and seeking to advance their own interests and priorities retard the development of national militaries, the establishment of civil control, and shift in loyalty.

However, civil control does not equate to democratic control, which is the essential characteristic of the third stage of development. Moving from the second to third stage military development is the most difficult and requires a significant re-order of general governing principles including the development of civil society. As a result, this transition faces resistances from multiple sectors. By their nature, military and security organizations tend to be conservative and are reluctant to

¹⁰³ Ibid:54

¹⁰⁴ Helre, Gunnar, *The Great Game Re-visited: Politics and Security in Central Asia* (Cmd. Norwegian Navy), 1997 -'98:4

change. Second, moves by the Central Asian leaders are quite calculated. All are cognizant of the instability caused by Gorbachev's reforms and the civil war in Tajikistan, thus they avoid most systemic political, economic, or security reforms that might erode their control over society. Third, social stability is based upon loyalty to the family and clan; therefore, regimes have eschewed any substantial differentiation between themselves and the state. This approach eliminates any potential quandary among the security sector over whether their role is to protect the state or the regime and by so doing negates shifting the security sector's loyalty from the regime to the state. The lack of progress in this transition is evident in conversations with officials from the region. When discussing military reform, they refer to the creation of staff and organizational structures, appropriate procurement, and training, all of which are significant issues related to the second stage in development.¹⁰⁵ While reference is made to establishing democratic control over the armed force, the steps being taken to implement such reforms are limited. The following discussion of the efforts being undertaken in Uzbekistan helps to better define these levels of development as well as provide some insight into the future.

The Case of Uzbekistan

Examining the strategic and operational levels of development provides an understanding of how far reforms have progressed. It also helps identify the obstacles to further reform and provides a framework in which to recognize the possibilities regarding a transition to democratic control of the security sector. Uzbekistan has experienced three distinct periods of security sector development. The first from 1991 – 1997 corresponded to Uzbekistan securing independence from the Soviet Union and establishing itself as the region's pre-eminent military force. During this period, Tashkent developed its own military. The second phase, from 1997 until September 2001, focused on combating the insurgency initiated by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan's (IMU) incursions into the Ferghana Valley. While the circumstances resulted in shifts in military operations and planning it also corresponded to an

¹⁰⁵ Author interview with informed Ministry of Foreign Affairs source 2004

increase in domestic suppression and heightened regime separation. The third phase emerging from September 11th attacks on the United States has been characterized by an increased American attention and presence in the region that has stimulated military reform, a re-focusing of Uzbek military doctrine from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism, and more recently closer ties with Moscow.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Central Asian states had 'statehood' thrust upon them and suddenly found themselves responsible for the fundamental responsibility of being a state – security. In May 1992, the security crisis deepened as Moscow nearly simultaneously concluded the Treaty on Collective Security and announced that it would no longer financially support former Soviet forces serving outside of Russia. The successful development of an independent military and ultimate establishment of strong civil-military relations is essential to the existence of a new state.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the Central Asian states initially focused on the monumental task of creating an independent military force without consideration to democratic reform. Tashkent, having served as the headquarters for the Soviet's Turkestan Military District, benefited from a military organizational structure and the best equipped military in the region. As Napoleon once noted, creating an army without an organizational structure is a difficult task.¹⁰⁷

Within the chaos of independence, Uzbekistan's unique position among the Central Asian states enables it and its president, Islam Karimov, to provide for the corporate needs of the military thus establishing a strong link between the regime and the military. In the wake of separation from Moscow, Karimov established a national defense committee to oversee the nationalization of Soviet forces deployed in Uzbekistan. He accelerated the nationalization process by recalling Uzbek officers serving overseas, prohibiting expatriate Russians from serving in the military, nationalizing the military schools, and requiring Uzbek recruits

¹⁰⁶ Feinberg, Jared, *The Armed Forces in Georgia*, Center for Defense Information, Washington DC, March '99:1

¹⁰⁷ Napoleon I, *Napoleon on the Art of War*, translated by Jay Luvass, Free Press, New York, NY 1999:10

to serve in the Turkestan district.¹⁰⁸ In 1992, 85% of the officers including 10 of 15 generals were Slavs, by 1997, 60% of the officers and 85% of conscripts were Uzbeks.¹⁰⁹ Karimov further legitimized the concept of national forces by having Uzbek units assume border control responsibilities from the Soviet border troops in 1995 thus eliminating much of the foreign military presence. Other cases such as Abkhazia have shown that the continued deployment of foreign troops erodes local support for national forces.¹¹⁰ Uzbekization served both the corporate and individual interests of the officer thus linking it to the regime. In essence, the officer corps owed its position to the regime.¹¹¹

Concurrently with establishing the Uzbek military, Karimov followed a policy of creating paramilitary units outside of the military structure. By creating a division of power between the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS) and the *Sluzhba Natsionalnor Bezopasnosti* (SNB), he balanced the security apparatus to an extent.¹¹² This was achieved by creating a new indigenous National Guard that replaced the Soviet *Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del* (MVD) troops and was under direct command of the President through the MoIS. Furthermore, command of the National Border Guards was vested with the Chairman of National Security and the MoIS. Integration of the internal security services is enhanced by a close connection between the border guard commanders, who are the third and fourth ranking officers in the SNB and will return to the SNB upon completion of their duty. Moreover, all internal security services are ultimately subordinate to the SNB, which has approximately 8,000 paramilitary troops. Notwithstanding, the border troops remain the poorest trained, equipped, and cared for part of the security sector. Internal security sector integration obviously resulted in the creation of armed units outside of the military command structure

¹⁰⁸ Smith Dianne L., *Opening Pandora's Box: Ethnicity and Central Asian Militaries* Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle PA 1998:18-19

¹⁰⁹ Smith Dianne L., *Breaking Away from the Bear*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle PA 1998:35

¹¹⁰ Feinberg, March '99:1

¹¹¹ Smith Dianne L., *Opening Pandora's Box: Ethnicity and Central Asian Militaries* Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle PA 1998:20

¹¹² Rustam Inoyatov, a member of the Tashkent clan that is closely linked to Karimov's Samarqand clan and is a rival to the MoD, commands the National Security Service.

but also allowed for a high level of military spending outside of the MoD's budget and ultimately inhibited cross sector permutation of ideas, which slows reform.

Regardless of common problems resulting from the Soviet experience, Uzbekistan achieved success in implementing strategic or first level development and transitioned to operational development. A military and national security doctrine is critical to establishing civil control, as distinct from democratic control, over the armed forces. Doctrine is essential for initiating a re-direction of the military's role from protector of the regime to one of protector of the state. In spite of Uzbekistan's efforts at developing a doctrine, it is unclear to what extent this re-direction has been successful. The 1992 Law of Defense established Uzbekistan's military for strictly defensive purposes with no territorial aspirations. However, Uzbekistan's doctrine was quickly overtaken by the shifting geo-political environment of the 21st century. As a result, Tashkent has struggled to keep its doctrine relevant. In 1997, the Concept of National Security and Military Doctrine were announced. Responding to both the Tajik Civil War and increasing radical Islam pressures particularly in the strategically important Ferghana Valley, the new doctrine united traditional security concepts with a broader application of military force to protect the domestic population against extreme situations, expatriate Uzbek minorities, and maintain similar (e.g. authoritarian) regimes in the region.¹¹³ The 1997 Concept made no reference to limiting the military's domestic powers. The implementation of the new doctrine also corresponded with attempts by the regime to criminalize the practice of Islam outside of state-sanctioned mosques.¹¹⁴ The crackdown on Islamists has been relatively consistent since 1997 and was institutionalized with the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations in May 1998. The crackdown has eroded national trust in the security apparatus although not necessarily the military which continues to be viewed by society as a necessary institution that has a limited domestic role and growing

¹¹³ See Smith Dianne L, *Breaking Away from the Bear*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA 1998:36 for a more depth discussion of the 1997 Concept.

¹¹⁴ *Uzbek Prison Deaths Raise Human Rights Concerns*” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on-line www.isn.ethz.ch, 8/15/02

respect continues to improve.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, human rights abuse has become a method of political control.¹¹⁶ The domestic use of force campaign is contributing to increasing regime-society separation that ultimately is a threat to stability.¹¹⁷

The most recent shifts in doctrine occurred in 2000 when the Defensive Doctrine and more significantly in 2001 when a new edition of The Law on Defense were adopted. These adjustments reinforced an internal security focus by concentrating attention on terrorist and extremist activities. It also provided for a domestic role for the military when confronting a military force or counter-insurgency. The IMU could have been considered both until late 2001. With the ouster of the Taliban regime by the United States in 2001, the IMU shifted its tactics from insurgency to terrorism. The corresponding shift in military mission has provided an opportunity for reform. Counter-terrorism requires professionalism among the forces and a high level of training. Appointed in 2002, the Uzbek Minister of Defense, Kadyr Gulyamov a civilian, has grasped the opportunity to initiate changes in the military structure.¹¹⁸ A trusted lieutenant of Karimov, Gulyamov has emerged as an advocate for reform. In a relatively short time, he has succeeded in attacking some of the operational challenges associated with the second level of military development. He has sought to establish interoperability among units that tends to promote a national command function rather than a service command structure. More importantly, the 2000 and 2001 revisions to doctrine and structure vested increased responsibility in the Defense Minister for managing all national security relationships. Efforts to advance this initiative include integrating the border committee, the MoD, SNB, and the MOIS under a joint staff and increased control of financial resources by the MoD.

¹¹⁵ Author interview with informed Department of Defense source 6/03 and interview with S. Masurenko, Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome April 2003

¹¹⁶ *Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform*, International Crisis Group (*hereafter* ICG Asia Report #42) Asia Report #42 Osh/Brussels, December 2002:2

¹¹⁷ See Forster, Peter K. *Balancing American Involvement in Uzbekistan*, Connections, April 2003 for a broader discussion of social and regime separation.

¹¹⁸ Author interview with informed Department of Defense source 10/04

While seeking to increase the exchange of information within the security sector, Gulyamov has made progress in separating military training from that of security forces and is committed to professionalizing forces. Aided by the early efforts at creating a homogenous military, Gulyamov has sought to empower non-commissioned and young commissioned officers as part of the professionalizing process. His initial goal is to improve manpower quality, reduce the traditional Soviet top-down management, and develop individual initiative. Efforts at increasing responsibility and leadership at the NCO ranks have corresponded with reduced conscription times to twelve months and increasing the number of “contracted” troops.¹¹⁹ This is important because effective development of a soldier typically takes a minimum of two years. Conscription barely allowed for adequate training let alone inculcating any ideas regarding the military’s role in society. Currently, all Uzbek Special Forces and 30% of the army are “contract forces.” Gulyamov also has assumed a major role in improving combat readiness. He has re-organized forces into smaller units, increased mobility, and advocated the procurement of new armaments and the maintenance of the infrastructure that focuses on logistics and equipment repair.¹²⁰ Finally, Uzbek forces have participated in a number of joint exercises with NATO troops as well as regional exercise. Realistic training exercises are essential to implementing new operational and tactical functions. They also allow troops of different countries to interact that can be an important part of inculcating ideas such as civilian control and authority. Thus, exercises in which Uzbek forces are integrated with NATO or NATO-member forces tend to be beneficial; however, the benefit of exercises in other environs is often unproven.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Contracted is often viewed as being interchangeable with professional; however, in the case of the former Soviet Union it is better to assume a narrow definition of contracted meaning soldiers are paid at a sufficient level to make military service a profession. Professionalism among the armed forces from a western perspective involves the integration of a set of values and principles. It is not clear that this has yet occurred among contract troops in the former Soviet Union.

¹²⁰ Author interview with informed Department of Defense source 10/04

¹²¹ See McDermott, Roger N. *Kazakhstan’s Armed Forces: Reform or Decay?* Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2002:11 for a discussion of viability in non-NATO led operations.

On a systemic scale, Gulyamov believes the development of individual initiative will ultimately strengthen Uzbekistan. Occasionally quoting Harry S. Truman on the use of the military as an implement of democratization and social change, Gulyamov believes once these officers and NCOs have completed their military service they will continue to demand a decision-making role in their country's affairs. His efforts are being directly supported by the United States who now deploys permanent NCO trainers in Uzbekistan and regularly interacts with the Uzbek MoD. These actions in themselves have separated the MoD from the internal security services and the judiciary, a separation that is essential to promote broader reforms. Moreover, there is evidence of increased de-politicization of the military and increased social integration. Goals such as improving the social and living conditions of armed forces, integrating information technology and computer simulation in training, and general improvement in the training are encouraging. These processes represent significant steps towards developing a professional national army capable of responding to Uzbekistan's threats and to its civilian leadership. However, Gulyamov's reforms reflect a "leavening process" and will take time to translate to strategic changes. Thus, the extent to which these reforms will drive Uzbekistan towards democratic control of the armed forces not to mention the internal security sector remains dubious.

The Future of Reform: Challenges, Threats, and Opportunities

Notwithstanding the successes inherent with codifying the country's use of armed force and military power, separating the military from the internal security forces, and improving the capabilities and procurement processes, many other strategic issues of reform have been ignored. Generally, reforms associated with the development of civil society are lagging in Uzbekistan and thus threaten the security sector's ability to transition to democratic control. Little progress has been made in establishing a bicameral legislature that was promised to be in place by late 2004. Moreover, the *Majlis* has no oversight power or control of the budget. Second, media censorship continues in spite of statements that it ended in May 2002 and independent media outlets remain limited and under close scrutiny. There is little open discussion surrounding the role

of the military or internal security services nor is the budget transparent. Finally, only marginal steps have been made towards making the *som* convertible that is essential to opening the economy.¹²² As a result of limited reform in civil sector, progress in crucial measures of security sector reform such as planning, programming, budgeting is lacking. Furthermore, the reforms that have enhanced capability do not necessarily translate into democratic reform in the command and control structure. Assistance used to improve anti-terrorist capabilities and to procure new equipment has had limited impact on meaningful reforms in other cases.¹²³ Also, the extent to which training permeates beyond those officers and forces initially involved is limited. Another concern arises from the missions being assigned to newly trained units. American law prohibits the US military from training security sector personnel, thus Washington focuses on improving the military's counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist capabilities to meet the identified threats. While such training requires professionalism, it also establishes a precedent for increasing the use of the military domestically. There is an infusion of confidence among the forces and a level of reliability that is enticing to a regime confronting domestic unrest. Under such scrutiny, one also cannot completely discount either the willingness of the regime to use reliable forces in a domestic situation or the dual use capabilities of new equipment such as the BARS, light armored vehicles, which can be used for crowd control as well as combating insurgents.

A second challenge to broader security sector reform is the competition between the various parts of the security sector. The SNB because of its size and capabilities is a rival to the MoD. While inter-service rivalry exists in most states, enmity is further exacerbated by the competition for limited resource. In this context, governments have a tendency to support those organizations that best serve their interests at the moment. In the case of Uzbekistan, the SNB and the MoIS fill this role most significantly as the enforcer of the government's domestic policy as well as its efforts at counter-terrorism.

¹²² *Uzbekistan's Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?* International Crisis Group (*hereafter* ICG Asia Report #46) Asia Report #46, February 18, 2003:1

¹²³ McDermott, *Kazakhstan's Armed Forces: Reform or Decay?* June 2002:15

What all this means is that Gulyamov's reform efforts have placed him in conflict with the more status quo oriented internal security services. Ultimately this could be to his detriment. His close connections to the Karimov and his control of some resources allow him to remain a player in Uzbek politics. He is well liked in Washington, which also is not insignificant. Notwithstanding, the MoD is not a power ministry in the traditional sense in spite of a traditional role as an influential player behind the scenes. Gulyamov's lack of an intelligence gathering operation such as the Defense Intelligence Agency or the service intelligence operations makes him beholden to other security sector forces to be effective. It is widely accepted, that like the KGB, the SNB is more powerful than and tends to dominate the army. Its ability to gather intelligence on elites, its financial resources, and its tight ties to Karimov's clan, reinforce the rivalry. This point should not be minimized, if one considers that more than three years after 9/11, the American intelligence community still refuses to cooperate effectively. The inability of Uzbekistan's Minister of Defense to get relevant and pertinent information leaves him susceptible. At a minimum, he could quickly become marginalized. A worse case scenario results in him being blamed for failures that he may have prevented with appropriate sharing of information.

A third structural challenge is the lack of willingness among the internal security services to reform. The internal security services retain broad responsibilities beyond counter-espionage and intelligence gathering and have overlapping powers that include intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecution. Their ethnic homogeneity; the KGB's legacy for secrecy and autonomy, and the government's propensity to use all security sectors, including law enforcement components, as a political entity designed to protect the regime further obfuscate reform and separate them from society. Relative to the military, internal security forces tend to reflect the attitudes of their leadership largely because their recruitment comes from clans loyal to the regime rather than through national conscription.¹²⁴ The Interior Minister, Zohirjon Almatov, is perhaps Uzbekistan's most powerful minister and has succession

¹²⁴ Smith Dianne L., *Opening Pandora's Box: Ethnicity and Central Asian Militaries*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle PA 1998:16

possibilities. More critically, even as Uzbekistan continues to weather a public relations debacle surrounding its human rights abuses, Almatov has never reported to the Prime Minister or parliament and certainly has not been forced to face the press.¹²⁵

The prevalence of corruption, the regime separation emerging from increased suppression and the lack of reform, and the possibility of coalescence both between government and criminal elements and the IMU with other regional terrorist groups hinder reforms and potentially threaten the Uzbek state. It is within the context of coalescence and corruption that the close integration of the internal security services is a disservice to Uzbekistan. A case in point is the circumstances surrounding the National Border Guards. Although the first line of defense against infiltration by criminals and terrorists, these forces have been accused of being unwilling to take on tough and dangerous assignments.¹²⁶ Part of their inefficiency may result from poor treatment and training. However, part also may be attributed to complicity with criminal elements and potentially terrorists attempting to infiltrate Uzbekistan or trafficking illicit goods through Uzbekistan. The pay structure and living circumstances, for example border guards are expected to find their own transportation home for leave or at the end of their tours often from remote posts, make these forces susceptible to bribes. However, corruption is systemically endemic, is a barrier to reform, and promotes a coalescence between the government and criminal elements. Corruption flows throughout the system. At a micro-level, it is individual guard's being willing to accept a bribe to ignore the smuggling of drugs or small arms contributes. An example of the extent to which corruption is institutionalized within the security sector is the practice of parents bribing recruiters to ensure their sons are placed in "good" units or at a minimum to keep them out of the border guards. These payments are distributed throughout the chain of command.

The extent to which the security sector is corporately and individually profiting from smuggling and trafficking, conscription graft, and other illicit activities contributes to an unwillingness to accept reform. In

¹²⁵ Author interview with informed Department of Defense source 10/04

¹²⁶ ICG Asia Report #42 Osh/Brussels, December 2002:2

addition, corruption erodes civil control of the security sector. Corruption and related criminal activities increase the power and wealth and perpetuate a lack of accountability and increased autonomy. Finally, corruption broadly contributes to the creation of a sub-economy that subverts legitimate economic development and provides funding to subversive groups.

Systemic corruption also contributes to increasing social dissatisfaction and anti-regime sentiment. According to the International Crisis Group, the oil workers strike in the summer 2003; women's demonstrations in Tashkent, and even the April 2004 bombings in Tashkent are evidence of popular discontent.¹²⁷ Increased social discontentment results in animosity towards the security forces, which are primarily responsible for perpetrating the violence against society. The resulting regime separation de-legitimizes the government, gradually heightens sympathy for radical groups and ultimately enhances the recruitment of individuals by radical groups.

A second form of coalescence is that between radical groups and the government. While much more gradual and less obvious than the coalescence with criminal elements, heightened sympathy for radical Islamic groups inevitable threatens to permeate the government. Sympathy for groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir is growing across Central Asia because it offers an alternative to the current governance. Ahmed Rashid contends that Hizb ut-Tahrir sympathizers have been active in the military, intelligence services, and upper bureaucracy since 1999.¹²⁸ Such infiltrations are worrisome because it erodes the security sectors capability and willingness to combat those groups that are the greatest long-term threat to stability. It also ultimately may result in the internal security service actually supporting radical groups similar to the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence's support for Islamists. In this case, co-opted security services see democratic control as western neo-imperialism.

¹²⁷ Lewis, David, *Bad Analysis Makes for Bad Policy in Uzbekistan*, International Crisis Group EurasiaNet 5/20/40

¹²⁸ Rashid, Ahmed, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* Yale University Press, New London CT 2002:125

The regime's pre-occupation with Hizb ut-Tahrir also has inhibited its ability to effectively analyze the threat posed by a re-constituted IMU. In March 2004, then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet commented that the greatest threat facing American forces in Iraq was the coalescence of groups opposed to coalition presence and goals in that country.¹²⁹ According to the Tajikistan National Security Service head, the IMU has united with other groups to form the Islamic Movement of Central Asia. The IMU's coalescence with other Islamists and nationalist groups in Central Asia is a concern. Although probably possessing insufficient strength to be considered more than an annoyance to Uzbekistan at this time, it is a real threat to governments with less proficient security sectors such as Kyrgyzstan. An assessment by the International Crisis Group that the IMU is unorganized and small scale as a result of the defeat of the Taliban is contradicted by other reports, including those from US intelligence, that indicate the IMU has the capability to recruit and train nearly 5,000 guerrillas in a year and is suspected in a number of recent terrorist attacks.¹³⁰ Finally, the IMU continues to be involved in the Central Asian drug trade with a network of couriers that indicates a level of influence across the region as well as significant financial resources to fund operations.¹³¹

Regardless of whether the Uzbek government concentrates on Hizb ut-Tahrir, the IMU, or more probably both, the war on terrorism will continue to influence security sector reform. From a positive perspective, it will be a catalyst to on-going military re-organization that has already engendered a level of reform and caused a re-assessment of the traditional military concepts breaking the dominance of Russian strategic and operational thinking. The war on terrorism already has increased Western attention, boosted the distribution of resources to Central Asian governments, and augmented the presence of American and NATO forces in the region. Since 9/11, Karimov has combined a

¹²⁹ *The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context*, DCI Worldwide Threat Briefing, March 2004

¹³⁰ Blank, Stephen, *Pakistan Emerges as Threat to Regional Stability*, 6/18/04 and additional Eurasia Insight on-line www.eurasianet.org: 5/15/02 and 5/14/03

¹³¹ Miller, Justin L., "The Narco-Insurgent Nexus in Central Asia and Afghanistan" *National Interest* vol. 2 Issue 18 5/7/03. The IMU reportedly controlled as much as 70% of the heroin trafficking in 2000,

policy of bilateralism, focusing primarily on relations with the United States with discriminate regional collective security. Uzbekistan sees its partnership with the United States and NATO has an effective means of modernizing the armed forces and improving its capability against modern security threats.¹³² The Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework, which was concluded in July 2002, is a key feature in this relationship. It has produced a range of cooperative initiatives at multiple levels in the military. It also has stimulated a stable process for military diplomacy between the United States and Uzbekistan and improved the operational capabilities of Uzbek special operation forces, which is critical due to size and needs of the country.

However, some aspects of the war on terrorism such as the regime's use of the issue to suppress all opposition and even a long-term American presence have resulted in negative responses. American presence has not succeeded in achieving political, economic, and social reform. The impact of multiple interests including Iraq, and a growing dissatisfaction with the progress of reforms risks deflecting attention from Uzbekistan and Central Asia generally and encouraging fatigue in Washington. A decrease in engagement would simply feed extremism and should not be permitted. Opportunities for reform are greater with American and NATO presence than without.

Second, the inability to meet expectations has resulted in a decline in Uzbek public support for American involvement. In late 2001, support for American presence was nearly unanimous. In July 2002, that support had dropped to 60%.¹³³ Of greater concern is the increasing perception that American involvement in Central Asia is part of a broader war on Islam. Nearly, 5% of the Uzbek population view the war on terrorism as a war against Islam and believe that American military cooperation has increased Karimov's confidence and willingness to use force to oppress society.¹³⁴ Paraphrasing former US Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil, all politics is local and the Uzbek's care only to the extent that American

¹³² Author interview with informed sources in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹³³ Khadjimukhamedov, Marat, Deputy Director Ijtimoiy Fikr Public Opinion Center, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty www.isn.ethz.ch 2/26/02

¹³⁴ EurasiaNet Eurasian Insight on-line www.eurasianet.org 3/20/02

presence helps them solve their problems. Notwithstanding, Washington should evaluate this information and other circumstances realistically to avoid any misperception that Uzbekistan is an “island of stability.”

As previously noted, American efforts have been instrumental in helping Uzbekistan transition from developing a national military to establishing civil control. Three initiatives should be considered as a continued catalyst to reform. First, the United States should encourage Uzbekistan to maintain its internal security services and special operation forces as size appropriate for confronting the threat posed by terrorism. Within this context, it needs help identify the real threats to Uzbekistan. Second, it needs to apply real pressure on the Uzbek government to implement reforms needed to create civil society. The State Department’s decision to withhold \$18 million in funding was important but primarily symbolic as most, if not increased military funding erased all, of the deficit. Real pressure with consequence for non-compliance is needed to improve human rights, increase political participation, and allow the formal recognition of political opposition groups willing to seek change through a democratic process. Third, the United States should support the increase in the size of training initiative to include groups beyond the military. Within this context, it should consider supporting the permanent deployment of police trainers either from other NATO countries or private companies to complement military training efforts being made under the Strategic Partnership Agreement. Major parts of this training need to include changing the perceptions regarding the role of security services as protectors of the state and its population and demilitarizing services that serve human security needs such as emergency workers.

The final external factor influencing security sector reform is Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia. Uzbekistan eschewed Russian influence for a majority of its independence in favor of ties with the United States and other collective security arrangements. It provided 40% of the forces for *Centrazbat* and joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and GUUAM, among other regional organizations. Although an original member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty, which has metamorphosed into

the Collective Security Treaty Organization, it withdrew when Karimov became increasingly concerned about Russian motives. Karimov sought to separate but not completely divorce from Moscow even if the latter had been feasible. Beyond economic and cultural ties, Russia shares Uzbekistan's concerns regarding Islamic fundamentalism. Moscow also often is viewed by the regime as being less demanding than the United States and NATO with regard to reforms. Finally, it remains a source of military training, new equipment and spare parts. Uzbekistan views its cooperation with Russia and the 2004 Strategic Partnership with Moscow as complementing its ties with the United States.¹³⁵ However, these ties remain an obstacle to further reform particularly of the internal security services.

Security sector reform is dependent upon the internal and external environment. The circumstances in Uzbekistan are no exception. Internally, the lack of broader efforts at reform will retard, if not eliminate, security sector reform. The impact of external events including the intensification of the war on terrorism as exemplified by the April and July 2004 bombings in Tashkent, a re-constituted IMU, the continued American presence, and the recent rapprochement with Moscow also will continue to influence Uzbekistan's willingness and efforts at security sector reform. At this point, the best hopes for reform are continued support for the efforts of Defense Minister Gulyamov; a continued development of ties between Washington and Tashkent that corresponds with heightened American awareness of democratization as a method for establishing sustainable security and expanded efforts in this area, and balancing of Russian involvement that complements areas of common interest but also establishes the United States as a viable choice for reform.

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¹³⁵ Authors interview with informed Ministry of Foreign Affairs source.

Charles Harns

MIGRATION, STATE SECURITY AND REGIONAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

On behalf of IOM, I would like to thank the organisers, particularly the Austrian Ministry of Defence, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the PfP Consortium overall for arranging this important meeting, and for the invitation for IOM to participate.

This forum provides a unique opportunity for IOM to discuss issues related to migration and security with the PfP community. I want to take advantage of this special context to focus not so much on programmes or activities, but more so on what I see as some of the key conceptual and strategic issues. If time allows I will make a few references to projects and programmes toward the end, and the manner in which such initiatives might reinforce the overall strategic elements.

Many of you know IOM well, but perhaps some would benefit from a brief refresher. IOM is an inter-governmental organisation with, currently 105 Member and 27 Observer States, and I want to acknowledge the IOM Member and Observer States in this meeting – nearly all the representations here today. We are not North American, nor Latin American or European, nor African or Asian; we are neither a developed States' organisation nor a developing States' organisation. We are, indeed, truly global and reflective of the diverse points of view as well as the growing common ground on migration issues in the world community. Our headquarters is in Geneva, though by far the largest presence we have is in the field, around the world in our more than 200 offices. At present we have over 4000 operational staff working in over 1200 active projects with a current budgetary value of over US dollars 600 million. While our work on projects is significant, we are both a policy and a project organisation, helping the world community to reflect upon, shape, enact and re-shape cooperative approaches to migration management.

With that preface, I would now like to touch upon the following points in support of our agenda here today: 1) the link, or nexus, between migration and security; and 2) the ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma concerning the debate on what should come first, democratic governance and structures, or inputs and assistance in the security sector. I will draw a few conclusions, perhaps obvious ones, and if time permits will return to the issue of programming and what capacity-building and technical cooperation in the migration and security area actually means in project terms.

The events of September 11th opened up a new set of challenges for all of us who work in the area of migration – whether we work with governments, international organisations, academic institutions, NGOs or from other bases. We were immediately and dramatically challenged to consider the relationship between migration and terrorism, and between migration and security more generally. The soul-searching and conclusion-reaching was not easy, and in fact continues to this day, though the dust, literally, has long-ago settled on the instigating events.

In this process we, as a community involved in migration management, have learned quite a lot. There has been a great deal of activity in the areas of policy, law, regulation and operations, and perhaps foremost in the area of internal and international government cooperation in those areas where migration management and security management complement one another.

IOM, for our part, has taken lessons from the 11th September events and from the follow-up to those events. We understand our role to be one of assisting all concerned to articulate the common edges between migration and security, and to assist government efforts to put in place more effective practices to ensure that the migration sector is contributing effectively in the overall efforts toward increased security, while providing as well appropriate balance in the areas of the facilitation of normal movement of persons and protection of the vulnerable.

If there is a common understanding that has emerged thus far in the process of examining the migration and security nexus, it is that migration management should not be considered the leading edge in efforts to eliminate terrorism and security threats. However, the area of migration is none the less an essential area for action in this regard. This raises the practical and political issue of how to organise migration management to best contribute to the agenda of improved security and, for all countries but particularly for countries of limited resources and capacities, where best to place investments in the migration sector. Let me take just a couple of minutes to explore those points and draw some preliminary conclusions.

First, how to organise migration management to best contribute to the agenda of improved security. Some of the recent strategic responses in the migration sector to the new security concerns subsume migration within an overall security response, even at times moving migration management into the security portfolio in organisational terms. The U.S. response, integrating most of what was the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into Homeland Security, can be seen in this light. While this may appear to be entirely new and, to some, somewhat troubling, there is historical precedent.

For example, in the years immediately preceding the United States' entrance into World War II, around 1940, the US INS was moved from the Labor Department into the Department of Justice, which then had the brief for domestic security. The move was explicitly for reasons of national security. Immigration was seen as a means of entry, infiltration and subversion by the enemy. A filter of security, with a very fine mesh, was put in place over the migration sector, with strategies that included fingerprinting of all aliens and requirements to regularly report, among other actions. In retrospect, some of the actions taken were of questionable security value and could not, with history as a judge, be justified. Over time, after the threat subsided, migration management in the U.S. was put back on a more independent and diverse track, but it never lost its relationship with security management and in fact stayed within the Department of Justice until its recent transformation into

Homeland Security – a move which was meant to further strengthen its service to security concerns.

The arguments for caution voiced in the United States at the time the recent reorganisation was being considered¹³⁶ parallel in many ways the cautions and concerns that are sometimes heard in regard to the Central Asian countries', and many other developing or transition countries', approaches to migration and security. It was feared that linking migration and security too closely would encourage a culture of fear of the foreign-born, discrimination and even active oppression of groups of persons by race, religion or national origin, and generally a weakening of democratic values and the culture of plurality of the United States. Further, it was feared that much improved operational systems, such as border data and visa application systems, would become tools for enabling discrimination and violations of human rights. Emphasising that "the very purpose of anti-terrorist initiatives is to preserve the fundamental rights and democratic institutions that terrorism seeks to undermine and destroy",¹³⁷ some observers made the case that the general trend toward a security-first approach was counterproductive and could become, though inadvertently, supportive of the terrorists' goals.

While these observers in the U.S. and other developed democracies were afraid of regression, in the Central Asian context the argument may be a bit different: that strong action linking migration and security will, for the same reasons, stall progress toward the achievement of cultures of plurality and toward general democratisation. Countering terrorism could provide a dense and convenient cover to maintain or intensify repressive practices of various kinds. Political opposition groups, including those advocating more open and democratic societies, might be conveniently sidelined or silenced as threats to national security. State resources needed for development initiatives could instead be re-directed into the security and military spheres, and foreign assistance might be similarly re-prioritised.

¹³⁶ Meissner, Doris. *After the Attacks: Protecting Borders and Liberties*. Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief. 8 November 2001

¹³⁷ *Report on Terrorism and Human Rights*. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States. 22 October 2002

These are all reasonable concerns, and good questions to ask. The difficulty is that the argument can quickly become polarised with, from one side, improved security being seen as antithetical to democratic values and human rights. While from the other side this perceived trade-off is at times acknowledged as unfortunate but necessary. In either case in this polarised perspective, as security advances, democratic values retreat. There are, however, many in the middle, including IOM, trying to balance the equation.

Within this debate the focus of attention is often on issues of political will and national character and values. Concern is expressed about initiatives to build security in the migration sector, and other sectors, in countries that do not have strong democratic traditions. These traditions are at times seen as prerequisite for investment in the security sector. Building democratic culture in the Central Asian and other countries is seen as the first and main challenge. This is not unreasonable, but I would suggest it its only part of the picture or part of the challenge.

Achieving effective security within the migration sphere requires not only the political will, but also the capacity to pursue security in migration effectively. In Central Asia, a good case can be made that, even assuming the political will, the capacities to work in internationally-acceptable ways in this sector are still weak. A heavy-handed approach can be, at times, as much the result of lack of options as lack of will and perspective. Let me provide a couple of examples of how this is played out in the migration sector.

One of the most nettlesome methods of immigration enforcement under recent scrutiny is that of group profiling, whether at borders, in visa application processes or in interior management strategies. Profiling is routinely criticised for its potential to abridge the rights of individuals unfairly, through guilt-by-association. It is instructive, though, that profiling is at times also criticised by law enforcement professionals due to its ineffectiveness. “Many law enforcement professions view profiling

as crude and, ultimately, inadequate substitute for behaviour-based enforcement and effective intelligence gathering.”¹³⁸

But to use the better options requires capacity and experience, and countries with fewer resources or less-developed governance and human resource development systems may have limited choices in this regard. Effective intelligence gathering in the migration sphere, which might inform activities against trans-national organised criminal elements in the migration sector (smugglers of arms and illicit goods; traffickers of human beings; and perhaps terrorist cells intermixed with these criminal elements), requires highly trained people and well-supported structures, and well-developed cooperation with neighbouring and other countries. When these are weak or absent, ‘traditional’ and often heavy-handed approaches, which may also be less effective, will endure out of necessity. Neither democratic values nor national and regional security advances under this scenario.

Another example is in the area of traveller pre-inspection and border checkpoint management. In Central Asia, data systems to support normal traveller inspection are present only at some borders, though major programmes are underway and others are planned, and none of the states to my knowledge has the capacity for Advance Passenger Information/Processing (API/APP) approaches that would allow for pre-screening air passengers before arriving at their air borders. These air borders are important transit points, as well as point of destination. None of the Central Asian countries have Airline Liaison Officers posted abroad at key departure airports. These approaches are in wide use by developed and highly democratic countries, and their judicious use can provide an alternative to unusually broad, group-based screenings and possible exclusions at the air ports-of-entry. Again, a lack of capacity provides an open door for more arbitrary and perhaps heavy-handed enforcement actions at the border. Where capacity and experience is lacking, it becomes difficult to distinguish between lack of political will and lack of means and experience.

¹³⁸ Chishti, Muzaffar. *Immigration and Security Post-Sept. 11*. Migration Policy Institute. 1 August 2002

Allow me to further illustrate the point in relation to green border management, which is probably more important than air border management in Central Asia, with a personal recollection from Afghanistan shortly after the fall of the Taliban regime.

I recall sitting in a sparse basement room in Kabul in a heavily-guarded compound with a senior Afghan official in early 2002, discussing the problems this official had in controlling the green borders. He noted even then that the movement of illicit goods and questionable people across Afghanistan's borders into and from Central Asia was increasing quickly, that this was in his view a threat to civil order, and that he had no real capacity to stop this. He had few staff, at best a handful of vehicles, no equipment and, at that time, his staff had no access to training. He noted that he had had many visitors telling him to please solve the problem. He was willing, even anxious to address these problems but did indeed lack the capacity to do very much. Today, it seems clear that the illicit movement of drugs and malafide persons into and out of Afghanistan, including to and from Central Asia, is a serious security threat. There was, and still is, political will to address this issue, but capacity, though increasing, remains weak. In Afghanistan, as in neighbouring Central Asian countries, if capacity is not strengthened the security threats could very well increase and the nascent democratic structures could be significantly threatened.

In the developed democratic states, approaches to security, including in the migration sector, are based on balanced policy and legal frameworks, and are enacted through robust operational systems. In less-resourced states without strong democratic traditions it is not only the lack of democratic traditions that inhibits appropriate security responses in the migration sector; it is the lack of capacity to handle security in more balanced ways – a lack of alternatives and models, and the means to enact them.

This suggests to me that providing assistance to build migration management systems, inclusive of policy, legal and operational elements should be a major priority. We need to remove lack of capacity from the equation if we are to see clearly where lack of political will and

resistance to democratic values are the main obstacles. Building capacities in migration management is part of a process of nation-building. Strongly democratic states have strong intelligence and law enforcement systems. Weakness in security does not necessarily correlate with higher standards in human rights or democratic governance.

To encourage democratisation alongside improved security, then, implies focusing strong attention on capacity building in selected areas of migration management. Capabilities in the right areas can provide options to using approaches that are, at least, questionable.

Central Asia's role in regional and international cooperation to combat terrorism is particularly important. It is not just another region of the world that needs attention; it is a region in close proximity to known threats and is, at the same time, a region with limited capacities to take effective national action and to support sophisticated partnerships in joint security management. While there may be places where political will is lacking, the primary obstacle in many locales is that of capacity and the lack of sustained support to development of that capacity. What we, at IOM, see in the migration sector in this regard may be representative of the overall governance situation.

I would encourage, then, continuing and intensifying a process of engagement and monitoring, and in fact this is the approach in Central Asia from most partners or donors. In that sense, my message is that we, the international community including the Central Asian governments, are, increasingly, doing this right in that region. It is unrealistic and counter-productive to link the initiation of capacity building investments in migration and security with the a priori achievement of high democratic standards. Rather the process of engagement through capacity building and technical cooperation activities should serve to build trust and confidence toward the achievement of the broader governance goals. The process of engagement also presents opportunities for evaluation and monitoring of the use of new capacities, which can inform the broader democratisation initiatives. Security can certainly be a prerequisite for democratic reform and growth.

Democratic reform can not always be a prerequisite for measured investments in security.

I have not, in this paper, discussed another important area of migration management linked with security: that of economic development. IOM has long viewed migration and development as intimately linked. Clearly economic pressures fuel much of the world's migration, both regular and irregular. Similarly, development issues are increasingly being linked with prevention of terrorism. The rationale for addressing development concerns from a migration perspective are reinforced by this connection: enhancing economic and community development in areas of high migration pressure is reasonable not only from the point of view of reducing pressures for irregular migration, and reducing the strength of smuggling and trafficking networks, but is also reasonable as a prophylactic measure to prevent the rise of disaffected groups that may be prone to enter into terrorist activities.

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored an excellent research report on the use of development cooperation as a tool in preventing terrorism.¹³⁹ I would recommend that those of you who have not seen it take a close look at this report. It can provide a useful basis for broader discussions on the links between nation building and human security in Central Asia and other parts of the world.

Let me close now with brief reference to the issue of programming and what capacity-building and technical cooperation in the migration and security area actually means in programme and project terms. IOM works in this sector primarily through the following kinds of initiatives: 1) Strengthening border systems, including the entry/exit data systems and the 'business process' used to manage border checkpoints; 2) Providing technical guidance and support to the improvement of travel documents and their issuance systems, particularly passports; 3) Building national capacities in the area of staff training and human

¹³⁹ Kivimäki, Timo. *Development cooperation as an instrument in the prevention of terrorism: Research Report*. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS), Copenhagen. July 2003 (for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark)

resource development in relevant Ministries and Departments; 4) Providing technical support and assistance to combat smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, including enhancing immigration service and law enforcement capacities to investigate these phenomena; 5) Enabling technical cooperation and policy planning between and among the involved states in sub-regions, and between the concerned regions; 6) Providing technical support to the development of new policy, legal and regulatory frameworks to support this sector; and, on the preventative side, 7) Providing programmes that enhance economic and community development in areas of high migration pressure.

I want to note as well the approach IOM undertook when launching this general programme framework in the former Soviet Union in the mid-1990s. While we were pursuing and encouraging the development of many of the noted governmental capacities, we understood the importance of encouraging the role of civil society in balancing and augmenting the governments' direct roles in migration management.

During that time we launched, in parallel to the government capacity building programmes, NGO capacity building programmes in the migration sector. Our goal was to encourage and enable NGOs to take on the normal advocacy, research and direct service roles that civil society normally fulfils in the migration sector. It is important and sensible, wherever possible, to build both capacities together – governmental and civil society.

Our programming approach also included then, and still does, the development sector: working to improve economic and social conditions in areas of high migration pressure. Micro-enterprise and employment-linked training projects, and projects to ensure basic community infrastructure, generally characterise these programmes in the former Soviet Union and in other parts of the world.

Migration as a theme is closely linked with many of the issues of concern to the Consortium's Study Groups. I hope that these comments will prove helpful in advancing the agenda and the overall goal of the

Study Groups, and provide a basis for further discussion of migration within the PFP processes.

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Шанхайская организация сотрудничества – инструмент региональной безопасности в Центральной Азии?

Abstract

The situation is being determined by five factors:

- 1) In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan conspirative extremist sects and organizations have developed. ‘*Hizb-ut-Tahrir*’, for example, tries to extend its influence not only in Southern Kazakhstan, but in the whole country.
- 2) A clash between Uigur terrorists and policemen in the city of Almaty in 2000 revealed the links of the Uigur to foreign Islamist extremists and the Uigur Diaspora in Kazakhstan.
- 3) A strong Chechen Diaspora, which has links to Chechnya, does exist in Kazakhstan.
- 4) There exists no common approach in Kazakhstan concerning determined action against extremism.
- 5) Still widespread corruption among civil servants (among them civil-servants in the judiciary sector and security services) hinders the effective fight against terrorism and extremism.

With respect to the steadily more complicated situation and the rising activities of international terrorists and extremists in the region, the Shanghai Organisation for Cooperation can play an important role. Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of these organizations.

Современные международные политические процессы происходят на фоне реальных угроз и вызовов, исходящих от международных террористических и экстремистских групп, прикрывающихся исламом. Однозначно, что мировое сообщество заинтересовано в скорейшей ликвидации этих сил, так как сейчас существует лишь одна дилемма: человечество или терроризм, право или несправедливость, цивилизация или мракобесие. В мире нарастает понимание того, что победу над терроризмом в 21 веке, так же как и победу над фашизмом в 20 веке, можно одержать объединенными усилиями всех народов и стран мира. При этом, на наш взгляд, ведущую роль в организации борьбы против терроризма может взять на себя только ООН.

В ходе глобальной и длительной войны с терроризмом неизбежно возникновение различных вариантов блокирования мировых и региональных держав. Глобальные игроки, исходя из опыта предыдущих двух мировых войн, будут просчитывать различные модели развития миропорядка и предполагаемые сферы влияния после победы над терроризмом. В этой ситуации конкуренция за ведущую роль в Центральной Азии между США, Россией, Китаем и ЕС будет обостряться.

Центральная Азия является уникальным регионом. На первый взгляд, у государств региона много общего: религия, национальные, культурные обычаи и традиции, сходство менталитетов и национальных языков.

Попытки наладить социально-экономические связи между странами региона предпринимались неоднократно. Создавались организации (Центрально-Азиатский союз, Центрально-Азиатское экономическое сообщество), подписывались многосторонние документы (например, Договор от 1994 года о создании единого экономического пространства, предполагавший, в частности, обеспечение свободного перемещения товаров, услуг, капиталов, рабочей силы, осуществлении согласованной таможенной и валютной политики).

1 ноября 2004 г. в Астане состоялась 3-я конференция министров стран-членов Центрально-Азиатского регионального экономического сотрудничества (Азербайджана, Казахстана, КНР, Кыргызстана, Монголии, Таджикистана) с участием руководителей Азиатского и Исламского банков развития, Европейского банка реконструкции и развития, Международного валютного фонда, Всемирного банка. Точками взаимодействия экономики ЦАЭС являются энергетика, транспорт и торговля. Азиатский банк развития предполагает финансирование 14 займовых проектов на сумму 295,3 млн. долларов и 33 проекта технической помощи на сумму 18,5 млн. долларов. Уже утверждены проекты концепции формирования консорциума по вопросам транспорта и водно-энергетических ресурсов, достигнута договоренность о возможности создания в формате ЦАРС газового консорциума. Но по разным причинам объективного и субъективного порядка эти благие пожелания до сих пор не претворены в жизнь, хотя в регионе накопилось много нерешенных проблем – рациональное использование водно-энергетических ресурсов, транспортное сообщение, унификация тарифов, незаконная миграция, делимитация и демаркация государственных границ, которые не могут быть решены каким-либо государством в одиночку. Хотя решение этих проблем в существенной мере позволит ликвидировать предпосылки к возникновению радикальных настроений у части населения стран Центральной Азии и «выбить почву» из-под ног у всевозможных пропагандистов терроризма и экстремизма, которые не прочь воспользоваться трудностями транзитного периода.

Разные подходы стран региона к организации регионального экономического сотрудничества сохраняются и сегодня. Так, если Казахстан предлагает в первую очередь создать водно-энергетический, транспортный и продовольственный консорциумы, то Узбекистан выступает за создание Центральноазиатского общего рынка. На 59-й сессии Генеральной ассамблеи ООН в сентябре с.г. министр иностранных дел РК предложил создать в Центральной Азии Центр по вопросам превентивной дипломатии, а его узбекский коллега призвал создать Региональный информационный

и координационный центр борьбы с трансграничными преступлениями, связанными с наркотиками.

В связи с этим внешняя политика и политика безопасности Казахстана не может не учитывать следующие факторы:

- Обостряющаяся конкуренция за ведущую роль в регионе между США, Россией, Китаем;
- сохраняющаяся разобщенность стран Центральной Азии, несмотря на различные инициативы о региональной кооперации и интеграции;
- нарастающая угроза терроризма и религиозного экстремизма в Узбекистане и в России, незримо соединенная с этими негативными явлениями деятельность наркосиндикатов и международной организованной преступности;
- необратимость процесса вовлечения Казахстана и других стран региона в мировые экономические процессы, необходимость активизации интеграционных процессов, в которых участвует Казахстан;
- наличие в регионе значительных запасов энергоресурсов;
- эгоистические интересы транснациональных корпораций, деятельность которых не всегда осуществляется в русле политики национальных государств, а в некоторых случаях и определяет такую политику;
- в условиях роста цен на нефть резко возрастает значение Центральной Азии как нефте- и газобывающего региона;
- поскольку региональная интеграция не стоит в повестке дня, в условиях, когда отдельные страны региона находятся в критическом состоянии, для Казахстана средством обеспечения национальной безопасности являются политика разноскоростной и разноуровневой интеграции с постсоветскими государствами, с одной стороны, участие в региональных системах безопасности, с другой.

Нельзя упускать из виду, что хотя в Казахстане, благодаря осуществляемым социально-экономическим и политическим реформам, практически отсутствуют предпосылки для возникновения террористической и экстремистской деятельности, в

соседних странах региона, в первую очередь, в Афганистане, сохраняется сложная ситуация. Продолжаются попытки определенных внешних сил направить в страны региона эмиссаров для дестабилизации внутривнутриполитической ситуации.

В заявлении Государственного департамента США от 26 октября 2004 г. обращается внимание на то, что экстремистские группировки, такие как ИДУ, имеющие связи с «Аль-Кайдой», активизировали свою деятельность в Центральной Азии и могут планировать здесь террористические акты.

Даже в таком контролируемом государстве как Китай, 1 ноября 2004 г. в провинции Хенан произошли беспорядки на этнической и религиозной почве между мусульманским меньшинством «хуйзу» (в КНР их насчитывается 20 млн. чел.; в Центральной Азии их называют дунганями) и ханьцами, в результате которых погибло более 150 человек.

Не нужно питать иллюзий относительно того, что Казахстан изолирован от глобальных угроз и вызовов по следующим причинам.

Во-первых, в Казахстане, как и в Узбекистане, Кыргызстане, Таджикистане созданы глубоко законспирированные экстремистские секты и организации.¹⁴⁰

Организация «Хизб-ут-Тахрир» не прекращает попыток создать сеть своих организаций не только на юге Казахстана, но и в других областях. По данным пресс-службы КНБ РК, с 2000 по 2004 годы к ответственности за незаконную деятельность, призывы к насильственному свержению конституционного строя и разжигание религиозной вражды привлечено 14 активистов партии «Хизб-ут-Тахрир» в Южно-Казахстанской и Павлодарской областях и Алматы.

¹⁴⁰ www.knb.kz., 12.10.2004.

С начала 2004 года зарегистрированы случаи распространения листовок «Хизб-ут-Тахрир» в Шымкенте, Туркестане, Кентау, Павлодаре, Кокшетау. Большое количество литературы и листовок изъято в студенческих общежитиях Алматы. Если в 2003 году в Казахстане было изъято одна тысяча листовок «Хизб-ут-тахрира», то в 2004 году – уже 11 тысяч.¹⁴¹

13 сентября 2004 года в г. Кокшетау было задержано 12 жителей Акмолинской области, причастных к незаконной деятельности «Хизб-ут-Тахрир». Во время обысков по месту жительства задержанных были изъяты книги, брошюры, журналы, листовки экстремистского содержания, а также денежные средства, собранные с членов этой организации.¹⁴²

В октябре 2004 года к двум годам лишения свободы был приговорен 31-летний А. Ниязов, задержанный в апреле 2004 года на рынке поселка Абай Сарыагашского района ЮКО за распространение листовок «Хизб-ут-Тахрира», призывающих к религиозной вражде. В октябре 2004 года на два года условно с двухлетним испытательным сроком был осужден 29-летний житель Караганды Ф. Абдугапаров, у которого было обнаружено 850 листовок экстремистского толка В 1999-2004 гг. Казахстаном было выдано 21 иностранцев, в основном граждан Китая, Узбекистана, Кыргызстана, вербовавших граждан РК для экстремистской деятельности на территории других стран. Только в Узбекистан из Казахстана за последние три года была экстрадировано пять узбекских граждан, подозреваемых в активном участии в незаконных экстремистских организациях и причастности к террористической деятельности.

О том, что деятельность организации «Хизб-ут-Тахрир» носит далеко не безобидный характер, свидетельствует факт избиения у подъезда собственного дома журналистки А.Буриевой. Ранее, этой журналисткой было подготовлено три материала на телеканале «Астана», в которых она попыталась раскрыть пагубное воздействие на современное общество деятельности организации

¹⁴¹ www.knb.kz.12.10.2004.

¹⁴² Акмолинская правда, 23.09.2004.

«Хизб-ут-Тахрир». При этом ценные вещи у журналистки не были похищены, а на телефон дома было сброшено сообщение: «Лучше плохой мир, чем хорошая война».¹⁴³

В конце февраля и начале марта 2004 г. на территории Карагандинской области пытались вести пропаганду две группы представителей радикально -ваххабитской организации «Таблиги Джамаат» из Узбекистана, Кыргызстана, Южно-Казахстанской области и Алматы.

В январе 2004 г. в Министерство юстиции РК обратился с заявлением о регистрации религиозное объединение «Республиканский центр сайентологии Казахстана и Центральной Азии», объединяющее 4 таких организаций на территории Казахстана. После проверки этому центру было отказано в регистрации.¹⁴⁴

Во-вторых, боевое столкновение в Алматы в 2000 году боевиков «уйгурской террористической организации» с алматинскими полицейскими, в ходе которой несколько казахстанских полицейских было убито и ранено, показало высокий уровень подготовки террористов и налаженные связи этой организации не только с зарубежными исламскими центрами, но и с уйгурской диаспорой в Казахстане.

В-третьих, в Казахстане присутствует многочисленная чеченская диаспора, сохранившаяся в нашей стране после сталинской депортации, представители которой поддерживают тесные связи со своими соплеменниками в Чечне. Так, в последнее время в Алакольском районе Алматинской области появилось много чеченцев-инвалидов, характер увечий которых дает основания предполагать, что они получены не в быту, а во время боевых столкновений.¹⁴⁵ О влиянии чеченской диаспоры свидетельствует тот факт, что пост заместителя руководителя Духовного управления

¹⁴³ Аргументы и факты - Казахстан, 29.09.2004.

¹⁴⁴ Казахстанская правда, 18.06.2004.

¹⁴⁵ Аргументы и факты - Казахстан, № 41/2004.

мусульман Казахстана занимает этнический чеченец, бывший муфтий Чечни, выступающий с резкой критикой антитеррористической операции, проводимой российскими федеральными силами в Чечне.

В-четвертых, в Казахстане нет единства в отношении необходимости принятия решительных действий по противодействию экстремизму. С одной стороны, Верховный суд РК по представлению Генеральной прокуратуры РК 15 октября с.г. запретил на территории страны деятельность четырех международных организаций («Аль-Кайеда», «Исламская партия Восточного Туркестана», «Курдский народный конгресс», «Исламское движение Узбекистана») на основании того, что их деятельность направлена на подрыв конституционного строя и разжигание межнациональной розни.

Во время обсуждения в Мажилисе Парламента РК в сентябре 2004 г. проекта закона «О противодействии экстремистской деятельности» депутат А. Айталы заявил, что в «демократическом обществе нельзя совмещать понятия «экстремизм» и «экстремистская деятельность». Как считает депутат, граждане могут иметь дома литературу профашистского характера, читать эти книги, разделять эту точку зрения, но никаких действий не предпринимать. А арестовывать лишь на основании того, что человек читает такую литературу, незаконно.¹⁴⁶

Е. Жовтис, директор Казахстанского международного бюро по правам человека, на «круглом столе» «Антитеррористическая система в Казахстане: иллюзии, реальность и перспективы» 26 октября 2004 г. заявил, что он противник одобренного Мажилисом закона «О противодействии экстремизму». По его словам, «если мы принимаем закон о противодействии экстремистской деятельности, то говорим, что у нас есть экстремистская деятельность, и она достигла значительных форм, и без закона с ней бороться невозможно. Мы ее искусственно переводим в разряд более

¹⁴⁶ Известия-Казахстан, 28.09.2004.

серьезной угрозы, которой пока еще нет. У нас есть целый ряд положений законодательства, которые содержат все необходимые правовые ресурсы и нормы для борьбы с экстремизмом и терроризмом»¹⁴⁷.

В-пятых, эффективной борьбе с терроризмом и экстремизмом препятствует коррумпированность чиновников, в том числе из правоохранительных органов и правовой нигилизм значительной части граждан.

Так, несмотря на ужесточение контроля за оборотом взрывчатых веществ, их хищения продолжают иметь место на предприятиях, где эти материалы используются в производстве. Например, в Акмолинской области, основной канал незаконного поступления взрывчатых веществ – хищения и злоупотребления работников «ГМК Казахалтын», имеющих доступ к их хранению и производству взрывных работ на шахтах. Воруют, продают, мастерят самодельные взрывные устройства и пытаются сбыть, нисколько не задумываясь о страшных последствиях. Только в 2004 году в Акмолинской области из незаконного оборота было изъято 3 самодельных взрывных устройства, общим весом в 18 кг. в тротиловом эквиваленте, самодельная подрывная машинка, 3 электродетонатора, 10 капсулей детонаторов заводского изготовления, 18.25 кг взрывчатого вещества «аммонит», 20 метров подрывного шнура.

В связи с осложнением ситуации в регионе и активизацией деятельности международных террористических и экстремистских организаций существенную роль в борьбе против этих угроз может сыграть ШОС.

В августе-сентябре 2004 г. были проведены совместные международные антитеррористические учения в рамках ШОС, с участием казахстанских и китайских военнослужащих, причем как на территории РК, так и на территории КНР. 17 июня 2004 г. в

¹⁴⁷ Экспресс К, 27.10.2004.

Ташкенте была официально открыта Региональная антитеррористическая структура (РАТС), предназначенная для координации обмена информацией в сфере борьбы с терроризмом.

29 сентября 2004 г. в Бишкеке состоялось заседание глав правительств ШОС. Глава правительства РК Д. Ахметов отметил, что участие в ШОС является одним из приоритетов казахстанской внешней политики. При этом Казахстан выступает за углубление сотрудничества в транспортной отрасли, за дальнейшее расширение прямых торгово-экономических связей в рамках ШОС, в частности, за создание совместных производств в различных отраслях, в частности, в легкой и пищевой промышленности. Большое значение в Казахстане придается совместным действиям в области охраны окружающей среды и сохранения экологического равновесия.

В октябре 2004 г. Россия, Белоруссия, Казахстан, Кыргызстан и Китай объявили о создании Евразийской группы по противодействию легализации преступных доходов и финансирования терроризма.

Важную роль в борьбе с современными вызовами и угрозами приобретает двустороннее сотрудничество, в частности, казахстанско-китайское сотрудничество. В последние годы Китай предоставил для казахстанских вооруженных сил автомобили высокой проходимости, оргтехнику, тыловое оборудование. В ближайшее время казахстанской армии будет оказана помощь в размере 30 млн. юаней (3,6 млн. долларов). Рассматривается возможность обучения казахстанских курсантов в военно-морских училищах КНР, а также поставки для ВМС РК китайских военных катеров.¹⁴⁸

В соответствии с подписанным 23 декабря 2002 года в Пекине Соглашением о сотрудничестве в борьбе с терроризмом, сепаратизмом и экстремизмом, налаживается сотрудничество

¹⁴⁸ Экспресс К, 12.10.2004.

между правоохранительными органами и специальными службами Казахстана и Китая. В ходе первого в истории отношений спецслужб двух стран визита министра государственной безопасности Китая Сюй Юньюе в Казахстан 12 октября 2004 г. были подведены итоги двустороннего сотрудничества и обсуждены перспективы дальнейшего развития в рамках региональной и международной безопасности. Было подтверждено намерение поднять на качественно новый уровень взаимодействие в борьбе с международным терроризмом и экстремизмом, организованной преступностью и наркобизнесом.

Особое место в двусторонних отношениях занимает ситуация в Синьцзян-Уйгурском автономном районе. Министр иностранных дел КНР Ли Чжаосин, выступая на второй встрече министров иностранных дел государств-членов СВМДА в г. Алматы в октябре 2004 г., заявил, что террористические силы Восточного Туркестана (СУАР) представляют «серьезную угрозу не только Китаю, но и безопасности и стабильности целого региона».¹⁴⁹

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¹⁴⁹ Республика, 29.10.2004.