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Dilemmas of Reform in Jiang Zemin’s China, by Andrew J. Nathan, Zhaohui Hong, and Steven R. Smith (eds.)
9. A Survey of Beijing Residents
With the death of Deng Xiaoping, discussion about the future political development of China is once again in the spotlight. In fact, debate over the viability of the current political regime in China started immediately after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. The prospects for reform in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the fate of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) projected by China watchers were then overwhelmingly pessimistic. 1 Seven years after the Tiananmen Square events, the survival of the CCP against all odds (including the aftermath of the collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) is in itself no small miracle. The post-Tiananmen political regime in China has been, by and large, stable. Not only has the CCP survived, it has also made impressive economic progress in the past seven years. This new development has caused a major reassessment of the situation in the PRC among China watchers. The New York Times called the phenomenon of China’s rapid economic growth in an authoritarian environment the “riddle of China.” 2 One China specialist even posed the question whether China is where Samuel Huntington’s “third wave” stopped and whether the PRC would be an exception to the fall of communism worldwide. 3
The most often-cited factors to account for the political tranquillity in the PRC are the remarkable economic growth and political oppression. 4 These two factors are certainly indispensable in understanding developments in China after 1989. However, they alone fall short of providing us with a satisfactory and convincing explanation of the “China exception.” Economic growth in and by itself does not directly contribute to political stability. In fact, it has been argued that economic development and modernization lead to political instability. 5 Also, it is simplistic to argue that the survival of the current communist leadership in the PRC is mainly due to political repression such as arrests and terror. A heavy-handed approach to controlling the population was adopted during the immediate aftermath of the June Fourth crackdown in some urban centers. Since then, tight political control has been replaced by a more relaxed approach by the government in dealing with the discontent among the masses, even though the high-profiled dissidents are still either imprisoned or under constant police harassment. It is a fact that criticisms of or even cursing the CCP and its leaders are not uncommon in China today. 6
This study, which is based on a survey of permanent residents of Beijing or residents with Beijing hukou (“residential registration”), intends to tap the mood and feelings of ordinary people in China regarding levels of political interest and democratic values, attitudes toward economic reform, evaluations of government performance in different policy areas, and levels of satisfaction and confidence generally. The survey had two purposes. The first purpose was fact-finding. Simply put, it was to find out what ordinary Beijing residents thought about political issues. The second purpose was to see where China was heading with regard to its political future, for public opinion does affect public policy. In a recent book, Allen Liu argues that post-Mao economic and political reforms should be considered as a result more of public opinions—which had grown too strong for the Communist Party leaders to ignore after the death of Mao Zedong—and less of the political motivations of any individual leaders. 7 The fact that the government has made noticeable efforts to control inflation and combat official corruption is evidence that the leaders and their policies are constrained to a certain degree by public opinion.
The Survey
Our survey of Beijing residents was conducted in December 1995 in cooperation with the Public Opinion Research Institute of People’s University in Beijing. 8 A total of seven hundred permanent Beijing residents eighteen years old or older were sampled using the multistage random sampling procedure. 9 The questionnaire was taken by the interviewer to the randomly chosen individual respondent to be filled out, and was brought by the interviewer back to the survey center. As a result of this survey measure, the response rate was 97 percent, considerably higher than surveys done in other fashions. The sample includes equal numbers of females and males. All age groups (from eighteen years old to over sixty-six years old) and occupation sectors are represented in the sample. Over 75 percent of the respondents have either middle school or high school diplomas. Nearly 80 percent of the respondents live in the urban areas of the city. Based upon a comparison between this sample and the 1990 Beijing census, the sampling error is less than 2 percent for gender and less than 3 percent for age.
Since the population of the sample was the permanent residents of Beijing, the survey results are not applicable to the rest of the country. The survey of Beijing residents can be regarded as a crucial case study for the special status of Beijing in Chinese politics and history. As the capital of many dynasties as well as the People’s Republic of China, Beijing has a special place in the history of contemporary China, not paralleled by any other city. Significant historical events, such as the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the Cultural Revolution of 1966, the April Fifth Incident of 1976, and the Tiananmen Square democracy movement of 1989, all started in Beijing. The mood of Beijingers is often looked at as the barometer of the mood of the country. The mood among Beijing residents six years after the dramatic events of 1989 should be especially interesting. 10
Findings
Level of Political Interest and Democratic Values
A conventional view is that nowadays people in China are too much consumed with making money and pay little attention to political and public affairs. With the influence of market economic reforms and the disillusion with democratic reforms, people are said to have become increasingly apolitical and pragmatic. 11 However, the survey shows that this perception of a low level of political interest may be incorrect or exaggerated. As Table 9.1 shows, about two-thirds of the respondents are still interested in national affairs. An even larger number of people are interested in Beijing local affairs. Another indication of the level of political interest is the frequency of discussion of politics. Our survey shows that many people do talk about politics with their family members, relatives, friends, and colleagues. Specifically, about 40 percent of our respondents said that they engage in political discussion with others very often, while about 50 percent said they talk about politics occasionally (see Table 9.1). Apparently, while they do not often share their thoughts with others, many people are interested in national affairs or Beijing affairs. These findings are not surprising, given the concerns about the leadership succession at the top and the high-profile cases of official corruption, particularly the case of former Beijing mayor Chen Xitong, in the last two years.
| Table 9.1: Level of Political Interest | |||||
| Very Interested | Interested | Somewhat Interested | Not Interested | N | |
| National Affairs | 13.8% | 56.9% | 27.3% | 2.1% | 682 |
| Beijing Affairs | 22.6% | 58.5% | 17.6% | 1.3% | 682 |
| Whenever we see each other | Very often | Not often | Never | Can’t tell | N | |
| Discussion of politics with others |
2.5% | 40.9% | 50.6% | 3.4% | 2.5% | 670 |
| Note: N denotes total number of responses. | ||||||
Demographic factors affect the level of political interest. We found that residency, education, age, and income seem to be the factors affecting the respondents’ interest in politics. Our findings are very similar to those studies on mass political behavior in other countries. Specifically, the level of political interest is higher among urban residents, the more educated, older people, and people with higher incomes. Table 9.2 clearly shows this pattern when it comes to people’s level of interest in national affairs. The sharpest contrasts are between urban residents and rural residents and between low-income people and middle/high-income people (see Table 9.2).
Table 9.3 illustrates the complexity in the political attitude toward democracy and civil liberties among Beijing residents. Over 85 percent of the respondents seem to be tolerant of people with different political views; the majority favors wider press freedom; and an overwhelming majority voice support for a more democratic way of choosing local government officials (see Table 9.3). However, findings from the next three questions indicate a low level of political efficacy among Beijingers. Seventy percent of the respondents lack confidence in themselves. Most of the respondents are reluctant to challenge the authorities, and an overwhelming majority of the people surveyed prefer stability and order to a freer society. The two sets of results seem to be contradictory. Apparently, Beijingers are in favor of the general and abstract principles of civil liberties and democracy, yet their cultural and behavioral pattern is still marked by elitist orientation, deference to authority, and preference for order. We suspect that the contradiction results from the gap between the two levels of political culture: the cognitive level and the behavioral level. On the cognitive level, buzzwords such as “democracy,” “freedom,” and “liberty” are quite acceptable to the general public. Indeed, even the Chinese constitution is filled with those terms and concepts. Yet, on a deeper level, a much longer term of socialization and experience is needed to change people’s behavior in this regard.
| Table 9.2: Interest in National Politics by Residence, Education, Age, and Income | |||||
| Very Interested | Interested | Somewhat Interested | Not Interested | N | |
| Residence | |||||
| Urbana | 15.7% | 61.7% | 21.0% | 1.4% | |
| Rural | 5.0 | 42.9 | 47.1 | 5.0 | 668 |
| Education | |||||
| Primary school or below | 9.9 | 53.1 | 32.1 | 4.9 | |
| Middle School | 11.2 | 53.7 | 31.8 | 3.3 | |
| College | 19.0 | 65.8 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 678 |
| Age | |||||
| Young (18–35) | 10.0 | 53.2 | 34.4 | 2.3 | |
| Middle (36–55) | 14.5 | 55.7 | 27.2 | 2.4 | |
| Old (over 55) | 18.0 | 65.1 | 15.7 | 1.1 | 682 |
| Monthly Income | |||||
| Lower (below 250 yuan) | 4.8 | 37.1 | 56.5 | 1.6 | |
| Middle (250–800 yuan) | 14.6 | 58.4 | 24.8 | 2.1 | |
| Upper (over 800 yuan) | 20.1 | 64.5 | 15.3 | 0.0 | 643 |
| Note: N denotes number of replies | |||||
| a. Urban residents here include both residents of urban districts of Beijing and residents of urban county towns in Beijing | |||||
| Table 9.3: General Political Attitudes | |||||
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Disagree | Strongly disagree | N | |
| Regardless of one’s political beliefs he or she is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as is anyone else. | 39.8% | 47.5% | 11.2% | 1.5% | 676 |
| The press should be given more freedom to expose wrongdoings such as corruption. | 68.5 | 25.8 | 5.2 | 0.4 | 677 |
| Elections to local government positions should be conducted in such a way that there is more than one candidate for each post. | 49.8 | 43.8 | 5.1 | 1.3 | 671 |
| The well being of the country is mainly dependent upon state leaders, not the masses. | 37.0 | 34.4 | 21.8 | 6.8 | 675 |
| In general, I don't think I should argue with the authority even though i believe my idea is correct. | 22.5 | 41.0 | 28.7 | 7.8 | 676 |
| i would rather live in an orderly society than live in a freer society that is prone to disruptions. | 61.8 | 33.0 | 3.6 | 1.6 | 673 |
| Note: N denotes number of replies | |||||
Attitudes Toward Economic Reform
Economic reforms that Deng Xiaoping started in the late 1970s have changed the face of China and have made it one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Economic reforms in general have improved the people’s standard of living. Yet economic reforms have also had their downside effects. Specifically, economic reforms have brought about corruption, inflation, job insecurity, declining welfare programs, and income inequality. What is the impact of the negative drawbacks on people’s views on economic reform? This survey shows the opinions about the economic and ownership system and attitudes toward economic reform in general. Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2 show an interesting pattern of preferences for economic system and ownership structure. With regard to economic system, very few prefer a total central planning economy (CPE). Less than 16 percent are fond of a predominantly CPE. Nearly a quarter of Beijing residents seem to favor a truly mixed economy, namely, half planning and half market economy, indicating they want to have the benefits of both systems. One-third of the respondents favor a predominantly market economy. Another 20 percent of the people are not sure which system works better for them. These findings indicate that even though many Chinese people have embraced the concept of the market economy, most are still uncertain about the adoption of a complete or predominant market economy. It should be pointed out that the official goal of the economic reforms since the early 1990s has been the introduction of a full market economy. With more than one-third of state enterprises in the red, fear of losing one’s job due to competition in a full-fledged market economy is a real fear for workers in the public sector.
Figure 9.1 Preference of Economic System (N=680)
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Figure 9.2 Preference of Economic Ownership System (N-680)
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The survey shows that socialist values are still very strong among Beijing residents when it comes to forms of ownership and means of production. Over 60 percent of Beijing residents still prefer predominantly public ownership (see Figure 9.2). Even a true mixed-ownership system gets little support. This finding means that CCP’s official policy of maintaining a by-and-large public ownership (i.e., the so-called socialist market economy) has wide popular support.
When asked about the speed of economic reforms, about 40 percent of the respondents seemed to be satisfied with the current pace of economic reforms (see Figure 9.3). However, nearly one-third of the people we surveyed think the economic reforms are happening “too fast” or “fast.” Very few think the reforms are either “slow” or “too slow.” Once again, nearly a quarter of the respondents could not answer the question. These findings show that the public is quite divided on the speed of economic reforms. Many people have been negatively affected by the market-oriented economic reforms and have suffered from the “pains” in the economic transition, even though the economic reforms have been perceived to be gradual and less radical than the economic reforms in the newly democratized eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union.
Figure 9.3 Attitude Toward the Speed of Economic Reforms (N=682)
When analyzed in terms of social-demographic characteristics, support for particular economic systems varies among different societal groups (see Table 9.4). Urban and rural residents do not seem to differ in support of different economic systems. But it is telling that a very high percentage of rural residents have no opinion on this issue. It also seems that the more educated a person is, the more likely he or she is to support a market-oriented economy. The support of a predominantly market economy is highest among college graduates. This is probably due to the fact that the better educated are better equipped to compete in a market-driven economy. It is also clear in Table 9.4 that people between eighteen and thirty-five give the strongest support to a predominantly market economy. This is primarily because people in this age group tend to be better educated, more energetic, and mobility-oriented, and are less afraid of new challenges. These qualities make them more competitive and marketable. Not surprisingly, more people in the upper-income bracket are supportive of a market economy, presumably because they have benefited the most from the market-oriented economic reforms. It is also quite noticeable from Table 9.4 that rural residents and people with primary education or below and in the low-income bracket have the lowest efficacy in choosing what kind of economic system they prefer.
| Table 9.4: Preference of Economic System by residence, Education, Age, and Income | ||||||
| 100% CPEa | Pre–CPEb | 50% CPE | Pre–MCEc | 100% ME | Can’t Tell | |
| Residence (N=666) | ||||||
| Urbana | 3.8% | 17.5% | 26.0% | 33.1% | 1.9% | 17.7% |
| Rural | 6.4 | 10.0 | 17.1 | 27.1 | 0.7 | 38.6 |
| Education (N=676) | ||||||
| Primary school or below | 11.1 | 12.3 | 18.5 | 19.9 | 2.5 | 35.8 |
| Middle School | 4.2 | 17.5 | 2.9 | 25.0 | 1.3 | 29.2 |
| College | 2.5 | 15.2 | 24.1 | 49.4 | 2.5 | 6.3 |
| Age (N=680) | ||||||
| Young (18–35) | 4.0 | 10.9 | 20.8 | 41.6 | 1.8 | 20.8 |
| Middle (36–55) | 2.9 | 15.4 | 27.2 | 27.9 | 1.8 | 24.6 |
| Old (over 55) | 6.4 | 22.5 | 25.1 | 29.4 | 1.6 | 20.3 |
| Monthly Income (N=641) | ||||||
| Lower (below 250 yuan) | 11.3 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 25.8 | 1.6 | 41.9 |
| Middle (250–800 yuan) | 4.3 | 17.3 | 26.8 | 29.3 | 1.6 | 20.6 |
| Upper (over 800 yuan) | 0.0 | 16.0 | 22.3 | 44.7 | 2.1 | 15.0 |
| Notes: a. CPE=Centrally planned economy | ||||||
| b. Pre=Predominantly | ||||||
| c. ME=Market economy | ||||||
Evaluation of Government Performance
How do the people of Beijing evaluate the performance of the government? Their evaluation reflects their level of satisfaction and can be used as one of the predictors of stability in the country. Respondents were asked to rate the performance of the government in ten policy areas using a scale of 1 to 5 points (1–very poor, 2–poor, 3–fair, 4–good, and 5–very good). The grades given are presented in Table 9.5. The overall evaluation of government performance by Beijingers in all ten policy areas is close to fair, or at 3-point level, which is barely a passing grade. The respondents give the lowest score to government performance in narrowing the income gap. The widening income gap (partly due to official corruption) is becoming a major sociopolitical problem. The government’s effectiveness in controlling inflation was also given a low grade. A substantial number of people are not happy with the government’s efforts in improving housing conditions, maintaining societal order, and combating pollution. The highest marks were given to the government’s performance in implementing family planning and national defense, indicating the effectiveness of government policies in these two areas.
Do people of different demographic and socioeconomic groups differ in their evaluation of government performance? To address this question, the statistical analysis of variance was used to detect any such differences. This analysis is designed to examine the variability in the sample in order to determine whether the population means are not equal. The results, presented in Table 9.6, show that the means between rural residents and urban residents are indeed different. The rural residents tend to give the government higher marks for its performance in the ten policy areas than do urban residents. Also, as indicated in Table 9.6, people with middle and upper incomes are more likely to rate the government highly than are people with lower incomes. Even though the non–college graduates rate government performance slightly higher than the college graduates, the difference is not statistically significant. Evaluation of government performance remains constant with all age groups.
| Table 9.5: Evaluation of Government Performance | |||||||
| 1 Very poor |
2 Poor |
3 Fair |
4 Good |
5 Very good |
Average grade |
N | |
| Controlling inflation | 11.3% | 36.9% | 38.4% | 9.4% | 3.4% | 2.6 | 681 |
| Providing job security | 5.7 | 26.7 | 53.3 | 10.4 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 671 |
| Minimize rich–poor gap | 16.5 | 43.7 | 28.5 | 6.2 | 4.3 | 2.4 | 677 |
| Improving housing conditions | 8.17 | 29.7 | 42.2 | 13.6 | 4.9 | 2.7 | 677 |
| Maintaining societal order | 8.7 | 29.3 | 39.9 | 13.5 | 8.2 | 2.8 | 679 |
| Providing adequate medical care | 5.7 | 24.9 | 45.0 | 18.3 | 5.7 | 2.9 | 678 |
| Implementing family planning | 0.9 | 3.1 | 18.3 | 40.4 | 36.8 | 4.1 | 678 |
| Providing welfare to the needy | 3.7 | 18.5 | 48.1 | 20.4 | 7.7 | 2.9 | 671 |
| Combating pollution | 11.0 | 35.8 | 31.5 | 14.1 | 7.3 | 2.7 | 679 |
| Ensuring a strong national defense | 1.3 | 3.4 | 30.8 | 33.7 | 30.6 | 3.9 | 679 |
| Note: N denotes number of replies | |||||||
Satisfaction and Confidence
The findings shown in Table 9.7 illustrate the mood of Beijingers and, perhaps, the Chinese people as a whole. On the one hand, it seems that people are extremely dissatisfied with several specific economic and political factors. An overwhelming majority of respondents expressed serious discontent with the growing gap in incomes. Over 90 percent “strongly agree” or “agree” that the income differentials are becoming too big. A majority of the people are not happy with the responsiveness of the government to their concerns. Over 70 percent of the respondents indicate that suggestions and complaints made to the government were often ignored. The majority are not satisfied with the speed of political reform. Over 80 percent believe that economic reforms far outpace political reforms in the country.
| Table 9.6: Evaluation of Government Performance (Index) by Residence, Education, Age, and Income | |||
| Mean | F Ratio | Significance | |
| Residence | |||
| Urban | 28.04 | ||
| Rural | 31.05 | 23.33 | .0000 |
| Education | |||
| Non-college | 28.80 | ||
| College | 27.32 | 3.59 | .0584 |
| Age | |||
| Young (18–35) | 28.64 | ||
| Middle (36–55) | 28.60 | ||
| Old (over 55) | 28.67 | 0.01 | .9943 |
| Income | |||
| Lower | 27.66 | ||
| Middle | 29.39 | ||
| Upper | 28.71 | 5.34 | .0050 |
| Table 9.7: Level of Satisfaction and Confidence | |||||
| Strongly agree | Agree | Disagree | Strongly disagree | N | |
| The gap between rich and poor is getting too big | 56.0% | 37.4% | 5.9% | 0.6% | 673 |
| Suggestions and complaints made by the public to the government are too often ignored | 25.8 | 46.5 | 26.4 | 1.3 | 675 |
| Economic reforms in China far outpace political reforms | 22.6 | 57.6 | 18.4 | 1.3 | 668 |
| Since the reforms in 1978, my living conditions have noticeably improved | 39.3 | 52.1 | 7.3 | 0.4 | 682 |
| Since the reforms in 1978, my social status has noticeably improved | 19.9 | 49.7 | 25.3 | 5.0 | 672 |
| It is unlikely that China will experience political and social turmoil in the next ten years | 29.1 | 55.2 | 14.1 | 1.6 | 676 |
| I am confident that China will become an economic power in the 21st century | 38.0 | 52.3 | 8.2 | 0.9 | 674 |
| Note: N denotes number of replies | |||||
On the other hand, people seem to be satisfied with the improvements made in their standard of living and social status since the reforms began in the late 1970s. Nine out of ten “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement that since 1978 their standard of living has noticeably improved, and seven out of ten “agree” or “strongly agree” that their social status has improved (see Table 9.7). These findings are consistent with other survey results. 12 This is one indication that economic reforms have achieved considerable success. The general satisfaction with the improvement in the standard of living and social status in part provides the basis for overall confidence and an optimistic view of development in the future. Nearly 85 percent do not believe that China will experience major sociopolitical turmoil in the next ten years, and 90 percent of them are confident that China will become a world-class economic power in the twenty-first century (see Table 9.7).
Do demographic factors play a role in the level of life satisfaction and confidence about the future? An analysis of variance shows that residence, education, and age do not make any difference in people’s satisfaction level and confidence level. The only relevant factor is income level. As indicated in Table 9.8, the population means are significantly different among three income groups, particularly between the lower income group on the one hand and the middle and upper income groups on the other. This means that people of higher income are more satisfied with the improvement in their living standards and their social status. In addition, the more money people make, the more optimistic they are about the prospect of future development (see Table 9.8).
Implications
The results of the survey support the following tentative implications. First, the political culture still tends to be conservative. On the economic front, even though most people in the survey admit that their lives have noticeably improved in the reform era, still the majority of them hesitate to endorse the adoption of a predominantly market economy and very few prefer a predominantly private ownership system. Apparently, people are still wary of the repercussions of the ongoing economic transformation. There does not seem to be a public consensus on the government’s goal of eventually adopting a “socialist market economy.” Therefore, the government should be careful in handling the transition from the central planning economy to a market economy. Dissatisfaction with the negative results of the economic reforms partially contributed to the outbreak of the Tiananmen events in 1989.
| Table 9.8: Satisfaction and Confidence by Income | |||
| Mean | F Ratio | Significance | |
| 1. Since the reforms in 1978, my living conditions have noticeably improved. | |||
| Lower Income | 3.15 | ||
| Middle Income | 3.41 | ||
| Upper Income | 3.45 | 15.62 | .0000 |
| 2. Since the reforms in 1978, my social status has noticeably improved. | |||
| Lower Income | 2.65 | ||
| Middle Income | 2.93 | ||
| Upper Income | 3.21 | 16.88 | .0000 |
| 3. It is unlikely that China will experience serious social turmoil in the next ten years. | |||
| Lower Income | 3.02 | ||
| Middle Income | 3.17 | ||
| Upper Income | 3.23 | 4.76 | .0088 |
| 4. I am confident that china will become an economic power in the 21st century. | |||
| Lower Income | 3.16 | ||
| Middle Income | 3.33 | ||
| Upper Income | 3.51 | 9.46 | .0001 |
On the political front, the majority still seems to be elitist and authority-oriented. What is striking is that the overwhelming majority (over 90 percent) prefer an orderly society to a freer society that is prone to disruptions. It seems that the public has been buying the “stability first” argument advocated by the government, partly because people are aware of the breakdown of order in many former Soviet republics after the collapse of communism. Relentless efforts by Chinese leaders to stress the need for stability for continued economic growth and development have struck a chord in the psyche, which is stigmatized by luan after more than a century of upheaval, revolution, and instability. The chaotic Cultural Revolution is still fresh in the minds of many people. This stability and order-oriented mentality explain, in part, the relative success of the post-Tiananmen regime in controlling the country since 1989.
Second, the strategy of eudaemonism, namely, making people happy by providing them with material benefits, adopted by the government to boost its political legitimacy since 1989 has partially worked in Beijing. It is apparent from the survey that a majority have experienced improvement in their living standard and social status. This high level of life satisfaction leads to a relatively high level of confidence in further economic development. Yet, the survey shows that people in Beijing only gave passing grades to government performance in a variety of policy areas. Consistently, people with higher income expressed more satisfaction with government performance, more satisfaction with their lives, and more optimism about the future. This provides part of the answer to the puzzle of the survival of the current political regime and the relative political stability since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. As the government continues to raise the standard of living, it will probably increase its political legitimacy. However, what we have also found is that materialism, partially encouraged by the leadership, has not reduced people’s attention to political issues. A majority of the respondents in the survey are interested in national affairs, and more than 40 percent of them discuss politics with someone else “very often.” Obviously, since Beijing is the political center of the country, figures concerning the level of political interest for the rest of the country may be lower.
Third, the findings also indicate that the most likely supporters of the current government are not in Beijing. The support for the CCP most likely comes from rural areas and people of higher income. As the survey results show, rural residents tend to have a lower level of political interest and efficacy. Hence, they are more susceptible to government control. Furthermore, rural respondents gave markedly better grades for government performance than their counterparts in the urban areas. It should be noted here that peasants in the suburbs of Beijing are generally wealthier and more urban than peasants elsewhere in China. Another likely support group for the regime in Beijing is the people who are better off and have gained materially in the reform era. Conversely, it seems likely that challenges to the CCP may come from the urban areas and people of lower income. The urban poor (many of them are workers and employees of the near-bankrupt state-owned enterprises) may be a major source of instability in the future.
The overall picture portrayed in this survey is certainly not all rosy, but it is far from gloomy. If the major findings from our survey of Beijing residents hold true for the rest of China, it is hard to imagine that the CCP will encounter major problems and challenges from below in the period of post-Deng power transition.
Endnotes
Note 1: See, for example, Lowell Dittmer, “The Tiananmen Massacre,” Problems of Communism (September–October 1989): 14–15. Also see Michael D. Swaine, “China Faces the 1990s,” Problems of Communism (September–October 1989): 20–35. Back.
Note 2: Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Riddle of China: Repression as Standard of Living Soars,” New York Times, September 7, 1993, pp. A1 and A6. Back.
Note 3: Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Path from Communism,” Journal of Democracy 4, no. 2 (April 1993): 30. Back.
Note 5: See, for example, Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?” Comparative Politics 5, no. 3 (April 1973): 425–447. Back.
Note 6: In two trips to China in the summer of 1994 and 1995, Yang Zhong, one of the authors of this chapter, personally witnessed people cursing Jiang Zemin and Li Peng at bus stops on several occasions. Back.
Note 7: See Allen P. L. Liu, Mass Politics in the People’s Republic: State and Society in Contemporary China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). Back.
Note 8: Doing a good survey in China depends heavily on having a reliable Chinese partner. Public Opinion Research Institute of the People’s University in Beijing, which was set up in 1986, was the first of its kind established in the PRC and has done numerous surveys for both Chinese as well as foreign organizations. Back.
Note 9: Seven urban districts and rural counties were randomly chosen after the first stage of sampling. Five residential neighborhoods (juweihui) or villages (cunmin weiyuanhui) were randomly chosen after the second stage of sampling. The third stage of random sampling produced a sample of twenty households from each of the five residential neighborhoods or villages of the seven urban districts or rural counties. One individual was chosen randomly from each household as the respondent at the final stage of sampling in our survey. Back.
Note 10: Two of our papers from this survey, “The Level and Sources of Popular Support for China’s Current Authoritarian Regime” and “Assessing Political Support in China: Citizens’ Evaluations of Governmental Effectiveness and Legitimacy,” are forthcoming in Communist and Post-Communist Studies and The Journal of Contemporary China. Back.
Note 11: Even the former participants of the Tiananmen Square democracy movement have become pragmatic and materialistic. See “Tiananmen and China’s Future: The View Five Years Later,” Current History 93, no. 584 (September 1994): 248. Back.
Note 12: For example, according to one survey conducted in the city of Qingdao, Shandong Province, at the end of 1993, 90 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the supply of goods in the market, and 75 percent of them felt their life was improved. See Renmin ribao (People’s Daily, Overseas Edition), May 13, 1994, p. 2. A Gallop nationwide poll conducted from May 20 to September 15, 1994, found that more than half of those surveyed expressed satisfaction with their lives, among other things, as reported by Li Jianmin and Chuck Lin in “China: A Tough Market, U.S. Survey Says,” Chinese News Digest (an electronic news magazine), February 19, 1995. Back.
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