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Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations, by Katharine H.S. Moon
The Nixon Doctrine and the attendant reduction of 20,000 U.S. forces from Korea were intended to lighten Washington's economic and military burden in Asia. Policy makers in Washington neither intended nor imagined any consequences for women; kijich'on prostitutes in Korea were certainly far removed from discussions about foreign policy. Yet, the Korean government's efforts to adapt itself to the changes in Washington and influence the U.S.-ROK relationship more to its liking drew these women into the process of foreign policy implementation. Consequently, the women became players, along with other camptown residents, the USFK, and the U.S. and ROK governments, in a game of competing interests and wills.
In retrospect, the Nixon Doctrine and the troop withdrawal had profound consequences for Korean camptown societies. First, many camptowns disappeared while others expanded and flourished, owing to the departure and redeployment of U.S. troops. Second, through the camptown Clean-Up/"purification movement," these long-neglected areas gained the attention and development efforts of the Korean government. Third, the establishment of Korean-American Friendship Councils and other forms of official US-ROK communication channels served as stepping stones for local Korean residents and officials to voice and pursue their interests on a more equal footing with local U.S. commands than prior to the early 1970s. In general, increased law and order and envi ronmental improvements helped many camptowns to begin shedding their pariah status in Korean society.
The Clean-Up activities that were generated by changes in the U.S.-ROK security relationship also had the effect of firmly institutionalizing and legitimating camptown prostitution in Korean society. The regulation of women changed from a loosely organized, individual base-sponsored arrangement to a systematic operation administered by the ROK Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. 1 One MoHSA physician working in the local VD clinic for Tongduch'on prostitutes proclaimed proudly to me in the spring of 1992 that Korea has very low VD rates and that the prostitutes are "very clean" for the U.S. soldiers. Tighter regulation of the sex trade and sex workers has reinforced prostitution as an accepted, permanent, and government-sanctioned means of earning income and conducting civil-military relations between Americans and Koreans. With official government regulation of prostitution, sexual commerce in camptowns ceased being the activity of renegade individuals and became an officially supported industry.
It is also important to note that the increased governmental control over prostitution that the Campaign engendered eventually spread to the larger Korean society. As the Clean-Up progressed, USFK and ROK officials recognized the fact that U.S. soldiers engaged in sex not only with camptown prostitutes but also with women catering to Korean nationals and foreign tourists. Beginning in 1974, non-camptown prostitutes also came under increased regulatory supervision. A report by the Preventive Medicine Division of the Eighth Army Medical Corps stated that the MoHSA had begun emphasizing the registration of such women because they "represent[ed] a serious reservoir of VD" to U.S. servicemen. 2 A joint U.S.-ROK VD supervision team observed during a visit to the Chunggu Health Center and VD clinic that registration of prostitutes primarily used by foreign tourists (principally Japanese) in the central area of Pusan rose from 500 in February 1973 to 1,184 by January 1974. 3 In short, USFK-ROK Clean-Up initiatives in the early-to-mid 1970s increased police and governmental intervention--both foreign and domestic--in tens of thousands of Korean women's lives.
Unlike the attempt by the U.S. military to control venereal disease during World War I, the Clean-Up Campaign lacked any regard for the physical and social welfare of women. The Campaign in Korea was an isolated event, lacking the context of social movements, whose "coattails" prostitution reform in the United States had ridden; 4 from Seoul's perspective, it was not a women's welfare issue at all, but solely, a matter of foreign policy and military alliance.
With regard to U.S.-Korean camptown prostitution, it is evident that power disparities do establish the broad framework of interactions and bargaining capacity between a patron state and a client state. The military might of the United States and the dependency of South Korea on such muscle power, highlighted by the Nixon Doctrine, led directly to joint governmental control over prostitutes' lives. But the Campaign helped raise the status of the ROK government in the eyes of USFK officials, a significant achievement of the Campaign. Prior to and during the initial stages of the Clean-Up, local command officials commonly complained of ineffective and inadequate local (Korean) government and law enforcement in camptown areas. Some went so far as to suggest that the Korean government did not function in some of these areas. In addition, the Korean government's weakness on the international level abetted its authoritarian and sexist control at the domestic level; the Campaign helped the government to expand and solidify its bureaucratic and coercive powers at the grass-roots level.
Not discounting the joint governmental abuse of these women's bodies and labor, the Campaign had, in the long run, the positive effects of decreasing incidents of extortion by private clinic operators and increasing the chances for women to receive proper medical treatment. One could argue that while the Clean-Up increased the power of the Korean government over the lives of camptown prostitutes, it also increased the government's responsibility for the welfare of these women. Prior to the Clean-Up, the U.S. military, the Korean government, and private businesses all avoided and evaded responsibility for the problems that prostitutes confronted and caused. After 1971, it became clear that the ROK government was ultimately accountable.
National Security and Patriotism: Kijich'on Women's Perspectives
| "Our country" . . . throughout the greater part of its history has treated me as a slave; it has denied me education or any share in its possessions. "Our" country still ceases to be mine if I marry a foreigner. "Our" country denies me the means of protecting myself, forces me to pay others a very large sum annually to protect me, and is so little able, even so to protect me. . . . Therefore if you insist upon fighting to protect me, or "our" country, let it be understood, soberly and rationally between us, that you are fighting to gratify a sex instinct which I cannot share; to procure benefits which I have not shared and probably will not share; but not to gratify my instincts, or to protect myself or my country. For . . . in fact, as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world. |
| Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas 5 |
In the late 1930s Virginia Woolf challenged the notion that states function to protect, preserve, and promote the interests of the people. Ahead of her time, she began the process of deconstructing the concepts, "national interest" and "national security." For her, "national interests" represented the interests of men, particularly the privileged, and "national security" did not eliminate the physical, economic, legal, and social insecurity of women.
More than fifty years later, women and men echo Woolf's bold assertions. Contemporary feminist academics and activists, ranging from liberal critics of Realism to postmodernists, women and development advocates, and peace activists, all challenge the role and capacity of the sovereign state to know and best fulfill the needs and interests of a nation's people. With respect to women and security, Spike Peterson and Judith Stiehm go so far as to describe the modern state as a patriarchal protection racket, 6 and many Asian feminists living with U.S. military bases and camptown prostitution in their countries consider their states collective pimps. Feminists charge that states have made women's lives insecure by fixating on military buildup, stand-offs, and adventurism. They have noted that women, if given the chance, would define security less narrowly to include "safe working conditions and freedom from the threat of war or unemployment or the economic squeeze of foreign debt." 7 Mary Burguieres advocates feminist approaches to peace which would espouse Johann Galtung's conceptualization of peace as "an absence of both personal and structural violence." 8 She adds that such approaches are important because they "loosen" governmental policies for peace from their "exclusive association with defence and foreign policy" and link peace efforts with social policy in general. 9
My interviews with Korean former prostitutes support the basic feminist claim that states' definition of "national security" is often irrelevant to the security of women's lives, and that state pursuits on behalf of national security often exploit and oppress women. The kijich'on women ridiculed the Korean government's efforts in the Clean-Up Campaign to label them as "personal ambassadors" and their selling of sex as patriotic service. Most women admitted that they were unsure of the meaning of "national security" (kukka anbo) and that governmental actions generally were oblivious to their needs for physical and economic well-being. Kim Yonja, a 25-year veteran of camptown prostitution, sharply articulated that the Korean and U.S. governments' rationales for or public professions of security policies had no connection to the actual needs of camptown women for protection. All of the women I interviewed stated that their greatest need for ROK government protection (after the Korean War) was not from North Korean threats but the exploitation and abuse of club owners/pimps, local Korean police and VD clinic officials, and the power of the U.S. bases. In other words, they needed protection from a Korean law enforcement system that inadequately provided for their legal, economic, political, and human rights and a Korean government too cowardly and self-interested to protect them against violence and abuse by U.S. soldiers.
Rather than feeling protected by the Korean government and U.S. soldiers, all of the women stated they felt used and betrayed by both Korean and U.S. authorities. The first of the two most common complaints against the U.S. military was that the Americans, who were in Korea to help Koreans, considered the women mere sex toys, concerned only with the health and well-being of the GI. The second was the violence of the U.S. soldiers toward the women and the lack of legal accountability on the part of the military authorities for the soldiers' criminal behavior. Mrs. Ch'oe recalled that she had been beaten by a U.S. serviceman and had reported the incident to the Korean police and the U.S. military police but that the soldier was allowed to go free. In Mrs. Pak's case, she experienced the irresponsibility and injustice of the U.S. military authorities in the extreme. Her sister, also a camptown prostitute in Osan, was mutilated and murdered allegedly by a U.S. serviceman in the early 1970s, but U.S. authorities never turned the man over to the ROK authorities (as provisioned in the Status of Forces Agreement) to be tried in the ROK legal system. Mrs. Pak bitterly recounted that the U.S. military offered neither apology nor financial compensation to her family and that camptown residents had to collect money from one another to pay for the funeral expenses. According to Mrs. Pak: "U.S. law in the U.S. was good--but in Korea, it was never upheld. The U.S. lawyers simply protected U.S. soldiers but did not seek the truth and real justice. The U.S. government did not give any compensation to Koreans for the wrongs that U.S. soldiers committed." 10
a name="154"> All the women emphatically repeated that the ROK government did nothing to improve their welfare. They particularly complained against the impotence and/or unwillingness of the Korean police to prevent abuses against the women and to help them leave prostitution. Mrs. Chang stated that when she had tried to run away from her club owner and had gone to the local police for help, the police kept her in the station overnight, then called her owner to come get her. The owner showed up at the station and "dragged her back to the club." 11 Mrs. Chang also recalled that local Korean officials in Tongduch'on had said that if a woman were to go to the suyongso (detention center for infected prostitutes), she would be taught employable skills but that in reality, that was only talk. As far as she knows, there was no such training. She also remembered that the head of a Tongduch'on organization that oversaw the prostitutes had tried in her own way to help the women by proposing that local authorities teach women who were detained in the suyongso how to read and write and "not let them just lie there for days while waiting for their infections to clear." 12 But the Korean government had not supported her, and the leader, lacking funds, could not establish such a program herself.
This was a common perception among prostitutes, but in fact, the Korean government did have plans and programs designed to help women leave prostitution or prevent them from entering. Since the early-to-mid 1960s, the government sent out women's welfare workers to train stations and bus depots in cities so that they could set up counseling centers for girls and young women migrating from the countryside in search of jobs. The goal was to alert these women to the activities of pimps and flesh traffickers and to dissuade them from entering jobs that were likely to lead them into prostitution. One local official of the MoHSA, who had worked in the Women's Welfare Bureau of Yangju County (which served Tongduch'on and Uijongbu) from 1964 to 1982, noted that the county increased its counseling staff by three in the early 1970s (to total four). These officials went out to the countryside to prevent women from pursuing misleading classified advertisements and job offers. They also located underage females in camptowns and sent them back home or to vocational schools. In the early 1970s, the efforts of this Women's Welfare Bureau included establishing and operating schools of instruction in taxi-driving, tailoring, and barbering/hairdressing for women who wanted to leave prostitution and minors who had not been in the prostitution business for a long time. The official stated that in 1970-71, the head of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs notified her office of the departure of the 7th Division and requested proposals for helping camptown prostitutes find alternative means of livelihood. She recalled that the Blue House took great interest in the efforts of her office and even sent words of gratitude for the plan to teach women taxi-driving. She added, however, that the failures of government offices to help camptown prostitutes stemmed from lack of funds for women's welfare programs and the resistance of club owners and pimps to such programs. 13
But the kijich'on women I spoke with did not interpret such welfare measures as genuine. For them, the government's only concern for the women was that they earn dollars and keep U.S. soldiers happy while in Korea. When I asked them if they felt they had contributed to the foreign-exchange earnings of the nation, most of the women replied "yes," but they immediately faulted the Korean government for failing to give them a fair share of their earnings and legal and social protection against local exploiters. For example, Mrs. Ch'oe asserted that her sexual labor helped increase the nation's coffers because, in her estimation, U.S. GIs in the 1970s spent a third or quarter of their earnings on sexual entertainment. She added that she and other women did not benefit from the government's increasing wealth: "Whatever profits were made went to private individuals with power (local businessmen and officials) and the Korean government. The government benefited at the women's expense." 14 Mrs. Chang also stated that although she helped the government get rich, she herself was charged with $1,000 in club debts by 1974-75. 15
The women also expressed contempt at their government's designation of their camptown role as patriotic. Mrs. Pak put it simply: "It was disgraceful work: How could it be patriotic sacrifice?" 16 All of the women stated that no camptown woman they ever knew felt that their sex work was a nationalistic or patriotic act and that economic need was what drove the women to remain in prostitution. Moreover, several pursued the idea of patriotism and stated that patriotism requires education and the positive provision and reinforcement of skills to conduct "necessary and important work" for the country. 17 They did not view their sex work as necessary or important for the security of South Korea.
However, many of the women believed that their role as camptown prostitute did serve to protect "normal" Korean women in the larger society from being raped and sexually abused by U.S. soldiers. They recounted stories of how before there were large numbers of camptown prostitutes near U.S. bases, "U.S. soldiers would break into the homes of private Korean citizens and rape women--housewives and young virgin girls." 18 Ms. Pae, who has worked in camptown prostitution for over 30 years, complained bitterly, "So, why does the society call us yanggalbo [Western whores]? We've played our part--if it weren't for us, where would Ônormal' Koreans be?" 19
When asked the women what they would do if they were given the power to define and advance national security and economic development to be relevant to their lives, all of them insisted that educating women would be the first and most necessary task they would undertake. Many emphasized the fact that the overwhelming majority of the camptown prostitutes of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s had very little formal education and that most had difficulty speaking, reading, and writing Korean. Many were completely illiterate. Given the Confucianist influence on Korean people, it is not surprising that these women shared with the general population the high value placed on education. One woman confessed that she married a U.S. serviceman so that she could "go to America and study." 20
But all of the women emphasized education not merely for education's sake, but as necessary for equipping them to provide for themselves economically and socially without resorting to selling their bodies, and for the sake of making real contributions to the security and development of their nation. Mrs. Pak stated that if she had power in government, she would "take the women away from the pimps and owners and put them into vocational schools and really put the women to work for the nation's good." 21 She stressed that "education is crucial to these women because that is what they lack most and what inhibits them from controlling their own lives better." 22
Some women also advocated governmental help in educating and empowering kijich'on prostitutes as prostitutes so that the women "could have more equal footing with the soldiers and owners they had to contend with." 23 They spoke of the need to teach English to the prostitutes so that the women could avoid exploitation and physical abuse by U.S. soldiers. More important, the women I interviewed emphasized the need for the Korean government to have provided them with legal and economic rights so that they could have had the power to fight the exploitation and abuse from pimps, club owners, corrupt police and VD clinic officials. Mrs. Choe boldly stated that if she had the authority, she would give camptown prostitutes and other poor Korean women economic, social, and legal compensation justly due to them for their work: "The government should be forthright to the women, promising them ÔIf you work this much for the government, we'll buy you a house, take care of your health, provide for your livelihood, and help you build a future.' " 24 Mrs. Chang asserted that in the worst case,
| if the Korean government wanted to continue using women's sexual labor to keep U.S. soldiers happy, then the government should take over the prostitution system (take it out of the control of pimps and club owners) to benefit the women, i.e., treat them like real employees who have rights and must be paid appropriately for their work. 25 |
The point that these women tried to make was not that their government should play official pimp in camptown prostitution but that it should fairly give to the women what was their due and not solely protect the interests of local businessmen and obey the wishes of the U.S. officials. All of them decried the Korean government and people for having "thrown them away." None of the women expected or wanted the government simply to dole out economic and social benefits; they expected and were willing to work for what they considered to be their fair share.
As mentioned earlier, the women resented the weakness of the Korean government's legal system and political power to protect them and other camptown residents from the economic, legal, and political domination of the U.S. bases. Mrs. Pak, whose sister had been murdered allegedly by a U.S. soldier, stated that "the Korean government should have used such murders and other violent crimes politically to demand more fairness from the U.S. government." 26 Some of the women contrasted the "strength" of the Japanese government in postwar Japan with the "impotence" of the Korean government in postwar Korea. Mrs. Ch'oe stated that although the Japanese government sent out its women as prostitutes to U.S. soldiers after the war, 27 it also gave them their share of the earnings and taught them employable skills. 28 Mrs. Chang believed that with respect to camptown prostitution, the Japanese government was smarter than its Korean counterpart because the Japanese women were given some power to deal with GIs. For example, she claimed that some Japanese camptown prostitutes were permitted to sell only oral sex and not vaginal intercourse. She reasoned that teaching and giving Korean women the power to determine what and how much they would sell would have helped them because the women could then have avoided pregnancies, abortions, bearing interracial children, and the accompanying physical, financial, and psychological pains. 29 It is not clear whether such perceptions of Japanese camptown prostitutes were based on fact, but the comparisons are important because they reveal the Korean women's belief that their government could have done something to help them, had it been smart enough and willing.
While much of the experiences of the former Korean camptown prostitutes support the criticisms of Woolf and others that traditional notions of national security are inadequate and irrelevant to many women's lives, Woolf's claim that as women, "the whole world is our country," when applied to kijich'on women, appears irrelevant. Those who challenge the near-sanctimonious tradition of sovereignty in international relations, including established transnationalists, feminists, and World Order advocates, predominantly live in wealthy Western nations and are intellectually, economically, and socially empowered enough to call sovereignty a myth and "opt out of" the nation-state system. They can travel outside their own country, compare societies, access international law and institutions, and expand their pocketbooks from cross-border interactions. In short, they have the freedom and power to define themselves as individuals and citizens of the world.
The Korean prostitutes in this study, like most poor and socially outcast women and men, do not have such freedom and power. In the women's eyes, the fate of their lives was tied to the economic and political strength or weakness of their own nation-state. What the Korean women expressed is the need to have their country and government interact with the United States and other powers on an equal political footing, for in their eyes, Korea has never been treated as a sovereign nation by the United States or other big powers. The women saw sovereignty of their nation as a hope, rather than a myth, a means to empower their own lives. For them, the hope that Korea would some day fully exercise its sovereignty was a promise that they would be abused no longer.
The comments of all the former prostitutes I interviewed point to a deep desire and need to be embraced by their nation-state. The common grievance was that their nation-state let them down and the common hope that their nation-state would include them as part of the national family and bestow upon them rights and privileges that would help empower their lives. They could not envision severing the tie between their fate and the strength/weakness of their nation because of their psychological need to be an accepted part of the Korean society and because institutions and laws outside Korean borders seemed even more distant and difficult to reach than their own government.
Although the women expressed the need for a strong Korean government in world affairs, they by no means desired an authoritarian state. They clearly conveyed the kind of state they desired, one with fair laws and the diligent enforcement of such laws to protect and promote the women's lives.
It is important to note that these women emphasized the primacy of a (reformed) fair and strong legal system as the most urgent and reliable means of regulating their lives. Carol Gilligan 30 and other advocates of "feminist standpoint," including Keohane (when promoting transnationalism), 31 have claimed that women's views of the world are based on notions of mutuality, reciprocity, and connectedness stemming from their relational, rather than legal or rule-oriented, life contexts and interactions. In other words, the relational context has been the support system of women. The camptown prostitutes, however, do not fit this scheme: their relational contexts--family, friends, coworkers, neighbors, their own selves as mothers--rather than supporting and empowering them, failed them. Many of their families were torn apart by war, poverty, disease, and physical abuse; the prostitutes themselves never learned to trust and depend on one another because camptown life bred competition, deceit, violence, and fear. And those who bore children rarely had the opportunity and resources to play the role of nurturer. Most avoided becoming mothers, and many gave up their children to American fathers and to adoption agencies. In short, because personal relationships and contexts failed them, the rule of law became more pressing a need.
The interviews with the former prostitutes call for two observations regarding the applicability of the "gender standpoint" approach to theorizing about politics. First, although men and women have had different experiences based on their gender roles, experiences that cross the gender line--poverty, social marginalization, and lack of recognized political power--may inform individuals' worldviews more forcefully than gender. Second, whereas Western scholarship has established male and female standpoints as polar opposites (e.g., rationalism, legalism, autonomy vs. relationalism, contextualism, and mutuality), Confucianist traditions espouse elements of both gender standpoints as together constituting a whole. With regard to the women I interviewed, their recognition of the need for a strong legal system was based on their aspiration to be included as members of the greater Korean society and their belief that with laws to protect them, they can contribute to the good of the society.
If the problem in Western traditions lies in the separation of the individual and the collective and the ascendance of the individual over the collective, the problem in Confucianist traditions is the opposite: the tendency of the collective to subsume the individual. In the case of Korea, governments have used "national security" as the rallying cry for collec tivism and excuse for silencing and making individuals "invisible." If values of mutuality and interdependence are needed to temper the excesses of individualism on a personal and state level in Western societies, recognition of individuals as having needs and rights separate from those that serve the collective are needed to temper the excesses of collectivism in Confucianist societies.
The expansion of the definition of political actor in international relations to include individuals without "significant resources" or "substantial control" over issue areas 32 can help "disaggregate" the collective and the hegemony of national and foreign elites and challenge governments' claims to defining alone the meaning of "national interest" and "national security." Students and practitioners of international politics have actively created the actors and rules of international politics: State sovereignty is created through the recognition or granting of such sovereignty by other states and international laws, and multinational companies and international organizations surfaced to the international arena with the recognition that private interests and operations influence and are influenced by state interests and actions. By recognizing or granting the role of international actor to women without "significant resources and influence," we can better assess the barriers that governments impose on women's ability to develop such resources and influence and help stop the vicious cycle of viewing poor, socially marginalized women as solely victims of governments or gendered schemes of power.
Note 1: In her study on the application of the British Contagious Diseases Act (1860s) to India, Philippa Levine also observed that "[i]t was only with the more organized efforts of government and the military authorities in the 1860s that the [VD regulation] system came to be established on a more secure and permanent footing." See "Venereal Disease, Prostitution, and the Politics of Empire: The Case of British India," p. 583. Back.
Note 2: Eighth Army Medical Corps, Preventive Medicine Division, Re: "Trip Report," February 14, 1974. Back.
Note 3: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 4: Barbara Meil Hobson, Uneasy Virtue, p. 209. Back.
Note 5: Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas, pp. 108-9. Back.
Note 6: V. Spike Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?"; Judith Stiehm, "The Protected, the Protector, the Defender." Back.
Note 7: J. Ann Tickner cites such definitions of security mentioned at the Women's International Peace Conference in Halifax, Canada, in 1985. She also states that third world women's concerns for security focused more on the "structural violence associated with imperialism, militarism, racism, and sexism" rather than Western women's concerns about nuclear war. Tickner, Gender in International Relations, p. 54. Back.
Note 8: Mary K. Burguieres, "Feminist Approaches to Peace," p. 10. Back.
Note 10: Paraphrased from telephone interview with Mrs. Pak via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 11: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chang via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 12: Ibid. Mrs. Chang could not recall whether the organization referred to was the local prostitutes' self-help "Women's Association" or the local MoHSA Women's Welfare Bureau. Back.
Note 13: Interview, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992. Back.
Note 14: Telephone interview via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 16: Telephone interview with Mrs. Pak via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 17: Telephone interview with Mrs. Ch'oe via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 18: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992. Back.
Note 20: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993. Back.
Note 21: Telephone interview with Mrs. Pak via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 23: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993. Back.
Note 24: Telephone interview with Mrs. Ch'oe via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 25: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chang via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 26: Telephone interview with Mrs. Pak via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 27: John Lie, "The State as Pimp: Prostitution and the Patriarchal State in 1940s Japan," pp. 11-16. The defeated Japanese government planned to "preempt American prurience by organizing prostitution for the occupying U.S. troops," p. 11. It established the Recreation Amusement Association which, at its height, employed about 70,000 women. Back.
Note 28: Telephone interview with Mrs. Ch'oe via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 29: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993. Back.
Note 30: Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Back.
Note 31: Robert Keohane, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint," in Grant and Newland, eds., Gender and International Relations. Back.
Note 32: Keohane and Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics, p. 380. Back.
Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations
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