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Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations, by Katharine H.S. Moon
For the Korean government, kijich'on prostitutes were an indispensable asset, as "personal ambassadors," in its adaptation to the changing security policies of the United States in the early 1970s. These state-designated patriots experienced increased joint governmental surveillance and control over their lives as compensation for their participation in the Clean-Up Campaign. Yet, they learned to take advantage of some of the regulations, such as the elimination of streetwalkers. The following illustrates how the "international"--the Nixon Doctrine and troop reduction--manifested itself in the "personal"--the lives of kijich'on women--through the Clean-Up Campaign. Specifically, the focus is on the effects of the antidiscrimination and VD control policies on two aspects of these women's lives--their work environment (club life) and their bodies--and relatedly, on their physical mobility and autonomy over their sexual labor.
Although Keohane, Nye, and Huntington have mentioned that transnational processes generate "asymmetries" and changes in the "balance of power within the local society," few have paid attention to such power disparities in studies of transnationalism. 1 This chapter demonstrates that asymmetries in the balance of power within the local society did indeed result from the interactions among the ROK government, the USFK, and various camptown residents, and that the asymmetries were distinctly gendered. In general, the USFK, ROK government, and local camptown power-holders promoted their respective interests at the expense of the prostitutes. But the women were not simply passive victims of others' political and economic ambitions. Although powerless in many respects, kijich'on women did voice their own interests, when push came to shove, through private complaints and public protests. The Camptown Clean-Up Campaign, which was intended to improve channels of communication and cooperation in camptown politics, became the cork that plugged up the possibility of public protest by kijich'on prostitutes.
Effects of Antidiscrimination Policies
Racial tensions between black and white servicemen and the U.S.-ROK efforts at antidiscrimination by camptown prostitutes reduced the women's freedom to choose their customers and exacerbated the environment of fear in the clubs. Most of the women who were interviewed recalled that their club owner/manager, and sometimes, USFK officials themselves, emphatically told the women not to discriminate against black soldiers in their "entertainment" functions. The club owners stressed that if the women did not cooperate with the U.S. military's efforts to reduce racial strife, the club could be placed off limits. As mentioned in chapter 4, the USFK's pressure on the club owners to eliminate discriminatory practices in their establishments served to increase the owners' power over the women. The prostitute was faced with the choice of following the orders of the U.S. base authorities and the club owner, and thereby risk economic and physical retaliation by white soldiers, or of discriminating against blacks, and thereby risk the wrath of club owners and the off-limits decree of base officials. In either case, the choice was not much of a choice; both promised economic and physical pain.
When I asked the women if they had been forced by anyone to sleep with black soldiers for the sake of camptown racial harmony, they replied "No." In most cases, the owners did not order the women to have sexual intercourse with black soldiers. However, one woman (Mrs. Chong) stated that some club owners/managers in Uijongbu, where she had worked, did force women to sleep with black soldiers and that few women, when pressured, disobeyed, lest the owner abuse her physically or fire her from the establishment. 2 Club owners' primary interest in cooperating with U.S. authorities was to safeguard their income-earning ability. Although most camptown clubs were racially segregated, some were divided into separate sections for whites and blacks within one establishment. 3 In this case, the club owner would designate which of the hostesses were to serve the black or white section. Those designated "black hostesses" had to contend with the social stigma and potential loss of income from white soldiers. Mrs. Chong also mentioned that some club owners, to earn more dollars, lied to white soldiers, insisting that prostitutes who in fact had slept with black men were "white-only" prostitutes. This kind of behavior by the owner jeopardized the physical safety and economic future of such women; if the white soldier discovered that he had been deceived, he could beat the woman and spread the word among his white friends that the woman was a "black" prostitute.
In general, the Clean-Up Campaign's antidiscrimination policies reduced the already limited autonomy of the kijich'on prostitutes over their sexual labor. There were no special rewards for associating with blacks, but the social stigma was severe. Most camptown prostitutes considered associating with blacks to be highly embarrassing because they faced the condemnation and taunts of not only white soldiers but other Korean residents. 4 For most prostitutes, racial discrimination against black men served as a means to retain their limited freedom of choice of customers and their already compromised sense of self-dignity.
The Clean-Up efforts improved the club environment for the black soldier and thereby helped alleviate the racial problems of the U.S. forces. But for the women, the club environments became increasingly oppressive, owing to the increased surveillance over the women's conduct by the owner, U.S. military police (MP), local Korean leadership, and both black and white servicemen. To survive in the bars, the prostitutes had to "look over their shoulders" constantly (nunch'i poda), balancing the wishes and punitive power of each surveillance group.
Effects of VD Control Policies
More than the antidiscrimination efforts of the Clean-Up, VD control had longer-lasting and more taxing consequences, both physically and financially, for the camptown prostitutes. The genuine effort to reduce the incidence and spread of venereal disease on the part of the USFK and ROK authorities itself cannot be criticized. However, from the beginning of the Clean-Up Campaign, improving the health of the women for the women's sake was never an issue. The sole aim of the U.S. military was to prevent its men from catching VD, and the sole aim of the ROK government was to help the USFK meet that goal. The health status of these women was merely a means to an end for both the USFK and the ROK authorities. Moreover, the burden of clean health fell on the women, not the servicemen. Emphasis on stricter VD control amounted to increased harassment by U.S. military police, Korean police, both USFK and ROK health authorities, and club owners to control the bodies of these women.
VD Education
Although the USFK and Korean authorities emphasized that kijich'on prostitutes should be educated about sexually transmitted diseases (chapter 4), such training was not uniformly and consistently conducted. Rather, adequate and continued education depended on the level of conscientiousness of the USFK and ROK leaders at each camptown. For example, the Uijongbu area quite systematically held meetings during which basic lectures and slides on venereal disease were presented to prostitutes. 5 The women were also urged not to treat VD on their own by using inappropriate or inadequate medications purchased at local pharmacies, but rather to seek professional medical care as soon as they experienced signs of infection. 6 Songt'an City, though less systematically than Uijongbu, included a briefing on VD during the monthly "Etiquette and Good Conduct" lectures. But many women did not attend these education sessions either because they had never heard about them or because they had considered them yet another regulatory nuisance. According to the women interviewed, the common complaint among both those who had attended and not attended such VD talks was that the Korean government did not care much about educating women to protect their own health but rather relied on the mandatory examination system to assure U.S. authorities that the women were "clean." In short, the women believed they had nothing to gain by attending these lectures.
In addition, all of the women I interviewed blamed the government for not distributing condoms and showing women how to use them. They contrasted this with USFK practice: the USFK made condoms readily available, free of charge, at the compound gates for the soldier to take into the camptown. The women stated that gate areas were known as "condom land" and that U.S. servicemen, as soon as they landed in Korea, were given VD lectures. The women believed that the ROK gov ernment did not make proper education and the availability of condoms for women a priority because the examination and detention system served as the core of VD control.
Mandatory VD Examinations
Across the board, camptown prostitutes detested the mandatory VD examination system and its heightened enforcement because they felt they had more to lose than gain from it. First, they found the exams deeply humiliating. The women I interviewed repeatedly used the word "shame" and "dread" to describe their feelings about VD exams. A USFK community relations officer then active in VD control in Uijongbu pointed out that some of the "smarter women" told him that forced VD examinations amounted to a violation of their human rights. 7 He noted that these women especially took offense at being harassed by U.S. military police to show valid VD cards and be examined by U.S. medics. They charged that their rights as Korean citizens were being infringed: "We're Korean. Why are American doctors and police checking us?" 8
On the other hand, one woman asserted that some prostitutes would have preferred being checked by Americans because given that Americans were foreigners and that "normal" Koreans despised these women, it was more embarrassing to expose their genitals to Korean nationals. 9 Although most prostitutes felt that they had no choice but to comply with stringent VD regulations in order to enter bars and clubs and attract GIs, they believed the system did not benefit them. Some women were known to have questioned the medical validity of a VD prevention system that focused only on women: "Why are the authorities cracking down on us? American GIs are half the problem." 10
Second, for the women, the most burdensome aspect of stricter VD control was financial. They were obliged to pay for the VD exams and any medical treatment out of their own pockets. Given that they were forced to hand over to the club owner about 80% of the money they earned from selling sex and drinks to GIs, they often lacked enough money to pay for VD checks and adequate treatment. If detained in the suyongso (detention center), women were unable to work for a period of 4 to 10 days on the average, while some were required to stay for a month. 11 Until their infection cleared, they could not be released; consequently, they could not earn income but were nevertheless, in many cases, required to pay for their medical expenses. 12 Often, a woman had to bor row money from her club owner to treat medical problems, which in turn increased her club debts.
Moreover, stricter enforcement of VD control increased the likelihood of bribes imposed on camptown prostitutes by local police and private health clinics. Facing pressures from USFK and ROKG officials to tighten VD regulation, local Korean officials stood to benefit professionally 13 and financially by cracking down on the women. If caught by the local KNP for not possessing a VD card or possessing an invalid card, women were often forced to pay bribes to the police in order to be released and permitted to continue to work. But since most of the women could not afford to pay the bribes, club owners came to bail them out and in turn raised the women's club debt. Club owners often vented their anger for having to pay the bribe money by beating the women. One woman who had worked in Uijongbu clubs in the early 1970s asserted that many women she knew feared the police the most because of the bribes they imposed on the women, including extortion for non-VD-related "offenses," and the related punishments the owner would mete out. 14
Private VD clinic operators were also notorious for bribing women, both before and after the Clean-Up Campaign. Before the USFK-ROK emphasis on VD control, private operators frequently lied to the women about their test results, claiming that those who had passed had failed and those who had failed had passed. In the first instance, women were forced to pay for treatment they did not require. In the second, women could get their VD cards stamped "pass" if they paid a fee, or bribe. One Mrs. Pak recalled that although she went for regular exams, she rarely knew if she was sick or healthy because she always felt that she was being duped by the clinic official. 15
With the initiation of the Clean-Up Campaign and its emphasis on replacing private with government-operated clinics, corrupt private clinics which continued to operate tended to indulge in the first type of extortion. One former prostitute from Songt'an, Kim Yonja, stated that "of the four private clinics in the area, three were out to make profits."
| This created a very frightening atmosphere: even if the woman didn't have VD, she'd be told she has it and was forced to be treated. If in one day you pull that kind of stunt on only 10 people out of all the women you examine, it'd be worth having a private clinic. 16 |
Ms. Kim, who had headed the "Women's Association" in Songt'an (early-to-mid 1970s), discovered numerous such abuses by clinic operators and began to compile records with which to address MoHSA authorities. In her own words,
| If the [private] clinic said that a woman tested positive for VD, then I would take her to another hospital or clinic and get her tested. If she tested negative, I would then receive the verification from that clinic. After about a year's worth of collecting various data, I reported the discrepancies (exploitation) to the Health and Social Affairs Bureau in Suwon [capital of Kyonggi Province]. In the aftermath, these private clinics were abolished, and MoHSA clinics entered the camptowns. 17 |
While it is unlikely that one woman's conscientious struggle on behalf of her sister prostitutes eliminated such abuses, Ms. Kim's words attest to the exploitation that the Clean-Up's stress on VD checks and treatment inflicted on many camptown prostitutes. At the same time, her statement also reveals that women did benefit in the long run from the establishment of government-operated VD clinics and tighter government supervision of the remaining private clinics in the sense that direct monitoring of VD examinations and treatment by the MoHSA encouraged more accurate medical record-keeping on the part of medical workers and reduced the extortionary practices.
Third, by emphasizing the maintenance of valid VD cards, the Clean-Up gave license to U.S. MPs, the local Korean police and health workers to harass all camptown women, not just the prostitutes. For example, MPs would come into the clubs and demand to see the VD cards of the club's hostesses in what amounted to "surprise inspections." Such action on the part of U.S. personnel was not sanctioned by the Status of Forces Agreement and was therefore a breach of Korean sovereignty. In Tongduch'on, USFK officials who undertook daily unannounced inspections were not limited to MPs; they included representatives of camp commanders, the Equal Opportunity Treatment Office, the Public Affairs Office, the Provost Marshall, the Criminal Investigation Division, the Office of Preventive Medicine, and the Inspector General. 18 Angered by the arrogance of U.S. MPs and other USFK inspectors, club owners and Korea Special Tourist Association (KSTA) leaders protested to local ROK and USFK authorities.
| a) The [U.S.] authorities concerned frequently makes [sic] a secret inspection of our facilities and takes [sic] unilateral actions to restrict the entrance to our clubs without taking our explanation [opinion] into consideration. b) Military police or Security Police rushes to our clubs to check the passes and ID cards of the employees and also to search the counter desks and music rooms in our clubs. These are, we think, injudicious actions to violate the human right [sic]. 19 |
Ms. Kim recalled that club women were also angered by the MPs' behavior and voiced their complaints to the club owners. She noted that the base authorities must have heeded these complaints because joint US-ROK medical teams gradually replaced MPs as unannounced inspectors. 20
Outside the clubs, the Korean police were all too eager to stop Korean women in the streets. Women who wore more make-up than others, women who walked with servicemen or were near a base, unaccompanied by U.S. personnel, even though they were not prostitutes, were all subject to random checks of VD cards by Korean police and health inspectors. In 1971, the Chief of Songt'an Police stated that "[t]he problem is that KNP, Korean health agents and women inspectors have no way of determining who is an unregistered streetwalker, Korean citizen or U.S. dependent." 21 Consequently, the tendency was to treat all women as prostitutes or potential prostitutes. Such actions date back to earlier attempts in different societies to control military prostitution; the enforcement of the British Contagious Diseases Act of the 1860s and U.S. federal legislation regarding venereal disease containment during World War I translated into the assumption that any woman found near military camps is a prostitute and therefore subject to gynecological examination. 22
The leaders of U.S. commands had to step in and negotiate with local police to refrain from stopping women for simply accompanying U.S. servicemen in town. U.S. soldiers charged that Korean police (KNP) and health inspectors were harassing them and their Korean female companions, often wives, girlfriends, or friends, without any provocation or reason. 23 Many base authorities requested that KNP and other local officials refrain from indiscriminate stopping of women accompanying GIs, claiming that such KNP actions "mean, by implication that (1) all Korean females accompanying U.S. personnel are prostitutes, or (2) that U.S. personnel go only with Korean females who are prostitutes." 24 Other commanders, however, asked their men to cooperate with the KNP, who were, after all, only doing their job to protect the health of U.S. personnel.
Whether working in the clubs, shopping on the streets, or sleeping in their rooms, kijich'on women confronted increased harassment by local U.S. and Korean VD control officials. As mentioned in chapter 4, local authorities "rounded up" women for mass VD examinations and injections of penicillin. The MoHSA official in charge of camptown VD control in 1971-72 recalled, for example, that in Tongduch'on, "[l]ocal officials would go find the woman who failed her exams and put her on the bus [for the detention center in Soyosan] by force if she resisted." 25 Ms. Kim recalled that VD control in Songt'an became increasingly severe beginning in 1972 and that "even those [Korean] housewives who happened to wear a lot of make-up [and therefore looked like prostitutes] got hauled into" the Ministry of Health vehicle stationed right at the front gates of the base. 26 It was also not uncommon for local police and VD clinic officials to enter the homes/rooms of those prostitutes who were considered to be infected and force them to go to treatment centers. 27 A Foreign Ministry document states clearly that the "health/sanitation inspection zone" was expanded to include not only clubs and restaurants but also the living quarters of club employees and adjacent residential areas that were not necessarily inhabited by people who serve U.S. military base personnel. 28 Ms. Kim and other camptown residents of the early-to-mid 1970s remarked that some U.S. base commands transported such women to treatment centers in U.S. military vehicles.
Joint USFK-ROK cooperation on VD control improved the potential for adequate treatment of infected women, but it did not fully take into account the women's sensitivities to certain medications and treatment regimens. Nor did it responsibly undertake the elimination of excessive or unnecessary treatment practices. USFK medical teams set the basic standards of diagnosis and treatment and monitored the compliance (or noncompliance) of private and public health clinics. In doing so, the USFK was instrumental in eliminating some types of inappropriate and abusive treatment practices by Koreans, especially private clinicians. For example, a (1974) joint U.S.-ROK supervision team "vigorously reprimanded" a physician in charge of examining 437 prostitutes in Chunggu, Taegu "for lack of any constructive progress since a visit last year by Dr. Kim (MHSA)." This physician was scolded for maintaining a "poorly-lighted, and quite filthy" clinic and administering inadequate doses of medication for gonorrhea. 29 More serious abuses, such as the treatment of women who tested 3+ or 4+ WBCs (white blood cells) with 1.0 gram of chloramphenicol, were considered "quite dangerous as well as probably worthless" and "recommended that it be discontinued." 30 The joint supervisory team that reported its observations to the Subcommittee in February 1974 also noted that the "haphazard treatment of cervicitis of unknown origin," administered by the Waegwan Health Center and VD Clinic, was "unwarranted" and that some women were quarantined for a period "probably excessive for medical care." 31
Such efforts to curb medical negligence and abuses, though genuine, were in fact selective: Some excesses were permitted to continue for the sake of inducing women's cooperation in VD control. For example, the same supervisory team that determined the Waegwan Health Center's practice of quarantining some women to be excessive did not recommend that this practice be discontinued. Rather, one of the team members, a Dr. Gallo of the 543d General Dispensary at Camp Carroll, asserted that this excessive practice had "psychological advantages." 32 In other words, the excessive quarantine period, though medically unwarranted, would serve as a lesson about the physical and financial consequences of failing VD tests to women who did not take the regulations seriously. Similarly, two other physicians on the joint team, a Dr. Antal (of the World Health Organization) and a Dr. Kim (MoHSA), "felt the period was too long when females were treated with penicillin [sic] but they did not push to reduce the period." 33
Moreover, it appears that the U.S. military required the higher doses of penicillin, 4.8-6.0 million units, as compared to the lower doses generally administered by Korean physicians, without having adequately researched their efficacy and side effects on the Korean women. USFK and ROK medical officials did acknowledge that approximately 5% of the prostitutes were allergic to penicillin and in some base areas took precautions to substitute penicillin with other drugs. 34 But many Korean physicians, even two and three years into the Clean-Up Campaign, remained "reluctant to give such large doses . . . because such doses in subjects allergic to penicillin could result in death to the patient." 35 The Subcommittee member representing the MoHSA conveyed this observation to the Subcommittee, adding that "more study was required on this problem." 36
According to the U.S. military, there were no reported deaths of prostitutes treated with penicillin in 1973. 37 Yet, the MoHSA chief in charge of camptown VD control in 1971-72 acknowledged that the most serious side effect from penicillin suffered by prostitutes was penicillin shock. 38 No person or document I came across offered information on the frequency and seriousness of such shock, though one joint supervision team report noted: "The doctor at the VD clinic [in the vicinity of Camps Henry and Walker in Taegu] appeared to have a paranoid fear that a girl would die of an anaphylactic reaction from injectable penicillin." 39 But instead of thoroughly investigating the situation, the team report concluded, "Most so-called reactions he was seeing were probably hysterical reactions to the injection itself and unrelated to the penicillin." 40
This kind of casual conclusion warrants the following observations: it is unlikely that women who had grown accustomed to regular gynecological and blood examinations and attendant injections would have reacted "hysterically" at the sight of a needle. Second, it is ironic, not to mention irresponsible, that medical officials so intent on making Korean physicians observe "sound medical practices" paid scant attention to the possibility of serious side effects ensuing from the recommended high doses of medication and permitted some medically "unscientific" and "unwarranted" practices to continue at the expense of the women's health.
In the end, in the mode of business-as-usual, many clinics continued to operate as they had prior to the visits of USFK and ROK authorities, and the authorities departed, resigned to the belief that since "real change is doubtful . . . U.S. servicemen would be well advised to avoid" those areas where "most prostitutes have chronic gonorrhea." 41 In the end, restoring ailing women to health was not as important as channeling men to areas where prostitutes were healthier and therefore less dangerous as sex mates.
Contact Identification
Alongside VD registration and effective diagnosis and treatment, the Clean-Up Campaign emphasized establishing and/or reinforcing strict "contact identification" systems. The purpose was to locate the female source of VD and mandate her to obtain treatment so that she would not spread her infection. Nearly all the bases had some form of contact system and regularly briefed servicemen regarding the contact procedure(s) they should follow in case of VD contraction. The USFK also urged its men to seek medical assistance from camp physicians as soon as they had any symptoms of venereal disease. Although one USFK document recommending VD control measures states "Korean prostitutes with venereal disease are encouraged to name U.S. contacts," 42 there was no mention in any of the documents or individuals I interviewed indicating the existence of such a procedure or system. On the contrary, information about military personnel with VD was held in strict confidentiality, and a woman who was accused by a soldier as a contact was not even permitted to find out his identity to prove him right or wrong. 43
Most of the women found the various contact identification measures humiliating, burdensome, inaccurate, and unfair. With the "tag system," women were required to wear numbered tags (VD card numbers) on their chests. The GI who contracted VD was supposed to remember the number and inform the base medical authorities of his condition. The medical office would then identify the woman by matching her number to her name and face in the "photo identification files" or copies of VD registration cards. (Medical offices and Provost Marshal Offices kept a book or file of records of each registered prostitute in the camptown, including her name, photograph, VD card registration number, local address, and the name of the club in which she worked.) The majority of the women I interviewed had worn such tags beginning in the early 1970s and remarked bitterly that they had felt humiliated in doing so. One woman asserted that many of her coworkers complained among themselves, "We're not animals--why are they tagging us and rounding us up!" 44
Some commands encouraged the infected GI to go to the club or home of the alleged VD transmitter and point her out to the relevant military officials. Accused women found such public displays condemning and degrading and would put up loud and sometimes violent resistance. 45 Because GIs generally avoided such face-to-face confrontation, most commands eventually adopted less confrontational practices, such as encouraging the infected soldier simply to point out the room where the alleged transmitter lived. Medical officials and/or the police would then go to her room or club and force her to get treated. 46
Club prostitutes also resented the contact systems because they tended to err at the women's expense and provided no avenue of redress for the woman who believed she was wrongly accused. The contact slip system, adopted by many commands, required that a GI who buys sex from a club prostitute write her name and VD registration number on a contact form available at the entrance of the club, retain it for two weeks after intercourse, and submit it to the medical office if he thought she was the source of his infection. The problem was that a soldier, who was often inebriated during sexual activities, did not always remember to write down the name of the woman he slept with. When pressed by medical authorities, he would offer any name he could remember. That name did not always match the identity of the real source, and consequently, a woman who had not associated with the infected GI would be accused. Women thus accused were forced to undergo gynecological and blood examinations. Kim Yonja stated that even if the test results were negative, no apology was offered by the U.S. side. She said that women, simply put, suffered unduly (tanghaetta) at the hands of the base authorities. 47 Indeed, a joint USFK-ROK supervisory team visiting the Tonggu Health Center and VD Clinic in Pusan found that the clinic did not treat those contacts who tested negative for VD. The team pointed out the error in such practice; the "VD Clinic was told they must use epidemiologic treatment for all contacts regardless whether an examination is negative or not" 48 (italics added). In other words, from the perspective of the U.S. and ROK authorities, medicating all contacts, infected or not, was preferable to letting uninfected women go free of medication.
Conflict Between Registered and Unregistered Women
Various forms of contact identification tended to fail because many GIs, disobeying command advice, continued to buy sex from unregistered women (streetwalkers or female employees of U.S. bases who sold sex on the side) and then name a registered club woman as the culprit. As the VD control programs took effect, USFK officials discovered that a significant number, if not a majority, of GI infections were derived from sexual contact with streetwalkers. For example, Lieutenant D. M. MacKinnon, representing the 4th Missile Command at Camp Page (Ch'unchon), reported at the Fifth USFK Civil Affairs Conference that over 50% of his command's VD cases were contracted from streetwalkers. 49 Again at a Civil Affairs Conference in September 1973, a Camp Page representative stated that a majority of VD cases came from "non-base-club women" living in an off-limits area 200 yards from Camp Page and emphasized that the contact slip system does not work. 50 Kim Yonja also commented that in those areas with strict VD control, "the problem was the streetwalkers. They didn't get such [VD] tests at all. So, in general, if a GI got VD, it was usually a streetwalker he caught it from, rather than a club woman, because the streetwalker was cheaper." 51
Inaccuracies inherent in contact systems that relied on records of registered prostitutes had the effect of pitting club prostitutes and streetwalkers against each other. Club women, angered for having to face false accusations and often unwarranted medical treatment, blamed the unregistered women for their plight. They resented having to serve as scapegoats after having followed VD registration and examination procedures. Most of the women I interviewed recalled that vicious fights often broke out between registered and unregistered camptown prostitutes, owing specifically to contact errors and to a general sense of victimization and revenge on the part of registered women. One former leader of the Songt'an Women's Association recounted how she went on patrol with joint KNP-MP patrol teams to catch streetwalkers. She had often run through village alleys, together with the police, in order to "corner such women" and "turn them over to the police." 52
From a feminist perspective, the USFK-ROK efforts to crack down on streetwalkers and enforce VD registration helped further fracture camptown prostitutes' already fragile sense of group organization and solidarity as women sharing similar plights of exploitation. First, enlisting the Women's Association to help the authorities eliminate streetwalkers amounted to a "divide and conquer" strategy on the part of the USFK and ROK Clean-Up officials. Instead of together challenging Clean-Up policies that treated both club prostitutes and streetwalkers like animals to be rounded up, inoculated, and detained, the women blamed and physically attacked one another for spreading VD. Second, the camptown Women's Associations, which were in theory to defend the needs and interests of club prostitutes, were in reality co-opted by USFK and ROK officials to compel members to observe VD regulations and antiracial discrimination policies in their sex work. Both U.S. and ROK authorities encouraged these Associations to adopt "self-policing measures" to ensure that all camptown prostitutes were registered with the Associa-
tion, the police, and the VD clinic. Many of the Associations complied with U.S.-ROK requests out of self-interest: fewer streetwalkers and increased numbers of registered women observing regular examinations and treatment would prevent off-limits impositions, fewer errors in contact identification, and better control, in general, over unregistered prostitutes' activities. In helping the authorities register streetwalkers and increase compliance with VD control measures, the women themselves helped further institutionalize camptown prostitution to the USFK'sliking.
The USFK and ROK officials administering the Clean-Up did exert genuine effort to reduce the number of streetwalkers (through raids and round-ups), especially minors peddling sex for money. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Transportation (Tourism), and Health and Social Affairs all stressed the importance of eliminating streetwalkers in order to enforce VD control. This was integral to reducing the spread of VD to GIs. In particular, local Korean officials and police, under orders from their superiors, pressured pimps to release underage females and warned club managers not to hire or permit the entry of female minors into their establishments. 53
Local camptown officials and former prostitutes I interviewed generally agreed that many club owners did cooperate with local Korean authorities to keep minors out of the clubs. Minors who were picked up by the Korean police were often turned over to the local Women's Welfare Office of the MoHSA for "guidance" education, designed to teach poor and vagrant women a skill such as barbering, hairstyling, or taxi-driving. The ROKG housed the girls in "accommodation centers" (similar to those for infected prostitutes), some of which took seriously the task of "guiding" the youths to live "normal" lives, while others served as detention centers resembling prisons. Some minors took advantage of the skills training while others returned to their hometowns. Still others went back to camptowns to earn dollars for sex.
It is impossible to know how many underage females were kept from falling deeper into the vices of camptown prostitution, but from the documents and individuals I surveyed, there appears to have been a genuine effort on the part of the ROK government to keep young girls out of camptown prostitution (and prostitution in general). One woman who has operated a small food stall in It'aewon's red-light area since the mid-1970s (to now) stated emphatically: "President Pak was a tough character: The police got rid of streetwalkers in It'aewon, especially minors, and put them in Songnam Center for 15 days or more. I heard from some women that the place was worse than a prison." 54
VD: The Fault of the GI
Despite the aforementioned efforts to tighten VD control over women and thereby reduce VD rates among servicemen, the problem continued to plague U.S.-ROK Clean-Up officials throughout the campaign. Command officials began to accept the fact that camptown prostitutes were only half the problem and perhaps easier to control than their own men. Lieutenant D. M. MacKinnon of the 4th Missile Command (Camp Page) in Ch'unch'on reported at the September 1973 Civil Affairs Conference that the local KNP had recently begun "massive sweeps of the off-limits area to crack down on girls without VD cards." In the same breath, he admitted that such crackdowns were not the whole answer:
| We forget that it is our soldiers, as well as the prostitute, who passes the disease, and that to dwell solely on controlling the prostitute is only half the problem. We also find that dwelling too much on this Korean and American problem unfairly blinds the command to all that is good in Chunchon and Korea. 55 |
There were two major obstacles to controlling the sexual activity of the GI: getting him to use condoms and getting him to stay away from unregistered women. Despite the commands' educational efforts on prophylaxis and sexual hygiene, regular reminder of the dangers of sexual intercourse with unregistered women, and placing areas frequented by streetwalkers off limits, servicemen continued to seek out streetwalkers and forgo the condom. MacKinnon stated in 1973 that although streetwalkers have been removed off the streets through KNP enforcement, "this has not deterred the price-conscious soldier, who has been going into the off-limits area to contact the street girl." 56 He added, "It is also a fact that 40% of our cases per month [at Camp Page] generally arise among soldiers who have had VD before." 57 In short, the sexual irresponsibility and promiscuity of some soldiers, not just the uncontrolled sexual activity of camptown women, became implicated in the VDproblem.
While individual soldiers ventured away from the base to find sexual pleasure, some commands sponsored prostitutes' entry into military compounds in an organized fashion. As early as December 1971, local Korean authorities in Tongduch'on complained to the Subcommittee, through ROK representatives, that a main source of VD in the Second Infantry Division (2d ID) area was the "estimated 400-500 'free lancers' " who were invited into Camp Casey "daily with no check [of valid ID and VD cards]." 58 Again in 1973, local Koreans, namely the club owners and the KSTA in Tongduch'on, aggressively raised this issue and put the 2d ID authorities on the defensive. The Ministry of Transportation conducted an investigation of a KSTA petition charging the Camp Casey authorities of transporting camptown women into the compounds and submitted the report to the Subcommittee:
| It is noted that business girls are gathered in group on the roads adjacent to the U.S. military compound, and taken into the compound by a USFK vehicle. The transportation to and from the compound is in service three times from 1700 to 1800 hours. Exact number of girls taken into compound a day cannot be verified. According to the statements made by residents in that area, the estimate of number of girls are [sic] more than 200 a day. (Photos are attached.) 59 |
When a joint USFK-ROK supervisory team visited Masan in 1974, the director of the local VD clinic told the team members that no women came for examinations because "of a change in policy at the Camp which allowed females to enter without presenting VD cards. Also, when the 609th ordinance company moved from Haeundae Beach [in Pusan] they brought prostitutes with them, most of whom failed to re-register in Masan." 60
Club owners took offense at the double standards of the U.S. military in imposing the burden of VD control on Koreans while themselves not applying strict control measures on their own personnel. "Lee Choon Sung," who sent the original petition on behalf of Tongduch'on club owners, expressed anger at the military's behavior, noting that U.S. camps, over which Korean authorities have no jurisdiction, "are the places of refuge from medical inspection, hot-beds of venereal disease." He pointed to the command's hypocrisy: "The USFK authorities . . . are ascribing the responsibilities for VD infection to us and are taking the unjustifiable measures [i.e., busing women]." 61 Although 2d ID authorities "emphasized that this [busing] program is conducted under strict supervision and that there is no prostitution involved when the girls are inside the military compounds," 62 the author of the MoT report argued otherwise:
| Inviting ladies to the compound is entirely the independent business of U.S. military authorities. However, bringing in business girls into the camps everyday in such a large scale indicates a different nature from inviting ladies for social occasions. 63 |
The same MoT representative on the Subcommittee stated unequivocally that such actions on the part of U.S. officials could jeopardize joint USFK-ROK cooperation in camptown Clean-Up and urged 2d ID authorities to "refrain from daily busing a large number of business girls into the military compound." 64
The point of contention for the Korean side was not that U.S. personnel were engaging in prostitution on base with Korean women but that busing women into the compound meant fewer men exiting the base to spend money in the local clubs. In other words, the actions of the 2d ID were hampering clubs' ability to earn U.S. dollars, particularly from the sex trade, and therefore served as a disincentive for Korean cooperation with U.S. requests for camptown "purification." The author of the MoT report summarized what was at stake for local Koreans and for the continuation of the Clean-Up:
| [S]uch actions by the U.S. base authorities might adversely affect business activities in the community in that area. Since the inception of this Subcommittee the ROK Government with U.S. cooperation made maximum efforts to improve the environmental conditions of the base areas, particularly that of sanitary and health conditions of the recreationary [sic] establishments for the U.S. personnel. In many cases such efforts paid off because local community leaders were more than willing to cooperate with the Government authorities for better facilities and services. Such being the case, if local communities are to be deprived of their business in its entirety they will have little incentive to cooperate with the authorities for better conditions. 65 |
While pleading the case of local Korean club owners, this ROK member of the Subcommittee was also conveying a threat of Korean non-cooperation in continued clean-up activities.
With respect to VD control, some club owners did in fact withhold or evade cooperation with USFK demands for retaining only those women with valid VD cards. The primary reason was economic--"the more girls, the more customers." 66 But the sometimes arrogant behavior and interference of U.S. MPs in the clubs and the double standards of base authorities (e.g., busing women) were other reasons. The club owners especially resented the military's imposition of the off-limits decree for VD control violations, which they considered an insult to Korean sovereignty. Generally, clubs were put off limits (usually for 7-10 days) if three or four club prostitutes were found with invalid VD cards in one month. 67 In some camp areas, commands unilaterally placed plaques or sign plates in clubs indicating "acceptable standards" for patronage by U.S. servicemen. Korean club owners protested such actions to the USKF and ROK authorities. A representative from the MoT reported to the Subcommittee that such actions by U.S. personnel in Tongduch'on "are causing considerable ill-feelings on the part of local community," emphasizing that "the placing of plates mentioned in effect constitutes double licensing of businesses, one by Korean authority and the other by U.S. authority." 68
Given the mutual interests of the club owners and prostitutes in blocking U.S. interference in the clubs and the off-limits decree, some club owners warned their women of upcoming "unannounced inspections" and told them to avoid being in the clubs at a certain time and/or to get their VD cards up to date. 69 The women would benefit by avoiding the potential humiliation of being charged with VD infection in public, consequent detention and costs of treatment, and income lost from prohibi tion to work in clubs. The club owners would benefit by retaining large numbers of women available for selling alcohol and sex.
Camptown Prostitutes Protest
The social unrest, economic dislocation, and sexual tensions in the summer of 1971 politicized the various groups of camptown residents, putting into sharper relief the costs and benefits of one another's actions and inciting them to defend and assert their interests both privately and publicly (chapter 3). It was the first time that kijich'on prostitutes, for a relatively prolonged period of time, led and staged public protests to voice camptown residents' grievances and demands against the USFK. Prior to this time, in most cases, the women had reacted when their bodies and pocketbooks were severely threatened by the actions of base personnel. For example, "about 200 prostitutes carrying sticks demonstrated outside [Camp Ames] demanding immediate arrest" of a GI alleged to have murdered a camptown prostitute on July 16, 1971. 70 Protests by prostitutes against alleged GI murders of Korean women and USFK's reluctance to turn the accused over to the Korean legal system were not uncommon even before the Clean-Up Campaign. 71
What was new in the summer of 1971 was the support given by the nonprostitute residents to the prostitutes protesting what they all believed were USFK injustices toward them and the commitment of the women to challenge, sometimes violently, American power over their lives. The most ardent and prolonged of such protests (from July 13 through August 9) took place in reaction to the off-limits decree imposed by commanders in Anjongni during the racial violence of July 9-10, 1971. What began as a protest by 100-150 prostitutes on July 13 against the decision of the Camp Humphreys command to close its main gate and put Anjongni off-limits grew to a crowd of approximately 600 prostitutes and 3,000 other villagers by August 9. 72 During the series of protests, prostitutes demanded that the base authorities withdraw the "cowardly retalition [sic]" (for villagers fighting with blacks the weekend of July 10) by opening the gates, 73 blocked waitresses who work on the base from entering the compound, 74 hurled stones at military personnel, 75 overturned the Pyongtaek County Police Superintendent's car, 76 and demanded to meet the base commander. Major General Joseph Perditz, Commander of Korea Support Command (KORSCOM), stated in a letter that the crowd outside Camp Humphreys, led by prostitutes, held a total of six U.S. sol diers hostage and demanded to speak to the installation commander, who agreed to do so. 77
The base authorities and local KNP initially responded to the protests with blockades, gas grenades, and increased police presence. The ensuing melee between the protesters and the police (both MPs and KNP) resulted in the arrest and clubbing of several prostitutes and other villagers by the Korean police. 78 But the protests also led to the official recognition of the prostitutes as a significant group to be contended with in camptown politics. Ms. Yi Chongja, "the representative of [the] village's 'girlie Club,' 79 was invited, together with National Assemblyman Choe, Yong-hee and one other village leader, to a luncheon sponsored by Col. Best to discuss the gradual lifting of the off-limits ban on Anjongni." 80 The ban on Anjongni was finally lifted on August 26, 1971 (although seven of the twelve local bars remained off-limits because of their failure to comply with standards agreed upon by local Korean and command leaders), after 48 days of social unrest and economic losses for the Korean residents. Without doubt, the prostitutes initiated and sustained this push, together with other villagers, to lift the ban on the village as promised by the Humphreys command in late July. The prostitutes not only received the support of other villagers in exerting pressure on the base leadership but also that of Koreans in the greater society. For example, on July 29, 1971, Chungang Ilbo, a leading national daily, accused the Humphreys command of breaking its promise to lift the ban. 81
Besides the protests in Anjongni, camptown prostitutes also staged demonstrations on behalf of their "human rights." In May 1971, the Han'guk Ilbo, another major daily, reported on protests by prostitutes (in P'yongt'aek) against GIs' efforts to cut their rates for sex:
| Some 1,000 Korean prostitutes staged a demonstration in a camp town near Seoul Monday evening, denouncing American soldiers for attempting to beat down charges for their services by half. |
| They held rallies and demonstrations in front of a U.S. Army camp in the town for three hours before breaking up voluntarily to wait for "proper measures" by U.S. Army authorities. |
| In the demonstration, the prostitutes asked the U.S. Army to make an apology for the attempt. 82 These prostitutes were objecting to the U.S. airmen's boycott, the "Do Not Buy Korean Commodities" campaign, which had begun in mid-April 1971; 90% of the participants were black. 83 The boycott was a protest against the local Koreans' discrimination against black soldiers. It was also a protest against the rise of local prices, which resulted from the increased demand that the redeployment of servicemen to the P'yongt'aek region, as part of the troop reduction, generated. Korean camptown prostitutes were outraged at the boycott and held rallies near various U.S. camps. Songt'an prostitutes "adopted a four-point resolution, calling for the withdrawal of the Korean commodity boycott drive and reverence for the human rights of the Korean people." 84 |
According to Kim Yonja, who helped lead the protest, club prostitutes were insulted by the fact that U.S. servicemen compiled a list of prices they were willing to pay for various goods and services in town, treating sex as just another object of purchase: "[T]hey fixed the local prices--for example, $5 for a pair of shoes and $5 for a 'short-time.' Therefore, we demonstrated. We charged, 'How is it possible that someone can set the same price for a pair of shoes and a woman's body, then print the prices and circulate them?' " 85
She and other prostitutes found such actions not only economically damaging, but morally demeaning. The boycott did end a couple months after its initiation, partly because of insufficient participation by airmen, 86 and partly because of the public protests by prostitutes and other villagers. Ms. Kim recalled that someone from the command did apologize to the women, and "therefore things were appeased." 87
The significance of the protests described above lies in the fact that many kijich'on prostitutes, though powerless in many ways, did not simply remain passive in the camptown turmoils of the early 1970s. On the contrary, they formed a local bloc with which to protest the U.S. hegemony over the economic and political life of their camptowns. Referring to the protests against the boycott, Ms. Kim stated, "[T]he shop owners and club owners joined forces with us and supported our protest because with fixed prices, the prices of their own goods fell." 88 In other words, U.S. actions, whether off-limits decrees or boycotts and prix fixe measures, had direct economic consequences on all camptown residents dependent on the bases for their survival. In this sense, although prostitutes were the most despised of the camptown residents, they represented, in stark relief, the vulnerability of local Korean residents to U.S. power and thereby succeeded to lead other villagers to challenge that power.
The political protests of prostitutes also underscore the refusal of many women, though condemned by Korean society and abused by Koreans and Americans alike, to be treated like commodities. In short, they asserted their sense of human dignity, albeit fragile, when pushed too far by others in the camptown communities. It is also significant that for these women the economic value of their labor and that of their human worth were intertwined. Moreover, they merged their sense of powerlessness, vis-á-vis the bases, to the violation of the human rights, or domination, of the Korean people in general by the United States.
It must be noted that public protest was one of the last available weapons of influence to which the women could resort and that such mass protests on the part of camptown residents were one of the reasons why the U.S. side initiated the Clean-Up Campaign. In other words, the military sought to prevent such public outcries and disturbances by instituting law and order in the camptown communities. Major General Joseph Perditz, the head of KORSCOM, complained of the unruliness of the local Korean population around several of his command areas in the spring and summer of 1971, listing the demonstrations that had broken out near Camps Howard (May 23), Humphreys (July 13, 27, August 3-5, 9), Ames (July 19), and Carroll (August 2). He and other high-ranking military officials insisted that the EUSA Commanding General raise the issue with the ROKG to ensure that such disturbances no longer occur. 89 With the initiation of the Clean-Up Campaign, such public challenges to U.S. military power in camptowns became rare throughout the 1970s. Law and order and improved communication between U.S. and ROK officials were intended to avoid violent and disorderly actions by both Koreans and Americans in the camptowns, but the effect on prostitutes was the official silencing of their voices.
Note 1: See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics, pp. xxv-xxvi and 388-89; Samuel Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," p. 358. Dependency studies do focus on the "asymmetries" in terms of class but rarely in terms of gender. Back.
Note 2: Telephone interview via Mr. An, March 10, 1993. Back.
Note 4: There were exceptions, however. For example, "Jin Soo," in the documentary film Camp Arirang, says that she liked black men because they were "real" and that being a "black prostitute" meant that a woman was "tough." Back.
Note 5: USFK, "Camp-Village Purification Program" (report), January 30, 1973, and "Status of Camp Village Control" (report) of Uijongbu City, May 30, 1974; Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992. Back.
Note 6: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992. Back.
Note 7: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992. Back.
Note 9: Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993. Back.
Note 10: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992; interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 11: Interview with the former MoHSA physician overseeing VD control in the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, May 14, 1992. Back.
Note 12: Some detention centers paid for the costs of medical treatment, and the Korean government's purification plans did allocate funds for such treatment. But according to current and former prostitutes familiar with the detention system, many women had to pay for their medical treatment themselves. Back.
Note 13: Supervisors would commend lower-level officials for their ardor. See chapter 3 on the willingness of lower-level officials to take up the Clean-Up Campaign, once high-level interest and attention became evident. Back.
Note 14: Interview, March 10, 1993. Back.
Note 15: Telephone interview via Mrs. Smith, April 2, 1993. Back.
Note 16: Interview, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 18: Subcommittee Minutes, #19, May 18, 1973, Enclosure entitled " 'Report on Situation in Tongduchon' (by Ministry of Transportation)." Representatives from the Ministry of Tourism conveyed to the Subcommittee the complaints of the Korea Tourist Association (now, KSTA) regarding U.S. interference in Tongduch'on clubs. The KSTA listed the names of these USFK offices. Osan Air Base officials also instituted "[f]requent inspections of night clubs for VD control measures violations at hours of highest patronage." (U.S. Air Force, Korea, "Venereal Disease Control: USAF Bases, Korea," May/June 1972.) Back.
Note 19: Petition sent from Lee Choon Sung, President of Korea Tourist Recreation Service Association, to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Injudicious Actions" by the 2d Infantry Division, March 16, 1973. Korean camptown bar owners in Taegu also complained of U.S. interference in their business, stating that their bars should be inspected by the ROK authorities or by joint U.S.-ROK teams: "The owners sa[id] that inspections conducted solely by U.S. authorities, and the subsequent actions taken by the U.S. authorities based on these inspections, are unwarranted." Statement by Son Yong Sok, Civil Affairs Specialist, 19th Support Group, Taegu, USFK Civil Affairs Conference, September 28, 1973. Back.
Note 20: Interview with Kim Yonja, Kunsan, May 14, 1992. Back.
Note 21: Pacific Stars and Stripes, September 4, 1971. Back.
Note 22: Judith Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society, p. 2; Barbara Meil Hobson, Uneasy Virtue, ch. 7. Back.
Note 23: Pacific Stars and Stripes, September 4, 1971. Memorandum of Department of Army, 4th US Army Missile Command, Provost Marshall Office, Re: "Mutual Agreement," May 9, 1972, stated: "In the past, some misunderstanding and resentment has [sic] developed between American soldiers and Korean National Policemen when KN [Korean national] females in the company of American soldiers were questioned about their Venereal Disease (VD) Cards." Also, Col. D. W. Blanton, Commander, U.S. Air Force 3d Combat Support Group, Kunsan, stated at the USFK Civil Affairs Conference of March 2, 1973: "Korean police or plainclothes personnel intensified stopping girls with GI's to ask for their VD cards. (Some of those stopped were wives.)" Back.
Note 24: Report of Col. H. E. Lovelace, Commander of 51st Air Base Wing, Osan, at USFK Civil Affairs Conference, March 15, 1972. Back.
Note 25: Interview with the MoHSA physician overseeing VD control in the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, May 14, 1992. Back.
Note 26: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 27: Interviews with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 14, 1992; Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992; a KSTA official, Seoul, May 26, 1992. Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993. Back.
Note 28: "Kijich'on chonghwa ru,l wihan Woemubu Sihaeng Kyehoek #1," (Camp town Purification Enforcement Plan #1) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), in Subcommittee Minutes, #9, April 21, 1972. Back.
Note 29: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 30: Ibid. This observation by the joint USFK-ROK team referred to the Tong Ku Health Center and VD Clinic in Pusan, which examined prostitutes working near the (US) Hialeah Compound. Back.
Note 31: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. The Waegwan Health Center was responsible for examining and treating prostitutes who worked near Camp Carroll. The particular "haphazard treatment" consisted of 2.4 million units of probenicid penicillin "followed by erythromycin, tetracycline, or chloramphenicol in various combinations and dosages" given to women with 3+ or 4+ WBCs. Back.
Note 32: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 34: Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972. Back.
Note 35: Subcommittee Minutes, #16, January 12, 1973. Back.
Note 37: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 38: Interview with the MoHSA physician overseeing VD control in the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, May 14, 1992. Back.
Note 39: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 42: EUSA, International Relations Office Files, "Epidemiological Control Measure (as recommended by the American Public Health Association)," 1972 or 1973 (?). (original in capital letters) Back.
Note 43: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992. Back.
Note 44: Interview with Kim Yonja, Kunsan, May 14, 1992. Back.
Note 45: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 46: Regarding soldiers' reluctance to name prostitutes face-to- face, one Pacific Stars and Stripes, article (November 12, 1971) noted, "Some of the soldiers fear retaliation the next time they go into the village [for having accused a woman]. However, each is assured [by the medical office] that he will only have to point out the girl's residence and will not make eye-to-eye contact with her is [sic] he doesn't want to. We [U.S. medics] drop the KNP at the hooch and then take the GI back to his unit or dispensary." Back.
Note 47: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992. Back.
Note 48: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 49: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, March 2, 1973. Back.
Note 50: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, September 28, 1973. Back.
Note 51: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 52: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992. Back.
Note 53: Ministry of Transportation, "SOFA Han-Mi haptong wiwônhoe ûi habûi sahang sihaeng chisi," (SOFA Joint Committee Joint Enforcement Instructions), March 9, 1972; Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992. Back.
Note 54: Conversation with "It'aewon Lady," Seoul, February 26, 1992. Back.
Note 55: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, September 28, 1973. Back.
Note 56: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, March 2, 1973. Back.
Note 58: Subcommittee Minutes, #5, December 14, 1971. Back.
Note 59: Subcommittee Minutes, #19, May 18, 1973. Back.
Note 60: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 61: Lee Choon Sung, President of the Korea Tourist Recreation Service Association, Petition to EUSA Commanding General, March 16, 1973. Back.
Note 62: Subcommittee Minutes, #21, July 20, 1973. Back.
Note 63: Ministry of Tourism, "Report on Situation in Tongduchon" (Re: petition signed by Lee Choon Sung), in Subcommittee Minutes, #19, May 18, 1973. Back.
Note 66: USFK Civil Affairs Conference, March 2, 1973. Back.
Note 67: Interviews with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992; a KSTA official, Seoul, May 26, 1992; Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Telephone interview with Mrs. Chong via Mr. An, March 10, 1993. The EUSA Civil Affairs Handbook 530-34 (January 11, 1968) states: " 'Off limits' threats are often a part of VD discussions. To produce the desired results, these measures should be considered primarily on a short-term basis whereby the Koreans are given certain conditions on which the removal of 'off limits' will be based. Placing whole villages or towns 'off limits' should be avoided, since the undesirable elements of those localities will simply filter into an adjacent 'on limits' area" (p. 67). Back.
Note 68: MoT, "Report on Situation in Tongduchon" in Subcommittee Minutes, #19, May 18, 1973. Back.
Note 69: Interview with Ms. Pae, Songt'an, June 6, 1992; conversations with various current and former club women in Tongduchon, 1992. Back.
Note 70: Pacific Stars and Stripes, July 28, 1971. Back.
Note 71: For example, more than 300 prostitutes "staged a protest funeral march in front of 8057 American Unit [in Pupyong], demanding a Sgt. Teni (phonetic) appear before them. They charged the American was responsible for the death of one of their friends called Miss Lee Un-ja," 23 years of age. "The hearse, carrying the girls in white mourning dress, stopped in front of the unit's front door en route to a burial site and shouted: 'Come out Teni. Let him appear before us.' They also attempted to enter the unit compound and were stopped by about 50 American military police and 30 Korean police." Korea Times, May 15, 1969. Back.
Note 72: Taehan Ilbo, July 13, 1971 (EUSA translation); Pacific Stars and Stripes, August 12, 1971; Taehan Ilbo, August 10, 1971 (EUSA translation); Chungang Ilbo, July 29, 1971 (EUSA translation); letter from Col. F. Best, Commander of Camp Humphreys, to Maj. Gen. J. Perditz, February 7, 1972 (in letter from Perditz to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Continuing Harassment by Korean Officials in Attempts to Place Back-Alley Clubs On-Limits," February 7, 1972; letter from Perditz to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Lack of Control of Civilian Populace," August 10, 1971. Back.
Note 73: Taehan Ilbo, July 13, 1971. Back.
Note 74: Letter from Maj. Gen. Joseph Perditz, Commander of Korea Support Command (KORSCOM), to EUSA Commanding General, Re: "Lack of Control of Civilian Populace," August 10, 1971. Back.
Note 75: Taehan Ilbo, August 10, 1971. Back.
Note 76: Letter from Best to Perditz, February 7, 1972. Back.
Note 77: Letter from Perditz to EUSA Commanding General; see note 74. Back.
Note 79: Ms. Yi Chongja was the then president of the Anjongni prostitutes' "Women's Association." According to her colleagues and friends, she had served in this capacity since the 1960s and had been an active advocate of prostitutes' interests until recent years. Ms. Kim Yonja, also a leader in the "Women's Associations" of Kunsan and Songt'an, told me that Ms. Yi would have been able to describe in detail the camptown politics of Anjongni during the 1970s, but when Ms. Kim and I tried to locate Ms. Yi in the spring of 1992, we learned that she had recently passed away. Back.
Note 80: Korea Herald, July 30, 1971. Back.
Note 81: Chungang Ilbo, July 29, 1971 (EUSA Translation). Back.
Note 82: Han'guk Ilbo, May 4, 1971 (EUSA Translation). Back.
Note 83: Overseas Weekly, August 14, 1971. Back.
Note 84: Chosôn Ilbo, May 4, 1971 (EUSA Translation). Back.
Note 85: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 86: Overseas Weekly, August 14, 1971. Back.
Note 87: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 89: Letter from Perditz to EUSA Commanding General; see note 74. Back.
Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations
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