|
|
|
|
Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations, by Katharine H.S. Moon
| All this emphasis to clean up the towns and get the President [Pak] involved was not in order to stir up withdrawal but to prevent it from gaining course because the situation was not very good for the American military there or for the Korean people. In other words, I think that the timing was influenced on both sides by the fact that the Americans didn't want to leave Korea and the Koreans didn't want the Americans to leave Korea. 1 |
To understand the motivations of both the USFK and the ROK government in conducting the Clean-Up Campaign, we need to examine the role of base-community relations in the larger context of U.S.-ROK security relations. The application of the Nixon Doctrine to Korea drove the USFK leadership and the ROK government into each other's arms, thereby tightening their joint commitment to the preservation of a large U.S. troop presence in Korea. For the USFK, the Clean-Up efforts were a means to defend its organizational interests, vis-á-vis the decision makers in Washington, and a symbol of its commitment to remain in Korea, regardless of Washington's policy statements. For the Korean government, the Clean-Up was an integral part of "private diplomacy," a desperate resort to the use of local people and resources, in the absence of conventional diplomatic carrots and sticks, to secure U.S. commitments to Korea. The ROK government's lack of leverage toward U.S. government policies in the early 1970s was transposed onto its relationship with the USFK. The Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. troops provided the opportune moment for the USFK to demand camptown improvements and for the ROK government to oblige.
USFK'S Public Relations Campaign: Camptown Clean- Up
The reduction of 20,000 U.S. troops from its forces highlighted the uncertain future of the U.S. military presence in Korea. In the words of one U.S. official working for the USFK in the early 1970s, "The Nixon Doctrine took the [U.S.] residual concern about Korea and the Korean War away from the U.S. politicians and the U.S. people. They began asking, 'Did we ever need forces here?' " 2 Because the decision had been made in the highest offices of Washington and because the USFK leadership believed that the loss of the 7th Division was not serious enough to jeopardize its deterrence posture, the initial 20,000 cut took place without substantial opposition from the U.S. military. However, many in the USFK leadership "thought it was a step in the wrong direction" 3 and did not wish to see any further reductions.
The USFK leadership differed with Washington on the assessment of the security threat to South Korea. 4 In the view of these officials in Korea, the White House, the State Department, and particularly the Congress did not have an accurate understanding of North Korean military capabilities and intentions. Prior to the troop reduction, General Michaelis, then Chief of the UN/USFK forces, emphasized numerous times, during Senate subcommittee hearings on U.S. security commitments to Korea, the formidable military threat that the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) posed to the ROK's security. 5 When asked several times by congressmen, during another round of hearings on U.S.-ROK relations, if such a large U.S. troop presence (at the time, around 43,000) was necessary in Korea, he stated without hesitation that such a large force is "essential" to the security of Korea. 6 Interviews with USFK officials familiar with the Nixon Doctrine and the troop reduction reiterated the seriousness of the North Korean threat in the eyes of the USFK leadership. 7 According to one former USFK intelligence officer,
| There was very much a fear on the part of the U.S. military in Korea that Kim Ilsong would open up the second front in Korea. We took the threats as very serious. The North Koreans killed U.S. GIs in cold- blooded fashion. It was a very frightening period, a very serious time [late 1960s/early 1970s]. North Koreans were ambushing our supply trucks through P'anmunjom all the time. I remember a meeting after the Pueblo incident when generals here wanted to put nuclear weapons in Wonsan. 8 |
Scholars of organizational studies emphasize that where one sits determines what one sees. 9 Members of military organizations are usually viewed as conservative in their political beliefs and professional conduct and prone to high perceptions of risk and danger. 10 For the U.S. military leaders in Korea, the fact that they were near, if not in, the demilitarized zone (DMZ), facing a hostile North Korean military machine, informed their threat perception of the North and their interpretation of actions in Washington. Many in the upper ranks had fought in the Korean War and were staunchly anti-Communist; their memory of the war colored their view of the North and their sense of commitment to the South. 11 A key USFK initiator of the Clean-Up commented that most of the upper-level officials in the USFK "became very pro-Korean in terms of [their] world view" and that "most commanders in Korea, including those in the 1970s, had very personal feelings--because of the war and all--of not wanting Korea to fall under the Communists." 12 USFK officials seem to have adopted what Richard Sklar describes as expatriates' loyalty to and identification with their host society: "The sense of identification with local attitudes and values on the part of such expatriates is likely to increase as a result of their participation in a heroic effort by a beleaguered and under-privileged nation." 13
The USFK leadership and the U.S. Embassy staff in Korea also tended to view U.S.-ROK relations in the broader context of the Korean government's and society's needs, aspirations, and fears, whereas policy makers in Washington, especially Congress, tended to regard Korean matters more exclusively in terms of U.S. interests and capabilities. For example, at a House subcommittee hearing, General Michaelis spoke of the possibility that troop cuts will "endanger the present, outwardly healthy climate for foreign investment [in ROK], a prerequisite of the survival of the Republic as a free nation." 14 Ambassador William Porter also emphasized the importance of a large U.S. troop presence, not only for security reasons, but also psychological ones. He insisted that the troops were important "in maintaining the sense of confidence which is responsible for so much of Korea's development." 15 Most of the American officials I interviewed noted how much the U.S. military leadership in Korea liked and respected the Koreans for being hard-working, hard-fighting people and wished Koreans well in their quest for economic and political development.
A version of Sklar's "doctrine of domicile" characterizes the USFK's perception of its role in Korea: despite Washington's reassessment of its responsibilities to Korea, the USFK was as committed as the ROK government to the defense and promotion of South Korea's security and economic prosperity as a nonnegotiable priority. Sklar states that the doctrine of domicile is a way for transnational corporations to reconcile their conflicting global and local interests. Unlike businesses, militaries do not root themselves in countries with opposing or conflicting political and economic ideologies from those of the home country. Military alliances draw the lines of allegiance and responsibility. Yet, the interests of overseas military establishments can and do conflict with the global political and military interests of the home government. In such instances, the military merges its organizational interests with the interests of the home government in the name of national security.
Halperin notes that "[o]fficials in the field are persuaded that improving relations with their host country is vital to the security of the United States." 16 For the USFK, preventing further reduction/withdrawal was essential to its viability in Korea and to improved relations with the Korean government and people, and hence, U.S. security interests in the Far East. The 69th Joint Committee Minutes urge the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations to "press forward in its important work" on Clean-Up, "with the objective of improving relations between the American military personnel and the Korean people and thereby promoting our mutual defense interests and security." 17
Halperin has underscored the protective and possessive tendency of militaries over their missions and installations: "Each military service supports foreign policies which will justify the forces it believes are necessary for the essence of the service. . . . Each service favors the retention of the bases which it uses and which suit a military strategy that accords with its force structure. Senior officers are particularly sensitive to possible actions which might jeopardize their bases. 18
During the early 1970s, the USFK leadership had good reason to be protective of its mission and installations in Korea. Members of the U.S. Congress were quite vocal in expressing their skepticism of the need for continued U.S. military presence in Korea. Faced with public pressures to distance the United States from Asian conflicts and stop their drain on the U.S. economy, many U.S. legislators criticized the administration's military commitments abroad. Senator J. W. Fulbright exemplified the congressional discontent toward Korea: "South Korea, it seems to me, ought to be able to take care of itself. If they are not able after all this time, when they have twice as many people [as the North], and all we have given them--if you [State Dept.] want to give them a few planes [to shore up their air capability], I would not object to that--we ought to get out" (italics added). 19
Throughout the 1970 Senate subcommittee hearings on U.S. security commitments to Korea, Senators Fulbright and Stuart Symington repeatedly questioned the need to station U.S. forces in Korea and emphasized that the military presence in Korea put a strain on U.S. economic resources. 20 Symington went so far as to question the validity of Korea as a U.S. security interest: "I fully supported our defending Korea, but do you think, in all sincerity, that it would have been disastrous to the security of the United States if we had lost Korea?" 21
To make matters worse, racial clashes in the Anjongni/Camp Humphreys area and the Yongsan (Seoul) compound in the spring and summer of 1971 aroused the attention and ire of Congressman Ronald Dellums. Dellums, an African-American, was vocal in his criticism of the Korean government and people's treatment of black servicemen in Korea and questioned the need to aid militarily countries where Americans, i.e., black soldiers, were not welcome. A few days after the weekend of the Anjongni riots, Dellums said in a press release that Korea had a long history of abusing minority U.S. soldiers and pointed out that the Anjongni incident was not an isolated event. 22 For the U.S. military in Korea, resolving the racial problems and presenting an image of cooperative and harmonious relations with Korean residents and the Korean government became urgent, not only for the maintenance of troop discipline and morale, but also for congressional support of its presence in Korea.
Janowitz has noted that as a response to the "pattern of congressional-military establishment relations [which] produces mutually re-enforcing tensions and compounds the task of political control," militaries recognize the need to conduct public relations with the legislative branch. 23 Viewed in this light, the Clean-Up Campaign was an intense and comprehensive public relations effort. In the words of a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up,
| [It] was an opportunity for the U.S. military in Korea to put a good face on their presence in Korea . . . so that [Congress] would not have a sore spot to pick up and use against the [USFK]. . . . For the USFK, the stake in this was that it wanted to show people in Washington that we have good relations, that nothing is wrong in Korea. . . . The military in Korea did not want to leave Korea; we thought it would not be good for the world context. 24 |
The USFK's attempts to avoid congressional criticism, its unwillingness to leave Korea, and its perception of its role in promoting global U.S. security interests converged in its promotion of the Clean-Up Campaign.
Additionally, the Clean-Up Campaign was not only a means for the USFK to assuage critics in the United States but also skeptics in the Korean government, who were doubtful of the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to Korean security. This public relations effort was extended to the Korean government as a way to demonstrate the USFK's commitment to remaining in Korea, regardless of what was publicized in Washington. In the words of a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up,
| The Koreans were feeling at the time [of the troop reductions] that it's all over for them if the United States leaves. So, the Clean-Up Campaign helped cool down the feelings of tensions on both sides. So, we made it clear to the Koreans through the Clean-Up activities that we wanted to stay. 25 |
Halperin has written about ways field officers evade implementation of foreign policy decisions made at the home office and express intentions and commitments not held or articulated by that office. The USFK did just that through its efforts to improve civil-military relations with Koreans. In the absence of strong, unequivocal statements from President Nixon or the State Department to defend Korea's security (e.g., statements promising no further troop cuts or complete withdrawal in the near future; inclusion of an "automatic response" promise in the mutual defense treaty), the USFK leadership attempted to fill the vacuum with people-to-people commitments. According to the U.S. Subcommittee chairperson of 1974-75,
| We [the USFK leadership] couldn't see that there could be any more reductions below where we were--42 or 43 thousand. During the time of the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. military in Korea set up teams to go around to Korean areas--these were people-to-people programs--and we'd go visit little villages with the aim to improve Korean- American relations; the purpose of these visits partly was mainly to assure [Koreans] that regardless of what the reporters wrote and what U.S. congressmen said, that the USFK had no intentions of walking out of Korea.,/font> 26 |
By demonstrating its desire to improve camptown life, the U.S. military aimed to prove to Koreans how much it cared about Korean- American friendship, cooperation, and cohabitation. Such efforts would show that a military bent on leaving the country would not be interested in beautifying its locale and establishing more and better official chan-
nels of USFK-Korean communication and interaction. The Clean-Up Campaign, then, was a means for the USFK to straddle U.S. critics and Korean skeptics, a public relations message to both Washington and Seoul.
Field offices sometimes do distance themselves from the actions or inactions of the home office and reveal their loyalty to the host society in order to preserve and promote their organizational interests and pursue their own version of the national interest. But this does not mean that overseas officials distance themselves completely from the policies of the home office or that they sympathize line, hook, and sinker with the host society's concerns and priorities. In the case of the USFK during the Nixon Doctrine years, its leadership was keenly attuned to the power dynamic between the U.S. and ROK governments. While attempting to relieve the Korean government of its nervous insecurity regarding the U.S. troop commitment to Korea, the USFK simultaneously emphasized the fait accompli aspect of the 20,000 cut and the threat of further withdrawal in order to pressure the ROK government into cooperating on civil-military matters. In short, the USFK took advantage of the power disparity between the United States and Korea during the early 1970s to pursue the Clean-Up.
Both USFK and Korean government officials who had been involved in the Clean-Up emphasized over and over that the timing of the Campaign greatly favored the USFK and disfavored the ROK government. They commented that the U.S. military was in the position to make demands and the Koreans without choice but to respond positively. A key U.S. initiator of the Campaign remarked that the U.S.-Korea security context of the early 1970s provided a golden opportunity to move on civil-military relations:
| It was altogether a strategic time--although the Koreans hadn't been interested before 1971, they surely responded. . . . The Koreans thought that it [the 20,000 force reduction] was the beginning of the end, so therefore that was one of the things that got them very interested into thinking and asking, "What is troubling you here? Why do you want to leave?" . . . President Pak, after all those years of neglect, suddenly realized that civil-military relations were important. . . . So, the time was right to work on them [camptown improvements], given the Korean government's willingness to work together under the possible threat of future reductions or withdrawal. 27 |
Korean MoFA officials who had worked closely with this U.S. official recalled the fervor with which the American would press for Clean-Up efforts and use the troop withdrawal issue as leverage. At Subcommittee meetings, he would pound the table with his fist and emphasize, "We can go any time; You don't want us to leave, so let's cooperate!" The Korean official who worked closely with the American in the early stages of the Campaign recalled that he would then yell back, "No, you can't go!" 28 These MoFA officials noted that the USFK, in general, put pressure on the Blue House with this point, "If you don't cooperate, then it won't be fun for you: We don't know what will happen to the U.S. military presence here, and our troops are now leaving anyway." 29
Anyone familiar with the history of post-1953 U.S.-Korea relations knows of the chronic insecurity that the Korean government, under both Yi and Pak, experienced regarding the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Korea dutifully played the role of "lesser ally" in an asymmetrical power relationship with the United States. Why then, with overwhelming power over South Korean security, did it take the USFK nearly two decades to succeed in persuading or pressuring the Koreans into cleaning up camptowns? Without doubt, the severity of the camptown problems in the early 1970s and the shock of the Nixon Doctrine on the Koreans offered immediate incentives to the USFK to push for Korean cooperation. In addition, the ROK government's decision in 1971 to withdraw its troops from Vietnam 30 increased the power of the U.S. military to exert its influence on civil-military affairs.
Keohane and Suhrke have observed that "lesser allies" have been able to exert considerable influence on the actions of the United States by demonstrating staunch anticommunism, loyalty, and reliability. 31 Regarding Korea, Suhrke states:
| President Pak cultivated an image of reliability rather than unreliability toward the United States. This was handsomely rewarded in a particular bargaining situation when South Korea had an opportunity to contribute in an area considered more important by the larger ally than by the smaller ally. . . . In return for sending troops to Vietnam, the Seoul government received financial and military assistance from the United States beyond the regular aid program. 32 |
Pak had committed Korean forces to the U.S. effort in Vietnam not only as an ally and as a gesture of appreciation for American blood shed on Korea's behalf, but also as a means to "buy" U.S. commitment to remain in Korea. 33 Ambassador Porter noted in 1978, during a congressional hearing in U.S.-Korea relations, that the Korean troop contribution to Vietnam did have exchange value vis-á-vis the U.S. troop commitment to Korea. Although U.S. representatives in Korea did not publicize the possible linkage between ROK troops in Vietnam and U.S. troops in Korea, he commented: "What people [in Washington] have said occasionally [to the Koreans], it would be perhaps in the form of looser assurances: You don't have to worry, you have that big contingent in Vietnam, and you shouldn't worry while you have that." 34
As long as the United States needed and valued the Korean contribution, the ROK government believed it held a tool of influence on U.S. policies toward Korea, 35 but with the United States itself withdrawing from Southeast Asia, the Korean contribution decreased in value.
Suhrke has noted the limitations of such small-power loyalty, that in the case of Korea, "[t]here was no apparent spillover effect in other areas of interallied bargaining, such as the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea." 36 But a reconsideration of U.S.-Korea relations during the late 1960s-early 1970s, especially at the local level, would offer a modification. First, Korea's troop contribution to Vietnam helped forestall U.S. troop reductions in Korea; the original consideration of troop cuts dated back to the mid 1960s, not early 1970s. 37 But more important to this study, there was considerable spillover effect in in-country bargaining strengths between the ROK government and the agencies of the U.S. government. One former U.S. representative to the Joint Committee recalled that when Ambassador Habib had asked him to clean up camptown problems (in 1973), particularly black-marketing, he asked Habib why his predecessor on the Joint Committee had not already done so. The ambassador responded that because "Korea was fighting our war for us in Vietnam--with their best division," the United States could not push too hard. However, the ambassador calculated that with Korean troops home from Vietnam, the timing was better. 38 In other words, the withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam dispossessed the ROK government of its leverage toward the United States and transferred it to the USFK. With this new opportunity, the USFK made numerous demands on the Korean government to improve camptown conditions.
In describing the approaches available to smaller allies seeking influence on U.S. (foreign) policies, Keohane mentions the benefits of "bargaining with separable elements of the U.S. government"( (39 ( particularly the military stationed overseas), or in other words, taking advantage of the organizational interests 40 and politics of the overseas establishment:
| The success of this strategy is determined largely by the extent to which the American government agencies are dependent on the small ally for performance of their missions. Allied influence on the United States is therefore particularly high where the United States maintains large-scale military installations and conducts substantial aid programs, for in such situations American agencies become dependent on the small ally's consent to their continued presence within its boundaries. 41 |
The Korean government indeed focused on its "common interests--in bases, military strength" 42 --with the USFK to maintain U.S. commitments to the ROK. There is no doubt that Korea provided the U.S. military with good training areas, "opportunity for exercising operational control over large ROK formations, many attractive career 'slots,' [and] a country that is unquestioned in its support of U.S. forces." 43 But Keohane's prescription for the success of this supplemental diplomatic strategy, when applied to Korea, misses the point: the severe dependence, militarily and psychologically, of the Korean government on the U.S. military for the nation's survival. No matter how much the U.S. military needed Korea for its organizational interests, the Korean government needed the U.S. military more. The larger context of power relations between Seoul and Washington informed the respective dependence level of the USFK and the ROK government on each other. Given the asymmetry of power in the U.S.-Korea alliance, the Korean government, in attempting a coalition with the USFK, was not able to exploit the USFK's dependence without the latter's intervention into local Korean political life. Once the USFK decided that the performance of its mission in Korea depended on improved civil-military relations, it was given the license to impose its vision of such relations on the Korean government and society. The application of the Nixon Doctrine to Korea and the loss of the Vietnam contribution left the ROK government grasping for straws vis-á-vis both Washington and the USFK headquarters in Seoul. The ROK government's dependence on both Washington and the USFK undercut the Koreans' ability to play the latter two off each other. It was the Korean government, not the USFK, that was forced to bend over backwards to keep U.S. troops on its soil.
Korea: From Insecurity to Private Diplomacy
Interviews with both U.S. and ROK officials who had been involved in the Clean-Up Campaign repeatedly point to Korea's insecurity in its security relationship with the United States during the early 1970s as the main stimulus for the ROK government's speed and alacrity in addressing camptown problems. One former ROK Subcommittee chairperson summed up the situation:
| At the time, the threat of invasion [from the North] was very serious. The need for U.S. military presence in Korea was very keen around the late 1960s and early 1970s. This threat and the reduction of U.S. troops and the US's demands for camptown improvements all came together and reached a critical mass. Until the Nixon Doctrine, we never thought the United States would go. The ROK government cooperated because the United States wanted cooperation. The Clean-Up activities weren't something the ROK government felt it needed to do anyway. But the United States put pressure on the Blue House. 44 |
The Blue House, in the person of President Pak, interpreted the camptown problems as a direct reflection of the rift and conflict between it and Washington. One ROK Subcommittee member who was active in initiating the joint efforts described Pak's thought process thus: " 'Why are the U.S. troops leaving? Because they're fighting with Koreans and not getting along. Therefore, we must get along with the U.S. soldiers so that they don't leave Korea.' . . . Addressing the needs of the U.S. military through Clean-Up was one way to win points with the U.S. government." 45 Pak's Political Secretary in charge of overseeing the actual day-to-day workings of the Base-Community Clean-Up Committee emphasized that the president showed constant interest in the progress of camptown Clean-Up, sending out orders and demanding reports. 46 The speed, provision, and coordination of funds and material and human resources, as well as cooperation with U.S. military authorities at all levels of the ROK government, attested to the urgency felt by the ROK government to improve civil-military relations. The Campaign became a Blue House priority in its defense of national security.
For the ROK government, cooperation with camptown Clean-Up was intended not only to keep U.S. servicemen in Korea but also to promote U.S. military assistance to Korea's force modernization efforts. Within a year of the Purification Movement, the Korean government became less fearful of further U.S. troop cuts as imminent and found assurance in the belief that the loss of the 7th Division was not indispensable as long as modernization of its own forces took place. 47 However, Seoul's doubts increased about the U.S. government's ability to deliver on its promise of the $1.5 billion military aid package. First, congressional criticism about Korean-American race relations, which had put the USFK on the defensive, threatened to block Korea's new path to security independence. Representative Ron Dellums, who had been vocal in calling for reduced U.S. military intervention abroad, 48 took credit for the rejection of a $50 million increase in military aid for Korea for the years 1971 and 1972 (proposed by Rep. William Broomfield) and stated publicly that "the United States should not give assistance to any country in which American men stationed there are subject to harsh and vile treatment by host nationals because of the color of their skin." 49
One ROK Subcommittee member, who had been active in initiating the Clean-Up, recalled that Dellums, during a visit to Korea in 1972 to support a black serviceman who had been charged with murdering a Korean woman, a prostitute, harshly criticized Korea through the media and called for a reduction of troops and aid. 50 According to one USFK member of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Affairs, Dellums' threat to reduce or discontinue military aid "got the ROK government to do something about camptown problems." He continued, "After that threat, conditions greatly improved: lighting, access ways, general beautification, etc. It was evident in the work of the BCCUC that Dellums' threat stimulated the Korean government to act. There's no question in my mind." 51 If Dellums had been a congressional maverick in criticizing U.S. military commitments to Korea, the Korean government may have been less responsive to the threats. However, as discussed above, the fact that many members of Congress had been publicly questioning U.S. military involvement in Asia, in general, and Korea, in particular, 52 helps explain the ROK government's immediate and serious attention to camptown problems, especially racial violence. One report highlighted the urgency of resolving camptown problems as a way to prevent further congressional criticism of the ROK government and threats to discontinue aid:
|
The Pyongtaek riots of July 9, 1971, were reported in the foreign press as caused by Korean racial discrimination and has become a controversial issue in the U.S. Congressman Dellums and other congressmen
accused Koreans of racial discrimination and strongly demanded that the United States cease its foreign aid to the ROK. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the Korean embassy in Washington to contact and explain to the concerned congressmen and major news organizations the details of the causes of the incident. . . . In view of the fact that the incident could cause serious repercussions in the U.S.-ROK relationship, the Foreign Ministry realized that U.S.-Korean cooperation not only at the local level but also at the national level are necessary. 53 |
By 1972, it became evident to the ROK government that the U.S. administration's promise of military aid did not assure that Congress would release the funds, and this uncertainty made the Koreans more sensitive to the actions and inactions of Capitol Hill. 54 Marshall Green, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1969 to 1972, later told Congress that in the early 1970s, the Korean government had a difficult time accepting the offer of U.S. aid contingent upon congressional approval. He admitted that the Koreans had good reason to worry, since the United States fell short on its annual commitment "year after year." 55 The United States not only failed to deliver the promised annual sums but also stretched out the modernization program two years longer than promised, reduced the operations and maintenance part of the security assistance, and shifted from outright grants to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit. 56 Paul Cleveland, who served as political/military officer and political counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Seoul from 1973 to 1977, told Congress that Korean officials, especially the Korean military, worried that such changes in the aid program indicated declines in U.S. commitment to ROK security. 57
In the summer and fall of 1970, the Korean government began to pinpoint the source of its insecurity toward the United States, as well as its hope for favorable U.S. support toward Korea: the U.S. Congress, and the American public. In the eyes of the Korean government, Congress held ultimate power over Korea's defense: Congress could extend or cut military aid, and Congress could revoke or observe the mutual defense treaty. 58 The ROK chairperson of the Civil-Military Relations Subcommittee from 1971 to 1972 spoke of his government's perceived need, in the early 1970s, to lobby the United States:
| We [the MoFA and the Blue House] watched [Congress] very keenly; we scrutinized who said what in Congress, then formulated our policies. We realized that 1) we have no lobby in Congress to speak for our interests, so shouldn't we do something about it? 2) we need to improve our public relations not only with Congress but also with the American public. These were of great concern to the MoFA and the Blue House. We wanted to "correct" American public opinion toward Korea, and to do this, we realized that we must use all means possible--public and private. 59 |
It was around the same time that Ambassador Porter noted, in a cable sent to Washington, that the Korean government
| appears prepared to pull out all stops in order to impress the United States with depth of public dismay [over the U.S. troop reduction] *** Immediate aim is to impress U.S. administration and Congress but longer range objective is undoubtedly to obtain minimum U.S. withdrawal and maximum compensation. 60 |
The ROK government diagnosed its problem with the United States to be bad public relations and a negative image of Korea and Koreans held by Congress and the American public. 61 To remedy this situation, the Koreans waged a campaign of "private diplomacy," or "people-to-people relations," to supplement (what they considered) their weak and inefficacious public channels of influencing U.S. policy circles. Encouraged by U.S. congressmen who were sympathetic to Korea to develop powerful lobbies in the United States, like those of Taiwan and Israel, 62 the ROK government sent out its private PR troops from various sectors of society--politics, business, media, academia, the military--to win the sympathy of their influential counterparts in the United States. 63 The Koreans wooed members of Congress, above all others, with Pak Tongson, the Korean businessman/socialite who resided in the United States, cast as the leading man in private diplomacy. Pak Tongson's overeager pursuit of congressional sympathy for Korea involved bribes, ranging from $100 to over $100,000, to at least 32 U.S. congressmen and 7 senators. His activities also included giving campaign contributions and lavish gifts, as well as throwing extravagant parties and fund-raisers. His dealings became known as "Koreagate." 64
Image" has been an important element in the ROK's relations with the United States since the early 1970s. K. J. Holsti has highlighted the uses of propaganda as a capability in international politics. 65 What distinguishes Korea in the early- to mid-1970s from other countries is its elevation of propaganda/lobbying as the primary capability in its foreign relations with the United States. Korea's obsession with public relations filled a vacuum in conventional forms of diplomacy available to the government. Desperate to gain some influence over U.S. policies, the ROK government employed "direct" lobbying, through Pak Tongson, and "indirect" lobbying, 66 through U.S. public opinion. Congress was the target of both tactics.
It is not a coincidence that the ROK government's influence-buying policies were first initiated and implemented in 1971 67 and that the ROK government began its Camptown Clean-Up efforts in 1971. According to former ROK members of the Subcommittee, the Clean-Up Campaign and the Pak Tongson efforts were part and parcel of Korea's attempts at private diplomacy. 68 The former was aimed at members of the U.S. community in Korea and the latter at the U.S. community in North America. The ROK government employed the camptown Clean-Up as a means to improve the image of Korea in the eyes of U.S. soldiers. It also wined and dined high-ranking USFK officials in order to gain their sympathy and commitment to the defense of Korea. In addition, as part of its new "invitation diplomacy," the Korean government invited U.S. veterans of the Korean War back to Korea to discover the "new and improved Korea," not the one described disparagingly by the U.S. press. 69 The intention was to have these pro-Korea "converts" return to the United States and act as unofficial lobbyists for Korea's interests.
These target groups fit the description of what K. J. Holsti refers to as "associational groups," individuals who are more likely to share similar attitudes, owing to similar group identification and experiences, and therefore an easier target than the general population. 70 These Americans also would have been more sympathetic to Korean interests because of their participation in Korea's defense and development. The goal was, then, to insure that these target groups gained a positive image of Korea during their stay.
All the Korean officials whom I interviewed, whether they had worked for the USFK or the ROK government, repeated that the Korean government and society were always concerned that GIs were getting a distorted and erroneous impression of Korea by their interactions with the prostitutes, pimps, drug dealers, and other social deviants populating kijich'on areas. The Blue House Secretary who oversaw the workings of the Base-Community Clean-Up Committee mentioned that the Blue House feared that because all that U.S. soldiers witnessed during their stay was kkangt'ong munhwa, or "culture of tin cans," 71 around their bases, these same individuals would return to the United States with an image of Korea as populated solely with poor, thieving people, groveling for U.S. dollars and lacking in national culture and pride. 72 The Korea Herald ran an editorial on June 10, 1971, that expressed outrage over the negative image U.S. soldiers were getting through kijich'on life. The paper urged Koreans to help clean up the towns so that the poor image would no longer negatively affect U.S. policies toward Korea:
| [Camptown vices] are bound to . . . damage the image of the Republic of Korea as a whole. . . . Highly placed military sources have been quoted by the vernacular newspaper as saying that the image of the Republic of Korea, as conveyed by nearly two million U.S. military servicemen to their relations and acquaintances at home, is extremely bad. And this is quite natural simply because the evils they personally witnessed being committed at military camp followers' towns in the Republic of Korea were, we repeat, outrageous. . . . All this, the analysis says, makes the Republic of Korea a place U.S. military servicemen are inclined to shy away from, and the poor image of the Republic of Korea, as brought back home by the servicemen, is influencing policy decisions in the U.S. Congress definitely to the disadvantage of the Republic of Korea. |
A 1968 survey conducted by American researchers who were on contract with the U.S. Department of the Army found that Korean and U.S. soldiers harbored much misunderstanding about one another andabout each other's society and culture. The Koreans were resentful of American behavior that exhibited arrogance and superiority over Koreans, and the Americans were ignorant about the life and values of Korean people: 57% of the Koreans answered "no" and only 13% "yes" to the question, "Do Americans like Koreans?" although 67% of the Americans said "yes" and only 15% "no" to the same question. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Korean soldiers said that prostitution hurts Korean-American relations, while significant numbers of American men in most units that were interviewed believed that prostitution helps Korean-American relations. 73 The point here is that Koreans felt highly sensitive about the image that American GIs were getting in camptowns.
The work of the BCCUC and the Subcommittee was intended to "correct" the image of Korea in the eyes of U.S. servicemen. One Korean national who served as a USFK community relations officer from the late 1960s to the present succinctly highlighted the crucial role of camptowns in keeping U.S. troops in Korea:
| The U.S. GIs didn't like being in Korea. If you walked into their billets [barracks], you would see posters of women's bodies marked up and divided into 365 days [indicating the days remaining in their tour of duty]. They would not have been unhappy to leave Korea. The only fun for the low-level GIs was to go into towns and drink, so, the Korean government thought it's necessary to improve camptown conditions. If community relations are bad, they can lead to withdrawal of forces. 74 |
In the effort to convey a positive image, the ROK government cooperated with the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations to bring U.S. soldiers in touch with "true" Koreans and Korean culture. The objective of the Subcommittee's "Panel on People-to-People Activities" was to develop programs and projects
| designed to assist U.S. military personnel in obtaining a better understanding of Korea and the Korean people and their culture, and to assist the Korean people in gaining a better understanding of the American serviceman and his cultural heritage. This panel [was] also responsible for proposing specific measures to enlist the support and make the most effective and coordinated use of available ROK and U.S. government and private resources and institutions to promote Korean-American cooperation in civil-military relations and to enhance friendship and understanding between U.S. military personnel and the people of Korea. 75 |
Through the efforts of this panel, GIs were invited to the homes of "respectable" Korean nationals (home visitations) for a traditional meal and a look at how "normal" Koreans live. The soldiers were also introduced to Korean university students at joint sporting and other recreational events, and the ROK Ministry of Culture and Information and the U.S. Eighth Army together sponsored the "Hello Korea" program, designed to introduce Korean culture to the U.S. guests. The ROK Ministry of National Defense sponsored monthly tours for U.S. officers and senior NCOs (noncommissioned officers), and the Korea Herald sponsored "Get to Know Korea" tours for U.S. soldiers interested in exploring the country's historical and popular sites. 76 The U.S. military, particularly the command of the 2d Infantry Division (ID), was also concerned with countering the negative image of Korea that its troops held. The command encouraged its units to take advantage of "Special Service Tours" outside the 2d ID area and also increased opportunities for social and sporting events between U.S. soldiers and Korean nationals. 77 These programs were in addition to the Clean-Up activities, which focused on reducing racial discrimination and enforcing VD regulation of prosti tutes. All programs were intended to make the daily life of the U.S. soldier more pleasant and comfortable.
The Korean government also targeted its "people-to-people diplomacy" at top USFK brass. It must be noted here that, as a token of hospitality and appreciation, Koreans have generally tended to roll out the red carpet for U.S. leaders. But the treatment in the early 1970s was especially lavish. When asked about the means by which the ROK government tried to gain firm U.S. commitments to Korea's security in the early 1970s, a former USFK intelligence officer immediately spoke of "brown-nosing" by Koreans through the use of female entertainers and extravagant gifts:
| There was deliberate effort on the part of the Korean government to brown-nose the U.S. military [in Korea] so that they would speak up against troop withdrawals and speak pro-Korea in general. There was a feeling within the Korean government that "The U.S. [7th Division] left because we didn't treat them better." In all my time here, I never saw so many kisaeng [geisha] parties than in the early 1970s. There were kisaeng parties virtually every night that U.S. generals would be taken to. People in my office used to ask, Why do the Koreans want to take us to another kisaeng party? The Korean government did this although it did not have enough money. It was taejop [generous hospitality]. The American military loved it. My office called it "being in bed with the Koreans," shmoozing with the Koreans. We had so many generals in bed with the Koreans, and they didn't even know it. There was a never-ending push for the Koreans to ask to see the four-star general . . . . By the late 1970s, some U.S. generals didn't even know that Pak was a dictator. The generals received incredible gifts from the Koreans. 78 |
This same official added that not only the Korean government, but also the private sector, conducted this "private diplomacy" on behalf of the government. Specifically, the heads of Samsung, Hyundai, and other chaebol 79 corporations wined and dined the generals regularly because the government could not afford all the expenses. This official confirmed the ROK government's fears of the negative image of Korea that U.S. soldiers held and emphasized the primacy of people-to-people diplomacy in the ROK government's effort to present a favorable image of their country. Such brown-nosing toward the USFK leadership ceased as Pak Tongson's "private diplomacy" in Washington backfired. 80
The Korean public relations scheme extended beyond U.S. officials in office to include American veterans of the Korean War. The Seoul government invited these veterans back to Korea on all-expenses-paid trips so that they would witness the miraculous changes from the days of war-torn poverty and devastation that had served as the backdrop to the fighting. The intention was to have these veterans return to the United States with a better image of Korea and in turn pass that positive image along to their neighbors and members of Congress. Korean War veterans and other Americans who had been stationed in Korea served as a significant target group. Their numbers altogether totalled more than six million, or approximately 6% of the entire U.S. male population, from June 1950 to February 1971. 81
It is important to note that Korea's external-oriented "private diplomacy" backfired while its internal-oriented component succeeded, particularly since in-country people-to-people interactions are usually not included in foreign policy analysis and since Korea's in-country people-to-people diplomacy has never been publicly noticed or acknowledged as an integral component of Koreagate. Korea's direct lobbying efforts through Pak Tongson represented the abrupt transition of a small ally's manipulation of its weakness 82 to pretensions of strength, as the way to influence U.S. policy. With the shock of the Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. troops, the ROK government determined that it must be a player, an active actor, in U.S.-ROK relations if it were to have any influence on U.S. decisions regarding Korea. Pak Tongson's lavish gifts and contributions to members of Congress and U.S. government officials and the Korean government's aggressive information campaign waged at the U.S. media and academia were intended to give a "new and improved" impression of Korea, one of wealth, generosity, sophistication, and pride. But these attempts came as a shock to a Congress and U.S. public that had never before witnessed an aggressive Korean presence in U.S. politics and had been only accustomed to an image of Korea as a poor, struggling, and needy nation. In a sense, such efforts represented too sharp a contrast to the already established basis of American sympathy for Korea, U.S. moral and geopolitical obligations to aid a beleaguered anti-Communist people; to succeed, propaganda-lobbying efforts should have fueled such sentiment. For the image of strength to have succeeded, Korea needed actual capabilities, economic and political, to back up its public relations claims. In the absence of such capabilities, Pak Tongson's efforts were fated to fail, at worst, and raise short-term curiosity, at best. Most important, Pak's influence-peddling schemes failed because the U.S. "dedicat[ion] to the policies of global involvement," its "crusading spirit," had weakened. 83
On the home front, Korea's in-country "private diplomacy," including the Camptown Clean-Up Campaign, toward USFK leaders, GIs, and veterans was highly successful, compared to that of Pak in Washington. Although it is difficult to claim that the Campaign prevented further U.S. troop reductions, 84 joint USFK-ROK cooperation on civil-military matters did help ease the tensions between the USFK and the ROK government, and it helped commit the two sides more strongly to promoting the defense needs of the Republic. The target groups of in-country people-to-people diplomacy were more sympathetic to Korean interests than were the Congress and the American public. And more pertinent, the target groups had a context in which to place Korean attempts at transforming its image from poverty and weakness to improved living standards and strength; these Americans had personally witnessed the intense efforts of Koreans to build their country. 85 Moreover, the Clean-Up Campaign addressed specific needs and wishes of the U.S. military in Korea. It did not appear out of the blue, nor was it excessive, as were Pak Tongson's efforts. Most important, unlike Koreagate, which tried to force a mutuality of interests between the United States and the ROK, in the face of changing U.S. priorities, the Clean-Up Campaign addressed actual mutual needs of the USFK and the ROK government: maintaining harmonious Korean-American relations and convincing the U.S. Congress and public to keep U.S. troops in Korea and aid the latter's struggles for self-sufficiency.
Uryo Munhwa--Culture of Insecurity: Private Individualsin "Total Diplomacy"
Foreign policy decision makers who are accustomed to looking at "the big picture" deal in the currency of heads-of-state, foreign ministers, and the diplomatic establishment. They rarely focus their foreign policy "lens" on low-level bureaucracies, local politics, and private individuals' actions. This habit applies especially to well-established and experienced foreign policy institutions, procedures, and personnel, particularly in the West. Nations lacking such infrastructures and experience are less able to streamline their foreign policy conduct. With an authoritarian leader able to penetrate and politicize various layers of society, the line between foreign and domestic affairs becomes ambiguous. But even an authoritarian regime requires explanations to serve as rationales to its people for its desperate actions. Uryo munhwa (culture of fear and anxiety), or "siege mentality," 86 facilitated the use of people-to-people diplomacy as the ROK's U.S. strategy in the 1970s.
Since the end of the Korean War, Koreans had learned to live with daily threats from the North, under the principle of "(national) safety first." 87 They did not need to be persuaded of enemy threats, since most of them had experienced first-hand the atrocities of war. On top of their own memories of the Communist invasion and resulting chaos, newspapers constantly reminded them of the numerous infiltration attempts by the North, and public message systems regularly blasted air raid warnings and anti-Communist propaganda. With the departure of the 7th Division, such reminders of the enemy threat increased in frequency and urgency. One former USFK intelligence officer described the visible signs of insecurity all over the country: Chaju Kukpang (independent national defense) and Charip (self-determination) banners and placards; government-ordered sandbags and machine gun emplacements. 88 He summed up the uryo munhwa thus: "There was more money and concrete poured into national defense beginning in the 1970s than any time since the end of the Korean War. The first half of the 1970s was a time of public alarm over national security." 89
Through speeches, decrees, and other actions, Pak Chonghui helped foster the "siege mentality," a situation akin to the state of preparation for war, where private citizens became part of the war effort and a capability in conducting foreign affairs. Personal insecurities and ambitions about his political future served as one source of his motivation for emphasizing that national security was in a state of crisis. He had won his third term by a very narrow margin in the April 1971 presidential election. His opponent, Kim Taejung (of the New Democratic Party), had repeatedly attacked him for having lost the U.S. commitment to Korean security. This was a particularly sensitive issue for Pak, since he had long held and publicized the view that only he was capable of representing his nation's interests to the U.S. government and people. In addition to the uncertainty in Korea-U.S. relations, Pak faced significant economic problems, labor unrest, and student protests that challenged his leadership. To stifle criticism and secure his power over both domestic politics and foreign relations, he instituted repressive social and political measures throughout the 1970s, beginning with the State of National Emergency Decree in December 1971 and the Yusin Revitalizing Constitution and martial law of October 1972. 90 He defended these measures as necessary for enhancing the Republic's security without depending on outside powers. 91
In addition to his personal ambitions, genuine anxiety over the future of Korea's security also motivated Pak's emphatic stance on the security crisis. He publicly emphasized the changing politics of the world's great powers--détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, the rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and the United States, and U.S. waning interest and involvement in Asian conflicts--as causes for Korea's urgent need to rely on its own resources. Above all, he constantly reminded the public of the North's heightened military capabilities and intentions to invade the South and put an end to the latter's painstaking achievements in economic and national development. 92 President Pak and other leaders likened Korea's situation to the days before the Northern invasion in 1950 and called upon the people to work vigorously for the reconstruction and defense of the nation, so as not to be caught off guard. 93 Pak reminded his people that although big powers may lose interest in Korea, Korea could not afford to reduce its vigilance over its security:
| The local tension on the Korean peninsula which occupies a corner of the globe may not seem significant in the major powers' world perspectives that are mainly directed to maintain the status quo. . . . Nevertheless, . . . we must unmistakably let ourselves know that those very people who live in this tense corner of the world are none other than ourselves and that this tension is the very matter of our own life or death. 94 |
To counter this trend toward increased danger and insecurity, Pak's Foreign Minister, Kim Yongsik, declared 1972 the "Year of National Security" (also, the "Year of Renovating Diplomacy") 95 and proposed the policy of "total diplomacy" (also called "multifaceted diplomacy"). Both Pak Tongson's lobbying efforts in Washington and "invitation diplomacy" were part of this new foreign relations campaign. Assertive overseas publicity drives also became important. The Ministry of Culture and Information distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of books, magazines, and pamphlets about South Korea, which were translated into various foreign languages. The stated aims of the public relations activities were to counter the "ever-intensifying north Korean Communist propaganda offensive" and to improve "the nation's international prestige by informing foreign countries of facts about contemporary Korea." 96 Specifically, according to the then National Assemblyman Paek Namok (also the chairperson of the ruling Democratic Republican Party), one priority of the "Year of National Security" was to keep U.S. forces in Korea. 97 The government adopted on February 18, 1972, a "seven-point guideline" for national security, which called for "mobilizing all national potential in order to meet 'all types of possibilities of aggressive schemes' of the North Korean Communists." 98 President Pak stated that in view of the "very serious situation" in domestic and international political life, "the nation has to exploit to the fullest extent all national potential in all sectors" 99 (italics added).
"Total diplomacy" enlisted private citizens in the crusade to enhance Korea's chaju kukpang. Pak urged overseas representatives of private Korean companies and Korean residents abroad to "actively contribute to the national defense" and called on "all Government officials and representatives of civil organizations assigned overseas" to work for the furtherance of national strength "with the pride and a sense of responsibility that they are representing the state." 100 As part of its propaganda campaign, the ROK government also called several Korean residents of the United States to Seoul in early December 1972 "and instructed [them] to take measures to improve the ROK Government's image in the United States." 101 Moreover, the government even recruited Korean college students to the national cause: The Korea Herald reported that the student body of Ewha Womans University, the largest and most prestigious women's university in Korea, held a fund-raiser and "delivered a total of 1,261,000 won [approximately $3,379 in 1971 terms] to Vice Defense Minister Yu Kunch'ang to be used for purchasing equipment for counterinfiltration operations." 102
Korea in the early 1970s, particularly with the imposition of Yusin and martial law, possessed many of the attributes of Lasswell's "garrison state." 103 Huntington has written that the "subordination of all other purposes and activities to war and the preparation for war" are basic to the garrison state. 104
But while Lasswell's criticisms emphasize the silencing and marginalization of individuals from political life, Korea's experiences reveal that such marginalization occurred side by side with a selective mobilization of people in the defense cause. In other words, the rationale for people-to-people diplomacy was the government's belief that private citizens do and can make a contribution to foreign relations, that given the country's dire situation, people could not divorce their personal lives from the political needs of the nation. Selective mobilization to meet government-established needs is not the same as voluntary political participation to determine those needs; however, it is also different from the narrowing of political space and number of actors described in Lasswell's version of the garrison-state. Moreover, Lasswell's later writings equate garrison-states with liberal Western nations, whose developed bureaucracies, technology, and sophisticated weapons systems threaten to paralyze and destroy civilian government and society. In other words, such nations are big powers who possess the political, economic, and military resources to sustain and promote the garrison-state. Korea, on the other hand, lacked such resources, and its adoption of the garrison-state represented a means to overcome such shortcomings. In the case of Korea, private individuals had more value as political assets for the government than would be the case for wealthy, big-power governments.
Note 1: Interview with a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up Campaign, Coscob, Conn., October 24, 1991. He served on the Joint Committee and the Subcom mittee on Civil-Military Relations from 1971 to 1975. Back.
Note 2: Interview with a former EUSA intelligence officer (late 1960s through 1970s), Seoul, May 12, 1992. Back.
Note 3: Interview with an adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of UN Forces, Korea, Seoul, January 23, 1992. Back.
Note 4: Interview, see note 1. Back.
Note 5: U.S. Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, pp. 1560, 1591-92. Back.
Note 6: U.S. House, American-Korean Relations, p. 50. Michaelis did add that only modernization of ROK forces would eventually allow for further reductions in US troops. Back.
Note 7: Interviews, see notes 1, 2, 3; interview, U.S. chairperson, Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, 1974-75, San Diego, Calif., October 28, 1991. Back.
Note 8: Interview, see note 2. Back.
Note 9: Graham Allison states, "[G]overnment leaders have competitive, not homogeneous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions." Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 146. Back.
Note 10: Bengt Abrahamsson, "The Ideology of an Elite: Conservatism and National Security," p. 74. Back.
Note 11: Interview, see note 1. Back.
Note 13: Richard Sklar, Corporate Power in an African State, p. 147. Back.
Note 14: U.S. House, American-Korean Relations, p. 43. Back.
Note 15: U.S. Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitment Abroad, p. 1579. Back.
Note 16: Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 263. Back.
Note 17: JC Minutes, #69, January 16, 1971. Also Subcommittee Minutes, #2, September 22, 1971. Back.
Note 18: Halperin, pp. 58-59. Back.
Note 19: U.S. Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, p. 1247. Fulbright was addressing U. Alexis Johnson, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Department of State. The senator severely questioned Johnson and other representatives of the Departments of State and Defense who were called to speak before the subcommittee on U.S. policy toward East Asia and demanded that the administration reconsider the policy and seek ways to get out of Asia in the "very near future" (p. 1249). Back.
Note 20: Ibid., pp. 1594-95. Back.
Note 22: Korea Herald, July 17, 1971; interviews with two former USFK community relations officers of the 1970s, Seoul, November 19, 1991 and April 6, 1992. The first of these interviewees also served as a Subcommittee member during the 1970s. Back.
Note 23: Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 359-60. Back.
Note 24: Interview, see note 1. Back.
Note 26: Interview with the 1974-75 U.S. chairperson, Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, San Diego, Calif., October 28, 1991. Back.
Note 27: Interview, see note 1. Back.
Note 28: Interview with a former USFK community relations officer, Seoul, April 18, 1992. Back.
Note 30: Members of the ROK Marine Brigade (Blue Dragon) and logistical unit (Southern Cross) arrived in Korea on December 9, 1971. They were the first of 10,000 ROK troops withdrawn from Vietnam by mid-1972. The last of the Korean troops from Vietnam arrived in Korea on March 14, 1973. James P. Finley, Command Historian, The U.S. Military Experience in Korea, 1871-1982: In the Vanguard of ROK-U.S. Relations, pp. 158 and 165. At the height of ROK military involvement in Vietnam, troop composition amounted to 50,000. Back.
Note 31: Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies"; Astri Suhrke, "Gratuity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances." Back.
Note 32: Suhrke, pp. 519-20. Back.
Note 33: To obtain ROK troop support in Vietnam, the United States promised the ROK government that no U.S. troops in Korea would be withdrawn without prior consultation with the ROK. In the words of General Dwight E. Beach, Commander-in-Chief of the UN Forces in Korea and the USFK from 1965-66, "The latter, to the Koreans, meant that no U.S. troops would be withdrawn without ROK approval." Stanley R. Larson and James L. Collins, Jr., Allied Participa tion in Vietnam, p. 125. Back.
Note 34: U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, p. 46. Back.
Note 35: In reaction to Washington's announcement of troop cuts in Korea, the Korean government threatened to "reappraise" its troop participation in the Vietnam War. U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, p. 45. For more in-depth discussion on the importance of the ROK troop contribution as political leverage, see Sung-joo Han, "South Korea's Participation in the Vietnam Conflict"; Sung-joo Han and Youngnok Koo, eds., The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea, pp. 149-55; Sung-joo Han and Gerald Curtis, eds., The U.S.-South Korean Alliance, pp. 209-12; Il-Baek Kwang, Korea and the United States, pp. 81-94. Back.
Note 36: Suhrke, p. 520. Back.
Note 37: Kwang, pp. 93-96. Back.
Note 38: Telephone interview with the U.S. Representative to the Joint Committee, 1973-75, October 31, 1991. The quote does not represent, verbatim, the words spoken by Habib, but was paraphrased by the interviewee. Back.
Note 39: Keohane, <\h>"The Big Influence of Small Allies," p. 166. Back.
Note 43: U.S. House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975, p. 709. Back.
Note 44: Interview, see note 28. Back.
Note 45: Interview with the former ROK Assistant Secretary of the SOFA Joint Committee (1971-73), Seoul, May 25, 1992. Back.
Note 46: Interview with the Blue House Political Secretary in charge of the Clean-Up Campaign, Seoul, June 11, 1992. Back.
Note 47: Interview, see note 45. Back.
Note 48: Dellums urged the U.S. administration to stop playing the role of world policeman abroad, insisting that domestic needs for U.S. economic resources were greater than external needs. U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, p. 737. Back.
Note 49: Korea Herald, July 17, 1971. Back.
Note 50: Interview, see note 45. Back.
Note 51: Interview with a former EUSA community relations officer and member of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (1970s), Seoul, April 6, 1992. This USFK official stated in a previous interview (November 19, 1991) that Dellums was very vocal about the race issue, telling Koreans, "If you're going to treat blacks badly, we're going to cut off U.S. assistance." According to the official, "the Korean government realized the serious nature of the threat and decided, 'We've got to do something.' The 'something' was the vice-ministerial level committee [BCCUC] to oversee base community relations." Another former EUSA community relations official, in his interview (April 6, 1992), made similar connections between Dellums' threats and the ROK government's cooperation on Clean-Up. Back.
Note 52: Donald Ranard, Director of the Office of Korean Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1970-74), stated in Congress that President Pak was fully aware of the public pressures within the United States that led to troop cuts in Korea in 1970-71. He mentioned the mood of the Congress, starting the summer of 1970, to reduce military assistance to Indochina, Defense Secretary Laird's statements about the need to cut the military budget, and chronic congressional and media worries over balance-of-payments concerns. U.S. House, "Investigation of Korean-American Relations," Part IV, p. 77. Back.
Note 53: ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Civil-Military Relations Subcommittee Provisional Activities Report and Policies," January 7, 1972 (my translation). Back.
Note 54: U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, p. 43. Back.
Note 55: Ibid., pp. 28-29. Back.
Note 57: Ibid., pp. 91-92. Back.
Note 58: Ibid. p. 79. Koreans were highly aware of U.S. congressional skepticism over U.S. military commitments to Korea. Senator Fulbright went so far as to raise the question of revoking the mutual defense treaty with Korea. U.S. Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, pp. 1596-97. Back.
Note 59: Interview, see note 28. Back.
Note 60: U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, p. 44. Back.
Note 61: Ibid., p. 33; Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Report, 1978, p. 41. Back.
Note 62: Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship, p. 76. Back.
Note 63: U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part I, 1977, p. 34. Paraphrased from the testimony of Kim Hyung Wook, former director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA); U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, p. 1. Back.
Note 64: For detailed documentation and analysis of Koreagate, see U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Parts I-VII, the "Report," and appendixes. Back.
Note 65: K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, ch. 7. Back.
Note 66: Chung-in Moon, "Influencing Washington: An Analysis of the South Korean Lobby in the United States," pp. 104-10. Moon summarizes the distinction that students of lobby behavior make: "Direct lobbying" includes the use of persons or groups in positions of power and influence over the actions of decision makers, and "indirect lobbying" attempts to mobilize public and private interests in the target country. "Grass roots mobilization," which refers to constituency influence over policy makers, is a form of indirect lobbying. The following paragraphs describe the Korean government's use of the grassroots strategy by attempting to enlist U.S. military personnel on behalf of Korea's defense cause. Back.
Note 67: U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part I, p. 37. Back.
Note 68: Interview with the former ROK Secretary of the SOFA JC and the Chair of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (November 1971 to September 1972), Seoul, April 18, 1992. Back.
Note 69: U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part V, p. 8. Back.
Note 70: Holsti, pp. 161-62. Back.
Note 71: Kkangtong, means "tin can" in Korean. The term has been used to refer to severe poverty and accompanying shame: Korean mendicants used to carry around tin cans or pails door to door and village to village, which served as containers for the scraps of food they received from begging. Some Koreans view this practice as an outgrowth of U.S. military food handouts during the Korean War. Back.
Note 72: Interview, Seoul, June 11, 1992. Back.
Note 73: Robert L. Humphrey, Troy Parris, James Shepherd, et al., "Troop-Com munity Relations Research in Korea: Educational Materials," Experimental Draft, prepared for the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Dept. of the Army, Spring 1970, p. 15; also EUSA, J-1, "Human Factors Research, Part II: Troop-Community Relations," 1965, pp. 9-10. The "Educational Materials" also raise the point that many U.S. GIs may think that Koreans are thieves (pp. 11-12) and that their poverty is due to laziness (p. 11). Back.
Note 74: Interview, Seoul, May 19, 1992. Back.
Note 75: JC Minutes, #67, October 21, 1971, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 18. Back.
Note 76: JC Minutes, #68, November 11, 1971, Enclosure 15. Back.
Note 77: Letter of Chief of Staff, 2d Infantry Division, to USFK Commanding General, June 26, 1972. The letter expressed concern over U.S. soldiers' image of Korea and proposed measures for the "[r]emoval of misunderstood view of Korea." Back.
Note 78: Interview with a former EUSA intelligence officer (late 1960s to early 1970s), Seoul, May 12, 1992. Back.
Note 79: Chaebôl, is the Korean equivalent of the Japanese zaibatsu, giant business conglomerate. Back.
Note 80: Interview, see note 78. Back.
Note 81: Finley, The U.S. Military Experience in Korea, p. 152. This was part of Korea's "Invitation Diplomacy." In 1972, the ROK invited 50 "prominent" Americans from political, academic, and press circles to Korea as part of the government's public relations effort. President Pak's rationale was that if people visit Korea for themselves, they will discover a new Korea, not one described by the New York Times, or Washington Post,. (These papers had been critical of Korea in the early-mid 1970s.) U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part V, p. 5. Back.
Note 82: See Keohane's "The Big Influence of Small Allies" on the use of "weakness" as an instrument of small power foreign relations. Suhrke's "Gratuity or Tyranny" describes such behavior in Korea's interactions with the United States. Also see Kwang, Korea and the United States. Back.
Note 83: Keohane has stated, "The small ally can take American- supported institutions and commitments for granted, however, only so long as the United States remains dedicated to policies of global involvement. It is precisely America's crusading spirit that has presented small allies with bargaining influence. " "The Big Influence of Small Allies," p. 163. Back.
Note 84: It is a fact, though, that the U.S. troop presence remained in the low-to-mid 40,000s until recent years. Back.
Note 85: See Chung-in Moon, "Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying," for an analysis of different types of lobbying strategies employed by Korea toward the United States and their comparative successes. Moon concludes that indirect lobbying-grass-roots mobilization and coalition-building-is most promising. He points out that "the overall social, political, and cultural contexts surrounding Korea and the United States strongly influence the choice and effectiveness of lobbying strategies" (p. 82). This would support my observation that the in-country people-to-people Clean-Up Campaign was successful because of the USFK's firsthand awareness of the political, social, and cultural context of Korean-American relations. Back.
Note 86: Rinn-Sup Shinn, a researcher of U.S.-ROK issues, described before Congress Korea's uryô munhwa, as "siege mentality," or "garrison state" mentality. U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part V, pp. 12-13. Back.
Note 87: The Commemoration Society for President Pak Chonghu,i and First Lady Yuk Yongsu, Kyôre ûi Chidoja, (The Leader of a People), p. 295. Back.
Note 88: Interview, see note 2. Back.
Note 90: For detailed analysis of the Yusin, period and Pak's political ambitions, see U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Parts IV and V; U.S. Senate, Korea and the Philippines: November 1972., Pak and his apologists have insisted that the authoritarian measures were necessary for the maintenance of ROK security, while critics have downplayed the security aspect and emphasized Pak's thirst for continued power. See chapters on Yusin, and Chaju Kukbang, by the Commemoration Society for President Pak Chonghu,i and First Lady Yuk Yongsu, Kyôre ûi Chidoja; Korean Research Institute on Political Issues, Tokjaeja ûi Kal, (The Knife of the Dictator), chs. 1, 3, 5; Kyosik Kim, Takyumentôri Pak Chông hûi; U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, pp. 74-75. Back.
Note 91: Korea Herald, June 25, 1971, March 19, 1972, July 1, 1972; The Commemoration Society for President Pak Chonghu,i and First Lady Yuk Yôngsu, Kyôre ûi Chidoja, pp. 48-50; U.S. Senate, Korea and the Philippines, pp. 5-11; U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part V, pp. 31-33. This last citation conveys the statements of former U.S. Ambassador Richard Sneider. Back.
Note 92: For example, Pak stated in his 1972 New Year's Address to the country that North Korea had fortified its territory and designated the period from December 1971 to March 1972 "as a time for struggle" and that 177 armed agents had been sent by the North to the South in 1971 on 59 different occasions (39 South Koreans were killed and 70 wounded). Korea Herald, January 1, 1972, New Year Supplement. Back.
Note 93: Korea Herald, June 25, 1971. Back.
Note 94: Korea Herald, January 1, 1972 and March 19, 1972. Back.
Note 95: Korea Herald, April 11, 1972 and June 28, 1972. Back.
Note 96: Korea Herald, February 3, 1971. Back.
for the maintenance of ROK
Note 97: Korea Herald, January 1, 1972. Back.
Note 98: Korea Herald, February 19, 1972. Back.
Note 100: U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part V, p. 9. Back.
Note 101: U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, p. 4. Back.
Note 102: Korea Herald, June 15, 1971. Along with Seoul National University, Yonsei University, and Korea University in Seoul, Ewha has traditionally been an influential voice of and for young Koreans. Back.
Note 103: Harold D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom; "The Universal Peril: Perpetual Crisis and the Garrison-Prison State"; "Does the Garrison State Threaten Civil Rights?". Back.
Note 104: Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 348. Back.
Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations
Email this citation