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Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations, by Katharine H.S. Moon
What began as a joint USFK-ROK venture to improve the discipline, welfare, and morale among U.S. troops in Korea turned Korean camptown prostitutes into instruments of foreign policy. Through the pursuit of the ROK government's "people-to-people diplomacy" toward the United States, the women became "personal ambassadors" who would be responsible for improving U.S.-ROK civil-military relations. During the Clean-Up Campaign, the prostitutes bore the burden of reconciling the differences between two races (blacks and whites) and two governments. Joint U.S.-ROK control over their bodies and behavior, through VD examinations and supervision of their interactions with GI customers, became an indicator of the status of base-community relations and the willingness of the ROKG to accommodate U.S. interests. Although they did not dictate policy, the women became transnational actors through their indispensable, though mostly involuntary, participation in the Clean-Up process.
The women's key role in the Clean-Up was based on their function as the glue of USFK-ROK community relations. The prostitutes were the primary and often sole contact with Korean society that GIs had on a daily basis. A "Human Factors Research Report" on troop-community relations stated unequivocally, "Fraternization [in the form of prostitution] is near the core of troop-community relations here." 1 The same study found that "there is a significant number of men in most units who believe that more male-female fraternization here endears the American to Korea--makes him more willing to fight for Korea" and that "[m]ost officers believe that fraternization is generally a constructive force." 2 According to a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up, the Korean government also believed that prostitution facilitated security relations between the United States and Korea:
| As a general rule, I know that the [ROK] government was benevolent about prostitution because it was a real source of U.S.-Korean friendship and friendliness. If a fellow is that far away [from home], his sexual appetites are met, he's feeling pretty good, and he'll serve better. I think both sides didn't try to stamp out prostitution but rather to keep it within bounds. 3 |
The above supports Enloe's observation that women, whether wives of diplomats or military nurses, have been used to facilitate relations among men and "soften" the harsh and impersonal political environment in which men perform their public duties. 4 Korean women and their sexuality (within the boundaries set by the military and local authorities) were considered necessary to the smooth operation of the U.S. military organization in Korea.
Antidiscrimination Efforts in Camptowns
The U.S. military and the local Korean authorities pinpointed kijich'on prostitutes as the source of social problems and unrest, especially with respect to racial violence.
5
Most of the retired and current USFK community relations officials and former Subcommittee members whom I interviewed acknowledged that the "business girls" were the source of off-post black-white conflict in the early 1970s primarily because they were labeled as "black" or "white." Black prostitutes were looked down upon by Korean camptown residents, white servicemen, and "white" prostitutes alike. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, most camptown R&R (Rest and Relaxation) establishments were segregated, not by policy but by choice and habit of the GI patrons. Accordingly, women generally worked in either "all-white" or "all-black" bars/clubs and tended not to mix their customers. But with
the rise of black militancy in the U.S. military in the late 1960s and the social confusion wrought by the movement of troops and prostitutes during the early years of the Nixon Doctrine, prostitutes and GIs would sometimes cross the racial lines, both deliberately and inadvertently. Such mixing of racial partners sparked often violent reactions among the GIs. Fights between black and white soldiers were, in a sense, over territory, that is, who possesses which women and who is trespassing on whose women. Many Korean prostitutes did discriminate against black servicemen because of their own racial prejudices and ignorance. But they also kept their distance from the black soldier out of economic necessity, which was informed by the racial hierarchy imposed on them by white soldiers, club owners, and other prostitutes. First, there were more white bars/clubs than black ones, meaning more white customers to sell drinks and sex to. Second, many, if not most, of the white clubs prohibited blacks from entering the establishments, which meant that most prostitutes did not have to make the choice of accepting or rejecting black offers for drinks or sex. Even if the women did interact with blacks, the club owner could fire them because the owner himself often feared offending and losing white patrons who opposed mixed-race patronage. Third, and most serious, the women feared that fraternizing with black servicemen would mean physical abuse and/or loss of income from white servicemen.
6
Regardless of the women's motivations, their display of "white favoritism" provoked the anger and frustration of black servicemen. Correspondence from installation commanders to the Commanding General of the EUSA and the Joint Committee, as well as reports from the USFK Civil Affairs Conference,
7
pinpointed the bars/clubs as the loci of camptown racial unrest and emphasized the need to make club owners control their employees' (particularly the prostitutes') discriminatory conduct. The head of the U.S. Army Garrison in Yongsan (USAGY), near It'aewon in Seoul,
8
stated the seriousness of discriminatory practices and the consequent imposition of off-limits decrees:
The Subcommittee's Panel on Race Relations and Equality of Treatment was particularly assertive in recommending behavioral changes among club/bar employees.
10
On the Korean side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the Base-Community Clean-Up Campaign also pressed for behavioral changes, particularly of the "hostesses," through camptown residents' cooperation with U.S. military personnel.
11
MoFA's "Civil-Military Relations Policy on Racial Discrimination" stated the following:
Education" was the key word for reducing and eliminating racial discrimination in clubs. Representatives of various USFK commands, as well as local Korean officials, regularly discussed the need to educate club owners, employees, soldiers, and other camptown residents on matters of racial discrimination. For example, the commander of the Yongsan Garrison enlisted the help of the 24th Psychological Operations Detachment (PSYOP) of the EUSA to educate club owners/managers and employees. The PSYOP team focused their efforts on the creation and distribution of posters, flyers, coasters (for glasses),
14
tape-recorded English lessons, and magazine articles designed to inform Koreans and Americans about race issues.
15
The "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet" (p. 6) offers the following advice: "Distribute tape-recorded English lessons to each club. Teach carefully selected words like tolerance and equality to the waitresses." The team also prepared "a course of instruction . . . for club employees to teach them [employees] the Black soldier's culture and U.S. policy on equal treatment."
16
The team also prepared posters, bearing the words, "(We) serve all customers
equally" and "Don't Discriminate--Participate," to be hung in the It'aewon clubs. Both U.S. and Korean officials at the local levels also tried to enlist the cooperation and leadership of the local prostitutes' "autonomous organizations" to teach their members not to discriminate against servicemen. In addition, local Korean authorities, e.g., the mayor's office, the police, and health clinics, also held regular Etiquette and Good Conduct Meetings to educate the prostitutes about respecting the human rights of black soldiers and creating an harmonious camptown environment. Uijongbu, for example, held "four meetings and five meetings respectively for regular club employees and 'business girls' " in 1972.
17
The Eighth Army Garrison in Seoul, which monitored It'aewon clubs and bars, was particulary active. In 1971, the command officials formed PEACE (Promote Equality Action Committee) with the owners of It'aewon clubs and the president of the prostitutes' organization, the Rose Society, to formulate and monitor antidiscrimination policies. The members of PEACE signed pledges to do their "utmost to insure equal treatment for all people"
18
and conducted poster campaigns (in English and Korean) to promote antidiscriminatory behavior in the clubs.
19
Camp Page in Ch'unch'on also initiated such pacts.
20
For the U.S. military, the racial problems in camptowns posed more than a threat to discipline, morale, and defense preparedness. They also raised political problems in its propaganda war with the North, as well as potential anti-Americanism among South Koreans. The PSYOP material stressed that "[t]he ROK's enemies take advantage of racial incidents and may attempt to agitate such incidents in order to create dissension between blacks and whites and eventually between the ROK and the U.S."
21
The USFK was intent on preventing North Koreans from exploiting racial tensions in American society as a way to embarrass the United States. In the October issue of Jayu (Friends of Freedom) magazine, PSYOP linked camptown racial problems to the integrity of the U.S. military and to the defense of South Korea: "For some time, the North Korean Communists have been directing some of their propaganda attacks toward the American Negro soldier, in an effort to encourage him to rebel against his military leaders, desert the Army, abandon the defense of the ROK."
22
The U.S. military in Korea was wary of the possibility that Korean camptown protests against the violent behavior of black soldiers (particularly in July 1971) would be misunderstood by South and North Koreans as anti-American uprisings. The Jayu article ended with
the reminder that Korean "protests against racial disturbance ought to be distinguished from Anti-Americanism."
23
The PSYOP planners were also careful not to appear as if the USFK were dictating policies to private Korean club owners and residents, although in reality, the U.S. side developed the majority of the antidiscrimination programs, and the Korean residents (faced with the USFK's off-limits power) had little choice but to comply. Under "Programming advice," the PSYOPS "Campaign Control Sheet" emphasized that:
In their efforts to educate prostitutes, the USFK planners reiterated that the women's discriminatory actions help fuel North Korean propaganda against the South and the U.S. military presence.
25
In July 1971, PSYOP officials gave 500 flyers (in Korean language) to the Yongsan police to distribute to It'aewon club owners, which in turn were distributed to "women patrons" (prostitutes).
26
In urging the women to treat all U.S. customers equally, the flyers stated:
The above concerns underscore the importance of the role of camptown residents in general, and the prostitutes in particular, from the perspective of the USFK and Korean authorities, in maintaining a "united front" against the Northern enemy and in keeping the peace between the South Korean and American sides. Both authorities considered these women not as passive spectators in the joint U.S.-ROK defense efforts but as necessary team-players. Their role in reducing or eliminating racial conflict was to determine both the image of the U.S.-ROK military relationship in the eyes of Americans, both South and North Koreans, and the ability of Communists to wage their propaganda campaign against the United States and ROK. Moreover, the women's participation was needed to help check potential anti-U.S. sentiments that could disrupt the U.S.-ROK alliance. Despite these educational attempts by the U.S. military, the real onus of off-post racial cooperation and harmony rested on the club owners and managers' ability to control of club employees.
29
Although publicity around antidiscrimination programs highlighted their cooperative and mutually beneficial aspects, the programs did in fact involve coercion and co-optation of local Koreans by the U.S. installation authorities. The commander of USAGY made this point explicit in his memorandum to the EUSA Chief of Staff:
Pressured by U.S. commanders, the club owners/managers pressured their hostesses to treat customers equally. Kim Yonja, who was working in Songt'an as a prostitute in 1971, recalled the following:
To expect club owners and managers, who served as collective pimps for the hostesses working in their establishments, to educate these women was a naive assumption on the part of the U.S. military authorities. It was common knowledge among camptown residents, both American and Korean, that club owners' only concern for the women was their ability to increase club revenues. The U.S. side was fully aware that many club owners/managers mistreated the women by physically beating them, psychologically harassing them, and keeping them in debt bondage. Demanding that these owners/managers increase control over these women's conduct was tantamount to increasing and legitimating the former's exploitation and abuse of the latter. The former U.S. chair of the Subcommittee from December 1971 to October 1972 responded frankly to my question, "What kind of carrots and sticks were used to enforce nondiscrimination by club women?" Answer: "Generally, a visit to the bar owner would either get her fired or get her head screwed on straight. Give pressure to the bar owner and they usually carried through."
32
Besides the power of hiring and firing, the club owner had other means of cutting off a prostitute's livelihood, e.g., confiscating her VD/registration card so that she would not be able to work. Kim Yonja stated that because most club women avoided the monthly "Etiquette and Good Conduct" lecture, some club owners/managers helped out the local Korean authorities who sponsored the meeting by confiscating the club women's VD cards as a way to force the women to attend: "If there were going to be a meeting tomorrow, then the owner would take away the VD card the night before, at closing time, and prohibit the women who don't go to the meeting from coming to work at the club for several days. Without the VD card, women could not work."
33
Another woman emphasized that there was virtually no legal or political recourse that women could take against the abuses: "If a woman is abused by the owner, unless the woman gets bruises that take months to heal, then, things just get covered up."
34
The women's limited power over their own lives was sharply reduced because of the political power the owners held over camptown life. According to Kim Yonja, who was active in the camptown politics of Kunsan and Songt'an in the 1970s and 1980s,
In the end, the prostitutes bore much of the burden of allaying racial tensions and creating a sense of cooperation and harmony in base-community relations. Their role in reducing racial conflict also offered the USFK and the ROK government a sense of improved relations and friendship. Throughout the first two years of the Clean-Up Campaign, both U.S. and ROK officials increasingly commended each other for the significant declines in camptown racial problems.
Venereal Disease Control
In 1971, for the first time in history, the USFK succeeded in pressuring the Korean government to regulate systematically and strictly the bodies/health of camptown prostitutes through regular and effective VD examinations and treatment. Although the USFK implemented various measures within its commands to reduce the high VD rates among its troops, the target of the U.S.-ROK anti-VD efforts was the camptown women. Joint U.S.-ROK coordination and cooperation on this issue came to represent not only improved relations between the United States and Korea but also dual state control over the bodies and sexual labor of the women. Moreover, the Korean government interpreted the sexual labor of camptown prostitutes as a "labor of love" for their nation: With cleaner, healthier bodies and cooperative attitudes in selling sex to GIs, the women would contribute to the defense and development of the ROK. The magnitude of VD as a social vice and medical problem became apparent to the USFK with the troop reduction of 1970-71 and the consequent redeployment of troops and migration of camptown Koreans throughout South Korea. For the USFK, prostitution and venereal disease
composed the singlemost difficult and persistent camptown vice to control in the Clean-Up Campaign.
Source: Morbidity Reports, RCS MED-78. From the Files of the office of International Relations, EUSA.
The U.S. commanders and medical officers in Korea determined that immediate and drastic measures were needed, so much so that in the sum
mer and fall of 1972, "[t]he Surgeon General [of the Department of the Army] came under great pressure to return to punishment as a means of VD control in Korea although punitive action against VD patients in the military had been prohibited by U.S. Public Law 439 since September, 1944. Military officials also considered other urgent measures, such as allowing names of VD patients to be released to commanders on a routine basis."
39
Cables exchanged between the Commanding General of the USFK, John Michaelis, and the DoA Surgeon General's Office reveal a push by field officers in Korea to take stricter VD control measures among troops than permitted by Washington. For example, General Michaelis complained in a cablegram:
Despite such persistence, the Surgeon General's Office remained adamant that no punitive actions, including denial of pass privileges, and other actions deleterious to "sound medical practice," such as circulating names of patients, comparing VD figures of different commands, and using VD as a basis for reenlistment decisions, would be permitted.
41
What the Surgeon General did emphasize was the "control of infection in prostitute reservoir [as] of primary importance" and recommended that the USFK "encourage growth of ROK diagnostic ability."
42
The 1972 Sherwood Report on the status of the VD epidemic among U.S. troops also emphasized that "traditional control measures," such as education and immediate reporting and treatment of the soldiers, would not significantly reduce VD rates "as long as there is such a high prevalence of
venereal disease in girls that are so easily accessible." Without doubt, the number of VD-infected camptown prostitutes was high: of the approxi
mately 13,000 registered camptown prostitutes recorded by the EUSA Preventive Medicine Division in the end of 1972, the Korean National Institute of Health recorded 6,700 cases of infection in October and November.
43
Unable to reconcile the differences between the Washington office of the Surgeon General and the field officers in Korea, the USFK authorities waged an aggressive campaign to educate servicemen about VD and preventive measures, through briefings and pamphlets,
44
as well as institute various "contact identification systems" to trace the human source of each man's illness, namely, the prostitute. For the U.S. military authorities in Korea and Washington, the control of prostitutes' physical mobility, the examination of her body, and treatment of her VD infection were the key components of lowering VD rates among U.S. soldiers. The USFK used the Clean-Up Campaign of the SOFA Joint Committee and the Korean Base Community Clean-Up Committee to press for rapid action on the VD problem. Several USFK and Korean officials I interviewed noted that although the initial target of the Campaign was camptown race relations, control of prostitutes and reduction of VD rates for U.S. troops consistently remained the major point of grievance for the USFK and the primary focus of work for the Korean government. One USFK community relations officer commented that racial unrest was merely the "spark" that ignited the Clean-Up activity and that control of prostitution/VD constituted the crux. He also mentioned that in his opinion, given the emphasis placed on VD control, the ROKG should have called the Clean-Up Campaign "Kukka Songbyong Chonghwa Undong" (National VD Purification Movement), instead of the generic "Camptown Purification Movement."
45
Joint Committee Minutes, Ad Hoc Subcommittee Minutes, the Civil Affairs Conference reports, and official correspondences of U.S. commanders in Korea leave no doubt that prostitution/VD was the Achilles heel of improved camptown life and improved Korean-American relations. A "Fact Sheet" of the EUSA J-5 office, which handled civil-military relations, emphasized the prostitution/VD issue as a U.S.-ROK priority: "The responsibility of Korean and U.S. military officials in working closely together in lessening unfavorable camp-community relations is nowhere more pronounced than in the problem of venereal diseases."
46
As with the antidiscrimination efforts, the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, particularly its Panel on Health and Sanitation, acted
as the initiator, mediator, and evaluator of U.S.-ROK anti-VD efforts. By bringing the complaints of individual base commanders and the Surgeon
General's Office of the Department of Army to the attention of their ROK counterparts on the Joint Committee,
47
the U.S. members succeeded in getting the following point across to the highest levels of the ROK government: "The ROK government has not applied adequate control measures to keep the prevalence of venereal disease in prostitutes at a low level."
48
The U.S. military specifically criticized the inadequacy of examination and treatment facilities, both in quantity and quality, the availability of antibiotics readily available at Korean pharmacies (at which prostitutes and soldiers regularly purchased for self-treatment purposes), medically unsound treatment regimens for infected women, and local health officials demanding and/or accepting bribes from camptown prostitutes in return for exemptions from mandatory examinations or "passing" women who failed the VD tests.
49
Simultaneously, the U.S. side insisted on active cooperation of the ROK government at all levels, and by personally visiting various camptowns, Subcommittee members, both Korean and American, were able to encourage and demand local coordination and cooperation. After such visits, local command-community cooperation on VD control was reported to have improved, with local health officials, in particular, improving their testing and treatment programs.
50
The Korean government took the task of controlling prostitution and VD seriously. Although records show the U.S. side to have emphasized the resolution of racial problems in the early part of the Clean-Up, Korean documents available as enclosures in the Subcommittee Minutes focused on the prostitution/VD problem from the very beginning of the Clean-Up Campaign. For example, MoFA's first Clean-Up proposal to the BCCUC, entitled "Kijich'on Chonghwa rul wihan Woemubu Sihaeng Kyehoek #1" (Camptown Clean-Up Enforcement Plans of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), listed VD control (including elimination of the causes of VD, effective treatment of infected women, and cooperation with U.S. military authorities on VD education) first among numerous Clean-Up items and pressed for the ROK's "utmost cooperation" with and the strengthening of joint government action through the SOFA mechanism (the Joint Committee).
51
Another report, "Woegukkun Kijichubyon Chonghwa Chonghap Taech'aek" (Comprehensive Plans for the Purification of Foreign Military Base Areas) of the BCCUC also listed VD as the first item on its "problem list."
52
a name="97">
An extensive study of the clubs of the Itaewon area by members of this headquarters has revealed that intolerable discriminatory practices are being allowed, or at least passively condoned, by club managers. . . . USAGY and members of the Equal Opportunity Council met with the seven Itaewon club owners and pointed out to them that they were showing discrimination toward the black soldier versus the white soldier in the areas of overall attitude, greeting, seating, and the actions of
the
ir entertainment girls. . . . [Soon after,] [a]ll but the King Club had made tremendous improvements. . . . The King Club of the Itaewon area will be Off Limits effective 2 June 71, in accordance with EA Reg. [Eighth Army Regulation] 192-96.
9
Relevant Korean organizations should coordinate with U.S. military representatives to eliminate racial discrimination on the part of club hostesses. Relevant U.S. military authorities should educate white soldiers with all possible effort not to discriminate against women who associate with black soldiers.
12
The U.S. military mentioned on paper the need to educate its own men about fair treatment toward Korean prostitutes, but there is no evidence that such education ever took place. However, the military developed and conducted extensive programs to teach cooperation and respect among its own men.
13
It is imperative for the success of operations that all PSYOP materials be reviewed by club owners for acceptance and that distribution be made by ROK law enforcement agencies. It is equally important that U.S. military installations not be readily identifiable with these materials. PSYOP materials should imply Korean concern to improve the racial situation in their respective areas and Korean awareness that they contribute to racial problems and it is their problem also.
24
(italics in original)
It should be noted that the North Koreans seek to exploit and exacerbate racial tensions among U.S. servicemen and conduct anti-U.S. propaganda in order to distance the United States and the ROK from each other. This, in effect, weakens the security of our country.
27
[Y]ou should also realize that you are unconsciously helping your enemy, while weakening the internal security of your nation. Remember U.S. personnel are here to help you to defend the Republic of Korea from North Korean invasion and subversion.
In order to keep your business and help the security of your country, you are asked to join with us and help us to solve the problem. . . . You are urged to treat all U.S. customers equally. All must be seated and
served with equal courtesy and speed, for example. Do not side with
any particular group of customers who come to your club, bar or store.
28
They [camptown Koreans] realize that the Garrison Commander carries a "big stick," i.e., he can place the club off limits, which would deprive them of revenue which they need to stay operational. Continually at the [PEACE] committee meetings it is brought to the committee's attention that this is a voluntary organization and certainly is not mandatory, but noncompliance to extending equality to all will lead to being placed off limits.
30
From the base side, the order that came down to us was to be nice to blacks if they come into the hall, to have the women sit with the blacks and dance with them if they wanted to dance. . . . [B]ut it was the owners who "educated" us. . . . [They] told the women, "Even if you don't
bring
them (black soldiers) home, at least drink and dance with them." All this refers to the Songtan area.
31
Most club owners in camptowns are village leaders. They hold power. It's not that the original residents become the owners, but owners have
arrived from other areas. By establishing their business and earning money, they become owners, Special Tourist Association leaders, etc. So, if a woman is physically abused by the owner, or if a woman is murdered by a GI, she had nowhere to turn to: She would be told (by the Korean authorities), "Look, the American soldier is here to help Korea--they put their lives on the line for Korea."
35
Veneral Disease Rates, Army Worldwide and Specified Areas
Month & Year
Korea
Worldwide
CONUS
Thailan
Vietnam
USA-REUR
Strength KoreaMean
Jul' 70
371.69
113.15
39.43
608.19
283.27
17.06
49,258
Aug
359.99
99.28
36.52
239.09
239.09
17.26
47,685
Sep
398.33
111.82
39.16
275.90
275.90
17.43
46,856
Oct
422.38
108.86
34.10
268.73
268.73
17.02
46,217
Nov
440.62
103.15
33.33
257.27
257.27
15.32
44,954
Dec
407.38
92.94
29.67
223.26
223.26
14.97
45,318
Jan '71
464.54
103.83
103.83
382.89
264.18
7.59
44,938
Feb
513.03
96.51
96.51
495.20
230.39
9.42
45,813
Mar
547.54
99.35
99.35
529.69
263.31
8.57
42,470
Apr
518.22
99.66
99.66
489.40
298.14
6.64
40,336
May
468.04
99.48
99.48
506.98
329.42
10.83
36,350
Jun
568.86
111.40
111.40
719.85
351.05
12.36
33,537
Jul
551.55
100.04
100.04
489.97
316.86
15.12
33,665
Aug
537.49
106.27
106.27
604.69
334.13
16.59
31,851
Sep
503.58
102.01
102.01
531.25
345.62
16.33
30,564
Oct
651.24
108.21
108.21
376.60
373.49
9.02
34,170
Nov
740.39
120.52
120.52
332.41
485.59
13.43
38,470
Dec
601.81
119.95
119.95
456.95
549.93
10.10
37,935
Jan '72
611.25
125.81
125.81
708.95
614.51
12.70
36,079
Feb
747.02
115.47
115.47
708.52
508.48
15.22
35,716
Mar
750..83
136.78
136.78
631.32
813.99
24.30
35,552
Apr
732.36
115.73
115.73
677.61
854.97
21.46
35,999
Note: Annual rates per 1000 mean strength includes cases treated on duty status.
The Chief of Preventive Medicine of the EUSA reported sharp increases in annual VD rates for U.S. troops in Korea from 389 cases/1000 men/year in 1970 to 553/1000/yr. in 1971 and 692/1000/yr. in 1972. Monthly VD rates in 1972 remained between 600-700, with the peak of 787/1000/yr. in May. Altogether, 24,457 cases of venereal disease
36
(among a mean troop presence of about 35,000) were reported for U.S. Army personnel in 1972.
37
Osan Air Base recorded a total of 2,261 VD cases in 1970 and 2,529 in 1971.
38
A comparison of U.S. Army VD rates worldwide (table 4.1) highlights Korea as a consistent trouble spot.
A dichotomy exists between this headquarters and the Surg Gen [surgeon general] in such matters as releasing statistics on VD and names of infected personnel to unit commanders in order that we can as one example, deny pass privileges until the patient is certified as cured by the local surgeon. We also need this information so that we can take appropriate administrative action against those soldiers who contract VD several times. . . . DA [Dept. of Army] policy prohibits such information from being provided, therefore, request this policy be changed. It is frustrating to commanders to respond to the high priority effort [on VD] which has been directed by the Secretary of the Army without resolving this major difference and does produce an adverse morale factor among our company and battalion level commanders. . . . It must be realized that drastic action is demanded if success is to be achieved.
40
(The original, of course, is in solid capitals.)
The Korean government did exert genuine effort and substantial funds to tackle the prostitution/VD problem. In its original Clean-Up plans, the BCCUC allocated 225 million won to projects aimed at the prevention and treatment of venereal disease. 54 Environmental Purification," including paving of roads and sidewalks in camp villages and improving sanitary facilities, street lighting, and housing, was the only clean-up project with an allocation figure (480 million won) 55 higher than that for VD control. The BCCUC's VD prevention program consisted of increasing the registration of women (to reduce the number of streetwalkers avoiding VD checks), enforcement of regular VD examinations for the women, improved examination and treatment techniques, construction and renovation of VD clinics and detention centers (for infected women), efforts to reduce the numbers of streetwalkers, and cooperation with U.S. military authorities on "contact identification."
According to the Korean government, mandating and enforcing regular VD exams and tightening control over both private and public VD/health clinics were intended to "liberate foreign soldiers and prostitutes from venereal disease." 56 In reality, the health of the women was intended to protect the health of the GI and please his superiors, who were intent on lowering VD rates. The BCCUC directed local Korean government officials, including the mayor, county chief, police, public health workers, Women's Welfare workers (of MoHSA), and other authorities to ensure that prostitutes register with the local police and health clinic and do not evade VD examinations and necessary treatment. Some local officials in turn worked with and through local Korean American Friendship Councils (KAFCs) to enforce VD regulation. Some of these KAFCs formed VD subcommittees, with the responsibility to formulate VD control policies, inspect club women's VD cards, oversee contact identification measures, and mediate communication and complaints between camptown residents, particularly the club/bar owners, and local U.S. military officials. 57
In general, registered prostitutes were required to undergo twice-weekly examinations for gonorrhea 58 and syphilis tests once every three months. But because club women avoided these examinations as much as possible (chapter 6), coercive measures were often used. For example, the ROK MoHSA instituted "mass round-up" and "mass treatment" measures in all base communities "for the purpose to find out the epidemic sources of V.D." during the last two months of 1972. 59 The "control teams," consisting of personnel from local health clinics and Women's Welfare Bureaus, as well as local police, literally rounded up camptown women, be they club prostitutes, waitresses, streetwalkers, live-ins, or other "suspects of VD reservoirs," and performed gynecological examinations on them and injected them with penicillin for inoculation purposes. The MoHSA report of 1972 projects in operation stated: "The unregistered persons checked during the above period [Oct. 29 to Dec. 31, 1972] and unexaminees [registered women who avoided or failed regular exams] are examined in force and confirmed cases will be treated in the clinics, admitted or not"(italics added). 60
Such mass treatments had been attempted in 1969 and 1971 without much success. 61 For example, the Commanding General of the 2d Division had complained to the Commissioner of Yangju County of Uijongbu that despite the mass round-ups and inoculation of business girls in Kyonggi Province on November 23 and 24, 1971, VD rates in the camptown villages remained "extremely high." 62 These mass round-ups and treatment routines, performed throughout the early 1970s reveal the trial-and-error measures of the Korean authorities as they groped for effective means both to control VD and "showcase" their VD control endeavors to the USFK audience. Prior to the mass treatments, ROK authorities, including the Ministry of National Defense, publicized the upcoming VD control measures to the relevant U.S. military authorities and asked the latter for their cooperation and support. 63 Despite the uncertainty of their medical value, round-ups and mass inoculations served as visible evidence of the ROK government's serious intent to meet health standards acceptable to the USFK.
In addition to registering and examining camptown women, the ROK government expended considerable funds to construct and renovate VD clinic facilities and detention centers, purchase modern clinical and laboratory equipment, and increase the number of camptown health personnel. In the second half of 1972 alone, the BCCUC appropriated 140 million won for the construction and renovation of 11 VD clinics in major camp areas as well as 93.1 million won for their 1973 operations. 64 Such projects were a priority in the Korean government's camptown VD plans, as evidenced by the speed and attention paid to completing these construction projects. According to the Thirteenth Report of the Subcommittee,
| The ROK Government had given the highest priority to the completion of five large new or renovated VD clinics in Kyonggi Province in the northern part of the ROK, and all of these facilities with a patient capacity of 550 are completed and in operation. Six facilities having a capacity of 590 patients are now completed and in operation, while the remaining five smaller facilities with a patient capacity of 170 are scheduled to open in April 1973. 65 |
To staff these facilities, the ROK government decided that "67 new goverment doctors, nurses, and technicians will be hired while 25 private doctors, nurses, and technicians will be given subsidies for work for the Government on VD." 66 Originally, the ROK government had planned to hire 101 new medical personnel for VD control, but budgetary constraints decreased the number. 67 Additionally, the BCCUC's "Comprehensive Purification Policies" (July 1972) planned to spend about 11 million won on new equipment.
Given Korea's still fledgling state of economic development, the Korean government had difficulty finding funds to actualize these camptown programs. 68 Despite the ROK government's original outlays, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs fell short of the required sums within a year of the BCCUC's purification movement. Korean officials noted that 18 million won ($45,124, 1972 rates) was the "normal" MoHSA budget for VD control "and not the extraordinary budget covered by the 'Base Community Clean-Up Committee's' program." 69 The U.S. military and the Korean government were aware that money for VD regulation and prevention had been siphoned from existing central and local government budgets intended for other projects. 70 The MoHSA prepared a comprehensive study on camptown health and sanitation issues for President Pak's review, which Robert Sherwood tried to obtain but was refused by MoHSA officials because the study was "classified." Sherwood did learn from the Korean officials that "[t]he study recommended that $250,000 be diverted from other ministry of health funds (there is no new money available) to construct additional clinics and to put all clinics under governmental control" (italics in original). Still, by the end of 1972, MoHSA had received only 18 million of the 72 million won ($180,496) needed to proceed with the BCCUC's 1973 VD Clean-Up. Strapped for funds and equipment and pressed by U.S. authorities to make progress on VD control, Korean officials unequivocally expressed their government's need for U.S. assistance. For example, the MoHSA representative on the Subcommittee stated that "due to budgetary limitations and the limitations on culture medium [bacterial cultures], without U.S. assistance the culture testing program could not be expanded." 71
Although the U.S. military's constant emphasis in the Clean-Up Campaign was to make the ROK government take full responsibility for VD control, U.S. assistance in the form of diagnostic materials, medical expertise, and medication became an indispensable part of the BCCUC's effort. The U.S. military assisted the ROK government with laboratory research and analysis of diagnostic and treatment methods 72 and, in some camp areas, provided transportation (to Korean detention centers) to those prostitutes who had failed their examinations. From mid-1973 to the end of the Campaign, U.S. help increasingly focused on providing Thayer-Martin diagnostic culture materials and on training Korean doctors and laboratory technicians to use these and other medical technology properly. 73 Both USFK and ROK health officials, especially the former, regularly surveyed different camp areas to ascertain the proper diagnosis and treatment of women. Those Korean clinic employees not complying with the USFK-MoHSA recommended procedures were reprimanded and urged to correct negligent or abusive practices.
In addition to examination procedures, the USFK emphasized that ROK health authorities administer adequate treatment, in terms of medication and duration of detention, to infected women. The USFK sought to end the long-established pattern of infected women being treated with the wrong kind of medication or with dosages it considered too low for too short a time. The military, through its medical channels to MoHSA and local VD clinics and the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, urged for a medication regimen of at least 4.8 million units of procaine penicillin preceded by 1.0 gram of oral probenecid daily until the infection cleared. 74 As with diagnostic materials, many USFK units provided medication to local VD clinics and treatment centers. For example, the Waegwan Health Center and VD Clinic received penicillin and probenecid from the 543d General Dispensary, and the VD clinic in Camps Henry and Walker area (Taegu) from the corresponding U.S. dispensaries; K2 U.S. Air Base at Taegu provided the Tonggu Health Center and VD clinic with procaine penicillin, probenecid, and spectinomycin; Kunsan Air Base, as well as Camp El Paso in North Ch'ungchong Province, usually supplied its local VD clinics with medication. 75
Historically, the need to control prostitution and VD placed the U.S. military in a double bind: The USFK had always sought to reduce VD rates among its troops and simultaneously maintain that the U.S. military does not participate in or condone prostitution. However, VD reduction in a country like Korea, with meager resources and awareness of the problem, required that the USFK dirty its hands in the local management of prostitution. Although USFK officials in the early 1960s and those in the early 1970s both faced these tensions and formulated similar proposals, their respective attitude toward and actual involvement in prostitution control differed significantly. Whereas the officials in the 1970s aggressively dictated to the Koreans health and sanitary standards acceptable to the USFK, their counterparts in the 1960s had cautioned against such active involvement in local affairs, stating, "The United Nations Command has followed a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the host nation." 76 Whereas the officials in the 1970s actively supplied Korean health clinics and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs with medical supplies and training, those of the 1960s were reluctant to assist the Health Ministry's beginning efforts to open a few VD clinics and treat infected women, stating, "[T]here is, at present, no authorization for the expenditure of U.S. Army medical supplies in such a program." 77
In the early 1960s, a Surgeon General of one of the main U.S. commands in Korea had proposed a comprehensive joint USFK-ROK VD control program similar to the one adopted in the 1970s, including the development and implementation of required training programs for employees of the MoHSW, U.S. participation in increasing personnel and equipment to support a comprehensive plan, and the U.S. purchase of necessary drugs for such a program. 78 But at all levels of the USFK, support for such interventionist programs was lacking. These officials cautioned that the implications of such a joint USFK-ROK VD program were "profound," i.e., requiring a "mass program of examination, presumably of Korean males and females, with subsequent treatment of infected individuals," and that such a program "cannot be justified solely in terms of reducing the likelihood of venereal infection among U.S. personnel. If publicized this tact [sic] could prove politically embarrassing both in Korea and in CONUS. This program can be explained only in terms of producing a positive improvement in the general health status of the local inhabitants." 79
The Inspector General of the EUSA in 1964 also cautioned against USFK involvement in the regulation of local prostitution, stating, "Such dealings or recognition of community health inspections and [medical] treatment tend to indicate official [USFK] approval [of prostitution]." 80
USFK officials involved in the Clean-Up Campaign of the 1970s were not oblivious to the fact that direct U.S. involvement in prostitution control could implicate the military in illegal activities, but such concerns were not primary. 81 Moreover, the "positive improvement in the general health status of the local inhabitants" through prostitution and VD control was not an issue in the 1970s. The only "benefit" to local Koreans ever mentioned (as rationale for the Clean-Up) by the U.S. authorities was economic: safer, more healthful club/bar environments, including healthier prostitutes, meant better business for the clubs. The above differences between the attitudes and actions (or inactions) of USFK officials during the two time periods indicate that prostitution had become more entrenched as a way of life for both the U.S. military and camptown Koreans by the 1970s, necessitating U.S. participation in the VD control of women, and that local Korean economic interests also became entrenched to the point that political implications of U.S. control over local life could be overlooked by both the U.S. and Korean sides.
But more significantly, the active involvement of U.S. military personnel in prostitution control points to a larger disparity in power between the U.S. and Korean governments in the early 1970s that helped effect a major shift in the ROK government's attitude toward prostitution and VD control. With this change, the USFK could politically afford to "interfere" in the "internal affairs of the host nation" without seriously risking Korean resistance and criticism. It was the Korean government, not the U.S. military, that was placed in the position of defending its actions and inactions regarding camptown prostitution and other problems plaguing the GI's life. U.S. assistance to ROK health authorities served as practical means of getting the Koreans to do what they were willing in spirit, though sometimes lacking in know-how and funds, to do. The Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea allowed the USFK to place the burden of official responsibility and accountability for camptown prostitution fully on the Korean government.
Although the reduction of VD rates among U.S. servicemen was the primary goal of prostitution/VD control for the USFK, the improvement of U.S.-ROK relations through local-level cooperation and the enhancement of Korea's image was the driving force behind the ROK government's control effort. Without doubt, the Korean people regarded camptown VD as such'i byong, or "disease of shame," 82 which generated a negative image of Korea. 83 The MoHSA official who oversaw the various prostitution/VD control programs in 1971-72 stated clearly that the purpose of the control effort was "to give a cleaner impression of camptowns and of Korea" and emphasized that the BCCUC's purification movement was not intended for the entire nation but solely for U.S. camp areas, especially those with large concentration of troops. 84 Only camptown prostitutes, not Korean prostitutes in general, were examined for VD (in the beginning of the Campaign). 85
The Korean government intended to mobilize camptown prostitutes to serve as "personal ambassadors" to the numerous GIs she sexually contacted, and the task of the Purification Movement was to transform her from being a bad ambassador to a good one. The Blue House Political Secretary who oversaw the BCCUC programs stressed that camptown prostitutes needed to be taught how to work correctly. He recounted his visits to camptown areas, where he asked the women, Why did Japan develop from nothing to greatness? He answered for them by emphasizing that they should imitate the spirit of Japanese prostitutes who sold their bodies to the post-1945 U.S. occupation forces:
| The Japanese prostitute, when she finished with the GI, did not get up to go get the next GI (for more money) but knelt before him and pleaded with him to help rebuild Japan. The spirit of the Japanese prostitute was concerned with the survival of her fatherland. The patriotism of the Japanese prostitute spread to the rest of the society to develop Japan. 86 |
Such a view clearly established camptown prostitutes' sex work as a vital form of patriotism, and lower-level Korean officials echoed such words in their regular educational lectures to the women. For example, women were urged during such classes in the Uijongbu area to "take charge of national prestige" (Kugwi rul tamdang hara). 87 One former camptown prostitute who worked in Tongduchon and Songt'an in the first half of the 1970s recalled:
| During every Etiquette and Good Conduct Lecture [sponsored monthly by local camptown officials], the local mayor or local public information officer or public peace officer would . . . give the introductory remarks. They would say, "All of you, who cater to the U.S. soldiers, are patriots. All of you are nationalists working to increase the foreign exchange earnings of our country." They said that we are servants of the nation and that we should live and work with pride. And then they told us not to show humiliating things [behavior] to the U.S. soldiers, to maintain our dignity as Korean women. 88 |
The control of camptown women's bodies and sexual health was integral to improving deteriorated USFK-ROK relations in the early years of the Nixon Doctrine. Just as the Clean-Up Campaign in general helped mitigate tensions between the ROK government and the USFK, the Subcommittee found that those camptowns which addressed the VD problem to the satisfaction of the local U.S. command leaders possessed a "spirit of mutual cooperation . . . between the Base Command and local Korean officials" and to have "excellent" civil-military relations. 89
Note 1: EUSA (Eighth U.S. Army), IO (Office of International Relations), "Human Factors Research: Part II. Troop-Community Relations," 1965, p. 3. Back.
Note 2: Ibid., pp. 9-10. Back.
Note 3: Interview with a key initiator of the Clean-Up, Coscob, Conn., October 24, 1991. Back.
Note 4: Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You?, ch. 4; and Bananas, Beaches, and Bases, ch. 5. Back.
Note 5: For example, one USFK community-relations officer since the 1960s stated that camptown prostitutes are the cause of all problems-social, legal, political-in the camptowns. He and other community-relations officers pointed out that the bars/clubs in which the women work and the conditions in which they work (drunkenness of soldiers, criminal activities by camptown residents, etc.) breed community problems. Interview, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992. Back.
Note 6: EUSA, "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet," p. 3; interview, Coscob, Conn., October 24, 1991 (see note 3); interview with two USFK community relations officers, Seoul, April 6, 1992; interview with the former ROK representative to the JC (April-December 1971), Seoul, December 12, 1991. Back.
Note 7: Sponsored by EUSA, ACofs, J-5, usually twice a year, beginning in 1971. The conference, also called "Korean-American Civil Affairs Conference," convened representatives from the various U.S. installations to present and discuss both problems and progress in base-community relations. ROK participants were generally limited to the members of the Subcommittee. Back.
Note 8: Itaewon was and still is the entertainment district closest to the Yongsan compound. It is no longer a red-light district, although it still houses many nightclubs and sex entertainment joints. It has become a shopping strip for tourists, not only GIs. Back.
Note 9: Letter from Col. Jack F. Belford, Commander of USAGY, to EUSA Com manding General, June 1, 1971. A memorandum attached to this letter states that Belford had met with the It'aewon club managers on April 26, 1971, and requested that the latter "instruct bartenders, waitresses, employees and entertainers to provide equal and courteous service to all UNC/USFK military personnel. These services should include, but are not limited to: a. Entry into club. b. Seating arrangements in the club. c. Service by waitresses, bartenders, entertainers, and employees. d. Dancing with military personnel. . . . The managers were advised that if discrimination continued to exist at any club, it would be placed 'Off-Limits' and be enforced." Memorandum by Maj. William R. Creech, EAGY (Eighth Army Garrison, Yongsan), April 26, 1971. Back.
Note 11: When reporting the work of the BCCUC to the Subcommittee, the ROK chairperson of the Subcommittee stated that, with regard to the problems of racial discrimination in camptowns, "increased educational efforts will be made [by the Korean side] to inform special entertainers and club owners on various aspects of these problems." Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972. Back.
Note 12: Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972. Back.
Note 13: Many USFK commands created or reinforced the work of the Equal Opportunity Officer, whose office was responsible for handling problems regarding racial discrimination and developing educational measures to eliminate racial tensions among U.S. troops. Some particularly conscientious heads of commands took initiatives to invite both black and white soldiers to speak their minds regarding race and offered direct mediation. At all ranks, there was substantial effort to train personnel to respect and cooperate with one another and to observe the provisions of the SOFA. To monitor the off-post behavior of soldiers, many installations created and/or reinforced "courtesy patrols" or "salt and pepper" teams (composed of one black and one white soldier per team). Separate from the military police, these patrol teams routinely frequented the clubs and bars in their particular camptown to check any potential problems or violence owing to racial discrimination (by Koreans or U.S. personnel). Back.
Note 14: One community relations officer who was familiar with the "coaster plan" told me that the original samples of the coasters (which bore pictures of women in nude or near-nude seductive poses like those of calendar pin-up models, with a few lines about equal service and antidiscrimination written on them) were eventually scrapped "because we [USFK officials] started noticing that the pictures were of Caucasian girls, not Asian." He implied that it would be inappropriate to use Caucasian models to represent Korean women but took no notice of the sexist portrayal of women, i.e., women looking like "sex kittens." Seoul, March 1992. Back.
Note 15: Dept. of the Army, Headquarters, 24th Psychological Operations Detach ment (A&S), Memorandum from Cpt. Stephen Sasfy to Col. Jack F. Belford (Commander, USAGY), Re: "24th PSYOP Itaewon Materials," July 28, 1971. Back.
Note 16: Dept. of the Army, Headquarters, USAGY (PROV), Memorandum from Col. Jack Belford to EUSA Chief of Staff, Re: "Itaewon," July 29, 1971. Back.
Note 17: Uijongbu, "Camp Village Purification Campaign," Report of 1973, January 30, 1973, pp. 3-4. Back.
Note 18: Pacific Stars and Stripes, August 11, 1971. Back.
Note 19: Pacific Stars and Stripes, November 25, 1971. Back.
Note 20: Pacific Stars and Stripes, January 7, 1972. Back.
Note 21: "PSYOP Campaign Control Sheet," p. 4. EUSA officials monitoring base-community relations also noted, "J5 believes the foregoing developing trends [camptown problems], if left unchecked, could develop into an explosive situation over a period of time, and could threaten the traditionally friendly relationships between Koreans and Americans unless appropriate countermeasures are taken in a timely fashion." "Disposition Form" from Cpt. Frank Romanick to EUSA Chief of Staff, Re: "Changing U.S. Forces Personnel-ROK Civilian Relations (U)," June 4, 1971. Individual heads of commands, here, Col. Best of Camp Humphreys, also articulated their belief that camptown problems, specifically racial unrest, are not isolated from the political and security interests of the ROK and the United States and that such problems "could result in adverse publicity on an international scale for both the Republic of Korea and the United States." Best expressed great frustration with camptown Korean's lack of understanding of the potentially geostrategic ramifications of their actions: "[Negative publicity] could provide significant propaganda material for the North Korean Communist Regime in particular, and the Communist conspiracy world-wide in general, while the officials in Pyong-Tae [sic] appear to take a shortsighted view of the immediate economic implications of local policies on their constituencies." Letter from Col. Best to Commanding General of KORSCOM (Korea Support Command), February 4, 1972. Back.
Note 22: Enclosure "d" of the PSYOP memorandum by Sasfy, entitled "Racial Problems in the ROK," October 1971. English version of the Jayu, article. Back.
Note 24: "PSYOPS Campaign Control Sheet," p. 6. Back.
Note 25: Psychological operations, or propaganda, was a consistent weapon in the military standoff between the DPRK and the U.S./ROK. A USFK PSYOP summary (dated Feb, 24, no year) of the North's propaganda activities between 1953-1972 states the following: "Besides the constant blare of loudspeakers and 'enlightened literature' extolling the virtues of Kim Il-sung directed at the nK [sic] people, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) carried on an active program against the ROK. To do so, it employed clandestine radio broadcasts, balloon-delivered leaflets . . . , infiltrations into ROK rear areas, and 'gray and black propaganda' (use of fictitious front organizations and false or misattributions). Additionally, both sides used signboards in the DMZ to encourage defection, and DMZ police engaged in face-to-face contacts, in which printed materials were sometimes exchanged." I obtained this document from the Psychological Operations Office of the EUSA at Yongsan in spring 1992. Back.
Note 26: PSYOP Memorandum by Sasfy. Back.
Note 27: Enclosure "B" of the PSYOP memorandum by Sasfy, addressed to "Female patrons [of clubs]," July 1971 (my translation from Korean). Back.
Note 28: Enclosure "A" of the PSYOP memorandum by Sasfy, July 1971. Back.
Note 29: The panel on Local Community and Governmental Relations recommended that "Owners or managers will . . . [b]e in complete control of their employees and any hostesses, or others who are frequenting the establishment for the purpose of deriving revenue from the patrons." "Seventh Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations," March 23, 1972, JC Minutes, #72, March 28, 1972, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 20. Back.
Note 30: Memorandum from Col. Jack Belford, Commander of USAGY, to EUSA Chief of Staff, July 28, 1971. Back.
Note 31: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 32: Interview, San Diego, Calif., October 28, 1991. Back.
Note 33: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 36: Included gonorrhea, syphilis, chancroid, lymphogranuloma venereum. The Acting Surgeon General of the Dept. of the Army, Maj. Gen. Spurgeon Neel, noted even higher rates for the 2d Division in the first half of 1972: 1100 cases/1000 men/year. Back.
Note 37: Memorandum by Maj. James Hathaway, Chief, Preventive Medicine Division of Eighth Army Medical Corps, Re: "VD in Korea," March 22, 1973. Back.
Note 38: U.S. Department of the Air Force, U.S. Air Force Hospital, Osan, Memo randum by Cpt. Rimas Liauba, Chief, Military Public Health, Re: "Venereal Disease Statistics," June 6, 1972. Back.
Note 39: U.S. Department of the Army, "Information Paper" by Col. R. T. Cutting, Re: "Evolution of DOD VD Policy," September 10, 1973. The Army practice of routinely listing names of VD patients to commanders ceased in 1954. Cable from Maj. Gen. Seitz to Lt. Gen. Larson, Re: "VD Control," September 27, 1972. Back.
Note 40: Cable from Gen. Michaelis to Gen. Palmer, (Assistant?) Chief of Staff of the Army, Re: "VD Control Activities," August 23, 1972. Back.
Note 41: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Memorandum by Maj. Gen. Verne Bowers, Re: "Venereal Disease Control Policy," January 19, 1973; DoA, Surgeon General, Cable to Commanding General, EUSA, Re: "VD Control Policy," August 11, 1972; DoA, "Fact Sheet" from Lt. Gen. Hal Jennings, Jr., M.D., Surgeon General, to Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Re: "The Surgeon General's VD Policy," August 1973. Back.
Note 42: Dept. of the Army, Surgeon General, Cable to Commanding General, EUSA, Re: "VD Control Policy," August 11, 1972. Also, the Surgeon General in 1973 reiterated that "the large prostitute population frequently surrounding military bases constitutes the primary reservoir of disease, and a most important factor in the continued high VD rates among U.S. servicemen. Identi fication of infected prostitutes is dependent upon a credible case contact program based on medical confidentiality [for the U.S. servicemen]." Surgeon Gen., H. Jennings, "Fact Sheet," Re: "The Surgeon General's VD Policy," August 1973. Back.
Note 43: Memorandum by Hathaway, Re: "VD in Korea," March 22, 1973. Back.
Note 44: The EUSA VD education measures in the summer of 1972 included "General Orientation Lectures on VD for Incoming EM [enlisted men], monthly refresher lectures in each unit. . . . [I]n addition, the 2D division program include[d] A. Orientation talks to all EM, pay grade E-6 and below, by . . . ass't comdrs [commanders] addressing dangers of VD in Korea. B. VD briefing at division reception center. C. Periodic briefing in unit training. D. Special briefings for officers and NCOS [noncommissioned officers]. E. Div PAO [Division Public Affairs Office] publishes articles on VD in div newspapers and VD bulletins for use down to company level." Cable from Gen. Michaelis to Gen. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff of the Army, Re: "Venereal Disease Rates-EUSA Korea," June 20, 1972; original, of course, in solid capitals. Back.
Note 45: Interview, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992. Interviewee noted that for reasons of national dignity, a name like "National VD Purification Movement" would have been inappropriate. Back.
Note 46: EUSA, J-5, "Health and Sanitation," 1972. Back.
Note 47: To demonstrate the urgency and serious intent of the U.S. military with regard to controlling VD, the U.S. component of the Subcommittee invited Col. Robert Sherwood from the Office of the DoA Surgeon General, Col. W. R. Warren, Chief Assistant to the EUSA Surgeon for Professional Services, and Maj. James Hathaway, Chief of Preventive Medicine Division of the EUSA Office of the Surgeon to the eleventh Subcommittee meeting. Subcommittee Minutes, #11, June 30, 1972. These individuals impressed upon the Korean component the need for Korean cooperation. Back.
Note 48: Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972, p. 6. example see note 3.6, Back.
Korea," March 22, 1
Note 49: Letter from Col. Best to Perditz, February 4, 1972; cable from Gen. Michaelis to Gen. Westmoreland, June 20, 1972; Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972; memorandum from Henry Essex, EUSA Medical Director, to EUSA Commanding General, October 10, 1972; letter from Chief of Staff of 2d Division to Com manding General of I Corps (ROK/U.S.) Group, June 26, 1972. Back.
Note 50: For example, report of the U.S. chairperson of the Subcommittee, Sub committee Minutes, #32, May 20, 1975. Back.
Note 51: Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972. Back.
Note 52: Subcommittee Minutes, #12, July 31, 1972. Back.
Note 53: The EUSA "Civil Affairs Handbook" of 1968 states that with regard to CRAC (Community Relations Advisory Council) meetings held jointly by local military officials and Korean camptown leaders, "there was a natural impatience . . . [on the American side] with a strong Korean reluctance to do anything constructive about the problems of most concern to the Americans, prostitution and venereal disease," (italics added). EUSA, Civil Affairs Handbook, #530-4, January 11, 1968, p. 68; also p. 64. Back.
Note 54: USFK Headquarters, "Problems in Civil-Military Relations in the ROK and the First Year of the Operation of the U.S.-ROK Joint Committee's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations," report attached to the letter of August 19, 1972 sent by Lt. Gen. Robert Smith, Chief of Staff of the USFK, to Ambassador Philip Habib, p. 4. Back.
Note 56: BCCUC, "Woegukkun kiji chubyon chônghwa chonghap taech'aek," Comprehensive Purification Policies for the Purification of Foreign Base Areas, July 1972. Back.
Note 57: For example, the VD Control Subcommittee of the KAFC of Uijongbu was very active in formulating and enforcing control policies. Back.
Note 58: The 1976 "Venereal Disease Control Directives" of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs states that the following persons were required to undergo examinations the following number of times: Prostitutes and "secret prostitutes": twice weekly; "[h]ostesses (dancers): once weekly; "[c]ateresses": once bi-weekly (p. 3). The 1977 "Directives for Venereal Disease Control" of the MoHSA required once weekly genital exams for "Business Girls"; every second week for "Dancers" and "Entertainers"; "[a]nytime necessary" for "Suspects of VD Reservoirs" (p. 7). Back.
Note 59: MoHSA, "Report of Ministry of Health and Social Affairs," Enclosure to Subcommittee Minutes, #14, September 29, 1972. Back.
Note 61: USFK, J-5 VD Files, "Epidemiological Control Measures (as recommended by the American Public Health Association)," undated but most likely 1972 or 1973. This document offered the following reasons for the failure of the 1969, 1971, and 1972 mass treatment programs: "limited coverage of programs did not preclude reeinfection [sic] of U.S. servicemen or Korean entertainers from areas not covered by program"; none of the programs included all prostitutes within the local area covered; U.S. servicemen were restricted to post only 2-3 days, shorter than the usual incubation period of 4-7 days. Back.
Note 62: Letter from Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Smith, Commander, 2d ID, to Commissioner Min Chong Kun of Yangju County, Uijongbu, January 7, 1971. Back.
Note 63: For example, prior to the November 1971 round-up and mass treatment, the mayor of Uijongbu notified the Commanding General of the U.S. I Corps (Group) of the control measure and requested that U.S. troops be confined to their installation compounds for the two days while "Korean prostitutes will be required to submit to the administration of doses of penicillin for VD control." "WHB," Chief of Staff Memo, "Subject: 'Ven Disease Prophylaxis,' " to Chief of Staff, UNC/USFK, November 19, 1971. A memorandum by Brig. Gen. N. J. Salisbury, Chief of Staff, EUSACI, to EUSA Chief of Staff ("ROK Program to Counter Venereal Disease," November 19, 1971) contained similar information and added, "It is expected that CG [Commanding General], Eighth U.S. Army will formally be requested by the ROK Minister of Defense to support this program on an Army-wide basis." Back.
Note 64: "Thirteenth Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (March 16, 1973), JC Minutes, #82, March 22, 1973, Enclosure 36. Back.
Note 66: USFK, "Disposition Form" from Cpt. Wallace Sharpe, ACofs, J-5, to Chief of Staff, UNC/USFK, Re: "ROK Government VD Program Under the 'Base Com munity Clean-Up Committee'," November 3, 1972. Back.
Note 68: Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972, pp. 4 and 7; Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Spurgeon Neel, M.D., Acting Surgeon General of the DoA, to Army Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Army, Re: "VD in Korea," July 11, 1972, p. 2. Back.
Note 69: A memorandum from the office of Cpt. Wallace Sharpe (J-5) addressed to the Chief of Staff, UN Command/USFK (Re: "ROK Government VD Program under the 'Base Community Clean-Up Committee,'" November 3, 1972, based on EUSA J-5's discussions with the MoHSA official in charge of the camptown VD programs, Blue House officials, and MOFA sources. Although Sharpe's memo urged the U.S. components of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee to "utilize every opportunity to encourage further appropriations for continuation of the program started by the ROKG during the latter half of 1972," it also acknowledged that the Korean government was demonstrating genuine effort and that delays in construction of planned facilities thus far was not necessarily slow. Back.
Note 70: Sherwood Report, July 7, 1972. Back.
Note 71: Subcommittee Minutes, #18, March 16, 1973. Earlier in 1972, the MoHSA representative to the Subcommittee, when asked by the EUSA Medical Director "what help can be offered," stated "that there is one immediate need for transportation of patients [prostitutes] to treatment facilities" as well as the "development of their [ROK's] bacterial culture capabilities for gonorrhea." Memorandum from Henry Essex, EUSA Medical Director, to EUSA Com manding General, Re: "Visit to Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in Regard to VD Program-4 October 1972," October 10, 1972. Back.
Note 72: Interview with the former Director of Chronic Diseases, MoHSA (1972), Seoul, May 14, 1992. He was also a member of the Subcommittee and supervised the VD control programs. Also, Subcommittee Minutes, #14, September 29, 1972. Back.
Note 73: The Thayer-Martin culture was the method of VD diagnosis preferred by the U.S. military for Korean prostitutes. The USFK pushed Korean health authorities at all levels of government to institute the T-M method; the first use of these culture plates in the examination of prostitutes began in June 1973. Report of Maj. James Hathaway, EUSA Chief of Preventive Medicine Division, Seventh Civil Affairs Conference, April 19, 1974. The EUSA Surgeon's Office supplied the T-M culture ingredients to MoHSA "to be made up in Korean laboratories and used in VD clinics." The USFK's 43d Surgical Hospital supplied T-M culture plates to local VD clinics in the summer of 1973. (Subcommittee Minutes, #27, May 3, 1974); Kwangju Air Base and the 4th Missile Command at Ch'unchon began supplying local VD clinics with similar plates in the winter of 1973; VD clinics near Camps Henry and Walker were given T-M cultures by the 543d General Dispensary. (The above, unless otherwise noted, are from Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974.) Back.
Note 74: In some cases, women were treated with 6.0 million units of procaine penicillin, but in general, 4.8 was the recommended dosage. Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 75: Subcommittee Minutes, #25, February 22, 1974. Back.
Note 76: Memorandum by Maj. Saalberg, EUSA G-1 Action Officer, Re: "Report on Venereal Disease," January 14, 1963. Back.
Note 80: Memorandum from Col. Frederick Outlaw, Inspector General, EUSA, to EUSA Chief of Staff, Re: "Observations Regarding Prostitution," March 18, 1964. Back.
Note 81: EUSA, J-5, VD Files, "VD Treatment of Korean Entertainers at U.S. Facilities," in "Epidemiological Control Measures (as Recommended by the American Public Health Association), 1972/73." This document states, "[US military] [t]reatment of Korean prostitutes could be misinterpreted as an indication of condoning or encouraging illicit sexual promiscuity." Back.
Note 82: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 4, 1992. Back.
Note 83: Korea Herald, June 10, 1971. Back.
Note 84: Interview with the former Director of Chronic Diseases, MoHSA (1972), Seoul, May 14, 1992. Back.
Note 85: Telephone interview with the first ROK chair of the Subcommittee Panel on Health and Sanitation, Seoul, June 15, 1992. He was a physician from the MoHSA. Back.
Note 86: Interview with the former Blue House Political Secretary in charge of the "Purification Movement," Seoul, June 11, 1992. Back.
Note 87: Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Uijongbu, June 12, 1992. Back.
Note 88: Interview with Kim Yonja, Songt'an City, May 3, 1992. Back.
Note 89: For example, the "excellent" relations between and the "successful" coordination and cooperation of Kunsan City officials and U.S. Kunsan Air Base officials is a case in point. The "Nineteenth Report" states: "There are 550 registered business girls and waitresses in Kunsan City and Silvertown, not including an unknown number of nonregistered business girls in the area. Registered business girls required two VD checks per week. Girls registered as waitresses in bars and in tea houses were also checked once each two weeks although Base officials were urging the City to conduct checks on waitresses, especially those in the tea houses, once a week. Cooperation between City and Base officials in obtaining detailed information about possible contacts, including photographs of the girls, was excellent with an average of some 80 percent positive contacts positively identified and treated during the past six months. Most problems resulted from incidents of VD contracted in contacts with nonregistered business girls on the streets. A 'Hot Sheet' on infected girls was maintained and data exchanged between Base and City authorities." "Nineteenth Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations," January 23, 1975, JC Minutes, #101, January 30, 1975, Enclosure 19. Back.
Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations
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