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Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations, by Katharine H.S. Moon
| We [Koreans] have come to know kijich'on as places cluttered with store signs written in English, bars that come to life in bright lights and wild music, overly made-up faces of women being fondled by drunken GIs, a place which is neither America nor Korea, a place where the state affairs and policies of both the United States and Korea meet face to face--such places we have come to call kijich'on. 1 |
The Camptown Clean-Up Campaign (or Purification Movement) of 1971-76 represents in a nutshell a convergence of high politics (U.S. security policy toward South Korea) and low politics (local civil-military relations between Korean residents and the U.S. military). It offers an in-depth look at how national governments, local people, and representatives of foreign governments create and adapt to political and economic opportunities fostered by foreign policy changes at the top. An analysis of the Campaign illustrates that Washington's revision of its Asia policy in the late 1960s directly generated social and economic dislocations in the kijich'on areas and triggered new assertions and configurations of power and interest regarding camptown life by both Koreans and Americans.
The Nixon Doctrine, which signaled U.S. disentanglement with land wars in Asia, serves as the backdrop to discussing the depth and breadth of camptown problems and the joint U.S.-Korean actions taken to address them through the Camptown Clean-Up Campaign. The Campaign was initiated by the U.S.-Korea Status of Forces (SOFA) Joint Committee (JC). 2 Apart from the organizational imperative of maintaining military discipline and morale, improving local civil-military relations became a crucial link to improving U.S.-ROK security relations (chapter 5).
From 1971 to 1976, the ROK government and the U.S. military in Korea (U.S. Forces, Korea or USFK) instituted many changes in the physical and social environments of the towns adjacent to U.S. military bases. At no time before and after these five years has there been such constant and intense effort on the part of the JC, the USFK leadership, various levels of the ROK government, and local residents to improve civil-military relations. To resolve the problems, the JC established the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (hereafter, Subcommittee) in September 1971, which in turn established seven panels to investigate specific problem areas and recommend action. Altogether, twenty-one Subcommittee reports, based on numerous field investigations, were presented to and approved by the JC during the five-year period.
The Nixon Doctrine and Troop Reduction
We have no intention of forever having troops in South Korea.
&nb sp; --William Rogers, U.S. Secretary of State, 1970 3
On July 24, 1969, President Richard Nixon, en route to Guam, told reporters that the United States would seek to reduce its military involvement in Asia and encourage the "Asianization" of conflicts on that continent. Originally called the "Guam Doctrine" and better known as the "Nixon Doctrine," this change of foreign policy was a result of U.S. public pressures to get out of Vietnam, the war's drain on the U.S. economy, the new president's intention to uphold his campaign promise to "withdraw honorably" from Southeast Asia, and the new administration's aspiration to meet the geopolitical challenges and opportunities generated by the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1960s. Throughout the early 1970s, the Nixon administration developed its strategy for a new relationship with Asian nations, based on the maintenance of U.S. security commitments to and increased burden-sharing by its Asian allies. Simply put, the Nixon Doctrine stated: "We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in other nations' affairs." 4
In practical terms, this meant the reduction and/or withdrawal of U.S. troops from Asian countries and future restraint in sending U.S. forces to Asia (based on "case-by-case" decision making). 5 And the United States continued its promise of including South Korea in its nuclear umbrella. By the end of 1971, U.S. forces in Korea had been cut by 20,000, second in size to the 265,000 withdrawn from Vietnam, followed by 16,000 from Thailand and 6,000 from the Philippines. 6 With respect to Korea, the 7th Infantry Division (ID), one of two divisions that had been in Korea since 1955, and three Air Force fighter squadrons were withdrawn from the full force of 64,000, leaving approximately 43,000 in the ROK. As part of its troop reduction and redeployment, the United States officially withdrew its men from the 155-mile demilitarized zone (DMZ) on March 10, 1971, which it had guarded since 1953, and transferred the responsibility (except for a small section in the Panmunjom truce area, which the United States continued to guard) to the ROK Army (ROKA).
Although the primary motivation was to disentangle the United States from Vietnam, the Nixon administration's public rationale for transferring the military burden was that many Asian nations had developed economically and politically enough to take on increased responsibilities for their security. Nixon praised South Korea's "graduated status" during his 1969 meeting with President Pak Chonghui in San Francisco, emphasizing that Koreans' economic achievements had reached "the point where they can look to the day where they will be able to stand on their own feet without outside aid." 7 During the Nixon Doctrine years, U.S. military and economic assistance, which in the 1954-1970 period had amounted to one-tenth of Korea's GNP, was cut dramatically. For example, total U.S. economic aid to Korea dropped from $928.7 million in 1961-65, to $546.7 million in 1966-1971, to $12.2 million in 1971-78. 8 Similarly, U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants to Korea declined from $291 million in 1971 to $94 million in 1974 to nothing in 1978. 9
But despite the leaps and bounds made in economic development in Korea by the late 1960s, the United States, particularly the military, stressed the need to modernize ROK forces if the U.S. troop reduction were not to upset the military balance on the peninsula. The USFK emphasized the strength of the North Korean military, particularly its advantage over the South's in air power. 10 Accordingly, the Nixon Doctrine, as applied to Korea, included $1.5 billion in military modernization assistance for a five-year period (1971-75). 11 Although neither the ROK nor the United States officially stated that the large sum was com pensation for the troop withdrawal, the modernization aid was without a doubt a means to soften the blow to Korea.
Initially, both the South Korean government and people expressed concern but not alarm over the Nixon Doctrine because since the Korean War, they had regarded their ties with the United States as a "special relationship," particularly since they had contributed 50,000 of their best troops to the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. 12 Korean officials originally assumed that their country would be exempted from Nixon's new Asia policy. Even three months before the U.S. ambassador officially notified the ROK government of the troop reduction plan, then Foreign Minister Ch'oe Kyuha stated in his testimony before the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee of the ROK National Assembly (December 2, 1969) that a U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea is "unthinkable" because the United States regards the Korean peninsula as a "special security area." He confidently asserted that he believed the United States would maintain its two divisions in Korea. 13 In his 1978 congressional testimony, Rinn-Sup Shinn, then a researcher at American University in Washington, D.C., also discussed the Korean government's view of the special relationship and attributed the Korean government's naivete and lack of political and diplomatic preparation for unfavorable changes in U.S. foreign policy to its "being steeped in the innocence of a dependency mentality." 14
But when U.S. Ambassador to Seoul William Porter announced the troop reduction to Pak on March 26, 1970 (National Security Decision Memorandum 48, calling for the reduction, was issued on March 20, 1970), the Korean government hit crisis mode in its relations with the United States and its security posture vis-à-vis the North. The general reaction was shock: The Korea Herald reported that the "20,000-man U.S. troop withdrawal was first regarded as a bolt from the blue sky," 15 and the Far Eastern Economic Review characterized the Seoul government's opposition to the withdrawal as "violent." 16 Defense Minister Chong Raehyok bought an advertisement opposing the troop cut in the Washington Post. 17 More dramatically, Prime Minister Chong Ilkwon threatened to resign with his entire Cabinet and to leave a portion of the DMZ unguarded if the United States actually executed its decision. He also threatened Porter that "if an attempt were made to fly the 7th Infantry Division out of Korea, he personally would lie down on the runway to keep the planes from taking off." 18
The psychological impact of the withdrawal announcement was greater than the reality of the numbers 19 because Koreans had come to view the large presence of U.S. ground forces as "more important than [the Mutual Defense] treaty language itself" 20 and feared that the withdrawal of one division was merely the beginning of the end of U.S. support for Korean security. All sectors of the Korean society--government, military, legislature, media, and the general public--opposed the U.S. cut as sudden, hasty, and provocative (of North Korean reaction). Even opposition members of the National Assembly joined the mass protest. 21 Koreans "expressed the fear that the new attitude in America really means that the United States will abandon Korea." 22
Seoul did have substantive grounds for doubting U.S. reliability because of its history of disappointment and frustration with what it considered to be inadequate U.S. responses to North Korean provocations in the late 1960s. First, President Pak was deeply upset by Washington's unwillingness to retaliate against the North's attempt on his life on January 21, 1968, in what is commonly known as the "Blue House Raid." Thirty-three heavily armed North Korean commandos had crossed the DMZ undetected in mid-January and had come within 1,000 feet of Pak's official residence, the Blue House, to attack the building and kill Pak. (U.S. Ambassador William Porter was the North Koreans' second target.) 23 Two days later, North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo in international waters near Wonsan, charging that the ship had illegally entered North Korean territorial waters and was involved in hostile activities against the North. Pueblo's 83 crew members were taken hostage. In reaction to these scare-tactics, Pak proposed that the United States and ROK jointly take decisive action, suggesting that the United States should launch air strikes against North Korean military installations. Pak also told Ambassador Porter that ROK troops could be in Pyongyang within two days. 24 But the United States took a low-risk approach, doing nothing about the Blue House Raid and conducting direct, bilateral negotiations secretly with the North Koreans for the release of the crew. This kind of U.S. caution greatly frustrated Seoul. Then in April 1969, the United States again decided against military retaliation for the North Korean downing of a U.S. EC-121 (unarmed reconnaissance) aircraft and its 31 crew members.
Once again, the South Koreans were disturbed by the emerging pattern of U.S. self-restraint, which they felt could only encourage North Korean belligerency. Seoul began to question seriously whether the United States, bogged down in the Vietnam War and undergoing an erosion in global influence, had the resolve to protect South Korea effectively in the event of an armed attack. 25
The Nixon Doctrine and the troop reduction occurred in the wake of such tensions in the alliance and in the midst of major geopolitical changes. First, plans to revert the control of Okinawa to Japan by 1972 were nearing completion. Although the Koreans ostensibly considered this a bilateral issue between Japan and the United States, they were nevertheless extremely nervous because they had regarded the purpose of U.S. bases in Okinawa as extended defense forces for Korean security. 26 Desperate not to lose U.S. military support in East Asia, Seoul had offered the United States its own soil, particularly Cheju Island, as a replacement base for U.S. forces in Okinawa and stated its willingness to house U.S. nuclear weapons. 27 Second, highly sensitive to U.S. policy toward South Vietnam, Seoul was severely dismayed to see U.S. military will and might dwindle in its Southeast Asian neighbor. In a congressional testimony, Ambassador Porter stated: "[Koreans] of course had noted the rising outcry in the United States about the Vietnam War. . . . They were afraid we were losing our fiber, that . . . our determination was being sapped by the media." 28
Third, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Nixon's sudden and secret undertaking of détente with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 and 1972, the ROK government expressed fear of being abandoned in a game of big power politics. In the words of A. Doak Barnett, "Nixon's announcement of his planned visit took the world by complete surprise and indicated to both allies and adversaries that fundamental changes in East Asian international relations were under way." 29 Relatedly, in 1971, the United States definitively supported China's entry into the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, in contrast to the wishes of Taiwan, who had been, like South Korea, a staunch U.S. ally against Communism. The ROK Foreign Ministry immediately called the announcement of Nixon's upcoming visit to the People's Republic of China "shocking." 30 Ambassador Porter later told Congress that the United States had given the Koreans "one hell of a jolt when we went into China without telling them." 31 The abandonment of Taiwan, by the United Nations and Japan (who normalized relations with the PRC) in 1972 reinforced the Koreans' fear of big power politics in East Asia.
Although Washington assured Seoul that the United States would not sacrifice the latter's interests in pursuit of better relations with the PRC, the Pak administration remained skeptical. The Koreans were particularly disturbed by the talk of "neutralization" (demilitarization) of the peninsula as a way to meet PRC demands for U.S. troops to leave the South. An editorial in the Korea Herald (August 15, 1971) voiced the Seoul government's anxieties and admonitions regarding U.S.-PRC rapprochement:
| If the United States should raise the question of Korea's neutralization in earnest, it would but be an apology for total desertion from the Korean scene. It will be the last thing we will find acceptable as a solution to the Korean problem. The only avenue to reducing tension and safeguarding the security of Korea will be to maintain a position of strength and superiority vis-à-vis the Communists. To conduct dialogue with them would be meaningless and hazardous unless we stand on such a position. . . . We are opposed to any move to utilize this country as a pawn in power politics in which our due voice and stake have little or no part. |
The 1971-72 period was also filled with ill-timed U.S. decisions and diplomatic faux-pas regarding bilateral issues, which in turn led Koreans to be confused and increasingly doubtful of U.S. commitments to the ROK. About a month before the joint U.S.-ROK announcement of U.S. force reductions (July 6, 1970), the United States moved to end economic grant assistance to Korea. In 1971, about a month before the full departure of the 7th ID from Korea, the Korea Herald (February 24, 1971) reported talk in Washington of terminating all U.S. aid-- economic and military--to Korea by 1976. Then in late October 1971, the U.S. Senate voted against the 1972 foreign aid package to Korea, causing strong protest by the Korean government and press. 32
Additionally, the United States sent mixed signals about its military intentions in Korea. Although the congressionally authorized U.S. troop ceiling in Korea was 43,000, U.S. military sources in Korea stated that "it [the ceiling] does not necessarily mean that the U.S. forces will maintain the full authorized manpower spaces after June 30 [1971]," the official deadline for the troop reduction. 33 More importantly, high-ranking Washington officials, on several occasions, mentioned a full withdrawal of U.S. forces by the mid-1970s, contradicting official statements that no such plans were in the works. For example, Vice President Spiro Agnew, after having talked with President Pak about U.S. commitments to the ROK in August 1970, "slipped" to reporters that all U.S. forces would be out of the country in five years. 34 Pak immediately demanded that the State Department clarify U.S. intentions. Moreover, the Koreans discovered after Agnew's visit that while the Vice President came to Korea ostensibly to coordinate, with the Koreans, plans for the troop cut and modernization aid, the United States had already begun sending its troops back home.
Less than a year later, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird stirred confusion and consternation among Koreans by stating in Congress (June 1971) his interpretation of the Nixon Doctrine as applied to Asia: "[T]o the extent possible we say military assistance, yes, but American ground forces, no." 35 He also "issued in August 1971 a Program Decision Memorandum to reduce the 2d Infantry Division [the only full division in Korea] to one brigade by the end of fiscal year 1974."( (36 ( Later in 1974, members of Congress recommended that the remaining 2d ID be moved south of Seoul and put in reserves in order to avoid automatic physical involvement in a possible war.) 37
The summer of 1971 was wrought with more U.S. statements that increased Seoul's insecurity. In early July, Major General Felix Rogers, the long-time senior delegate to the UN Korean Military Armistice Commission (KMAC), suggested that a Korean should take over as the senior KMAC delegate to the talks with the North. 38 Although the UN/USFK command officially commented that Rogers' statement "does not represent or imply any current or contemplated changes in the KMAC by the U.S. government," 39 Koreans interpreted the suggestion as a reflection of the U.S. trend to disengage itself from problems on the peninsula. 40 Adding fuel to fire, the United States urged Seoul in early July to reduce its armed forces by 125,000 "within the next five years so that," according to the Washington Post, " Seoul can assume increasing operation[al] military costs now covered by U.S. grants." 41 This prompted an immediate objection from the ROK Defense Ministry. Because Koreans voiced strong opposition to such a reduction at the 1971 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (annual meeting of the U.S. and ROK heads of Defense), the United States acceded to postponing discussion of the issue until the next SCM meeting. 42
Although foreign policy "shocks," bad timing, and conflicting words and actions emanating from U.S. officials, along with Seoul's traditional hypersensitivity to Washington's every word and deed regarding East Asian security, were greatly responsible for the above-mentioned problems, a difference in threat perception between the United States and ROK was the fundamental cause of the tensions in the early 1970s. The U.S. Ambassador to Korea from 1974 to 1978, Richard Sneider, admitted that the U.S.-ROK relationship suffered from a "lack of mutual perception" during congressional hearings on U.S.-Korea relations in the 1970s. 43 The United States underestimated Korean response to the troop cut, in particular, and the Seoul government's insecurity vis-à-vis the North, in general. For the Koreans, the news of the troop withdrawal reminded them of the U.S. pull-out in 1949, a year before the Communist invasion of the South. The Korea Herald, upon House Speaker Carl Albert's visit in August 1971, boldly asserted,
| W]e cannot but recall the bitter memory of the grave blunder both the United States and this republic committed shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War early in 1950. Resting assured on wishful thinking about the ever-aggressive and hostile nature of the North Korean warlords, the United States withdrew its occupation troops from Korea, leaving behind only a token force of military advisers. 44 |
Others likened Laird's congressional testimony in which he stated that the United States will avoid sending ground troops into Asian conflicts to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's 1950 speech omitting Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia. 45 Koreans feared that Laird's speech would serve as another green light for the North to invade. In the early 1970s, Korean officials and press emphatically reiterated Premier Paek Tujin's warning of March 1971 that the United States was underestimating the threat from the North. 46 President Pak himself also frequently commented that "foreign observers" who doubt that the Pyongyang regime would provoke a war in the 1970s "do not understand the fundamental nature of Kim Il-sung and his clique or what the Communists are aiming at." 47
Although the United States never dismissed North Korean military capability and threat, many of its top-ranking officials considered Seoul's fears as "exaggerated." 48 Even the USFK Commander, General John Michaelis, testified before Congress that although the North Korean threat "is felt in a very real way in the Republic of Korea today," North Koreans lack the ability to conduct prolonged conventional warfare without the aid of the Soviet Union and the PRC and is therefore most likely to continue unconventional military operations, 49 such as psychological warfare, infiltrations, and espionage. The Korean press was quick to note such opinions and disagree: The Taehan Ilbo noted: "[W]e think the north Korean Communists could invade directly into this republic when all the U.S. forces withdraw, while Ambassador Porter and Gen. Michaelis doubted any possibilities of . . . [such] invasion even after the withdrawal of U.S. forces." 50
Unable to control U.S. policy-making, the ROK government made all-out attempts at damage control and development of resources to influ ence its ally in the future. First, Seoul insisted on U.S. assurances, particularly the strengthening of the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty to allow the automatic involvement of U.S. military forces in case of armed conflict, in lieu of the stipulations requiring congressional consultation and consent. The United States never agreed to any kind of expansion of the original treaty. Second, the ROK insisted on receiving the $1.5 billion modernization aid prior to U.S. troop reductions, to which the U.S. never agreed. Reluctantly accepting the fact that the United States would pull out without fulfilling the aid promise, the ROK government persistently sought guarantees that Congress would appropriate the full amounts on time during the five-year period. No such promise was ever offered. By 1972, the United States already began to fall back on its word and by 1975 fulfilled only 69% of its military aid commitment. 51 The aid program took two years longer than the original date of 1975 to complete.
Yet, the ROK's military arsenal and preparedness improved significantly in quality and quantity through the $1.5 billion, leaving the South with better resources to match the North's. The modernization program included "F-4 Phantom aircraft, M-48 Patton tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, and Honest John surface-to-surface missiles," 52 as well as substantial upgrading of command and communications equipment. Besides the increases in military hardware, the modernization aid served to assuage Seoul of its anxiety about U.S. commitments and insecurity toward its Northern enemy.
Third, the ROK government launched a new phase in U.S.-ROK relations by opting for a more independent security stance and aggressive diplomacy. The Nixon shocks of the early 1970s motivated the Pak administration to increase its defense budget from the postwar ceiling of 4% and to develop its own military equipment and research. By 1976, the South was producing or coproducing patrol boats, tanks, and M-16 rifles, and by 1978 successfully testing its first surface-to-surface missiles. 53 Pak made numerous speeches calling for self-reliance in defense matters throughout 1971 and 1972, and initiated unprecedented, direct talks with the North for improved North-South relations.
Fourth, the Pak regime began pursuing unconventional means of diplomacy, namely influence-peddling through private agents, "people-to-people diplomacy," to compensate for its dearth of conventional carrots and sticks in its relations with the United States. This move later snowballed into the "Koreagate" scandal (chapter 5). The ROK government's attempt to lobby the U.S. Congress and public aimed first at pre venting further U.S. troop cuts; second, ensuring continued congressional approval of the military modernization assistance promised by the Nixon administration; third, quelling U.S. criticism of Pak's increasingly repressive form of rule in the 1970s; fourth, maintaining a powerful Korean presence among Washington's elite as a way to supplement conventional forms of diplomacy. It was this context of uncertainty and tension in the U.S.-ROK relationship that highlighted the urgency of U.S.-Korea camptown relations. The following pages link together the elite world of Washington and Seoul and the netherworld of kijich'on prostitution as the loci of adaptation to the Nixon Doctrine.
Base- Community Problems in the Early 1970s
Washington's systematic calculations of troop reduction in Korea generated into social, economic, and political disarray and tensions for Koreans and Americans in the kijich'on areas. With the reduction of U.S. forces by 20,000 (7th ID), military units were disbanded and reorganized, and the remaining troops were redeployed. The 2d Infantry Division (2d ID), whose home had been in the Munsan/Yongjugol region, moved to Tongduch'on to occupy the camps left behind by the 7th Division, while camptowns in that region were virtually shut down. Together with the flux of U.S. soldiers, Koreans helped reshape kijich'on commerce and social life. Club owners, prostitutes, and others moved away from areas being deserted by the troops to those where the troops were concentrated. Officials from both the U.S. military authorities and the ROK government agreed that
| [t]he drawdown of U.S. forces introduced new elements of tension into traditionally friendly relationships. Accompanying base closures and restationing of U.S. Forces resulted in widespread dislocations among Koreans living in villages adjacent to U.S. bases . . . and resulted in increased competition among bar owners, "business girls," and merchants. 54 |
(The above appears in capital letters in the original document.)
The withdrawal of U.S. troops caused economic havoc for the thousands of Korean nationals dependent on U.S. bases for jobs and income. The Korea Herald reported that by June 1971, 6,000 Koreans (out of a total of 32,000) employed at various U.S. installations were to be laid off.
55
Real estate prices in most camptown regions sank with the rise in
the Korean residents' insecurity about the future of the U.S. military presence in their towns.
56
The camptown businesses, in particular, were severely hit. According to one official of the Korea Special Tourist Association, 57 "[t]he withdrawal put over 100 clubs out of business. Many of these people just threw away [abandoned] their establishments and left the area because there was no one to sell them to." 58 Newspapers reported that "[b]ar owners who used to clear $200 to $300 a night now [following the withdrawal] eke out a living on $4 to $5." 59 Prostitutes also suffered economic losses and geographical dislocation. The village of Yongjugol, which in the summer of 1970 had "boasted a total of over 2,200 'entertainers' who catered to the needs and wants of about 18,000 soldiers from the 2nd Inf. Div. and other units in the area," marked a mere 200 women remaining in July 1971. 60 Hundreds moved to camptowns in Seoul (It'aewon), Osan, and Tongduch'on. "Others . . . quietly slipped back into their families and [went] to work as taxi drivers, beauty shop operators, or secretaries." 61 The Korean press reported that "[t]he business slump has hit the Korean girls catering to the GI's. They number about 5,000. Up until last September, their earnings averaged about W100,000 a month per person. In recent months, the figure dropped to W5,000 to W7,000." 62
During my interviews, U.S. military and ROK government officials who had been familiar with the withdrawal effects on camptowns emphasized the anger, frustration, and loss of trust that Korean residents felt toward U.S. servicemen. A Korean national who had worked in Community Relations for the USFK since the 1960s noted:
| With the withdrawal, camptown residents came to question the reliability of the U.S. Camptown and national public opinion was,"It's too soon to withdraw. . . ." [People] lost their livelihood, and there was no financial compensation from the U.S. side. . . . With the withdrawal, people felt loss and despair. 63 |
Local Koreans, who had long felt abused and mistreated by American economic superiority and arrogance, vented their fears and frustrations more violently than in the past. The Korean government official serving as an Assistant Secretary to the Joint Committee during this period had spoken with camptown residents to investigate racial problems. He summed up the Korean sentiment as follows:
| Simply put, the local Koreans felt like this: "Since you [U.S.] say you're leaving, we don't like you anymore." Until the late 1960s/early 1970s, the locals had trusted and depended on the U.S. So, even when the GI behaved badly and fought with Koreans, the locals put up with it because they knew they'd see the soldiers the next day [in their stores or bars]. But once the men who were to leave acted nasty in town, the locals became more resentful.,/font> 64 |
Aware of the connection between troop reduction/redeployment and camptown problems, the same official had requested that the U.S. military provide information in advance on future troop deployments in Korea, especially in those areas that were being expanded, such as P'yongt'aek (especially Camp Humphreys and Osan Air Base areas). 65 U.S. military officials in both Washington and Korea were aware that the withdrawal of 20,000 troops might have negative effects on community relations in general and discipline and morale of U.S. troops in particular. Senior U.S. officials in Washington noted that since nearly all of the front line duties were turned over to the Korean military for the first time, the "American troops no longer feel 'an immediate exposure' to the Communist fire, less 'motivation' for being in Korea which requires a greater amount of effort to provide servicemen with constructive programs so that they would not feel they are 'wasting 13 months of their life' in Korea for no 'visible and immediate' purpose." 66 The USFK noted similarly that "[t]he withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the DMZ probably has been a contributing factor toward a lessening of morale and esprit de corps among American troops in Korea, which in turn has tended to stimulate incidents in rear areas." 67
Base-community conflicts had long been brewing in the camptowns prior to the early 1970s. Fights among U.S. servicemen and between the soldiers and local Korean nationals were not uncommon. Camptown residents and USFK officials both had frequently complained about black-marketing and theft by both Koreans and U.S. military personnel. Koreans often accused U.S. soldiers for abusing their power with the locals, for example, for refusing to pay for taxi rides and prostitutes. Prior to 1970-71, base-community problems gained national attention when a Korean national was alleged to have been killed by a U.S. serviceman. The murder victims were more often than not young Korean prostitutes. Such problems were publicized by Korean newspapers, often as a reflection of the ROK government's dissatisfaction with U.S. actions/inactions 68 and as a reflection of local protest. 69 The U.S. military regularly scrutinized community relations issues and particularly their "play" in Korean papers and noted: "It is easily conceivable that the large number of assaults by U.S. personnel against Korean national females, no matter what provocation might have been given for these assaults, could be made into a major article condemning American brutality." 70
But for the most part, the Korean government and Koreans remained loyally pro-United States throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and most of the 1970s, and base-community problems, despite their constant presence and nuisance, were seen by both sides as a part of the U.S.-Korea relationship.
In the summer of 1971, base-community problems took a turn for the worse. Fights between black U.S. servicemen and white servicemen were frequent in 1971, as were fights between blacks and local Korean residents. Increasingly, the United States portrayed local Korean residents as instigators and culprits, rather than as victims of U.S. military abuses (which both U.S. and Korean reports had done prior to this summer). Investigations by the JC yielded the following explanations for the disturbances:
| Most such incidents take place in places of entertainment such as Korean night clubs in the near vicinity or entry/exit gates of the U.S. compounds, or in the alleys and pathways offering ingress and egress to and from the clubs. A careful review of such incidents reveals that a large number, if not a majority, of such clashes arise [sic] from feelings by black servicemen that they are being discriminated against in some respect by either white servicemen or by Korean service personnel working in the various Korean clubs. . . . More specifically, investigations reflect that black charges of discriminatory practices in Korean clubs relate to the performance of three functions by club proprietors and their managers and personnel. These are: 1) alleged or real discrimination against black servicemen in the service of food or beverages on club premises; 2) alleged or real discrimination by bona fide hostesses working in the clubs against black servicemen in their entertainment or dancing functions on club premises; and 3) alleged or real discrimination against black servicemen by club management in the selection of types of music played within the clubs. 71 |
The Psychological Operations unit of the Eighth Army (EUSA) made the following assessment of Korean culpability in the racial incidents:
| This [increased Korean] involvement [in racial confrontations] normally assumes three forms of progression. First, the Koreans aggravate racial problems [existing on post] by discriminatory practices. Second, they are often the injured party during black/white confrontations, suffering physical and/or property damage. Third, they demonstrate, often violently, against U.S. troops in general and against blacks in particular. . . . Discriminatory practices by the Koreans are usually of a passive nature rather than one of violence. In the clubs, such practices include poor service, unfriendliness, and sometimes refusal to even serve black soldiers. Among business girls, such practices take on two forms. Some of the business girls refuse to associate with blacks. Some also discriminate against Koreans who do associate with blacks and consider those Koreans to be of lower status than those who go only with white soldier[s]. Polarization has developed to the point that some girls are called 'black' because of their frequent association with blacks." 72 |
From the perspective of the black soldier, discrimination by local Koreans, in addition to the discrimination within his military unit, was like adding salt to an open wound. 73 Instead of serving as a source of rest, relaxation, and pleasure, bars and clubs offered the black soldier more tension and alienation. Black Americans complained that Korean clubs play rock and country music instead of soul music (preferred by blacks) to attract white patrons and that the few bars that were all-black bars were usually dirtier, smaller, and less pleasant than the white establishments. They also protested that the Korean owners of bars and clubs discriminated against their credit, that "white credit," but not "black credit," was accepted as payment for drinks and food. 74 Moreover, their money and, therefore, they themselves were sometimes rejected by Koreans. One black soldier stated aggrievedly: "I lost a brother and a cousin over here during the [Korean] war. . . . But the Koreans tell us they don't want us because we're black. I ask a girl to go to bed and she says no. My money is as green as anybody's." 75
Black soldiers' protest against discrimination was part of the Black Power movement taking place in the United States. As one soldier put it, "We're tired of discrimination. We're tired of it in the vil [camptown] and we're tired of it in the Army. We're not gonna take it anymore. We're gonna get what belongs to us. We're gonna get what the white dudes have taken away from us for years." 76 Such soldiers staged sit-ins and protests to celebrate the lives of Martin Luther King and Malcom X 77 and wore special black arm bands as a gesture of protest and solidarity with other blacks. Some of the most militant were also followers of Eldredge Cleaver. 78
From the perspective of the local Koreans, much of their discrimination against blacks was defensive, necessitated by the black-white polarization that existed among the ranks of U.S. military personnel. The Korean owner of a bar or club feared that welcoming black patrons would alienate the white patrons, who outnumbered and allegedly out-paid blacks. 79 Similarly, Korean prostitutes were also highly alert to racial divisions among U.S. soldiers. Prostitutes who associated with whites were considered "higher class" than those who slept with blacks, and it was common for the women to be socially and geographically segregated (in terms of bars and residence) according to the race of men they slept with. A woman who worked in white bars catered to white men and risked beatings by white soldiers and/or loss of business if she "entertained" or slept with a black man, just as a woman who slept with black men also risked retaliation from her black clients if she crossed the racial line.
U.S.-ROK documents, newspaper reports, and interviews with Americans and Koreans who lived or worked in the camptowns in the 1960s and 1970s indeed verify that many camptown Koreans, including the prostitutes, discriminated against black soldiers. There is no reliable scholarship that explains the sources and dynamics of Korean racism toward blacks, but it is commonly known among Koreans that they prefer lighter skin to darker skin even among fellow Koreans and other Asians. Abelmann and Lie do point out that "American racial ideology" is the primary source of Koreans' racism toward African- Americans, both in Korea and in the United States. 80 One Korean American immigrant they had interviewed offered, "I had the idea that blacks were dirty and aggressive from American films and from our experience with black soldiers. My very first day in America I was afraid to go outside because of the dangerous blacks." 81
Both Koreans and Americans familiar with kijich'on life also noted that Koreans had learned and imitated racist language and behavior toward blacks from the white soldiers in Korea since the mid-1940s. Indeed, some camptown Koreans protesting against racial violence in Anjongni in 1971 carried placards that echoed racial slurs and insults often used by racist Americans in the United States: "We Don't Need Any Niggers" and "Go Back to Cotton Field." White soldiers stationed in Korea during the early 1970s admitted that "Korean locals have been subjected to the attitudes of the white majority for so long that they practice discrimination without even being aware of what they're doing." 82 U.S. military personnel familiar with community relations issues admitted that racial problems in the camptowns were primarily a U.S. responsibility:
| [It is] undoubtedly true in many instances [that] club owners and the hostesses are discriminatory towards one group or the other. . . . However, it must be recognized that we have created this condition through patronage habits and individual or group behavior. . . . In many instances, vociferous groups have forced Korean clubs to cater to only a certain group and exclude all others. . . . Korean business establishments willingly try to correct those undesirable practices over which they have control but are in a dilemma when they try to correct a situation which is created and controlled by the patrons. Korean businessmen, hostesses, and residents have been drawn into the midst of the current turmoil. 83 |
The U.S. military was aware that Koreans, both the local camptown residents and government officials, could become resentful of black-white problems being unleashed on Korean soil. 84 Indeed, up to the early 1970s, Koreans saw the racial tensions in the camptowns as primarily, if not solely, an American problem. 85 For local camptown Koreans, racial problems among the U.S. troops simply translated into bad business.
Korea was not the only spot during this time period where racial tensions among U.S. soldiers flared. A report published in the U.S. Congressional Record " showed that provost marshals in Germany, Korea, Vietnam and other major military areas reported 'sharp' to 'alarming' increase in incidents of racial unrest." 86 A study on racial tensions among troops stationed in the Far East (conducted by the Pentagon's civil rights chief) noted extreme frustration felt by black servicemen. 87 The U.S. Air Force itself publicly endorsed a "sharply worded internal report alleging racial discrimination and slack leadership in its Air Training Command." 88 What makes Korea stand out is the severity of the spillover of such tensions from within U.S. camp gates to the larger kijich'on areas, the Koreans' persistent staging of violent protests, especially by prostitutes, against the spillover, the exacerbation of racial tensions by the troop reductions and redeployments of the 1970-71 period, and the USFK's concern that North Korea would take advantage of the tensions to decry the U.S. troop presence in the South.
Throughout 1971, racial tensions between black and white servicemen increased, spread through various camp areas in Korea, and exploded on the weekend of July 9, 1971, in the village of Anjongni in P'yongt'aek County, the site of Camp Humphreys. 89 The demographics of Anjongni at the time of the July racial riots was as follows: 4,759 Korean villagers, including an estimated 970 prostitutes; 1,700 U.S. military personnel at Camp Humphreys, including approximately 500 black servicemen. There were 12 local clubs that catered to U.S. military personnel.
According to newspaper accounts, Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) of the EUSA, and official U.S.-ROK joint investigations, 90 the violence began with 50 black soldiers who simultaneously entered five local camptown clubs (bars/nightclubs), ordered people to leave, and proceeded to demolish the establishments. The violence was purportedly an act of protest against those Korean clubs that discriminated against blacks. As the blacks went on their rampage, a mob of over 1,000 Korean nationals chased them, wielding sickles and throwing rocks in retaliation. Koreans sought out and beat up the alleged black perpetrators. Fights ensued between the blacks and the Koreans, calling forth 170 U.S. military police (MPs) and 80 Korean police personnel to control the violence with tear gas and gunshots into the air. The commander of the Camp, Colonel John C. McWhorter, placed the town indefinitely off limits to U.S. personnel at approximately 1 a.m., July 10. Throughout the weekend, thousands of Korean nationals gathered near the gates of Camp Humphreys to protest against black violence and the off-limits decree. Approximately 10 U.S. soldiers and more than 20 Koreans were reported to have been injured, and the Korean side reported property damage of 20 million won ($54,000 at 1971 rates).
The Camptown Clean- Up Campaign
Top levels of the ROK government and the USFK leadership learned of the severity of kijich'on problems through numerous channels. During the early 1970s, individual U.S. command officials, who regularly reported local community problems to their superiors, urgently requested the intervention of the high command and the Joint Committee to persuade the Korean side to cooperate on improving camptown life. The then U.S. Secretary of the Joint Committee, Robert Kinney, was instrumental in pressing both the then USFK Commander in Chief (CINC), John Michaelis, and the then U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib (1971-74) to exert pressure on the top levels of the ROK government to clean up camptowns. 91 He also urged Korean members of the Joint Committee to cooperate. All ranks of the U.S. military that were concerned with community relations agreed that camptown improvements were impossible without the cooperation and assistance of the ROK government in Seoul.
In addition, Washington put pressure on the Korean government. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) report stated that on August 31, 1971, Ambassador Habib submitted to the ROK Foreign Minister President Nixon's letter addressed to the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the consequent orders of the two Secretaries to overseas commands to eliminate racial problems. "U.S. Embassy personnel discussed these problems with the ROK Foreign Minister," 92 who responded that the ROK government would organize a new special joint committee to solve racial problems. 93
President Pak Chonghui and his Blue House staff 94 also learned of the USFK's urgency regarding the July camptown problems and its general dissatisfaction with community relations through the MoFA, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), 95 including the Korean National Police (KNP), top ROK Army brass, and the Korean press. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the office of the ROK representative to the Joint Committee (who was usually the Director of American Affairs in the MoFA and the official liaison between the U.S. military and the Korean government), reported the concerns and complaints of the U.S. military to the Blue House and the ministries and agencies concerned.
Interviews with ROK government officials who had been involved in the Clean-Up emphasized that more than the MOFA, it was Home Affairs 96 and a certain General Yi Chaejon who impressed upon President Pak the need to take action. According to the then Blue House official placed in charge of the kijich'on Clean-Up, General Yi, the then head of the Korean component of the ROK/U.S. I Corps Group in Uijongbu, directly addressed Pak about the severity of camptown problems and requested that Pak do something. 97 The U.S. military recorded that Pak, immediately following a visit to the I Corps Group headquarters in December 1971, "issued a call for establishment of a ROK 'Base Com-
munity Clean-Up Committee' (BCCUC) to develop a program of action to deal vigorously with the most urgent problems relating to the base communities." 98 In addition to these direct official channels to President Pak, Korean newspapers increasingly focused on the severity and intensity of base-community problems and the alleged abuse or mistreatment of Koreans by U.S. soldiers. 99 Unlike former times, camptown problems became too widely publicized within the Korean government and society and too polarized between Koreans and Americans to be ignored.
According to the former Blue House Secretary in charge of the Clean-Up, Pak was annoyed that these camptown problems had been left to fester and called the Minister of Home Affairs and other officials and "scolded them" for their negligence. He decided that leaving these mat ters to the relevant lower-level authorities was insufficient to solve the problems and that direct Blue House control was necessary. 100
On December 22, 1971, Pak first ordered the establishment of the BCCUC ("Purification Movement" in Korean) and the formulation of "purification policies" for U.S. military camp areas. Thus a high-grounded group of Korean officials--the Principal Political Secretary (ministerial level) to the President, a vice minister from each of the following ministries: Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Justice (MoJ), National Defense (MND), Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA), Transportation (MoT), Communication and Information (MoCI); the director of Customs Administration, the Political Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Deputy Vice Minister of the Economic Planning Board (EPB), the Governor of Kyonggi Province, and the President's Secretary for Home and Social Affairs--assembled for the first Purification meeting on December 27, 1971, which lasted four hours at the Blue House. 101 With the official establishment of the BCCUC on December 31, 1971, the Blue House Committee on that same day ordered each government ministry, province, county, and city/village to formulate its own "purification policy." In the following six months, the BCCUC conducted fact-finding investigations and pressured and coordinated each ministry, agency, province and city involved to act on the President's orders. In July 1972, President Pak approved the comprehensive BCCUC program, which required 1.15 billion won ($2.88 million in 1972 terms) in expenditure, 102 and directed the Committee to "expedite planning for a comprehensive ongoing program for the years 1973-1975 to complete the work started in the camp communities during 1972." 103
The U.S. side took its own initiative through its ongoing participation in the Joint Committee. "[W]ith the approval of the ROK Cabinet," 104 the JC established the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations on September 2, 1971, and delegated to it the
| responsibility to investigate and analyze the problems involving United States military personnel in Korea and Koreans living in the vicinity of or working in the United States military installations, and to make recommendations for necessary actions, both preventive and corrective, designed to eliminate conditions which will adversely affect Korean-American relations, and to promote mutual understanding and harmonious community relations between American servicemen and the Korean people. 105 |
Through the establishment of numerous panels to investigate and recommend action in specific areas of community life, both the U.S. and Korean components of the JC pushed forth an ambitious agenda to improve base-community relations. 106 Between September 1971 and August 1976, the Subcommittee conducted at least 35 fact-finding tours, covering at least 15 different base areas in Korea, and made at least 43 formal recommendations to the JC, all of which were immediately approved by the committee. The bulk of these activities took place during 1971 and 1972.
The work of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations and of the BCCUC were formally separate. However, by the nature of the problems and solutions involved, the work of the two was complementary. The U.S. military, through the auspices of the SOFA Subcommittee, mapped out the problem areas and specified desired ends (e.g., prevention of racial discrimination and reduction of VD rates among U.S. soldiers), and the Korean government put money and manpower to work through the BCCUC. The U.S. military aimed to improve the quality of life in camptowns for its personnel and thereby restore troop discipline and morale. The Korean government also had this concern, but as a means to improve the image of Korea in the eyes of the U.S. soldiers (chapter 5).
The SOFA Subcommittee's initial task was to reduce, if not eliminate, racial discrimination against black servicemen and racial violence in camptowns. Both U.S. and Korean members of the Subcommittee, through the recommendations of the Panel on Race Relations and Equal-
ity of Treatment, pressed local (Korean) government authorities, "in cooperation with the military representatives of . . . installation commanding officers, [to] encourage the proprietors and managers of Korean clubs . . . to train and direct service personnel . . . to perform duties in serving U.S. servicemen personnel food and beverages without discrimination as to the race of such patrons." 107
The Panel also recommended that local Korean authorities encourage owners and managers to "train and instruct bona fide hostesses working in such establishments to refrain from engaging in discriminatory practices directed against customers of any particular race in the performance on club premises of entertainment functions such as dancing or conversing with patrons." 108 Bars and clubs were also urged to play a "balanced selection of various types of music" and thereby not cater to the musical preferences of white servicemen while ignoring those of blacks. 109 These and other forms of discrimination, such as the display of club signs that were racially offensive or exclusionary, 110 were to be prohibited.
The Subcommittee found that general environmental clean-up and improvements were needed to improve human interactions in the camptowns. To this effect, it called for the widening of narrow roads and the installation of more streetlights, the removal of bars and clubs from hidden alleys to areas of greater access, 111 and the renovation of establishments frequented by U.S. personnel to be more accommodating and inviting. The Subcommittee's Panel on Health and Sanitation also called for attention to improved sanitation and hygiene in the clubs and among club personnel. 112 The Subcommittee also recommended measures to reduce black-marketing, theft, and other vices in the kijich'on areas.
The USFK dissatisfaction with the state of civil-military relations stimulated many joint USFK-ROK efforts at reducing venereal disease rates among U.S. troops and enforcing stringent VD checks on the camptown prostitutes. Venereal disease was one of the most frequently recurring issues in the work of the Joint Committee during the first half of the 1970s and the most difficult problem to control to U.S. liking. For the U.S. miltary, VD was a serious and urgent problem; it posed difficulties in military discipline, preparedness, finances, 113 and morale. The VD problem in Korea was considered so serious that the Pentagon sent a special investigator/consultant, Colonel Robert W. Sherwood, Chief of the Preventive Medicine Division from the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, to the U.S. Forces in Korea. Colonel Sherwood concluded that "[t]here is an uncontrolled major epidemic of venereal disease in U.S. Army personnel in Korea and an even greater uncontrolled epidemic of venereal disease in the Korean prostitutes. 114
He called for increased VD education among servicemen and "mass treatment and chemoprophylaxis for all registered prostitutes"
115
and emphasized that VD control "must be a coordinated effort with the other U.S. Military Forces and with the Republic of Korea"
116
(italics in the original). The Surgeon of the EUSA, Colonel Henry A. Essex, agreed with Sherwood's assessment
117
and pinpointed the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea (in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine) as a main cause of the increase in VD rates:
These and other reports by the U.S. military reiterated the shortcomings of existing Korean measures to regulate VD among Korean prostitutes. The then Acting Surgeon General of the Department of Army,
Major General Spurgeon Neel, recommended that in addition to traditional means of control, i.e., "extensive command health education," the U.S. military and Korean government "make an extensive effort to reduce the large number of unregistered prostitutes or to register and place them under control," to cooperate on laboratory research on VD, and (for the U.S. military) to push for adequate funding for such programs from the Korean government.
119
The U.S. component of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations articulated these concerns to the Korean members. The emphasis was on registering women, enforcing regular VD checks, and quarantining women infected with VD.
120
Prior to 1971, the Korean government had usually been embarrassed and uncomfortable about such issues; the U.S. military was aware that prostitution and venereal disease were touchy topics for the Korean government.
121
Sherwood observed in his report that
But with the Clean-Up efforts initiated by the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, Sherwood found Korean government officials not only accessible but willing to address openly issues of prostitution and VD:
Rather than shy away from addressing these unpleasant issues, the Korean government expended considerable amounts of energy and funds into "cleaning up" its women and reducing VD transmission to U.S. soldiers. The BCCUC's first item on its comprehensive Clean-Up agenda, as with MoFA and MoHSA, targeted the control of prostitution and venereal disease by enforcing regular medical examinations of prostitutes, improving VD clinic facilities, and detaining infected women at special centers.
124
The Ministry of Home Affairs put direct pressure on local-level officials to enforce health and sanitation standards in camptown bars and clubs. Officials of the ROK government reported to the Subcommittee that "the physical check of bar employees, most of whom are the [sic] registered business girls, are being conducted on a twice-a-week basis" and that education programs for club employees (on venereal disease and service conduct in clubs) are being conducted twice a year or more by provincial governments.
125
The ROK government allocated a total of 380 million won in 1971-72 (approximately $1 million in 1971 terms) to improve health and sanitation in camptowns, with 224 million won (approximately $600,000) earmarked for the prevention and treatment of VD.
126
In order to improve the quality of camptown facilities and social life, both the Korean and U.S. military authorities agreed on the necessity to improve channels of communication between each base command and local Korean officials and residents. The U.S. military had long complained of inadequate and ineffective local administration and law enforcement in camptowns and periodically had urged Seoul to take action against social disorder and administrative unaccountability.
127
After conducting joint field investigations, the Subcommittee found that the lack of coordination and dialogue between local Korean governmental officials and U.S. military authorities had been "exacerbated where there were no effective community relations [advisory] councils [CRACs] through which Korean and American authorities can consult and achieve agreement on necessary actions."
128
The Joint Committee then agreed to rename these councils as "Korean-American Friendship Councils" (KAFCs) and recommended that the ROK government and the USFK require both U.S. and Korean local authorities to establish such councils.
129
The ROK government promulgated regulations concerning the establishment and functions of KAFCs in June 1973, and by September
of that year, 68 councils had been formed.
130
Usually, the Korean component of the councils was composed of representatives of local shops and clubs/bars, local government officials (e.g., the mayor, county chief, health clinic director, information officer), the local police, the Korea Special Tourist Association, "respected village elders," and (sometimes) "Business Girls' Associations." The U.S. component was usually represented by the base commander (or deputy), provost marshal, medical officer, community relations officer, public affairs officer, and other relevant offices. Meetings were usually held once a month, and efforts were made to resolve "problems of mutual interest and concern" and promote "good-will between U.S. Armed Forces and the Korean civilian population."
131
Improvement in club service and facilities and "[g]uidance for VD carriers and entertainment girls" were prioritized as "matters of common interest."
132
In addition, the Korean National Police augmented its forces in numerous kijich'on areas and coordinated patrols with U.S. Military Police (MPs). The KAFCs and joint U.S.-ROK patrols were to apply and enforce Clean-Up policies formulated by the Joint Committee and the BCCUC. The U.S. military and the ROK government each used a combination of carrots and sticks to induce the cooperation of local camptown inhabitants. The U.S. authorities employed economic gain as the carrot and the off-limits decree as the stick. They repeatedly emphasized to local authorities, bar/club owners, and prostitutes that cooperation in the form of decreased racial discrimination against U.S. servicemen, compliance with sanitation standards, and stringent observance of VD examinations and "contact identification systems"
133
would ensure continued U.S. patronage. On the other hand, failure to cooperate meant placing individual camptown establishments and/or entire areas off limits to U.S. military personnel.
134
According to the U.S. military, "[t]hey [the Korean population] realize that the Garrison Commander carries a 'big stick,' i.e., he can place the club off limits, which would deprive them of revenue which they need to stay operational."
135
For Korean villagers dependent on U.S. patronage for income, the off-limits threat was credible. During the 48-day ban on Anjongni (July 10, 1971 to August 26, 1971), one businessman alone reported a loss of about 5 million won ($13,157),
136
and a candy-shop owner stated, "Every villager is now almost out of his mind. We are much worried about our living. Most of us depend on our daily earnings on GIs."
137
Several heated discussions between the Korean and American members of the Subcommittee took place on the issue of off-limits actions. The Sub-
committee's "Seventh Report" mentions that the Subcommittee intensely argued about lifting the ban on four back-alley clubs in Anjongni, with the Korean side pushing for such action and the U.S. side holding back.
138
In November 1972, the Acting ROK chairperson of the Subcommittee threatened to suspend Korean participation in Clean-Up activities if the U.S. side could not control the abuse of the off-limits power exercised by military commanders.
139
Despite local protests against off-limits actions
140
and the intervention of the Korean government on behalf of camptown authorities and residents, Korean shop owners and prostitutes generally had little choice but to comply with U.S. demands.
141
While trying to protect the interests of local businesses, the Korean government simultaneously used political patronage and authoritarian control to pressure local governments, police, and KSTAs to meet the interests of local U.S. commands. Because the Clean-Up order had been issued by President Pak and actively carried out by the upper ranks of the Home Affairs Ministry, low-level officials had little choice but to comply. As political appointees, each provincial governor, county (kun) chief and ward (ku) head were beholden to their superiors.
142
Moreover, the then JC Assistant Secretary for the Korean side noted that as the Subcom- mittee's Clean-Up efforts began producing positive results, "the local officials wanted to get in on the action for their own political usage. They began to run around getting involved in this work."
143
The local officials would in turn put pressure on local establishments and residents to cooperate with U.S. military authorities.
144
Regarding VD control, U.S. military and ROK government officials (former and current) commented that women were often forced to comply with regular check-ups and quarantines.
145
Although bar-owners and prostitutes generally resented the increased police and governmental control over their business activities, many camptown residents did welcome the central government's attention to "environmental beautification" because funds and other resources were made available for long-needed infrastructural improvements. From the perspective of U.S. and Korean officials responsible for overseeing camptown improvements, the Clean-Up Campaign yielded positive results. First, racial discrimination on the part of Korean camptown workers toward black U.S. servicemen significantly decreased together with racial violence.
146
Second, sanitation conditions, roads, and lighting in camptowns greatly improved. With consistent prodding from the U.S. military, the Korean government tightened its venereal disease control of women (chapters 4 and 6), while the U.S. military restructured its VD
contact identification systems and assisted the ROK government with medical supplies and expertise. Despite the initial resentment of some camptown residents toward the increased surveillance and control of their villages by two governmental authorities, many camptown Koreans, in the long run, benefited economically and politically from the Clean-Up. The Purification Movement provided developmental attention and assistance to these long-neglected shantytowns.
147
Some residents caught on quickly that the Clean-Up would help improve business by facilitating U.S. patronage and attracting "more legitimate businesses."
148
Politically, the Campaign's reinforcement (in some cases, creation) of Korean administrative accountability and suppression of lawlessness in camptowns served to de-emphasize the pariah image. Moreover, the establishment of Korean-American Friendship Councils helped empower villagers who had had little recourse for addressing grievances regard- ing U.S. military actions and GI behavior. One official of the Korea Special Tourist Association commented that U.S. Military Police (in Tongduch'on/Camp Casey), who had acted arrogantly in policing bars/clubs before 1971-72,
149
ceased to throw their weight around after the establishment and fortification of KAFCs in 1972: "Sometimes they [MPs] accompanied U.S. and Korean health officials [into the clubs] but weren't as abusive as before. I wonder if we had had the friendship associations functioning before 1972 whether such abuses on the part of the U.S. military could have happened."
150
The KAFCs and the imposition of Korean governmental authority in camptowns also helped prevent the rampant use of the off-limits decree by U.S. commanders.
151
By the middle of 1972, Subcommittee efforts at improving community relations generated changes in the USFK off-limits policy. The new directive emphasized consultation and cooperation with Korean owners of establishments, and when necessary, the use of the USFK chain of command as mediator with the appropriate offices of the Korean government.
152
Despite the gains, the social cost of these camptown improvements was increased authoritarian control and militarization of people's lives. The number of police personnel,
153
checkpoints, vehicles, and raids
154
increased in most camptowns,
155
and U.S. military patrol teams increased in number and kind to monitor the behavior of both U.S. personnel and Korean residents. Although increased policing was needed to control the excesses of camptown life, the Purification Movement reduced the amount of village space, especially that of camptown women, not subject to the surveillance of governmental and military authorities.
Note 1:
Migun kiji pandae chon'guk kongdong taech'aek (National Association Against U.S. Bases), Yangk'i ko hom (Yankee Go Home), p. 72. Back.
Note 2:
The Joint Committee, composed of a delegation from the U.S. military and U.S. Embassy in Korea and the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), was established in 1967 as the central and primary body responsible for managing USFK-ROK relations on a regular basis. The JC met monthly until 1980 and three or four times a year from 1980 on. The Minutes of the Joint Committee meetings state that they "are considered as official documents pertaining to both Govern ments." The complete volumes of the Minutes can be found in the U.S. Library of Congress. Back.
Note 3:
U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 62, February 9, 1970, p. 1598 (Interview on "Issues and Answers," ABC network, January 18, 1970). Back.
Note 4:
Public Papers of the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1970 (hereafter, Public Papers, of Nixon), p. 9. Back.
Note 5:
Public Papers, of Nixon, 1969, p. 552. Back.
Note 6:
U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 63, December 21, 1970, p. 1643, "Statement by Marshall Green, Asst. Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs," on U.S. National Security and Assistance to East Asia, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 30, 1970. Back.
Note 7:
Public Papers, of Nixon, 1969, p. 678 and p. 676 respectively. Back.
Note 8:
Un-chan Chung, "The Development of the South Korean Economy and the Role of the United States," p. 181. Back.
Note 9:
Joo-Hong Nam, America's Commitment to South Korea: The First Decade of the Nixon Doctrine, pp. 107 and 156. Back.
Note 10:
U.S. Senate, U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, p. 1560. Back.
Note 11:
Originally, both U.S. and ROK sides drew up lists of modernization needs. Korea's amounted to approximately $4 billion while that of the United States was between $1 to $1.5 billion. The final bill amounted to $1.5 billion. U.S. Senate, Korea and the Philippines: November 1972, p. 24. Back.
Note 12:
Victor D. Cha, "Alignment Despite Antagonism: Japan and Korea as Quasi-Allies," p. 104. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1994. Back.
Note 13:
Korea Herald, December 3, 1969. Back.
Note 14:
U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part V, pp. 3Ð4. Back.
Note 15:
Korea Herald, July 1, 1971. Back.
Note 16:
Far Eastern Economic Review, August 6, 1970, p. 18. Back.
Note 17:
Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship, p. 102; Il-Baek Kwang, Korea and the United States, p. 123. Back.
Note 18:
Robert Boettcher, Gifts of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park, and the Korean Scandal, p. 91. Back.
Note 19:
Korea Herald, January 1, 1971. Back.
Note 20:
U.S. Senate, Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 21. Back.
Note 21:
Commemoration Society for President Pak Chonghu,i and First Lady Yuk Yongsu, Kyôre ui chidoja ,(The Leader of a People), p. 281; Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea, p. 25. Back.
Note 22:
Korea Herald, January 31, 1971. Back.
Note 24:
U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, 1978, p. 37. Back.
Note 25:
Lee and Sato, p. 45. Back.
Note 26:
Interview with the former Assistant Secretary of SOFA Joint Committee (June 1970 to March 1973) and member of the Subcommittee, Seoul, May 25, 1992. He was a member of the following "panels" that had been established by the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations: Local Community and Govern mental Relations; Korean National Police-U.S. Military Police Cooperation and Coordination; Race Relations and Equality of Treatment; People-to-People Projects. Having conducted numerous field investigations and worked with U.S. counterparts on civil-military relations, this official is considered by his colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be an expert on community relations problems during the early 1970s. Also see "Public Comment" of President Pak printed in U.S. Senate, U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, p. 1663. U.S. bases on Okinawa were (and are) "the source for immediate support in case of difficulty" on the Korean peninsula. Statement of Gen. J. H. Michaelis, USFK Commander, in U.S. House, American-Korean Relations, p. 59. Back.
Note 27:
At the end of 1969, President Park had stated in a "Public Comment": "Our position is clear on [this] point. Regardless of what happens to Okinawa, we are willing to offer Cheju Island as a site for new U.S. bases. . . . [W]e value the power of deterrence, and would tolerate the introduction of nuclear weapons into our territory." U.S. Senate, U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, pp. 1662Ð1663. Back.
Note 28:
U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, p. 42. Back.
Note 29:
A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 196. Back.
Note 30:
Pacific Stars and Stripes, July 18, 1971. Back.
Note 31:
U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Affairs, Part IV, p. 66. Back.
Note 32:
Korea Herald, November 4, 1971 and November 7, 1971. Back.
Note 33:
Korea Herald, June 20, 1971. Back.
Note 34:
U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, p. 77. Back.
Note 35:
Korea Herald, October 6, 1971 and June 25, 1971. Back.
Note 36:
Lee and Sato, p. 103. Back.
Note 37:
Pacific Stars and Stripes, September 7, 1974. Back.
Note 38:
Korea Herald, July 6, 1971. Back.
Note 39:
Korea Herald, July 7, 1971. Back.
Note 40:
Ibid. (editorial by the Korean daily Chosôn Ilbo, reprinted in the Korea Herald,). Back.
Note 41:
Korea Herald, July 6, 1971. (a Washington Post, dispatch) Back.
Note 42:
Korea Herald, July 14, 1971. Back.
Note 43:
U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part V, p. 36. Back.
Note 44:
Korea Herald, August 11, 1971. Back.
Note 45:
Korea Herald, June 25, 1971. Back.
Note 46:
Korea Herald, March 9, 1971. Back.
Note 47:
Korea Herald, January 22, 1971 and July 13, 1971. Back.
Note 48:
U.S. Department of State cable, dated July 28, 1970, reprinted in U.S. House, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part IV, p. 75. Back.
Note 49:
U.S. House, American-Korean Relations, p. 41. Back.
Note 50:
Reprinted in Korea Herald, June 12, 1971. Back.
Note 51:
Norman Levin and Richard Sneider, "Korea in Postwar U.S. Security Policy," p. 49. Back.
Note 54:
Minutes of the SOFA Joint Committee Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, Meeting #11, June 30, 1972. From here on, these minutes will be referred to as Subcommittee Minutes, followed by the meeting number and date. Back.
Note 55:
Korea Herald, March 19, 1971. Back.
Note 56:
For example, "Kun [county] officials [of P'yôngt'aek County] said . . . that the price of land at P'aengsong-myon and Songt'aen-myon [Songt'an], which soared up to W27,000 per p'yong [Korean measurement of land space] has recently dropped by 10 to 50 per cent. . . . Some 200-odd realtors said that as many as 1,000 persons want to sell their houses, but that only about 5 per cent of them have been able to sell their property. About twenty-two entertainment joints in P'yongt'aek and Osan are about to close up due to the acute slump." From CA News Service, entitled "Feature: Slump Hits 'GI Town' Throughout Nation Amid Rumors of U.S. Troop Cut," July 10, 1970. From files on community relations in the Office of International Relations, EUSA, Seoul. Back.
Note 57:
The Korea Special Tourist Association (KSTA) is an arm of the Korean Ministry of Transportation (which also handles matters of tourism) which represents and oversees camptown businesses. Each camptown area generally has its own KSTA office. The bars and clubs catering to U.S. military personnel are specially licensed to serve tax-free alcohol. By regulation, no male Korean nationals are permitted to enter these establishments, and female Korean nationals, except those working in the clubs, are to be accompanied by a U.S. citizen, i.e., a GI. In practice, Korean-looking men are stopped from entering while Korean-looking women are allowed in even without U.S. male escorts. Some clubs in Seoul (It'aewon) permit male Korean nationals to enter the clubs with a U.S. citizen, but the club management generally resents the presence of Korean males in the establishment. Back.
Note 58:
Interview with an official of the KSTA, Seoul, May 26, 1992. He informed me that the KSTA Club Records of 1971 and 1972 reveal that 39 clubs in Pochon, 62 in Paju, and 27 in Pup'yong disappeared with the withdrawal of the 7th Division and the relocation of the 2d. The KSTA stated that all the decreases in the number of camptown clubs took place between 1970Ð71. Back.
Note 59:
Pacific Stars and Stripes, July 15, 1971. Back.
Note 62:
Feature: "Slump Hits 'GI Town' Throughout Nation Amid Rumors of U.S. Troop Cut." Back.
Note 63:
Interview, Seoul, May 19, 1992. Back.
Note 64:
Interview with the former Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73), Seoul, May 25, 1992; see note 26. Back.
Note 65:
Subcommittee Minutes, #8, March 20, 1972. Back.
Note 66:
Korea Herald, April 14, 1971. The article was copied from the A-K News Service, Washington, D.C. Back.
Note 67:
"Disposition Form: Changing U.S. Forces Personnel-ROK Civilian Relations (U)." Back.
Note 68:
Publications in Korea were heavily censored at the time. Given the ROK government's general reticence to publicize officially tensions in the U.S.-Korea relationship during the 1960s and early '70s, often the newspapers would voice complaint or protest against U.S. policies or actions in lieu of the Korean government. A 1971 USFK memorandum regarding community relations states: "Current attitudes of the ROK Government toward the U.S. Government in general, and the U.S. position vis-à-vis Korea specifically, are usually reflected in the Korean press handling of Korean-American relationships." "Disposition Form" sent by Capt. Frank Romanick, ACoffs, J-5, addressed to "Chief of Staff" regarding "Changing U.S. Forces Personnel-ROK Civilian Relations (U)," June 4, 1971. Frank Romanick later became the first U.S. chairperson of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations. Back.
Note 69:
For example, on August 7, 1968, Tonga Ilbo, "charged U.S. MP's [military police] at Bupyong with 'unlawfully confining people, searching houses and assaulting local residents' and cited various incidents of violence or mistreatment toward Koreans." Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) translation. Back.
Note 70:
Memorandum by John A. McReynolds, USFK, "Community Relations Advisory Council (CRAC), Bupyong (ASCOM)," November 1, 1968. Back.
Note 71:
U.S.-ROK SOFA (Status of Forces) Joint Committee Minutes, #69, Enclosure 2 of Enclosure 11 (December 16, 1971). From here on the Minutes will be referred to as JC Minutes, followed by the number, and date. Back.
Note 72:
Office of International Relations (IO), EUSA, Seoul, Korea, "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet," pp. 1Ð2. Back.
Note 73:
One black serviceman said in a newspaper interview: "It all starts back in the unit. . . . There is discrimination there. Then we come to the ville and the Koreans discriminate against us. I've been told by bar owners that they don't want blacks to patronize their places." Oversees Weekly, April 1971. Back.
Note 74:
One of the discriminatory practices often mentioned by black servicemen was the "chit and credit system," which Korean owners/managers of clubs allegedly offered to whites but not blacks. Some commands made the abolishment of the system a condition for lifting the off-limits ban imposed on uncooperative Korean establishments. Pacific Stars and Stripes, August 27, 1971. Back.
Note 75:
Overseas Weekly, April 1971. Back.
Note 76:
Pacific Stars and Stripes, October 24, 1971. Back.
Note 77:
Pacific Stars and Stripes, May 21, 1971. Back.
Note 78:
Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Seoul, April 6, 1992. Back.
Note 79:
An investigation by the EUSA Psychological Operations unit found that "Most bar owners are hostile to blacks because: a. Their talk, dress, and general behavior frightens [sic] them and sometimes their guests. b. They allegedly don't buy as many drinks as whites but sit at tables for long periods of time. c. Their loud talk and wild gestures may cause white customers to leave the bars. d. By now racial problems involving violence are well known by the club owners. e. The owners believe that whites who spend more money in their bars, [sic] don't favor blacks." From "Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet," p. 3. Back.
Note 80:
Nancy Abelmann and John Lie, Blue Dreams: Korean Americans and the Los Angeles Riots. Back.
Note 82:
Oversees Weekly, August 14, 1971. Back.
Note 83:
From the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, EUSA, "Civil-Military Affairs Newsletter 7Ð71" (July 1971), p. 1. Back.
Note 84:
Ibid. U.S. military officials monitoring civil-military relations noted the following: "The Racial Problem in Korea is undoubtedly drawing serious attention from Korean officials because of the social disruptions, property damage and injury to Korean citizens stemming from black-white confrontations in Korean communities. A natural reaction from Koreans is likely to be consternation that Americans (blacks and whites) are using Korean soil to vent their hostility toward each other." Back.
Note 85:
"Psychological Operations Campaign Control Sheet," p. 2. Back.
Note 86:
Quoted from Korea Herald, July 7, 1971. Back.
Note 87:
Korea Herald, August 14, 1971. Back.
Note 88:
The report criticized the following: "Unequal treatment is manifested in unequal punishment, offensive and inflammatory language, prejudice in the assignment of details, harassment by security policemen under order to break up five or more Blacks in a group (and) double standards in enforcement of regulations." From Korea Herald, September 29, 1971. Back.
Note 89:
From Korea Times, July 14, 1971. Camp Humphreys was (is) the home of the 23d Support Group of the Korea Support Command (KORSCOM). Back.
Note 90:
Pacific Stars and Stripes, July 11, 1971, July 14, 1971, July 16, 1971, August 18, 1971; Korea Herald, July 11, 1971; Korea Times, July 14, 1971; Overseas Weekly, August 14, 1971; Serious Incident Reports of the EUSA, Provost Marshal's Office (PMO) #7Ð51 (July 10, 1971); Letter by Col. Best (February 1972) addressed to Commanding General, EUSA. Back.
Note 91:
Interview with a USFK community relations officer, Seoul, April 18, 1992; interview with the ROK Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73), Seoul, May 25, 1992; see note 26. Back.
Note 92:
Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, USFK, "Problems in CivilÐMilitary Relations in the ROK and the First Year of the Operation of the U.S.-ROK Joint Committee's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Rela tions," 1972, p. 1. This report was attached to a letter written by Lt. Gen. Robert N. Smith, Chief of Staff, USFK and U.S. Representative to the Joint Committee, and sent to Philip C. Habib, U.S. Ambassador to the ROK (1971Ð74). Back.
Note 93:
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), "Civil-Military Relations Provisional Subcommittee Activities Report and Policies," January 7, 1972. Back.
Note 94:
The Blue House is the residence of the ROK president. In Korean, it is called ch'ôngwadae. Back.
Note 95:
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) oversees the civil service bureaucracy, the national police, and local governmental affairs. Back.
Note 96:
The ROK Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73) noted that news about camptown problems and the Clean-Up climbed up the hierarchy of the MoHA, from the village and county levels to the office of the provincial governors, to the highest ranks of the MoHA and finally to the Blue House. Interview, Seoul, May 25, 1992. Back.
Note 97:
Interview with the former Blue House Political Secretary in charge of overseeing the Purification Movement, Seoul, June 11, 1992. Back.
Note 98:
"Problems in CivilÐMilitary Relations in the ROK," p. 4 (see note 92). Although the Blue House Secretary did not state when Gen. Yi spoke about camptown matters to President Pak, it is most likely, given the actions Pak took immediately after the December 1971 visit, that the problems were mentioned then. Back.
Note 99:
The U.S. military observed that "Korean newspapers are carrying increasing numbers of reports of alleged G.I. misdemeanors and acts against the Korean people, in what are obviously pro-Korean and sometimes provocative accounts of the incidents." From "Disposition Form: Changing U.S. Forces Personnel-ROK Civilian Relations (U)." For a sampling of such Korean press reports, see "GI Violences [sic] Increase in Base Areas," TA News Service, June 2, 1971 (EUSA translation); "MPs Pistol-Whip Woman," Taehan Ilbo, June 21, 1971 (EUSA translation); "Dirty Cups, Racial Turmoil Lead to Leave Ban," Chosôn Ilbo, July 7, 1971 (EUSA translation). The racial violence in Anjongni in July 1971 was also covered widely by newspapers throughout Korea. Back.
Note 100:
Interview, Seoul, June 11, 1992. Back.
Note 101:
Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972. Back.
Note 102:
Subcommittee Minutes, #8, March 20, 1972. Back.
Note 103:
"Problems in Civil-Military Relations," p. 4 (see note 92). This document also notes that the 1972 expenditure included approximately 395 million won ($990,223) to be provided from the national budget and 675 million won ($1,692,153) from provincial and local budgets (p. 4). Back.
Note 105:
SOFA JC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations, "Memo randum Subject: Establishment of Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Civil-Military Rela tions," signed September 2, 1971; "Problems in Civil-Military Relations," p. 1. Back.
Note 106:
There was a separate panel for each of the following areas: Local Com munity and Governmental Relations; Korean National Police-U.S. Military Police Cooperation and Coordination; Health and Sanitation; Narcotics and Drug Control; Larceny and Black Marketing; Race Relations and Equality of Treatment; People-to-People Projects. From JC Minutes, #67, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 18, October 21, 1971. Back.
Note 107:
JC Minutes, #69, Enclosure 2 to Enclosure 11, December 16, 1971. Back.
Note 110:
JC Minutes, #70, January 28, 1972, Enclosure 3 to Enclosure 15. The USFK also recommended that bars post "sanitary inspection certificates" in prominent places and that they be kept current by frequent health inspectors' visits. EUSA, J-5 Fact Sheet on numbers of licensed entertainers and VD clinics, based on May 11, 1972, briefing by ROK MoHSA officials to J-5 representatives at MoHSA, entitled "Health and Sanitation," in International Relations Office Files, EUSA Headquarters. Back.
Note 111:
JC Minutes, #72, March 28, 1972, Enclosure 20. Back.
Note 112:
JC Minutes, #68, November 24, 1971, Enclosure 4 to Enclosure 15; JC Minutes, #70, January 28, 1972, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 15. Back.
Note 113:
The U.S. Air Force in Korea reported that with regard to venereal disease, the most direct problem besides personal health is the "manhours lost away from the job required in the treatment and follow-up work of these diseases." U.S. Air Force, Korea, "Venereal Disease Control: USAF Bases, Korea," May/June 1972. Back.
Note 114:
Col. Robert W. Sherwood, "Deposition Form-Trip Report to Eighth U.S. Army, Korea," July 7, 1972, p. 7. Back.
Note 117:
Col. Henry A. Essex, Surgeon, EUSA, Memorandum addressed to Chief of Staff (EUSA), "Report of Col. R. W. Sherwood on Venereal Disease in EUSA," July 20, 1972, p. 1. Back.
Note 118:
Surgeon, EUSA, cable to Surgeon General, Dept. of the Army, "VD Rate," June 15, 1972. A memorandum by John A. McReynolds, Civil Govern ment Officer, EUSA, to Capt. Frank Romanick, U.S. chairperson of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Relations (June 19, 1972), also underscores the troop reduction and consequent dispersion of U.S. forces and prostitutes as a major cause of the VD rate rise. He noted that "[p]rior to U.S. Forces drawdown last year, the reported number of VD cases per thousand per year was 350Ð400 (mostly gonorrhea)" and that "Following the drawdown and, as reported through 31 October 1971, the figure rose to 680-750." Back.
Note 119:
Maj. Gen. Spurgeon Neel, Acting Surgeon General, Dept. of the Army, DASG-HEP, "VD in Korea," memorandum to Army Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Army, re: Col. Sherwood's report, July 11, 1972. Back.
Note 120:
The Panel on Health and Sanitation urged vigilance on the part of bar owners/managers to assure that "Korean females permitted to roam or otherwise frequent the bars have legitimate connection with the bar and, as appropriate, possess required and current health certification." JC Minutes, #70, January 28, 1972, Enclosure 1 to Enclosure 15. It also recommended that Korean and U.S. Forces authorities charged with prevention and control of venereal disease intensify efforts to require VD carriers to undergo necessary treatment and to remove them from public circulation until such time as they are pronounced free from disease. JC Minutes, #68, November 24, 1971, Enclosure 3 to Enclosure 15. Back.
Note 121:
The EUSA J-5 "Fact Sheet" on numbers of licensed entertainers and VD clinics states that "[t]empers on both sides are easily roused on this subject, with many compound commanders tending to hold the Korean community responsible and community officials blaming U.S. personnel for promiscuity and failure to take basic sanitary precautions." Back.
Note 122:
Sherwood, "Deposition Form-Trip Report to Eighth U.S. Army, Korea," p. 4. Back.
Note 123:
Ibid., pp. 4Ð5. Back.
Note 124:
Base-Community Clean-Up Committee, "Woegukkun kiji chonghwa chonghap taech'aek" (Comprehensive Policy for the Purification of Foreign Troop Bases), July 1972, enclosed in Subcommittee Minutes, #12, July 31, 1972. Specifically, the ROK chair of the Subcommittee reported to the Subcommittee that "the ROK Government plans to open sixteen additional medical facilities to control VD at a cost of 82 million won ($205,565) during the rest of this year. In addition, VD checks will be intensified and a total of about 60 million won has been allocated for various medical control measures and treatment of VD in affected persons. In addition, the Government would augment the number of Korean doctors and nurses working on these problems by 100 and has budgeted 38 million won for this purpose." Subcommittee Minutes, #8, March 20, 1972; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Kijich'on chonghwa ru,l wihan woemubu sihaeng kyehoek" #1 (MoFA Plans for the Purification of Camptowns), enclosed in Subcommittee Minutes, #6, January 24, 1972; Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, VD Control Programs, enclosed in Subcommittee Minutes, #10 (submitted to MoFA upon MoFA's solicitation of information from relevant ministries to be reported to the 70th meeting of the SOFA Joint Committee). Back.
Note 125:
Subcommittee Minutes, #24, December 7, 1973. The report specified that 195 employees were trained in North Kyongsang Province, 805 in Kyonggi Province, and 463 in Seoul. These figures were offered to the Subcommittee as evidence of the progress the Korean government was making on camptown improvements. Back.
Note 126:
Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, USFK, "Problems in Civil-Military Relations in the ROK," p. 4. Back.
Note 127:
For example, see the statements of Lt. Gen. Robert J. Friedman (U.S. representative to the Joint Committee, 1968) in JC Minutes, #26, June 5, 1968, Enclosure 1. Back.
Note 128:
JC Minutes, #68, November 24, 1971, Enclosure 15. Back.
Note 130:
Subcommittee Minutes, #22, September 25, 1973. Back.
Note 131:
USFK, Headquarters, Policy Directive 5-3, "Civil Relations, Government Affairs: Korean-American Friendship Councils," September 7, 1973. Back.
Note 132:
ROK MoHA, "Working Rules for Regulations Concerning the Establish ment of Provincial ROK-U.S. Friendship Councils," 1973. Subcommittee Minutes, #33, April 9, 1976, Enclosure. Back.
Note 133:
See chapters 4 and 6. Back.
Note 134:
A good example of the use of the off-limits decree to coerce desired ends is that of the 2d Infantry Division (Tongduch'ôn) in November 1971. The commanding general of 2d ID indefinitely placed off limits the areas connecting Yongjugol, P'aju-ri, and Sonyu-ri beginning November 17, 1971, with the following justification: "The failure of Korean authorities and businessmen to control illegal, unsavory, or unhealthy activities in these areas requires such action. . . . The VD rate among prostitutes indicates a complete failure of police and health agencies to coordinate their efforts to effectively solve the problem." The commander demanded action on such problems plus the installation of street lights, the transfer of businesses catering to U.S. soldiers to main streets, and the cessation of drug sales to U.S. personnel as conditions for the lifting of the off-limits ban. Sub committee Minutes, #4, November 19, 1971, Enclosure. Back.
Note 135:
Col. Jack F. Belford, letter to Chief of Staff, EUSA, on camptown problems in It'aewon (Seoul), July 29, 1971. Back.
Note 136:
Pacific Stars and Stripes, August 28, 1971. Back.
Note 137:
Korea Times, July 14, 1971. Back.
Note 138:
"Seventh Report of the Subcommittee on Civil-Military Affairs," Subcommittee Minutes, #8, March 20, 1972. The Report states that an agreement was reached "after extensive negotiations." Back.
Note 139:
The ROK acting chairperson expressed "deep concern and regret over the unilateral actions taken by the 2d Division in placing off limits and in issuing press release on civil-military relations." He continued, "The spokesman allegedly insinuated the non-existence of the Government and administration in the territory of the Republic of Korea and the non-existence of ROK-US cooperation." He requested that off-limits in three towns in P'aju-kun be immediately lifted and that off-limits actions on Korean communities be suspended "while Ad Hoc Subcommittee is in activities." He then stated, "If these requests would not be met, the ROK component would consider suspending its activities because it defies raison d'etre of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee and usefulness of its role." At the same meeting, the U.S. chair of the Subcommittee expressed regret over this matter, apologized for the 2d ID's actions, and urged for continued joint cooperation. Subcommittee Minutes, #4, November 19, 1971. Back.
Note 140:
For example, Anjongni prostitutes and villagers (totaling approximately 3,600 people) protested at the gates of Camp Humphreys throughout July and early August against the command's refusal to lift the off-limits ban. Chungang Ilbo, July 29, 1971 (EUSA translation); Taehan Ilbo, August 10, 1971 (EUSA translation). Back.
Note 141:
For example, the commander of Camp Humphreys lifted the ban on Anjongni only after the villagers agreed to accept his five-point demand. Chungang Ilbo, July 26, 1971; Pacific Stars and Stripes, August 28, 1971. A Korean national who has served as a USFK community relations officer for about thirty years stated, "Off-limits was the ultimate leverage because it created critical injury to the owner. So, owners had to follow all the demands of the U.S. base command." Interview, Seoul, May 19, 1992. Back.
Note 142:
"As of 1967, local administration was under the direct control and supervision of the central government. The mayors of the Special City of Seoul and the Special City of Pusan, nine provincial governors, and heads of other local administration bodies [were] appointed by the central government. . . . County (gun,) chiefs [were] appointed by the President at the recommendation of the provincial governors. . . . Ward (ku,) chiefs [were] appointed by the President at the recommendation of the mayor of their respective cities." Department of Army, 8th Army Headquarters, Civil Affairs Handbook, #530Ð4, January 11, 1968, pp. 28Ð29. Back.
Note 143:
Interview with the ROK Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73), Seoul, May 25, 1992. Back.
Note 144:
Interview with a key initiator of the Clean-Up, Coscob, Conn., October 24, 1991. Back.
Note 145:
Interview with a USFK community relations officer, April 6, 1992. He stated, "There's no doubt that local community health officials and police were forcing girls to comply with VD checks. The women needed to be pushed." Also, interview with an official of the Korea Special Tourist Association, Seoul, May 26, 1992. Back.
Note 146:
For example, Col. G. D. Tate, Jr., Commander of the 4th Missile Command at Camp Page, reported at the March 15, 1972, Civil Affairs Confer ence: "Every club owner signed a pledge of 'equal treatment for all.' . . . Racial discrimination of any sort is minimal." "Report of Korean-American Civil Affairs Conference, Yongsan," March 15, 1972. Two years later, such progress continued in most base areas. For example, the Asst. Information Officer of the 314th Air Division at Osan Air Force Base (Songt'an) reported: "As regards discriminatory practices off-base, it appears that we have entered a more mature and encouraging phase. . . . During 1974 there has been no overt discrimination in the off-base clubs." "Eighth United States Forces Korea Civil Affairs Conference, December 6, 1974." Back.
Note 147:
One of the key initiators of the Clean-Up described the gains for local Koreans as follows: "Most of the camp areas were small villages before the Clean-Up and have since developed into thriving towns. The clean-up wasn't the only reason for their development-it was bigger than that-but the clean-up was the first time that the two governments got together and decided to do something about the areas." Interview, Coscob, Conn. October 24, 1991. Back.
Note 148:
Ibid. The interviewee commented that improved business conditions, along with improved base-community relations, attracted more non-American-oriented businesses to the camptowns, i.e., Korean dependency on U.S. military dollars gradually decreased. Back.
Note 149:
Specifically, he referred to MP harassment of club hostesses under the pretext of checking VD cards. MPs did not have the authority to conduct such searches. Interview, Seoul, May 26, 1992. Back.
Note 151:
Interview with the ROK Assistant Secretary of the JC (1970Ð73), Seoul, May 25, 1992; interview with a KSTA official, Seoul, May 26, 1992. Interviews with Korean officials revealed that in the eyes of Koreans, the U.S. military, prior to the Ad Hoc Subcommittee's Clean-Up efforts, used the off-limits power as an instrument of community relations instead of as a last resort for containing serious danger or threat to the well-being of its personnel. One official recounted that "the U.S. military roped off areas with MPs guarding them when they put places off limits." Similarly, a KSTA official stated, "In the 1960s and early '70s, the U.S. side would put up signs on clubs saying 'off-limits.' They would nail them on without our [Korean owners/managers] permission or input. And they would post a sign up at their gate indicating that such and such club was off-limits. They stopped doing that from the mid-70s on. They don't directly put the signs up themselves. Consultations take place." Frequent use of the off-limits decree amounted to a U.S. challenge and insult to Korean sovereignty. Back.
Note 152:
The Subcommittee Minutes (#10) of May 18, 1972, state the following: "USFK, in supporting the work of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee, revised its policy in the area of civilÐmilitary relations. . . . [The new policy directive on off-limits] requires local commanders to formally notify and to seek assistance from establishment owners and local government officials in correcting unsatisfactory conditions." It continues that when the problem cannot be resolved at the local level, the USFK Headquarters will go to the ROK national government for assistance: "In effect, each U.S. commander now has a channel to the central ROKG [government] when required." Back.
Note 153:
For example, from September 1, 1971 to mid-December 1971, the number of Korean National Police members in Tongduch'on, outside Camp Casey (Headquarters, 2d Division), increased by approximately 150%. Subcommittee Minutes, #5, December 14, 1971. Back.
Note 154:
Police raids of clubs and camptown women's homes, as well as spot searches of Korean women accompanying U.S. GIs, increased with the VD control efforts of the Korean government and the U.S. military. Subcommittee Minutes, #11, June 30, 1972; Pacific Stars and Stripes, September 4, 1971; USFK, J-5, Fifth United States Forces, Korea Civil Affairs Conference, March 2, 1973, Report of Col. D. W. Blanton, U.S. Air Force, Commander, 3d Combat Support Group, Kunsan. Back.
Note 155:
In addition to increased Military Police and Security Police patrols, various U.S. commands formed "Salt and Pepper Teams" and "Courtesy Patrols" to help monitor camptown interactions and activities. These teams were separate from the military police. Pacific Stars and Stripes, August 20, 1971 and July 28, 1972. Back.
Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations
[T]he drawdown of troop strength in 1971 resulted in movement of prostitutes to other areas of troop concentration. Many of these prostitutes did not re-register, as required by the ROK government, in the new area. This substantially higher number of virtually uncontrolled prostitutes is considered a basic cause of the increased VD rate.
118
[P]rostitution is against the law [in Korea] and it is difficult for the Ministry of Health to justify a request for funds to control venereal disease in prostitutes. . . . Prostitution and the resulting high venereal disease rates in U.S. military personnel (and probably other foreigners) is a source of embarrassment to the ROK, its Tourist Service and its Ministry of Health.
122
The Koreans did not attempt to minimize the problem. They provided statistics that indicated a very high prevalence of venereal disease in prostitutes. Their statistics reveal a probable venereal disease prevalence of about 50% in prostitutes. . . . Also they indicated their concern about the inadequacy of their diagnostic facilities, laboratory procedures and training of laboratory personnel. They acknowledged that the clinics which collected cervical specimens, stained and examined them for gonorrhea were inadequately paid. . . . Finally they acknowledged that they had little control over the quality of services provided, especially in the private clinics. Most venereal disease clinics are privately operated. (It was reported from other sources that often in private clinics for a small payment by the prostitute an examination will not be done and the health card stamped free of disease.) The unfavorable situation has been described by the Ministry of Health in a com
prehensive study sent to the "Blue House." (It was not possible to get a copy of the report. It was said to be "classified.")
123
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