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## Notes

All translations from foreign-language sources are mine.

### *Introduction: Finding Empire*

1. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), for a philosophically grounded discussion of empire in the age of globalization.
2. S. N. Eisenstadt, introduction to S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *The Decline of Empires* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 4.
3. A few examples will convey the richness of the extant historical literature: Warren Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); John Strachey, *The End of Empire* (New York: Praeger, 1959); René Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (New York: Pantheon, 1987); Robert Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Franz Ansprenger, *The Dissolution of the Colonial Empires* (London: Routledge, 1989); A. B. Bosworth, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: Continental America, 1800–1867*, vol. 2 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993); David Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750–1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); D. K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire, 1830–1914* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University

- Press, 1973). And of course Edward Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York: Viking, 1952).
4. See Geoffrey W. Conrad and Arthur A. Demarest, *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Joseph Tainter, *The Collapse of Complex Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, eds., *The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988); Norman Hammond, *Ancient Maya Civilization* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1988).
  5. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); George Lichtheim, *Imperialism* (New York: Praeger, 1971); David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organization* 50 (winter 1996): 1–33; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* (New York: Random House, 1980); Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Alexander Cooley, "Explaining Imperial Persistence and Decline: Contemporary Dependencies, Asset Specificity, and Global Economic Change," paper presented at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, September 3–6, 1998, Boston; Mark N. Katz, "The Legacy of Empire in International Relations," *Comparative Strategy* 12 (1993): 365–83.
  6. Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); S. N. Eisenstadt, "Center-Periphery Relations in the Soviet Empire," in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR*, pp. 205–21 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1997); Alexander Demandt, ed., *Das Ende der Weltreiche: Von den Persen bis zur Sowjetunion* (Munich: Beck, 1997); Richard Lorenz, ed., *Das Verdämmern der Macht: Vom Untergang grosser Reiche* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000); Robert A. Kann, *The Habsburg Empire: A Study in Integration and Disintegration* (New York: Praeger, 1957); Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., *The Economic Decline of Empires* (London: Methuen, 1970); Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, *Rise and Demise: Comparing World Systems* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997); Robert Wesson, *The Imperial Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation Building* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997); Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon, 1960); S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (Glencoe, N.Y.: Free Press, 1963); John H. Kautsky, *The Politics of Aristocratic*

- Empires* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); S. E. Finer, *The History of Government*, vols. 1–3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
7. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage, 1987); Geir Lundestad, *The American "Empire"* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1990); Imanuel Geiss, "Great Powers and Empires: Historical Mechanisms of Their Making and Breaking," in Geir Lundestad, ed., *The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy*, pp. 23–46 (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994).
  8. See Richard Koebner, *Empire* (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1965), pp. 1–60.
  9. For exceptions to this rule, see Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, "Hierarchy Under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State," *International Organization* 49 (autumn 1995): 689–721; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," *International Organization* 48 (spring 1994): 215–47; Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
  10. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *Politics: Authority, Identities, and Change* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996).
  11. Leonard Binder et al., eds., *Crises and Sequences of Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). See also Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 55 (September 1961): 493–514; Edward A. Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962). For a critique, see Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985).
  12. The transitions literature is enormous and growing. See in particular Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Mary Ellen Fischer, ed., *Establishing Democracies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996); Lisa Anderson, ed., *Transitions to Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). For a good review of the literature, see Georg Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993).
  13. See Robert Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf Jr., eds., *The Future of the Soviet Empire* (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); David J. Dallin, *The New Soviet Empire* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1951).

14. Ariel Cohen, *Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), pp. 151–52; Alexander J. Motyl, “The End of Sovietology: From Soviet Studies to Post-Soviet Studies,” in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR*, pp. 302–14 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Giovanni Sartori, “Totalitarianism, Model Mania, and Learning from Error,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 5 (1993): 5–22; Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
15. See V. I. Lenin, “Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism,” *Selected Works in One Volume*, pp. 169–263 (New York: International Publishers, 1971); J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1905); Rudolf Hilferding, *Das Finanzkapital* (Vienna: Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1910). See also Winfried Baumgart, *Imperialism: The Idea and Reality of British and French Colonial Expansion, 1880–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); V. G. Kiernan, *Imperialism and Its Contradictions* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire*, pp. 38–62.
16. Jeremy Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978); Seweryn Bialer, “How Russians Rule Russia,” *Problems of Communism* 15 (September–October 1964): 45–52; “Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR: Special Issue,” *Problems of Communism* 16 (September–October 1967); Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR* (New York: Free Press, 1990); Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991); Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Alexander J. Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980); Alexander J. Motyl, “‘Sovietology in One Country’ or Comparative Nationality Studies?” *Slavic Review* 48 (spring 1989): 83–88; Motyl, *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities*; Edward Allworth, ed., *Soviet Nationality Problems* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (London: Croom Helm, 1983); Michael Rywkin, *Moscow’s Muslim Challenge* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1982); S. Enders Wimbush, ed., *Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
17. Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979). See also Marco Buttino, ed., *In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts, and Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1993); Alvin Gouldner, “Stalinism: A Study in Internal Colonialism,” *Telos* 10 (winter 1977–78): 5–48.

18. See Charles F. Furtado Jr. and Andrea Chandler, eds., *Perestroika in the Soviet Republics: Documents on the National Question* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992). Some Soviet analysts were also involved in relegitimizing the concept of totalitarianism. See Georgii Arbatov and E. Batalov, "Politicheskaia reforma: evoliutsiia sovetskogo gosudarstva," *Kommunist* (March 1989): 35–46; Valerii Tishkov, "Narody i gosudarstvo," *Kommunist* (January 1989): 49–59; A. A. Kara-Murza and A. K. Voskresenskii, eds., *Totalitarizm kak istoricheskii fenomen* (Moscow: Filosofskoe obshchestvo SSSR, 1989).
19. Valerie Bunce used imperial terminology several years before the USSR's collapse. See Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability," *International Organization* 39 (winter 1985): 1–46.
20. Mark Beissinger, "The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 11 (1995): 149–57.
21. See Alexander J. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 1–15.
22. Giovanni Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," in Giovanni Sartori, ed., *Social Science Concepts*, pp. 15–85 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1984); Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, pp. 8–15.
23. Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: Modern Library, 1932). See also Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Weathervane, 1972); H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890–1930* (New York: Vintage, 1958); Pieter Geyl, *Debates with Historians* (New York: Meridian, 1971), pp. 150–64.
24. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" in Fareed Zakaria, ed., *The New Shape of World Politics*, pp. 1–27 (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1997).
25. Hughes, *Consciousness and Society*; Robert M. Adams, *Decadent Societies* (San Francisco, Calif.: North Point, 1983); Brooks Adams, *The Law of Civilization and Decay* (New York: Knopf, 1943).
26. See Theo Sommer, "Europa im Aufbruch," *Die Zeit*, January 5, 2000, p. 4; Bill Emmott, "The Twentieth Century," *Economist*, September 11, 1999, pp. 5–44. See especially Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), and Dan Smith, ed., *The State of War and Peace Atlas*, rev. 3d ed. (London: Penguin, 1997).
27. See John Barrow, *Theories of Everything: The Quest for Ultimate Explanation* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1991); Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, pp. 9–11.
28. See Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, *The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 1989); Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, pp. 132–33.

29. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8 (1971): 81–117.
30. Karl Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader*, pp. 497–508 (New York: Free Press, 1963).
31. Rein Taagepera, "Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 475–504; Taagepera, "Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 B.C. to 600 A.D.," *Social Science History* 3 (October 1979): 115–38; Taagepera, "Size and Duration of Empires: Systematics of Size," *Social Science Research* 7 (1978): 108–27; Taagepera, "Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 3000 to 600 B.C.," *Social Science Research* 7 (1978): 180–96.
32. That imperial trajectories also resemble the trajectories of great powers is not surprising: after all, empires *are* great powers. This resemblance permits us to treat the former as a species of the latter. But it does not compel us to do so any more than the similarity between empires and federations or between political empires and business empires forces us to pay it exclusive theoretical attention. We can just as easily, and legitimately, treat empires as entities unto themselves and attempt to understand them on their own terms.
33. On algorithmic compressibility see Barrow, *Theories of Everything*, pp. 14–20.
34. James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991): 169–95.
35. Nelson Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). See also Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
36. See Carl Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science* (New York: Free Press, 1965); Ernst Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, 2d ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1977).
37. On intervening variables see Robert Audi, ed., *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 382.
38. Alexander J. Motyl, "Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 31 (January 1999): 127–45.
39. Alexander J. Motyl, "After Empire: Competing Discourses and Interstate Conflict in Postimperial Eastern Europe," in Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building*, pp. 14–33 (London: Routledge, 1998); Motyl, "Imperial Collapse and Revolutionary Change: Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia, and the Soviet Empire," in Jürgen Nautz and Richard Vahrenkamp, eds., *Die Wiener Jahrhundertwende*, pp. 813–32 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993); Motyl, "From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The Fall

- of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective,” in Richard Rudolph and David Good, eds., *Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union*, pp. 15–43 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991).
40. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, pp. 11–18.
  41. See Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 64 (December 1970): 1033–53; Sartori, “Comparing and Miscomparing,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3 (1991): 243–57.
  42. See “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium,” *World Politics* 48 (October 1995): 1–49; Thomas A. Spragens Jr., *The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory* (New York: Dunellen, 1973); Douglas Chalmers, “Interpretive Frameworks: A Structure of Theory in Political Science,” unpublished paper, 1987.
  43. See, for instance, Ian S. Lustick’s devastating critique of the work of Arend Lijphart: “Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism,” *World Politics* 50 (October 1997): 88–117.

### 1. Imperial Beginnings

1. Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” *Journal of Peace Research* 8 (1971): 8.
2. Ibid., pp. 82–83.
3. Ibid., p. 85.
4. Alexander J. Motyl, “Thinking About Empire,” in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation Building*, pp. 19–29 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997). Michael Doyle disagrees with this argument. See *Empires* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 34.
5. Galtung, “Structural Theory of Imperialism,” pp. 83, 89.
6. The presence of culturally distinct populations, the non-natives and natives, does not preclude ethnic, cultural, or religious diversity. For a discussion of ethnic diversity of the Ottoman core, see Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 1983). On culturally distinct populations see Donald J. Puchala, “International Encounters of Another Kind,” *Global Society* 11 (1997): 5–29; Rushton Coulborn, “Structure and Process in the Rise and Fall of Civilized Societies,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 8 (1965–1966): 404–31.
7. Alexander J. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 118–

22. See also Jean Gottmann, ed., *Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variation in Politics* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980).
8. D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: Atlantic America, 1492–1800*, vol. 1 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 370. See also Geoffrey Parker, *The Geopolitics of Domination* (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 66–75.
9. Gary B. Miles, “Roman and Modern Imperialism: A Reassessment,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32 (October 1990): 641.
10. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); John A. Armstrong, “Administrative Elites in Multiethnic Polities,” *International Political Science Review* 1 (1980): 107–28. See also John A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973).
11. Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 12, 15. See also Michael Ursinus, “Byzanz, Osmanisches Reich, türkischer Nationalstaat: Zur Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs,” in Richard Lorenz, ed., *Das Verdämmern der Macht: Vom Untergang grosser Reiche* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000), p. 153.
12. See Cho-yun Hsu, “The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han Dynasty,” in Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, eds., *The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations*, pp. 176–95 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988).
13. See Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class* (New York: Doubleday, 1984); Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).
14. Bruce Parrott, “Analyzing the Transformation of the Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1997), p. 7.
15. Galtung, “Structural Theory of Imperialism,” p. 89.
16. Gerhard Masur, *Simon Bolivar* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1948), p. 678, is quoted in Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 54. See also Hans-Joachim König, “Der Zerfall des Spanischen Weltreichs in Amerika: Ursachen und Folgen,” in Lorenz, *Das Verdämmern der Macht*, p. 133.
17. Meinig, *Shaping of America*, vol. 1, p. 378.



18. On vagueness as a philosophical problem see Linda C. Burns, *Vagueness: An Investigation into Natural Language and the Sorites Paradox* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1991).
19. On resources see H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 80–81; Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1975).
20. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Weathervane, 1972), p. 288.
21. Some of these transportation networks are discussed and/or illustrated in Richard J. A. Talbert, ed., *Atlas of Classical History* (London: Routledge, 1985), pp. 51–53, 124–27; Martin Gilbert, *Soviet History Atlas* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 35–36; Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of East-Central Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), pp. 90–92; John Haywood, *Atlas of World History* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1997). See also Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 275–77; Meinig, *Shaping of America*, vol. 1, pp. 65–76.
22. On totalitarianism see Alexander J. Motyl, “The End of Sovietology: From Soviet Studies to Post-Soviet Studies,” in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR*, pp. 302–14 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).
23. David A. Lake, “The Rise, Fall, and Future of the Russian Empire,” in Dawisha and Parrott, *The End of Empire?* p. 35.
24. On the differences between hegemonic, formal, and informal types of rule, see Doyle, *Empires*, pp. 34–45.
25. John Darwin, *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 4.
26. S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (Glencoe, N.Y.: Free Press, 1963). See also Anton Bebler and Jim Seroka, eds., *Contemporary Political Systems: Classifications and Typologies* (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 1990).
27. Scholars have a large degree of agreement about the defining characteristics of empires. Ronald Suny defines empire as a “particular form of domination or control, between two units set apart in a hierarchical, inequitable relationship.” Michael Doyle suggests that “empire . . . is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society.” George Lichtheim defines empire as the “relationship of a hegemonial state to peoples or nations under its control.” S. N. Eisenstadt notes that “the basic center-periphery relations that developed in the tsarist empire were characterized—in common with those of many other historical empires—by the differentiation, specification and crystallization of centers in general and of political centers in particular, as autonomous, structurally and symbolically

distinct entities.” David Lake suggests that “in empire, one partner cedes substantial rights of residual control directly to the other; in this way, the two polities are melded together in a political relationship in which one partner controls the other.” Geir Lundestad states that “empire simply means a hierarchical system of political relationships with one power being much stronger than any other.” Finally, Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim claim that “informal empires are structures of transnational political authority that combine an egalitarian principle of de jure sovereignty with a hierarchical principle of de facto control.” See Ronald Grigor Suny, “The Empire Strikes Out: Russia, the Soviet Union, and Theories of Empire,” paper prepared for “Empires and Nations: The Soviet Union and the Non-Russian Peoples,” conference, University of Chicago, October 24–26, 1997, p. 5; Doyle, *Empires*, p. 45; George Lichtheim, *Imperialism* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 5; S. N. Eisenstadt, “Center-Periphery Relations in the Soviet Empire,” in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 206; Lake, “Rise, Fall, and Future,” p. 34; Geir Lundestad, *The American “Empire”* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1990), p. 37; Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, “Hierarchy Under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State,” *International Organization* 49 (autumn 1995): 695.

28. See Niklas Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme: Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), pp. 30–52.
29. The work of Ferdinand de Saussure is of course critical to the notion of languages as systems.
30. Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
31. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, vols. 1–2 (New York: Academic, 1974, 1979); James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
32. Talcott Parsons, *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*; Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic, 1963); David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965). For an excellent overview of structuralist thinking, see Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975). See also Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 64 (December 1970): 1033–53.

33. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, pp. 49–50; Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, pp. 35–36.
34. For criticisms of systems theorizing, see Ronald Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981), pp. 161–62; Malcolm Waters, *Modern Sociological Theory* (London: Sage, 1994), pp. 131–72.
35. On human irrationality see Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., *The Limits of Rationality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Kolja Rudzio, “Verfluchte Psyche,” *Die Zeit*, October 7, 1999, p. 31.
36. S. N. Eisenstadt, introduction to S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *The Decline of Empires* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 1.
37. See Murray Forsyth, ed., *Federalism and Nationalism* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989).
38. Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 80–84. See also Stephen L. Dyson, *The Creation of the Roman Frontier* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
39. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove, 1977); Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon, 1967).
40. Miles, “Roman and Modern Imperialism,” p. 643.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 647.
42. Jervis, *System Effects*, pp. 76–87.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 177–91.
44. Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, p. 382.
45. David Easton, *The Analysis of Political Structure* (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 273–79.
46. See Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, p. 384.
47. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 170–76.
48. Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: The World System, A.D. 1250–1350* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 368.
49. Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 438.
50. Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon, 1966).
51. *Plato’s Republic* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1974), p. 196.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
53. Mark Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).
54. Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge:

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55. Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1983); Martin Jänicke, ed., *Herrschaft und Krise* (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973).
  56. Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, p. 438; Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, p. 94; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 30–31; Tainter, *Collapse of Complex Societies*, p. 120; Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, p. 71.
  57. Robert A. Kann, *The Habsburg Empire: A Study in Integration and Disintegration* (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 134.
  58. Cho-yun Hsu, “Roles of the Literati,” p. 189.
  59. Carlo M. Cipolla, introduction to Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., *The Economic Decline of Empires* (London: Methuen, 1970), p. 2. See also “Menschen machen Katastrophen,” interview of Wolf Dombrowsky, *Die Zeit*, August 26, 1999, p. 15.
  60. See Colin Renfrew, “Systems Collapse as Social Transformation: Catastrophe and Anastrophe in Early State Societies,” in Colin Renfrew and Kenneth L. Cooke, eds., *Transformations: Mathematical Approaches to Culture Change*, pp. 481–505 (New York: Academic, 1979).
  61. Herbert Kaufman, “The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations as an Organizational Problem,” in Yoffee and Cowgill, *Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations*, pp. 233–35; Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: Modern Library, 1950), pp. 91–93. See also Edward Hallett Carr, *What Is History?* (New York: Vintage, 1961), pp. 130–34.
  62. James D. Fearon, “Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science: Exploring an Analogy Between Cellular Automata and Historical Processes,” in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics*, pp. 39–67 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). See also Manus I. Midlarsky, *The Disintegration of Political Systems: War and Revolution in Comparative Perspective* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986).
  63. Charles F. Doran, “Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in International Relations and Economics,” *International Studies Review* 1 (1999): 11.
  64. See Stephen Jay Gould, *The Panda’s Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History* (New York: Norton, 1980), pp. 179–93.
  65. George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).
  66. William McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1976).

67. Brian Fagan, *Floods, Famines, and Empires: El Niño and the Fate of Civilizations* (New York: Basic, 1999). See also "The Big Heat," *Economist*, August 28, 1999, p. 64.
68. Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (Boston: Beacon, 1955), p. 203.
69. Alexander Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd* (New York: Norton, 1976), pp. 202–6.
70. Robert G. Wesson, *The Imperial Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 36.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
72. Good examples of self-contradictory arguments that try to marry choice to situations of manifest nonchoice are Steven L. Solnick, "The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A Neoinstitutional Perspective," *World Politics* 48 (January 1996): 209–38; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90 (December 1996): 715–35.
73. See Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, pp. 91–196 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Stephen Gaukroger, *Explanatory Structures* (Hassocks, U.K.: Harvester, 1978).
74. Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 1984).
75. See Robert A. Denemark, "World Systems History: From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations," *International Studies Review* 1 (1999): 69; Michael Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change," *Politics and Society* 17 (June 1989): 115–62; Roger Petersen, "Mechanisms and Structures in Comparison," in John Bowen and Roger Petersen, eds., *Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture*, pp. 61–77 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
76. Arthur Danto, *Narration and Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 257–84.
77. This is not to say that values have no place in social science. Quite the contrary. But they cannot serve as the sole justification for the validity of some theory. Choice is, of course, essential to questions of morality.
78. Gabriel A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1990), pp. 51–53, 117–35.
79. Jack A. Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Jack A. Goldstone, "Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, and the Process of Revolution," *Theory and Society* 20 (August 1991): 405–53; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*; Nikki Keddie, "Can Revolutions Be Predicted; Can Their Causes Be Understood?" in Nikki

- Keddie, ed., *Debating Revolutions*, pp. 3–26 (New York: New York University Press, 1995); Said Amir Arjomand, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” *World Politics* 38 (April 1986): 383–414.
80. See Bob Sutcliffe, *Imperialism* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999).
  81. See Doyle, *Empires*, pp. 19–34; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism* (New York: Random House, 1980).
  82. Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, “Global Politics at the Turn of the Millenium: Changing Bases of ‘Us’ and ‘Them,’” *International Studies Review* 1 (1999): 79.
  83. Imanuel Geiss, “Great Powers and Empires: Historical Mechanisms of Their Making and Breaking,” in Geir Lundestad, ed., *The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994), p. 33. But, apparently, empires are war makers. See William Eckhardt, “Civilizations, Empires, and Wars,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (1990): 9–24.
  84. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Structure of Nations and Empires* (Fairfield, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1977), p. 66.
  85. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, pp. 133–36.
  86. See Parker, *Geopolitics of Domination*, pp. 1–9, 64–75.
  87. Lundestad, *American “Empire,”* p. 55.
  88. Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 132.
  89. Lake, “Rise, Fall, and Future,” p. 34. See also Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, *The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 1989).
  90. See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 106–155; David Friedman, “A Theory of the Size and Shape of Nations,” *Journal of Political Economy* 85 (1977): 59–77. Hendrik Spruyt offers a sophisticated version of this argument in “Explaining Imperial Decline: The Obsolescence and Dissolution of Empires in the Modern Era,” paper prepared for the convention of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., August 27–31, 1997. See also Robert O. Keohane, *International Politics and State Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 35–66.
  91. See Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay?* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).
  92. D. K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire, 1830–1914* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 464.
  93. See Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 90–104; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 31–65.

94. Geoffrey W. Conrad and Arthur A. Demarest, *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 120–21.
95. On overextension see David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” *International Organization* 50 (winter 1996): 1–33; Ronald Findlay, “Toward a Model of Territorial Expansion and the Limits of Empire,” unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, May 1994.
96. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, in *Discourse on Political Economy and The Social Contract*, trans. Christopher Betts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
97. The work of David Lake illustrates many of these pitfalls. On the one hand, Lake argues that “increasing hierarchy [i.e., empire] raises the costs to the dominant state of governing the subordinate power.” In particular, “to gain the subordinate party’s willing consent to a hierarchic relationship, the welfare losses created by these distortions must be compensated by some transfer or side payment from the dominant state—increasing the costs to the latter. As the subordinate partner’s residual control declines, and the distortions increase, so must the compensation package offered by the dominant state.” On the other hand, “rent-seeking,” which “creates an imperialist bias in a state’s foreign policy . . . distorts the economy and reduces rates of economic growth. Over time, as the distortions accumulate, the state can improve its returns by reducing rents, freeing the economy from monopoly restrictions, and stimulating growth. . . . As the state turns from seeking rents to encouraging growth, the optimal size of the political unit will contract” (Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy,” pp. 42, 47, 50). The flaws in Lake’s analysis are fourfold. First, Lake must either anthropomorphize “the state” or use semantically meaningless predicates of the form “the state can improve,” “the state turns,” and so on. Second, Lake is explicitly wedded to the notion of optimal size, even though his own analysis clearly suggests that this signifier is empty. Third, Lake’s insistence that empire can be a dyad like any other hierarchical relationship effectively reduces empires to little more than big states. Fourth and most important is Lake’s equally problematic insistence that costs and benefits affect elite choices. This proposition assumes that the trade-offs between governance costs, opportunism, rent seeking, and economic growth are knowable to elites as trade-offs—all the time, and not just when things are obviously going wrong—and that elites choose for or against empire on that basis. But if *choice* refers to identifiable points in time when alternatives are weighed and options are considered, then elites rarely if ever really choose. Like optimal size, choice is an empty signifier.
98. For a critical treatment of rational choice theory, see Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni-

- versity Press, 1994); Jane L. Mansbridge, ed., *Beyond Self-Interest* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1990). See also Jonathan Cohn, "Irrational Exuberance," *New Republic*, October 25, 1999, pp. 25–31.
99. See Gerd Roellecke, "Du hast keine Wahl, aber triff sie," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 1, 2000.
  100. See Ernst Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, 2d ed. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1977), pp. 30–32; Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, pp. 8–11.
  101. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, pp. 131–45.
  102. Charles Diehl, "The Economic Decay of Byzantium," in Cipolla, *Economic Decline of Empires*, p. 101. I make this point in "Thinking About Empire," pp. 19–29. See also Alexander Demandt, "Die Weltreiche in der Geschichte," in Alexander Demandt, ed., *Das Ende der Weltreiche: Von den Persen bis zur Sowjetunion* (Munich: Beck, 1997), pp. 223–27.
  103. Fernand Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981); David Hackett Fischer, *The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: Norton, 1997). See also Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage, 1984).
  104. Doyle, *Empires*, pp. 128–38.
  105. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

## 2. Imperial Decay

1. Herbert Kaufman, "The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations as an Organizational Problem," in Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, eds., *The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), pp. 228–29.
2. A. H. M. Jones, "The Social, Political, and Religious Changes During the Last Period of the Roman Empire," in S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *The Decline of Empires* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 69.
3. Carlo M. Cipolla, introduction to Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., *The Economic Decline of Empires* (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 5, 6–7.
4. Cho-yun Hsu, "The Roles of the Literati and of Regionalism in the Fall of the Han Dynasty," in Yoffee and Cowgill, *Collapse of Ancient States*, p. 189.
5. Rein Taagepera: "Expansion and Contraction Patterns for Large Polities: Context for Russia," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 475–504; Taagepera, "Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 B.C. to 600 A.D.,"



- Social Science History* 3 (October 1979): 115–38; Taagepera, “Size and Duration of Empires: Systematics of Size,” *Social Science Research* 7 (1978): 108–27; Taagepera, “Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 3000 to 600 B.C.,” *Social Science Research* 7 (1978): 180–96.
6. Warren Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 7–8.
  7. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, *Rise and Demise: Comparing World Systems* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 200–29.
  8. Bas van Fraassen, *Laws and Symmetry* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).
  9. Michael E. Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 576–81.
  10. On “essentially contested concepts” see William Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1974).
  11. Giovanni Sartori, “Totalitarianism, Model Mania, and Learning from Error,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 5 (1993): 5–22.
  12. See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951); Hans Buchheim, *Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968); Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die totalitäre Erfahrung* (Munich: Piper, 1987); Stephen F. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Bartłomiej Kamiński, “The Anatomy of the Directive Capacity of the Socialist State,” *Comparative Political Studies* 22 (April 1989): 66–92; Barrington Moore Jr., *Terror and Progress—USSR* (New York: Harper, 1954); Stephen E. Hanson, “Social Theory and the Post-Soviet Crisis,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28 (1995): 119–30; Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, eds., *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 2d ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1989); “*Historikerstreit*” (Munich: Piper, 1987); Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 945–48. For a history of the concept see Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
  13. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).
  14. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944).
  15. Alexander J. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 3–15.

16. Ibid, pp. 2–3.
17. Karl Deutsch, “Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems,” in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 498–99.
18. On stability see Alexander J. Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 1–19.
19. It is interesting to consider whether computers might not make empires, theoretically at least, infinitely sustainable. My thanks to Polly Kummel for this insight.
20. See Alexander J. Motyl, “The End of Sovietology: From Soviet Studies to Post-Soviet Studies,” in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR*, pp. 302–14 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).
21. See Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
22. Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 39–40.
23. See Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967); Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Barrington Moore Jr., *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1950); Richard Löwenthal, “On ‘Established’ Communist Party Regimes,” *Studies in Comparative Communism* 7 (winter 1974): 335–58; Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970); Maria Hirsowicz, *The Bureaucratic Leviathan: A Study in the Sociology of Communism* (New York: New York University Press, 1980); Igor’ Birman, *Ekonomika nedostach* (New York: Chalidze, 1983).
24. Włodzimierz Brus, *The Economics and Politics of Socialism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 13–14.
25. Deutsch, “Cracks in the Monolith,” pp. 498–99.
26. Ibid., p. 499.
27. Ibid., pp. 501–2.
28. Ibid., p. 502.
29. Ibid. Deutsch is hardly alone in drawing such conclusions. According to Anthony Downs, “No one can control the behavior of large organizations; any attempt to control one large organization tends to generate another; each official tends to distort the information he passes upward in the hierarchy, exaggerating those data favorable to himself and minimizing those unfavorable to himself” (Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* [Boston: Little Brown, 1967], pp. 262, 266). Joseph Tainter concurs: “The costs of information processing show a trend

of declining marginal productivity. . . . As the size of a social group increases, the communication load increases even faster. Information processing increases in response until capacity is reached. After this point, information processing deteriorates, so that greater costs are allocated to processing that is less efficient and reliable" (Tainter, *The Collapse of Complex Societies* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], p. 99). For a prescient analysis of the USSR's nonviability, see Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, *Road Maps to the Future: Toward More Effective Societies* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1980).

30. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith," pp. 506–7.
31. Geoffrey Parker, *The Geopolitics of Domination* (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 149–50.
32. G. W. Bowersock, "The Dissolution of the Roman Empire," in Yoffee and Cowgill, *Collapse of Ancient States*, pp. 170–71.
33. See E. A. Thompson, *Romans and Barbarians: The Decline of the Western Empire* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982).
34. Geir Lundestad, "The Fall of Empires: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy," in Geir Lundestad, ed., *The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994), p. 393. See also Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 900–1990* (Cambridge, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 24.
35. According to Carlo Cipolla, "The fundamental fact remains that public consumption in mature empires shows a distinct tendency to rise sharply. The phenomenon is reflected in the growth of taxation. One of the remarkably common features of empires at the later stage of their development is the growing amount of wealth pumped by the State from the economy" (see his introduction to *Economic Decline of Empires*, p. 6). Robert Gilpin writes in a similar vein: "At first, because of its initial advantages over other states, the growing state tends to expand very rapidly. In time, however, the returns to expansion diminish, and the rate of expansion slows. Finally, as the marginal costs of further expansion begin to equal or exceed the marginal benefits, expansion ceases, and an equilibrium is achieved. . . . Once a society reaches the limits of its expansion, it has great difficulty in maintaining its position and arresting its eventual decline. Further, it begins to encounter marginal returns in agricultural and industrial production. Both internal and external changes increase consumption and the costs of protection and production; it begins to experience a severe fiscal crisis. The diffusion of its economic, technological, or organizational skills undercuts its comparative advantage over other societies, especially those on the periphery of the system. These rising states, on the other hand, enjoy lower costs, rising rates of return on their resources, and the advantages of backwardness. In time, the differential rates of growth of declining and rising states in the system produce a decisive redistribution of power and

- result in disequilibrium in the system" (Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], pp. 155, 185).
36. See Alexander J. Motyl, "Thinking About Empire," in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation Building*, pp. 19–29 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997).
  37. Kaufman, "Collapse of Ancient States," pp. 221–22.
  38. See Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, pp. 192–225. John Keegan hopes that humanity may not be "doomed to make war or that the affairs of the world must ultimately be settled by violence" (Keegan, *A History of Warfare* [New York: Knopf, 1994], p. 386). John Mueller (*Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Modern War* [New York: Basic, 1989]) and Michael Mandelbaum ("Is Major War Obsolete?" *Survival* 40 [winter 1998–1999]: 20–38) are rather more certain that wars between great powers may be obsolete. The inductive case for their argument is weak, but, even if they prove to be right, their conclusions apply only to the future and thus to future empires. With respect to past empires, therefore, we can safely take war as a given. See also David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
  39. D. W. Meinig, *The Shaping of America: Atlantic America, 1492–1800*, vol. 1 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 381–85; Richard Koebner, *Empire* (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1965), pp. 105–93.
  40. Such a view is of course premised on the assumption that all elites pursue power and therefore engage in contention. Just such an assumption underpins Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1978), and John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1982). See also Charles Taylor, "Faith and Identity: Religion and Conflict in the Modern World," *Newsletter* of the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, no. 63 (November 1998–January 1999), pp. 28–31.
  41. John Darwin writes: "The British empire did not come to an end primarily because the British lost interest in it, or dictated a rapid shedding of redundant imperial commitments. On the contrary, the recognition of the necessity of progressing towards colonial self-government coexisted with an equal determination to preserve British world power" (Darwin, *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991], p. 114).
  42. Bernard Porter, "Die Transformation des *British Empire*," in Alexander Demandt, ed., *Das Ende der Weltreiche: Von den Persen bis zur Sowjetunion* (Munich: Beck, 1997), pp. 169–71.
  43. Cho-yun Hsu, "Roles of the Literati," p. 194.
  44. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

45. Ibid., p. 195.
46. Ibid., pp. 191, 193.
47. Ibid., pp. 194–95. See also Chase-Dunn and Hall, *Rise and Demise*, pp. 158–63.
48. Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 101–2. See also Helmuth Schneider, “Das Ende des Imperium Romanum im Westen,” in Richard Lorenz, ed., *Das Verdämmern der Macht: Vom Untergang grosser Reiche* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000), p. 31.
49. Alexander Demandt, “Die Auflösung des römischen Reiches,” in Demandt, *Das Ende der Weltreiche*, p. 40.
50. Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society, and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 20.
51. Philippe Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 9.
52. Arther Ferrill, *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1986).
53. Bernard Lewis, “Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire,” in Cipolla, *Economic Decline of Empires*, p. 217.
54. Ibid., p. 228.
55. Engin D. Akarli, “Economic Policy and Budgets in Ottoman Turkey, 1876–1909,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 28 (July 1992): 446, 466–467. See also Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908* (New York: New York University Press, 1983).
56. Akarli, “Economic Policy and Budgets,” p. 448.
57. Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 337–47.
58. Akarli, “Economic Policy and Budgets,” p. 460.
59. Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 126–28.
60. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, “The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post–Cold War Era,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 51–85.
61. Treadgold, *History of the Byzantine State and Society*, p. 677. See Franz Georg Maier’s discussion of *Pronoia* in “Byzanz: Selbstbehauptung und Zerfall einer Grossmacht,” in Lorenz, *Das Verdämmern der Macht*, pp. 53–54.
62. George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1969), p. 323.

63. Ibid., p. 481.
64. Charles Diehl, "The Economic Decay of Byzantium," in Cipolla, *Economic Decline of Empires*, p. 100.
65. Maier, "Byzanz," p. 49.
66. Treadgold, *History of the Byzantine State and Society*, p. 813.
67. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, pp. 499–533; Archibald R. Lewis, *Nomads and Crusaders, A.D. 1000–1368* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 154–55, 192–93.
68. Doyle, *Empires*, p. 120.
69. Ibid., p. 102.
70. Renate Pieper, "Des Ende des Spanischen Kolonialreiches in Amerika," in Demandt, *Das Ende der Weltreiche*, p. 79.
71. Hans-Joachim König, "Der Zerfall des Spanischen Weltreichs in Amerika: Ursachen und Folgen," in Lorenz, *Das Verdämmern der Macht*, p. 145.
72. Doyle, *Empires*, pp. 331–35; König, "Der Zerfall des Spanischen Weltreichs," p. 147.
73. Franz Ansprenger, *The Dissolution of the Colonial Empires* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 266–89.
74. Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day* (London: Penguin, 1968), pp. 218–21 (see p. 218 for the quote); see also Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage, 1987), pp. 275–91.
75. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, pp. 347–72. See especially Roland Höhne, "Die Auflösung des französischen Kolonialreiches, 1946–1962," in Lorenz, *Das Verdämmern der Macht*, pp. 205–35.
76. Darwin, *End of the British Empire*, p. 120. See also Horst Dippel, "Die Auflösung des Britischen Empire oder die Suche nach einem Reichersatz für formale Herrschaft," in Lorenz, *Das Verdämmern der Macht*, p. 252.
77. Michael Graham Fry, "Colonization: Britain, France, and the Cold War," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1997), pp. 128–35.
78. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall*, p. 366.
79. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 198.
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83. Ibid., pp. 7–13.
84. David Good's analysis of the late Habsburg economy shows that economic growth can occur in mature empires if states withdraw from the economy

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44. See Douglas Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach* (New York: Vintage, 1989); Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J. D. Trout, eds., *The Philosophy of Science* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).
45. Ehrhard Behrens, “P=NP?: Oder, Anders Gefragt: Ist Glück in der Mathematik entbehrlich?” *Die Zeit*, March 4, 1999, p. 43.
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48. Tainter, *Collapse of Complex Societies*, p. 127. Although most of his themes will find their way individually into my argument, on the whole Tainter’s scheme is of limited utility to a study of empires in general and imperial collapse in particular. First, his unit of analysis is “society” and not any particular polity or political ordering thereof. Second, Tainter defines *collapse* not in terms of the society per se but in terms of complexity: “A society has collapsed when it displays a rapid, significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity” (p. 4). Because society and complexity are almost synonymous for Tainter, it follows that the collapse of either, or of both, is possible only “in a power vacuum . . . when there is no competitor strong enough to fill the political vacuum of disintegration” (p. 202). Finally, Tainter’s view of both

collapse and complexity is much too broad to accommodate my own, far narrower focus on mere empires as peculiar kinds of political systems. One immediate consequence of this difference in perspectives is that the Habsburg empire could not on his account really have collapsed, as its complex society was merely redivided, while for me it decidedly did.

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#### 4. *Imperial Revival*

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15. See Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire, 1871–1918* (Dover, N.H.: Berg, 1985), pp. 9–51; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Der autoritäre Nationalstaat: Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur im deutschen Kaiserreich* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990), pp. 234–56.
16. Andreas Hillgruber, “The Historical Significance of the First World War: A Seminal Catastrophe,” in Gregor Schöllgen, ed., *Escape into War? The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 1990), p. 175.
17. David Stevenson, *The First World War and International Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 310.
18. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers* (New York: Vintage: 1987), pp. 275–333.
19. See Woodruff D. Smith, *The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). According to David Kaiser, “Hitler, more than any other individual in modern history, demonstrated the possible extent and the ultimate limit of the role of a single individual in international politics. Despite the experience of the First World War and the limitations upon German resources in the 1930s, which would clearly have dissuaded many other German leaders from preparing for or unleashing another general war in Europe, he managed by careful manipulation of contemporary politics, economics, and military technology to conquer most of Western Europe and to bring his armies to the banks of the Volga. . . . But he could not prevail in a long-term struggle with economically superior powers, and he could not turn to diplomacy when the military balance turned against him. His opponents in the Second World War not only blamed the war upon Hitler and the Nazi regime but also insisted upon total victory and unconditional surrender” (Smith, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990], pp. 390–91). For a discussion of the range of interpretations of Hitler’s role, see Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 2d ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1989); Michael R. Marrus, *The Holocaust in History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988).
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22. Alexander J. Motyl, "After Empire: Competing Discourses and Interstate Conflict in Postimperial Eastern Europe," in Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building*, pp. 14–33 (London: Routledge, 1998).
23. See Alexander Yanov, *Weimar Russia and What We Can Do About It* (New York: Slovo, n.d.). Zbigniew Brzezinski believes that the more appropriate comparison is between post-Soviet Russia and post-Ottoman Turkey. See his "Living with Russia," *National Interest*, no. 61 (fall 2000): 5–16.
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27. Lilia Shevtsova and Scott A. Bruckner, "Toward Stability or Crisis?" *Journal of Democracy* 8 (January 1997): 12–26. See also Lilia Shevtsova, *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Alexander J. Motyl, "Structural Constraints and Starting Points: The Logic of Systemic Change in Ukraine and Russia," *Comparative Politics* 29 (July 1997): 433–47.
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29. See Anders Åslund and Marth Brill Olcott, eds., *Russia After Communism* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Pål Kolstø, *Political Construction Sites: Nation Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2000); U.S. National Intelligence Council and Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Conference Report: Federation in Russia: How Is It Working?* (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 1999); Dietmar Müller, *Regionalisierung des postsowjetischen Raumes* (Berlin: Osteuropa-Institut, 1997).
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  32. See Thomas Graham and Arnold Horelick, *U.S.-Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
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### *Conclusion: Losing Empire*

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