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Introduction

Through Ritual, Heaven and Earth join in harmony, sun and moon shine, the four seasons proceed in order, the stars and constellations march, the rivers flow and all things flourish; men's likes and dislikes are regulated and their joys and hates made appropriate.

—Hsün Tsu (ca. 313–238 B.C.E.)¹

Reconciliation and Social Order

The most important and enduring puzzle for social scientists is explaining sociality and how it is maintained.² How do groups of individual actors maintain social order despite competition and conflict among themselves?³ Johan Galtung succinctly captured the enigma: “The fact that we are around testifies to a lot of conflict resolution capacity. And reconstruction. And reconciliation. How come?”⁴

Formal and informal observations of many levels of social organization acknowledge the tension between aggressive pursuit of self-interest and societal harmony. Many of these observations also point to the importance of *reconciliation*—mutually conciliatory accommodation between former antagonists—as one process integral to mitigating future violence and maintaining societal relationships after violent conflict.⁵ Consider four descriptions of reconciliation events in very different societies.

1. In primate society, Frans de Waal described a fight in the chimpanzee colony of the Arnhem Zoo:

It was the winter of 1975 and the colony was kept indoors. In the course of a charging display, the dominant male attacked a female, which caused screaming chaos as other chimpanzees came to her defense. When the group finally calmed

down, an unusual silence followed, with nobody moving, as if the apes were waiting for something. Suddenly the entire colony burst out hooting, while one male worked the large metal drums in the corner of the hall. In the midst of the pandemonium I saw two chimpanzees kiss and embrace . . . the embracing individuals had been the same male and female of the initial fight.⁶

2. In subnational tribal relations, the letters of Samuel Sewall captured the following ceremony of Native Americans of the northeast colonies in 1680:

Meeting with the Sachem they came to an agreement and buried two axes in the ground . . . which ceremony to them is more significant and binding than all the Articles of Peace, the hatchet being a principle weapon.⁷

3. In the national society of contemporary South Africa, Archbishop Desmond Tutu's Truth and Reconciliation Commission collected testimony from victims and perpetrators of apartheid with the following goal:

The promotion of national unity and reconciliation . . . the healing of a traumatized, divided, wounded, polarized people.⁸

4. In the realm of international politics, contemporary historian Hendrick Smith described the signing of a peace treaty and public joining of hands among President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, and President Jimmy Carter of the United States:

The elusive, unprecedented peace treaty that Egypt and Israel signed today has enormous symbolic importance and the potential for fundamentally transforming the map and history of the entire region . . . the best diplomatic estimate here is that the treaty has markedly reduced the risk of a major war in the Middle East for a considerable time . . .⁹

Although the settings vary greatly, each anecdote contains, implicitly or explicitly, the same hypothesis: future violence is less likely to occur, and societal order more likely to be restored, if principals to a conflict engage in a formal, public reconciliation event indicating a desire for improved relations.

Is there systematic empirical support for the presumption that reconciliation events coincide with effective conflict resolution and, if so, why and how do these events contribute to restoring order and affinity in relations? As political scientists, we are particularly interested in the role and reach of reconciliation within and between states after conflict.

With these questions in mind, this book makes some important discoveries. It finds that reconciliation events do mark turning points in con-

flicts, leading to better relations in many cases, and substantially reducing rates of recidivist violence within and between nations. Intuitive observations of a relationship between reconciliation events and successful conflict resolution are supported by evidence from many civil and international wars.

This book explores reasons why these events might correlate with restoration of civil and international order in many instances. To guide that investigation, it develops two very different models of reconciliation, a signaling model and a forgiveness model; it derives testable hypotheses about expected behavior from the models; and it grounds each model in two different paradigmatic assumptions about human rationality, rational choice and evolutionary psychology.

Ultimately, both models prove useful in understanding the role of reconciliation events in conflict resolution, the forgiveness model in civil disputes and the signaling model in international disputes. Specifically, with regard to civil conflicts, this study finds that reconciliation events restore lasting social order when they are part of a forgiveness process characterized by truth telling, redefinition of the identity of the former belligerents, partial justice, and a call for a new relationship. The forgiveness model, however, does not explain why or how international reconciliation events contribute to successful conflict resolution between, as opposed to within, nations. International society lacks the will and the ways necessary to pursue a forgiveness process. Instead, the signaling model helps us understand why the events contribute to improvement in bilateral relations. It predicts correctly that when a reconciliation event was part of a costly, novel, voluntary, and irrevocable concession in a negotiated bargain, it contributed meaningfully to a reduction in future conflict. Reconciliation events that lacked these qualities generally failed to lead to a successful signal of a desire for improved future relations, and, in the end, relations were less likely to improve.

As noted, each model rests on a distinctive set of assumptions about human rationality. The signaling model is fully consistent with the paradigmatic assumptions of rational choice; that is, humans apply universal, general, reasoning rules to all problems in making choices in their current environment, including interpreting and acting on signals in reaching a negotiated settlement of conflicts. Rational processes include conscious

reasoning only and are separated from emotions. The forgiveness process—an emotionally guided, specific pattern of problem solving—cannot be founded on psychological and physiological assumptions of general rationality, however. The search for paradigmatic assumptions about perception, strategy, choice, and behavior for the forgiveness model analogous to rational choice as the foundation for the signaling model, led to different assumptions about rationality consistent with aspects of evolutionary psychology and affective neuroscience. Those assumptions—that humans possess numerous, patterned, specific, problem-solving capabilities as a result of interaction with past environments, *and* that those capabilities work in synch with our emotional repertoire—are different from those underlying rational choice.

The utility of both models for understanding reconciliation in different settings opens the door to broadening what we mean by rationality in human problem solving and decision making. It illustrates certain limits to rational choice's general rationality assumption—that the mind applies the same dispassionate, logical principles to all types of problems—as *the* scientific foundation for social theory. The relevance of the forgiveness model to explaining reconciliation in civil conflicts forces us to reexamine and reinterpret fundamental assumptions about the micro-foundations of rationality in the construction of social theories.

Findings in the natural sciences (particularly biology and neuroscience) and psychology support the notion that the mind possesses several different problem-solving mechanisms and suggest the need to reintegrate emotion into rationality and cognitive activities such as perception, preference formation, choice, and memory to capture how the mind addresses certain problems. Unfortunately, the social disciplines, political science in particular, have failed to use these conceptions about rationality to generate new social explanations. This book is the first to describe this alternative view of rationality and use it to generate a compelling new insight into a critically important social question: how do states restore civil order after war?

Efforts to generate new and useful social hypotheses based on an evolutionary, emotionally animated notion of rationality face many theoretical and practical problems and challenges. Some of these difficulties are the same as those faced by rational choice or any other broad, deduc-

tive method. Other problems apply only to this perspective, and some are the result of past failures at integrating the natural with the social sciences. We offer our thoughts on some of these challenges later in the book.

New approaches and new explanations for resolving social conflict also lead to novel possibilities for policy and practice and, in turn, generate opportunities for theory development. In our final chapter we offer some general insights for conflict resolution practice and policy, and identify future research paths suggested by our study.

But we are getting ahead of ourselves. The first step in this journey is canvassing civil and international conflicts to see if casual observations of a link between reconciliation events and order restoration are systematically supported by evidence.

Do Reconciliation Events Matter? What Is the Relationship between Them and Subsequent Relations between Belligerents?

The next chapter focuses on the role of reconciliation events in resolving intrastate conflict, which is the dominant form of warfare today. This form of conflict merits particular attention because, since the end of the Cold War, the number of civil conflicts compared with international conflicts has increased considerably. In the 1990s, the ratio of civil to international conflicts reached 5 to 1, historically very high (figure 1.1).

Moreover, today's civil conflicts have increasing international effects as they often destabilize their region through refugee flows, smuggling and organized crime, and opportunistic interventions by neighboring governments. Civil wars also engage the international community when they entail violations of international norms such as the prohibition against genocide and, more broadly, protection of human rights. If reconciliation events are linked to breaking the cycle of violence that has wracked so many countries, it is vital to understand how they operate to restore social order.

In chapter 3 we examine the role of reconciliation events after interstate wars. This investigation, like the one of civil conflicts in chapter 2, is warranted only, however, if *prima facie* evidence shows that such events




Figure 1.1

Number of conflicts per decade.

Source: Brecke (1999), available at www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/PSS99_paper.html.

coincide with a reduction in subsequent civil or international violence. We answer the question with the results of two broad studies that evaluated the effect of reconciliation events in both national and interstate arenas. These surveys allow us to accomplish three things: to assess, generally, the relationship between a reconciliation event and subsequent relations between belligerents; to select cases for further investigation; and to generate explanatory models.

Reconciliation Events and Civil Conflict

We began with a broad survey that assessed reconciliation between participants of civil conflicts by examining the relationship between the presence or absence of a reconciliation event after the conflict and subsequent relations between the participants. For the purposes of this study, we define a reconciliation event as one that includes the following elements: direct physical contact or proximity between opponents, usually senior representatives of respective factions; a public ceremony accompanied by substantial publicity or media attention that relays the event to the wider national society; and ritualistic or symbolic behavior that indicates the parties consider the dispute resolved and that more amicable relations are expected to follow.

It is important to distinguish between reconciliation events and reconciliation. The former are a proxy indicator of reconciliation. We used them to identify potential reconciliations because they are *measurable* indicators of possible reconciliations. Reconciliation events can be identified in the historical record, whereas reconciliation (of this type) ultimately occurs within the minds of many, perhaps most, individuals in a society and is difficult to measure. A second justification is that it is difficult to envision reconciliation occurring among the general public if there has not been a reconciliation event.

To establish a set of countries for which the kind of reconciliation event we are interested in is an appropriate and meaningful concept, we assembled a list of all recorded within-country violent conflicts in the twentieth century. For the purpose of this study, the term “violent conflict” is used as shorthand for violent political conflict. Cioffi-Revilla’s definition of war for his LORANOW project serves as the definition of violent conflict for this project:

A war (a “war event”) is an occurrence of purposive and lethal violence among two or more social groups pursuing conflicting political goals that results in fatalities, with at least one belligerent group organized under the command of authoritative leadership.¹⁰

This definition provides sufficient generality such that it encompasses a wide variety of types of lethal conflicts that may occur within a country, such as civil wars, bloody coups, massacres, democides, or riots. At the same time, through the political goals criterion, the definition distinguishes violent conflict from other forms of lethal violence such as mob lynchings, gang turf battles, and organized crime vendettas. The line between violent conflict and other forms of lethal violence may be fuzzy in definition, but in practice they are seldom confused.

Furthermore, a conflict is deemed to be violent when at least thirty-two people were killed within a one-year period as a result of the point of contention that initiated the lethal violence. The thirty-two-person threshold results from a design criterion of the database we used, the Conflict Catalog, which is the only database that contains all recorded within-state conflicts in the twentieth century. That threshold enables all conflicts in the Conflict Catalog to satisfy the level two or higher classification level established by Richardson.¹¹

Our search of the historical record identified 430 violent conflicts in 109 countries. We then explored the histories of each of those countries, using a wide variety of sources, to determine whether a reconciliation event had occurred and, if so, when. That effort unearthed eleven cases (ten countries) with reconciliation events satisfying the definition given above, all occurring in the latter half of the century.

We then determined which of those eleven cases had experienced a violent civil conflict subsequent to the reconciliation event. We found that seven (64%) of them did not experience a return to violent conflict. In contrast, only 9 percent of countries that experienced civil conflict without a reconciliation event avoided recurrence of that conflict in the time period demarcated by our reconciled cases (1957–present). Table 1.1 summarizes the results of our investigation and appendix A lists countries and classification of conflicts.

Reconciliation Events and Interstate War

What role, if any, do reconciliation events play at the level of international society?¹² To explore that question we first identified interstate wars during the past century. Second, we identified pairs of countries that opposed each other to determine specific dyads that might reconcile.

Table 1.1
Reconciliations after Civil Conflicts

Country	End of Conflict	Reconciliation Event	Outcome
Colombia		1957	War
North Yemen		1970	War
Chad		1971	War
		1992–1993	War
Argentina	1978	1984	Peace*
Uruguay	1980	1985	Peace
Chile	1978	1991	Peace
El Salvador	1992	1992	Peace
Mozambique	1992	1992	Peace
South Africa	1989	1992–1993	Peace
Honduras	1985	1993	Peace

* Peace refers only to the absence of civil violence exceeding the thirty-two-fatalities threshold.

Table 1.2
Set of International Conflicts with a Reconciliation Event

Dyad	End of Conflict	Reconciliation Event	Data Set Used*
1. USSR–West Germany	5/1945	8/1970	C, W
2. West Germany–Poland	5/1945	12/1970	C, W
3. USA–Japan	8/1945	4/1952	C
4. Japan–UK	9/1945	4/1952	C
5. China–Japan	8/1945	4/1952	C
6. India–Japan	8/1945	4/1952	C
7. France–Japan	8/1945	4/1952	C
8. Australia–Japan	9/1945	4/1952	C
9. Greece–Japan	8/1945	4/1952	C
10. New Zealand–Japan	8/1945	4/1952	C
11. South Africa–Japan	8/1945	4/1952	C
12. India–China	11/1962	12/1988	W, P
13. Honduras–El Salvador	7/1969	10/1980	W
14. USA–Vietnam	1/1973	7/1995	P
15. Israel–Jordan	10/1973	10/1994	L
16. Egypt–Israel	10/1973	8/1978	W
17. Ethiopia–Somalia	3/1978	4/1988	W
18. Cambodia–Vietnam	1/1979	10/1991	P
19. Uganda–Tanzania	4/1979	2/1981	W
20. Vietnam–China	3/1979	10/1991	P
21. U.K.–Argentina	6/1982	3/1990	P

*The authors used several data sets for the production of figures 2 through 9. C, Conflict and Peace Data Bank; W, World Event/Interaction Survey; P, Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action; L, Schrodt and Gerner's (1997) data set for Middle Eastern events.

Next, we examined each relationship to determine if and when a reconciliation event had occurred between members of dyads (table 1.2). See appendix B for a detailed explanation of our methodology.

Then, using events data¹³ drawn from four data sets we created plots showing the relationship for each dyad and demarcated the time of the reconciliation event at the appropriate spot on the plots. The result is a before-and-after picture of bilateral relations between former belligerents that experienced a reconciliation event.

Eight of twenty-one international conflicts with a reconciliation event offered clear visual evidence of the impact of that event: five dyads in




Figure 1.2
Relationship of USSR toward West Germany.




Figure 1.3
Relationship of India toward China.

which an event appeared to show improvement in bilateral relations and three that did not provide visual evidence of a reduction in conflict.¹⁴ See figures 1.2 to 1.9 for individual plots and table 1.3 for a summary of visual findings.

In interpreting the figures, each dark vertical bar portrays a measure of the behavior of one dyad member toward the other for one month during the period of investigation. A tall bar indicates a month of high conflict and a short bar indicates a month with relatively less conflict. A bar that extends below zero indicates a month in which cooperative acts outweighed conflictual acts, and a horizontal gap between vertical bars indicates a month or months in which there were no recorded acts (or the quite unlikely possibility that conflictual acts were precisely counterbalanced by cooperative acts).¹⁵ The long, dashed vertical bar indicates the time of a reconciliation event.

Time series plots such as these are useful because they enable us to visualize easily the basic dynamics of the behavior of one country toward another over a significant period of time and identify the impact, if any, of a reconciliation event in the relationship. An ideal example of a reconciliation event showing dramatically improved relations would be a figure




Figure 1.4
Relationship of Egypt toward Israel.




Figure 1.5
Relationship of China toward Vietnam.

in which many tall bars would be on the left of the event and, beginning at the time of the event, the bars being very short or even dropping below the zero line.

Summary of Survey Results

These results suggest that reconciliation events are often, but not uniformly, correlated with restoration of civil and international order. This finding merits further investigation. The eleven cases of civil conflicts and eight of interstate conflict provide a workable selection of cases for in-depth study with variation in the dependent variable—postreconciliation relations between former combatants.

Having found that a reconciliation event results in sustained peaceful relations between belligerents in some, but not all, cases, this study investigates the nineteen cases for answers to two questions: under what conditions does actual reconciliation occur and achieve reduction in future conflict? and what is the mechanism by which reconciliation has this effect? The answers will contribute significantly to the literature and practice of conflict resolution, and, in turn, illustrate the relative merits and limits of two approaches to social theorizing that guided our investigation.




Figure 1.6
Relationship of Poland toward West Germany.




Figure 1.7
Relationship of the United Kingdom toward Argentina.




Figure 1.8
Relationship of Cambodia toward Vietnam.




Figure 1.9 Relationship of Honduras toward El Salvador.

Table 1.3 Summary of Visual Analysis

Reconciliation Event with Visual Evidence of Improvement in Bilateral Relations	Reconciliation Event without Visual Evidence of Improvement in Bilateral Relations
USSR–West Germany	UK–Argentina
India–China	Cambodia–Vietnam
Egypt–Israel	Honduras–El Salvador
China–Vietnam	
Poland–West Germany	

Method of Investigation

Comparative Case Study

This study considered the questions *how* reconciliations are realized and, therefore, *why* they lead to restoration of peace after conflict through a detailed, theoretically informed, comparative case study analysis. An in-depth study of a small number of cases provides an opportunity to explore

those questions subtly yet systematically. This methodology also presents certain challenges. The major challenge, of course, is the problem of complex, multiple determinants of social phenomena and the risk of spurious or invalid inferences being drawn from a few cases in which many causal factors may be at play; in short, the problem of “over-determinacy.”¹⁶

To control for this problem, the investigation will be defined by systematic use of theory and a within-case process tracing procedure. Two models, one drawn from rational choice and game theory and the second grounded in evolutionary psychology, will be used to establish relevant independent variables, and within-case process tracing will identify the intervening steps or cause-and-effect links between independent variables and outcomes.¹⁷ To explore our research questions, this study used the nineteen cases that provide a substantial range of outcomes on the dependent variable (subsequent relations between former antagonists) and are relatively free of selection bias.

Theoretical Framework for Case Analyses: Model Development

Despite pervasive references to reconciliation in popular discussions of conflict resolution, the assumption that reconciliation events are an important determinant of subsequent relations within and between states is powerful, yet is not fully examined in the theoretical literature. Although impressionistic, narrative accounts of a single conflict abound, few examined postconflict reconciliation comparatively from a social scientific perspective.

In general, the conflict resolution literature identifies a surfeit of factors that can account for de-escalation of conflict. For example, Louis Kriesberg explained:

A combination of several changes is generally needed to bring about a transition into a de-escalation movement, particularly for protracted conflicts. The changes occur within one or more adversary, in their relations, and in their social context. Quite different combinations of changed conditions can bring about the shift toward de-escalation.¹⁸

This literature draws our attention to the complexity of conflict resolution in practice, a topic this book returns to in a discussion of explanatory reductionism in chapter 4. Nonetheless, most of this literature is descriptive, noting variable forms and the socially constructed nature of conflict and its resolution, and implicitly rationalistic in its assumptions.¹⁹

The approach here is explicitly social scientific in that it develops two models from general hypotheses about reconciliation processes, derives specific hypotheses about expected behavior, and connects each model to its underlying assumptions about human nature and human rationality, its “microfoundation.” The study then examines evidence in our cases for patterns that support either model.

A Rational Choice Model

The first model of the reconciliation process emerges from rational choice and, more specifically, game theoretic approaches to explaining cooperative outcomes. Game theorists specify possible outcomes from the interaction of rational actors seeking to “win,” that is, achieve desired strategies and satisfy their preferences.

This model describes a mechanism or process consistent with a general signaling hypothesis: the best strategy for breaking a pattern of hostile interactions is by sending signals that provide a measure of commitment to the pursuit of improved relations. Reconciliation events or gestures are particularly effective forms of this type of signal because they are almost always politically costly to leaders of opposing sides, and costly signals are more reliable determinants of a leader’s true intentions for improved relations than low-cost or cost-free signals.²⁰ Reconciliation initiatives impose costs because of their “audience effect.”²¹ Leaders do not conduct policy in isolation, but before domestic and international audiences. Concern with adverse political reaction to a reconciliation gesture toward a former adversary, or with political humiliation should a leader decide to back down from an agreement if it fails to produce the intended effects or if it produces adverse reactions in key third-party actors, are important audience costs associated with reconciliation.

In short, a reconciliation event (and the reconciliation it symbolizes) is a costly (or potentially costly) signal that the other party is likely to interpret as a genuine offer to improve relations and thus may break a deadlocked conflictual situation. Because of associated costs of backing away from the event, it may also buttress initial attempts of the parties at cooperative interaction. Social science, since the work of J. David Singer, has maintained that for one actor to perceive another as a threat it must see the latter as having both the capability and the intent to block the attainment of one’s desired strategies and goals.²² Thus, by sending

costly (and therefore trustworthy) signals indicating a less hostile intent, reconciliation events reduce the perception of threat between actors (other things being equal) and permit improvement in relations. Such initiatives may break through a conflictual relationship with its conditions of high ambiguity, high mistrust, and low credibility.

Specific behavioral hypotheses can be derived from this signaling model. Game theory and rational choice theory instruct us to investigate case studies for negotiated bargains associated with reconciliation events (offer and reciprocation) that increase or decrease costs to participating parties. Elements that increase costs should enhance chances for improvement in relations, whereas factors that reduce costs should reduce the likelihood of a positive impact on relations. For example, a reconciliation attempt made despite factional opposition would send a stronger signal to an adversary than one with little domestic consequence, and hence should be more likely to change the adversary's threat perception. Furthermore, factors that clarify or obfuscate the signal-sending effect of a reconciliation event should be important determinants of its success or failure. Clearer signals of a desire for improved relations should contribute to successful reconciliation.

Social psychology (the study of intergroup relations, including intergroup conflict and its de-escalation or resolution) identified several specific factors that improve recognition and increase the weight of a reconciliation signal and encourage reciprocation. For example, a conflict cycle or impasse in intergroup relations, what some political scientists label a "hurting stalemate,"²³ can be broken and relations enhanced by certain forms of contact and communication between parties, a so-called contact hypothesis.²⁴ Some place particular emphasis on contact between decision makers. Ronald Fisher's work maintains unequivocally that "movement toward resolution in the sense of searching toward creative, mutually acceptable, and self-sustaining solutions may only come about through direct dialogue between influential representatives of conflicting parties."²⁵ The relevance of reconciliation events to the broader process of reconciliation and thus our use of them arises from this set of findings.

According to social psychology, factors that facilitate the sending of successful (conflict-reducing) signals between individuals and groups include the following:

1. *Costliness*. The offer of a reconciliation must impose a cost on the initiator and its reciprocation a cost on the other party; the higher the cost, the better.²⁶
2. *Vulnerability*. Reconciliation initiatives should involve risk and be vulnerable to exploitation.²⁷
3. *Novelty*. Reconciliation attempts are most likely to break established conflict patterns when they are dramatic, positive (not merely refraining from a negative action), unexpected, and thought provoking.²⁸
4. *Voluntariness*. Reconciliation signals are best when made unilaterally, rather than as the result of pressure or coercion. The offer of conciliation from the stronger party is prima facie evidence of voluntariness.²⁹
5. *Irrevocability or noncontingency*. Making noncontingent and irrevocable offers that are likely to be understood as conciliatory, rather than quid-pro-quo, contribute to the success of a reconciliation attempt.³⁰ Carrying out conciliatory initiatives as announced³¹ and making unambiguous offers that are open to verification³² contribute to irrevocability and noncontingency.

From these findings we propose a signaling model of reconciliation as shown in figure 1.10. Actions in the reconciliation process involving novelty, voluntariness, and costliness contribute to successful reconciliation. Costliness, in turn, consists of actions entailing vulnerability and/or




Figure 1.10
Signaling model of the reconciliation process.

irrevocability-noncontingency. These four factors have a relatively independent effect on the dependent variable, successful reconciliation.

With this model we further propose a specific hypothesis: a successful reconciliation emerges in cases manifesting these elements. Moreover, cases exhibiting a higher number of these elements will be the most successful. In chapters 2 and 3 the case studies are examined for each factor to determine whether this hypothesis is supported.

Cognitive-Behavioral Assumptions of the Signaling Model

Most works on signaling are consistent with a general rationality assumption about decision making: an individual (or individual acting on behalf of a collective) chooses an action from an array of potential actions that maximizes its interest or utility.³³ Assumptions of rational decision making are as follows:

1. Actors pursue goals.
2. These goals reflect the actor's perceived interests.
3. Behavior results from a process that involves, or functions as if it entails, conscious choice.
4. The individual is the basic agent in society.
5. Actors have preferences that are consistent and stable.
6. If given options, actors will choose the alternative with the highest expected utility.
7. Actors possess extensive information on both the available alternatives and likely consequences of their choices.³⁴

These assumptions apply with equal force for all persons.

Deciding to go to war and, conversely, to resolve a conflict are both rational choices for decision makers under certain conditions. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita explained that for national leaders

the selection of war or peace is a choice that is initiated, conducted, and concluded by individual leaders who must accept responsibility for their decisions. . . . Their choices depend on their estimation of costs and benefits.³⁵

Conflict resolution through conciliatory signals could also be an example of rationality.

These psychological assumptions confer certain important advantages to rational choice approaches: parsimony, the availability of equilibrium analysis,³⁶ deductive reasoning, and universality, or interchangeability of

individuals.³⁷ Proponents contend that rationality assumptions allow for *scientific* investigation of politics and enhance our ability to explain and predict human behavior. Indeed, it is this specification about the micro-foundations of political behavior—deductive accounts of individual incentives, constraints, and calculations—that allegedly give rational choice theory its rigor.³⁸

Many political and social scientists question and critique this model of decision making.³⁹ Some assert that the assumption about human behavior derived from economists—that people pursue self-interests subject to information and opportunity costs—does not apply to the realm of politics because most political acts concern public goods that are not explicable in market terms.⁴⁰ In a different vein, cognitive theorists criticize rational choice assumptions because of the limitations on decision making imposed by human cognition. The best-known examples of qualifications to strict rationality are models of “bounded” rationality and theories on the use of heuristics that recognize the limits on humans’ rational processing capabilities.⁴¹ A few theoreticians considered a possible role for emotion in decision making,⁴² but most cognitive theorists either ignore emotion or see its role in decision making as secondary, marginal, or counterproductive. For most, assumptions of rational choice are accepted as an accurate depiction of decision making. Many others accept general rationality as a legitimate approximation of salient political interactions⁴³ or view rationality as a useful assumption that successfully establishes correspondence with observable phenomena.⁴⁴

Rational choice assumptions, in turn, rest on a theory of human cognitive mechanisms that generate this expected behavior—a deeper, natural science microfoundation. The mind is assumed to be essentially content independent, taking its cues from the environment, and domain general; that is, its rational processes operate in the same manner in all domains of human activity. The paradigm sees the mind as a general-purpose computer that embodies rational, that is, universal, decision rules. The same reasoning mechanisms and principles operate regardless of content to address all challenges in one’s environment: “how one acquires a language, how one learns to recognize emotional expressions, . . . how one acquires ideas and attitudes about friends and reciprocity—everything but perception.”⁴⁵ With the exception of certain basic drives such as hunger and thirst, the human mind is content free, not designed to recognize, struc-

ture, or solve certain problems rather than others, but flexible, capable of applying rational rules equally well in any domain. Moreover, rationality refers only to conscious reasoning; it does not include subconscious mental processes and emotions.

Thus, general rationality from Gottfried Leibniz's calculus to Alfred Whitehead and Bertrand Russell's mathematics⁴⁶ maintains that rationality guarantees correctness independent of the material being reasoned about. The expected behavior of universal or general rationality—all individuals always act to maximize their well-being as they understand it, based on their preferences and strategic opportunities—and its assumptions about the human mind as a general-purpose, dispassionate calculator are stringent. The intellectual history of this view dates from the Enlightenment philosophy of progress and individual freedom through reason. This concept has deeper roots in the writings of the ancient Greeks, but it differs from the original Greek meaning of the word whose root *ratio* meant achieving balanced and proportional, not maximum individual, wants.⁴⁷

The rational choice paradigm is silent on the question of why individuals behave in self-interested ways. It offers no explanation for the origins of a self-interested mind. It has great difficulty explaining behavior that is either manifestly not self-interested or emotive (a topic examined in chapter 4).⁴⁸

An Alternative Model: Reconciliation as Forgiveness

An alternative approach asserts what we call the forgiveness hypothesis: reconciliation is part of a process of forgiveness, transforming certain emotions (moving from anger to affinity) and transcending certain beliefs about oneself and the other, that opens the possibility of new, beneficial relations. It begins by observing that reconciliation is a ubiquitous mechanism for solving the enduring problem of sociality. It then builds a model or explanation for this patterned behavior based on an evolutionary theory of the mind that assumes the mind has evolved to solve specific, recurring problems such as how to maintain social relations through integration of emotion and reason.

Specifically, the general forgiveness hypothesis suggests the following: an adaptive problem that humans and our ancestors⁴⁹ encountered for several million years (since they first lived in groups) is the problem of

sociality, how to restore social order and the benefits of affiliation despite inevitable conflicts and injuries. In response, the often-witnessed and variously documented ability to forgive and the process of reconciliation are, hypothetically, modern manifestations of a functionally specialized, emotionally assisted, human problem-solving capability that we possess to explicate ourselves from this recurrent dilemma. Without such a mechanism, Hannah Arendt supposed, “Our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed [conflict] from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever, not unlike the sorcerer’s apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the spell.”⁵⁰

The universality of a problem such as sociality, or evidence of a ubiquitous problem-solving mechanism such as reconciliation, is not proof of an evolved human capability, but it does allow for generating hypotheses about behavior and designing observations and tests that are plausibly consistent with psychology and biology and otherwise would not have been thought of. Procedurally, the method of deriving and examining social science hypotheses from an evolutionary perspective begins by noting the existence of a complexly articulated and recurrent behavioral trait, in this case, reconciliation events. Second, one can ask, deductively, whether the trait could reasonably be the expression of an adaptation; that is, a response to a species-typical problem encountered over several million years of human evolution. If so, we might be witnessing a contemporary manifestation of an evolution-engineered, emotionally influenced problem-solving capability rather than simply the exercise of general reasoning. Human decision making has an emotive dimension that must be accounted for, not just our rational calculations. Third, armed with a plausible hypothesis, the posited behavioral characteristic must be linked with and understood in its cultural, social, or political system.

To appreciate this model it is necessary to elaborate the elements of this theory of the mind, the model’s microfoundation; explain how it includes emotion with calculation; and link it to the forgiveness hypothesis. We turn now to the building blocks of this model.

Cognitive-Behavioral Assumptions of Evolutionary Psychology

Evolutionary psychology,⁵¹ which is informed by evolutionary biology, offers an alternative framework for explaining the reconciliation process

that connects social theory with the natural sciences and attempts to integrate human reasoning with human emotions. This approach begins by assuming that theories of human motivations and behavior must be consistent with the fact that the human mind is an evolved structure, a fact consistent with modern biology.⁵²

Works in evolutionary psychology and neuroscience⁵³ begin by assuming that the human mind, like any other organ, can be understood as an evolved structure⁵⁴ that includes a large collection of functionally specialized, domain-specific mechanisms.⁵⁵ The mind's specific problem-solving capabilities, or circuits, to use the popular metaphor, are adaptations⁵⁶ constructed by natural selection⁵⁷ and other evolutionary processes over time⁵⁸ to cope with regularly occurring reproduction-threatening problems (so-called adaptive problems).⁵⁹ Form follows function. The function of a particular mental design refers to "how it contributed to its own propagation in ancestral environments"⁶⁰; that is, how it addressed particular challenges over long periods of evolution. This is a very different understanding of the function of mental processes than that proposed by rational choice theorists, who posit a general problem-solving mind whose function is to maximize an individual's goals or well-being in response to its *existing* environment. From an evolutionary perspective, rationality of this kind exists as a side effect of a given evolved design, but it can play no role in explaining how such a design came into existence or why it has the organization it does. For example, the ability of mentally agile individuals to play chess derives in part from evolved spatial and navigational abilities. Similarly, our complex inner ear, designed to give us the ability to walk upright, permits the more agile among us to ride skateboards. But our balancing mechanism was not *designed* to enable us to ride skateboards, nor was our rationality designed to play games. The specific problems the mind was designed to solve date to the Pleistocene era, although those ancient problems do not exhaust the range of problems the mind is now capable of solving.

According to an evolutionary view, all normal human minds reliably develop a *collection* of functionally integrated reasoning abilities that interpret experience by providing frames for understanding events in our environment (such as the actions of others), that infer others' motivations and intentions, and that shape one's behavior. The mind possesses "privileged hypotheses" or crib sheets about how the world works, a

phenomenon shared by humans ranging from infants as young as a few hours to adults at various ages and from various cultures.⁶¹ This circuitry, which includes some rational methods, also has other inference procedures that are not universally logical, and both types of procedures or methods help us solve particular problems. These problems include, but are not limited to, acquiring language, recognizing faces and emotions, understanding physical principles, and diagnosing reciprocity and cheating. Moreover, these circuits enable problems to be solved faster and more reliably than a content-free rational computation device could, because a general-purpose computer can make no special assumptions about the problem to be solved and thus is constrained to apply the same methods to solving every problem. Having no privileged hypotheses, general rationality is quickly overtaken by combinatorial explosion. “*Combinatorial explosion* is the term for the fact that with each dimension of potential variation added, or with each new successive choice in a chain of decisions, the total number of alternative possibilities faced by a computational system grows with devastating rapidity.”⁶² Embedded knowledge about specific problems allows the mind to grasp problems much more readily because all possibilities need not be considered. A frame “carves the world into defined categories of entities and properties, defines how these categories are related to each other, suggests operations that might be performed, defines what goals might be achieved. . . .”⁶³ Of importance, a growing body of evidence supports the idea of these specialized,⁶⁴ but not indelibly fixed,⁶⁵ mental domains.

In sum, an evolutionary paradigm suggests that the human mind has developed reliable, specialized mechanisms that are preequipped to know many things about social interactions such as exchanges and threats, emotions, language, and expression, among others. The mind’s flexibility and power result from the large number of specific problem-solving capabilities, not from absence of specific content and application of general rational principles. As David Buss maintained,

A carpenter’s flexibility comes not from having a single, domain-general, “all-purpose tool” for cutting, poking, sawing, screwing, twisting, wrenching, planing, balancing, and hammering, but rather from having many, more specialized tools. It is the number and specificity of the tools in the entire toolkit that give the carpenter great flexibility not a single highly “plastic tool.”⁶⁶

So go human mental faculties as well.⁶⁷

This approach clearly helps us reconcile the functions of the human mind with biological evolution. In addition to a large body of neuroscience that identified modularity in the human brain, this approach is consistent with the fact that evolutionary design generally favors specific organs and mechanisms designed to solve particular tasks.⁶⁸ It has not yet succeeded, however, in fully explaining humans' remarkable behavioral flexibility, including incredibly complex information processing.⁶⁹

The evolutionary psychology account of general problem solving maintains that

Breadth is achieved not by abandoning domain-specific techniques but by adding more of them to the system . . . what is special about the human mind is not that it gave up "instinct" in order to become flexible, but that it proliferated "instincts" [i.e., adaptations] . . . which allowed an expanding role for psychological mechanisms that are (relatively) more function general.⁷⁰

How specific reasoning is additive or compounding and how general rationality works with specific reasoning are not fully resolved. The road to explaining this process, however, cannot proceed without a new understanding of emotion's role in problem solving.

The Role of Emotion

Unlike rational choice theory, which treats emotions as exogenous to, or impediments of, reason, this understanding of the human mind incorporates emotion as well as reasoning in explaining human behavior because emotions are products of an evolutionary process: the results of functional adaptation.⁷¹ Specifically, emotions, it is suggested, identify, establish priorities for, and help solve regulatory problems in, a mind filled with many functionally specialized mechanisms as well as general reasoning ability. Emotions "provide the 'go,' 'stop,' and 'turn' signals needed for much decision making and planning, even in regard to highly abstract topics."⁷² In ways thus far only partially understood, they animate and help coordinate among problem-solving techniques and their appropriate application to situations.⁷³ Chapter 4 provides a fuller explanation of the role of emotion in rationality.

"Emotion" is subject to many definitions and connotations, but it is generally thought to include physiological arousal, sensations of pleasure and/or displeasure, and ideas or cognitive appraisals regarding the source of arousal.⁷⁴ The biological bases of emotions and their interaction with

cognition are explored in chapter 4. Here, it is enough to note that emotion is incorporated into an evolutionary view of problem solving.

Recall that, in evolutionary psychologists' view of the mind, form follows function. Thus, it is presumed that the brain's systems are designed not for cool rationality, but for hot cognition, to respond to crucial events related to survival and reproduction. As such, these theorists assume natural interconnections between affect and cognition.⁷⁵ In general, emotions work hand in hand with cognition and behavior as interrelated parts of a functionally designed system.⁷⁶ Findings in neuroscience increasingly support this proposition.⁷⁷

More specifically, reconciliation occurs when shame and anger that often lead to aggression or a desire for revenge are superceded by a different emotive and cognitive path—empathy and desire for affiliation. Although each of these terms is much debated in psychology and in other fields, for our purposes, anger can be understood as a strong emotion or experiential state ranging from irritation to fury that occurs in response to a real or imagined shame, frustration, threat, or injustice; aggression is an impulse to hurt as a possible response to anger⁷⁸; and revenge is a more deliberate form of aggression.⁷⁹ Empathy implies a realistic understanding resulting from feeling with (not for) another,⁸⁰ and affiliation is a basic human motivation, a desire for belonging with another, even if only to enhance one's own chances for survival.⁸¹

The Forgiveness Model

These assumptions about the human mind and rationality generate a different set of predictions about human behavior and decision making than those of rational choice. Concerning reconciliation, they suggest a forgiveness model in distinction to the signaling model. As stated earlier, the forgiveness hypothesis proposes that reconciliation is a direct outgrowth or manifestation of patterned, emotively driven, problem-solving behavior, not merely rational calculations. Behind this hypothesis is the belief that a general rationality assumption may fail to account fully for conciliatory behavior. Below we describe a forgiveness model that explains how the reconciliation process can take place in a manner consistent with the forgiveness hypothesis.

Before going further, it must be acknowledged that discussing reconciliation this way might seem out of place in discourse about rough-and-

tumble collective power conflicts. We ask the reader to suspend judgment on this score. Without engaging theological or normative approaches to forgiveness and reconciliation, we believe that this topic deserves serious examination by social scientists as a possible mechanism for resolving intergroup conflicts and for maintaining social order.

Furthermore, forgiveness takes time to consummate, and where collectivities are involved, it becomes much more complicated than in the one-on-one model of an injured person and a wrongdoer.⁸² Louis Kriesberg, for example, noted that “After intense struggle between large-scale adversaries, it is not likely that reconciliation will be universal among all members of the opposing sides.”⁸³ Nonetheless, forgiveness and reconciliation have a clear social function—restoring a neutral or more positive relationship after a transgression and reestablishing membership or affiliation in a larger society—that could occur between individuals, between an individual and a group, or between groups.

Behaviorally, the process of forgiveness and reconciliation as described across many different disciplines invariably includes four phases. First, parties to a conflict must recognize shame and anger from a perceived wrong, injustice, frustration, or injury. They must *acknowledge* the harm. “Official investigations, judicial proceedings, artistic productions, and mass media reporting are all ways to face openly what many experience covertly.”⁸⁴ Potential mechanisms for coping with anger typically include conscious or unconscious denial, active or passive expression (aggression or revenge), or forgiveness.⁸⁵ The forgiveness option requires recognition first. As Joanna North explained, “Forgiveness does not remove the fact or event of wrongdoing but instead *relies* upon the recognition of wrong having been committed in order for the process of forgiveness to be made possible.”⁸⁶ One does not forget to forgive, one remembers and forgives.

Second, forgiveness involves a changed understanding of oneself and of the other party to a conflict. Anger from an injury or wrong is closely associated not only with the desire for revenge, but with the “pain of injury,” that is, emotions such as sadness or fear, and damage to one’s self-esteem or identity.⁸⁷ Forgiving involves a self-transformation wherein the party sees itself as something other than a victim and achieves a more complete and balanced identity.⁸⁸

Forgiveness is outwardly directed as well. Specifically, it requires constructing a new identity for the other, the enemy. Analysts describe this

process in both cognitive and emotive language. Cognitively, it involves “reframing” the other, “separating the wrongdoer from the wrong which has been committed. . . . Reframing does not do away with the wrong itself, nor does it deny the wrongdoer’s responsibility for it, but it allows us to regard the wrongdoer in a more complete, more detailed, more rounded way . . .”⁸⁹ The other party is recognized as separate from the injury he or she inflicted, and the humanity of that person is acknowledged by those who have suffered.⁹⁰ In Hannah Arendt’s words, “*what* was done is forgiven for the sake of *who* did it.”⁹¹ In addition, this phase is often described in emotive terms as an “empathic understanding” of the other,⁹² a “willed change of heart,”⁹³ or “metanoia,” a changed state of consciousness.⁹⁴

Third, the parties must forego the option of revenge, however natural, desirable, or justifiable. This forbearance does not require abandonment of all versions of punishment, redress for wrongs or injuries, or abandonment of justice, only willingness to break the cycle of injury and counterinjury.⁹⁵ Retribution for a wrong must be less than total.⁹⁶


Fourth, one or both parties make an offer that results in contact between them and a public expression of forgiveness, with the offer of a renewed but different relationship, what we call a reconciliation event. This reestablishes, at a minimum, mutual affiliation, coexistence,⁹⁷ mutual toleration, or respect.⁹⁸ As Murphy and Hampton described it, it is “at the very least the ‘civil’ relationship that prevails between strangers in a human community.”⁹⁹ Although new, beneficial relations are possible, they are not certain: “Just as forgiveness accepts ambiguity in the past, so it does not seek to resolve all future conflicts ahead of time.”¹⁰⁰ Rather, forgiveness and reconciliation enable members of a society to maintain stability and mutually beneficial affiliation with each other. This resolution may be in the context of high levels of integration or limited interaction.¹⁰¹

In sum, forgiveness requires recognition of harm—truth telling, development of a new understanding of oneself and the other, and willingness to forego prolonging hostility through acts of revenge. It also can include the offer of a renewed community in the future—a reconciliation event.¹⁰² The fundamental argument of the forgiveness model is that although cognitive judgments and strategy are involved in the process of reconciliation, the process fundamentally represents an emotionally cued change to a *specific* problem-solving mechanism that helps us restore relations

in our societal group rather than *general* rational calculation. Although the patterned behavior may vary in practice, one can visualize the stages of forgiveness by considering figure 1.11. Because these elements of forgiveness are themselves processes rather than discrete events, figure 1.12 illustrates the flow of the forgiveness sequence. In reality, all cases may not strictly adhere to such a sequence, but we would expect behavior to follow the general pattern.



Figure 1.11
 Forgiveness model of the reconciliation process.



- Key:
- Truth telling
 - - - - - Partial justice
 - o o o o o o o o Redefinition of identities
 - x x x x x x x x Call for a new relationship

Figure 1.12
 The forgiveness sequence.

Pulling together these insights and applying them to the question of reconciliation and conflict resolution gives us a very different model than that derived from a rational choice perspective. Compare these figures with the signaling model in figure 1.10.

Operationally, examining case studies in terms of the forgiveness model would involve a search for evidence of an acknowledgment of wrong and injury. We would expect to see a change of self-perception or identity from one who was wronged to one of autonomy and equivalence in the relationship. Furthermore, we would anticipate evidence of a change to a more holistic view of the other, expressed either rhetorically or in action, and a call for a new relationship coinciding with, or proximate to, the reconciliation event. Finally, we would expect efforts to find justice short of vengeance and full retribution. Evidence of this behavior would support the forgiveness model.¹⁰³ In practice, all these dimensions of reconciliation may not be fully realizable.¹⁰⁴ We must remember that this model is an ideal of reconciliation as forgiveness.

Organization

The next chapter presents eleven cases of reconciliation events after civil conflicts. The two fundamental models (or general hypotheses)—rational choice signaling and evolutionary psychology forgiveness—and the behavioral patterns they anticipate (our specific hypotheses) will guide the investigation. The chapter concludes by considering the fit between models and cases.

Chapter 3 considers the role of reconciliation in interstate, as opposed to intrastate, war. These eight cases allow a second opportunity to assess the contending models and explore the role and reach of reconciliation in the most diffuse of all societies—the society of states.

Chapter 4 considers in depth the relative merits, similarities, and differences to explaining human decision making between rational choice and evolutionary psychology as approaches to social theory. It reassesses the value and limits of social theory based on established rationality assumptions, and considers an alternative scientific approach to social theorizing based on reintegration of emotion and reasoning. Specifically, it explains how and why emotion should be reincorporated into rationality. Chapter 4 also considers common problems of rational choice and evolutionary

psychology perspectives, the relationship between a constructivist and an evolutionary perspective, and the unfortunate history of attempts to integrate findings from the natural sciences into social theory.

Chapter 5 offers concise, general insights on the role of reconciliation as a tool for conflict resolution practitioners and policy makers. It identifies generic features, drawn from the case studies, of successful reconciliations and considers factors that often facilitate or complicate efforts to conclude social reconciliation. This chapter also identifies avenues for future research on reconciliation and conflict resolution, and suggests other political questions that might be amenable to an approach involving hypotheses derived from the integration of emotion into rationality.

