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Introduction: The Bush Revolution in Rogue Strategy

The precise membership of the club of states that "stand outside the international community,"[1] what they threatened to do to be made part of it, the political rhetoric used to identify and rally support against them, and the various policies proposed or enacted to combat them have evolved from administration to administration. Generally recognized as underdeveloped countries pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and supporting terrorism, these actors have been called everything from outlaw or pariah states[2] to backlash states[3] to rogue states[4] to states of concern[5] and at various times have included Cambodia, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, and Uganda.

The Clinton Department of State's official change in the political lexicon from "rogue states" to "states of concern" in 2000 was the most significant shift as it marked a conscious effort to move away from the ineffective one-size-fits-all strategy that seemed to result from dealing with distinct states collectively as "rogues" and move toward a strategy of "differentiated containment"[6] that treated each potential threat and its unique challenges individually.

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the new threat perception, rhetoric, and security strategy that emerged swung the political pendu-

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lum to the other extreme. In a striking parallel to Ronald Reagan's Cold War reference to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire," President George W. Bush's 2002 State of the Union address candidly redefined the enemy in precisely three parts: "States like [Iran, Iraq, and North Korea], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."[7] The president declared the potential nexus of weapons proliferation and terrorism as the defining criteria: "By seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD), these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred … In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic."[8] To the alarm of much of the international community, the administration's subsequent National Security Strategy made clear that, in a post–September 11 world, the United States would not tolerate inaction. Defeating the new enemy necessitated a new strategy: in the administration's words, "to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."[9]

Together these statements not only pinpointed those international actors perceived by the United States to pose the greatest threats to U.S. interests and international stability but also previewed for the world the lengths the United States would go to defeat them. In the two years that have passed since, the United States has preempted and overturned one government, seeks to foster democratic trends while working with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its European allies to root out nuclear weapons in a second, and continues to balance between isolating and multilaterally building incentives with its Asian partners in the third. Thus, despite the candid, collective categorization of the axis of evil, U.S. policy toward Iraq, Iran, and North Korea has varied greatly.

Reshaping Rogue States presents a variety of perspectives to begin to analyze the common policy trends and the distinct policy options that can address the unique threats posed by each of the so-called axis members. By presenting international and U.S. perspectives on potential future developments and their implications within each rogue state,

among regional players, and in international law in particular, this book encourages you to draw your own conclusion about the recent U.S. policy actions to combat these threats.

Its declared national security strategy of preemption, more than anything, arguably will distinguish the Bush administration from its predecessors in the history books. Whether or not one believes that key players in the administration had visions for preemptively striking and overturning the Saddam Hussein regime prior to the September 11 attacks, the drastic change in the international security context and the emergence of a clear and capable threat to the U.S. homeland precipitated by those attacks set the stage for the United States to shift its foreign policy, along with all of the implications for international law on the use of force.

Although not made quite as explicit or asserted as a doctrine per se, the policy of regime change has emerged as just as central to the Bush administration's overarching rogue strategy in the post–September 11 world. Whether and how U.S. policy should, or legally can, seek a change in the regime—or at least in its behavior[10]—in these axis states has moved to the center of international debate, particularly after being implemented in Iraq.[11] The first two parts of this book grapple with the concepts of preemption and regime change in both real and theoretical terms. Strategists and scholars from around the world examine the underlying implications of states pursuing such policies for international norms on sovereignty and the use of force; ask and begin to answer fundamental questions about what, if anything, justifies such policies; and weigh the benefits of alternative approaches to meeting the new threats indisputably upon us. Parts One and Two therefore introduce a conceptual and global framework for analyzing each of the three case studies that comprise the rest of the book.

The articles in Part One assess preemption's efficacy in deterring the acquisition, distribution, or possible use of weapons of mass destruction; the potential for preemptive threats, as opposed to actual operations, to serve these purposes; and the likely reactions of key international players as well as the axis itself to the United States' bold declaratory

policy. Their responses revealed an array of prospective consequences, international priorities, legal definitions, and policy alternatives.

In their attempts to decipher the strategy, both François Heisbourg and Lawrence Freedman deal directly with the real implications of rhetorical semantics at play, specifically elaborating on the international confusion between a declared strategy of preemption and one, when implemented, that actually looks more like prevention. Heisbourg calls the Bush doctrine a "work in progress" that will require further clarification—in definition and scope—before it can converge with other countries' national security strategies or support. Also arguing the need for clearly distinguishing between the two, Freedman advocates an updated notion of prevention, not preemption or deterrence, as an effective strategy to deal with threats as they develop rather than after it is too late. Anthony Clark Arend's discussion of international law and the use of force analyzes preemption in the paradigm of the UN Charter but ultimately concludes that, for all practical purposes, that paradigm is outdated. He calls on the United States to take the lead in improving it. At the center of each of the three strategist's discussions is the question of "imminence" and what, more specifically, defines an imminent threat in the contemporary strategic context?

The rest of the first section presents strategic alternatives. Jason D. Ellis proposes a comprehensive counterproliferation strategy; in a world that has moved fundamentally beyond five nuclear (and few chemical and biological) weapons states, he argues that the United States must move beyond traditional nonproliferation approaches, as the administration did. Gu Guoliang, in contrast, shifts the discussion from preemption to cooperative security, calling on the United States to work cooperatively with other powers to address the threat of WMD terrorism. Guoliang's objections are clear: in practice, preemption will not work and, in principle, it breaks all existing rules.

Part Two is a collection of articles on the various implications of regime change, what some might argue is the logical extension of preemption in dealing with rogue states. The section opens with Pascal Boniface's discussion of what justifies pursuing a policy of regime change

in the modern world. Are dictatorship, WMD proliferation, genocide, and/or support for terrorism conditions that obligate the international community to enforce a policy of regime change as a last resort? Who decides, and how?

Catherine Lotrionte as well as David B. Rivkin Jr. and Darin R. Bartram then address two different options for regime change from the international legal perspective. Lotrionte provides a comprehensive analysis of when and under what circumstances targeting regime leaders might provide the best policy option. Her article provides the historical, domestic precedents established by prior administrations and the international legal principles for taking such action in the past as well as the moral, legal, and practical criteria policymakers should consider today. Rivkin and Bartram then defend the international legality of military occupation, maintaining that arguments to the contrary are either misinformed about historical precedent and doctrine or are employed as pseudolegalistic assertions to object to a war opposed for other reasons. In the end, they argue, what matters is to legally ensure a lasting peace. Suggesting that a U.S. policy of regime change might not be all that new at all, Barry Rubin closes the section by drawing lessons from the U.S. experience in Iran in 1953 for U.S. efforts toward changing regimes today, particularly in Iraq. Among other lessons, Rubin warns that the real danger may lie not in the U.S. role in initially changing the regime but rather in a long-standing U.S. presence.

The latter half of the book discusses the political, military, regional, and geostrategic dimensions of U.S. policy toward each of the three axis members. In Parts Three and Four on North Korea and Iran, respectively, authors deal with the threats posed by the two remaining members (what some now call the "axle of evil") vilified by the Bush administration in early 2002, while Part Five examines Iraq after Saddam to shed light on the challenges of yet another phase of U.S. rogue policy: post–regime change. Our goal in each of these sections is to promote awareness—in classrooms, governments, and think tanks as well as among the concerned public—of the unique domestic and regional factors that will have to be addressed to effectively thwart the potential threats posed by

each country and the ramifications of pursuing certain policies. At the same time, we hope that you can also discern parallels among the threats and regime behavior of the three as well as international reactions to available policy options to help draw your own conclusions about the direction for future strategy.

The North Korean threat and potential policy responses are the subject of Part Three. Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki outline the incentives behind and a plan for striking a grand bargain with North Korea. They explain how coupling carrots that actually entice with tough demands to address North Korea's nuclear program, reduce its conventional forces, and reform its outdated economic system can begin to transform one of the world's most troubled regions. David Shambaugh then elucidates the driving forces behind China's strategy toward North Korean nuclear advancements, arguing that halting North Korea's nuclear program is not the ultimate end that China hopes to achieve. Rather, China's calculations, interest, and goals are more long term and complicated, leading to a longer hierarchy of objectives. Derek J. Mitchell's blueprint for U.S. policy toward a unified Korea provides guiding principles for planning for this contingency today to help ensure regional stability, precisely because policymakers cannot definitively predict when unification might occur. Finally, Victor D. Cha contends that as the U.S.-South Korea alliance steadily approaches a pivotal reassessment, the focus must be on the future, not just North Korea; policymakers need to stop thinking about the alliance in ad hoc terms and start creating a vision for the future U.S. presence in Northeast Asia generally and in Korea specifically.

Part Four on Iran seeks to shed light on some of those aspects of the Iranian threat that appear to have been overlooked in policy circles thus far and their implications for policy responses. Gary Sick draws attention to a shift in Iranian terrorism away from hostage-taking and targeted assassinations and toward support for radical anti-Israeli groups in Palestine that calls for a different and more creative set of responses by the United States. Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak propose moving the debate on Iran's nuclear developments beyond interna-

tional nonproliferation efforts to include leveraging nuclear politics within Iran, specifically calling for ways to generate real debate among the Iranian public about the state's nuclear future. Both Ali M. Ansari and Mahmood Sariolghalam appeal to U.S. policymakers to move beyond oversimplifications and stereotypes in dealing with this country's complex polity. Ansari's historical analysis suggests that regime change in Iran has been a continuous process and that the democratic tendency introduced during the Constitutional Revolution in 1906 may not have lost its way, while Sariolghalam disabuses misconceptions, including those about the nature of political Islam in the country. Sariolghalam concludes that Washington needs to look beyond 2010, when groups that will compete to advance Iran's national interests, economic prosperity, and political openness will manage the country.

The four final chapters of the book address the challenges the United States continues to face in post-Saddam Iraq. Steven Metz tackles the ongoing insurgency specifically, outlining the intractable dilemma of promoting insurgency if the United States stays or instability if it leaves. He advocates implementing six principles as the basis for a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy to forestall the threat. Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack then grapple with the strategic possibility of making democracy work in Iraq; they conclude that the transition will be difficult but not impossible and that the stakes make it imperative. Dawn M. Brancati goes one layer deeper into the democratization debate by making her case for establishing federalism in Iraq as the only means to prevent ethnic conflict and secessionism. She explains how and why three principles in particular must shape the development of a specific kind of federalism for peace and stable democracy to prevail. Finally, Jon B. Alterman discusses the U.S. vision for Iraq and the region more broadly from the perspective of Iraq's neighbors. Not only do these Middle Eastern countries find U.S. plans and especially U.S. rhetoric deeply troubling, he argues they also have the means to keep them from coming to pass.

The various chapters of *Reshaping Rogue States* by no means cover all the intricacies and challenges that have arisen thus far or that will con-

tinue to emerge as the United States moves forward in its campaign to combat threats posed by states that support terrorism and/or seek WMD now or in the future. It also does not provide any specific insight into potential challenges presented by other states beyond the three axis members branded in early 2002. Moreover, the articles presented here collectively do not advocate any single policy prescription nor do they draw any uniform conclusions about the administration's rogue strategy more broadly.

Rather, the objective is to provide you, the reader, with the background and diversity of international perspectives to be able to come to your own conclusions. In dealing exclusively with the twin policies of preemption and regime change and the three states targeted, at least rhetorically, we hope that this book will encourage readers to identify the parallels and the differences among these three challenges to international order and, where appropriate, draw on historical lessons to help combat their threats without creating new threats in the process.

In the aftermath of the conflict in Iraq, it remains to be seen whether the so-called Bush doctrine of preemption and regime change will be overtly applied to Iran, North Korea, or any future threats. History may record that only Iraq's regime was preemptively changed because of its potential to spread WMD technology to terrorist networks. Nevertheless, that decision has altered the realm of what is considered possible. New calculations are undoubtedly being made within potential rogue targets and among prospective U.S. partners while new policy tools are being considered to help improve the array of options available for combating unprecedented and increasingly complex threats in the future.

Whether you agreed with the decision to overthrow Saddam's regime or not, the policy landscape has forever been redesigned by it. Should Iran's or North Korea's regime be preemptively changed? Under what circumstances would international law allow it? What other options are available? What lessons and new challenges are emerging in Iraq? The goal of *Reshaping Rogue States* is not to answer these questions definitively but to provide a range of expertise that helps all readers begin to understand and improve the policy options available to combat the

threats posed by WMD in the hands of terrorists or of these regimes ... whatever you or the U.S. administration chooses to call them.

Notes

1. Thomas H. Henriksen, "The Rise and Decline of Rogue States," *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 2 (spring 2001): 349.
2. Ibid., p. 354; Robert S. Litwak, "What's in a Name? The Changing Foreign Policy Lexicon," *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 2 (spring 2001): 377.
3. Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 45–46.
4. Bill Clinton, "Remarks to Future Leaders of Europe in Brussels, January 9, 1994," *Public Papers of the Presidents, William J. Clinton, Volume 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 11.
5. See U.S. Department of State, "Daily Press Briefing, DPB #61," June 19, 2000, http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/0006/000619sb.html (accessed March 18, 2004). See also Steven Muffson, "A 'Rogue' is a 'State of Concern,'" *Washington Post*, June 20, 2000, p. A16.
6. See Zbigniew Brezinski, Brent Scrowcroft, and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 20–30.
7. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," January 29, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (accessed March 18, 2004).
8. Ibid.
9. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. 15, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed March 18, 2004).
10. Some statements by administration officials were interpreted to mean that Saddam's disarmament, even if he remained in power, might constitute regime change. See, for example, Joyce Howard Price, "Saddam Could Stay in Power," *Washington Times*, October 21, 2002.
11. For an exceptional discussion of regime change and its potential to be used to prevent proliferation, see Robert S. Litwak, "Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change," *Survival* 45, no. 4 (winter 2003–04): 7–32.