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CIAO DATE: 06/05

The Logic of Political Survival

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow

MIT Press

October 2003

 

Abstract

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.

The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Professor of Politics at New York University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution

Alastair Smith is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University.

Randolph M. Siverson is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis.

James D. Morrow is Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the University of Michigan.

 

Table of Contents

Preface

I A Theory Of Political Incentives

  1. Reigning in the Prince (PDF, 34 pgs, 158 KB)

  2. The Theory: Definitions and Intuition

II Policy Choice And Political Survival

  1. Institutions for Kleptocracy or Growth

  2. Institutions, Peace, and Prosperity

  3. War, Peace, and Coalition Size

  4. Political Survival

III Choosing Institutions

  1. Institutional Preferences: Change from Within

  2. The Enemy Outside and Within:War and Changes of Leaders and Regimes

  3. Promoting Peace and Prosperity

Notes

References

Index