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The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela
2000
6. Patterns of Adjustment: Opportunities and Constraints
Adjustment had become the main feature of Hamas’s political conduct. Its strategies of controlled violence, negotiated coexistence, and calculated participation all reflected Hamas’s effort to avoid making a decision about its conflicting commitments to an all-Islamic vision and a Palestinian nation, on the one hand, and to communal interests, on the other. Whereas an all-Islamic vision would mean a strategy of confrontation with Israel, the PLO, and the PA, local communal considerations would encourage Hamas to adjust to the changing circumstances and acquiesce in the political reality.
Hamas’s strategies reflected a perception based on neither a full acceptance nor a total rejection of the political order emanating from the Oslo accords and the establishment of the PA. Although Hamas made its struggle with Israel a religious duty, it did not lose sight of its sociopolitical interests. A sense of political realism and “here and now” considerations were signs of pragmatism. Hamas’s thrust toward extremism was balanced by its awareness of political constraints and structural limitations. Hamas refused to accept the basic assumptions or to officially recognize the consequences of the peace process. But it did not seek an all-out confrontation with the emerging new political order prompted by the PA- Israeli dialogue. Thus the Hamas discourse represented its inclination to stick to its ideological premises and pursue its long-term goal of establishing an alternative social and moral order, but it also demonstrated its implicit acceptance of the current political circumstances. And as Hamas strove to preserve its image as a highly doctrinaire, activist movement, it displayed considerable ability to adjust to the new reality. Hamas, then, continued to name armed struggle as its sole strategy of national liberation from the Israeli occupation, but it did not rule out the possibility of indirectly joining the new Palestinian political order. Hamas refused to accord legitimacy to the PA and yet recognized it as a fait accompli; it rejected Israel’s right of existence and yet showed its pragmatism by being willing under certain conditions to tolerate a temporary coexistence. For the same reasons, Hamas publicly rejected official participation in the PA’s institutions because of the symbolic ramifications of such a move. In practice, however, Hamas encouraged its members to take part as individuals in building the Palestinian society by joining the civil service and the PA’s operational apparatus.
In a cost-benefit analysis, Hamas’s politics of adjustment carried tangible advantages at a minimal organizational price and at a tolerable normative sacrifice. A policy of adjustment protected Hamas from being marginalized because of its dogmatic adherence to maximalist goals or because of its ignoring the far-reaching changes in Israeli-Palestinian relations. At the same time, it prevented a head-on collision with Israel and the PA, which could have caused the movement’s demise. From Hamas’s viewpoint, there were certainly enough incentives for following a strategy of political adjustment. The question is how the movement managed to find a middle way between the two radical options, each of which could have exacted an intolerable price. How could Hamas maintain its militant, uncompromising image and continue to take pride in its public achievements in the face of deep disagreement and bitter conflicts between internal rivals that sometimes erupted into violence? To answer these questions, we must examine Hamas’s structural and organizational characteristics, their effect on the decision-making processes, and the leadership’s ability to justify pragmatic moves in religious terms.
Compared with the PLO, Hamas was at a marked disadvantage. Hamas was a newly established political movement whose leaders were local and inexperienced. Its material resources were limited, and its international contacts were few. In contrast, by the 1980s the PLO was widely recognized and diplomatically established in both the Middle East and the rest of the world, having been granted official diplomatic recognition or some form of representation by more than eighty nations. 1 In many political circles, the idea that a political settlement of the Palestinian problem could be achieved without the PLO’s participation had become inconceivable. The PLO was the only nongovernmental body to gain observer status in the United Nations, and it had managed to get a series of anti-Israeli resolutions passed by the General Assembly. 2 It also had emerged as a significant force in Middle East politics; thus the notion that a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict would require a solution to the Palestinian problem had firmly taken root. After losing its territorial stronghold in Lebanon in the 1982 war, the PLO nevertheless was able to maintain its position as a key player in Middle East politics, and its status as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people remained unchallenged.
The PLO’s political achievements reflected primarily the efforts of its largest and dominant faction, Fatah. Under Arafat’s leadership, Fatah managed to unify the main Palestinian groups under a national umbrella organization and achieve a consensus around a common national platform. The PLO sanctioned each faction’s autonomy and, under Fatah’s leadership, insisted on the principle of independence of Palestinian decision making, despite the tireless efforts of Arab states to dominate the PLO and impose their preferences on it. The PLO’s achievements were echoed by its intensive political activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially after the 1973 war. These activities took the form of political, social, and political penetration; institution building; and the control of students, workers, and welfare and charity associations. The PLO thus became a symbol of Palestinian national identity and of aspirations for independence and statehood.
During the 1970s, the PLO also created interorganizational mechanisms of collaboration to mitigate conflicts, manage tensions, and deal effectively with noncompliance. Although ideological cleavages, political mistrust, and suspicion had not disappeared, no serious Palestinian political or military group existed outside the PLO’s sphere of influence. All the major groups were either affiliated with or identified with the PLO. It had become the dominant force in Palestinian political life, and its symbolic status, charismatic leadership, and political influence among the Palestinian people were beyond question.
In the late 1980s, when Hamas emerged as a significant political element in the occupied territories, the PLO was already internationally recognized and represented as a state-in-the-making in control of military and civil institutions and financial resources. Moreover, despite the loss of its Lebanese territorial base in 1982, the PLO continued to maintain an institutional presence in refugee camps, among students, and in other Palestinian communities in the diaspora. Despite not having sovereignty, the PLO became the supreme national authority and the nucleus of the Palestinian state-to-be. Indeed, even though the Intifada accorded Hamas clear advantages—simply for having its leadership and institutions in the territories—Hamas could not match Fatah in terms of human, military, and political resources. Under these circumstances, an all-out confrontation with Fatah would have been disastrous for Hamas’s social and communal institutions. Hence, Hamas repeatedly warned its activists against internal violence, turning this prohibition into a normative limitation in its rivalry with Fatah.
The potential for such a confrontation, and the damage that it would cause, soared after the Oslo agreement was signed, when the Fatah leadership, with its military and civilian apparatuses, moved into the Gaza Strip and Jericho and assumed the status of a self-governing authority backed by Israel. Moreover, as Hamas was aware, the PLO’s political experience with the West Bank after 1973 suggested that whenever the PLO adopted a pragmatic approach and preferred “here and now” considerations over “hereafter” calculations, it won broad public support. Supported by the PLO’s institutional penetration, the notion of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza was deemed by the Palestinian inhabitants to be a realistic solution. This shift in the PLO’s policy during the 1970s enhanced its stature in the occupied territories in the face of the prevalent pro-Hashemite political sentiments. The Oslo accords produced the same impact, as they represented a historical rapprochement between the PLO and Israel. Taking into account the balance of power between Hamas and the PLO, one may argue (1) that Hamas had a sufficient incentive to pursue the politics of adjustment that represented pragmatism and compromise and (2) that a prolonged adoption of strategies of political adjustment could lead to greater institutionalization and routinization at the expense of revolutionary fervor and political and military activism. More specifically, a policy of adjustment might lead gradually to Hamas’s acceptance of the PA as a legitimate authority and to its direct participation in PA institutions. In the long run, such a development might diminish Hamas’s claim to be a normative and political alternative to the PA. Yet, however persuasive the arguments for being pragmatic, we cannot exclude the possibility that under certain circumstances, Hamas turn to a policy of confrontation with either or both Israel and the PA. So, to answer the question of whether Hamas would follow pragmatic strategies or turn to violence, we must examine the movement’s structural features and organizational tenets that affected its political thinking, shaped its conduct, and influenced its strategic choices.
Strategies and Structures
Hamas’s adoption of a strategy of political adjustment can be explained in terms of its ability to bridge the gap between opposing considerations of practical needs and normative requirements, representing its dual commitment to both sociocommunal values and religious-nationalist beliefs. As a religious and national movement self-perceived as the sole moral and political alternative to the existing order, Hamas had to maintain its radical image, which is identified with a strategy of all-out confrontation. Yet as a social movement, Hamas had to take into account issues closer to home. Accordingly, Hamas was effectively compelled to develop a way to maneuver politically despite its radical Islamic and national vision and its claim to be able to realize its vision through violent means.
Hamas was able to bridge the gap between its official dogma and “here and now” considerations as long as it justified pragmatic moves in normative terms and engaged in pragmatic initiatives that carried tolerable organizational risks. Islamic argumentation played an important role in legitimizing its pragmatic conduct. Such argumentation probably helped the rank and file accept these moves and reduced the risk of division within the movement. The concept of sabr is a typical example of Hamas’s inclination to use a normative justification for its political inaction toward, or acquiescence in, an accepted reality that might have been regarded as a deviation from religious dogma.
Sabr enabled the Hamas leadership to justify its ongoing efforts to build an Islamic society from below, according legitimacy to the movement’s preference for long-term religious and communal activities over a short-term, avant-garde vision of revolution from above. It was in this context that Hamas distinguished between a permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, which it unequivocally rejected, and a temporary settlement, which it deemed tolerable; between a short-term policy necessitating the temporary delay of its ultimate goals in accordance with circumstances and constraints and a long-term strategy based on firm adherence to Islamic radical vision; and between willingness to accept ad hoc arrangements of coexistence as the lesser evil and denial of the PLO’s and PA’s legitimacy. Sabr thus served as a normative device of legal interpretation, providing Hamas with a measure of maneuverability to minimize the negative effects of deviating from the official dogma, which called for pragmatic moves and responses. At the same time, this device reduced the chance of effective, prolonged opposition from within.
Nevertheless, Hamas’s institutional landscape and its structure indicate that the movement suffered from intrinsic limitations in ensuring a viable base of support for its strategy of political adjustment. If Hamas did succeed in turning to pragmatic action without being seriously hurt by accusations of deviating from Islamic dogma and Palestinian nationalist norms, this would be the result of the surrounding political environment rather than Hamas’s own institutional capabilities. Arguably, then, far-reaching developments in the region’s political environment and significant local changes might weaken Hamas’s ability to maintain a strategy of political adjustment and pragmatic thinking.
Like other social movements and political organizations, much of Hamas’s inter- and intraorganizational activity is grounded in its hierarchical structure and interpersonal relations. Without sovereignty and political independence, traditional affiliations and loyalties have become critical factors in Hamas’s public activities, as they are often based on personal acquaintance, family blood, or physical proximity to or close affiliation with a site of prayer or a religious figure. But compared with other organizations, what stands out in the case of Hamas is the tension between the movement’s formal and informal elements, between its religious- national vision and communal needs, as well as the tension emanating from the power struggle between “outside” and “inside” over Hamas’s leadership and institutions. This tension increased significantly after 1989 when the movement’s headquarters and staff gradually moved abroad as a defensive measure to secure freedom of action and reduce its susceptibility to Israeli repressive measures. The technocratic, “outside” leadership preferred a formal and hierarchical structure, choosing clandestine activities and organizations like the secular revolutionary movements to which some of Hamas’s senior members had belonged before shifting to Islamic radicalism. Hamas’s organizational structure made the “outside” leaders paramount, and the local leaders were organized informally based on ties of solidarity and traditional attachments.
Therefore, much of Hamas’s structure during this formative period continued to play a significant role afterward as well. Its characteristics derived from the activity of al-Mujamma` al-Islami, which was established in Gaza in 1973. As a popular religious organization, the Mujamma` strove to create an Islamic space in which to build a community of believers to be ruled by the shari`a. The Mujamma`’s activities were aimed toward preparing the way for the establishment—at an indefinite time—of an Islamic state.
The Mujamma` focused on education, preaching, and communal activity, leading to an increased effort to form autonomous social enclaves based on the principle of self-sufficient systems parallel to those of the state. The Mujamma` formed institutions to provide educational, medical, sports, and material services for the needy, most of which revolved around the mosques in the main refugee camps of the Gaza Strip—Jabaliya, Nusairat, Shati', Dair al-Balah, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. 3
As a local movement, the Mujamma`’s interpersonal networks and interactions, based on friendship, reputation, and trust rather than on hierarchy, played an important role in building organizational infrastructure and mobilizing resources and public support. Indeed, the Mujamma` was affected less by authoritative, bureaucratic, and vertical relations and a hierarchical chain of command than by group interaction and lateral relations based primarily on solidarity among the participants, self- identification as a collective unit, a common background, and a sharing of basic knowledge and values. 4
The informal relations within the Mujamma` also determined its organization. Thus, the leaders’ success in attracting new members, expanding its popular support, and securing obedience and compliance from its followers depended on personal, charismatic virtues rather than coercive means. The archetypal leader was Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, the founder of the Mujamma` together with others such as Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Mahmud al-Zahar, and `Abd al-`Aziz Rantisi. The ability of these charismatic leaders to command both obedience and compliance depended more on persuasive ability and less on coercion, more on the controlled use of symbolic and beneficial rewards than on the threat of sanctions and punishment. This pattern of informal activity derived also from the Muslim Brothers’ tradition which, under the influence of Sufism, remained aloof from politics and formal state institutions, emphasizing instead education and elitist Islamic scholarship. 5
Hamas was founded as an Islamic and Palestinian nationalist movement at the beginning of the Intifada, reflecting a turn to territorialization. Its quest for the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state covering all of Mandatory Palestine by means of armed struggle—as an alternative to the PLO’s two-state solution—encouraged the movement to develop formal civilian and military institutional capabilities.
Hamas’s emphasis on a popular uprising and controlled violence to mobilize the people required a structure based on vertical relations and a hierarchical chain of command. Moreover, Hamas’s goal of political domination and normative hegemony led to its expansion from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank. To the intensified mass action that characterized the Intifada, Hamas responded with more bureaucracy and a more formal structure than the pre-Intifada al-Mujamma` al-Islami featured.
Hamas’s need for a more formal structure was also dictated by external constraints. Israel’s repressive policy during the Intifada, especially after the outlawing of Hamas and the massive arrests of its cadres in May and June 1989, led the movement to seek more effective measures to secure its survival and continue its activities, hence its emphasis on discipline, secrecy, compartmentalization, and hierarchy. Interpersonal interactions based on trust and persuasion were no longer sufficient, although they continued to affect relationships in regard to both civil and military actions.
Hamas’s competition with the PLO also drove it toward a hierarchical structure and infrastructure building. It was after the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 that the PLO began its intensive political activity in the occupied territories. In later years, the organization gained popular support and secured powerful positions in municipal bodies, student groups, trade unions, and charity and welfare organizations. Its institutional inroads were matched by its ideological success, and the PLO emerged as a source of political inspiration for the population, as both the embodiment of Palestinian national aspirations and an ideological guide to the labyrinthine politics of the Palestinian and inter-Arab systems. More often than not, the PLO and the Palestinian issue were seen as inseparable.
The PLO’s institutional domination of the occupied territories became clear during the Intifada. And it was this institutional penetration that enabled the PLO to mobilize public support for both violent and nonviolent measures initiated by local activists. Therefore, in order for Hamas to secure a prominent position in the Palestinian population, it had to establish a countrywide bureaucratic apparatus and an institutional network. These could improve Hamas’s capability to compete with the PLO for public support, using both practical and coercive means to ensure the population’s compliance.
In addition to the military and organizational constraints imposed on Hamas by Israel and the PLO, a key factor was the geographic separation and sociopolitical differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a result of the Israeli-Arab war of 1948, the West Bank became part of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip was governed by Egypt. The unique political conditions and particular social and economic circumstances that developed in each region resulted in two different communities. True, following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 the enforced unification of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under Israeli occupation helped narrow the differences and strengthen common political and social values. But the new political circumstances could not obliterate the differences between and contradictory interests of the two regions. Since 1967, the Gaza Strip had been a more violent society than the West Bank. Gaza was more economically distressed, demographically saturated, dense with refugees, and more religious than the West Bank.
Politically, the differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967 were reflected in the continuing Jordanian influence over the Islamic establishment in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. With Israel’s tacit agreement, the Muslim waqf—the body in charge of religious endowments—and Muslim judicial apparatuses continued to operate as part of the Jordanian Ministry of the Awqaf, leaving the Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) under Jordan’s supervision. 6 Since the West Bank was made part of the Hashemite Kingdom in April 1950, Amman’s official policy had been marked by a tacit alliance with the Muslim Brothers (MB) against both pan-Arab movements and communism. In East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the waqf apparatus supported the MB through charitable committees (lijan al-zakat) which operated in most of the towns and villages, as well as through appointments of preachers and other clergy. 7 Following the war of 1967, Jordan’s efforts to preserve its standing in the religious establishment and the PLO’s struggle for the civic domain led the MB to increase its organizational efforts and to restructure its institutions in order to compete with the PLO.
The record of Hamas’s activities, both violent and nonviolent, during the Intifada indicated its awareness of the need to design those activities according to its formal organizational structure. Hamas’s growing involvement with the people in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank amid competition with the United National Command (UNC) and confrontation with Israel, encouraged it to become less complex, avoid conflicting commands, and ensure control by the leadership. Similarly, Hamas created an organizational infrastructure based on horizontally and vertically differentiated positions. Vertically, positions are linked to a hierarchical chain of command—instructions go down and compliance reports go up—and are controlled by supervisors with a fixed number of subordinates, each of whom has one clearly identified supervisor to whom he is responsible. Horizontally, various tasks are grouped according to the functions performed for the organization. 8
Hamas’s organizational infrastructure is meant to function in accordance with the principles of bureaucratic hierarchy. It includes internal security, military activities, political activities (protests, demonstrations, etc.), and Islamic preaching (da`wa). All four units have separate regional headquarters in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The security apparatus (al-majd) was first established in 1986 as part of the Mujamma`, its main function to gain control of the local population, to “gather information on suspected collaborators with the [Israeli] authorities and [those] who deviated from the Islamic path—thieves, drug dealers, pimps, and traffickers in alcohol drinks and pornographic videocassettes—and their punishment by physical damage to their bodies or property.” 9 During the Intifada, the security apparatus’s functions expanded to include the printing and distribution of Hamas leaflets as well as the execution of Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel. 10 The military apparatus had already been established before the Intifada, as secret military cells of al-Mujamma` al-islami, known as “the Islamic Holy Warriors.” During the first three years of the Intifada, the military squads were operated by separate regional headquarters in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The military apparatus, however, came to be associated with `Izz al-Din al-Qassam units, which were established in 1992 and were immediately identified with the spectacular terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians. Hamas set up its political activity unit in the early days of the Intifada. Its assignment was to be “responsible for the daily activity of the Intifada: stoning, building barricades, burning tires, starting demonstrations, writing slogans, enforcing strikes, extending first aid to the wounded during curfews, and making peace among the residents.” 11
Unlike other Hamas activities, the main role of the da`wa is the Islamization of the community by means of social mobilization and religious preaching. The da`wa was mentioned in the Qur'an (14: 46) as God’s “call” to humans to find in Islam their true religion. The da`wa activities are concentrated around the mosques and include religious, educational, sports, and social activities, as well as the recruitment of candidates for training as members of Hamas.
From the outset, Hamas invested its chief organizational efforts and financial resources in education, religious preaching, and welfare (including support for families of martyrs and of prisoners in Israeli jails). Hamas’s educational activities are offered to children and youth from kindergarten through primary and secondary school all the way to postsecondary education. “A Guide for the Muslim Student,” distributed to students involved in da`wa in 1992, states:
The student should say: I did not come to school only to study . . . even if I have to do that as a Muslim, for I must find the narrow path between my studies and the da`wa for Allah, for which we were created by Allah. Always remember! The da`wa for Allah is the highest and most honorable act—it is the duty of the Prophet and his followers; those preaching for da`wa are like the stars in heaven leading the errant back to the straight and narrow path. 12
In an internal document dating from the middle of 1992 and entitled “A General Plan for da`wa Activity,” Hamas outlined its annual program to teach Islam to schoolchildren. The program includes producing a monthly publication, organizing competitions on religious topics, enlisting Muslim Brothers to teach in the schools, and arranging activities for students in their free time. It also calls for establishing “houses of the Qur'an,” a network operating from mosques and serving as a forum for public seminars and setting up extracurricular workshops in Qur'anic studies for children and youth after school.
Aside from disseminating da`wa through written publications—books, pamphlets, personal letters, and articles in widely circulating newspapers—Hamas attributes great importance to oral communication, using public occasions for religious preaching. These occasions include family events such as weddings or funerals, reconciliations between rival families, participation in public lectures and symposia, lectures on religious issues, sermons (especially on Fridays and holidays), and plays bearing a religious message. Hamas also organizes discounted book sales and distributed stickers and cassettes and movies of religious interest.
The movement has formed administrative bodies to provide medical and educational services, which constitute the core of its communal infrastructure. The Scientific Medical Association, which was established as a counter to the Palestinian Red Crescent—a stronghold of the left in Gaza Strip—coordinates the activities of medical infirmaries, dental facilities, and the blood bank. The association charges a nominal fee for its services or offers them free of charge to the needy. In addition, Hamas operates the Association for Sciences and Culture, which coordinates education from kindergarten up to secondary school, taking care to include Islamic religious values at all levels of schooling. As a popular movement, Hamas operates a vast propaganda machine, coordinated by the Supreme Council for Islamic Information, which is in charge of media coverage of Hamas and its activities, relations with the international press, and a press agency (al-Quds Press), with bureaus abroad and in major Palestinian cities. 13
In addition, Hamas is broadly involved with the workers, especially in urban neighborhoods. The Islamic Workers Union, which Hamas established in July 1992, organizes lectures on Islamic labor laws, which are accompanied by religious preaching. Hamas also works closely with graduates of Islamic universities and colleges, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Association of the [Islamic] Scholars of Palestine (Rabitat `ulama' filastin), which was formed in the summer of 1991, later was established as an official institution with eighty members. It was to serve as the supreme religious authority in charge of persuading the educated classes of Islam’s superiority as a way of life. But it disbanded shortly after it was established, perhaps because of the “outside” leadership’s opposition. The latter apparently preferred to rely on an external religious advisory council (majlis shura, see later)—whether really existing or just imagined—that would be more amenable to its influence.
To consolidate its civilian activities, Hamas offers a training program for members who are then assigned various public responsibilities. The trainees fast for three days a month, and within two months each trainee must complete the following tasks: read a book, organize a meeting on a religious topic, watch a video movie, participate in an outing with other trainees, take part in religious lessons for the public, and contribute to a cultural publication by writing for it or distributing it.
In addition to labor’s functional division, there was also a vertical geographical division. The Gaza Strip was divided into seven districts and the West Bank into five. Each district was divided into subdistricts, which were further divided into local units of villages or refugee camps. Each unit was headed by a supervisor who was responsible for two or three cells. At the district level, there also were committees on education, publications, finance, and prisoners. The prisoners’ committee was established to support prisoners’ families financially, paying for detainees’ legal defense, and transferring “canteen money” to jails. 14
Hamas’s units are carefully compartmentalized.
Every drafted person, every district and unit, was identified by a number and a code. Members of each cell knew only their cellmates and their supervisor. Members of each unit could communicate with one another but not with members in other districts. Communication between different units operating in separate districts was to be conducted through the security apparatus’s members, who acted as couriers. 15
In practice, Hamas’s political leadership in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and abroad is occasionally surprised by military actions against Israel about which it had no prior knowledge. Some of the “inside” leaders often claim that the military units were operating independently rather than on external or high-level political orders. 16 Such claims are meant, first, to give the impression that the political leadership has nothing to do with terrorist actions and thus should be exempt from accusations that could make Hamas’s community infrastructure vulnerable to retaliation by Israel or the PA. In fact, such claims are not entirely groundless. At least some terrorist acts against Israelis were carried out by individuals acting on their own for religious or personal reasons.
Indeed, during the Intifada, Hamas’s ability to operate as a hierarchical organization suffered serious damage. Despite the difficulties of penetrating such a highly motivated movement as Hams, Israel’s intelligence agencies repeatedly exposed Hamas’s planning or operational military groups while its repressive measures of detainment and deportation weakened the senior and middle leadership. Consequently, the grassroots activists—young, educated, militant, charismatic figures, often from the lower middle class—had a disproportionate amount of influence and freedom of action in their constituencies. That these men were willing to risk their lives in military activities against Israel and then to go underground for months or years to escape detainment by the Israelis have made them national heroes.
The members of the military apparatus are thus distinctly different from both the “inside” and “outside” political leaders because of their age as well as their social and professional background. This discrepancy might help explain the frequent irregularities in Hamas’s hierarchical order and even the violations of its official leadership’s policies. Hamas’s pattern of decentralized organization is expressed in local initiatives that often contradict the official policy and instructions of the top leadership. This is most strikingly manifested in the execution of Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel or of immoral conduct and violation of Islamic norms. These individual initiatives occasionally embroil the movement as a whole in conflict with other organizations, primarily Fatah.
The diminished ability of Hamas’s senior leaders to maintain control over the rank and file, and the growing stature of the young local activists, underscores the organic nature of Hamas’s structure:
The organic nature of local activities sometimes has led to dramatic results, highlighting the discrepancy between the activists’ low hierarchical status and the outcome of their nonauthorized initiatives. Furthermore, given the absence of clear hierarchical norms, so prevalent in Islamic movements, it is likely that the thrust toward an organic structure will widen the gulf between the central leadership and the rank and file, resulting in the local power centers challenging the leaders’ moral and political status.
What prevented this organizational disharmony between the central and local leaders from deteriorating even further is the fact that it is operational rather than ideological. As long as the Intifada continued and the expulsion of Israel from the occupied territories topped Hamas’s agenda, differences and disagreements among the movement’s various groups were treated more as tactics than as principle. Indeed, during the Intifada it was because of external political developments that Hamas, despite the gap between radical militancy and more controlled activity, was spared the need to adopt policies that might have been interpreted as a major deviation from its religious dogma. Consequently, the possibility that the differences would lead to an organizational split and cause structural chaos was drastically diminished.
The Logic of Structural Reorganization
The arrest in 1989 of Hamas’s leader, Ahmad Yasin, brought to an end the era during which the movement’s leaders came exclusively from within. The vacuum that opened in the senior- and middle-level leadership was filled mostly by deportees from the territories, technocrats in liberal professions, mostly in their late thirties and early forties. Many were former disciples of Yasin, and some had been granted scholarships by the Mujamma` to study abroad. These men, of whom Abu Marzuq was typical, were able to gain legitimacy and assume authority based on the organizational and leadership skills they demonstrated when the movement experienced crises, as well as their ability to raise funds from supportive governments and communities worldwide for “inside” civilian and military activities. Here, too, the links between the delegates outside the leadership and the local activists are based on personal acquaintances and are supported by Hamas’s senior activists in Israeli prisons. Indeed, activists from abroad often come to the West Bank and Gaza with lists of names of the movement’s members or of those tapped for key positions, along with instructions and ready cash. 18
Compared with the “inside” members, the “outside” leadership consists of relatively young, educated technocrats who belong to the radical groups within Hamas. The “outside” activists subscribe to a vision of political Islamism—that is, a revolution from above—rather than with religious revelation through ordinary processes of communal activity. However, they do not have to cope with the reality of Israeli occupation, the PA’s domination, and the daily hardships of the Palestinian community, which might explain why they can afford to adopt a harder line concerning the armed struggle and the Oslo process. This radical perception, coinciding with the militancy of the rank and file in the occupied territories, helped the “outside” Hamas to reorganize the movement’s activity into a hierarchical order following the mass arrests of 1989. This initiative was designed to give the “outside” leadership control over the “inside” and secure the subordination of the latter’s operational ranks.
Standing at the top of the pyramid in Hamas’s new organizational order are two bodies, both based outside the occupied territories: the Advisory Council (Majlis shura), and the Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-siyasi). The Advisory Council is thought to have twelve members, the majority non-Palestinians. 19 It serves as the supreme religious authority, its principal role being to provide normative backing and moral justification for Hamas’s political conduct and major decisions. Officially, the council’s decisions are based on a majority vote. 20 In practice, however, the council does not operate as a collective body; rather, issues under discussion are referred to a council member able to offer expert advice.
Unlike the amorphous structure of the Advisory Council, the Political Bureau functions as an executive body that has obtained more control over and greater obedience and compliance from Hamas’s rank and file. The bureau’s ten members are responsible for directing Hamas policies and adjusting them to conform with the shifting realities. Until his deportation from Jordan and subsequent arrest in the United States in 1995, Dr. Musa Abu Marzuq served as the head of the Political Bureau. It was under his energetic leadership that Hamas became capable once more of acting and conducting a dialogue with the PLO, other Islamic movements, and Arab governments. 21 The acting head of the bureau was Khalid Mash`al, who replaced Abu Marzuq following the latter’s arrest, and a failed attempt on his life was made by the Israeli Mossad in October 1997. Other leading figures were the Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghawsha and Hamas’s representatives in Jordan (Muhammad Nazzal), Iran (`Imad al-`Alami, until early 1998), Syria (Mustafa Qanu`, until early 1998), Lebanon, and Sudan.
Like the members of the Advisory Council, all the bureau’s members reside outside the occupied territories, mainly in neighboring Arab countries. Usually they are well educated and in white-collar professions and maintain close contact with other Islamic movements as well as with Palestinian communities abroad. Jordan, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia are among the states helping, or encouraging, Hamas to maintain a visible presence. In addition, members of the Political Bureau have been able to obtain financial support from Palestinian and Muslim communities in the United States and Britain. It is this fund-raising ability that may explain the bureau’s primacy in the movement following the Israeli sweep in 1989.1 22 The bureau supervised the local activity of Hamas through three committees: da`wa, finance, and internal affairs. 23
To ensure control over Hamas’s local units and their daily activities, the Political Bureau established two coordinating bodies: the Administrative Unit, and the West Bank and Gaza Office. The former body is responsible for coordinating the da`wa activities and the Security and Events Units. In addition, the units make the appointments to command roles, formulate plans in coordination with the representatives of other units, and recruit new members. The West Bank and Gaza Office acts as a liaison between the headquarters of the two regions. 24 The reorganization of Hamas also included the establishment of an overall military apparatus in charge of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Since 1989, Hamas’s “outside” leaders have worked hard to institutionalize the movement’s presence in Arab and Palestinian communities in the United States and Europe, especially Britain and Germany. Focusing on Muslim community centers, these efforts have included organizing conventions, issuing pamphlets and publications, and raising money for supposedly humanitarian purposes. The largest center was in Dallas, Texas, and was responsible for publishing periodicals of the Palestinian Islamic movement in North America, such as al-Zaituna, Ila Filastin, and The Palestine Monitor. At the end of 1991, a Hamas center opened in Springfield, Virginia, Musa Abu Marzuq’s hometown, but both centers were shut down in 1993 when the U.S. government declared Hamas a terrorist organization.
Like the PLO, Hamas has two sets of leaders, those “outside” and “inside” the territories, with the former in control of the latter. The outside group is more closely identified with Hamas’s ultimate goals and grand vision, and the inside group focuses on local grievances and close-to-home issues. Also similar to the PLO, Hamas’s operational networks, both inside and outside the occupied territories, have strengthened its quest for an all-Palestinian movement.
Oslo and the Future of Hamas-PA Relations
The establishment in May 1994 of the PA in Gaza and Jericho threatened Hamas’s popular position, especially the “outside” leadership’s domination of the movement in the PA-controlled areas. Indeed, the PA’s growing penetration of the Palestinian population in Gaza heightened the tension between Hamas’s “outside” and local leaders regarding the strategy to be used in response to the newly established political order. Both groups knew that Oslo might enhance the prestige of the PA, to the detriment of Hamas, and both recognized the importance of a dialogue with the PA. Nevertheless, each group came to a different conclusion. Hamas’s “outside” leaders preferred a strategy of avoidance, or an absence of response, to initiatives geared to assimilate Hamas into the new political reality and thus implicitly legitimize the PA. By contrast, the “inside” leaders were willing to consider such initiatives while downplaying their significance. Nowhere were these differences over Hamas’s preferred strategy and conduct toward the PA more vividly expressed than in the issue of a political party to be formed by Hamas in order to participate in the general elections to the Palestinian Authority’s Council held in January 1996.
Whereas the “outside” was more reluctant, the “inside” leadership took a more positive approach to the idea of establishing a political party and running in the elections. Ibrahaim Ghawsha, the Amman-based official Hamas spokesman, clarified the “outside” leaders’ position in several statements made to the Palestinian, Arab, and international media. In an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper, Ghawshah stated:
Hamas will not be transformed into a political party. . . . We know how much the Zionist and American quarters and those who rotate in their orbits would like that. Containing Hamas politically, folding its resistance and jihad banner, and involving it in the Oslo agreements are their ultimate hope.
Hamas indeed discussed the establishment of a political party more than three years ago. It is no secret that the idea was discussed with the deportees in 1992. Several months ago, the movement’s consultative institutions approved the establishment of a political party not to replace Hamas and not to contradict its political program and strategic objectives. It was left for the movement to choose the appropriate time to announce the establishment of this party. The movement’s consultative institutions also decided not to participate in the Oslo agreement, which the movement rejects. It regards the elections as one of the mechanisms of the Oslo agreement. They are not comprehensive legislative elections open to the Palestinian people at home and abroad, as the movement wants, but are connected with the settlement plans. 25
A month later, in a radio interview, Ghawshah added the following to his arguments against Hamas’s participation in the elections:
In light of the recent developments in the Gaza Strip, [where a] grave crisis and tension [prevail], to overcome this crisis matters should take the correct course. In other words, a million Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip should be allowed to elect their true leadership from among the people, under the auspices of a neutral party. . . . We want the world to know who represents the Palestinian people by holding free and fair direct elections for the people, outside the framework of the Oslo and Cairo agreement. Afterward, elections can spread to all Palestinians inside and outside [the occupied territories]. 26
Mahmud al-Zahar, a pediatrician from Gaza and a prominent Hamas leader, took the opposite position. As for the establishment of a political party, al-Zahar stated,
Islam has come to tackle realities on the ground. As a body which seeks to apply Islam to reality, Hamas has stated from the beginning, and from the moment the PA was established, that it is ready to participate in the process of construction. However, it has some controls which govern its religiously based political ideology. Participation in the process of construction does not mean that one accepts the Oslo agreements; nor does it necessarily mean one rejects them. It means we have to find a suitable formula that reconciles the two realities so that the requirements for construction may be placed above ideological or political differences. This calls for the establishment of a body that works to further enhance the concept of institutions. Let us view things on the ground to clarify the picture. As Palestinian people, comprising all affiliations, including Fatah and Hamas, we now need to pass a law on political parties that would meet all the requirements and that all parties will approve. Parties will then be formed. These parties have programs, ideologies, and projects and can participate in the construction operation either from within the PA or from outside it through voluntary work or parallel services work. Thus, the construction process does not mean restricting the issue to those who accepted Oslo and that everything else is rejected.
First of all, Hamas was, and is still, a militant [jihadiyyah] organization acting against the occupation. Now, if a new reality is imposed that requires the establishment of parties, then parties will participate. We do not now have a law that specifies or regulates the way to establish parties. We need a law, which must be approved by all Palestinian factions and the Palestinian public, that can entrench the concept of pluralism. After that, these bodies which will be established, be they parties or political or ideological organizations, can preset their ideas and decide to participate or not participate in the elections. 27
In response, Hamas’s spokesman, Ghawashah, flatly rejected al-Zahar’s position:
No change has taken place in the position of Hamas. The movement refuses to participate in the self-rule elections for many reasons. These elections are an implementation of the Oslo agreements, which are incomplete agreements. Only two million Palestinian people will participate, excluding the four million who are abroad. Besides, the Zionist occupation will be the final authority of the council to be elected. For these reasons, the Islamic Resistance Movement still stands by its position of not participating in the self-rule elections and calling on the Palestinian people to boycott these elections, which we believe do not express in a free and fair manner what these people want.
With respect to the local elections, we called on the Palestinian Authority, from the very first day, to conduct fair and free municipal elections. Unfortunately, the Authority appointed the municipalities in Gaza, Nablus, Hebron, and others, and refused to hold democratic elections. 28
Underlying the differences between the “inside” and the “outside” leaders were two issues. First, the “outside” leaders were inspired by an avant-garde vision and advocated a revolution from above; the local leaders, however, preferred to focus more on immediate communal interests and reformist processes from within. Second, as a result of uncertain external political developments in which other parties were involved, the “outside” leaders feared they would be marginalized by the “inside.”
We could argue that the PA’s growing political control and the differences between Hamas’s “inside” and “outside” leaders would intensify the latter’s effort to secure its influence within the movement by escalating the military effort and thereby driving a wedge between the military command and the “inside” political leadership. However, Israel’s and the PA’s pressure on Hamas, particularly on its military apparatus, would weaken the “outside” control over the local leadership. Accordingly, the tension between the “outside” and “inside” leaders could adversely affect Hamas’s organizational unity, putting at risk the fragile coexistence between the two parties. In turn, such developments could undermine Hamas’s ability to turn to a policy of adjusting to the new political reality.
There are three reasons that Hamas managed to avoid an organizational split and structural chaos. First is the PA’s policy, which, as a matter of tactics, prefers dialogue and coexistence to a military confrontation with Hamas. Second is the fact that Israel, under the Labor government that took office in 1992, withdrew the demand that the PA dismantle Hamas and now is willing to accept the PA’s preventive steps against radical Islamic terrorism. Third is the provisional character of the Oslo accords, which have left unresolved until the final status talks key issues such as the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967, the future of Jewish settlements beyond Israel’s 1967 borders, Jerusalem, the PA’s permanent political status, and the demarcation of Palestinian territory. In addition, Arafat’s repeated commitment to establish an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital has helped bridge part of the gap between Hamas and the PA pertaining to the political goals of the peace process.
It is Hamas’s internal weakness and the PA’s and Israel’s perception of the Oslo accords—and the role of Hamas in this context—that made its policy of adjustment a preferable option to both Hamas’s “inside” and “outside” leaders. A strategy of all-out confrontation by the “outside” leaders in an attempt to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo process, would exact a high cost. In the short run, uncontrolled violence against Israel and the PA could disrupt implementation of the accords. In the long run, however, the deterioration of the Oslo accords would trigger violent retaliations by Israel—including a tighter closure of the Palestinian-inhabited areas—and the PA, thereby adding to the public’s resentment of Hamas, which could alienate its local, nonmilitary leadership. Thus, the effect of a policy of all-out confrontation by Hamas’s “outside” faction could help consolidate the position of the PA and the “inside” Hamas leaders.
If the “inside” Hamas leaders collaborated with the PA, or participated in its institutions to the point of de facto recognition of the PA, thereby defying the “outside” leadership, they might obtain personal political benefits. But this would generate extensive opposition among Hamas’s rank and file, undermining the legitimacy of the “inside” leadership. Arguably, then, despite the “outside” leadership’s control of material resources and the civil and military apparatus, as long as the outlook of the permanent Israeli-Palestinian settlement remains vague and the PA maintains its tolerant policy toward Hamas, the movement will probably continue to adhere to its policy of adjustment as a guiding political strategy.
Apart from the “push” factors, “pull” forces also have encouraged Hamas to seek a policy of adjustment as the preferred alternative. Strategies of controlled violence, negotiated coexistence, and calculated participation have helped the movement stick to its official dogma, which calls for the establishment of Palestine as an Islamic state. At the same time, strategies of political adjustment have enabled Hamas to maintain its involvement in a broad variety of civil activities in the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, through its welfare and social services, parallel to those of the PA.
Hamas’s adoption of a policy of adjustment also has enabled it to perceive its relationship with the PA as an intermediate situation of prolonged tensions and contradictions, to be dealt with by institutional arrangements and normative devices that mitigate the antagonism rather than resolve it. In this respect, Hamas has usually avoided adopting rigid political doctrines regarding its relations with the PLO, and later with the PA, opting instead for temporary accommodation.
The perception of Hamas’s relations with the PA as temporary has two aspects. First, it reflects Hamas’s sense that it is engaged in an unresolved conflict, and so it should not view the existing political order represented by the PA as a permanent peace solution. Second, groups within Hamas have been able to accept the existing situation in the short term until they acquire the means to realize their ultimate goals.
The perception that the political order established by the Oslo accord is temporary, then, offers both the potential for change and the possibility of somehow maintaining the existing political order in the Palestinian autonomous areas. By regarding their political existence under the PA as temporary, groups within Hamas can delay confronting the PA over issues of symbolic significance that in the past led to a violent showdown. These patterns of relations contradict less nuanced generalizations such as T. E. Lawrence’s statement that “semites had no half-tones in their register of vision. . . . They never compromised: they pursued the logic of several incompatible opinions to absurd ends.” 29
True, compared with other Islamic movements in the Arab states, Hamas has operated in a political arena characterized by a limited self-governing authority and overall Israeli domination. This has resulted in, simultaneously, an armed struggle against Israel and a political struggle against the PA. One can argue that major changes in this situation might question the feasibility and benefit of Hamas’s continued policy of adjustment and the preference for it to other tactics. Rapid progress in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations toward a permanent settlement with clear territorial, institutional, and economic gains for the Palestinians would increase the PA’s chances of obtaining wider support from the Palestinian communities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
In such a scenario, Hamas’s justification for continued coexistence with the PA, as well as its civic activities, could be expected to be diminished, intensifying the differences both internally and with the PA. Such a development might lead to one or all the possibilities of direct confrontation between Hamas and the PA, a split within Hamas, within the autonomous areas, as well as between the “inside” and “outside” leaderships. But stagnation or a regression in the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic process would make the Palestinians even more frustrated, forcing the PA to close ranks with Hamas and other radical opposition movements.
Still, given the complexity of Palestinian politics, we could argue that accelerated progress toward a permanent settlement would not automatically lead Hamas to confrontation with the PA. Hamas is more reformist than revolutionary, more populist than avant-garde, more political than military, more communal than universalist. Hamas is aware of cost- benefit considerations and has made its decisions accordingly. Similarly, the PA has chosen pragmatism over extremism and has subscribed to the prose of reality rather than the poetry of ideology. Hamas has been cognizant of its limitations, though without admitting it; anxious to preserve Palestinian national unity—hence its extreme sensitivity to public opinion—particularly in view of the PA’s volatile diplomatic negotiations with Israel. Thus, we might assume that even if PA-Hamas relations were in crisis, both sides would remain faithful to their basic inclination to avert a total showdown. Admittedly, this inclination tends to weaken when Hamas’s hostility toward Israel grows or it feels threatened.
Various structural and cultural conditions might strengthen Hamas’s and the PA’s desire to maintain their coexistence. Unlike Arab revolutionary regimes such as those in Syria, Iraq, and Algeria, the PA has traditionally tolerated Islamist elements. In contrast to Syria or Iraq, where the reins of power are held by an ethnic minority group, nearly all Palestinians are Sunni Arabs. Above all, unlike Syria’s and Iraq’s policy of excluding an Islamic opposition, the PA’s policy toward opposition movements has been characterized by an inclusive approach generally aimed at co-opting the opposition to minimize its effects on the decision-making process.
The PA’s policy toward the Islamic opposition resembles the negotiated coexistence adopted by Jordan and Saudi Arabia toward the Islamic opposition in those countries. Under these circumstances, a deterioration in PA-Hamas relations would be probably approached by the two parties more in terms of redefining their power relations rather than leading them to confront each other. The history of Hamas’s relations with the PLO, and later with the PA, shows that seeming rivals and enemies can find ways to co-exist even if they cannot resolve basic conflicts.
Hamas and Israel: Indirect Dialogue
The coexistence of Hamas and the PA as well as significant progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations may strengthen trends in Hamas favoring political dialogue with Israel with the possibility of coexistence. As our study has shown, Hamas is far from being fixated on unrealistic “all or nothing” objectives. Despite the perception that Hamas caters only to fantasies, it has demonstrated an awareness of the shifting political circumstances and a willingness to base its policies on cost-benefit calculations. Hamas, then, does not live up to its world image of a one-track organization with a monolithic, fanatic vision; unshakable fundamentalist interests; rigidly binary perceptions; and intransigent preferences. In fact, if Hamas were to adopt such an unbending approach, it would be counterproductive, increasing its isolation in the local Palestinian, inter-Arab, and international arenas.
A comparison of Hamas’s declared principles with its concrete actions shows that it has been in Hamas’s interest to become politically active and not to exclude the possibility of a settlement—albeit temporary—through nonviolent means. Consequently, Hamas’s political imagination and its organizational energies have generally been directed toward striking a balance among constantly growing conflicting considerations, competing demands, and contradictory needs.
Taking into account Hamas’s fears that a strategy of clear-cut decisions would lead to a point of no return, as well as its structural need to search for a policy that balances national and local interests and maintains an equilibrium among multiple normative commitments, we cannot exclude the possibility that a continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and of the coexistence of Hamas and the PA may encourage the organization to search for a political understanding with Israel. Probably Hamas’s ability to justify such a move in the eyes of the radicals and gain the rank and file’s support as well, would depend largely on its leaders’ ability to adopt a strategy of political ambiguity. In such a strategy Hamas would rely on a third party—the PA and/or Jordan—to negotiate the political understanding and a workable coexistence with Israel.
The use of politically ambiguous strategies to address otherwise irreconcilable issues includes the following problems:
Participants do not know exactly where they stand. It is not clear what they or their antagonists may do. There are no fixed boundaries or guidelines to behaviour that can be described as legitimate, reasonable, or acceptable. At the very least, ambiguity produces the stress of not knowing one’s own limits or those of one’s adversaries.
Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian history of violence renders a situation of ambiguous guidelines doubly problematic. “If good fences make good neighbours, a situation of undefined boundaries between hostile communities raises the possibility of bloodshed.” 30
Hamas has no guarantee that relying on politically ambiguous strategies and on the services of a third party would preclude such problems. Hamas might have to pay a heavy price for the assistance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) or Jordan. In return for their services, they might try to restrict Hamas’s freedom of action or, if Hamas were to act against their will, refuse to help. Hamas also cannot rule out the possibility that the PA or Amman would hold talks with Israel behind its back to reach agreement on disposing of Hamas if its social status and political influence were deemed to have become too powerful.
Nevertheless, a political understanding with Israel, achieved through a third party, remains Hamas’s lesser-evil alternative, so to speak. Certainly, such a course would minimize the intensity of the shock to its supporters if it entered into a public dialogue with Israel. A slower pace would mean better management of events and allow for modifications as needed. Hamas would also have an opportunity to take safety measures and plan its responses in advance.
In the dusty reality of the Middle East, politically ambiguous strategies and reliance on a third party to enhance the possibility of an understanding and a workable coexistence between the Palestinian Hamas and the Jewish-Israeli state seem unattainable. Yet looking at the dramatic shift in Israeli-Egyptian relations in the late 1970s and at the developments in the Israeli-PLO conflict during the early 1990s, we cannot escape the conclusion that what once seemed improbable might become inevitable. Often, people, movements, and nations terrorize the entire world just to become part of it.
Endnotes
Note 1: UPI release, January 17, 1982; for more details, see Anis F. Kassim, “The Palestine Liberation Organization’s Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 9, no. 1 (1980): 19&-;22, 29, 30. Back.
Note 2: For more details, see Aaron David Miller, The PLO and the Politics of Survival (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983), pp. 97–98. Back.
Note 3: On the “enclave” concept and its social and symbolic dimensions in a comparative context, see Emmanuel Sivan, “Tartbut ha-Muvla`at” [The enclave culture], Alpayim 4 (1991): 94–95. Back.
Note 4: For additional structural features of social movements, see David Knoke, Political Networks, the Structural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 490. Back.
Note 5: On the Sufi influence on Hasan al-Banna, see Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 1–6. Back.
Note 6: David Farhi, “ha-Mo`atza ha-Muslemit be-Mizrah Yerushalayim 'ube-Yehuda ve-Shomron me-'Az Milhemet Sheshet ha-Yamim” [The Muslim Council in East Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria since the six-day war], Ha-Mizrah He-Hadash 28 (1979): 3–21. Back.
Note 7: Ifrah Zilberman, “Hitpathut ha-Islam ha-Kitzoni ba-Shtahim me-'Az 1967” [The development of radical Islam in the territories since 1967], in M. Ma`oz and B. Z. Kedar, eds., Ha-Tnu`a ha-Le'umit ha-Falastinit: Me-`Immut le-Hashlama? [The Palestinian national movement: From confrontation to acquiescence?] (Tel Aviv: Ma`arachot, 1996), pp. 321–347. Back.
Note 8: On the features of formal organizations and social movements, see Knoke, Political Networks, pp. 75–76, 91–98. Back.
Note 9: A. Shabi and R. Shaked, Hamas: me-Emuna be-Allah le-Derekh ha-Teror [Hamas: From belief in Allah to the road of terror] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1994), p. 81. Back.
Note 10: Ha'aretz, December 16, 1990. Back.
Note 11: Shabi and Shaked, Hamas, pp. 119–121. Back.
Note 12: “A Guide to the Muslim Student,” cited in Udi Levi, “Hashivut ha-Da`wa 'u-Missuda ba-Tnu`ot ha-Islamiyot” [The Importance of da`wa and its institutionalization in the Muslim movements], seminar paper, Department of International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1997. Back.
Note 13: Shabi and Shaked, Hamas, pp. 282–284. Back.
Note 14: Ibid., pp. 118, 124. Back.
Note 16: See for instance, the statements by Ibrahim al-Yazuri, AFP (Paris), October 13, 1994, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, October 14, 1994; interviews with Mahmud al-Zahar, al-Hayat (London), October 17, 1994, al-Hayat al-Jadida (Gaza), April 24, 1995, p. 5, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, April 27, 1995. Back.
Note 17: T. Burns and G. Stalker, The Management of Innovations (London: Tavistock, 1961), cited in Dennis A. Rodinelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 163. Back.
Note 18: Interview with a senior Israeli official in charge of antiterrorist warfare, May 27, 1998. Back.
Note 19: According to another version, the Advisory Council has twenty-four members. See al-Wasat, November 30, 1992. Back.
Note 20: al-Shira`, January 4, 1993. Back.
Note 21: Shabi and Shaked, Hamas, p. 154. Back.
Note 22: al-Wasat, November 30, 1992, and February 22, 1993. Back.
Note 23: For details, see Shabi and Shaked, Hamas, p. 154. Back.
Note 25: al-Mujtama` (Kuwait), October 31, 1995, pp. 32–33; FBIS-NESA, Daily Report, December 7, 1995, p. 11. Back.
Note 26: Radio Monte Carlo (Paris), November 20, 1994; FBIS-NESA, Daily Report, November 22, 1994, p. 16. Back.
Note 27: Voice of Palestine (Jericho), October 10, 1995; FBIS-NESA, Daily Report, October 11, 1995, pp. 23–24. Back.
Note 28: FBIS-NESA, Daily Report, October 12, and October 13, 1995, p. 5. Back.
Note 29: T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1938), p. 38. Back.
Note 30: Ira Sharkansky, “The Potential of Ambiguity: The Case of Jerusalem,” in Efraim Karsh, ed., From Rabin to Netanyahu (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 191. Notes to Appendix One: Hamas’s Internal Structure Back.
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