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The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela
2000
5. Calculated Participation
Islamic thinkers discern four main strategies that mark the political behavior of Islamic movements: (1) reformist, operating through education, preaching, and guidance (sabil al-wa`z wal-irshad); (2) communal, focusing on the Muslim institution of welfare (zakat) and other social services; (3) political, operating through mass mobilization and public conviction aimed at pressuring rulers to implement the shari`a; and (4) combatant-political, using military force or violence against the ruling elites. 1 In fact, however, since the 1940s, Islamic movements, as demonstrated by Hasan al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood Association (MB) in Egypt, which became a role model for similar movements across the Arab world, have shown flexibility, adopting mixed elements from these strategies under different social and political conditions. Under al-Banna’s guidance, the MB movement initially adopted a reformist approach but later also attempted to obtain political representation and prepared a military option by establishing an armed militia. 2
Islamic Movements and Strategies of Political Participation
Although Islamic movements have traditionally been divided by strategies of action even within the same state, the single most important variable determining their behavior has been the freedom of social action and access to power made available to them by the ruling elite. Contemporary Islamic movements have generally responded violently to violent repression, as shown at certain periods in the cases of Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, whereas in those states that tolerated Islamic political movements, they have been willing to accept the rules of the political game and refrain from violence, such as in the case of the MB in Egypt, 3 Jordan, 4 Sudan, 5 and Yemen. 6
The reformist and communal approaches—often inseparable—have been the mainstay of the MB’s activity since its founding in Egypt in the late 1920s and subsequent spread throughout the Arab world, whereas political and violent Islam remained on the margins in most Arab states until the late 1970s. The 1980s and 1990s, however, have witnessed a novel pattern of action of modern Islamic groups, a trend toward political parties and participation in the political process and even in power, even in non-Islamic regimes. Moreover, this trend has persisted despite the efforts of Arab regimes to slow down or backtrack on the process of controlled democratization, which usually was started under the pressure of the Islamic movements. This was the case in Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan, whose regimes since the late 1980s have restricted freedom of speech and passed new election laws with the aim of reducing the Islamists’ public power and presence in parliament. In Algeria, where the ruling FLN military elite overturned the victory of the Front islamique du salut (FIS) in the general parliamentary elections of December 1991—prompting militant Islamist groups to start a nationwide armed struggle against the regime—the Front hesitated to use violence and tried to find common ground. 7 In Lebanon, although Hizballah remained committed to armed struggle against Israel’s presence in the south of the country, it took part in two consecutive parliamentary elections (1992 and 1996) and won representation. 8
The scope of political participation and power sharing of Islamic movements in the Arab world since the 1980s—and the essential role they have been playing in the democratization of political life in Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Kuwait—became a focal point in the debate on Islam and democracy among students of the contemporary Middle East. Students of political Islam have been divided over the meaning of the growing participation of Islamic movements in the political process, which signals that they have accepted pluralism and the rules of the game determined by non-Islamic regimes. The focal point of the debate has been whether these movements represent a normative change in the attitude toward liberal democracy or a drive for power by exploiting opportunities afforded by the non-Islamic regime and under its terms. The underlying question is the extent to which such movements might be willing to accept democracy and apply its principles not only during the struggle for power but also after gaining power. 9
The most conspicuous advocates of this increasingly dominant trend in the Arab world have been Hasan al-Turabi, leader of the Islamic National Front in Sudan, and Rashed Ghanouchi, the exiled leader of al-Nahda movement in Tunisia. These leaders adhere to active participation of the Islamic movements in the political process and accept the principle of a multiparty system (ta`ddudiyya). Drawing on pragmatic approaches used in the MB movement under Hasan al-Banna’s lead, Turabi and Ghanouchi claimed legitimacy for the incorporation of Islamic movements in an ad hoc coalition (tahaluf) with non-Islamic parties, in order to exploit the opportunity of political participation to seize power and impose Islamization “from above” through official state machinery. 10 Although this approach recognized the crucial role of religious guidance and education as a necessary phase for creating a wide base of cadres for a mass Islamic movement, it also called for adopting modern strategies of mass mobilization rather than the elitist seclusion implied in Sayyid Qutb’s writings. 11 According to this approach, although the use of violence is not illegitimate if the regime is repressive, it is not recommended because of the overwhelming power of the state and the danger of giving the ruling elite a pretext to wage an all-out war against the Islamic movement, as Nasser did in Egypt and Hafiz al-Assad did in Syria. This is why Turabi referred to the option of gradual penetration into the armed forces and bureaucratic apparatuses, parallel to participation in the political process (reflecting Turabi’s experience and road to power in Sudan). 12
The drive of Islamic movements for participation in non-Islamist power (musharaka)—preached and implemented by Turabi—has been further justified by Rashed al-Ghanouchi according to the normative principle of necessity (fiqh al-darurat, similar to the interest principle—maslaha). Drawing on Joseph’s role in Pharaoh’s administration and the Prophet’s agreement with non-Muslim elements in Mecca, Ghanouchi maintains that such participation, or coalition (tahaluf) with non-Islamist movements, is a legitimate tactic to promote the Islamic movement’s goals. 13 In this context, it is noteworthy that although Hamas boycotted the elections to the Palestinian Authority’s Council held in January 1996, it did use Ghanouchi’s pragmatic approach and collaborated with non-Islamic movements. In October 1991, on the eve of the international peace conference held in Madrid, Hamas joined a Syrian-based coalition composed of mostly radical-leftist Palestinian groups (“The Ten Front”) opposed to the Israel-Palestinian peacemaking process. 14
Under authoritarian regimes, opposition movements cannot gain much by joining the ruling system. Indeed, they might legitimize the regime while risking the loss of their constituency and becoming dependent on the ruler. 15 Similarly, Islamic movements have questioned their political participation and remained reluctant to turn into full-fledged political parties and share representation in non-Islamic institutions, thus legitimizing non-Islamic regimes. In addition to these reservations, Islamic movements—like other extraparliamentary opposition movements claiming to be an alternative to the ruling party—have found that a metamorphosis from a religious, social, voluntary movement into a political party includes, at best, not only prospects for representation and power sharing but also the possibility of being controlled, contained, and marginalized by the regime. As extraparliamentary movements, the Islamic groups have enjoyed considerable civic autonomy and direct contact with the masses through the mosques and charitable associations and through social services they provide, especially to the poor urban masses. Party politics (hizbiyya) has meant a loss of these relative advantages due to the acceptance of strict formal rules that require transparency and accountability to the regime. Moreover, whereas the earlier activities coincided with Islam’s loftiest values—charity and social solidarity—reflecting honesty and service to the community of believers, official political activities have traditionally been identified with corruption and selfish interests. 16
The prospect of gaining influence and power balanced against the limitations and risks of this option was the subject of much of the debate in Islamic movements in response to the new opportunity offered to them by the ruling elites in the form of “democratization from above.” The crux of the matter, then, was cost-benefit considerations in the context of political freedom and restrictions determined by the regime. 17 As an official political party, the Islamists would be stifled by the regime, might suffer irreparable damage to their image, and were bound to lose supporters to more radical Islamic groups. However, failing to enter politics and take advantage of political pluralism could frustrate the expectations of the young generation of Islamists for participation in the political game and a shortcut to power. 18
One way to resolve the dilemmas inherent in an Islamic party’s political participation has been to create a “front” organization based on the communist model after World War II. This pattern of political action was used by communist parties in the Middle East, which until the 1950s refused to cooperate with the bourgeoisie, assigning the duty of social revolution exclusively to the proletariat. But in the wake of the European experience and awareness of the gap between Marxist theory and the sociopolitical structure in the countries of the Middle East, the communist parties there were permitted to align tactically with national and bourgeois groups. The result was the creation of temporary coalitions, known as “national fronts,” combining communist and nationalist parties and movements such as the Ba`th, Nasserists, Arab Nationalists, and lower-middle-class socialist groups in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. The alignment with the bourgeoisie was meant to topple the “reactionary” ruling elites closely connected with the West and in their place establish a “neutral national” regime. The communists believed that following the shift of power, they would be able to take over the state’s centers of power and change the social and economic structure “from above.” 19
In the case of the Islamic party, such a front would include Islamists and potential opposition elements, though still Islamic, and would be considered as an extension, or instrument, of the main MB movement. This idea was successfully implemented by Turabi in Sudan in 1985 in the form of the Islamic National Front (al-Jabha al-islamiyya al-qawmiyya) and by the Algerian Front islamique du salut (FIS—Jabhat al-inqadh al-islami) in 1989. Similarly, the MB in Jordan formed the Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-`amal al-islami) in 1992 to serve as the political arm of the Islamic movement there. 20
By the early 1990s, however, Islamic movements were chafing under strictly controlled democratization in Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan. Participation in general elections and parliamentary life rarely brought the Islamic groups to real power sharing, that is, co-option to the government. The restrictions—in the guise of administrative regulations and discriminatory legislation—imposed by the ruling elite on these groups’ freedom of political organization and speech limited their power in the representative institutions. The result was a retreat by the movements from participation in parliamentary elections. In 1990 the MB in Egypt boycotted the elections, as did the Islamic Action Front in Jordan in 1997. The decision by the Jordanian group followed a long and bitter debate triggered by the Islamic movement’s declining representation in parliament after the general elections of 1993 when the government amended the election law, effectively marginalizing the Islamists. 21 The debate within the movement, which followed its participation in the general elections of 1993 and frustration at the disappointing results, revealed the split between Palestinians and Jordanians in the movement. Each side tried to justify its contradictory attitudes through Islamic argumentation and terminology while in practice representing different interests. Thus, the opponents of political participation, most of whom were Palestinian by origin, contended that to take part in elections and parliamentary life effectively legitimized the Jordan-Israel peace treaty, which contradicted Islamic principles. Conversely, the proponents of continued participation, a minority of mostly Jordanians by origin, displayed a willingness to cooperate with the nationalist and leftist forces, as well as with the regime itself—regardless of its commitment to the peace treaty with Israel—as long as their participation would lead to power sharing. As in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the debate in Jordan culminated in a decision by the Islamic Action Front in July 1997 to boycott the elections that November. The decision, however, backfired on the militants, as more pragmatic elements were elected, forming a majority in the Front’s institutions. 22
The drive of Islamic movements to power sharing, justified on religious grounds and the Islamic community’s well-being, is visible across the Arab world, from Algeria and Sudan through Yemen, 23 Lebanon, and Jordan. Even in Israel, officially defined as a Jewish state, a group from the Islamic movement decided—at the cost of splitting the movement—to run together with a non-Islamist party (the Arab Democratic Party) on a joint ticket and won two seats in the Knesset in the 1996 general elections. 24
Besides reflecting the new opportunities for political participation afforded by most Arab regimes since the early 1980s, the Islamic movements also wanted to shorten the process of Islamizing the country by shifting from an evolutionary to a political strategy in order to gain access to power. Indeed, the very willingness of Islamic movements to take part in various levels of state-controlled and limited democratic systems demonstrated their belief that they could gain influence and promote their goals by operating within the existing political order.
A close study of Hamas’s strategies of action reveals a similarity to those of other Islamic movements in the Arab world, as well as to those of the communist parties, concerning participation in the political process—in this case, entry into the PA’s structural system—and its justification in normative terms. Hamas’s posture of neither fully accepting nor totally rejecting the PA’s legitimacy has been apparent in the movement’s internal debate and its actual behavior over the issue of participating in the PA’s executive and representative institutions. Hamas’s wish to ensure its survival and continued growth necessitated its access to power and resources, based on coexistence with the PA. But Hamas also was eager to minimize the damage to its political stature as a result of collaborating with the PA and especially participating in its formal institutions, which might be interpreted as a deviation from its Islamic principles. It was this dilemma that underlay Hamas’s strategy; it was a strategy that could be pursued only as long as it left intact, or at least ambiguous, the movement’s commitment to its religious-national vision, on the one hand, and compromise with respect to the Oslo process, on the other.
Indeed, much of Hamas’s approach to the issue of participation can be described as differentiating between participation through direct and official presence and participation through political involvement in the PA’s representative and decision-making institutions. Taking into account Hamas’s refusal to recognize the PA, involvement in its acting administrative apparatuses without an official presence and direct representation would provide a useful means to minimize the disadvantages of the existing post-Oslo processes without paying the political cost of its endorsement. Moreover, involvement would serve as a safety valve for Hamas, reducing the threats to its continued activities and public support.
Yet involvement without an official presence would be uncertain: it might provide political safety in the short run but would be exposed to threats of instability in the long run. An official presence, however, would increase the stability and continuity of resource allocation over the long run but might force Hamas to renounce or minimize its public rejection of Oslo and legitimization of the political and legal status of the PA. Given the growing conviction among both Palestinian and Israelis that the Oslo process was irreversible, the more that the PA tightened its grip on the society, the more intense the debate within Hamas became regarding its participation in the PA’s executive institutions.
Alternatives and Preferred Options
The international peace conference held in Madrid in October 1991, with unprecedented PLO-backed Palestinian representation, was a clear indication to the Hamas leadership that the possibility of an Israeli- Palestinian-Jordanian settlement could not be ruled out, thus forcing it to clarify its position regarding that possibility. Hamas’s dilemma was made worse by the anticipated establishment of a PLO-based self-governing authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The situation was further complicated by talks initiated by the U.S. State Department with Musa Abu Marzuq in the United States and Amman in the early fall of 1991, aimed at obtaining Hamas’s support for the participation of a Palestinian delegation from the occupied territories in the Madrid conference. Hamas, however, had long objected to Palestinian participation in peace talks with Israel, calling instead for the escalation of the Intifada. 25
This became Hamas’s dominant public response to the Madrid talks (and afterward to the Oslo agreement) and to the establishment of the PA by the PLO, which it contemptuously dubbed “the Tunis command.” 26 Internally, however, the period of the Madrid and Washington talks (1991–1993) was marked by a complex self-searching in the Hamas leadership and a review of alternative strategies, with a view to minimizing the repercussions of an Israel-PLO settlement on Hamas’s communal infrastructure and political status. Specifically, Hamas examined its future strategy based on the premise that a confrontation with the Palestinian self-governing authority had to be avoided. Accordingly, Hamas’s leaders looked at the experience of other Islamic movements that had entered the political process in their drive for Islamic legislation and power sharing. In the debate, in which Hamas’s constituency was invited to take part, the movement’s leaders considered establishing an Islamic party as a “front” organization to oppose the PA.
The debate underscored Hamas’s essential difference from other Islamic movements in the Arab countries. In addition to its reformist religious character, Hamas was also a combatant movement, committed to liberating Palestine by means of a holy war. Indeed, although the movement’s leaders refused to veer from its dogmatic doctrine of armed struggle toward social and political action, they occasionally demonstrated openness, flexibility, and willingness to adopt new options in accordance with the changing political circumstances. The prolonged debate over this issue shows unequivocally that Hamas’s paramount concern was to ensure its future as a social and political movement within the framework of a Palestinian self-governing authority. The armed struggle against Israel was therefore not a strategic but a tactical goal, subordinated to the movement’s needs in the Palestinian arena.
In April 1992 an internal Hamas bulletin stated that the movement’s leadership had decided to object to a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, “as it was being suggested.” Hamas rejected the idea because it derived from the Madrid process, which the movement rejected on what it considered pragmatic political grounds, most notably that by attending the conference, both Jordan and the PLO had effectively deferred to Israeli prerequisites. In the bulletin, Hamas for the first time presented its position on elections to representative institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It stated that it would not object to nonpolitical representative elections and that it would take part in such elections provided they were fair and just, were not conducted under Israeli occupation, were administered under appropriate international supervision, and were not conditioned on the candidates’ commitment to support the peace process. 27 In July 1992, while Hamas and Fatah activists were still clashing and Hamas’s leaflets fiercely and contemptuously attacked the negotiations with Israel, a secret document was circulated among Hamas senior members analyzing a spectrum of alternatives ranging from a total boycott of the PA to full and official participation in the election and the PA’s institutions. 28
The document assumed that the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would lead to an agreement on establishing an interim Palestinian self-rule with general elections in the territories under its jurisdiction to be held shortly thereafter. Based on earlier consultations among leading Hamas figures in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the diaspora, the document presented a draft analysis of assumptions and a variety of considerations concerning Hamas’s response to the new reality. In order to reach a decision regarding its position on participation, Hamas’s policy paper examined its options in view of a possible PLO-Israel accord and the advantages and disadvantages of each, as well as the expected responses of the PA and the Palestinian public to each choice of action.
Besides its detailed discussion of Hamas’s participation in the PA elections, this document offers a rare glimpse of decision making in the movement marked by careful consultation with the rank and file. The recipients of the document were asked to consider the suggested alternatives in accordance with the movement’s goals and ideology and to prepare an answer within a week, to help the leadership decide on the most appropriate election strategy. The document set August 10, 1992, as the date for reaching a final decision.
The paper was classified, and its cover letter with directives to the recipient activists did not specifically mention Hamas (referring to it as “the movement”), even though the discussion clearly revolved around Hamas’s prospective stand. The document’s recipients were requested to consult with as many knowledgeable people as possible to ensure that the final decision would have wide support in Hamas, preserve the movement’s achievements, and follow its principles. The document had a nonideological tone, bereft of the Islamic phrases and terminology of the delegitimization of Hamas’s rivals and demonization of its enemies, particularly Israel and the Jews, usually referred to as descendants of Satan, monkeys, and pigs. Instead, Israel was referred to by its proper name, and terms such as “Zionists,” “Jews,” or the “enemies of Allah” were absent. Unlike the usual language of Hamas’s leaflets and publications, saturated with Qur'anic verses and oral traditions (hadith), the document refrained from using even once terms such as “shari`a,” “Qur'an,” “Muhammad,” or even “Islam.”
The timing of the document suggests that it reflected the ascendancy of Israel’s Labor-led government, which came to power in June 1992, and the high expectations for progress in the peace process that it had aroused. Thus, Hamas’s positions toward Palestinian self-rule and the general elections were labeled “fateful” to the movement’s future and defined as “the most dangerous and difficult” ever in its history. We have reproduced the full document here, owing to its significance as a reflection of the movement’s modes of political thinking, its ability to adjust to changing circumstances, and its decision-making methods in evaluating and examining available alternatives.
In the name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate
Re: The position regarding the interim self-rule and the elections
Distinguished brothers,
The l.s. [possibly referring to the political committee (lajna siyasiyya)] presented to you a paper on our position regarding the forthcoming development, assuming that the negotiations now being held succeed in bringing to the interim self-rule. We then started a debate over [our] position regarding the general elections that might be held in the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip.
We have already received responses from Gaza and the [West] Bank and the brothers abroad. In this paper, we are trying to review the consolidation of opinion, suggesting . . . [sic] our decision making and examining the most influential factors in this regard. Following this [stage], a final proposal concerning the subject will be drawn up . . . [sic] the higher circles. We must arrive at a final draft resolution before 10.8.92 . . . [sic] on this paper and your evaluation of the most important elements affecting the decision and your opinion regarding the most appropriate position for the movement . . . [sic] within a week after receiving the paper.
Brothers!
We ask that you handle this paper with the utmost secrecy because the debate is continuing and no final decision has yet been reached. We also request that you study the paper carefully and consult with knowledgeable people in your area. [The reason is] that we wish to reach a decision acceptable to the widest possible basis of our ranks which, at the same time, would preserve the movement’s achievements and remain faithful to its goals and principles. We also ask that you provide us with your elaborate rather than summarized opinion because we are about to make a fateful decision that will affect the future of our movement in the coming phase. We believe that this decision is absolutely the most crucial and difficult in the history of our movement. Hence, we hope that you give the issue your closest attention and respond within a week.
Peace be with you and Allah’s mercy and blessings.Our paper handles the following aspects:
First: Introduction to the Next Phase
Most of the analyses, including those of this movement, tend to [assume] that the peace process will culminate in an agreement between Israel and the Arab parties and that this agreement will result in the establishment of interim self-rule for the Palestinians.
It has been suggested that elections will be conducted among the Palestinians with the possible goal of establishing a Palestinian authority to which the [Israeli] military government’s powers and authorities will be transferred. This might be an administrative authority of a political nature and powers to oversee the daily affairs of Palestinians’ lives. The [important working hypotheses are] that elections will be held; public institutions will be built; most of the powers and authorities of the military government will be transferred to the Palestinians; and it is possible that the first event will be the elections.
What is, then, the most appropriate position for the movement to take in view of what might happen?
Second: The Alternatives
There are four possible alternatives:
- Hamas participates in the elections.
- Hamas boycotts the elections and is contented with calling the people also to boycott the elections . . . [sic] against the elections.
- Hamas boycotts the elections and also attempts to disrupt them by force in order to delegitimize them as well as the whole peace process.
- Hamas participates under another name, the essence of which would be determined in accordance with the circumstances of the next phase and the results of the negotiations.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the four alternatives? They are clarified in the following table:
Table 5.1: Third: Advantages and Disadvantages of the Alternative Positions Toward the Elections The Alternative Advantages Disadvantages First: Hamas participates in the elections
- Attaining the highest possible percentage of the votes.
- Proving the movement’s popularity.
- Preventing political isolation.
- Preserving the popular basis won by the movement during the Intifada and confronting the attempts to contain it.
- Securing a greater chance to confront the concessions in the phase of final negotiations [acting] from a position of elected popular representation.
- It will be difficult for Hamas to play a role of political participation and [violent] resistance at the same time.
- A significant legitimacy will be given to the elections, indicating Hamas’s compromise of its objection to the self-government as a solution to the [Palestinian] problem.
- If [Hamas] will not win a majority, which is most likely, the act [of elections] will appear as a [reflection of] popular consensus.
- Its impact on the current of Jihadist Islam concerning Palestine.
Second: Hamas Boycotts the elections and calls on the people also to boycott [the elections]
- An attempt to diminish the legitimacy of the elections and in effect also of the negotiating process and the concessions that it entails.
- Political corroboration deriving from our objection to the self-rule and its consequences.
- If we win, it means foiling the process of negotiations.
- Affirming the absence of legitimacy of negotiations and concessions.
- Affirming Hamas’s capability of political action.
- Deepening Hamas’s popularity and power.
- Political isolation [of Hamas], facilitating the opportunity to Fatah to contain Hamas . . . (sic)
- The movement loses the political warranty that supports the policy of resistance to the occupation.
Third: Boycott and attempt to disrupt the elections by force.
- It might mean an entrance into a military confrontation with Fatah, that is, a civil war, for which we would be held responsible by the [Palestinian] people.
- We might not succeed in foiling [the elections], which means, sustaining popular losses in addition to the human casualties, providing the future authority a pretext to adopt policies of striking the movement and forcing it into isolation.
Fourth: Political participation under another placard.
- Guaranteeing non-isolation.
- Preservation of the popular basis attained by the Islamic movement
- It might not realize the same rate of votes, which we can attain through participation in the name of Hamas.
- Confusing the public [due to the difference] between the position of resistance and the position of participation, even if there was a separation between the placard and the movement.
Fourth: The Elements of Decision Making
The responses to the initial document that have reached us presented many elements that should be taken into account in the decision-making process regarding our position on the self-rule and its institutions as well as the general elections that would take place. The following is a discussion of the key elements presented, in order of their significance:
1. What are our main interests and goals that we want to pursue in the next phase?
During the years of the Intifada, the Islamic movement has realized a great popular capital and attracted a large part of the people who have resisted the concessions and adhere to the Islamic rights in Palestine. The movement has built institutions and has trained many members and supporters to become leaders and exercise popular activities. Our basic interests might be summarized as follows:
- Preserving the movement’s popular base so that it can strongly support the continuation of the jihad in the next campaigns. This means that [if we were] politically isolated and absent [from the political arena], we would be deprived of the masses and lose much of the popular support that until now we have not been able to organize [ta'tir].
- Adhering to jihad as the way to liberate Palestine from the [Israeli] occupation, which will remain during the implementation of the interim self-rule.
- Resisting normalization and further negligence and surrender of the Palestinians’ rights. This might be the most important factor in determining our choice . . . [sic]. It must be bound to our goals and interests in every historical phase . . . [sic].
In view of our alternative positions, we can say that . . . [sic]. [It would be difficult to disrupt] . . . [sic] the elections and be content with calling for a boycott because no matter how successful we may be in preventing people from participating, the voter turnout will be no less than 30 to 40 percent of the electorate. Although we might selfishly argue that this would support Hamas’s position, it would not be enough to disrupt the elections. A low voter turnout, however, has not denied the legitimacy of elections in other states. The Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria won elections even when the voter turnout was less than a third of the electorate. The same situation [exists] even in the United States where the voter turnout is less than 50 percent of the electorate. Yet [choosing] this option certainly means abandoning the political arena to Fatah’s leaders to do as they wish. We can expect that one of their priorities will be containing our movement, dismantling its institutions, and ending its activities, on the pretext of enforcing the self-rule’s authority in order to be strong in confronting Israel in the final negotiations. Such an outcome would clearly be counterproductive to our interests and goals in the next stage.
2. The Movement’s Ideological Position
The movement rejects self-rule as a solution to the [Palestinian] cause and insists on the liberation of the land and the purification of [its] sanctuaries. Some [people] maintain that participating in the elections means abandoning the movement’s ultimate goals. Others maintain that participation will depend on whether the elections are held before or after the negotiations end. Also, participation will depend on whether it will be conditioned that the candidates recognize Israel or commit themselves to the negotiating process. Objectively, however, there is no doubt that it will be difficult for Hamas to bridge [the gap] between participation in the elections and what it requires in terms of altering our discourse and resisting the occupation and what it requires in terms of [adopting] a clear and unique discourse of jihad. This is a very important element because it might diminish the prospects of the first alternative, namely, Hamas’s participation in the elections.
3. Our Capabilities and Power in Regard to the Internal and External Balances of Power
It is intended in this element to define the alternatives with which our power and capabilities enable us to cope. By our power and capabilities, we mean
- The number of our members prepared physically and psychologically.
- The proportion of popular support for any alternative that the movement might choose.
- The quantity of arms and ammunition we possess.
- Our ability to convey our position to the media so that we will not be the victim of false propaganda.
- Our ability to persuade the Arab and Islamic sectors to support the alternative we choose.
We can say that our power enables us to undertake all the alternatives presented except for one, which we must avoid, namely, confrontation and disruption of the elections. The chances of success in realizing this goal seem poor and entail great risks, primarily entering into an armed struggle with Fatah which would be then supported by Israel and the international media. A large segment of the population might blame us because it will be easy for them to believe that Hamas first used force to impose its will on the others.
The predicament of this choice is that a decision on it seems to be most difficult while the other side . . . [sic] . . . the elections will be held without interruption. The result might be that we will defer to . . . [sic] . . . its boycott, which brings us back to the second choice, about which we concluded that it would not serve the goals of . . . [sic] . . . our capability in the context of the balance of power. In regard to the Palestinian arena, the movement confronts Fatah, which agrees with . . . [sic] and will not hesitate to use any method of elimination and bloodshed if Hamas tries to stop by force the implementation of the settlement, which would necessarily mean a civil war in which we would lose more [than Fatah would] because our real power is our popularity, whereas Fatah’s power derives from a combination of both financial [resources] and control of the important institutions.
The other Palestinian parties will never enter the struggle but will try to pick up what the two [major] parties lose. These organizations’ lack of power in the street and their affiliation with the PLO will make it incumbent on them to take part in the elections and in the institutions to be built. There is the risk that our movement will be on one side while the other forces and currents are on the other.
On the Arab and international level, if the negotiations are successful, the United States would exert a significant weight to help implement the accords, as occurred at Camp David, by way of [extending financial] aid to the Palestinian self-rule. In regard to the Arab and Islamic arena, it is expected that the Islamic movements will [be content with] issuing statements of rejection of the capitulationist accords, but we have no reason to believe that the Islamic movements in Jordan, Syria, or Lebanon will take a tougher position on the accords. In conclusion, this assumption disqualifies the third choice, namely, our most militant position, because we would be isolated even from the Islamic movements in other Arab states, which means that the most active Palestinian party (Fatah) could ignore us because the balance of power would be in its favor.
4. The Chances of Success and Failure in the Elections
Most of the estimates show that we might not be able to win a majority if we participate in the elections, which [means that] we would lose them and, at the same time, grant legitimacy to the negotiations. It is difficult to calculate the amount [of support] that we might have, as it will depend on the particular system of elections, the political alignments that we might initiate, and the level of organization and competence in conducting the election campaign. Yet the question here is whether we should decide on participation if we have a good chance of winning and decide on a boycott if we have a poor chance of winning a majority. Clearly, the elections will not be a one-time event, but the way in which we would tackle the next phase, primarily the elections, might be crucial to the movement. Our goal might not be to win a majority but, rather, to achieve a significant [political] presence, which would secure the movement’s power and political weight. We believe that we can win a third of the votes, which would mean an excellent political presence, by which we could make sure we would not be overlooked. This [estimate of] one third is what we expect overall, whereas [the proportion of votes] might be higher in areas such as Hebron and Gaza and lower in others.
5. [People’s Expectations]
We also must consider the people’s expectations and wishes, the economic and security pressures [they suffer], and the assumption that they would support the [peaceful] solution once some gains in these areas had been achieved. Among these gains [might be] freezing [the Jewish] settlements—even gradually—and financial aid from America and Europe, some of the Gulf states, and Japan. Here we must remember that many of the people . . . [sic] . . . the negotiating delegation from Madrid for the first time. Local and international propaganda might ultimately focus on . . . [sic] [highlighting the future material gains] and amplifying them. Hence, we expect that a large segment of the people would accept participation in any elections . . . [sic] clear interests, regardless of their feelings toward the [Palestine] cause as a whole. This means that a boycott of the elections on our part . . . [sic] would be acceptable only to the close adherents familiar with the movement’s position, who are the bulk of our supporters. The scope of the boycott would not be significant unless we used force, such as declaring a strike, preventing the people from reaching the voting places, or shutting down their means of transportation. This would mean leaning toward our third choice, which we have concluded would lead to a bloody confrontation with Fatah that we could not win. Then we would lose the people’s support and thus would probably not be able to disrupt the elections or the self-rule and its institutions.
6. The Connection Between the Elections and Self-Rule
Some people believe that the connection between these two issues implies that participating in the elections means agreeing to self-rule as a solution to the Palestinian problem. Others maintain, however, that unless there is a condition to this effect, participation of the Palestinians in the elections does not necessarily mean voting for either confirmation or rejection of the negotiations conducted by the [Palestinian] delegation and the Fatah leadership. Although the coincidence [of the elections and self-rule] leaves a vague impression [that such a connection indeed exists], we should not count out any choice that the movement might consider appropriate in view of the more significant factors. As for the vague impression, we might be able to correct it through our political and propaganda input and our activity on the ground, which will continue the holy war (jihad) against the [Israeli] occupation. (End of document)
Hamas’s policy paper outlines a range of alternatives from which decision makers were to decide the best approach to take with regard to elections. It is a document with a clear sense of political opportunities and constraints, and it offers an impartial, meticulous analysis of cost-benefit considerations, according to the movement’s basic assumptions—such as Fatah’s military superiority and the Palestinian public’s likely massive support for elections—and the probable impact of each option. Unlike Hamas’s public discourse, which is saturated with religious and historical symbols and norms defining the boundaries between right and wrong, this document (shown to senior figures only) is marked by political realism. The key question here is not the illegitimacy of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) but Hamas’s future as a social and ideological movement and the policy it should adopt to preserve its political assets without losing its ideological distinctiveness.
A close examination of the document reveals that Hamas seems to have been caught in the middle of the spectrum of alternatives. Participating in the elections would legitimize the PLO, but if Hamas called for a boycott and the people voted anyway, it would lose its credibility. Hamas tried to cope with the dilemma of participation by adopting a strategy that combined elements of political involvement with mechanisms of indirect presence. Nowhere has this strategy of participation been better expressed than in regard to the general elections to the PA’s Council, its incorporation into the PA’s administration, and the establishment of a political party.
Elections to the PA’s Council
Elections were held on January 20, 1996, in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including the Palestinians of East Jerusalem). The elections were based on the Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1993, and on the Israeli-Palestinian agreement of September 28, 1995 (Taba accord, or Oslo 2). 29 According to article 3 of the DOP,
Hamas’s position was tightly linked to two overriding questions: first, the PA’s political program, that is, the grand policy with which Hamas would be identified by participating in elections that were bound to legitimize the PA and, implicitly, the DOP; second, Hamas’s prospects of playing a significant political role in the PA. Hamas had been a fierce critic of the DOP and the elections, which it had urged the Palestinian public to boycott.
Hamas’s first decision regarding the anticipated elections was apparently made on September 9. A year later, with Israeli-Palestinian negotiations progressing slowly, Hamas’s leaders reaffirmed their previous decisions. Their explanation was an essentially pragmatic one: the movement ruled out participation because the elections were bound to be part of a “humiliating and shameful agreement” and because it was assumed that they would be held under Israeli domination. 31
Hamas’s spokesmen explained that the Palestinian signatories had made far-reaching territorial concessions: abandoned Arab Jerusalem; failed to secure a satisfactory solution to the predicament of the majority of Palestinians, particularly the refugees; and committed themselves to a process that would not lead to sovereignty and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Above all, the Hamas spokesmen declared that they would not be a party to an agreement that legitimized Israel’s plundering of Islamic lands in Palestine. 32
While constantly reviling the Oslo process, the debate within the movement remained unresolved, with Hamas trying to keep open all its options so as to be able to capitalize on future opportunities. Thus, despite the initial decision to boycott the elections, Sheikh Yasin announced shortly afterward that Hamas might participate in the elections after all, provided that the PA Council was given legislative power. Yasin explained that unless Hamas was represented, the Council might make laws detrimental to the Islamic movement. According to Yasin, the crucial elements were the interests of the Palestinian people and the uninterrupted development of the Islamic movement. From this point of view, participation in the PA’s institutions would seem to serve Hamas’s interests. At the same time, however, other spokesmen of the movement expressed an unequivocal, even ambivalent, position, ostensibly leaving open the question of Hamas’s participation in the elections: “Everything is subject to consideration, including the possibility of participating in the elections.” 33
The statements by Yasin and other Hamas leaders reflected a position with broad support from Hamas’s constituency. It held that participation was the lesser evil and could serve as a guarantee against an attempt to eliminate Hamas if there was strong domestic and international support for the PA. Nonetheless, the leaders set strict conditions for the movement’s participation in the elections: that the elections be open to all Palestinian people and that the aim be the establishment of a sovereign and legislative council, not a powerless representative body under Israeli domination. In addition, they maintained that Hamas’s participation in the elections was dependent on the extent of the agreement to their procedures and democratic nature. An opposing viewpoint maintained that such participation would cost Hamas its credibility and be tantamount to political suicide, by blurring the dividing lines between Hamas and the PA. Worse, it might imply Hamas’s acceptance of the Oslo process. The Hamas approach, which combined political judiciousness and criticism of the PA, was succinctly expressed by the movement’s spokesman in Amman, Ibrahim Ghawsha, who stated that Hamas “seeks no authority [sulta] and wants no part of the pie, or any position of power.” According to Ghawsha, all Hamas wanted was to continue the jihad and the Intifada, which would oblige the Palestinian Authority to stop persecuting, arresting, and disarming members of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam. 34
Hamas as an ideological opposition movement distinguished by its adherence to the Palestinians’ basic rights (thawabit), could not have it both ways and participate in elections that were broadly perceived as a vote of faith in the Oslo accords. Thus, in spite of the internal debate, the political leadership remained opposed to participation. There were, indeed, some practical considerations that Hamas could not escape. First, despite the intention to hold the elections under international supervision, it was doubtful that they would be fair. Hamas’s and other opposition leaders realized that Arafat had stacked the deck against them by adopting a majoritarian method, rather than proportional representation, which would effectively strengthen Fatah as the ruling party at the expense of other popular political forces. 35 Second, even if the elections were relatively fair, Hamas had to calculate the potential scope of its success—in the case of both participation and boycott—and the results of each choice. According to a poll conducted in May 1995 by the Palestinian Research Center in Nablus, only 28 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip residents believed that the elections for the PA Council would be fair. At the same time, 20 percent were willing to boycott the elections if the opposition organizations called for that. Only 50 percent of the participants said that they felt free to criticize the PA. According to the poll, Hamas had only 12 percent of the population’s support. 36
Generally, the advantages and disadvantages were divided along regional lines. Due to the PA’s tighter control in the Gaza Strip, Hamas leaders there were relatively more inclined to participate in the elections than were their colleagues in the West Bank. It was this same Gaza Strip leadership that had pressured the “outside” leadership to consider establishing an Islamic political movement like those in the neighboring Arab states, an issue that became an inseparable part of the debate over Hamas’s participation in the elections and its relations with the PA (see later in this chapter). The Gaza leaders of Hamas also revealed a willingness to enter into negotiations with the PA over this issue, even without the consent of the “outside” leadership. In addition to the regional division, differences within Hamas apparently derived from socioeconomic disparities as well. In the Hamas-PA meeting in Khartoum in November 1995, the Hamas delegates, all from the autonomous Palestinian areas, were not conspicuous political leaders in the movement but members from a wealthy group of merchants in the movement. They supported participation in the elections, contrary to the view of many leading Hamas figures, especially outside the autonomous territory, as well as among the rank and file, who maintained a militant approach toward Israel and identified the elections with the Oslo accords. 37 It was from this reservoir that `Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the military apparatus of Hamas, drew most of its recruits.
Hamas’s dialogue with the PA did not induce the movement to change its essentially negative position on the elections, although it tempered it somewhat. At the PA’s behest, Hamas agreed to do no more than passively boycott the elections and not to interfere with the Palestinian public’s freedom to decide. By the end of October 1995, Hamas spokesmen no longer talked about boycotting the elections and urging the Palestinian public to do likewise, but only about “refraining” from participation. 38 In late October 1995, following the release of Hamas prisoners by the PA, `Imad Faluji, editor in chief of the Hamas organ al-Watan and a leading supporter of Hamas’s participation in the elections, explained that the movement’s eventual decision would depend on certain assurances:
We want to be convinced that any Palestinian parliament will be free. The elections must be independently planned and formulated by the Palestinians without any Israeli interference. And we insist that all unresolved questions must be up for discussion—though we flatly refuse any Israeli preconditions on the status of Jerusalem. 39
Hamas’s indecisive attitude represented the debate in which the movement’s leadership had continued since the Oslo agreement, and the weakened position of the Islamic bloc following eighteen months of PA rule. In November 1995, for example, Hamas estimated that its support by the Palestinian people had dropped from 30 to 15 percent. This had been one result of Arafat’s policy of “co-opt and divide,” which included conditional tolerance of Hamas’s public activity, cycles of short arrests and releases of leaders and activists, and recurrent closures of newspapers identified with Hamas. 40 But apart from Hamas’s announced reasons for boycotting the elections, the movement’s leaders were still in prison, including Yasin and Rantisi (by Israel), and Abu Marzuq (by the U.S. government), which apparently strengthened the outside leadership’s militant voice and could further diminish the movement’s prospects of success in the elections.
The vacillations that marked Hamas’s attitude toward the elections since the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) ultimately crystallized into a kind of “positive ambivalence.” In practice, this meant avoiding official participation in the elections and hence the legitimization of the DOP but still displaying an informal presence in the election process to avoid risking political marginalization. In mid-November, Hamas announced its official decision to boycott the elections to the PA Council, though not actively, explaining that the movement was not against the principle of elections but against the dissatisfactory terms of the Oslo accords, especially Israel’s insufficient withdrawal from the occupied territories and the inadequacy of the election law. Hamas made it clear that its boycott was not meant to prevent indirect participation, stating that “we have repeated the call to our members and to adherents of the Islamic bloc to register their names on the electoral roll.” 41
Hamas’s decision not to participate officially in the elections remained unchanged in the talks held in Cairo on December 18&-;20, 1995, between its delegates and the PA’s representatives. The main issues on the agenda were Hamas’s participation in the elections and the PA’s demand that Hamas should cease its military operations against Israel. 42 On the issue of elections, the PA urged Hamas to stop playing a negative role and to participate, at least in East Jerusalem, in order to bolster the Palestinians’ position in their negotiations with Israel over the final status of the city, due to begin in May 1996. Hamas, however, refused to perceive Jerusalem as an exception and stuck to its boycott of the elections as a whole. On the issue of armed struggle against Israel, Hamas refused to halt its attacks against Israel completely, but it did agree to stop its violent attacks on Israel from the areas under the PA’s control or those areas where the PA and Israel maintained joint patrols (areas A and B) (on the unwritten understanding between the PA and Hamas, see chapter 3).
Within the framework of a passive boycott of the elections, Hamas encouraged persons identified as Islamists, or even as its own members, to run as independents. Informally, Hamas also called on its followers to exercise their right to vote for Islamic candidates who had been associated or maintained good relations with the movement. This move represented a realistic approach that recognized the strong public excitement about exercising this unprecedented civil right. Indeed, if Hamas called for a boycott and people voted anyway, it would lose its credibility. Furthermore, the lists of registered voters for the general elections were to be used to determine the eligible electorate for the future municipal elections in which Hamas would be sure to take part officially, as they would have no connection to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Like the Islamic movements in Israel and in some of the neighboring Arab countries, Hamas was fully aware of the opportunity to be officially represented in the PA Council by committed Islamist independent delegates, thus preserving the ideological image of Hamas.
In accordance with the interim agreement, elections for the president of the PA were held simultaneously with those for the members of the Palestinian Council, using separate ballots. Participation was open to all Palestinians, eighteen years or older, who lived in their electoral district and whose names were on the voters’ rolls. Candidacy for membership in the Assembly was open to every Palestinian who was thirty years or older on election day.
Election of the Council’s members was regional, personal, and direct in each voting district. Although the elections were personal, the system permitted movements, parties, and individuals to organize and present joint lists from which the voter could choose the candidates he or she preferred. Every voter could vote for the same number of candidates as number of seats allotted to the district and could vote for candidates from different lists. The winning candidates were those who received the largest number of votes. Of the 725 candidates, 559 were independents who ran on the basis of their established reputations as national or social activists, personal wealth, or relationship to one of the larger clans in a specific district. There were 166 candidates up for election, 36 on new lists that had been drawn up as the elections approached, and 130 representing preexisting movements and parties. 43
By adopting a strategy of unofficially participating in the elections, Hamas could urge its supporters to take part and to help them get to their voting place. Hamas advised its followers to vote for the seven candidates whom the movement supported as close adherents and of whom five (according to another version, six) were elected. Also, Hamas supported several independents and even a number of Fatah candidates who were known for their good relations with the Islamic opposition. An exit poll of 3,200 voters by the Palestinian Research Center in Nablus found that 60 to 70 percent of Hamas supporters participated in the elections, whereas the general level of participation ranged between 88 percent in the Gaza Strip and 70 percent in the West Bank (Hamas’s participation was still lower than that of the PFLP and the DFLP whose participation was closer to the general level). 44
A regime can manipulate elections in three main ways to favor itself: (1) by deciding on a propitious time for the elections; (2) by instituting an electoral system highly favorable to itself, harassing and intimidating the opposition, and employing government resources in the campaign; and (3) by outright fraud and theft. 45 In the January 1996 elections in Palestine, Arafat engaged in at least the first two, if not all three of these techniques. 20 First, Arafat appointed his long-time confidant and Fatah member Sa'ib `Ariqat to head the Central Election Commission that was to pass the electoral laws and oversee the elections. The commission set the election date for January 20, one day before the start of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Had the elections been held after Ramadan, Hamas would have had a chance to reach the masses through the daily prayers and Friday sermons, though principally through its charity and welfare committees, which tended to be especially active during this month among the poor. The Palestinian vote, then, demonstrates one method by which elections can be strategically set to benefit one specific party. 47
In addition, the (PA) Council of eighty-eight members was chosen by majority winner-take-all elections in sixteen districts. But not all the seats allotted to a region represented the same number of people in each district. For example, in the region of the Gaza Strip, the number of seats allotted was based on 8,730 voters per seat, whereas in the region of Salfit, in the West Bank, 18,996 voters vied for the one seat allotted. 48 Three districts had a single member, and thirteen had several members. Six seats were reserved for Christian candidates and one for a Samaritan candidate. Candidates could run as individuals or as members of a party, and voters could split their tickets across parties. Voters were allotted the same number of votes as slots for their district. For example, a voter in Gaza City had twelve votes, one for one candidate, and he could vote for candidates of different parties. With the polls a month before the election showing Fatah running at 40 to 45 percent and Hamas at 15 percent, 49 Arafat must have known that a majority system would greatly favor his party. If the polls were correct, a proportional system would have required Arafat to share power with thirteen or more Islamic Council members. Moreover, multimember districts further favored Arafat’s party, since, as Lijphart writes, “all majoritarian systems tend to systematically favor the larger parties, to produce disproportional election outcomes, and to discourage multipartyism. District magnitudes larger than 1 tend to reinforce these tendencies.” 50
Not only did the electoral system itself benefit Arafat, but so did the conduct of the campaign. The Central Election Commission was appointed only a few weeks before the vote, and up until the last few days, it continued to announce new arrangements. Even the district boundaries were uncertain until the last moment. Furthermore, the official campaign period was reduced to just over two weeks from the planned twenty-two days, a very short length of time for an election in which 725 candidates were running for office. One of the few well-known campaign rules was that political speeches were forbidden in mosques, a clear attempt to diminish Hamas’s chances of success if it decided to participate. 51 There were also reports that Palestinian police patrolling the streets at night were tearing down posters for any non-Fatah candidates. Some observers noted that if all these advantages were not enough, then the presence of at least three PA policemen at every polling station would probably help persuade Palestinians to vote for Arafat and Fatah. 52
Incorporation Without Identification: Hamas and the PA’s Institutions
The strategy of unofficial participation also determined Hamas’s stand on placing its members in the PA’s executive apparatuses. Similarly to its attitude toward participating in the elections, Hamas encouraged its adherents to join the PA’s administrative organizations on their own. Hamas justified this by distinguishing between two perceptions of the PA, as a sovereign political power and as an administrative organization to provide services to the people. Whereas the former represented political principles and national symbols, the latter was seen as instrumental, linked to daily life. As Mahmud al-Zahar explained,
There is a difference between [being] a clerk in the educational department and applying a policy to the educational department. Members of Hamas work in the departments of education, health, agriculture, and everywhere . . . but everyone knows that we do not take part in those departments whose task is to implement the political Oslo agreements. 53
Citing the Oslo accord the PA had signed with Israel, Hamas remained adamant in its refusal to grant the PA legitimacy as a national center which, besides its authority to enforce the law, would also articulate the people’s ideas, symbols, and beliefs. But Hamas was willing to recognize the PA as an administrative entity with the duty of maintaining law and order and providing employment and services to the community. Hamas, for its part, regarded its active presence in the PA’s administrative organization not only as a means to exercise its social influence but also as a guarantee against any attempt by the PA to impede the Islamic movement. 54
Hamas justified this position by pointing to the necessity of avoiding civil strife, a position the movement had taken from the start. Hamas leaders admitted, however, explicitly as well as implicitly, that their acquiescence to the PA and their willingness to accept “the Palestinian people’s democratic decision” reflected the movement’s strategic weakness in view of the intra-Palestinian, regional, and international reality created by the Oslo agreement. Accordingly, Islamic spokesmen suggested a “wait and see” tactic, maintaining that the amount of criticism on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides meant that the agreement’s collapse was only a matter of time. Meanwhile, patience and flexibility on Hamas’s part were needed to guarantee the movement’s uninterrupted communal activity. Indeed, after the signing of the Oslo agreement, both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad repeatedly called for patience as a manifestation of true Islam and adherence to its long-term goals. Preaching patience (sabr) as a religious norm thus helped justify a policy of coexistence with the PA despite the latter’s commitment to a political settlement with Israel. 55
The distinction between long-term ideological commitment and here-and-now needs had already been affirmed years before when Israel imposed a series of closures on the Palestinians in the occupied territories, citing security. At the same time, Israel incrementally limited the number of permits for Palestinians working in Israel. Although this policy had been initially adopted in response to terrorist attacks by Palestinians, mainly Islamists, in Israel in late 1990, with the availability of an alternative labor force of newcomers from the Soviet Union and the continuation of violence, those restrictions turned into a de facto Israeli policy that has remained in place despite the Oslo accord and the economic agreement between Israel and the PA signed in April 1994 (the Paris Protocol). In late 1994, the demand for day jobs by Palestinians in Gaza Strip alone was 60,000 while the demand by Israelis had dropped below the number of permits issued by the Israeli authorities. In January 1995, before the ha-Sharon Junction (Beit Lid) suicide attack and consequent closure, the Israeli demand was for only 22,000 workers, 10,000 fewer than the permitted quota of workers. Consequently, despite its scarce resources, the PA became the largest employer in the Gaza Strip. 56
This is why and how Hamas’s position toward the PA’s institutions was marked by an attempt to differentiate between the political and the executive. Whereas Hamas’s propaganda elaborated on ways to discredit and delegitimize the PA’s leadership, it was careful not to alienate the Palestinian public and especially the rank and file in the PA administration. Already in October 1993, Hamas had instructed its followers not to antagonize the Palestinian police officers. Indeed, these police officers were to be encouraged to collaborate with Hamas’s armed activities against Israel and even to “initiate suicide actions . . . exploiting their possibilities of [available] weapons, and freedom of maneuver to support the resistance.” 57
Despite the poor prospects of achieving a tangible influence on the PA, Hamas leaders could not ignore the advantages of having a political presence in PA institutions. In particular, they sought a voice in the construction and functioning of legislative, judicial, and educational institutions, whose impact on the social and religious aims of the Islamic movement was undeniable. Such participation was also intended to prevent legislation that might be incompatible with Islam. In the same vein, Hamas asserted its intention to take an active part in municipal elections and repeatedly urged Arafat to hold them. Unlike the elections to the PA’s representative institutions, which were perceived as part of the Oslo process, municipal elections were considered directly related to the service of society. Arafat, however, preferred to appoint municipal councils in Gaza, Nablus, Hebron, and other cities rather than to hold elections, which Hamas believed would enable it to demonstrate its popularity and record of achievements at the local and communal levels. 58
Because of this approach and the PA’s policy of preferring coexistence to confrontation with Hamas, the latter encouraged its followers to take official positions in the religious establishment in the West Bank, explaining that these positions were administrative, providing services to the community, but had no representative significance. Thus, by reducing the significance of participating in the PA’s administration to the individual-level and executive positions, Hamas could portray its participation as unofficial, with no political or symbolic meaning. “If the Islamists [directly] participate in the government, it would mean that they have become part of it and would not be able to return to the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ [islam huwa al-hall].” 59
Presence by Proxy: Establishing a Political Party
As the Hamas paper of alternative strategies cited earlier showed, already in the summer of 1992, the movement had considered establishing a political party as a way to participate indirectly in the elections to the PA Council. Hamas renewed its interest in this option in early 1993 following the deportation by Israel of 415 leading members of the Islamic movements. It was, however, the signing of the Oslo accord later in the year that triggered an intensive public debate over this issue in Hamas circles. According to one of the figures who advocated the idea, Fakhri `Abd al-Latif, the Oslo agreement obligated Hamas to consider a new political strategy in which a legal party could better serve the Islamic movement’s interests and preserve its achievements. 60
The proponents of an Islamic party argued for maintaining an official political presence by means of a legal instrument that would serve as a security net for the Islamic movement in case of an attempt by the PA to suppress Hamas. The envisaged party was to offer Islamic followers a legitimate framework for participating in elections and political life in general, including serving on the Legislative Council. The party was not supposed to replace Hamas but, rather, to “serve as its instrument, just like the Islamic University in education and charity associations in the welfare sphere.” 61 The opponents of the idea claimed that establishing an Islamic party might cause Hamas to lose its combatant (jihadi) character and also identify it with mere politics, thereby perhaps pushing militant followers out of the movement. Thus, under self-government and as long as the struggle for Palestinian national liberation and statehood continued, Hamas was obligated to remain a clandestine movement with no organizational link to a political party. 62
Support for establishing an Islamic political party came mainly from senior figures of the Islamic movement in the Gaza Strip, who in the summer and fall of 1994 wrote a series of preliminary draft papers on various aspects of the question. The papers explained the necessity of a political party and the best time to form it, defined its relations with Hamas and other elements of the Islamic movement, and determined its basic guidelines. One of the documents urged quick action, before the PA had consolidated its position. 63 According to the Hamas spokesman, in the summer of 1995 the consultative bodies of Hamas—possibly the Consultative Council (Majlis shura)—resolved in principle to establish an Islamic political party, though when was not decided. 64 The decision was clearly made with a view to the elections to the PA Council, which were then thought to be imminent. The party was envisaged as a political arm of the Islamic movement, hence the issue of armed struggle against Israel would not be affected.
According to these documents, the party would have four main tasks: 65
In its platform, the proposed Islamic party would struggle for the liberation of the Palestinian people from the yoke of the “Zionist occupation” and implement the “right of return” of the 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees. Although trying not to contradict the Hamas charter, the documents’ framers did not define its territorial aims in line with the charter, which strove for the liberation of all of Palestine by means of armed struggle. Rather, the party borrowed the pragmatic goal set by Hamas, bringing about a full Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, including the removal of all the Jewish settlements in those territories. That aim coincided with Hamas’s statements about its willingness to accept a “temporary truce” (hudna) with Israel, though not peace. The proposed Islamic party would work to block all normalization with the “Zionist entity” and halt the PA’s policy of political concessions in negotiations with it. The party would also respect human rights, freedom of political organization and association, political pluralism, and the majority decision in selecting the Palestinian people’s leaders and its representatives in “inside” and “outside” institutions. Another plank in the platform called for an effort to remedy the PA’s hostility toward Islam and the Islamic movement and to minimize the chances of an armed clash between the two. The platform committed the Islamic party to refrain from employing violence and force to reach its goals. At the same time, the platform made clear that the party supported all the national and Islamic bodies striving to realize the Palestinian people’s full rights in a strategy of armed resistance to the Israeli occupation. 67
Structurally, the party was to be made up of a founding committee, a general assembly, a consultative council (majlis shura), and a political bureau. Representation would be based on geography, “sectoral affiliation,” past activity in Hamas and its communal institutions, public status, and administrative and organizational skills. Consequently, an Islamic party would require a restructuring of the Islamic movement, which under the new dispensation would consist of three-tiered functional institutions. Hamas would be responsible for clandestine and military activities, maintaining an institutional separation from the Muslim Brothers, who would continue to maintain the da`wa (Islamic preaching) infrastructure, and the Islamic party. The Islamic party would secure political backing for the other two arms of the Islamic movement and thus forestall any attempts by the PA to suppress Hamas and da`wa activities by cooperating with the PA and maintaining an official presence in its institutions. Under the new structure, the Islamic movement would be managed directly by a supreme political leadership, which for security considerations would be located outside the Palestinian territories and would be the source of legitimacy for all parts of the movement. To ensure the party’s Islamic character, it would always have a majority of MB (51 percent or more) among its cadres, and the MB would have the final say regarding the admission of members to the party. 68
In mid-November 1995, shortly after Hamas’s spokesman announced the decision in principle to establish a party, Arafat announced the foundation of the National Islamic Salvation Party (Hizb al-khalas al-watani al-islami). Arafat had an obvious interest in publicizing the new party, to demonstrate his success in persuading the Islamic opposition to take part in the elections, thus legitimizing the Oslo process. In a meeting with Arafat, the party’s founders, all well-known Islamist figures in Gaza Strip, stated that they were not connected with any existing political body. The new party’s spokesman, Fakhri `Abd al-Latif, conceded that his party and Hamas were based on the same principles, although they were structurally independent. He also revealed that the new party’s Political Bureau was composed of members of Hamas, but not all the founders were originally from Hamas. 69
Despite the practical reasons for its foundation, a month before the elections the new party still had not officially announced its participation, apparently because of the delay in the political talks between Hamas and the PA. Meanwhile, reservations grew within Hamas about taking part in the elections. Other reasons for its reluctance to participate in the elections, apart from rejection of the Oslo accord, were the party’s incomplete preparations for the elections and insufficient time for preparations, and the limited power allotted to the Council. At a massive rally in Gaza on its eighth anniversary in mid-December 1995, Hamas’s leaders officially announced that the movement would not take part in the elections on the grounds that the “Oslo elections” would not guarantee the Palestinian rights for sovereignty and a state for the Palestinian people. But they repeated their commitment to avoid infighting and to contribute to building a civic and secure society through dialogue with the PA. Hamas’s decision not to participate in the elections was announced again at the Cairo talks, yet it implied that candidates identified with Hamas—understood as the newly established National Islamic Salvation Party—would take part. 70 But with the registration of candidates for the elections closed, it was clear that the National Islamic Salvation Party would not take part officially in the elections, leaving them to Fatah and its two marginal political partners: the People’s Party (Hizb al-sha`b—previously the Communist Party) and the Palestinian Democratic Union (al-Ittihad al-dimuqrati al-filastini—FDA).
In the final analysis, the abstention of the Islamic party from participation in the elections derived from a combination of internal and external causes. Certainly, the timing and system of the elections were designed to give Arafat an advantage. These circumstances apparently provided Hamas’s “outside” leadership with strong reason to reject the participation of an Islamic party in the elections, beyond its initial concern lest such participation strengthen the “inside” leadership at its own expense. Furthermore, given the symbolic significance of the elections, the expected decisive victory of Arafat and Fatah, participation of the Islamic party in the elections would only have called attention to Hamas’s public weakness and present it as a marginal movement. Such results could weaken Hamas’s bargaining position with the PA and encourage the latter to take further steps to reduce the movement’s public influence.
In March 1996, two months after the elections, the National Islamic Salvation Party officially announced its founding after receiving the PA’s approval. The announcement was accompanied by a list of the names of the nineteen members of the Political Bureau, emphasizing the party’s openness, as opposed to Hamas’s secret character. The members of the Political Bureau were well-known figures with a record of activity in Hamas; indeed, some of them were in prison when the party’s founding was announced. The party would accept political pluralism, conduct its activities by legal political means, and respect human rights. 71
In the first two years following its foundation, the National Islamic Salvation Party gained little public attention or political significance and, in fact, remained a footnote in Palestinian politics. The party’s poor organizational and political performance might be traced to the changing Israeli-Palestinian and intra-Palestinian relations. First, in 1996, Hamas’s concern that the PA might take strict measures to isolate it socially and politically and suppress its activities faded, owing to the stalemated Israel-PA negotiations following the election of Netanyahu’s right-wing government in Israel. Moreover, weakened by this stalemate and the growing economic and social hardships of the Palestinians under its jurisdiction, the PA sought to reach a tactical rapprochement with Hamas. Second, the long-delayed municipal elections were postponed indefinitely, stripping the party of a major task it had counted on. Nonetheless, the party did undertake certain activities, especially propaganda, occasionally issuing statements of protest and criticism of the PA, and recruitment of youth by, among other means, opening summer camps for children. 72 At the same time, Hamas continued to play openly its political role, with its leaders referring to military issues as well, while its communal activities continued to prosper.
The absence of a Hamas-based Islamic party in the elections might indicate the main considerations determining Hamas’s political behavior regarding participation in the PA institutions. The fear that refusing to cooperate with the PA would cause the movement irreversible damage and that participating might be interpreted as legitimizing the Oslo process obligated Hamas to opt for unofficial participation. Such a mode of participation was subject to three considerations:
These are the reasons for Hamas’s decision to encourage its members to vote in the elections and support the candidates identified with Hamas—but as individuals, not as members of a party. In the same vein, Hamas encouraged its members to join the PA’s executive offices, but not to accept any position with political significance. In both cases, Hamas’s chance of scoring gains without paying a symbolic price seemed possible, and the likelihood of consent by Hamas leaders both “inside” and “outside” was thought to be high.
Endnotes
Note 1: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, al-Hall al-Islami: Farida wa-Darura [The Islamic solution: Duty and necessity], 5th ed. (Cairo: Maktabat Wahaba, 1993), pp. 155–192; Fathi Yakan, Nahwa Haraka Islamiyya `Alamiyya Wahida [Toward one global Islamic movement], 3d ed. (Beirut: Mu`assassat al-Risala, 1977), pp. 8–21. Back.
Note 2: Martin Kramer, “Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power,” Middle East Quarterly (June 1996): 39. Back.
Note 3: Sana Abed-Kotob, “The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27 (1995): 321–339. Back.
Note 4: See for example, the interview with Ibrahim Kharisat, spokesman for the Islamic movement in the Jordanian parliament, explaining the irrationality of using force to pass legislation in the parliament, for Filastin al-Muslima (November 1992): 29; `Abdallah al-`Akailah, “Tajribat al-haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Urdun,” in `Azzam al-Tamimi, Musharakat al-Islamiyyin fi al-Sulta [The Islamists’ participation in power] (London: Liberty for the Muslim World, 1994), pp. 101–112; al-Hayat, September 12, 1994, pp. 1, 6. Back.
Note 5: Tim Niblock, “Islamic Movements and Sudan’s Political Coherence,” in H. L. Beuchot, C. Delmet, and D. Hopewood, eds., Sudan: History, Identity, Ideology (Reading, Pa.: Ithaca Press, 1991); Hasan al-Turabi, al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Sudan [The Islamic movement in Sudan] (n.p., n.d.), pp. 34–35. The book was published by Muhammad Hashimi, an activist member of the Islamic Renaissance (al-Nahda) Movement in Tunisia. Back.
Note 6: Tah Nasr Mustafa, “al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Yamaniyya: `Ishruna `Aaman min al-Musharaka al-Siyasiyya” [The Islamic movement in Yemen: Twenty years of political participation], in `Azzam al-Tamimi, Musharakat al-Islamiyyin fil al-Sulta, pp. 140–171. Back.
Note 7: Gideon Gera, “ha-Tnu`a ha-Islamit be-Algeria” [The Islamic movement in Algeria], in Meir Litvak, ed., Islam ve-Demokratiya ba-`Olam ha-`Arvi [Islam and democracy in the Arab world] (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Me'uhad, 1998), pp. 224–230. Back.
Note 8: For a positive summary of Hizballah’s parliamentary experience, see the interview with the deputy secretary-general, Na`im al-Qasim, for Filastin al-Muslima (October 1994): 25. Back.
Note 9: See, for example, John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, “Democratization and Islam,” Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 427–440; Emmanuel Sivan, “Eavesdropping on Radical Islam,” Middle East Quarterly 2, no. 1 (1995): 13–24; Glenn E. Robinson, “Can Islamists Be Democrats?” Middle East Journal 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 373–388. Back.
Note 10: See, for example, the interview with Turabi in Qira'at Siyasiyya (Florida), no. 3 (Summer 1992): 20; his interview with Filastin al-Muslima (November 1992): 34; Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 47, 56–57; Rivka Yadlin, “ha-Yelkhu Shnayim Yahdav Bilti `Im No`adu?” [Would the two go together unless they had agreed?], in Meir Litvak, ed., Islam ve-Democratya ba-`Olam ha-`Arvi, pp. 76–79. Back.
Note 11: Islam, Democracy, the State and the West: A Round Table with Dr. Hasan Turabi, May 19, 1992, World and Islam Studies Enterprise and University of South Florida, Committee for Middle Eastern Studies, p. 18; Rashed al-Ghanouchi, Mahawir Islamiyya [Islamic pivots] (Cairo: Bait al-Ma`rifa, 1992), pp. 142–144; Qaradawi, Awlawiyyat al-Haraka al-Islamiyya, pp. 16–17. Back.
Note 12: Amir Weissbrod, “ha-Islam ha-Radicali be-Sudan: Hagut 'u-Ma`ase—Mishnato ha-Datit veha-Politit shel Hasan al-Turabi” [Radical Islam in Sudan: Thought and practice—The religious and political doctrine of Hasan al-Turabi] (master’s thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1997), p. 154; al-Wasat, November 7, 1994; Filastin al-Muslima (November 1992): 34. Back.
Note 13: Rashed al-Ghannouchi, “Hukm Musharakat al-Islam fi Nizam Ghair Islami” [The rule of Islamic participation in a non-Islamic regime], in `Azzam al-Tamimi, Musharakat al-Islamiyyin fi al-Sulta, pp. 13–24, Kotob, “The Accommodationists Speak,” pp. 328–329. Back.
Note 14: Leaflet signed by ten organizations (Hamas is first on the list), “Fali-Tasqut Mu'amarat al-Tasfiya fali-Tastamirr al-Intifada al-Mubaraka” (Down with the conspiracies of elimination, let the blessed Intifada go on), October 24, 1991, Filastin al-Muslima (November 1991): 31. Back.
Note 15: Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 186. Back.
Note 16: G. Kramer, “The Integration of the Integrist: A Comparative Study of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia,” in Ghassan Salame, ed., Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London: Tauris, 1994), pp. 204–205; R. Meijer, From al-Da`wa to al-Hizbiyya: Mainstream Islamic Movements in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in the 1990s (Amsterdam: Research Center for International Political Economy, 1997), p. 4. Back.
Note 17: Emmanuel Sivan, “Eavesdropping on Radical Islam,” Middle East Quarterly 2, no. 1(1995): 21. Back.
Note 18: On the debate in this respect by the Islamic movements in Egypt, see `Isam al-`Iryan, “`Awa'iq al-Musharaka al-Siyasiyya fi Misr” [The obstacles for political participation in Egypt], in `Azzam al-Tamimi, Musharakat al-Islamiyyin fi al-Sulta, pp. 217–219; Meijer, From al-Da`wa to al-Hizbiyya, p. 6. For Jordan, see A. Ghara'ibah, Jama`at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Urdun, 1946–1996 [The Society of Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 1946–1996] (Amman: Markaz al-Urdun al-Jadid lil-Dirasat, 1997), pp. 137–138. Back.
Note 19: A. Benningsen, “The National Front in Communist Strategy in the Middle East,” in Walter Laqueur, ed., The Middle East in Transition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 351–360. The impact of this concept on Turabi in Sudan is reflected in the name he gave to his movement in 1985: The National Islamic Front (al-Jabha al-islamiyya al-qawmiyya), as well as in his approach to other issues. Weissbrod, Ha-Islam ha-Radicali be-Sudan, pp. 167–168. Back.
Note 20: On the foundation of the Front, see A. J. Azem, “The Islamic Action Front,” in J. Schwedler, ed., Islamic Movements in Jordan (Amman: al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, 1977), p. 115. Back.
Note 21: `Abdallah al-`Akailah, “Aina Nahnu wa-Matha Nurid” [Where are we and what do we want], al-`Amal al-Islami (Jordan) (September–November 1996): 19–23; al-Hayat, September 12, 1996, pp. 1, 6; al-Ra'i, November 25, 1996, p. 39. For the conservative attitude, see al-Ra'i, November 4, 6, 1996, p. 32 (for both). Back.
Note 22: On the Palestinization and radicalization of the movement in the 1990s, see Shmuel Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 1998), pp. 44–49; On the MB’s decision to boycott the elections and its differences with the Islamic Action Front, see al-Hayat, July 10, 1997, and al-Dustur (Jordan), July 13, 1997. Back.
Note 23: Taha Nasr Mustafa, “al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Yamaniyya,” pp. 140–171. Back.
Note 24: On the considerations and vacillations concerning this decision, see Filastin al-Muslima (August 1991): 21–23, and (June 1992): 15–17. Back.
Note 25: Interviews with Hamas’s “outside” leaders: Ibrahim Ghawash for Filastin al-Muslima (May 1991): 24–25, and (October 1992): 10–11; `Imad al-`Alami for Filastin al-Muslima (April 1992): 33; Muhammad Nazzal for Filastin al-Muslima (March 1992): 19, and (September 1992): 13. Back.
Note 26: The expression appeared in a Hamas leaflet criticizing the PA’s director of security, June 4, 1994. Back.
Note 27: Hamas, al-Rasid (a noncirculating internal bulletin), no. 2 (April 15, 1992): 1. Back.
Note 28: An internal Hamas document, faxed on July 27, 1992. Back.
Note 29: State of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995). Back.
Note 30: On Arafat’s efforts to convince Hamas and other movements to take part in the elections or join Fatah’s list of candidates, see Lamis Andoni, “The Palestinian Elections: Moving Toward Democracy or One-Party Rule?” Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 6–9; Al-Nas wal-Intikhabat, a special weekly on the elections, financed by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation and distributed as a supplement to the al-Quds daily of East Jerusalem. It was issued on six consecutive Sundays before the election and on the election day itself, December 12, 1995. Back.
Note 31: Interview with Ibrahim Ghawsha for Filastin al-Muslima (October 1992), 10–11; his announcement, al-Ra'i, November 11, 1993. Back.
Note 32: Interview with the deputy chairman of the Association of the [Islamic] Scholars of Palestine, Sheikh Taysir al-Tamimi, for Filastin al-Muslima (October 1994): 40; interview with Ahmad Yasin for Filastin al-Muslima (November 1993): 5; Ibrahim Ghawsha to Voice of Palestine from Jericho, September 25, 1995, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, September 26, 1995. Back.
Note 33: al-Quds (East Jerusalem), November 1, 1993, p. 11. Filastin al-Muslima (November 1993): 7. See also Muhammad Nazzal’s statement in Shihan (Amman), April 22, 1994; FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, April 14, 1994. Back.
Note 34: al-Dustur (Jordan), April 11, 1995, p. 29; Muhammad Nazzal to Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Arabic), August 8, 1995, FBIS-NESA, Daily Report, August 9, 1995; Ali al Jarbawi, “The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine-Israel Accord,” Muslim World 83, nos. 1–2 (January–April 1994): 152–153. Back.
Note 35: Graham Usher, “Arafat’s Opening,” New Statement and Society 8, no. 82 (December 1, 1995): 25; Sami Aboudi, “Palestinian Militants Rail Against False Democracy,” Reuters, January 19, 1996. Back.
Note 36: For a report on the pall (the sample included 1,271 people), see Ha'aretz, June 2, 1995. Back.
Note 37: Biladi—Jerusalem Times, October 27, 1995, pp. 17–19; News from Within (Jerusalem) (November 1995): 10. Back.
Note 38: Interviews with Ibrahim Ghawsha for Radio Monte Carlo (Arabic), October 12, 1995, FBIS-NESA, Daily Report, October 13, 1995; al-Ra'i (Jordan), October 25, 1995. Mahmud al-Zahar affirmed Hamas’s response to the PA’s request, al-Dustur (Jordan), February 19, 1996, p. 25. Back.
Note 39: Quoted from al-Watan (Gaza), Biladi—Jerusalem Times, October 27, 1995. Back.
Note 40: News from Within (Jerusalem) (November 1995): 17. Back.
Note 41: Biladi—Jerusalem Times, November 17, 1995, p. 2. Back.
Note 42: On Arafat’s efforts to convince Hamas and other Palestinian groups to take part in the elections or join Fatah’s lists of candidates, see Andoni, “The Palestinian Elections”; al-Nas wal-Intikhabat, December 12, 1995. Back.
Note 43: As`ad Ghanem, “Founding Elections in Transitional Period: The First Palestinian General Elections,” Middle East Journal 50, no. 4 (1996): 4–8. Back.
Note 44: Biladi—Jerusalem Times, January 26, 1996. In an interview with al-Hayat (London), February 6, 1996, pp. 1, 6, Arafat argued that five of Hamas’s members had been elected; Khalil Shikaki, “The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 18; Andoni, “The Palestinian Elections,” p. 5. For slightly different data, see As`ad Ghanem, Ha-Behirot ha-Falastiniot ha-Klaliyot ha-Rishonot, January 1996—Mivhan ha-Demokratya [The first general Palestinian elections, January 1996—the test of democracy] (Giv'at Haviva: ha-Makhon le-Heker ha-Shalom, 1996), pp. 16, 18. The general voter turnout was 75.86 percent—73.5 percent in the West Bank and 86.77 in the Gaza Strip. Back.
Note 45: Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 182–186. Back.
Note 46: Our description of Arafat’s manipulative strategies in the elections is partly based on Adir Waldman, “Democratic Opposition in Palestine,” seminar paper, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1996. Back.
Note 47: “Peace Monitor,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 1 (Autumn 1995): 106. Back.
Note 48: Al-Nas wal-Intikhabat, January 20, 1996, p. 5; Andoni, “The Palestinian Elections,” pp. 9–10. Back.
Note 49: Graham Usher, “Arafat’s Opening,” New Statesman and Society 8, no. 82 (December 1, 1995): 25. Back.
Note 50: Arend Lijphart, Election Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 20. Back.
Note 51: Martin Peretz, “Global Vision,” The New Republic, January 22, 1996, p. 12; Ethan Eisenberg, “Democracy in Gaza: An Election Diary,” Congress Monthly 63, no. 2 (March–April 1996): 9. Back.
Note 52: Shyam Bhatia, “Vote Arafat for Dictator, “The Observer, January 14, 1996, p. 21. Back.
Note 53: al-Watan (Gaza), January 19, 1995, pp. 8–9. Back.
Note 54: Sheikh Jamal Salim, “al-Hizb al-Siyasi al-Islami: Min Mutatallabat al-Marhala” (The Islamic political party: A necessity of the [current] stage), al-Quds (East Jerusalem), June 10, 1994; Muhammad al-Hindi, “al-Islamiyyun wal-Taswiya” (The Islamists and the settlement), al-Quds (East Jerusalem), July 1, 1994; interview with Mahmud al-Zahar for al-Quds (East Jerusalem), November 28, 1994; interview with Muhammad Nazzal for al-Urdun (Jordan), February 5, 1996, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, February 6, 1996. Back.
Note 55: Interview with Musa Abu Marzuq for Filastin al-Muslima (June 1994): 16; Interview with `Abdallah al-Shami, leader of the Islamic Jihad in Gaza, for al-Quds (East Jerusalem), December 17, 1994; interview with Ibrahim Ghawsha for Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Arabic), August 17, 1995, FBIS-NESA, Daily Report, August 18, 1995. Back.
Note 56: Time, November 21, 1994; Ha'aretz, May 30, 1995. Back.
Note 57: Hamas (internal circular), “Siyasat wa-Madamin al-Khitab al-I`lami lil-Marhala al-Qadima Ithra Ittifaq Ghazza-Ariha” [Policies and contents of the propaganda speech in the next stage, following the Gaza-Jericho agreement], October 28, 1993. Back.
Note 58: Mahmud al-Zahar, “al-Qiwa al-Filastiniyya . . . wa-Intikhabat al-Hukm al-Dhati” [The Palestinian forces . . . and the elections of self-government], Filastin al-Muslima (October 1994): 30; Ibrahim Ghawsha to Radio Monte Carlo (Arabic), October 12, 1995, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, October 13, 1995. Back.
Note 59: Interview with Rabi` `Aql, a senior activist in Hamas, for Sawt al-Haq wal-Hurriyya, December 3, 1993. Back.
Note 60: Interview with Fakhri `Abd al-Latif for Ha'aretz, December 17, 1995. Back.
Note 61: Interview with Mahmud al-Zahar for Filastin al-Muslima (June 1995): 14–15. Back.
Note 62: Isma`il Haniyya, Filastin (Gaza), September 30, 1994, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, October 21, 1994; Muhammad H. Hamid, “al-Islamiyyun wal-Hizb al-Siyasi” [The Islamists and the political party], al-Quds (East Jerusalem), June 11, 1994. Back.
Note 63: There are five documents, each discussing a separate aspect of the party’s foundation. The most important document was entitled “Mashru` Ta'sis Hizb Siyasi Islami” [Plan for establishing an Islamic party] (n.d.], which summarized the other documents. See also `Imad Faluji’s proposal for a party similar to the Islamic Action Front in al-Quds (East Jerusalem), June 22, 1994. Back.
Note 64: Interview with Ibrahim Ghawsha for al-Mujtama` (Kuwait), October 31, 1995, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, December 7, 1995. Back.
Note 65: Hamas (internal document), “Al-Nizam al-Asasi lil-Hizb” [The party’s basic law] (n.d.). Back.
Note 66: Ha'aretz, December 20, 1995. Back.
Note 67: Hamas, “Al-Nizam al-Asasi lil-Hizb.” Back.
Note 68: Hamas, “Ta`rif al-Hizb wa-Ahdafuhu” [Definition of the party and its goals] (n.d.). Back.
Note 69: al-Nahar (East Jerusalem), November 24 and December 17, 1995. Back.
Note 70: al-Quds (East Jerusalem), December 17, 20, 1995. Back.
Note 71: al-Quds (East Jerusalam), March 22, 1996. Isma`il Abu Shanab was still in an Israeli prison, and Ahmad Bahr was in a Palestinian prison. Back.
Note 72: See for example, Ha'aretz, July 24, 1998. Back.
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