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The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela
2000
4. Coexistence Within Conflict
The emergence of Hamas as a political alternative to the PLO intensified the tension between the two over how to shape the day-to-day activities of the Intifada and over the controversial peace process. Their rivalry grew rancorous following the Madrid peace conference in late October 1991. It has been argued that despite their divergence regarding ultimate objectives and means, the reality of occupation and the absence of a state structure accounted for the ideological and political proximity of Palestinian nationalists and Islamists, thus underscoring the distinctiveness of the Palestinian case. 1 But a close examination of the relationship between Hamas and the PLO during the Intifada and under the Palestinian Authority established in June 1994 shows that the patterns of negotiated coexistence and the continuation of their dialogue developed against the backdrop of intra-Palestinian politics, especially under the Palestinian Authority.
From the outset, Hamas was ambivalent toward the PLO, signaling, on the one hand, an interest in coexistence and, on the other, loyalty to its ideological distinction and political independence. Hamas’s effort to maintain a dialogue and to ensure coexistence with the PLO, and later with the PA, reflected its political weakness in light of the growing international, regional, and local support for the Israeli-PLO peace process. It was this perception of the tenuousness of its position that induced Hamas to try to work out an understanding with the PLO that would enable it to gain time to expand its ranks and consolidate its power. At the same time, its quest for distinction and organizational independence led Hamas to search for a way to deflect the PLO’s attempts at subordination and containment.
Flexibility Through Conformity
During the Intifada, Hamas took a conciliatory approach to the PLO, praising its historical record of armed struggle and political achievement in placing the Palestinian refugee problem on the international agenda as a national liberation issue. 2 That approach reflected Hamas’s awareness of the PLO’s prestige in the Palestinian society. Hamas, though, was eager to build its image as a movement seeking Palestinian national unity based on a militant Islamic agenda. Such an image would respond to the PLO’s accusations that Hamas’s insistence on preserving its independence and refusal to join the UNC had undermined the Palestinians’ national unity and played into Israel’s hands. 3 Thus, from the outset, Hamas criticized the PLO for its secular perception and its dearth of Islamic values. Although the Palestinian National Charter was consistent with its own national principles, Hamas argued that it could not join the PLO because the charter lacked the Islamic values that were essential to joint political action. Indeed, Hamas spared no effort to rebuke the PLO for its secular perceptions and disconnection from Islamic values. 4
Following the resolutions adopted by the PLO at the nineteenth PNC session held in Algiers in November 1988, 5 Hamas’s criticism of the PLO’s secularism became a full-fledged condemnation of what it perceived as the PLO’s abandonment of the armed struggle and deviation from its national platform. In a special leaflet, Hamas stated that the PLO was no longer a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people because it was willing to recognize the Jewish enemy and to abandon the greater part of Palestine. In contrast with the PLO’s “deviation,” Hamas portrayed itself as the authentic representative of the Palestinian people’s national aspirations and collective needs. Taking credit for the eruption of the Intifada, Hamas expressed its determination to wage a jihad until all of Palestine was liberated. 6
Although it stated that it was “not an alternative to anyone,” Hamas’s slogans, such as “the Qura’n is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” 7 reflected its Islamic vision. Hamas’s adherence to Islamic values prompted it to assert publicly that joint action with the PLO would be possible when the latter accepted three main principles: that the ultimate goal of their common struggle was to establish an Islamic state over the whole territory of Palestine “from the river to the sea,” that a Jewish entity in any part of Palestine was inconceivable, and that jihad was the only way to attain this goal. Nevertheless, acknowledging the deep ideological differences with the mainstream Palestinian national movement, Hamas spokesmen often limited the possibility of agreement and cooperation with the PA to the prevention of mutual fighting (taqtil). 8
Thus the profound differences between the two movements and Hamas’s desire to avoid intra-Palestinian disputes did not prevent Hamas from demonstrating its willingness for controlled cooperation with the PLO on the loose basis of an agreed-on platform calling for the liberation of all of Palestine. Apart from explaining this willingness as stemming from the primacy of the Palestinian national interest and the necessity of internal unity against the common Israeli enemy, Hamas’s attitude also derived from a realistic appraisal—both during the Intifada and following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority—of its military and popular inferiority to the PLO mainstream. Hence it adopted the principle of “prohibiting internal [Palestinian] fighting” (hurmat al-iqtital al-dakhili) and repeated proclamations regarding its willingness to cooper-ate with the PLO and, later, to accept the PA’s power to prevent intra-Palestinian disputes. 9 Furthermore, Hamas’s awareness of its limited ability to liberate Palestine or confront the PLO led it to take a rather realistic approach to a political settlement with Israel, which entailed a calculated deviation from its stated doctrine. In fact, the same pattern of controlled violence that Hamas had used against Israel also characterized its efforts to seek a flexible strategy by which it could coexist with the PLO without being identified with the peace process or seem to have abandoned its original goal of establishing an Islamic state in historic Palestine.
This approach was expressed during the Intifada in various statements made by its most prominent leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, as the following three examples show: First, Hamas did not rule out the possibility of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, provided this was considered the first phase toward the establishment of a state in Palestine as a whole. Second, Hamas was ready to consider international supervision in the territories after the Israelis withdrew if it were limited in time and did not require direct concessions to Israel. Third, Hamas would reject any attempt to enter into political negotiations with Israel over a peace agreement as long as the Israeli occupation continued; however, Hamas would not exclude such an initiative after a full Israeli withdrawal. 10
Yasin’s statements reflected a growing tendency within Hamas, even before the Oslo accord, to bridge the gulf between the movement’s agreed-on prose of reality and the poetry of its ideology. By adopting a strategy of neither full acceptance nor total rejection of the PLO’s program of political settlement, Hamas was able to justify its position in normative terms, defining such “concessions” as tactical moves. It is here that we find a seemingly contradictory approach to the very idea of a political settlement with Israel. Thus, Hamas criticized the PLO’s sanctioning of Palestinian participation in the Madrid conference of October 1991, calling it “a conference for the sellout of Palestine and Jerusalem,” while leading Hamas figures kept open the admissibility, in principle, of a truce (hudna or muhadana) with the Jews. Although a final peace settlement with Israel was forbidden—and, if signed, would be null and void a priori—Hamas left open the option of a temporary agreement with Israel, provided it denoted neither peace (salam) nor final conciliation (sulh). According to Hamas, such a relationship with Israel would coincide with the Muslims’ interests (maslaha) and would not legitimize the enemy’s presence on occupied Islamic land. Similarly, Hamas rejected the PLO’s legitimacy to represent the Palestinian people but at the same time stated that a political coalition was feasible if based “on an agreed program focused on jihad.” 11
Hamas demonstrated its flexibility by differentiating between the short-term goal of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and the long-term goal of establishing a Palestinian Islamic state on the whole territory of Palestine that would replace Israel. By accepting this order of goals, Hamas effectively subordinated the former to the latter by emphasizing the transitional nature and temporary status of any political settlement with Israel.
Hamas sought to enhance its social and political presence in the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the expense of the PLO, but without clashing with the secular forces, maintaining that it was for the Palestinian people to decide which course was preferable. In fact, the establishment of Hamas was a recognition of the Intifada’s ability to widen the movement, at the expense of the PLO, and to achieve dominance among the Palestinians in the occupied territories by reasserting the rallying power of armed struggle, especially in its religious form of jihad. The realization of this goal necessitated a gradual approach of expansion and takeover of key positions by means of conviction and the use of existing democratic procedures while refraining from collision that could jeopardize the movement’s future development.
The Struggle over Hegemony
The daily confrontation with Israel during the Intifada and the attendant agonies of the Palestinian population provided a favorable atmosphere for Hamas to challenge the PLO’s claim of ideological hegemony and political domination. As mentioned earlier, even before the Intifada, members of al-Mujamma` al-islami had systematically tried to penetrate professional associations and other public institutions as part of their effort to attain political influence. This effort was redoubled during the Intifada when Hamas tried to gain official representation in all the leading local bodies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These included chambers of commerce, labor unions, professional organizations, and student associations. In addition, following Israel’s massive arrests of the Hamas leadership, including Sheikh Ahmad Yasin himself, in May 1989, Hamas established its own international infrastructure, emulating the PLO’s division of labor between “inside” and “outside” bases of power and its hierarchical structure. Reports of Hamas’s attempts to establish contacts with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in search of arms and training appeared as early as November 1989, and Hamas developed close ties with Syria, the Islamic movement in Jordan, and Hizballah in Lebanon. 12 Hamas’s international alignment was based on ad hoc considerations of opposition to Israel and the PLO rather than on pure ideology. Thus Hamas allied itself with Iran and Syria and, after the Madrid peace conference in October 1991, joined in establishing the Syrian-based “Ten Front” together with other militant Palestinian factions, mostly nationalist and Marxist, that condemned the PLO’s participation in the peace process. 13
Hamas’s reorganization sought to enhance the movement’s political and military capabilities by obtaining funds from friendly governments and Islamic supporters, both regional and international. The regional infrastructure also provided military resources such as training facilities, mainly in Iran and Syria, 14 and operational networks necessary for enlisting manpower, trafficking arms and funds, and conducting secret communication. Yet unlike the PLO, Hamas initially derived most of its money from Palestinian sources, including Islamic institutions that received financial aid from external Arab and Islamic donors. According to unverified Israeli intelligence estimates, Hamas’s overall annual budget in the years 1993/94 was $30 million to $50 million. According to these reports, about half this sum was collected directly from Palestinian Islamist associations in the diaspora, individuals, and business communities and indirectly from Arab and Islamic humanitarian foundations in the Middle East, western Europe, and the Americas. The rest was donated by the governments of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and by private Middle Eastern donors. The flow of funds from the United States and western Europe was channeled through Islamic welfare organizations, including those of the Islamic movement in Israel, for ostensibly humanitarian purposes, such as support for families of the fallen and prisoners. 15
The expansion of Hamas’s activity to regional and international spheres weakened Hamas’s coherence as a political movement. Its growing reliance on external financial and military resources effectively transferred the center of the movement’s decision-making body from the occupied territories to Amman, where a new political body was established in 1992: The Political Bureau headed by Musa Abu Marzuq (who conducted much of the bureau’s activity from his base in Springfield, Virginia) and its members were Hamas’s representatives in the Arab states and Iran. The newly established institution, which as of 1993 was fully based in Amman, represented the “outside” leadership and derived its legitimacy and power from its control of financial resources, the military apparatus, and close relations with the Islamic movement in Jordan and with the Iranian and Syrian regimes. The “outside” center of power increasingly disagreed with the local “inside” Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank over the benefit of continuing the armed struggle against Israel and its attitude toward the PA. 16
Indeed, the Intifada contributed to the growing Islamization of the Palestinian public mood at the expense of the PLO’s secular nationalism, which paralleled the deteriorating economic conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. External developments also played a part: the fall of the Soviet Union tarnished the PLO’s prestige by presenting its sole global ally as a broken reed and the frustrated hopes for substantial Arab funds to support the Intifada, which had to be channeled through the PLO. The prolonged violence and emerging conviction that the Intifada had reached an impasse forced the Palestinians to become more self-reliant and introverted, causing them to regard Islam as their main source of guidance.
The Kuwait crisis that led to the Gulf War of 1991, and Arafat’s unrestricted support for Iraq, further aggravated the PLO’s political and financial position both regionally and internationally. Concretely, this was manifested by the cessation of financial aid from the Gulf monarchies and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from these countries. By 1991, the PLO’s financial crisis forced Arafat to reduce the organization’s international diplomatic presence and stop giving money to Palestinian institutions and welfare agencies in the occupied territories and even to victims of the national struggle and other needy groups. Immediately after the Gulf War, Palestinians, including Fatah activists, began to be more critical of Arafat’s leadership and the PLO’s political decision- making process and of Arafat’s mismanagement of the organization’s funds. Hamas lost no time in exploiting the opportunity to launch an indirect attack on the PLO’s financial irregularities, contrasting this with the modesty and decency of Islamic schools and institutions. 17
During the Intifada, Hamas grew stronger, building institutions and attracting young people to the mosques, as well as more pilgrims to Mecca. Since the beginning of the Intifada, most of the violent attacks against Israeli targets had been committed by Islamic combatants, whether Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Islamic activists across the Jordan River, or Hizballah in southern Lebanon. Moreover, Hamas’s grassroots leadership projected credibility, dedication, and integrity compared with the PLO’s outdated and notoriously corrupt leadership, alleged unscrupulous bureaucracy, and abandonment of the armed struggle in favor of a luxurious lifestyle.
Hamas’s burgeoning popularity was particularly pronounced after the Gulf War. The war had hurt the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza and greatly limited Fatah’s financial ability to pay welfare subsidies or even salaries to its employees. At the same time, Hamas’s charity committees (lijan al-zakat) and other Islamic associations continued their welfare activities. Indeed, besides foreign agencies, they were the only organizations that continued to dispense welfare, thus attracting many frustrated PLO supporters to the Islamic movement. 18 The Hamas welfare committees proceeded to tighten their local and international contacts, especially with Palestinian diaspora communities and Islamic associations in Israel and the Arab world, as well as with contacts in Europe and the United States. Hamas’s agenda continued to focus on Islamic education, on the grounds that the “right education” was a prerequisite for building an Islamic society.
The impasse that followed the 1991 Madrid peace talks was another setback for Arafat’s political position as a sponsor of the local Palestinian delegates (Faisal Hussaini, Haidar `Abd al-Shafi, Hanan `Ashrawi, and others) to the negotiations with Israel. Arafat’s declining prestige in the West Bank and Gaza Strip reflected the Palestinians’ disappointment in the peace process. The impasse in the peace negotiations left the PLO in an inferior position vis-à-vis Hamas and the leftist PFLP and DFLP, which, from the beginning, had rejected the Madrid conference’s terms of reference and further heightened the tension in the PLO-Hamas relationship. 19
The Hamas-Fatah rivalry reached a boiling point in 1992. The two organizations were locked in a struggle to acquire dominant positions in the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. To obtain the advantage, Fatah enlisted the cooperation of the leftist PFLP, DFLP, and the communists. In Gaza, the nationalist bloc won the elections in the engineers’, physicians’, and lawyers’ associations (65 percent in the last), although the Islamic movement won in the chamber of commerce. In the West Bank, the Islamic bloc was victorious in Hebron’s chamber of commerce and the students’ association of the city’s Polytechnic Institute and its university. The exception, in the markedly religious-traditional city of Hebron, was the Red Crescent Association, in which the nationalist bloc gained a majority of seats. Hamas’s most surprising victory came in the elections for Ramallah’s chamber of commerce, a body that included a significant number of Christians and been considered a stronghold of secularism and nationalism. 20
Hamas also won the elections for the teachers’ seminary in Ramallah and for the committee of alumni of UNRWA institutes. The national bloc won the student elections at the local institute for refugees in Qalandia. 21 In Nablus, the nationalist list of candidates—from Fatah, the PFLP, DFLP, and the communists—was victorious in the chamber of commerce, though by only a narrow margin over Hamas (48 percent to 45 percent). The nationalists also won all the seats in the teachers’ association at al-Najah University, although Hamas won 80 percent of the votes for the alumni association of the UNRWA institutes in Nablus.
In Jerusalem, the Islamists received 43 percent (versus 47 percent for the nationalists) of the votes of the electric company’s workers. The nationalists won all the seats of the workers’ union of al-Muttali` Hospital, and Hamas won a majority in the Maqasid Hospital. Hamas also won all the seats on the students’ council of al-Umma College in Jerusalem (64.5 percent for the Islamic bloc versus 35.49 percent for the PLO’s list). 22 So impressive were Hamas’s growth and electoral achievements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially after the 1991 Madrid peace conference, that in April 1992 the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiations announced its objection, for the time being, to an Israeli initiative to hold municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza.
The competition between Hamas and Fatah for leadership of Palestinian public institutions blurred the boundaries between the nationalist and the Islamist messages, which were invoked in the leaflets of both movements. Consequently, following its defeat in the 1992 elections in the Ramallah chamber of commerce, Fatah adopted an Islamic stance, creating the “Islamic national commercial and industrial coalition” which won a narrow victory in the 1992 elections for the chamber of commerce in Nablus. The rivalry between the organizations also led to a revolution in the use of slogans. Whereas Hamas had previously portrayed its rivals as “communists,” its alignment with the leftist “fronts” after Madrid led Fatah supporters at al-Najah University to attack the communists and question the strange collaboration between Hamas and the left. 23
The Struggle for Leadership
The competition between Hamas and Fatah to mobilize the masses by means of organized civil disobedience, boycotts, protests, and strikes deepened the animosity in their relations. Then in 1989, Fatah’s pressuring of Hamas to accept the UNC’s authority also exacerbated the tension between the two rival movements. The PLO was especially perturbed by Hamas’s growing popularity, its independent decisions to execute collaborators, and its setting of separate dates for strikes and protests, which seemed to challenge the PLO’s authority represented by the UNC. That Fatah and the leftists excluded Hamas from the prisoners’ committees in Israeli incarceration facilities did not help the situation either. 24
These circumstances became fertile soil for armed clashes between Fatah and Hamas activists in the occupied territories, and sporadic violence erupted in Tulkarm and Gaza. In September 1990, at the initiative of leading Muslim Brotherhood (MB) figures in Jordan, Hamas and Fatah signed a “charter of honor” recognizing Hamas’s legitimate existence as an equal and independent faction and agreeing to refrain from hostilities. The charter was meant to address the immediate origins of the Hamas-Fatah clashes, especially Fatah’s veto of Hamas’s participation in the prisoners’ committees. Although the charter paid lip service to the principle that “Islam is deeply rooted within us, it is our principle as Muslims, and way of our life,” the main bone of political contention between Fatah and Hamas—the latter’s independence and growing challenge to the PLO’s authority—was not resolved and soon erupted again. 25
Hamas’s successes notwithstanding, it could not overlook the PLO’s pressure to join the overall Palestinian national organization as a separate faction. In April 1990, Hamas—in what was probably a ploy to foil the idea rather than keen interest—applied to the PNC to join the PLO. But to avoid being co-opted and manipulated by Fatah, Hamas requested that general elections for the PNC be held among all Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and in the diaspora. If circumstances precluded holding such elections, Hamas insisted on being allotted at least 40 percent of the seats on the PNC, based on its proven power in elections to public institutions in the occupied territories. In addition, Hamas requested revisions in the Palestinian National Charter, rejection of political negotiations with Israel, and adoption of the jihad as the sole means to liberate Palestine. According to Hamas, since the PLO’s policy was mistaken, it was the PLO that should adopt Hamas’s strategy and not vice versa. 26
Hamas also insisted on proportionate financial allocations and the inclusion of its representatives in the PLO’s bureaucratic apparatus. Hamas’s demands were effectively a claim for parity with Fatah that would end the latter’s unchallenged domination in the PLO. At the least, it would give Hamas veto power over the PLO’s decision making—hence Arafat’s rejection of the demands and his counteroffer of no more than 20 percent. The dispute over Hamas’s participation in the PLO remained unresolved until the Madrid peace conference in October 1991, when the issue was effectively dropped from the agenda. In the debate between the two movements, the PLO—actually Fatah—depicted its relations with Hamas in terms of a state vis-à-vis a splinter group that had rebelled against the state’s legitimacy. According to Fatah, the PLO constituted the Palestinian homeland, entity, and state and so was above partisan debate. The PLO itself maintained that it was legitimate to criticize Fatah, but criticism of the PLO was tantamount to heresy (ridda) from Islam (for which the penalty was death). 27
The PLO continued to press Hamas to accept its exclusive authority in the Palestinian arena and to try to delegitimize Hamas’s independent existence. The PLO also criticized Hamas’s conduct, implying that the MB was collaborating with Israel. At the same time, Hamas continued to present a judicious facade of adherence to the principle of willingness, in order to maintain a dialogue with the PLO for the sake of Palestinian national unity, avoidance of intra-Palestinian violence, and the quest for a joint struggle against Israel. In effect, however, Hamas insisted on the principle of sharing power equally with Fatah. Hamas’s position was vividly expressed as well in its dialogue with Fatah on establishing a joint municipal council for the city of Gaza, an endeavor that foundered on Hamas’s far-reaching claims for representation.
Responding to Fatah’s campaign denouncing Hamas’s refusal to join the PLO as a faction, Hamas’s argumentation combined pragmatism and ideology. Hamas invoked democratic principles expressing a willingness to respect the majority decision of the Palestinian people. Yet Hamas also insisted that Islam was the only viable foundation for the Palestinian national effort. Like the Palestinian radical left, Hamas rejected the PLO’s thrust for a negotiated Palestinian state in the occupied territories on grounds of Israeli hegemony and not necessarily because of any religious prohibition on negotiations and political settlement with Israel.
In conjunction with the 1991 Madrid peace conference, Hamas stated that the PLO’s withdrawal from the peace talks was the principal prerequisite for “Palestinian unity.” The issue of Hamas’s representation on the PNC and other PLO institutions was ostensibly set aside once the controversy over Palestinian participation in the Madrid conference gave Arafat’s opponents a potent argument against his criticism of Hamas for its reluctance to join the PLO. Hamas pointed to Fatah’s support for the Madrid process at a time when Israel was still fighting the Intifada. Hamas contended, typically, that considerations of current Islamic, Arab, or Palestinian weakness vis-à-vis the enemy reflected a lack of faith in the will of Allah, warning that “history does not pardon the cowards and defeatists.” 28
Although Hamas had never officially recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, after the PLO consented to participate in the Madrid peace conference, Hamas claimed that the majority of Palestinians rejected the “conference of wholesale of the land” and denied the PLO’s legitimacy to represent the Palestinian people. Such legitimacy, Hamas reiterated, required the “Islamization” of the PLO’s political program, meaning an unconditional return to the armed struggle for the liberation of all of Palestine. 29
The relationship between the two organizations was strained further by their continuous competition at both the operational and political levels. Hamas’s growth and electoral successes, and the erosion in Fatah’s popularity with the Palestinian public due to its financial difficulties and support of a fruitless peace process, generated new tensions. Ostensibly the disputes revolved around the nature and course of the Intifada, but in fact they reflected a struggle for domination of the Palestinians’ daily life through strikes, commemoration days, and commercial, educational, and social activities, as well as the tenets of individual moral conduct, especially women’s modesty. Indeed, the Intifada was increasingly marked by internecine strife between Fatah and Hamas, which, although both accused Israel of provoking their differences, hurled mutual recriminations at each other over the discord within the Palestinian community. 30
Fatah portrayed Hamas as a minority group, constituting no more than 15 percent of the population, which was attempting to foist its agenda on the Palestinian majority. Hamas, for its part, repeatedly pointed to the intolerable contradiction between the PLO’s diplomatic negotiations with the “Zionist enemy” and the latter’s continued repression of the Palestinian people by “iron and fire.” Hamas gained momentum by its clear and unreserved adherence to the armed struggle as the essence of the Intifada and an antidote to the moribund Madrid process espoused by the PLO. Over and over, Hamas called on other Palestinian factions, especially Fatah, to refrain from intra-Palestinian violence, to respect signed agreements, and to coordinate Intifada activities according to the principle of armed struggle against Israel. However, Hamas itself came under attack by the PLO as well as by its closest partner, the Islamic Jihad, over its arbitrary execution of PLO activists for their alleged collaboration with Israel. 31
The PLO became increasingly critical of Hamas’s continued attempts to exploit the massive protests and strikes to enhance its political prestige at the expense of the national forces. The PLO was mainly concerned with solidifying its position as the sole legitimate national authority and the articulator of the norms and values that shaped Palestinian life under Israeli occupation. The marginal role that the armed struggle assumed in Fatah’s agenda led to the inevitable conclusion that the PLO leadership had indeed viewed the Intifada as no more than a means to strengthen its position in the peace negotiations. Hamas, however, sought, according to its spokesman Ibrahim Ghawsha, to “nip it [the peace process] in the bud” by all possible means and to force Fatah to accept the “Islamic program.”
Fatah tried to take full control of violent operations and mass protest actions in Palestine in order to prevent an interruption of the negotiations with Israel, as the collapse of the talks would provide Hamas further prestige. Capitalizing on this tendency, Hamas claimed that the “comical self-governing” (al-hukm al-dhati al-hazil) solution had tempted the supporters of the “capitulationist negotiations” (mufawadat al-istislam) to work toward “melting” the Intifada, that is, abandoning the idea of jihad. Both movements accused Israel of provoking their differences and clashes; however, since Madrid, the Intifada’s agenda had become the crucial test for the PLO’s control of the Palestinian arena. 32
Fatah was apparently behind a leaflet of the “popular struggle committees” that asserted there was no alternative to the PLO and portrayed Hamas’s insistent refusal to join the PLO as a provocation against the Palestinian people. The leaflet denounced Hamas for its inconsiderate policy of imposing strikes on workers and peasants who were struggling to eke out a living under harsh conditions. The leaflet warned that the “imaginary” rise of Hamas was dangerous, that this movement was to blame for the deportation of many PFLP fighters, and that it was sowing division and hatred in the “one nation.” 33
It was in this context that the two rival movements disagreed over the use of disciplinary violence against Palestinians in the name of the Intifada. Representing the PLO, Fatah clashed with Hamas over the latter’s independent decisions to execute collaborators, an instrument that had apparently been used by both movements against each other’s members. The troubled relations between activists of Fatah (and other secular factions) and Hamas deteriorated into the secularists’ disruption of prayers, desecration of mosques, and attacks on clergy. There was a sporadic series of murders in the Tulkarm and Rafah areas, as well as street clashes between the `Izz al-Din al-Qassam and the Fatah Hawks. Many activists on both sides were wounded, and threats were made against the life of leading figures of both movements in the Gaza Strip. The violent factional clashes spread to Hebron, where buses were torched as a result of a quarrel between Hamas and Fatah students over the latter’s decision to permit male and female students to travel on buses together. Public figures, including delegates to the Madrid conference, appealed for an end to violence and a return to dialogue. 34
On June 7, 1992, a “document of honor” was distributed in the name of Hamas and Fatah, reasserting their adherence to Palestinian national unity and proclaiming that Islam was the “nature . . . faith, and way of life” of the Palestinians. The document called on Fatah and Hamas to refrain from violence against each other. It also urged the establishment of joint committees to prevent conflicting Intifada activities by Hamas and Fatah, their entanglement in violent family and clan disputes, and the eviction of residents from their homes and villages in the wake of conflicts between the two movements. Fatah’s renewed undertaking to incorporate Hamas into the prisoners’ committees indicated that its previous commitments in this area had not been implemented. But Hamas immediately rejected the document, alleging that although it had been negotiating an agreement with Fatah, the latter had published the document without prior consultation with Hamas. 35
In early July 1992, continued clashes between Hamas and Fatah activists intensified the efforts to end what seemed about to erupt into civil strife. The severity of the situation was indicated by the intervention of the “outside” leaders of both rival factions, who issued a joint call in Amman to cease all violent activities and warned that the internecine violence might diminish the Intifada’s achievements. To contain the tension and clashes and preserve the agreement between the two movements, joint local conciliation and follow-up committees were set up, with representatives from the West Bank and Gaza as well as from Israel. 36
But such measures could hardly erase the ideological cleavages or mitigate the political competition. Toward the end of 1992, the PLO-Hamas relationship reached its lowest ebb as Arafat’s attacks on Hamas became more vehement and humiliating. At one point, he called Hamas a “Zulu tribe,” suggesting that Hamas’s isolationism was like that of the Inkata movement, which had refused to accept the authority of the African National Congress under the leadership of Nelson Mandela during the talks with the white government of Frederik de Klerk. Arafat’s hostility toward Hamas stemmed from his mounting concern over the latter’s enhanced position in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which in turn was eroding public support for the peace process. Besides disparaging Hamas’s gains in the elections to public institutions in the West Bank and Gaza, Arafat also endeavored to delegitimize the rival movement, suggesting that its close collaboration with Iran conflicted with the principle of independent Palestinian decision making. Arafat went as far as to accuse Hamas of serving Iranian foreign interests, which was infringing on Palestinian sovereignty and sabotaging the national struggle. 37
An Antagonistic Collaboration
On December 17, 1992, Israel deported 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists to south Lebanon, following the kidnapping and murder of an Israeli border policeman. It was Israel’s largest deportation of Palestinians from the occupied territories since 1967. The deportees included Hamas’s senior leaders, including `Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi, the most prominent Hamas leader in the occupied territories, as well as the movement’s local political, educational and religious activists, though none of them apparently had a military record.
The unprecedented deportation backfired almost immediately, demonstrating the limits to Israel’s attempt to eliminate the movement’s civic and political basis. Rather, the deportation was perceived as an acute violation of Palestinian human rights and a cynical exploitation of the occupation of Palestinian territories, and it triggered a harsh international reaction to Israel. In Palestine, rivals and supporters alike rallied to the cause of the deportees, reflecting their deep ideological opposition to such punishment and their familial and local solidarity with the deportees, who represented every segment of the Palestinian population. Thus, although the mass deportation temporarily paralyzed Hamas, it boosted Palestinian national solidarity with the deportees and their respective movements.
For the first time since the beginning of the Intifada, the PLO and Hamas issued a joint leaflet condemning the deportation. The Hamas-PLO initiative was followed by an ad hoc agreement among all the military organizations operating in the field—Fatah’s Hawks, the PFLP’s Red Eagles, and the Battalions of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam—to cooperate in military operations against Israel. The public desire to resume the PLO-Hamas dialogue found Hamas in a favorable position vis-à-vis the PLO, with Hamas stating that a unified Palestinian position should be based on the PLO’s correction of its mistake by withdrawing from the Madrid negotiations. Hamas’s position on this issue was presented as “clear and nonnegotiable.” The pressure exerted by Hamas, the deportees’ families, and the general public on the Palestinian delegates to the peace talks and on the PLO’s leadership all but forced the latter to condition the renewal of the Washington talks—which had been adjourned for Christmas—on the deportees’ return. For Hamas, it was a victory that neither Israel nor the PLO had desired. 38
The mass deportation of Hamas activists came shortly after the movement reached a strategic agreement with Iran, according to which the Islamic republic would support Hamas politically and materially against Israel and the peace process. In November 1992, a year after Hamas had opened an official office in Teheran, a delegation of the movement, headed by spokesman Ibrahim Ghawsha, reportedly arrived in Iran and met with the revolution’s spiritual guide `Ali Khamena'i and with the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Muhsin Rada'i. The two parties signed a draft agreement providing for a political and military alliance. Under its terms, Iran would give Hamas financial and military assistance, political facilities, and a radio station in southern Lebanon. The agreement was apparently confirmed during another visit of Hamas leaders to Teheran in early December 1992. It was this agreement that spurred Hamas to escalate its military operations against Israel—manifested in the murder of an Israeli policeman—in an attempt to derail the peace process. 39
The Hamas-Iran alliance only deepened the Hamas-Fatah political cleavage. But Hamas’s turn to Iran also caused discontent within Hamas. A minority faction, apparently associated with the “inside” leadership, advocated a “Palestinization” of the movement, cessation of the armed struggle, and a focus on open, peaceful efforts that would protect Hamas from Israeli repression and free it from the need to ally with the PLO as a shield. At the same time, the majority, representing primarily the “outside” leadership, accepted Hamas’s Islamization of the conflict with Israel by making alliances with other Islamic movements, especially Iran. The proponents of Islamization regarded Hamas as the true representative of the Palestinian people and as a moral and political alternative to the PLO, whose collapse, they believed, was only a matter of time. 40
Despite the manifestations of Palestinian solidarity with the deported Islamists, Israel’s reaction presented Hamas with a dilemma in terms of its relations with the PLO. Hamas’s appeal to the Arab and the international community, in the name of human rights and Palestinian legitimacy, represented its independence from the PLO but could be also interpreted as Hamas’s readiness to cooperate with states and organizations maintaining close ties with Israel or strongly advocating the peace process. At the same time, the deportation offered the PLO an opportunity to lead the international diplomatic campaign against Israel and demand the immediate return of the deportees. The PLO tried to minimize Hamas’s use of the deportation for political profit, playing on its status as the official representative of all the Palestinians, irrespective of political or ideological affiliation. It was against this backdrop that the PLO invited Hamas for a meeting in Tunis immediately after the deportation, ostensibly to persuade Hamas to join the PLO’s efforts on behalf of the deportees but more likely as a step toward the co-option of Hamas through its incorporation into the PLO. Hamas’s dilemma was evident in its reluctant acceptance of the PLO’s invitation and its insistence on receiving a written invitation from Arafat himself before sending its delegates to Tunis. 41
The Tunis talks in December 1992 were little more than a dialogue of the deaf. Each side repeated its own agenda, without resolving their differences. Besides the return of the deportees, Hamas repeated its demand that the PLO leave the peace talks and escalate the Intifada and the armed struggle in the occupied territories—proposals for which it gained the support of the PFLP and DFLP delegates. Although Arafat was willing to let Hamas decide on the form of its participation in the PLO’s international efforts on behalf of the deportees, he firmly rejected Hamas’s demand to withdraw from the peace negotiations. Arafat claimed that such a step could be decided only by the PNC, which was the forum that had sanctioned participation in the Madrid peace process. Avoiding the call to escalate the armed struggle, Arafat instead offered a constructive dialogue with Hamas in order to gain its cooperation in building institutions in the occupied territories. He repeated his offer to Hamas to join the PLO as the organization’s second largest faction, with eighteen guaranteed seats in the PNC (compared with Fatah’s thirty-three and the PFLP’s fifteen). Arafat also held out to Hamas the possibility of obtaining additional seats from among those allocated to popular associations and the Palestinian diaspora communities.
The Hamas delegation expressed no more than a willingness to study Arafat’s proposals. From the PLO’s viewpoint, however, the significance of the Tunis talks lay mainly in the fact that they had taken place. Hamas’s acceptance of Arafat’s invitation to visit the PLO’s Tunis headquarters—despite internal reluctance and outspoken opposition by some of its allies in the Damascus-based “Ten Front”—seemed tantamount to tacit recognition of the PLO’s status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and of Arafat’s legitimate leadership. Hamas’s decision to attend, despite Iranian and Syrian discontent, clearly resulted from consideration of its “inside” infrastructure’s needs and expectations of accepting Arafat’s outstretched hand as a manifestation of national solidarity. Yet the PLO’s impression that it had gained the upper hand over Hamas and its expectation for positive results in the future talks between Hamas and Fatah scheduled to begin in Khartoum in early January proved to be overly optimistic. 42
From January 1 to 4, 1993, representatives of Hamas and Fatah held a political dialogue in Khartoum under the supervision of Hasan al-Turabi, the spiritual leader of the Islamic regime in Sudan and an exemplary leader of political Islam. Contrary to Israeli and Palestinian commentaries at the time—which held that agreement was close—an unofficial version of the proceedings in Khartoum reveals the unbridgeable gap between Fatah and Hamas. 43 During the talks, Hamas expressed a willingness to join the PLO following the removal of obstacles such as the issue of representation and divergent political positions. The concluding statement revealed nothing of the tense atmosphere, which was reflected in Arafat’s harsh language regarding the Hamas representatives. The PLO leader accused Hamas of undermining Palestine’s national interests by accepting funds from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, which had the sole purpose of harming the PLO. Hamas’s response was to reiterate its demands: withdrawal from the peace process, 40 percent representation on the PNC, and deep structural changes in the PLO, which Arafat vehemently rejected. Indeed, the main dispute in the Khartoum talks was over the PLO’s participation in the peace negotiations with Israel, which Hamas castigated as heresy. Arafat, on the other hand, insisted that Hamas must accept unconditionally the PLO’s status as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, it remained unclear whether he was willing to give a quid pro quo: recognizing Hamas as a legitimate, independent opposition within the PLO.
Although the dialogue was officially held between Hamas and Fatah, it was effectively a continuation of the Tunis talks. As in Tunis, Arafat himself took part in the meetings, representing the PLO’s position, though from time to time he spoke also as Fatah’s leader, and the main topics referred to the Tunis conference. Both sides were usually represented by their “outside” leaders. Fatah’s delegation included military and political figures headed by Salim al-Za`nun, and Hamas was represented by the same figures who had been in Tunis, headed by Musa Abu Marzuq. The proceedings indicated that the Hamas delegates could not make a decision on their relations with Fatah without consulting Iran and Syria.
Faced with a political deadlock, Hamas and Fatah once again opted to paper over their differences. Hamas repeated its “adherence to the principle of affiliation to the PLO as a necessary framework for national unity,” stressing the need to continue the dialogue on the issue of representation in order to achieve greater coordination. On a more practical level, Fatah and Hamas announced agreement on tactical issues such as establishing joint committees on the deportees, preventing violent clashes between the two movements, and even setting up a joint command for the Intifada. Yet despite its proclaimed agreement to coordinate action on the deportees, Hamas in fact rejected Fatah’s suggestion that it should take part in a PLO-based committee on the subject, refusing to accept the PLO as the body’s source of legitimacy. 44
Hamas did not jettison its positions even when Hasan al-Turabi publicly recognized the 1967 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 242—shortly after the Fatah-Hamas dialogue—sending a clear message of support for Arafat. Furthermore, although Turabi reiterated that the ultimate Palestinian goal should be the recovery of all the occupied territories, he urged Hamas to soften its attitude and join the PLO. After becoming the first Islamic leader to publicly recognize resolution 242, Turabi also attempted to legitimize Arafat’s leadership by referring to him as the symbol of the Palestinian cause and recalling his past affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. 45
Turabi’s overt support of resolution 242 and the peace negotiations apparently induced Hamas not to demand a total break in the peace talks. Furthermore, a public opinion poll conducted in the occupied territories in January 1993 revealed that only about 30 percent of the Palestinians there favored a withdrawal from the peace talks, although a majority were ready to boycott the imminent meeting scheduled for Washington. It was with this information that Hamas’s spokesman and delegate to the Khartoum talks, Ibrahim Ghawsha, stated that his movement’s willingness to join the PLO was “not a tactical maneuver” and explained that this would depend on whether Hamas could influence the PLO’s organizational structure and decision making. 46
Despite failing to reach a political agreement, both Fatah and Hamas preferred to maintain a dialogue and some collaboration rather than become enmeshed in an all-out confrontation. This position, which emerged during the Intifada, was maintained on the eve of the signing of the Oslo agreement. Rumors of a possible unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip led Hamas to seek an agreement with the PLO, apparently in order to avert the use of force by the Fatah Hawks against its activists. 47 This objective became urgent following the Oslo agreement and the expected establishment of Palestinian self-government in the Gaza Strip.
The Inconclusive Post-Oslo Dialogue
The shock and sense of crisis in the Hamas leadership following the signing of the Oslo accords on September 13, 1993, did not change the basic pattern of the movement’s response to the PLO’s political moves. Hamas’s response remained one of cautious rejection alongside a calculated acceptance of the new reality. Indeed, the opportunity to channel some of its opposition to Israel by means of violence allowed Hamas to show restraint in its dealings with the Palestinian self-government authorities. An internal political report prepared by Hamas shortly after the Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed concluded that the movement faced two options, neither one of which was promising, namely, to take part in the establishment of a Palestinian self-government or to keep out of it. 48 The report noted the differences within Hamas over which option to choose and acknowledged the movement’s inability either to prevent the agreement’s implementation or to offer an alternative in line with national and Islamic principles. The document also conceded Hamas’s limits in any confrontation with the PLO aimed at derailing the Oslo accord: “We opt for confrontation, but shall we confront our people? And can we tilt the balance in our favor? And if we succeed, will we be able to offer the people an alternative, or will our success only intensify the offensive of [the Israeli] occupation?” In a personal plea to the movement’s activists and supporters a month after the DOP was signed, Abu Marzuq conveyed the sense of crisis within Hamas: the United States, now the world’s sole superpower, strongly supported the Oslo agreement; the Arab world had been weakened by the Gulf War and had splintered into states, each of which had its own domestic problems to deal with while Arab and Islamic parties became deeply involved in local politics; and the Palestinian people were still occupied, its leadership in the hands of a “defeated group” that had forsaken both country and religion and put itself in the service of the occupier.
In his plea, Abu Marzuq found consolation in history, in which Muslims had often overcome hardship and crisis by means of faith and perseverance. The key to survival, he maintained, was patience (sabr). More specifically, Abu Marzuq called for the continuation of jihad and stressed the need for sacrifice “under all circumstances and in every situation,” as well as for maintaining Palestinian unity and bringing together the forces of resistance on the basis of Islamic and national principles while protecting the movement’s existence (al-hifaz `ala al-dhat) and its popular and political gains. The strategy the Hamas leadership decided to adopt was one of armed struggle against the occupation along with political confrontation with the signatory to the “shameful agreement,” namely, the Palestinian self-governing authority. In practice, this meant avoiding violence or political terrorism against Palestinian rivals while continuing the Intifada by all possible means, penetrating the Palestinian self-government institutions from the start, and exerting the utmost effort to secure public support for the Islamic movement. 49
Hamas’s tolerant attitude and disposition to collaborate with the PLO, particularly Fatah, continued after the Oslo agreement was signed. True, following the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP), Hamas issued a statement expressing its “total rejection . . . of the ‘Gaza-Jericho First’ [accord] for its conclusion of dangerous concessions, its total departure from national and legal norms, and its outright transgression of the red lines agreed on by the Palestinian National Council.” According to Hamas, the accord “brings limited and fragmented self-administration in Gaza and Jericho and represents an affront to our honor, a denial of our sacrifices and years of struggle, and a violation of our established historic rights to the land of Palestine.” 50 Still, as in the pre-Oslo era, Hamas maintained a policy of controlled violence against Israel while demonstrating a moderate attitude toward the Palestinian self-governing authority. Thus, although Hamas’s top leadership refused to meet with Arafat and Abu Mazin because of their part in signing the DOP, it did issue instructions prohibiting infighting and maintaining open channels with Fatah. 51
Although the Oslo accord raised hopes for a better future among the Palestinians in the occupied territories, especially the hope of an independent Palestinian state, uncertainties nevertheless marked the future of the Oslo process and hence of the PLO’s ability to fulfill the Palestinians’ expectations. Overall, though, the Oslo agreement was popular among the Palestinian public, and it was this, together with the uncertainties, that led Hamas to adopt a “wait-and-see” approach toward the PLO. Thus, as long as the peace process enjoyed broad public support, it would be best for Hamas to maintain a dialogue and limited collaboration with the PLO and thus ensure the continued smooth functioning of Hamas’s communal activities, rather than to embark on a radical path with an uncertain outcome. As long as the PLO-PA had military strength and political control, Hamas’s policy of coexistence within a negotiated order would minimize the threat of its marginalization.
The Oslo accord threatened Hamas’s political maneuverability and independent existence because it stipulated replacing Israeli occupation with a PLO-led Palestinian Authority. Hamas was aware that now the Islamic movement would have to confront both Israel and the PLO if it were to remain loyal to its normative vision. After examining its limited options for political action and seeking to preserve its political position in Palestinian society, Hamas decided that it had to maintain its coexistence with the Palestinian Authority. 52
The rationale for this was clear. An all-out confrontation would bolster the movement’s principles and militant image but risk its freedom of action and possibly its very existence. More dangerous yet, it could erode Hamas’s ability to underwrite social and economic services for the community, regarded as crucial to maintaining its popularity. A “successful” jihad against Israel—one that would end the peace process—would aggravate the Palestinians’ socioeconomic plight—for which Hamas would be blamed—and turn people against the movement. But cooperation with the PLO might place Hamas in a “divide and rule” trap as a result of the co-option of segments of the movement’s leadership into the system and thus undermine Hamas’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel and the PLO.
The establishment of the PA in June 1994 made Hamas’s dilemma even worse. Arafat’s creation of a centralized authority with international moral and financial support was embodied concretely in the formation of a large security force, most of whose members had served in the PLO’s military units and secret apparatuses in the Arab states and hence were loyal to Arafat. In addition, Arafat had exclusive control of the media and the financial flow into the West Bank and Gaza and was steadily tightening his collaboration with Israeli intelligence and security authorities. By moving quickly to consolidate its power and the means to uphold it, the PA became better able to mobilize public support and limit the Islamic movement’s opportunities to act. 53 This institutionalization process by the PA deepened Hamas’s awareness that it needed a new working formula to bridge the gap between its official ideology and the dramatically changing reality. As in Sheikh Yasin’s early statements during the Intifada, Hamas displayed a sensitivity to and awareness of practical considerations of “here and now” that necessitated an indirect dialogue with Israel.
The main considerations favoring a pragmatic approach had been succinctly explained by Musa Abu Marzuq, head of the movement’s Political Bureau, shortly before the Cairo agreement on the implementation of Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho. In an article published in the movement’s internal organ, al-Risala, 54 Abu Marzuq expressed concern at the Israeli-PLO agreement and described three major threats that would require Hamas’s continued rejection of the current process:
According to Abu Marzuq, Hamas’s difficulty in coping with these threats derived from
Abu Marzuq’s concern was expressed in an effort by Hamas, on the eve of the official establishment of the Palestinian Authority, to reach an agreement with Fatah on local matters in order to prevent a violent outbreak between the two movements. In early May 1994, shortly before the signing of the Cairo agreement on the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Jericho, a joint declaration was issued by the Battalions of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam and the Fatah Hawks, announcing an agreement between them aimed at strengthening Palestinian national unity and preventing civil war. The six-issue document called for refraining from rhetorical and violent polemics, using “constructive dialogue” and joint reconciliation committees to settle disputes, calling a one-month moratorium on executions of collaborators, cutting back the number of strike days, and ending the interdiction on study in schools. This agreement became a blueprint for a similar one between Islamic and Fatah activists in Hebron. 55
Hamas also was aware that the strong international and regional support for the Oslo process meant that any attempt to derail it would be no more than a “political illusion.” The movement’s leaders were familiar with the international and regional trends that had forced Islamic movements in almost all the Arab countries to go on the defensive. Hamas, for example, could not overlook the fact that the Sudanese Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi held back from denouncing the Oslo accords or that Egypt seemed willing to support Arafat’s tough policy against Hamas in the event of a collision between the two movements. Hamas also lacked strategic depth among the Palestinians: its supporters in the territories were in a minority; the Islamic movement in Israel was closer to Arafat than to Hamas; and the Islamic movement in Jordan was under the government’s strict control. 56 Conceding these weaknesses, Hamas had little choice but to reach a limited understanding with the PA. A confrontational approach would give the PA a pretext to deliver a serious blow to its main opposition, smoothing the way toward a permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Within a year of the PA’s establishment, Hamas’s influence had noticeably waned in the Gaza Strip in the wake of security operations by the PA to suppress its activities. To prevent further damage, Hamas’s religious and political leaders strove not to give the PA cause to engage in a violent clash. Hamas’s local leadership also displayed an increasing interest in coexisting with the PA on the basis of a temporary agreement, participation in the elections, and independent political activity by Hamas. However, objections to these conditions were raised by Hamas’s “outside” political leaders and its military wing, `Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Threatened to be marginalized by any agreement between the “inside” leaders and the PA, the “outside” leaders and the military apparatus defined the moderate line toward the PA as a defeat. Indeed, the military wing may have stepped up the armed struggle in order to block an agreement between Hamas and the PA. 57
Toward a Strategy of Mutual Restraint
Relations with Hamas had been at the top of the PA’s agenda since the signing of the DOP in September 1993. Notwithstanding Arafat’s attempts to enlist leading activists of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt to help persuade Hamas, and also the Islamic Jihad, to acknowledge the PA, Hamas remained adamant that it would accept no less than official recognition as a legitimate opposition that could continue its uninterrupted development under the PA. But Hamas’s attempt to play it both ways—and, more particularly, its decision to continue the armed struggle against Israel—forced it into a head-on collision with the PA.
Even without the armed struggle against Israel, relations between Hamas and the PA might still have boiled over. Still, the presence of the Israeli occupation probably contributed to the Hamas leadership’s loss of control over its military wing, which, in turn, increased the tension and conflict between the political leadership of the Hamas and the PA. Early in November 1994, a car bomb explosion killed Hani `Abed, a military leader of the Islamic Jihad. Islamic activists attributed the killing to Israel, but crowds at the funeral directed their wrath at Arafat, calling him a traitor. The leader of the Islamic Jihad, `Abdallah al-Shami, later apologized to Arafat and urged his own followers to avoid civil war. Earlier, however, he had issued a bellicose message, vowing that in the future “the guns of Jihad will not be able to distinguish between an Israeli soldier and the Palestinian police.” 58
The rising tension between Islamic Jihad and Hamas, on one hand, and the PA, on the other, reached a peak on November 18, 1994, a Friday, following prayers in Gaza’s Filastin Mosque, when a violent clash erupted between the PA police and Islamic activists, who had planned a protest. The clash, which quickly developed into a full-fledged riot that targeted property and public buildings identified with the PA, resulted in fifteen deaths, some two hundred injuries, and the arrest of hundreds. The incident underscored the deep frustration within the Islamic movements over the Oslo agreement and conveyed dramatically their growing suspicion that the PA had helped Israel eliminate the leaders of Hamas’s and the Islamic Jihad’s military wings. Tension between the Islamic movements and the PA reached yet another crisis when Islamic Jihad activists assembled in Gaza and flaunted their weapons, threatening Arafat’s security personnel and vowing to continue the violent struggle. In response, the PA outlawed unauthorized demonstrations and arrested about two hundred Islamic Jihad activists. 59
The incident demonstrated the PA’s newfound self-confidence and its determination to use arms to enforce its authority. Yet both sides demonstrated restraint, and Hamas said it was willing to open a dialogue with the PA. By pointing to Israel as the cause of the violent clash and by voicing common concerns such as “the homeland, Jerusalem, the [Palestinian] prisoners, [and Jewish] settlements,” both parties were able to overcome the embarrassment that the incident had caused and demonstrate their unity.
The PA sought to stay above the fray, insisting that the dialogue be conducted between Fatah and Hamas, but Hamas insisted that talks with the PA be held on an equal footing, since the clash had occurred with the PA’s police force. In addition, Hamas insisted that the dialogue be held outside the Palestinian autonomous areas and in the presence of Arab leaders, to ensure that the PA did not apply any pressure. The disagreement between the PA and Hamas was eventually resolved by Arafat’s decision to accept Hamas’s demand to conduct the dialogue with the PA outside the autonomous region, which was tantamount to recognizing Hamas’s political status as a legitimate opposition. 60 In the PA-Hamas talks in Khartoum and Cairo in late 1995, Hamas raised concrete issues, such as the release of prisoners and an end to the persecution of its members, while requesting that the PA not support splinter groups of the movement. In return for its agreement on these points, the PA secured Hamas’s commitment not to disrupt the general elections to the Palestinian Council. Hamas agreed not to boycott the elections and to take a neutral position. 61
The PA’s responsiveness toward the “inside” Hamas only aggravated the split within the movement, for then the “outside” tended to take a tougher attitude. 62 It was the fear of being ignored by the PA that induced elements of the “inside” Hamas to advocate participating in the emerging Palestinian bureaucracy and the elections to the PA Council (on the elections, see chapter 5). However, the more intransigent elements in the movement urged that the movement’s authenticity be preserved and its original goals kept as a shield against internal erosion and containment by the central authority. Hamas’s vacillation between these two approaches had been clearly reflected in its leadership’s debate over means and strategies since the September 1993 Israeli-Palestinian DOP, and the uncertainty had a potent impact on the movement’s practical politics. However persuasive the argument to become part of the PA and thus obtain access to resources and decision-making processes, this option also meant that Hamas might lose control over part of its military apparatus—a serious blow, as it was the military wing that had given the movement room for maneuver, legitimized its separate existence, and lent credibility to its claim to be an alternative to the PLO. Acquiescence in the peace process, therefore, could have severely threatened Hamas’s ability to survive and develop into a moral and political alternative to the PA.
The cumulative effect of the internal debate within Hamas was to intensify its tendency to differentiate between an attitude toward the “objective,” namely, Israel, and the perception of “actual situations.” 63 Hamas repeated its rejection of Israel’s legitimacy, maintaining that the solution to the conflict was a Palestinian Islamic state “from the river to the sea,” that is, Mandatory Palestine. But a blind pursuit of this attitude could paralyze Hamas’s political maneuverability and force it to fight the PA or abandon its quest to provide an alternative political frame of reference to the existing order. That this extreme scenario did not materialize was due to Hamas’s attitude toward “actual situations,” which revealed its political realism and a recognition of the constraints that consistently led Hamas to express its willingness to adopt the traditional Islamic concept of truce— hudna—with the infidels, in return for a Palestinian state in part of historic Palestine. Under these terms, the Hamas political leaders did not rule out an indirect dialogue with Israel. According to Sheikh Jamal Salim, head of the Palestine Muslim Scholar Association (Rabitat `Ulama' Filastin) in Nablus, it would be possible to reach an agreement with Israel, similar to the truce of Hizballah with Israel in Lebanon, through any available mediation. 64 This attitude was supported by other leading figures, such as Sheikh Jamil Hamami, Sheikh Husain Abu Kuwaik, and Dr. Mahmud al-Zahar. 65
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, even before the establishment of the PA in Gaza, Hamas’s political leadership had announced a peace initiative of its own, which amounted to a “strategy of phases.” Hamas’s realpolitik extended to acceptance of a temporary agreement—hudna—with Israel if the latter withdrew fully and unconditionally to its pre-1967 borders and dismantled its settlements outside these borders. Hamas’s leaders repeated this shift in their strategy in internal communications with the movement’s activists, emphasizing the temporary nature of such an agreement and their continued adherence to the jihad and the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic state of Palestine. 66
The legitimacy of hudna as a phase in the course of a defensive jihad against the enemies of Islam has been widely discussed—and accepted—by both radical and more moderate Islamic scholars since Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. The concept has been justified by historical precedents ranging from the Prophet’s treaties with his adversaries in Mecca (the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, 628 c.e.) and the Jews of al-Madina, to the treaties signed between Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi and other Muslim rulers and the Crusaders. The common denominator of these precedents is that they were caused by Muslim military weakness and concern for the well-being (maslaha) of the Islamic community and were later followed by the renewal of war and the defeat of Islam’s enemies. In retrospect, these cases of hudna were legitimized in realpolitik terms and interpreted a priori as necessary and temporary pauses on the road of jihad against the infidels. 67
Although the Oslo accord theoretically could be interpreted on the basis of the historical precedent of an Islamic state reaching an agreement with infidels, Hamas insisted on the religious illegality of the agreement with Israel, thus clearly distinguishing between Hamas and the PLO. Hamas spokesmen argued that any recognition of Israel’s right to exist on Islamic land was irreconcilable with religious jurisprudence. Along with the religious argument, Hamas raised specific reservations regarding the content of the agreement and its failure to address basic claims of the Palestinians. According to Hamas, the PLO had made inordinate concessions to Israel, especially concerning the question of Jerusalem and Palestinian independence, and had displayed a willingness to settle for only two-thirds of the West Bank.
Hamas adopted the same line in its negative response to a religious opinion (fatwa) issued by the mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh `Abd al-`Aziz Ibn Baz, that permitted Arab leaders to make peace with Israel if and when it served Arab-Muslim interests. A peace of this kind, the mufti argued, would be contingent on the Jews’ being inclined toward peace (yajnahu lil-silm) and would be temporary. This fatwa was sharply criticized by religious figures associated with Hamas. Prominent among these men was the Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who rejected the fatwa on the ground that Israel could not be considered to be leaning toward peace as long as it continued to occupy Islamic lands and to shed Muslim blood. 68
Arafat’s statements since signing the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian agreement seemed to support Hamas’s phased strategy, enabling Hamas’s leaders to maintain its coexistence with the PA. without necessarily legitimizing it. However apologetic, Arafat’s statements nonetheless used militant Islamic terminology that, as Sadat had done after signing the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in 1979, tried to legitimize the Oslo process with Israel by relying on historic examples of temporary agreements between Muslim states and non-Muslims that ultimately ended in victory by the Muslims. 69
By interpreting any political agreement involving the West Bank and Gaza Strip as merely a pause on the historic road of jihad, Hamas achieved political flexibility without losing its ideological credibility. In fact, Hamas emulated the PLO, which in the twelfth session of the PNC in June 1974 had set an interim national objective without abandoning the strategic goal of an independent Palestinian state covering all of Mandatory Palestine. In that session, the PNC decided that the PLO would, as an interim stage, establish a “national, independent and fighting authority on any part of Palestinian land to be liberated.” 70 Hamas now adopted the same strategy, which would allow it to live with the post-Oslo reality without recognizing Israel; to support the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip without ending the state of war or renouncing its ultimate goals; and to consider restraint, but not to give up the armed struggle, instead ascribing violent actions to uncontrollable groups and distinguishing between “political” and “military” wings within the movement while claiming the right to launch operations from areas under Israeli rule. In this way, Hamas hoped to retain both its credibility and organizational unity.
The differentiation between short-term needs and a long-term commitment to Palestinian national goals enabled Hamas to play the role of a “positive” opposition to the ruling power, focusing on social, economic, and political grievances that would underscore—and legitimize—its separate existence. Political activity here and now was thus justified in terms of hereafter. Acceptance of a political settlement in the short run was interpreted as being complementary, not contradictory, to long-term desires.
Indeed, Hamas did not miss an opportunity to criticize both the Oslo agreement and the disadvantages for the Palestinians, as well as the disappointing social and economic results. But Hamas was also attentive to the broad Palestinian public support for Oslo and the understanding of its irreversible nature. Hamas’s critique, therefore, focused less on issues of principle and more on matters of economic, social, and security significance, referring especially to impoverished Palestinians. An example of the cautious line Hamas was walking was, as we saw in the previous chapter, its reaction to the assassination in March 1998 of Muhyi al-Din al-Sharif, a senior figure of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Although Hamas leaders criticized the PA, accusing it of complicity in the killing, they were careful not to turn their public criticism into an all-out protest, which would have tested the PA’s willingness to use force against Hamas. 71
Hamas’s inclination toward coexistence with the PA was due, first and foremost, to its recognition of its military inferiority to the PA. The Hamas leaders also realized that the PA’s security and police forces were waiting for a pretext to abolish Hamas as a military movement, especially following the incorporation of Fatah into the PA’s bureaucratic and security apparatus. 72 To these considerations were added strategic ones—namely, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the weakness of the movement’s allies in the Arab and Muslim world, and the need to adapt to the new reality, which meant narrowing the movement’s activities to social and political domains.
Hamas’s considerations in favor of coexistence with the PA despite the disagreements also derived from its assumption that the Oslo process was bound to founder against insurmountable future political obstacles, compounded by Palestine’s myriad socioeconomic difficulties. The more apparent the PA’s failure was, and the greater the people’s grievances against it, the better Hamas’s political cause would seem. Such considerations shaped the form, rather than the essence, of Hamas’s critical response to the Oslo process and its hesitation to participate in the PA—a move that could cost Hamas popularity, since it would be perceived as a partner to power. 73 Moreover, the same considerations have guided Hamas’s approach to the possible use of violence against the PA. Only if the PA were to take steps to undermine Hamas’s civic infrastructure—its religious, educational, and social institutions and its public activities—would violence become inevitable. 74
Hamas’s willingness to acquiesce in a provisional political settlement with Israel, that is, without compromising its ultimate goals, have enabled it to consolidate a working formula of coexistence with the PA. This involved the creation of joint ad hoc conciliation forums with Fatah and committees on national concerns such as the Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Hamas’s willingness to maintain a negotiated coexistence with the PA has been reciprocated by the latter on grounds of cost-benefit calculations. True, Arafat has sought to weaken and divide Hamas and force it to join the PA, but his cautious policy also reflects a preference for dialogue over collision. Furthermore, gestures of temporary rapprochement with Hamas—such as meetings with Hamas leaders or the release of Hamas inmates from Palestinian prisons—have become a useful instrument by which the PA can curb internal criticism and win public support. 75
This pattern of coexistence became critical following the release of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin from an Israeli prison and his return to Gaza at the beginning of October 1997. Yasin’s release followed the Israeli Mossad’s abortive attempt on the life of Khalid Mash`al, the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau in Amman, and King Hussein’s demand that Israel release the imprisoned symbol of Hamas (see also chapter 3). Whereas Yasin’s return to social and political activity in Hamas allowed Arafat to maintain a close watch over the movement’s spiritual leader, it also posed a challenge to the PA. In May and June 1997, Yasin visited Iran, Sudan, Syria, and the Gulf states for fund-raising purposes. After an absence of more than eight years, Yasin was reestablishing his position within the movement and shifting Hamas’s center of gravity back to the Palestinian territories. His visits to countries such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait (as well as Iran) could be seen as part of a wider effort by Hamas to strengthen its regional presence. In this sense, Yasin’s return to activity posed a political threat to the PA—as well as to Hamas’s Political Bureau in Jordan, which was apprehensive that the weight of the movement would shift back to the “inside” leadership. 76
The preference of Hamas and the PA for cooperation over confrontation spawned a pattern of relations best described, as already noted, as coexistence within a prolonged conflict. Both sides were well aware of the gulf dividing them and of the improbability that they could reach an agreement that would enable them to live side by side in political harmony. Yet each side recognized the limits beyond which it could not press for a solution of “one in place of the other.” Neither side would accept the other fully, but both were equally loath to adopt a position of total rejection. Given the social circumstances and political reality in which Hamas and the PA operated, the price to be paid for in attempting to remove the other from the political stage was intolerable. Both therefore preferred to pursue a strategy that would mitigate the disadvantages of coexistence rather than strive for a new political order that excluded the other side. Underlying this pattern of relations was the sober perception that took root in both camps, holding that the achievement of a clear decision in their protracted dispute would never be more than wishful thinking and, crucially, that a mode of action based on a zero-sum perception was likely to end in tragedy. Hence, the most promising course was for each side to concentrate on consolidating its position and to enhance its bargaining ability vis-à-vis the other side, instead of pursuing an “all or nothing” policy to advance ultimate political goals.
Endnotes
Note 1: As suggested by J. F. Legrain, “Mobilisation islamiste et soulevement palestinien 1987&-;1988,” in G. Kepel and Y. Richard, eds., Intellectuels et militants de l’Islam contemporain (Paris: Seuil, 1990), p. 153. Back.
Note 2: Hamas’s charter, article 27; “Hadha Huwa Ra'yuna fi Munazamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya” [This is our view of the PLO], Filastin al-Muslima (May 1990): 8; “Hamas, Hadath `Abir Am Badil Da'im?” [Hamas, a passing episode or a permanent alternative?], al-Sawa'id al-Ramiya: Sawt al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fil-Watan al-Muhtal, March 1990, p. 9. Back.
Note 3: UNC leaflets, September 6 and November 27, 1988. Back.
Note 4: Hamas charter, article 27; Ziyad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 31. Back.
Note 5: This session declared the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of UN General Assembly resolution 181 of November 1947, which called for the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. Back.
Note 6: Hamas leaflet, November 10, 1988; see also Hamas leaflet, November 11, 1991. Back.
Note 7: See, for example, Mahmud al-Zahar to al-Quds, November 28, 1994; Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 78. Back.
Note 8: Mahmud al-Zahar to al-Watan (Gaza), May 5, 1995. Back.
Note 9: “Wahdat al-Saff . . . Matlab Islami Thamin” [Unity of rank . . . a precious Islamic demand], Sawt al-Aqsa, January 1, 1990 (reproduced in al-Sabil, January 31, 1990); “Na`am lil-Wahda al-Wataniyya . . . wa-Lakin” [Yes to national unity . . . but], Filastin al-Muslima (July 1990): 25–26; Hamas leaflet, October 24, 1991; Ibrahim Ghawsha in Filastinn al-Muslima (October 1992): 11; Hamas, Waraqa Awwaliyya Hawl Tajannub al-Iqtital wa-Hudud al-Difa` `an al-Nafs, September–October 1993, internal circular; Sheikh Hasan Abu Kuwaik to al-Quds, August 30, 1994. For a theological explanation of the prohibition of internal bloodshed, see al-Quds, May 8, 1994. Back.
Note 10: Yedioth Aharonoth (Tel Aviv), September 16, 1988; Sheikh Ahmad Yasin to al-Sirat (publication of the Islamic movement in Israel), April 10, 1989. Back.
Note 11: Mu'tamar `Ulama' Filastin, “Fatwa al-Musharaka fi Mu'tamar Madrid wal-Sulh Ma'a Isra'il,” Jerusalem, November 1, 1991; `Abdallah `Azzam, al-Difa` `An Aradi al-Muslimin Aham Furud al-A`yan (Jidda: Dar al-Mujtama`, 1987), pp. 59–60. Hamas leaflet, “Bayan lil-Tarikh . . . La Limu'tamar Bay` Filastin wa-Bayt al-Maqdis,” September 23, 1991. Back.
Note 12: For details on Hamas’s activity in Europe and the United States and on the beginning of contacts with Iran,, see A. Shabi and R. Shaked, Hamas: me-Emuna be-Allah le-Derekh ha-Teror [Hamas: From belief in Allah to the road of terror] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1994), pp. 168–172, 240–241; al-Wasat, November 30, 1992. Back.
Note 13: Ha'aretz, November 20, 1989; The Ten Front leaflet, “Fali-Tasqut Mu'amarat al-Tasfiya wali-Tastamirr al-Intifada al-Mubaraka” [Down with the conference of liquidation, let the blessed Intifada go on] (Hamas appears first on the list), October 24, 1991, Filastin al-Muslima (November 1991): 31. Apparently, the Front was passive until it renewed its activity a year later. See “Bayan Siyasi Ham” [An important political announcement], a leaflet signed by Hamas and eight other Palestinian factions, September 15, 1992. Back.
Note 14: On Iran’s support for the Islamic Palestinian movements, see Fathi Shiqaqi to al-Diyar (Lebanon), August 30, 1994, p. 17; on military training in Iran and Syria undertaken by Hasan Salama, the head of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam in Hebron who commanded the mass suicide attacks of February–March 1996 in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ashkelon, see Ha'aretz, August 15, 1996. Back.
Note 15: al-Watan al-`Arabi (Paris), November 7, 1994; Y. Melman, “War and Peace Process,” The Washington Post, January 29, 1995; see also Arafat’s allegations that Hamas received $30 million from Iran, al-Wafd (Egypt), December 19, 1992, p. 6, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, December 22, p. 5; al-Wasat, February 22 and November 30, 1993; al-Shira`, January 4, 1993; al-Manar (Jerusalem), March 29, 1993. Back.
Note 16: The New Yorker, August 19, 1996; al-Watan al-`Arabi, November 4, 1994. Back.
Note 17: Hamas leaflet, “al-Tayar al-Islami fi al-Jami`at wal-Ma`ahid al-Filastiniyya fi al-Watan al-Muhtall” [The Islamic current in the universities and institutions in the occupied homeland], March 1992; for the financial difficulties of the Palestinian universities, see al-Quds, July 15, 1992, p. 4; Ha'aretz, May 17, 1992, quoting Na'if Hawatima’s interview with al-Haqa'iq (Tunisia); Kol Yerushalayim, July 26, 1991. Back.
Note 18: Hisham Ahmad, Hamas (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994): 66; Y. Torpstein, “Nadvanim le-Allah” [Super philanthropists] Ha'aretz, January 13, 1993; “She`atam ha-Yaffa Shel ha-Gizbarim ha'Islamiyim” [The great moment of the Islamist treasurers], Ha'aretz, March 15, 1992. Back.
Note 19: Iyad al-Barghuthi, al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Filastiniyya wal-Nizam al-`Alami al-Jadid [The Palestinian-Islamic movement and the new world order] (Jerusalem: al-Jam`iyya al-Filastiniyya al-Acadimiyya lil-Shu'un al-Dawliyya, 1992), pp. 30–31; Guy Bekhor, “Yamim Kashim Le'Ashaf” [Difficult days for the PLO], Ha'aretz, November 13, 1992; Report by Y. Torpstein, Ha'aretz, January 1, 1993; leaflet by “al-Haraka al-Tashihiyya fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya” [The reformist movement in the PLO], Jerusalem, September 4, 1992. Back.
Note 20: On Hamas’s political penetration into popular institutions, see Mahmud al-Zahar, “al-Haraka al-Islamiyya, Haqa'iq wa-Arqam” [The Islamic movement; facts and figures], al-Quds, November 10, 1992; and Dani Rubinstein’s report, Ha'aretz, November 27, 1992. Back.
Note 21: al-Quds, June 15 and August 5, 1992. Back.
Note 22: al-Bayadir al-Siyasi, May 30, 1992; Y. Torpstein, “She`urei Dat le'Ashaf” [Religion classes for the PLO], Ha'aretz, June 3, 1992. Back.
Note 23: Husam `Abd al-Hadi, “Nahwa Haraka Wataniyya Islamiyya” [Toward a national Islamic movement], al-Quds, August 9, 1992. See also Arafat’s comment on Hamas’s alignment with the Marxist factions in the framework of the Ten Front, proceedings of the Fatah-Hamas talks in Khartoum, January 1–4, 1993, al-Manar (Jerusalem), March 29, 1993. Back.
Note 24: `Abd al-Sattar Qasim, Ayyam fi Mu`taqal al-Naqab [Days in the Negev prison] (Jerusalem: Lajnat al-Difa` `An al-Thaqafa al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya, 1989): 98. Back.
Note 25: A joint Fatah-Hamas leaflet (n.d.), reproduced in Filastin al-Muslima (October 1990): 4; Ziyad Abu Ghanima, “Mithaq al-Sharaf Bayn Hamas wa-Fatah, Bariqat Amal li-Sha`bina . . . wa-Saf`a li-`Aduwwina” [The pact of honor between Hamas and Fatah, a gleam of hope to our people . . . and a blow to our enemies], al-Dustur (Jordan), September 24, 1990. Back.
Note 26: Hamas leaflet, July 22, 1990; Ha'aretz, November 11, 1992. Back.
Note 27: On the PLO-Hamas dispute, see “Hadha Ra'yuna fi Munazamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya,” Filastin al-Muslima (May 1990): 8; “Likay la Tadi` al-Haqiqa: Radduna `Ala al-Hamasiyyin” [So that truth is not missed: Our response to Hamas people], Filastin al-Thawra, July 8, 1990; “Qira'a fi Radd Hamas `Ala al-Musharaka fi al-Majlis al-Watani” [Reading in Hamas’s response regarding participation in the National Council], Filastin al-Muslima (July 1990). See also Sheikh Ahmad Yasin’s interview with al-Mukhtar al-Islami (Egypt), May 1989. Back.
Note 28: Hamas leaflet, no. 77, August 3, 1992, according to Filastin al-Muslima, September 1992, p. 5. Back.
Note 29: Hamas leaflets nos. 77, 81, 85, 87, 88, 89, August 3, 1991–July 5, 1992; Mahmud al-Zahar to al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 17, 1992, p. 8. Back.
Note 30: Hamas leaflets, December 27, 1991, April 26, 1992, July 31, 1992. Back.
Note 31: Hamas leaflet, “Awlawiyyat al-Jihad al-Filastini fi al-Marhala al-Rahina,” June 21, 1992; Hamas leaflets, December 1, 1991, and April 7, 1992, reproduced in Filastin al-Muslima, May, June 3, and August 3, 1992; leaflet of the Islamic Jihad, “Nida' Ila al-Sha`b wal-Mu'assasat wal-Wujaha: 'Uwqifu al-Majazir Qabl Wuqu`iha” [A call to the people, the institutions and leaders: Stop the massacres before they occur], April 8, 1992. Back.
Note 32: Faraj Shalhub, “Hamas wa-M. T. F.: Wahda Min Ajl Bina' al-Mashru` al-Jihadi” [Hamas and the PLO: Unity for the sake of building a jihadist program], Filastin al-Muslima (October 1990): 2; Marwan al-Barghuthi to al-Liwa', July 15, 1992, p. 13; Keyhan (Iran), October 31, 1992, p. 16, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, November 30, 1992, pp. 9–11; Hamas leaflet, “Awlawiyyat al-Jihad al-Filastini fi al-Marhala al-Rahina” [The priority of jihad in Palestine in the current phase], June 21, 1992. Back.
Note 33: Ha'aretz, November 11, 1992. Back.
Note 34: Faisal al-Husaini’s call to Hamas to join the PLO in convening the PNC to strengthen the national unity, al-Quds, May 4, 1992; Ha'aretz, July 2, 8, 1992; Hamas leaflets, “al-I`tida'at al-Mutakarrira `Ala Buyut Allah . . . Man Yaqif Wara'aha!? wali-Maslahat Man Yatim Tanfidhuha!?” [The repeated aggression against Allah’s homes . . . who is behind it and in whose interest it is carried out?], December 27, 1991, April 7, 1992, reproduced in Filastin al-Muslima, May and June 3, 1992; battalions of `Izz al-Din al-Qassam leaflet, September 29, 1992. Back.
Note 35: “Wathiqat Sharaf” [A document of honor], a joint Fatah-Hamas leaflet, June 7, 1992; Hamas leaflet, “Bayan Hawl Wathiqat al-Sharaf” [An announcement about the document of honor], June 8, 1992. Back.
Note 36: Ha'aretz, July 10, 14, 1992; among the members in these committees were Haidar `Abd al-Shafi and Faisal al-Husaini, as well as Israeli Arab figures, including Haj Ra'id Salah, interview with `Abd al-`Aziz al-Rantisi, al-Quds, July 15, 1992, p. 2. Back.
Note 37: Arafat to Algiers Voice of Palestine, January 14, 1993, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, January 15, 1993, p. 9; and interview with al-Ra'i (Jordan), November 30, 1992, p. 12, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, November 30, p. 6; see Muhammad Nazzal’s response, al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 30, 1992, p. 5, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, January 5, 1993, p. 4; Ha'aretz, November 11, 1992. Back.
Note 38: al-Hayat, December 24, 1992; Ha'aretz, December 21, 1992; January 21, 1993; al-Watan al-`Arabi, January 1, 1993, pp. 16–21. Back.
Note 39: Hamas, “Miswaddat Ittifaq Bayn al-Hukm al-Irani wa-Harakat Hamas” [A draft agreement between the Iranian regime and the Hamas movement] (internal document, n.d., faxed on November 16, 1992); al-Watan al-`Arabi, January 1, 1993, pp. 20–21. Back.
Note 40: al-Watan al-`Arabi, January 1, 1993; PLO memorandum: “al-Hiwar Ma`a Hamas” [The dialogue with Hamas], summarizing the PLO-Hamas talks in Tunis, December 24, 1992. Back.
Note 41: Hamas’s delegation was composed of the head of the Political Bureau, Musa Abu Marzuq; Hamas spokesman Ibrahim Ghawsha; the official representatives in Iran and Jordan, `Imad al-`Alami and Muhammad Nazzal, respectively; and two senior members of the Islamic movement in Jordan. Back.
Note 42: PLO memorandum: “al-Hiwar Ma'a Hamas,” summarizing the PLO-Hamas talks in Tunis, December 24, 1992. See also al-Watan al-`Arabi, January 1, 1993. Back.
Note 43: The proceedings of the Khartoum talks were published by al-Manar (Jerusalem), March 29, 1993. See also Ha'aretz, January 24, 1993; al-Quds, January 12 and February 2, 1993. Back.
Note 44: al-Manar, March 29, 1993; al-Quds, January 12, 1993. Back.
Note 45: al-Manar, March 29, 1993; al-Quds, February 2, 1993; Ha'aretz, January 20, 1993. Back.
Note 46: al-Quds, February 2, 1993; al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 30, 1992, p. 5, FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, January 5, 1993, p. 4. Back.
Note 47: al-Quds, March 16, 1993. Back.
Note 48: Hamas, Annual Political Report, August 1, 1992, to September 20, 1993, quoted in al-Wasat, December 18, 1995, pp. 17–18. Back.
Note 49: al-Risala (Hamas internal periodical), October 13, 1993. Back.
Note 50: al-Quds (Jerusalem), September 13, 1993. Back.
Note 51: Ali al Jarbawi, “The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine-Israel Accord.” Muslim World 83, nos. 1–2 (January–April 1994): 144–153, analyzes the way Hamas coped with the challenge of the Declaration of Principles. Back.
Note 52: On Hamas’s instructions to the movement’s followers to prevent internecine Palestinian violence (iqtital) in the name of Palestinian national unity and a joint front against the Jews, see, for example, Ahmad, Hamas, p. 71. This was also the line adopted by the Islamic Jihad: see Fathi Shiqaqi’s statement, al-Diyar (Lebanon), August 30, 1994, p. 17; FBIS, NESA, Daily Report, September 13, 1994, p. 10. Back.
Note 53: The pattern of a clash of interests between the local Palestinian factor and the PLO—tacitly assisted by Israel—is not unfamiliar in the history of the occupied territories since 1967. A previous occurrence was in early 1982 between the National Guidance Committee and the PLO, eventuating in the dismantling of the former. The same pattern was repeated in the way Israel and the PLO tackled the local grassroots leadership of the uprising. Back.
Note 54: al-Risala (Hamas internal periodical), April 21, 1994. Back.
Note 55: al-Quds, June 10, 1994; joint leaflet, April 22, 1994; Khalid al-Kharub, “Harakat Hamas Bayn al-Sulta al-Filastiniyya wa-Isra'il: Min Muthallath al-Qiwa Ila al-Mitraqa wal-Sandan” [Hamas movement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel: From the triangle of forces to the hammer and anvil], Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, no. 18 (1994): 28–29. Back.
Note 56: al-Wasat, November 14, 1994, June 28, 1995, p. 22. Back.
Note 57: al-Wasat, June 12, 1995, pp. 22–23, 33–34. Back.
Note 58: Time, November 21, 1994, p. 63. Back.
Note 59: Time, November 28, 1994. Back.
Note 60: al-Quds, November 20 and December 17, 1994; al-Nahar (East Jerusalem), October 12, 1995; Mahmud al-Zahar to al-Watan, December 8, 1994, p. 1; `Imad Faluji’s interview with Sawt al-Haqq wal-Hurriyya, January 27, 1995, p. 13. Back.
Note 61: al-Quds, December 22, 1995; al-Nahar (East Jerusalem), December 23, 1995. Back.
Note 62: al-Nahar (East Jerusalem), October 11, 1995; al-Wasat, January 1, 1996, p. 30. Back.
Note 63: For more on this distinction, see Milton Rokeach, “Attitude Change and Behavioral Change,” Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (1966/67): 529–550. Back.
Note 64: Referring to the July 1993 unofficial understanding between Israel and Hizballah, following Operation Din ve-Heshbon (Accountability) in southern Lebanon. Back.
Note 65: al-Wasat, November 14, 1994, p. 16. Back.
Note 66: Statement by the Political Bureau of Hamas, March 16, 1994; Ibrahim Ghawsha to al-Sabil (London), quoted by Reuters, April 19, 1994; al-Nahar (East Jerusalem), May 15, 1995. Back.
Note 67: `Azzam, al-Difa' `An Aradi al-Muslimin, pp. 59–63; leaflet, signed by “Mu'tamar `Ulama' Filastin,” November 1, 1991; Rabitat al-Tullab al-Islamiyyin fi Filastin, “Hukm al-Sulh Ma`a al-Yahud” [Islamic Students Association in Palestine, “The law of peace with the Jews”] (n.d.). Back.
Note 68: On the polemic over the legitimacy of the agreement with Israel and the religious judgment of Ibn Baz, see al-Watan (Gaza), January 11, p. 6, January 19, p. 13; February 28, 1995, p. 8. Back.
Note 69: Voice of Palestine Radio, March 24 and November 11, 1995; al-Jumhuriyya (Egypt), September 17, 1993; his speech in Johannesburg on May 24, 1994. Back.
Note 70: For the text of the decision, see Filastin al-Thawra, June 12, 1974. Back.
Note 71: Interview with Mahmud al-Zahar for al-Watan (Gaza), January 19, 1995, p. 8; interview with Ibrahim Ghawsha for al-Watan, February 2, p. 8; interview with Musa Abu Marzuq for Filastin al-Muslima (June 1994): 16; Majdi Ahmad Husain, “al-Hisad al-Murr li-Ittifaq Ghazza-Ariha” [The bitter harvest of the Gaza-Jericho agreement], Sawt al-Haqq wal-Hurriyya, December 2, 1994, p. 11. Back.
Note 72: Typical of that was a Hamas leaflet issued on June 4, 1994, several days after the withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza, which threatened the Palestinian police over their persecution of Islamic activists. See also the interview with Mahmud al-Zahar for Filastin al-Muslima, June 1995, pp. 13–15. Back.
Note 73: Ahmad Yusuf, “al-Islamiyyun wa-Marhalat Ma Ba`d al-Ittifaq” [The Islamists and the postagreement phase], Filastin al-Muslima, June 1994, p. 19. Back.
Note 74: Ahmad Yasin to al-Wasat, November 1, 1992. Back.
Note 75: See the report on the meeting of representatives from Hamas and the National Islamic Salvation Party with representatives of Fatah and the PA to start a “national dialogue,” following the incidents of the Hashmonean Tunnel in October 1996, al-Quds (East Jerusalem), February 28, 1997; Danny Rubinstein, “Be-Hamas `Asakim ka-Ragil” [Business as usual in Hamas], Ha'aretz, January 21, 1998. Back.
Note 76: al-Hayat (London), April 19, 1998; Ronen Bergman, “Lama Ein Piggu`im?” [Why are there no (terrorist) attacks?], Ha'aretz (weekly suppl.), June 5, 1998, p. 34. Back.
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