5 NATO Enlargement

POLICY, PROCESS, AND IMPLICATIONS

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In March 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic took their respective seats as the newest members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this chapter I examine the decision-making dynamics that framed the various rationales for the policy of enlarging NATO. I then assess the implementation of the policy as of early 1999 in order to consider its prospects for success. My central conclusion is that NATO enlargement originated from a diverse group of policy objectives. Its implementation to date shows that not all supporters are likely to be comfortable with the outcome of policy decisions stemming from the admission of three new NATO members. On its own, NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic was a logical reflection of post–Cold War European security dynamics. NATO's method of implementing the enlargement policy, however, may not necessarily be what all advocates of enlargement—including the three new members—initially hoped to achieve.

Why NATO Enlargement?

NATO enlargement was a European idea—or, more specifically, a German initiative. The impetus for the policy stemmed from the German government of Helmut Kohl in mid-1993. Germany hoped to use NATO membership to stabilize countries to its east and thus enhance its economic investments there, engage the United States deeply in post–Cold War European security, and ensure that any future front lines in Europe emerged far to its east. Ultimately, Germany accelerated NATO toward enlargement in order to reaffirm its own postwar self-restraint in security policy. As one high-level German official put it: "Insofar as the Germans

like happy neighbors, they also think that the presence of the United States is an insuring element, a stabilizing component to prevent our neighbors from perceiving that something might happen. . . . This is what you objectively call a stabilizing factor. . . . So it has not only to do with an outside threat, it's an internal balancing element inside the European security structure as such."[1]

Early German initiatives were not well received by the other NATO allies. By August 1993, senior NATO officials had signaled discomfort with the policy. At the core of their concern was deep worry over its military implications and its impact on Russia. In Washington, D.C., NATO enlargement gathered some early support at the RAND Corporation, among the policy planning staff of the Department of State, and at the National Security Council. Senior decision-makers in the Department of State, however, and particularly those at the Department of Defense, opposed the policy. By the fall of 1993, a general consensus was reached within the US government and among the NATO allies that immediate enlargement would be self-defeating and damaging to the alliance. As a result, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program—one of reaching out to the east, short of providing security guarantees—was agreed to in January 1994.[2]

Nevertheless, the idea of NATO enlargement had prompted intense debates over four independent themes advanced by policy advocates: grand strategy, the spread of stability, the building of democracy and a Western-oriented community of states in Europe, and collective security.

NATO had always been a tool of grand strategy, and containment of external aggression against member states its primary utility. Some advocates of NATO enlargement saw the policy as an effective way of perpetuating NATO's classic role in keeping the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out. In this view, NATO enlargement would extend and sustain American involvement in post–Cold War European security. The end product would be the extension of American influence into the region between Germany and Russia in order to prevent future security competition between a growing power in Germany and a declining power in Russia. Of equal concern to some supporters of NATO enlargement was a lingering Cold War view that Russia remained a threat.

Historical fear of Russia was an important (though not the sole) factor that drove applicant countries toward NATO. Indeed, some senior US officials saw the enlargement of NATO as a hedge in the event that democracy collapsed in Russia and Moscow chose a more confrontational policy toward the West.

For some advocates of NATO enlargement, the policy was a tool for spreading stability—that is, shaping the international security environment in central and eastern Europe by linking membership in NATO with specific policy outcomes within or among states. By bringing new members toward the multilateral NATO defense planning process, states might learn about each other and be socialized into new patterns of behavior. This would reduce uncertainty and therefore the costs of national defense in new member countries. Through this expansion of multilateral planning, NATO would lower the costs of collective defense or out-of-area activities such as peacekeeping as it added new members with shared interests. Moreover, by specifying membership criteria, NATO would shape the international security environment in central and eastern Europe.

The United States endorsed five criteria for NATO aspirants to meet before being considered for membership: democratic elections; individual liberty and the rule of law; demonstrated commitment to economic reform and a market economy; adherence to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) norms and principles involving ethnic minorities and social justice; resolution of territorial disputes with neighbors; and establishment of democratic control of the military. Collectively, NATO required new members to provide adequate resources and assume the financial obligations of joining and to establish interoperability with NATO structures. Additional membership criteria included transparency in defense planning, parliamentary oversight of national defense structures, minimal standards of defense planning to operate with NATO structures, and a commitment to leaving the door open to further enlargement.

To some advocates of NATO enlargement, the policy was based on a moral imperative to spread democracy in postcommunist Europe. By expanding the "democratic club" of nations within NATO, the organization

would reify its internal fabric by including like-minded states with similar values and interests. As new democracies emerged from the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, NATO enlargement would consolidate the process. It would thus contribute to a building of community in Europe that would broaden the idea of "the West" on the continent. As the US Department of Defense concluded in its *Report to Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications:* "The purpose of enlargement is to integrate more countries into the existing community of values and institutions, thereby enhancing stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area."

Finally, some supporters of NATO enlargement saw the policy as a means of promoting a new architecture for European security based on the concept of collective security—in contrast to NATO's traditional purpose of collective defense, limited to alliance members. Collective security is an institutionalization of balance-of-power arrangements organized on the principle of all against one. Advocates of collective security posit that states can organize to punish violators of agreed-upon international norms. According to this principle, NATO membership would contribute to European security by facilitating the internal management of crises among aspiring members such as Hungary and Romania. At a more general level, some advocates promoted NATO enlargement if it were open to all qualified European states—including Russia. From this perspective, Russia should become a full member of NATO in order to institutionalize collective security in twenty-first-century Europe.

Measuring Success

Measuring the success of NATO enlargement is difficult, considering the variety of rationales behind the policy. As the other chapters in this book show, the three new NATO members have made considerable progress along their paths to membership. Moreover, through parliamentary ratification, sixteen previous members of NATO have welcomed the new members into the alliance. Nevertheless, to fully assess the long-term success of NATO enlargement will require years of observation. What follows is an initial effort to examine the ways in which NATO enlargement was

being implemented at the time of NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit, held in April 1999. I organize the discussion in terms of the four major themes just outlined: grand strategy, the spread of stability, the building of democracy and community, and collective security.

Grand Strategy

Some advocates of NATO enlargement are left with a conundrum: NATO has expanded to include the three countries many supporters wanted, but strategic goals have been poorly served by what will be a hollow military commitment to the new members. The price of success has been to give Russia an informal veto in NATO decision-making, which has accelerated trends toward making collective security NATO's de facto policy. The strategic case for enlarging NATO may have had fundamental shortcomings because it treated NATO as a traditional alliance rather than as an organization that is undergoing a dramatic transition away from its policy of collective defense. The historical rationale for NATO enlargement may have been weak for two key reasons.

First, this approach ignored disintegrative trends in the alliance that emerged with the absence of the Soviet threat. Although the United States attained consensus for the normative goals of NATO enlargement, key European countries would have been uncomfortable supporting enlargement in the absence of an accommodation with Russia. Two members that each share a border with Russia—Norway and Turkey—were among the least enthusiastic supporters of NATO enlargement. Britain, France, and Italy were not especially excited by the policy, either. Ironically, Germany, which accelerated NATO enlargement in 1993, seemed to insist in 1997 that an accord with Russia be reached at any expense, including substantial NATO concessions over infrastructure development in new member states.[3] The cost of this grand strategy for post–Cold War European security has been a gain for Russia over the instrument of implementation—NATO.

Second, those who advanced strong principles of collective defense as reasons for enlarging NATO were guided by perception and historicism rather than by a careful assessment of capabilities, threats, and trends. If Russia is a threat to central and eastern Europe, then the region would be

more secure with a line drawn, in theory, at Russia's border. Thus the three Baltic countries and Ukraine would be primary candidates for membership. Enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic invites the creation of a gray zone of security competition farther to the east. Whereas Germany might view its security as dependent on events in Poland, Warsaw may, in part, view its security as dependent upon events in Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. By stressing a limited enlargement, NATO may have contributed to a security vacuum more dangerous than the one enlargement has solved. For example, absent a credible military guarantee to defend Poland's borders, NATO's area of interest has now spread to include stability in one of the most unstable countries in eastern Europe—Belarus.

Hypothetical threats aside, advocates of collective defense incorrectly assumed that Russia was a threat to central Europe. Russia's own internal assessments are said to conclude that only after substantial downsizing of the Russian armed forces, combined with years, if not decades, of economic growth, could the Russian military mount a conventional challenge to central and eastern Europe by 2025.[4] Ironically, NATO enlargement may have given conservative forces in Russia justification not to reduce the overall size of the armed forces and proceed with serious military reform. Although at face value this possibility appears to validate Western concerns about the quantitative Russian threat, it ignores the qualitative disaster of the Russian military. Indeed, NATO enlargement may reduce the prospect for military reform that might allow Russia to become a major threat to Europe in years to come. While this might reduce the immediate danger of aggression against a new NATO member, the delay in military reform in Russia also diminishes the possibility that Moscow will adopt a Western-style military or invest in programs to increase the security and stability of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Ultimately dismissing alarmist notions of a Russian threat, NATO military planners assumed in 1997 that new members could be reinforced with a mobilization of two divisions—an impressive drop from the six assumed in 1996.

Arguments favoring the enlargement of NATO in order to deter Russian threats thus had little value. A more plausible threat-based case for NATO enlargement was available, however, but was rejected by the

United States. Threats ranging from instability in the Balkan region to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East or North Africa made a strong case for Romanian membership.[5] For example, a scenario in which, hypothetically, large-scale instability in the Persian Gulf forced the United States to look for alternative energy sources would likely shift American strategic priorities to the oil-rich Caspian Sea region, possibly leading to security competition between the United States, Iran, and Russia. In such a scenario, Romania's membership in NATO would provide a critical base for US operations by assisting extended deterrence and supporting force projection. Given uncertain trends in Turkey's political development, Romania could become critical to the security of the alliance's southern rim. Because this scenario is as plausible as a Russian threat to central Europe, it is worth questioning why the United States opposed Romania's entrance into NATO in 1997. A majority of European NATO members, for a variety of reasons, pushed strongly for Romanian membership, thereby placing the United States in a very small minority. Only when the Clinton administration tersely insisted that it would not support Romania's entry did the allies drop their insistence on its (and Slovenia's) membership.

The event most damaging to the strategic case for NATO enlargement was the negotiation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which gave Moscow a voice in NATO debates in exchange for its grudging acceptance of enlargement. At the highest level, rejection of the goal of containing Russia was paramount to the decision-making involved in NATO enlargement. As US President Bill Clinton said at the signing ceremony for the NATO-Russia Founding Act in Paris in May 1997:

> The historic change in the relationship between NATO and Russia grows out of a fundamental change in how we think about each other and our future. NATO's member states recognize that the Russian people are building a new Russia, defining their greatness in terms of the future as much as the past. Russia's transition to democracy and open markets is as difficult as it is dramatic. And its steadfast commitment to freedom and reform has earned the world's admiration.[6]

The president added that "this new NATO will work with Russia, not against it.... By reducing rivalry and fear, by strengthening peace and cooperation, by facing common threats to the security of all democracies, NATO will promote greater stability in all of Europe, including Russia.... We are determined to create a future in which European security is not a zero-sum game—where NATO's gain is Russia's loss, and Russia's strength is our alliance's weakness."[7]

This approach led to a variety of concessions by the United States and its NATO allies to Russia regarding new members. Though officially a restatement of existing NATO policy as codified in the 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement,* these concessions were designed to help ease Russian concerns over NATO enlargement. First, NATO agreed that it saw no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members or any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and it saw no future need to do so. Specifically, the act said: "This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities." Nuclear storage sites were defined as facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, including all types of hardened above- or below-ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.[8] The language addressing nuclear weapons infrastructure and related storage facilities was added by American and NATO negotiators at Russia's insistence during negotiations over the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Second, NATO agreed that there would be no quantitative change in force levels in new member states that might negatively affect the existing Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Both NATO and Russia agreed that they would prevent a potentially threatening buildup of conventional forces in central and eastern Europe. There would be no significant force buildup by new members, and there would be no substantial deployment of NATO forces on new member territory that might shift the balance of power.[9] NATO agreed that "in the current and foreseeable security environment, the alliance will carry out its collective defense and

other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces."[10]

As a result, NATO's deterrent value for a new member such as Poland will be based on a promise of reinforcement and intervention rather than on the actual presence of troops to deter an attack. Reinforcement is the centerpiece of NATO's New Strategic Concept of 1991. NATO planning emphasizes multinational force projection, supported from extended lines of communication and reliance on deployable and flexible logistics support capabilities for crisis management. The stress is on smaller, more mobile, and, in particular, more rapidly deployable reaction forces that can quickly reinforce interoperable national forces in the event of a collective defense requirement. The strategic environment in 1991, however, allowed NATO to rely on the forward defense of Germany through the continued stationing of American armed forces. Thus the US Department of Defense concluded in 1995: "Forward deployed conventional and nuclear forces are the single most visible demonstration of America's commitment to defend U.S. and allied interests in Europe."[11] In the post-enlargement NATO, forward deployment of conventional and nuclear forces has been abandoned in favor of a reinforcement status in Germany. The United States now has a forward political commitment to defend Poland but no forward deployments to make such a commitment credible.

Perhaps more problematically for the new NATO, any decision to reinforce a new member during a crisis carries a risk of escalation that would raise fears in Russia that the premises on which Moscow had accepted NATO enlargement were being violated. Such concerns would inevitably affect the NATO consensus process and be as likely to divide as to unite current NATO allies over defense of the new member. Indeed, there has already been a worrisome decline in the willingness of the public in Germany (from which reinforcement would most likely have to flow) to support the defense of new allies. In 1996, some 61 percent of Germans felt that NATO enlargement would benefit European security. In 1997, the number was down to 38 percent. An opinion poll found that 51 percent of Germans surveyed would vote against Poland's joining NATO when the

question was worded this way: "Keeping in mind that our country must defend any NATO member that comes under attack, please tell me how you would vote if there were a referendum tomorrow on including Poland in NATO." Only 23 percent of Germans believed that NATO should not be swayed by Russian concerns about acceptance of new members.[12]

In the absence of a strong security guarantee to the new NATO members, the decision-making surrounding NATO enlargement may have failed to meet a major strategic goal—to hedge between German and Russian security competition. Were Poland to feel threatened, and were the absence of an immediate security guarantee to divide NATO into inaction, Germany might still opt to act unilaterally to protect its interests to the east. Absent a strong NATO presence and a credible guarantee to Poland, the old claim that NATO's mission is to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down may have lost a degree of value. Indeed, NATO must now explain why, if it does not need American troops deployed in Poland, it does need US troops stationed in Germany.

Third, NATO agreed to create a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) for regular consultation with Russia inside NATO headquarters. Such consultation includes regular meetings at the ambassadorial, ministerial, and heads-of-state levels. The PJC can establish committees and working groups and will hold regular meetings for military representatives and chiefs of staff no less than twice a year, in addition to monthly meetings at the military representative level. Russia has established a mission to NATO headed by a representative of ambassadorial rank; it includes a senior military representative for purposes of strengthening military cooperation between NATO and Russia.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act stipulates that its provisions neither "provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and action. . . . They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states."[13] This statement led to public-relations assertions that Russia would have a "voice but not a veto" in NATO's decision-making process. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 7 October 1997, US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright noted that "the NATO-Russia Founding Act

gives no opportunity to dilute, delay, or block NATO decisions. NATO's allies will always meet to agree on every item on their agenda before meeting with Russia."[14] Albright added: "The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to new and old members. All it does is restate unilaterally existing NATO policy."[15] To critics of this key aspect of NATO's transformation, Albright's reassurances did not reflect great sensitivity to the way NATO works in its consensus process.

Russia does not have a "veto" over NATO decisions because no country has a formal veto; NATO makes decisions by consensus. A vote, which would enable a formal veto, is held only if unanimity on a particular decision already exists within the alliance. Thus, it is in the consensus process that effective veto power lies—and that is where most of the influence and bargaining takes place in NATO. Russia's presence will inevitably affect that process because it has been granted an increased capacity to lobby individual NATO members to be sensitive to Moscow's concerns. At a minimum, cohesion and coherence in NATO will be affected by this new institutional architecture. NATO will have to attain consensus among all nineteen members before going to the PJC on any given issue. The inevitable result will be administrative disarray that could lead to institutional gridlock and bureaucratic redundancy in daily operations or, especially, in a crisis.

NATO's post–Cold War consensus was sorely tested by Balkan issues and by the NATO enlargement process. As a result, NATO risks assuming an institutional architecture under which confusion reigns while state interests conflict. As the analyst William Hyland concluded: "That Russia will have 'a voice but not a veto' is a naïve incantation. . . . Moscow will have more of an opportunity to influence every NATO decision, including military strategy, than the new members themselves."[16] A leading supporter of NATO enlargement, Henry Kissinger, conceded: "I confess that, had I known the price of NATO enlargement would be the gross dilution of NATO, I might have urged other means to achieve the objective."[17] This school of enlargement advocates must now rely on a diluted alliance and collective security to sustain its strategic objectives in central and eastern Europe.

The Spread of Stability

The United States and its allies have attempted to use NATO enlargement as a tool to promote stability in postcommunist Europe by linking membership to specific actions or policies on the part of aspiring members. The results so far have been mixed. At the operational level, this became clearest in the area of military criteria for membership in NATO—there were none. Consequently, the transaction costs of consensus-building in NATO are likely to be increased by adding new members. NATO's capacity to spread stability throughout central and eastern Europe may be diminished if the consensus process now makes crisis management more difficult. Cohesion issues within NATO will also be aggravated by a growing split in the trans-Atlantic relationship over the costs and burden sharing involved in NATO enlargement.

Arguments for linking NATO membership to policy outcomes were undermined by the timing of the decision to proceed with enlargement, which was driven primarily by political calculations by President Clinton. The basic decision to expand NATO was not related to domestic political calculations, but the timing of implementation was. Initially, Clinton and senior US officials opposed the policy, seeking to defer discussion of enlargement by initiating the Partnership for Peace. Only National Security Advisor W. Anthony Lake and a handful of other key advisors actively pushed for NATO enlargement in 1993 and 1994. When congressional Republicans included NATO enlargement in their 1994 Contract with America, Clinton accelerated NATO toward enlargement as an attempt to claim the issue for himself. Yet only during the 1996 presidential campaign did Clinton make a firm commitment to set a timetable for enlargement. Decisions relating to the sequencing of NATO enlargement negotiations and parliamentary ratification were guided not by specific policy goals but by a desire to have the project completed for the symbolically important fiftieth anniversary of NATO in April 1999. Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien spoke for many of the NATO allies when he stated at the Madrid summit in 1997 that the Clinton administration had no strategic vision for Europe and that America's two-year campaign to enlarge NATO was "done for short-term political reasons, to win elections."[18] At no point did President Clinton make an effort to explain why

NATO enlargement had been deemed a bad idea in the administration's interagency process in 1993–94 but a good idea in late 1996.

The linkage approach to NATO enlargement was nonetheless strong. Its strength lay in NATO's combining membership criteria with specific policy outcomes in or among aspiring member states. Once these countries become NATO members, however, there is no guarantee that they will ascribe to the criteria with which enlargement was linked. This is not to say that there is reason to expect new member's policies to diverge from their current directions. Rather, the concern has more to do with NATO as an international organization. NATO is a nonregulative institution that is heavily dependent upon the exercise of American power in order to function. Independent institutional leverage to shape state behavior is absent among members but high for those seeking to get in. By articulating membership criteria, NATO was able to get aspiring countries to conform to important norms and procedures—for example, in the areas of civil-military relations and negotiation of border disputes. The challenge for NATO now will be to sustain these trends within a nonregulative institution.

NATO's strength depends on the exercise of American power and influence. Absent that, its institutional attributes alone have yet to be shown to guarantee peace. For example, from 1967 to 1974, Greece was governed by a military junta that came to power using a secret NATO counterinsurgency plan. Despite the wishes of the Scandinavian members of NATO to have Greece considered for sanction by the alliance, they could get no consensus in the North Atlantic Council even to debate it. Turkey's record as a democracy is highly questionable. As recently as the summer of 1997 (just before the Madrid summit), the Turkish military forced the elected government to give up power. As US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger said, briefing reporters before the summit: "There's no exit door from NATO. . . . Once you come into NATO, there's no door on the back that says, this is the door for countries that didn't make it."[19]

Interestingly, NATO's enlargement criteria ignored the most important aspects of what NATO does. NATO is, at its core, a military organization, but it established no military or strategic criteria for assessing membership qualifications. For example, in Hungary 63 percent of the

public has signaled its opposition to using Hungarian forces to defend another NATO ally if attacked. Although NATO has no need or plans to station nuclear weapons in new member states, it is a principle they must accept. Yet 96 percent of Hungarians oppose the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory. Moreover, 88 percent of Hungarians oppose an increase in defense spending to pay for membership if it comes at the expense of social spending.[20] The 1997 Hungarian defense budget was about 1.3 percent of gross national product (GNP)—far short of the 2.2 percent that American officials estimate Hungary will have to spend in order to achieve the lowest level of integration into NATO.

For its part, the Czech government cut defense spending some 20 percent between 1997 and 1998. Senior Czech officials have promised the United States that they will increase their defense spending over the next several years to meet the requirements of integrating into NATO. Such an increase would be by 20 percent, which would get the Czechs back to where they were before they began cutting defense spending, which was about 1.8 percent of GNP.

According to Jeffrey Simon, an effective advocate of enlargement as a linkage tool to promote military reform in central and eastern Europe, Hungary has considerable work to do to restore military prestige, build social support for the military, and construct a viable military institution. Simon notes that parliamentary oversight of the military in Hungary is limited, that Hungary lacks an interagency organization that could formulate and coordinate a national security policy, and that no public record of defense policy or the state of the Hungarian Defense Forces is provided by the Hungarian Ministry of Defense.[21] Although the armed forces of Hungary include thirty thousand conscripts, their time spent in service is limited to nine months.[22] Credible forces will include only professional and limited-contract soldiers, with conscription time reduced in order to free monies to pay for basic training and the upkeep of forces. In 1997, the Hungarian government sought to contract forty-five hundred soldiers, but by August only twenty-two hundred places had been filled. Most soldiers were unemployed young men with a general education through the American equivalent of the eighth grade. Seventy percent of Hungarian professional soldiers hold a second job to make ends meet.

The Czech Republic has similar military problems, if not worse.[23] Only Poland has presented a credible and effective plan to modernize its armed forces over a fifteen-year period. Ultimately, it would be inappropriate to measure these new NATO members by comparing their armed forces with those of current NATO countries. It is possible, however, that with a more extended linkage period, more could have been achieved in terms of guaranteeing a high degree of force modernization, implementation of defense spending goals, and specific policy commitments.

Institutionally, the transaction costs of NATO consensus-building may be increased by adding new members. In the current security environment, these countries have every reason to show that they will be good allies over time, particularly by closely mirroring American policy goals. But it would be inappropriate to assume that new members will always share the same immediate interests as their allies. When asked in October 1997 whether NATO enlargement would dilute the institution's ability to carry out future tasks, the recently retired SACEUR General George Joulwan could offer only, "[That] is a point that needs to be debated over the next year or two."[24] For enlargement to succeed in lowering transaction costs, it may be necessary to keep additional pressure on new or future NATO members to contribute to overall alliance goals and ensure that NATO can expand and maintain cohesion simultaneously.

Out-of-area, or "non–Article 5," missions, such as the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia, are symbolic of the idea that there is a "new NATO." The new NATO is defined by increased European responsibility for security matters and nontraditional military activities such as peacekeeping.[25] Many senior central and eastern European government officials note privately, however, that they do not want to join the "new NATO"—they seek the "old NATO" of collective defense and a hard American security guarantee. But there is no strong collective defense element to NATO enlargement as practiced. Therefore, the process of adapting NATO's military structure to become more efficient for force projection will be complicated. For example, it is in the interest of new members to promote NATO military planning in a way that makes their immediate regional security concerns a high priority and to use their new leverage as NATO members to bargain for that position. NATO's bureaucratic time and

energy may thus be diverted away from current challenges to the south and toward a more Cold-War-oriented dominance of the central European region. As F. Stephen Larrabee, an early and articulate advocate of NATO enlargement, now maintains: "There is very little work being done on NATO's southern strategy, even though everybody agrees that is where the next war could happen. . . . The alliance is being expanded into central Europe, where the threat has vanished, yet nobody seems to know if it can cope with the multiple risks present in the Mediterranean."[26]

Further complicating NATO's ability to project stability, the allies agreed, as part of the enlargement package, to conduct further rounds of NATO enlargement. Only three of eleven candidate countries were admitted to NATO membership in the first round, and pressure for further expansion will be intense. The recently retired chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, concluded:

> I think that NATO as now organized must have some limits, but I don't know what they are. What do I mean by that? On the political side we have the mechanisms in the NATO North Atlantic Council and the NATO Defense Planning Committee . . . military committees of unanimity. There might be a natural law that says there's a limit to how many nations can make tough decisions in that kind of mechanism, and if you go beyond that, must you somehow change that?[27]

At the political level, therefore, NATO enlargement at best complicates governance matters within the alliance. While the "new NATO" reflects a collective desire to spread stability in Europe, the alliance's political and operational ability to sustain such a goal is in decline.

The political dynamics in NATO most complicated by the enlargement decision-making process involved financial burden sharing. In calculating the financial burden, the United States government assumed that overall costs would range from $27 billion to $35 billion over a ten-to twelve-year period.[28] Among the countries involved, new members would pay 35 percent of costs, current European members would pay 50 percent, and the US would pay about 15 percent.[29] This assumption was

rebuked by French President Jacques Chirac at the Madrid summit, where he said that France would spend nothing on NATO enlargement. The German government was also adamant that enlargement costs be kept to a minimum. British officials working in the Ministry of Defense suggested that NATO enlargement might actually reduce the amount Britain contributed to NATO infrastructure costs. Complicating this dynamic, American members of Congress insisted that the European allies bear the primary cost burden of NATO enlargement.

The European NATO allies were strongly critical of the US cost study, which some viewed as prescribing unnecessarily high costs in order to market US arms in central and eastern Europe. Actually, US Department of Defense officials had urged new NATO members not to purchase expensive new weapons systems. Instead, they stressed education and training in NATO doctrine, procedures, and command-and-control, interoperable communications systems, and integration into air defense structures. "Soft" interoperability—specifically, in language, procedures, and doctrine—is viewed by NATO military planners as a fundamental requirement of early integration. Nonetheless, some of the strongest American advocates of NATO enlargement have pushed to export large and expensive weapons systems to new NATO members. For example, Bruce L. Jackson served as president of the US Committee to Expand NATO and was at the same time director of strategic planning for the Lockheed Martin Corporation, the world's largest weapons manufacturer. Offering a potential market of about $10 billion for fighter jets alone in new member countries, NATO enlargement was obviously an appealing policy for US arms manufacturers.

A credible collective defense commitment to new NATO members would require greater costs than were initially estimated. Indeed, current cost assumptions for NATO reinforce the conclusion that the security guarantee that new members will get is questionable. As Walter Steutzle, a former high-level defense planning official in the German government, asserted: "If you are serious about providing equal security, the basic defense needs of the new members will raise the enlargement bill to $70 billion."[30] Nonetheless, in October 1997, US Secretary of Defense William

Cohen announced to the US Senate Appropriations Committee that estimated enlargement costs would be lower than anticipated. The administration asserted that the initial US cost study had assumed that four countries would be invited to join NATO, instead of only three, and the infrastructure of the new members had been found to be in better shape than expected. Therefore, the shared direct costs of NATO enlargement would be only $1.3 billion over ten years (a figure reduced from $5 billion in a spring 1997 NATO study; the initial US study had assumed shared direct enlargement costs of $9–12 billion).[31]

These costs are assessed as the specific costs of integrating the new members into common NATO programs such as air defense and headquarters. They exclude the costs of making the new members' militaries compatible with Western standards. There is serious reason to question the finding that new members' militaries were in better shape than expected. NATO had been working with these militaries on their territory in one way or another since 1994. Since no major programmatic changes had taken place in the new member countries between February 1997 and the issuing of the NATO report that fall, the claim that the US and NATO did not know the state of infrastructure in these countries was acknowledged off-the-record by NATO officials as dubious.[32]

During NATO's negotiations with the three new members in the fall of 1997, alliance officials grew increasingly concerned about the status of the armed forces in these countries. According to a classified NATO study leaked in Brussels to the magazine *Defense News,* NATO's internal view of the three new members departed substantially from the public rhetoric that justified the low-end cost assessments.[33] NATO Defense Planning Questionnaires (DPQs) completed by the three invitees in October–November 1997 raised serious concerns in NATO about the scope and depth of problems in the new member states and demonstrated flaws in the cost assumptions of the policy. The NATO study identified the Czech army's equipment as "old and approaching obsolescence" and noted that none of the ships in Poland's navy was "capable for command and control or joint or combined operations." The DPQ assessments concluded that vast segments of each new member's infrastructure were obsolete, unsecured for communications, and generally incompatible with NATO.

The internal NATO study also revealed serious air force command-and-control problems in Hungary's thirty-two-page DPQ report. NATO noted that some 70 percent of the country's pilots carried out only fifty hours of training per year, with another 30 percent flying only thirty hours per year. Poland's forty-three-page report, titled "Defense Review Committee Assessment of Plans of Poland," opened by stating that the country's army faced "widespread and significant interoperability deficiencies" that, if not corrected, would "substantially limit its combat capacity." The NATO report was especially critical of Poland's naval readiness, because only a few ships were "capable of more distant deployment beyond Poland's coastal region and the Baltic Sea," and "only limited improvements" would occur during the five-year period of national planning under review. Additionally, the Polish DPQ noted that there was no tactical ballistic missile defense capability for any of the Polish army's surface-to-air missile systems, while the air force suffered from low levels of combat readiness, lack of mobility in its air defense systems, limited airlift, and very limited tactical reconnaissance resources.

The NATO reviews of the three new members' DPQs raised acute concerns among military planners about the ability to meet basic NATO planning requirements for new members with low-end cost estimates. For example, the Polish DPQ showed that no Polish air base had adequate cargo-handling equipment, and none of the air force's radar, communications, or navigation equipment could exchange data with NATO's. Because of its size, Poland's share of the additional NATO infrastructure money will be $649 million over ten years, with the Czechs and Hungarians receiving approximately $260 million each. Such expenditures will be sufficient to help buy communications equipment that the three new members need and will help their armed services' radar and command systems to interface with NATO's. However, the internal NATO study did not suggest that infrastructure was better than expected. Indeed, Poland's DPQ showed that none of its fifty-five military airfields was connected to a fuel pipeline system. Internal NATO estimates assume that constructing a single mile of pipeline will cost as much as $300,000 in the Czech Republic and more in Poland, where distances from airfields to existing fuel lines are greater.

Ultimately, the acceptance of a low-end cost study was a concession by the United States to its allies. This became the official NATO cost study, which had been delayed because of a trans-Atlantic split over priorities. Europe (and Canada) wanted the lowest possible cost figures, whereas Washington insisted on higher numbers to provide at least minimal credibility to the collective defense provisions of the NATO treaty. Accepting the European position was a dramatic shift for American diplomats. In May 1997, a US official in Brussels commented, "We've laid it on the line about costs to our allies.... They're low-balling the cost and that's not acceptable."[34] However, the remaining costs of elevating new members to mature capability would still require additional funding on a bilateral level. For example, Polish officials indicated they would require (while not formally requesting) up to $2 billion in credits to purchase multipurpose aircraft. Additionally, the RAND Corporation estimated that to equip five divisions and ten air wings already in NATO so that they could rapidly reinforce the new members in a crisis, and to stockpile supplies and ammunition in the new countries for the reinforcement's use, would cost $22 billion.

For this reason, a General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of NATO enlargement costs concluded that the administration's estimates were "quite speculative" and that "while not an added cost of enlargement, such assistance would represent a shift in the cost burden from the new member countries to the countries providing assistance."[35] According to the GAO study, the ultimate costs of NATO enlargement will be contingent on several factors. Specifically, NATO has yet to define its future strategy for defending the expanded alliance, the force and facility requirements of the new member states, and the way in which costs of expanding the alliance will be financed. Additionally, the absence of an assessment of long-term security threats and the promise of further expansions make cost assessments highly contingent.

NATO enlargement, for the short term, may also exacerbate an increasing military disfunctionalism within NATO and thus further increase the costs of spreading stability. European defense investment has declined precipitously and impedes the ability of European countries to participate in power projection missions. European dependence on the United

States is leading to a strategic imbalance in NATO, particularly in areas of high technology. Current European members of NATO can barely communicate with the US military. For example, in the summer of 1997 NATO conducted a Mediterranean exercise (IVITEX '97) that included more than twenty-five ships from the United States, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The goal of the exercise was to test the communications links of the naval forces and to establish a common ground for communications. The commanders were forced to use the lowest common level of communications technology to ensure uninterrupted communications across the different navies, which was a substantial diminution from the technical capabilities contributed by the American forces.[36] The chairman of NATO's Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, complained that "the United States is moving with unparalleled velocity toward the kind of high-tech military equipment that has no match in Europe. . . . I am beginning to worry that one day we will wake up and find that our armies can no longer work well together."[37] As of early 1999, NATO could mobilize only 2 percent of its overall combat potential in twelve hours—a decline from 70 percent at the end of the Cold War. As European allies continue to struggle with monetary union criteria, prospects are slim that this burden-sharing dilemma will be resolved in the near future.

In theory, NATO enlargement could diminish this problem. Because they inherited a Soviet military legacy, the three new NATO members will have to undergo substantial force modernization. And because they are likely to be investing in defense infrastructure as part of their military integration into NATO, they may become more compatible with American forces than some current allies are. However, as these countries reorient their priorities toward membership in the European Union after having attained NATO membership, they are equally likely to choose not to invest in defense modernization. Either way, new NATO members may have some difficult economic choices to make in the years to come—especially if the real challenges to their security and stability come not from traditional sources of power but from economic chaos and instability in the global market.

NATO faces a new institutional challenge as a result of the enlargement

process. There is a particular danger that NATO is confusing institutional interaction within the alliance with concrete actions that actually increase international security in Europe. One senior NATO official worries about "institutional gridlock and bureaucratic redundancy" resulting from the expanding institutional mechanisms of managing NATO enlargement.[38] In fact, NATO officials are often left exasperated over how to make the new institutional architecture work or how it would respond in a serious crisis.[39] NATO's mandate and missions have been expanded substantially, but without a corresponding increase in resources or personnel to help implement the changes. Secretary General Solana concluded in 1997 that "if this pace continues, it is hard to predict what NATO will be like just three years from now."[40]

Building Democracy and Community

The relevance of NATO's goal of building democracy and community in postcommunist Europe is mixed, but this goal was the dominant force behind the implementation of the enlargement decision. It is important, however, to differentiate between NATO and democracy in Europe. Austria, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland are democracies that do not require reinforcement of their identity by joining a military alliance—though it is possible that some of them might seek to join NATO for other reasons in the future. Nonetheless, rewarding democratic reformers for the impressive efforts they have made toward democracy and lasting peace in central Europe was a critical rationale for NATO enlargement. Thus, NATO enlargement might be viewed as a fundamentally political act rather than a military or strategic one.

There are some marginal risks associated with this policy objective. Confidence in democratic and market reformers in the new member states will certainly be enhanced by the symbolic affirmation of those countries' return to Europe via NATO membership. Political leaders in the new NATO states, however, may not have prepared their publics sufficiently for the budgetary implications of NATO membership. Absent a strong base of public support for defense investment, there is a risk that the substantial costs of military integration might force the new members to adapt their budgetary priorities away from economic reform programs,

leading to public displeasure with reform-oriented politicians. For domestic political reasons, new members may ignore defense investment and thus make themselves, from a military perspective, "second-class citizens" in NATO. Nevertheless, the prospect of shifting budget priorities in central Europe has raised high-level concern in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is responsible for guaranteeing credits and loans that finance economic reform among the aspiring members. In June 1997, the IMF managing director personally warned US Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin that increased defense spending by new NATO members could negatively affect the IMF's engagement with them. Yet officials from the Czech Republic and Hungary have informally signaled that they hope to purchase F-16 or F-18 fighter aircraft costing some $8 billion. If they do, the expenditure would exceed the combined defense budgets of all three new member countries.[41]

At the core of this dilemma is a tension between NATO enlargement as a political act and the fact that NATO is, at its core, a military organization that requires substantial contributions from its member states. Czech President Václav Havel maintained that NATO must redefine its aims and purpose before admitting new members. "The expansion of NATO should be preceded by something even more important, that is, a new formulation of its own meaning, mission, and identity," Havel asserted.[42] NATO's mission has changed, but it is still primarily in the military business, and new members will be expected to contribute to its military functions and to build public support for its military role. As German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe asserted, the three new members "have to make their own contribution—this concerns not only financing but also public opinion so that we can be sure that if there's a crisis their populations will be willing to carry the burden."[43]

Despite warnings by countries left out of NATO membership and by opponents of the enlargement policy, NATO's enlargement has not harmed democracy in those countries left out—including Russia. There, reformists consolidated power in the Yeltsin administration in the months immediately following the Madrid summit. If they failed to sustain reform, it was due to internal political and economic crises in Russia and not to NATO enlargement. If anything, NATO enlargement was a net

gain for Russia, which now has a voice in NATO policy and was also invited to participate with the transformed Group of Seven industrialized countries, now the Summit of the Eight. American and allied backing for Russia's admittance to this exclusive club of democratic powers was largely a concession to Russia's worries that NATO enlargement would isolate it from the international community.[44]

Although one senior Romanian official warned in advance of the Madrid summit that rejection of Romania as a NATO member would leave the country with a sense of abandonment by the West on a par with that resulting from the Yalta accords, Romanians continued with economic reform programs and democratization efforts, albeit faltering ones.[45] A senior Estonian official warned that a failure to join NATO might force the Baltic countries to reevaluate their 1991 decision to align with the West, but this has not happened.[46] Nevertheless, NATO does risk endorsing a double standard by declaring that membership should not be decided by where a country sits on the map while privately being guided by geostrategic concerns in the case of the three Baltic countries. A high-level Baltic official wants NATO to be honest if it is not serious about inclusiveness for those who have met political criteria. He asserts tersely that "if, in reality, whether you are in NATO is dependent upon where you are located, then NATO should say so."[47] Indeed, holding out a false promise of NATO membership to the Baltic countries only encourages them to waste scarce resources by lobbying and conducting public-relations programs in NATO countries.

NATO enlargement is also a half-step toward community building because it risks undermining NATO's existing Partnership for Peace program of cooperative outreach to interested non-NATO countries in central and eastern Europe. Though it was initially perceived as a sort of waiting room for NATO membership, the Partnership for Peace eventually took on a life of its own. Through a variety of programmatic activities, NATO worked at the ground level to build trust among the central and eastern European militaries while enhancing civilian control over the armed forces and transparency in defense planning.

To compensate for the rejection of aspiring members, NATO promised an "enhanced" Partnership for Peace program that would include making

PFP more operational and oriented toward real-world contingencies, strengthening its political consultation elements, and involving partners more in its planning and decision-making. Overall, common NATO funding for the PFP in fiscal year 1997 was a mere $16.4 million. Direct American assistance to facilitate partnership programs under the "Warsaw Initiative" Foreign Military Financing program is provided by funding grants to partners primarily for training and the purchase of nonlethal equipment in the areas of communications, language, and search-and-rescue, as well as computers, personnel equipment, and command-and-control centers for a Regional Airspace Initiative. From 1996 to 1998, the annual US allocation to these programs grew from $53.1 million to $94.0 million. The fiscal year 1999 budget request, however, signaled a decline, to $80.0 million. At the very time an enhanced PFP was being celebrated, rhetoric outpaced the investment of resources that would actually make it credible.[48]

The PFP has been weakened in part because its three main drivers were Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Enlargement will inevitably consume NATO resources away from the PFP and toward integrating the new members into the alliance. When asked how the United States intended to provide resources for an enhanced PFP, one senior State Department official suggested that "these partners will have to mobilize their domestic interest groups in Washington" in order to assure funding.[49] US Senator Richard G. Lugar maintained that "neither NATO enlargement nor PFP is well understood in the Senate, and it will be hard to make an enhanced PFP credible without resources."[50] Without an *increase* in PFP funding, the credibility of NATO's open door to promote further democratization among aspiring countries is in doubt. According to a high-ranking NATO military official: "Enhanced PFP is lip-service. . . . Militarily, NATO has already reached the maximum of what it can sustain in PFP, as resources are at the limit and funds and staff are beyond limits."[51]

The Partnership for Peace was among the most creative aspects of NATO's post–Cold War adaptation. It is the main NATO program that can functionally promote the spread of an undifferentiated Western community at the military-to-military level by blurring the distinction

between NATO members and nonmembers. Arguably, if the goal of NATO enlargement is to extend a Western community based on shared democratic principles, then funding equal to, if not greater than, that provided to the three new members should go to the PFP from the United States and its allies (including the new NATO members). This is especially true because the three countries that were invited to join NATO were those least in need of the confidence that membership would bring in order to help consolidate democracy. Nevertheless, they will inevitably be the primary focus of resource investment as they are integrated into NATO.

NATO has sought to accommodate the non-invitees who still aspire to NATO membership by eliminating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and replacing it with a new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The NACC was created at American initiative in 1991 to build non–collective defense consultation and socialization among NATO and non-NATO states. Its comprehensive work plan on information sharing for peacekeeping played a critical role in preparing PFP countries to complement and work with NATO troops in the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Criticized by US officials as an anachronism of the Cold War (even though it was established in 1991), the NACC was absorbed by the EAPC, which was presented as a new alternative to NATO membership. The initial premise behind the EAPC was to create an elevated level of partnership for countries that formally sought NATO membership. Not wanting to create a third tier of participants in the NACC, however, the EAPC assumed the identity of the NACC. Acronyms changed, but with no qualitative difference.

In sum, the two main programs consistent with the building of democracy and community in central and eastern Europe are diminished by NATO enlargement. As a result, this goal of NATO enlargement is a glass both half full and half empty. It is half full because the countries that were admitted are stable democracies. It is half empty because the countries that most need the confidence to build democracy were left out.

Collective Security

Trends in NATO are toward collective security. Although NATO has no legal responsibility to function as a general European collective security

system, states in Europe are increasingly treating it as such—especially Russia. However, rather than institutionalizing an emerging pattern of collective security power dynamics, Europe has proceeded in an ad hoc manner toward collective security. By first seeking to build interlocking institutions in 1991, the United States, Canada, and Europe sought an integrative approach to create a security architecture and deter aggression in the Balkan region. When that failed, Europe moved toward an ad hoc arrangement in which NATO would be a tool for the UN or OSCE as a peacekeeping force. When that arrangement, too, failed to end the Balkan conflict, Europe resorted to an informal concert arrangement with the five-power Contact Group, for which NATO became a means of collective security—not a determinant of it.

NATO's own trend toward collective security was accelerated by the decision to give Russia a voice in NATO decision-making. Moreover, its members increasingly view NATO's mission as being defense not only of territory but also of values. As Czech President Václav Havel asserted: "The new European security system must be built by democratic forces. . . . The North Atlantic Alliance is, as recent experience has shown, the most appropriate means of ensuring the collective security of our values."[52] By broadening NATO's fundamental purpose beyond that of collective defense, the alliance's responsibilities are being increased to include intervention within states when stability is challenged—as the summer of 1999 demonstrated in Kosovo.

Kosovo was especially instructive regarding NATO's post-enlargement evolution. As Serb forces attacked ethnic Albanians, who represent 90 percent of the population in this Yugoslav region, they were conducting aggression within a sovereign state. Collective intervention by NATO would represent a test of its new mission. Could members justify intervention in a sovereign state—and if so, under what legal mandate? With regard to the overall enlargement package, it was interesting to note that in August 1998, none of the new NATO allies sent forces to participate in NATO-PFP exercises in Albania designed to signal NATO resolve to halt the Serb assault. Even more importantly, Presidents Clinton and Chirac agreed in an August 1998 telephone conversation that at the time NATO could not intervene in Kosovo without Russian support. Formally, NATO

was not reflecting the principle of collective security and did not claim to do so, but in practice its members behaved as if collective security was the organizing principle for European security and NATO was the channel for it. At the same time, the power dynamics that have undermined previous state efforts to build collective security architectures constrained NATO's ability to act when the crisis grew to proportions that threatened regional stability in the Balkans.

For advocates of NATO's transition toward collective security, this pattern of state behavior implies that NATO should include Russia as a member in order to better reflect underlying power dynamics. Yet for advocates of collective security, the promise remains unfulfilled. NATO ignored the premise of collective security between Hungary and Romania by leaving Romania out of the enlargement process. Russia lingers in a waiting room in which it is formally given a lower legal-institutional status than Belgium, Luxembourg, or the Czech Republic in affecting European security. The informal veto granted to Russia may not satisfy Moscow over the long term. Conversely, there is no reciprocal provision in the NATO-Russia Founding Act that would dismantle the PJC if Russia violated international norms of behavior—for example, in its near abroad. A "voice but not a veto" works both ways regarding Russia, and there is no mechanism for sanction against Russia within the NATO-Russia architecture. Thus, for collective security to be complete, Russia would have to join NATO as a full member, and the principle of collective defense would have to be eliminated—or placed in reserve.

Among NATO countries there is public support for the idea that Russia should be a member of NATO. In one 1997 survey, 68 percent of Americans who were questioned indicated that NATO should be expanded to remove the outdated divisions of the Cold War and help bring Europe together. Only 22 percent believed NATO should be expanded to make it larger and more powerful so that it could more effectively deal with the possibility of a threat from Russia. Most significantly, 52 percent of those surveyed favored NATO membership for Russia. Support was even higher when stability in Russia was made a prerequisite. Fully 65 percent agreed that "once Russia has shown that it can be stable and peaceful for a significant period, we should try to include it in NATO."

Only 30 percent believed that "there are too many ways that our interests might come into conflict with Russia in the future and there is always the chance that Russia may go back to being aggressive. . . . Therefore it is not a good idea to include Russia in NATO."[53] When asked whether Russia should join NATO or be excluded from membership, people in the new member countries responded favorably, with the Czech Republic at 50 percent, Hungary at 46 percent, and Poland at 42 percent in support of Russian membership.[54] US President Bill Clinton suggested that "no European democracy should be excluded from ultimate consideration. . . . My personal position is that should apply to Russia as well."[55]

Advocates of collective security see Russia remaining in an inadequate and dangerous "halfway house" as a result of the overall NATO enlargement package. Moreover, just as some advocates of collective defense might be surprised that their policy advocacy has instead advanced trends toward collective security, so might the new and old members of NATO wonder whether they are getting what they signed up for. It would be ironic if, in seeking to join NATO in part over fears of Russia, central and eastern Europeans have caused the institution to evolve toward something other than what they thought they were getting into and devoting resources toward. This trend toward collective security may eventually raise a fundamental question, given the historical track record of the institutional form: If NATO is becoming a general collective security system for Europe, is it still the best alternative for guaranteeing peace and security—including preventing the possibility of security competition within the West?

What Next for NATO?

NATO enlargement was an important political dynamic shaping the post–Cold War European security environment. Indeed, it was a logical extension of the "new NATO." The alliance's institutional role now involves a variety of new goals, including rebalancing the organization between US and European military responsibilities, outreach to the East, peacekeeping, and organizing to respond to nontraditional threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related missile

technology. Yet NATO enlargement, placed in the context of competing expectations and goals, raises important questions about the future effectiveness of NATO. Some supporters of the enlarged alliance might worry especially that the security guarantee to new members is tenuous and that Russia has been granted a strong say over the NATO consensus process. The rationales for enlargement with the most relevance to its implementation—building democracy and fostering collective security—challenge the very foundations of NATO as a collective defense organization.

New NATO members may not especially like the further implementation of the existing enlargement policy. Poland, no doubt, did not join NATO to see it transformed into a collective security institution with an enhanced Russian voice over Warsaw's own security interests. Thus, NATO will have to assess more concretely what collective defense means in the new security environment. Its policy of reinforcement, adopted in the 1991 New Strategic Concept, relied on forward-deployed American troops and nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. In the post-enlargement NATO, forward deployment no longer exists. Any security challenge to new members would be a sore test of NATO's ability to build consensus for "Article 5" missions, and any decision to reinforce a new member could be destabilizing to overall European security.

As a result, new NATO members will still have to rely on self-help for their territorial defense. The main benefit they will get from NATO is technical expertise to aid in modernizing their armed forces as they become deeply integrated into the NATO culture of conducting security relations. This *is* an important and substantial gain for the new members. At the same time, their leaders should make clear to their publics exactly what they will get from NATO—and what they must contribute as responsible members. In the run-up to the process of parliamentary ratification of enlargement, Hungary and the Czech Republic made a number of commitments to NATO regarding long-term goals, including planned increases in their defense budgets. But global economic trends that might make the economies of the new NATO members vulnerable in the absence of European Union membership may put such goals at risk. Therefore, it is in the interest of the US and its NATO allies to see that these countries become EU members at the earliest opportunity. EU

membership will lock in an institutional framework that will ensure that the new NATO members can be the contributors to security they aspire to be.

From an American foreign-policy and security perspective, the need to make EU membership a high priority creates a short-term dilemma. First, as the new NATO members seek to join the EU, they will have to satisfy French and German political leaders—in the area of common foreign and security policy, among other things. If, as is increasingly the case, French and German policies diverge from America's, the new members may have to make hard choices about their strategic alliance with the United States and their economic interests in EU membership. Second, as these countries set a high priority on meeting the criteria for EU membership, they will be challenged to sustain increases in defense investment programs as they implement further economic restructuring. Ultimately, NATO requires considerable commitment from its members, who must make the security relationship credible at a military and political level. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are strategic contributors to NATO just by their location on the map. Making sure that they are operational contributors to NATO as an institution will require a sustained commitment and considerable leadership.

NATO is confronted by a new challenge raised by the values-laden democratic mission and the collective security dynamics in Europe that drove the enlargement process. NATO is a union of sovereign states. But if NATO is orienting itself around a premise that it must secure the values of its members, then questions of military planning and strategic agendas arise. Just how far would NATO go to "secure" democracy? There is a common misconception about NATO that a member (old or new) could be suspended if it violated institutional norms and rules in either its foreign or its domestic policy. There is no such provision in NATO. The treaty allows only for a state to withdraw voluntarily from the organization. A state not playing by the rules can wreak considerable havoc on NATO by blocking consensus and inhibiting effective decision-making. If NATO's new mission is based on a concept of values rather than of territory, then in theory the allies must be prepared to intervene in a state if democracy is threatened. If NATO were really serious about this new

mission, it would have to change its operational mandate and submit such changes in mission to parliamentary ratification.

Because prospects for such a development are poor, NATO must clarify exactly what it can and cannot do to enhance democracy. NATO can contribute to a general sense of reassurance and confidence in the reform processes of new member states, especially in the area of civil-military relations. It can also serve new and aspiring members by promoting a security culture that facilitates the peaceful resolution of international disputes through transparent defense planning and political consultation. Thus NATO can reduce the need for new members to worry about the intentions of their allies. By broadening the Partnership for Peace with substantial increases in funding and closer access to NATO defense planning procedures, NATO can expand this security culture further by blurring the distinction between members and nonmembers such as Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. If it is successful, then pressure to conduct additional NATO enlargements for political reasons—at the expense of strategic criteria—may decline.

For the relationship between NATO and Russia (and between NATO and Ukraine) to succeed, the partnership will have to receive a greater bottom-up emphasis at the political and military level. Immediately following the Madrid summit, interest in Washington in developing the NATO-Russia partnership declined. Many advocates of enlargement viewed the relationship as having fulfilled its purpose—that is, ensuring the completion of a limited enlargement process. Yet Western-style military reform for Russia and Ukraine is a core interest for both old and new NATO members and will thus require an increase in political attention and resources at the operational level. If a culture of trust and direct cooperation in areas of shared interest can be developed, then these by-products of the enlargement decision will enhance security in Europe. On the other hand, if trends in NATO toward military dilution, strategic imbalance, and collective security continue, then Russia may have been granted an unprecedented opportunity to negatively affect decision-making in the alliance, an opportunity that was not reciprocated in terms of Western influence in the former Soviet Union. Ultimately, knowing how to build a positive and energetic relationship with Russia

will be as important as knowing what circumstances might require NATO to dissolve cooperation with Russia.

NATO enlargement has, to date, played a positive role in shaping the security environment in central and eastern Europe. NATO enlargement, however, was an important *process,* not an end in itself. NATO must now explain exactly what its broader foundations are if its relevance is to be sustained in the twenty-first century. This is critical to justifying to the United States Congress the long-term stationing of American troops on the continent—on which any credible defense of new members will rest. If forward defense is not required in Poland, then it is that much more important to establish a clear rationale for the maintenance of US forces in Germany. NATO is an institution in transition, and sustaining its strategic foundations, particularly the core US-German security partnership, will be essential in the twenty-first century if NATO is to maintain its strategic viability. Building upon this bedrock of post–Cold War European security will be especially important if trends in NATO toward collective security continue and the enlargement door truly does remain open.

The problems with the policy do not necessarily lie in its well-intentioned goals, but rather in its implementation, which overpromised what NATO enlargement would deliver and established trends in NATO toward collective security. For example, presidential talking points and congressional testimony by senior US officials appeared designed to appeal simultaneously to supporters of enlargement who wanted to expand the alliance on the basis of anti-Russian containment and those who wanted to use NATO enlargement to integrate Russia into a general European collective security system. As a result of such divergent policy rationales, NATO enlargement must be viewed as part of an overall package that requires vision, leadership, and orchestration if it is to work. NATO enlargement, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, an enhanced Partnership for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council each had strong foundations independently. Making them function together will require increased staff energy and budgets at a time when national investments in NATO are in decline. NATO has become

overcommitted, understaffed, and underfinanced. Sifting through this increasingly complex institutional dynamic will be one of the greatest challenges to both old and new member states in the early twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Off-the-record comments, Washington, D.C., February 1996.

2. For further detail on the decision-making dynamics that led to NATO enlargement, see James Goldgier, "NATO Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," *Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 85–102; and Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

3. Based on the author's interviews with senior US and European officials, 1994–1997.

4. Author's interviews with US officials, November 1997.

5. For discussion of threats to NATO's southern regions, see *Allied Command Structures in the New NATO* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997). Also see Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *White Book on Romania and NATO,* 1997.

6. "Remarks by President Clinton at NATO/Russia Founding Act Signing Ceremony," the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 May 1997.

7. *Ibid.*

8. "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation," NATO Office of Information and Press, May 1997.

9. This was a sensitive concern for the Russian negotiators. As the Russian ambassador to the United States claimed in a speech in April 1997, at the annual SACLANT Seminar, "enlargement will mean added to NATO: 731 fighter bombers, 1,300 to be reduced will be replaced by 3,400 Soviet-made tanks in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; 290 airfields, 550 weapons depots; and Visegrad tactical aviation will be able to bring missiles directly to the west of Russia."

10. "Statement by the North Atlantic Council," NATO Office of Information and Press, 14 March 1997.

11. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO,* June 1995, 27.

12. "German Public Endorsement of NATO Enlargement Declines Sharply," *USIA Opinion Analysis* (April 1997): M-55-97.

13. NATO Information and Press, May 1997.

14. Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to the US Senate Foreign Relations Commttee, 7 October 1997.

15. *Ibid.*

16. William G. Hyland, "NATO's Incredible Shrinking Defense," Paper presented to a CATO Institute Conference, "NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality," 25 June 1997.

17. Henry Kissinger, "The Dilution of NATO," *Washington Post,* 8 June 1997.

18. J. F. O. McAllister, "If You Buy That, We Know a Bridge in Brooklyn," *Time* 150 (21 July 1997): 16.

19. "Transcript: Berger, Cohen, Talbott Briefing on NATO Summit," *United States Information Agency,* 2 July 1997.

20. "Hungarian Public Widely Opposed to Military Spending Increase," *USIA Opinion Analysis* (21 April 1997): M-66-97.

21. Jeffrey Simon, "New Challenges in Hungarian Civil-Military Relations," paper presented at an international conference on civil-military relations in Budapest, Hungary, September 1997.

22. Also see Sebastian Gorka, "Hungary Reinvents its Defence Force," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (May 1997): 197–200.

23. See Christine Spolar, "Applicants Offer Lots of Heart but Few Arms," *Washington Post,* 17 June 1997; and George Jahn, "Money Woes Plague NATO Invitees," *Associated Press,* 16 November 1997.

24. "Transcript: Joulwan Interview on NATO Enlargement," *USIS Washington File* 2070, 29 October 1997.

25. See Sean Kay, "The New NATO and the Enlargement Process," *European Security* 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 1–16.

26. William Drozdiak, "Sixth Fleet Keeps Watch in Mediterranean Region's Turbulent Seas," *Washington Post,* 16 August 1998, A28.

27. Transcript: interview with reporters from the *International Herald Tribune, USA Today, Defense News,* and *Jane's Defense News,* 16 June 1997.

28. Other estimates, such as that of the RAND Corporation, saw likely costs of $40–60 billion, whereas the Congressional Budget Office estimated costs as high as $120 billion.

29. This conclusion was based on the assumption that force projection defense of new members would require already-agreed-upon modernization by current NATO member forces—which the US had completed.

30. William Drozdiak, "NATO Expansion 'On the Cheap' May Have Surcharge," *Washington Post,* 12 March 1997, A22.

31. William Drozdiak, "NATO: U.S. Erred on Costs of Expansion," *Washington Post,* 14 November 1997, A22.

32. Author's interviews, spring 1998.

33. Brooks Tigner, "NATO Papers Belie Modest Expansion Costs: Classified Reports Reveal Deep Deficiencies in Polish, Hungarian, Czech Republic Militaries," *Defense News,* 8 December 1997, 1. All references to the DPQs come from this article.

34. Brooks Tigner, "New NATO Cost Rift Threatens to Erode Support," *Defense News,* June 1997.

35. "GAO: NATO Expansion Price Tag Unknown," *United Press International,* 23 October 1997.

36. See Brian Bender, "Naval Exercise Highlights NATO Interoperability Challenge," *Defense Daily,* 1 August 1997, 190.

37. William Drozdiak, "NATO Finds an Expansive Sense of Purpose," *Washington Post,* 6 July 1997, A1, 19.

38. Author's interview, spring 1997.

39. Author's interview, spring 1997.

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41. Jeff Gerth and Tim Weiner, "Arms Makers See a Bonanza in Selling NATO Expansion," *New York Times,* 29 June 1997, A1, 4.

42. Open Media Research Institute, *Daily Digest,* 29 April 1995.

43. Sean Kay, "Budapest Needs to Get Serious about NATO," *Wall Street Journal Europe,* 6 October 1997, A6.

44. See Hans Binnendijk and Sean Kay, "Measuring NATO's Outreach," *Washington Times,* 21 August 1997, A17.

45. Off-the-record discussion with a senior Romanian official, Washington, D.C., June 1997.

46. Off-the-record discussion with a senior Estonian official, Washington, D.C., April 1997.

47. Off-the-record discussion with a high-level Baltic official, spring 1997.

48. The Department of Defense contribution to exercise and support programs received increased funding between 1996 and 1997, from $40 million to $49 million. In 1998 the budget fell to $37.5 million, in part necessitated by an undistributed administrative reduction in all Office of the Secretary of Defense defense-wide O&M funding. The 1999 budget request was for $54 million, though that was not guaranteed at the time of writing.

49. Off-the-record discussion with a senior State Department official, March 1997.

50. On-the-record discussion with Senator Richard G. Lugar, March 1997, at the annual SACLANT Seminar.

51. Off-the-record discussion, spring 1997.

52. Václav Havel, "NATO and the Czech Republic: A Common Destiny," *NATO Review* 45, no. 5 (September–October 1997): 8.

53. Steven Kull, "The American Public, Congress and NATO Enlargement, Part I: Is There Sufficient Public Support?" *NATO Review* 45, no. 1 (January 1997): 9–11.

54. United States Information Agency, "NATO Enlargement: Public Opinion on the Eve of the Madrid Summit," May 1997.

55. "Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity at Meeting with Members of Congress and National Security Team, Madrid, Spain, 7 July 1997, " the White House, Office of the Press Secretary.