# *Chapter 8*

## INTERNATIONAL NGOS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: ATTEMPTING TO BUILD CIVIL SOCIETY

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Of all the former socialist states of East-Central Europe and Eurasia, Bosnia-Herzegovina has suffered the most in the post–cold war period. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, fought from 1992 to 1995, resulted in the deaths of more than 200,000 people; half the population fled or was expelled; the economy collapsed; and power accrued to antidemocratic extremist forces that had actively participated in the violence. Because of the international community's leading role in ending the war and establishing stability in the postwar period, Bosnia-Herzegovina also has more international NGOs—more than 250—than any other country in Eastern Europe.

In addition, numerous international organizations and more than twenty thousand troops from various countries and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The focus of attention of the United States and the major European powers, Bosnia-Herzegovina is in many ways under a kind of protectorate. International actors make crucial decisions, determine electoral laws, run the central bank, sit on the constitutional court, and decide where the money flowing into the country should go.[1] The international community thus has a large stake in rebuilding Bosnia-Herzegovina as a democratic country and preventing the outbreak of conflict, goals shared by the vast majority of Bosnians.

With this kind of attention, and with hundreds of millions of dollars pouring into the country, Bosnia-Herzegovina is in many ways a good test case for the effectiveness of international NGOs. They play key roles in running the programs of the major donors and funders, and their strategies are crucial to the success of the overall goals of the international community. In this chapter I therefore focus on international NGOs whose activities are meant to construct civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

My findings are based on research that I have been doing on the region since the mid-1980s, as well as a visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia from May 27 to June 17, 1998, two visits to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996, previous fieldwork in the region in 1994–1995, and by my ongoing research on the former Yugoslavia. During the 1998 trip I conducted twenty interviews, whose subjects included representatives of eight international NGOs, four international organizations, and two groups that function as forums for international NGOs and local NGOs.

I discuss in detail five international NGOs that are working toward the broad goal of building civil society. They are pursuing four general kinds of strategies: trying to directly change the political structures and institutions of postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina by building political parties and conducting civic education; building local nonpolitical party NGO capacity; and using reconstruction and development to strengthen community and civil society. These NGOs include those receiving the largest amounts of funding, and they are representative of the range of strategies being used by international NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A review of their work suggests that the most effective international NGOs are those that see their work as a two-way process, wherein the international agencies help local NGOs to determine their priorities, and personnel of the international agencies see locals as equal partners. The most effective strategies are those that integrate concrete projects and an inclusive decision-making process to build community and civil society locally, a strategy that allows local actors, communities, and NGOs to determine priorities, projects, and directions. This seems especially important for international NGOs that are seeking to strengthen local actors and networks as participants in civil society.

International NGOs that focus on "nonpolitical" elements such as housing, infrastructure repair, and economic revitalization, rather than on formal politics (the usual target of democratization efforts), help create alternative sources of stable employment and resources, thereby lessening the economic dominance of existing political parties and power structures. Perhaps more important, strategies that combine construction projects and the local community's participation in identifying and executing them contribute in crucial ways to rebuilding communities and civil society. Reconstruction projects undertaken by private international companies—a policy that is increasingly pursued by the United States—do not include this civil society component and thus would not

produce the kinds of change that the international community claims to be seeking. In short, donors can get more bang for the buck by funneling reconstruction and development money to international NGOs that are committed to a particular *process*—one that is sensitive to the experiences and needs of the local society, that works with locals as equal partners in determining priorities and strategies. This integration of concrete projects and a focus on rebuilding communities and civil society seems to be the key to success for international NGOs, if their goal is the long-term sustainable development of civil society.

Apart from the difficulties that are inherent in the context in which the international NGOs operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina—in particular the structures of political power that were established during the war and those that were set up by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement—a major limitation on the effectiveness of international NGOs is their structural location. The major challenge to their effectiveness is their dependence for funding on institutions and organizations that have specific interests and perceptions unrelated to the local realities or the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina society. To the extent that funders and donors rather than local needs drive their actions, international NGOs reflect the interests of powerful states in the international system. As such the NGOs act as instruments of power—a way for states to project their power into other societies—rather than as forces working with the interest of the locals as the priority. This situation is manifested in concrete terms when international NGOs operate without a realistic needs assessment based on the complex and long-term strategies that are necessary for rebuilding Bosnian society, and on what locals deem those needs to be, and instead fashion projects based on the goals of the funders, the donors' priorities and interests. According to a number of Bosnians with whom I spoke, too often these latter factors, rather than the local situation, drive funding priorities and thus limit international NGOs.

The most effective international NGOs that I found used a variety of strategies to do their work: relying on in-depth expertise about the region to convince funders to trust their strategies; directly lobbying funders to change or modify their policies and priorities; using funding to achieve not only donor-specified goals but also the mission or goals of the international NGOs.

Also hampering effectiveness is the tendency of donors and some international NGOs to generalize from experience elsewhere; this leads them to overlook the specificities and complexities, both current and historical, of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One example is the assumption that before 1990 Yugoslavia (or other socialist countries, for that matter) was in some kind of totalitarian deep freeze and that now the population must be retrained in democracy. This ignores the kind of grassroots activism seen throughout the region during the Gorbachev period but even earlier. International NGOs that ignore or write off those experiences ignore what should be a solid basis for moving forward. The disconnect between the experiences and needs of society and the interests that

drive projects and priorities is the most severe limitation on international NGO effectiveness.

The next section provides the context within which international NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina operate. Following that is a summary of the international NGOs that I examine and their strategies, and an analysis of the effects and limitations of these strategies. I conclude the chapter with some observations about the usefulness of these activities for democratization and the development of civil society.

## HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was imposed from outside, the result of political strategies by conservative elites in Serbia and Croatia. Although much of the Western journalistic and academic work on the war says otherwise, what is quite clear from a close study of events leading up to and during the war is that the violence was imposed on the republic—that the ruling parties in Serbia and Croatia compelled the "nationalist" political parties to install extremists as their leaders and exported arms, paramilitary groups, and armies into Bosnia to destroy the fabric of that country's existing multiethnic communities. This strategy, which traces at least to 1988, was a direct response to trends toward democratization and liberalization within Serbia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia as a whole and had the goal of preventing shifts in the structure of political and economic power within the Yugoslav republics. Because Yugoslavia in the mid-1980s had seemed to have a better chance than any of the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe to make the transition to liberal political and economic systems, its conservative elites were more threatened than in other socialist countries. The wars were, in effect, the conservatives' response to these pressures for democratization.[2]

Indeed, for the purposes of this study it is of great importance to note that Yugoslavia, of all the socialist countries, was the most open to Western ideas and had its own experience with indigenous concepts of grassroots participation in decision making within firms as well as within local communities. One of the most striking things in talking to international NGOs with no previous experience in the region is the degree to which they believe that Bosnians are coming out of a totalitarian experience—one so profound that it is a caricature of even the Soviet system. Representatives of these international NGOs seem all but unaware of the mechanics and realities of the Yugoslav political system under Tito, which, although not the workers' paradise portrayed by some, was much more participatory than the Western stereotypes of communism portray. They also seem unaware of the political ferment, grassroots movement for democracy, and the events of the late 1980s that showed a full awareness of notions of democracy, civil society, independent media, electoral campaigns, and political partic-

ipation. Indeed, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in April 1992 when people attending a massive multiethnic peace rally were marching through Sarajevo and were fired upon by a handful of Serb nationalist snipers who had the backing of Belgrade. That all these trends developed in the absence of international NGO assistance is an important sign that any problems that Bosnia is facing are due not to the ignorance of Bosnians but to other structural factors that have been reinforced by the war.

The war, which lasted until 1995, changed the face of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It silenced and decimated the prewar democracy and peace movements, including democratic forces within the republic's main political parties, and it devastated civil society. One of the most insidious and destructive effects of the war was the resulting ethnic homogenization: Whereas before the war few areas of the country were ethnically homogeneous, by 1995, when the Belgrade-backed Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) finally agreed to negotiate a settlement to the conflict, the country had effectively been divided into three areas, each controlled by an extremist, ethnically labeled, and antidemocratic political party that commanded structures of power that the war had not changed.[3] The SDS controlled more than half the country—an area where Serbs now make up 95 percent of the population (compared to 50 percent before the war), while the remainder was under the effective control of the Zagreb-backed and -controlled Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZBH) and the Bosnian Muslim Party of Democratic Action. The SDS and the HDZBH in particular pursued policies of "ethnic cleansing"—that is, they murdered or expelled non-Serbs and non-Croats and in both areas razed Muslim cultural monuments, including mosques.[4]

The current role of the international community stems from its major role in bringing the war to an end. Although the United Nations was present in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the beginning of the war, the role of the United Nations Protection Force was restricted to delivering humanitarian aid and protecting that aid. Infamously, U.N. forces were not allowed to protect the civilian population.[5] The United States became directly involved in 1994, as the Clinton administration brought an end to the Zagreb-initiated war against Bosnia's Muslim population. In 1995 the United States effectively supported the army of Croatia and the official Bosnian army in their attacks on Belgrade-backed Serb forces in Croatia and then in Bosnia. With the help of NATO air attacks on the SDS's military communication system and other forms of air cover, the Croatian and Bosnian armies took SDS-held territory and then threatened Banja Luka, the main SDS-held city in Bosnia. At that point the SDS military and political leadership agreed to a cease-fire and to a U.S.-brokered settlement to the war.

The agreement that was reached in November 1995 at an air base outside Dayton, Ohio, established the institutions that still dominate Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton accords, signed by the presidents of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia, as

well as the leaders of the three nationalist parties, preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single internationally recognized state but divided it into two "entities": a Serb-designated entity, the Republika Srpska, with 49 percent of the country's territory, and the Croat- and Muslim-designated Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Agreement called for free and fair elections and specified that refugees had the right to return to their prewar homes. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is ruled by a three-member presidency—voters from each of the three major ethnic groups elect one member—and by a parliament that is also elected on an ethnic basis. A NATO-led military force that includes troops from thirty-three countries has been present in Bosnia-Herzegovina since January 1996: 60,000 troops in the first year, reduced by early 2001 to about 20,000.[6] The civilian side of implementation falls under the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an autonomous international institution that has the authority to impose decisions on the country if the Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions are unable to come to agreement and even to remove local officials who block implementation of the Dayton accords.[7] The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is responsible for running elections, and the United Nations runs the International Police Task Force, made up of officers from around the world who are unarmed and whose goal is to help restructure the Bosnia-Herzegovina police force.[8]

Postwar Bosnia is thus in many ways an international protectorate, because the main international organizations—OSCE, OHR, the Peace Implementation Council (a group of fifty-five governments and international organizations that sponsor and direct the peace implementation process)—are effectively in charge. The stated goal of the international community is to create a multiethnic, democratic Bosnia as the best way to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. Bosnia can be viable only if these actors back up their stated goals with actions, in particular by creating an environment that is conducive to democracy and civil society. Only in such an environment can international NGOs conceivably have a positive influence on Bosnian society. To the extent that the nationalist parties continue to use fear and the threat of violence to silence and marginalize dissenters, the ability of international NGOs to help locals rebuild their society is severely circumscribed. While the international community has often shown its willingness to remove actors who actively obstruct the implementation of the Dayton accords, which call for creating space for moderates, the tendency by international NGOs to accept that the cause of the conflict was ethnic animosities tends, perhaps unwittingly, to strengthen the nationalist parties.[9] This is important because a main challenge for those wanting to strengthen democracy and civil society is overcoming the hold of extremists; the key challenges for international NGOs include reconstructing communities not only physically but also in terms of allowing refugees to return to their

homes. In many ways resolving this issue of refugee return, justice, and reconciliation is a prerequisite for building sustainable civil society.

While international NGOs, with the right strategies, can help the process of stabilization, there is certainly a limit to the amount of change that they can bring about on their own. While this is true of international NGOs everywhere, the international community's overwhelming and decisive role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the identical goals of international NGOs and the main international organizations running Bosnia, means that we would expect international NGOs to have significant positive influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus in theory this area provides an ideal situation for measuring the effectiveness of international NGOs.

## STRATEGIES OF WESTERN NGOS

The international NGOs that I chose to study all have the overarching goal of reconstructing civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They use four broad strategies for rebuilding civil society: directly addressing the issues of political structures and power, and in particular the role of the international community, through the International Crisis Group; building political parties and providing civic education through the National Democratic Institute; building local NGO capacity and networks through the Strategies, Training, and Advocacy for Reconciliation Project (STAR); and rebuilding the community through Catholic Relief Services and Mercy Corps International.

### *INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: STRUCTURAL REFORM*

The International Crisis Group is a private, independent, multinational NGO "committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict."[10] Established in 1995 by a group of "prominent international citizens and foreign policy experts," its funding comes from the European Union, individual states (mostly Western European), foundations, and private companies. By 2001 the International Crisis Group had projects in fourteen hot spots around the world. It mainly researches and publishes detailed, high-quality reports that "combine on-the-ground analysis in conflict-threatened countries, with detailed policy prescription and advocacy." In each report the International Crisis Group advocates specific and detailed policies that it has identified as solutions to existing or potential crises, and it actively lobbies state governments and international organizations, both publicly and behind the scenes, to act on its analyses and recommendations.

The International Crisis Group began its activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in February 1996, shortly after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, with the goal of supporting international efforts to implement the agreement. The International Crisis Group explicitly addresses the factors that are most crucial to the viability of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state and society—the structural and political ones—and targets the most influential actors: the international organizations and states that are effectively running Bosnia-Herzegovina. The International Crisis Group is thus in many ways the international NGO in the best position to have a major effect because it is attempting to influence those actors that have the power to change Bosnia-Herzegovina's political structures and to ensure the stability and peace necessary for civil society to reemerge. Indeed, in many cases the reports by the International Crisis Group were the only reliable information and analysis available to the international community in specific areas or issues.[11]

The International Crisis Group's in-country staff members all are fluent in the local language, and all have an in-depth knowledge of and experience in the country. They work closely with Bosnians as well as international actors. Many members of the organization's board of directors and top representatives are former senior diplomats, so the International Crisis Group is extremely well connected to international actors, including the European Union, the United Nations, and OSCE, as well as individual state governments. Board members use this informal network to influence policy in a way that most international NGOs cannot. In addition, because the International Crisis Group is not particularly dependent on any one international organization or state for funding, it can publish independent analyses that are often highly critical of international actors and policies.

Staff members have also participated in televised debates with Bosnian politicians and have given numerous talks about the organization's proposals to Bosnian political and intellectual circles in both Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The International Crisis Group has a high profile among Bosnians: Local people with no connections to the international or NGO community often spontaneously mentioned the International Crisis Group and described it as having a good understanding of the local situation and good ideas for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The International Crisis Group thus provides information to the Bosnians themselves about issues that international organizations often decide behind closed doors.

The International Crisis group is clearly not a typical international NGO, in large part because it targets the international policy community, states, and international organizations instead of trying to change how local actors think or behave. As such, it seems to turn the usual flow of influence between international NGOs and donors on its head: It is trying to change the priorities and policies of the donors themselves through carefully researched and argued reports, as well

as through direct lobbying by influential diplomats. Thus the International Crisis Group is an interesting new kind of strategy for international NGOs.

## *NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE: PARTY BUILDING AND CIVIC TRAINING*

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs is a nonprofit that works to "strengthen and expand democracy worldwide."[12] It is funded mostly by the National Endowment for Democracy, an NGO funded by the U.S. Congress, both directly and through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The institute has been in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1996 and is pursuing two kinds of strategies, both of which are typical, traditional "democratization" approaches that focus on formal political institutions and impose preconceived projects and goals on the local society. A program to develop political parties, based in Sarajevo, aims at directly helping parties to strengthen themselves as democratic institutions and teaches them how to be responsive to citizens. A civic education and advocacy program in Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Mostar aims to "convey democratic values and knowledge of Bosnia's emerging political systems to citizens" as a means of mobilizing them to participate in democratic structures. Part of the latter project involves setting up a network for domestic monitoring of elections.

Although the institute recruits young Bosnians to do much of the political party work, its program seems to be very much a cookie-cutter approach that does not take into account local experience or knowledge. Indeed, the heads of the institute's Bosnian offices have no particular regional expertise, nor do they speak the local language. The party-building program is presented to local "leaders, organizers, and activists" in a Bosnian-language publication that is merely a translation into Bosnian of a handbook that the institute uses in its work around the world (its other printed materials in Bosnian, for example, citizen survey forms, are likewise translations of generic materials).[13] Similarly, the institute's representative in Tuzla, who has no regional expertise, said he was strongly pushing the institutes Bosnian employees to do door-to-door canvassing, which he saw as effective because of his own experience as a political activist in Chicago. The local employees of the institute, however, strongly resisted his suggestion. He discounted their resistance as resulting from their ignorance of the effectiveness of such campaigns, rather than accepting it as a reflection of their knowledge of local customs and experience.[14]

According to the institute's Sarajevo office, it measures the effectiveness of the party-building strategy by election results—whether parties with which the institute has worked have made electoral gains—as well as by increases in party membership and more sophisticated campaign literature. The institute's Washington,

D.C., office, however, strongly disavowed the use of electoral success as the measure of effectiveness; instead, it said, the institute looks at whether the parties have achieved the institute's goals through their internal and external activities, such as better public outreach, better organizational structure, and campaign plans. Neither type of evaluation measures whether the institute's efforts are having a real influence on Bosnian society; apparently, the assumption is that if the parties follow the institute's prescriptions, the benefits to Bosnia will automatically accrue.

The institute's civic education project involves advocacy training and encourages and helps locals to form NGOs and to become actors in the political process. To this end the institute in 1996 and 1997 organized twenty discussions in villages around Tuzla in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and another thirty in Banja Luka in Republika Srpska. Each group was trained in how to hold "democratic meetings," that is, meetings in which all points of view can be put forward, listened to, and respected. Discussion group meetings, attended mainly by intellectuals, old-age pensioners, and community activists, were held once every four to six weeks, focusing on the general topic of learning about the process of transition in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

These groups also organized a candidates' forum before the 1996 elections in Republika Srpska and monitored the elections. The local staffs of the institute in Tuzla and Banja Luka concentrated on bringing together a group of seven core NGOs from both the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska to monitor the September 1998 national elections. Here the institute was using monitoring as a way of building an election-monitoring infrastructure for the entire country, with the goal of setting up an NGO that would serve all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

## *THE STRATEGIES, TRAINING, AND ADVOCACY FOR RECONCILIATION NETWORK FOR WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP: BUILDING LOCAL NGO CAPACITY*

The STAR (Strategies, Training, and Advocacy for Reconciliation) Network for Women's Leadership operates exclusively in the former Yugoslav republics (including Kosovo) and is meant to build the capacity of women's leadership and women's NGOs in that region.[15] STAR's specific goal is to build sustainable, non-nationalist, democratic NGOs that advocate social change and to do so by fostering NGO networks that work to influence public policy and by providing training, technical assistance, and development assistance. STAR has also worked to raise awareness of the situation of women and local NGOs among private U.S. donors and has helped to forge links between its local NGO partners and other international NGOs.

The STAR project came out of a meeting of women NGO leaders from the former Yugoslavia in February 1994. It was established in October 1994 with a three-year, US$2.1 million grant from USAID and continues to be funded mainly by USAID. The STAR project is directed by an American who, like all of STAR's international staff members, speaks the local languages and has long experience in the region. STAR runs projects in four program areas throughout the former Yugoslavia: citizen participation, training local NGOs in participatory leadership and advocacy training, organizational development, and conflict resolution; media and communications; advocacy for women's health; and NGO self-financing and small business development. STAR has an advisory board made up of local NGO representatives, and the needs of local groups drive its overall priorities. STAR works with any non-nationalist women's group; by 1997 it had partnered with twenty groups in eleven cities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

STAR's particular focus is on building networks between women's NGOs within Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the wider former Yugoslavia. STAR also seeks to link these NGOs directly with other women's NGOs worldwide. For example, it brought representatives of South African, Israeli, and Palestinian groups to speak on postconflict civil society problems that are common to all these regions, and it was instrumental in making it possible for local women leaders to participate in the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing.

The key part of STAR's strategy is to empower local NGOs, to give them the tools and as much control of the process as possible. STAR also is conscious of issues of equality and the way in which money makes true partnership difficult. STAR's approach is based on the view that learning is a two-way process and that STAR is learning from local NGOs as much as they are learning from STAR, in particular in the areas of grassroots organizing and dealing with postwar gender and community issues.[16]

STAR has succeeded in its main goal of building a sustainable network of women's NGOs; according to an internal evaluation, "USAID saw STAR's experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina as lessons that could be . . . shared by other international organizations."[17] Likewise, the feedback from partner NGOs is positive and consistently and favorably compares their experiences with STAR to experiences with other international NGOs.

Originally a project of Delphi International, a U.S.-based NGO, since October 1999 STAR has been part of another U.S.-based NGO, World Learning.[18] Since 1999 STAR has branched out and now works not only with women's NGOs but with women in all sectors, including business, government, and trade unions, with the goal of developing women's networks in the region. Recent accomplishments include helping local NGOs to organize a women's conference on the economic situation and poverty in Bosnia in June 2001.

## *CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES: RECONSTRUCTION AS A MEANS OF BUILDING COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY*

Catholic Relief Services is the official international relief and development agency of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.[19] Catholic Relief operates globally and supports a range of international assistance projects as well as providing emergency relief. The overall goal of Catholic Relief is to lay the groundwork for a transition from relief activities to development activities, with the focus on human development and social justice. Catholic Relief's activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are funded mostly on a year-to-year basis, 40 percent from the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (BPRM), 45 percent from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and 15 percent from private donations to Catholic Relief. In 2001 the BPRM was facing funding cuts in its Bosnia programs and seemed to be cutting back its commitment to integrated strategies, focusing specifically instead on rebuilding shelter.

Catholic Relief's staff has a large percentage of locals, with minimal international staffing (in 2001, 110 staff members were nationals and eight were from other countries). From the start Catholic Relief has worked with local NGOs as partners, especially the main NGOs of Bosnia-Herzegovina's four major religious communities: the Catholic group Caritas, the Serbian Orthodox Dobrotvor, the Muslim Merhamet, and the Jewish group La Benevolencija.

Catholic Relief came to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 to do humanitarian work during the war; from the start it was committed to staying on to do postwar reconstruction. Since the end of the war in 1995 Catholic Relief has been working in emergency relief assistance and recovery, enterprise development, and "counterpart strengthening" (strengthening local NGOs). The focus of its activity is rebuilding civil society through the reconstruction of houses and infrastructure in about twelve communities (by 2001 this was up to forty communities), which takes about 80 percent of Catholic Relief's resources in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Catholic Relief's goal is "the restoration of multiethnic communities on a sustainable basis," allowing people to return to peaceful and productive lives in their home communities and facilitating community reintegration, with peaceful refugee returns without need for international peacekeeper escorts.[20] To achieve this goal Catholic Relief has been working to reward "open communities," that is, those that have officially declared their willingness to allow minorities to return to their homes.

To this end in each community Catholic Relief first established a multiethnic community working group made up of representatives of local interests and chaired by a Catholic Relief field-worker who is a native of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The working group itself takes the lead in decision making, acting as an assess-

ment and planning body for the community's reconstruction and recovery strategy as well as for the design, planning, and management of Catholic Relief's programs. This idea, of integrating community building into the reconstruction efforts, came from Catholic Relief's experience in Bosnia and elsewhere, doing projects with multiethnic groups as implementing partners, and was begun after a self-evaluation in late 1996 during which Catholic Relief decided that the ideal program would focus on the community instead of on the project.

The funding that Catholic Relief receives is specifically for reconstruction, but while private (U.S.) companies also do reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina under contract from USAID, they are not interested in anything beyond the physical rebuilding of houses. Catholic Relief's mandate is to go beyond that; in the course of rebuilding houses Catholic Relief also seeks to rebuild communities as social organizations, resulting, according to one international organization representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in better overall outcomes at a lower cost.

The Office of the High Representative defines success for returns as one person staying one night in a rebuilt house. In contrast, Catholic Relief has a two-stage definition: the first is when part of a family is living in a rebuilt house as its principal residence; "real return," however, is when the family has vacated and given up rights to its temporary residence to fully resettle in its original, rebuilt, home. For the purpose of reporting to donors on the goal of returning to productive lives, Catholic Relief uses proxy indicators such as numbers of houses rebuilt or repaired and the number of agreements of intention to return. This fulfills the obligation to donors, but it does not capture some of the more important or long-term elements. Catholic Relief is working on how to evaluate these aspects of its programs and is trying to develop funding instruments that fit local needs, rather than having projects driven by funding requirements.

## *MERCY CORPS INTERNATIONAL: RECONSTRUCTION AS A MEANS OF BUILDING COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY*

Mercy Corps International is headquartered in the United States and Scotland and provides emergency relief and sustainable community development and civil society worldwide. Mercy Corps is funded by the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and Western European governments, and the World Bank. The Bosnia project is funded mostly by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, specifically for reconstruction of housing. It also sells agricultural surplus from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to raise money for other projects. The Bosnian office has more than one hundred employees, more than ninety of whom are locals, and the staff includes civil, construction, and electrical engineers as well as program officers. The goals of the Bosnia project include the return and reintegration of refugees into their prewar communities;

reestablishment of local communities through civil society initiatives; shelter and infrastructure reconstruction; and provision of microcredit.[21]

The current Mercy Corps project in Bosnia-Herzegovina dates to a 1993 effort to run a water system reconstruction project during the war. The infrastructure reconstruction programs focus on water and heating systems, homes, schools, and medical clinics. The civil society element of the program is based on the belief that Mercy Corps could not just go into a community, build houses, and then leave, because people must participate in the reconstruction of their own communities in order to rebuild those communities. The microcredit strategy addresses the communities' need for economic revitalization. In 1998 Mercy Corps was the only international NGO working to localize the process of providing microcredit. Mercy Corps does not work on strengthening local NGOs, because it sees them as tending to be inefficient and costly. Mercy Corps seeks to provide people with information, skills, and ideas so they can build a social infrastructure. These ideas and strategies came out of Mercy Corps's civil society work in other countries and the experiences of people working in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although Mercy Corps's funding from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is strictly for reconstruction, it has carried out this mission in a way that also addresses community building. As long as the houses get built, Mercy Corps can use whatever strategy it deems best. While its reports to donors require quantified results, such as the number of houses built, Mercy Corps's own evaluation of success is based on whether the entire community—business, government, and beneficiaries of reconstruction—is involved. But this cannot be quantified, and results may not be obvious for several years.

More recently, Mercy Corps has received an umbrella grant for the reintegration of refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia through active engagement of communities. As of October 2000, Mercy Corps had rehabilitated and reconstructed more than 4,200 houses; reconnected 80 water systems; reconnected electrical supply systems in more than 80 villages, towns, and cities; repaired central heating systems in two cities; and issued almost 7,400 microcredit loans in more than twenty-one municipalities in all regions of the country.

## IMPACT

Because of its focus on the political and structural issues, the International Crisis Group's strategy of influencing international actors to change political structures and policies has perhaps the greatest potential as an effective strategy from the macroperspective. It is important too because it casts light upon activities of international organizations that might otherwise go uncriticized and unchecked, thus forcing them to take into account the effect of their activities on Bosnia-Herzegovina society and to consider other perspectives. The International Cri-

sis Group provides something of a check on the other institutional and political factors that, in the absence of criticism, tend to drive these organizations. Given the power of international organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this watchdog function is extremely important. The International Crisis Group and other observers claim that its activities have been quite successful, bringing about concrete changes and rethinking of a number of important structural and political issues.[22] All these changes have contributed to a more stable environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is conducive to democratization and the reemergence of civil society.

The most effective strategies for reconstructing and strengthening civil society have been those that focus on rebuilding communities by encouraging people to work together toward a tangible, common goal. Such a strategy facilitates a re-creation of the organic bases on which any community is built and moves the focus of energy away from the national political scene (which was the focus of nationalists before and during the war) and toward the local and regional scene. Thus it appears that potentially the most effective strategy may be an integrated one that uses major projects, such as reconstruction of housing or infrastructure as the focus of a process of rebuilding community or civil society, supplemented by programs (such as microcredits) that create businesses and jobs in the community.

As the projects run by Catholic Relief and Mercy Corps have shown, this strategy effectively empowers locals, bringing major stakeholders in a community together to work out how to reconstruct their societies, independent of state or other institutional actors. Key to the success of such strategies is that these international NGOs base their activities on decisions made by the community, rather than imposing preconceived concepts or strategies from above. Mercy Corps' experiences in using the rebuilding of housing, electrical and water systems, and other infrastructure, and its participation in the community restoration project in Brčko and in other municipalities, are good examples of this. Likewise, Catholic Relief has expanded its reconstruction work from twelve to forty communities, reintegrating these communities in "sustainable ways." An example is the town of Stolac, from which Bosnian Muslims had been expelled by Croat forces. Catholic Relief enabled thousands of refugee families to return by helping to rebuild their destroyed homes and engaging people in the community in order to smooth the return of the Bosnian Muslims to live among their Croat neighbors.

This approach provides a kind of experiential learning, in which participants reconstruct community and civil society in a concrete way. This strategy focuses on communities, especially in sectors ripped apart by war, and gives them a concrete way to rebuild themselves both physically and in spirit. By working together, deciding together, and building together, people involved in these projects rebuild the interpersonal and community ties that the war severed and

provide these communities and thus Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole with a basis for the future. They also contribute in important ways to democratization by constructing a process of participatory decision making. As Catholic Relief points out, shelter repair is an especially good focus for such a strategy since it reduces stress on local communities: Refugees living in the community can return to their rebuilt homes, freeing up housing and allowing the community to accept back families that fled during the war.

Another effective strategy is the strengthening of existing local NGOs, empowering them to make decisions and set priorities and to make connections with other local and international NGOs. This strategy builds on the remnants of prewar civil society, drawing on the traditions of political activism that were present in Yugoslavia, rather than imposing wholesale models and preconceived notions from outside. A large part of the success of this strategy, seen in the work of STAR and Mercy Corps, is the result of its reliance on those who know best—the locals—what their communities and society need and how best to achieve those goals. Thus in neighboring Croatia, the women's NGO network and STAR successfully pressured the national government to set up a series of women's shelters and address other women's issues; a partner NGO successfully reduced prostitution of minors related to the international peacekeepers' presence in Zenica; partner NGOs organized an international women's conference in Bosnia in 1996; and local NGOs have a "sense of increased ownership of the network," as evidenced by their initiative in organizing such projects as the May 2001 conference on economic reform and poverty in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Likewise, the Bosnian staff of Mercy Corps' microcredit project, the Economic Development Department, has assumed full responsibility for it and is in the process of transforming it into an independent local microcredit organization.

Less effective is an explicit and narrow focus on political party building and civic education. A North American model of political activity ignores the organic society in which and from which political parties and activities grow. It also misses the basic driving force of political power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, unlike in the United States, ruling political parties effectively operate as the state—in some ways ruling parties are too strong. The state—and thus the party that controls the state—is the primary allocator of tangible and intangible resources and especially of secure jobs, and the only other source of stable, secure jobs is the international NGOs and other international organizations. Teaching political parties to behave like "democratic parties" does nothing to address this problem. Even when opposition parties have won elections, they are ruling in the same structural environment and thus tend to be drawn into the same kind of patronage logic that the nationalist parties have relied on. Thus focusing on electoral strategies or formal political institutions by itself

does little to change this or to build civil society; rather, it tends to give particular parties access to resources that may give them an advantage in domestic political competition.

What is missing is the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina society, its recent history of political and power structures, and a view of the process as two-way learning. The National Democratic Institute's "political party building" efforts do not address the root cause of political conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina; it seems to focus narrowly and in a preset way on political parties as key actors because it has a narrow view of what "politics" is about. This view apparently ignores both issues of structural power and the organic bases upon which communities and civil society are built. Civic education probably does not hurt, but the rebuilding of communities, the empowerment of society, and the creation of opportunities and incentives for people outside politics are what will make politics and political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina democratic. It would seem much more useful for discussion groups to focus on community issues at the local level, coming up with ways to empower themselves and their communities, rather than focusing on abstract issues at the national level. In that sense the integrated strategies of Mercy Corps, Catholic Relief, and STAR are much more promising in terms of their long-term effects, because activism at the local level is likely to translate into more interest in and activism at the national level as well.

According to Bosnian NGO observers, the presence of so many international actors and the in-flow of massive amounts of money has major negative effects on Bosnia-Herzegovina society itself. The best and the brightest Bosnians, especially those who know English, are now working for international organizations and international NGOs as staff members, drivers, and interpreters, rather than in Bosnia-Herzegovina society itself or for local NGOs, most of which cannot afford to pay much. Another effect is generational: Older, more experienced and educated Bosnians who do not know English are left out, creating not only a knowledge gap for international NGOs but also resentment. Because of the money that international NGOs are spending in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnians are now also much less willing to work as volunteers than before. I heard a number of stories of Bosnians who were unwilling to take part in conferences, meetings, workshops, or other activities unless they were paid. Likewise, many Bosnians have become extremely cynical and jaded about international NGOs, often seeing their presence more as a result of the NGOs' desire for self-promotion than of any real desire to help Bosnians. This impression is strong exactly because so many international NGOs did not pursue strategies like those of Mercy Corps, Catholic Relief, and STAR, strategies that take Bosnians seriously and that are sensitive to local knowledge, context, and needs. In this way some international NGOs have actually made it less possible and much harder to rebuild civil society because many Bosnians have the impression that civil society

projects are really a sham by well-paid internationals. Indeed, with few exceptions, international actors seem to have little awareness of how their control of resources is negatively affecting Bosnia-Herzegovina society.

## LIMITATIONS

As I mentioned in the introduction, the major obstacle facing international NGOs is the structural situation in which they are working, in the sense that they do not control the political and economic environment but also in the sense that they are dependent for funding on donors that have their own priorities and interests. Of course, this is true of international NGOs everywhere. But in Bosnia-Herzegovina this structural constraint is especially striking because at a declarative level, the main international actors have the same goals as most of the international NGOs. As such, one would expect Bosnia-Herzegovina to be a best case scenario for the effectiveness of international NGOs. But donor priorities have tended to shift every six months or year—from humanitarian relief to reconstruction to business development to refugee returns to building civil society—reflecting the donors' political interests. As donor priorities shift, so too do those of the international NGOs, most of which are on one-year funding cycles. They therefore face the choice of shifting their activities or losing support. A related problem is donors' focus on short-term results; this often undermines important long-term goals that only strategies that do not have immediate or quantifiable payoffs can achieve, a dilemma underscored by workers affiliated with Catholic Relief.

The negative effect that occurs when donors drive the process was most clearly expressed by a USAID officer in charge of NGO relations.[23] While he praised the humanitarian international NGOs such as Catholic Relief, the International Rescue Committee, and Mercy Corps for their work during the war and for providing invaluable information during the immediate postwar period, he declared that their time was now over. USAID would be shifting its funding, he said, to international NGOs that have experience elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe and that work specifically on "democracy assistance." This, however, neglects broader strategies and ignores the limits of democracy assistance narrowly defined, especially when applied to the postwar context.

The same USAID officer commented that a major problem for his agency is that other donors may continue to fund projects and international NGOs that USAID does not agree with or that do not fit USAID's priorities.[24] The ability of USAID to selectively fund only those international NGOs that pursue strategies congruent with USAID's ( the U.S. government's) priorities and perceptions means that innovative and effective integrated projects such as those pursued by Catholic Relief and Mercy Corps—which do not necessarily provide an immediate tangible result and do not fit into preconceived notions of democracy as-

sistance—may lose out if the United States attempts to pressure other donors to adhere to a limited vision of democracy assistance.

Donors tend to have a specific focus and to fund only projects that are strictly reconstruction or strictly democracy assistance, which ignores the importance of multidimensional programs. A common concern expressed by Bosnians familiar with international NGO activities is that donors also often appear to neglect realistic and localized needs assessment and that locals are often not equal partners in determining needs and priorities. Indeed, most donors will not work directly with local NGOs or do so only if they have an international NGO as a partner. A Bosnian NGO activist observed that many international NGOs have an interest in remaining as the intermediary for local NGOs and the outside and thus do nothing to encourage local NGOs to establish direct links with outside funders.

A 1996 study for CARE Canada by an international NGO consultant gives some idea of the extent of the distrust of locals. The study proposed the establishment of an endowment to provide local NGOs with a stable source of income; it would have been run by a board of local NGO representatives, and funding was to have come from those international organizations and governments that today are the largest donors to Bosnia-Herzegovina.[25] But donors proved unwilling to surrender control of how their monies are spent, and to date the effort has not been successful.

Even where locals are seen as equal colleagues and peers, the disparity of power between local and international NGOs is a further constraint on effectiveness. The STAR project is perhaps the most sensitive to this factor, perhaps because of the background of the project's directors, who had much experience in this region long before the war, speak the language, and are quite aware of the realities within these societies in a way that most international NGO personnel are not. STAR attempts to empower locals, and its regional advisory board, made up of local NGO leaders, determines the organization's priorities, while partner NGOs have undertaken a number of major projects on their own. STAR also seeks to link local NGOs with NGOs in other countries. STAR treats the locals as colleagues and peers and sees their presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a two-way learning process while recognizing that the power disparity can never be completely absent.

Another general problem facing international NGOs is the sheer number of them operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This brings problems of coordination, including duplication of activities and projects that work at cross-purposes to each other. The intense competition for limited funding distracts from a real assessment of local needs and exacerbates the problem of funders' interests driving the process by rewarding international NGOs that obey them and punishing those who do not. Some international NGOs, in order to maintain funding and their raison d'être, try to keep local NGOs dependent, maintaining a role as

intermediary. STAR is a counterexample; it encourages local NGOs to contact foundations and other donors directly for funding and to contact other non-Bosnian NGOs on their own.

In general terms the long-term viability and success of even the best international NGO projects in an international protectorate such as Bosnia-Herzegovina depend almost exclusively on the degree to which the international community continues its commitment to a situation that is conducive to stabilizing communities by rebuilding them. While the best international NGO strategies contribute to creating such a situation at the microlevel, they cannot accomplish this within communities without stability at the macrolevel. Thus without support from the major international actors, strategies that focus on empowering local actors and communities cannot hope to be sustainable over the long term. In this way, the International Crisis Group's strategy, which explicitly targets the international community at that macrolevel, is a crucial factor in continued success.

The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a number of important lessons for international NGOs that operate in other societies with the aim of building civil society.

First, international NGOs should try to seek funding from donors that take the long view and that leave the international NGOs free to let local actors determine priorities and projects. This is a challenge for international NGOs that rely for funding on government agencies and international organizations, because these actors fund projects for political reasons that may have little to do with the interests of the society in question and everything to do with domestic political interests within the donor country, institutional interests of the funding organization, power interests of the state in the international arena, or preconceived notions of how to ensure democratization. This is especially true for funders of "democracy assistance." One way to do this is to diversify funding in a way that does not give any one funder too much leverage; another way is to change the way donors think about projects by citing successful long-term, integrated projects that have made a difference. In both cases, however, international NGOs should examine the motivations and preconceived notions of those who fund such assistance and question the appropriateness and effectiveness of idiosyncratic U.S. concepts and practices for other societies.

Indeed, international NGOs should examine how even admirable goals like democratization can in fact serve the power interests of their funders rather than the interests of the society in which the NGOs are operating. If international NGOs do have some autonomy in deciding what goals to pursue and the strategies they will use to do so, they should be self-critical about whether they are acting on behalf of their own institutional interests and preconceived notions or according to the realities in the host country. They should encourage

horizontal networks among local NGOs in all the countries in which they are active; this focus on networking is a key part of STAR's strategy and one reason for its successes. Likewise, international NGOs should see their activities as interactive processes rather than as a kind of transmission belt running from outside to inside.

Third, the focus of international NGO efforts should be on helping communities build themselves into civil society, rather than importing notions of political party work or building civil society based on U.S. experiences and conditions. International NGOs need to have a firm grasp of the existing communities and relationships within those communities. This includes an understanding of how politics fits into the bigger picture. In cases where politics was the center of power (as in most of the formerly socialist countries), it is important to realize that merely teaching political parties to behave democratically, or teaching people the principles of liberal democracy, will not get to the underlying dynamics of power. Politics must come from the realities of power on the ground. For democracy to be successful, it must be grounded in the everyday experience of the population. Otherwise, what exists is the acting out of democracy without its substance. Attempts to build democracy must build on ideas and experiences of the society in question, not simply assume that there is nothing there on which to build. In the case of Bosnia the experiences of grassroots participation in community and enterprise management under the socialist system, while far from perfect, have given people the experience of participation and activism. Likewise, the political ferment and electoral campaigns of the late 1980s and early 1990s, along with the existence of critical and independent media, are bases on which international NGOs should build their activities.

Fourth, a sensitivity to power relations in the country raises the question of funding opposition parties. Indeed, in a country like Bosnia-Herzegovina the goal should be to decrease the importance of politics and of the center(s), rather than focusing upon it. Electoral outcomes do matter, and who controls the state is an important factor, as recent electoral victories of non-nationalist parties in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in neighboring Croatia, have shown. The next step needs to be the empowering of local communities, not in the form of political parties or even NGOs but as communities. STAR has more recently moved in that direction through its shift to facilitating networks of women in all sectors of society rather than just among women's NGOs. This is also where the integrated strategies of Mercy Corps and Catholic Relief are crucial. By focusing on these "nonpolitical" projects, international NGOs in fact are facilitating the creation of political communities and activists.

Along these lines the United States—and USAID in particular—has been moving toward giving reconstruction projects to private companies. This is clearly a mistake, because business has little incentive to spend the time, effort,

or resources to rebuild community or civil society. Thus the United States in particular should avoid ceding reconstruction projects to U.S. or other international private contractors and should instead focus its reconstruction money on international NGOs that use reconstruction of houses and infrastructure to achieve other, broader goals.

The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the kinds of strategies that international NGOs have developed there provide important lessons. Bosnia-Herzegovina shows the effectiveness of multifaceted integrated strategies that concentrate on local communities and work on the process of building community. Focusing on an overall common goal, such as infrastructure repair or shelter reconstruction, and having all the community's stakeholders involved in making decisions, planning, and implementing the resulting projects is more effective than workshops in "civic education" and "multiparty democracy." Using this kind of project as the focus, and supplementing it with development strategies such as microcredits, conflict resolution, and advocacy, seems to be a most effective way to build civil society and democracy.

Of course, in some ways Bosnia-Herzegovina is a special case. The wartime destruction provides a clear focus for community-building efforts as well as for donor funding. The challenge is to transfer this kind of strategy into societies that do not have such obvious projects for communities to focus on. A parallel challenge is to convince donors that they can achieve the broader goals of democracy and social stability by funding reconstruction, renovations, or other kinds of infrastructure or housing projects in societies that have not just been through a war.

In more general terms Bosnia-Herzegovina shows the importance of involving locals in decision making and implementation and of explicitly facing the question of the power disparity between the international NGOs, which disburse funds, and the society itself, which receives them. Exactly because of this disparity international NGOs must make extra efforts to seek out and encourage alternative or dissenting voices among locals and be models of good NGO behavior by seeing their relationships with locals as a partnership to which both sides contribute.

## NOTES

1. According to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina—which is part of the Dayton Peace Agreement reached in November 1995—the Constitutional Court is to have nine members—"jurists of the highest standing"—three of whom "shall be selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights . . . [and] shall not be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of any neighboring state." Likewise, the constitution provides that the governor of the central bank be appointed by the International Monetary Fund and that he or she not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any neigh-

boring state. The Dayton accords' Annex 3 also charges the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with running all elections in the country. For the text of the constitution, see "General Framework Agreement: Annex 4, Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Office of the High Representative*, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id = 372 (October 10, 2001). The text of the entire agreement can be found at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id = 380 (October 10, 2001).

2. See V. P. Gagnon Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–95): 131–66; Gagnon, "Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia," Working Paper no. 96–1, Cornell University Institute for European Studies, Ithaca, May 10, 1996, which is also available at the Web site of V. P. Gagnon Jr., http://www.ithaca.edu/gagnon/articles/demob/index.htm (October 10, 2001); Gagnon, "The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s: A Critical Reexamination of 'Ethnic Conflict': The Case of Croatia" (paper presented at the annual meeting of Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, April 2001).

3. In 1991 the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 43 percent Bosnian Muslim, 31 percent Serb, 18 percent Croat, and 8 percent others.

4. For details see Human Rights Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina*, 2 vols. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992–93). See also details from prosecutions at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague in reports at *Tribunal Watch*, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?tribunal_index.html (October 10, 2001). The address for the ICTY site is http://www.un.org/icty/ (October 10, 2001).

5. For a critique of U.N. policy see David Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

6. For background on the Stabilization Forces, see NATO's Web site at http://www.nato.int/sfor/ (October 10, 2001).

7. The Office of the High Representative has imposed a common currency, passport, national anthem, license plates, and flag on Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as numerous other laws and regulations. The mandate of the High Representative is set out in Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It declares that the High Representative is "the final authority in theatre to interpret the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement." The High Representative is nominated by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (a group of fifty-five governments and international organizations that sponsor and direct the peace implementation process). The U.N. Security Council, which approved the Dayton Peace Agreement as well as the deployment of international troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then endorses the nominee. The OHR budget is funded from the following sources: European Union, 53 percent; United States, 22 percent; Japan, 10 percent; Russia, 4 percent; Canada, 3.03 percent; Organization of the Islamic Conference, 2.5 percent; others, 5.47 percent. For more information see the OHR's Web site at http://www.ohr.int (October 10, 2001).

8. For the Web site of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, see http://www.oscebih.org/oscebih_eng.asp (October 10, 2001). See the International Police Task Force Web site at http://www.unmibh.org/unmibh/iptf/index.htm (October 10, 2001).

9. That said, recent trends in Bosnian elections have shown growing electoral support for nonethnic parties; for example, in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina the

2000 elections brought to power a coalition of non-nationalist parties, while a coalition of non-nationalist parties from both entities now forms the government at the all-Bosnia level. These trends have been strengthened by the recent changes in government in Croatia and in Serbia.

10. "About ICG," *CrisisWeb*, http://www.crisisweb.org/about/program.cfm?typeid = 4 (October 10, 2001). The address of the Web site of the International Crisis Group is http://www.crisisweb.org (October 10, 2001).

11. Examples include the International Crisis Group's report on politics in Republika Srpska in 1996—a time when outsiders had no information on this topic—as well as its critical analyses of the international community's policies on refugee returns, media, and elections. Indeed, as Christopher Bennett, the head of the International Crisis Group's Sarajevo office from 1996 to 1999, put it, the International Crisis Group began to set the agenda via its research "because nobody else was putting out anything comparable" (personal communication, May 2001). He also noted that the International Crisis Group influenced international media coverage of Bosnia-Herzegovina by providing story ideas to visiting journalists and putting the international community's "spin" into context.

12. "The Work of the National Democratic Institute," *National Democratic Institute for International Affairs*, http://www.ndi.org/about/about.asp (October 10, 2001). See the National Democratic Institute's Web site at http://www.ndi.org (October 10, 2001).

13. National Democratic Institute, "Politicke stranke i tranzicija ka demokratija: Prirucnik za jacanje demokratskih stranaka namjenjen liderima, organizatorima i aktivistima" (Political Parties and the Transition to Democracy: Handbook on Strengthening Democratic Parties for Leaders, Organizers, and Activists), September 1997.

14. Nick Green, director of Civic Education Project, National Democratic Institute, interview by author, Tuzla, June 11, 1998.

15. The Web site for the STAR project may be found at http://www.worldlearning.org/star (November 13, 2001).

16. See Jill Benderly, "A Woman's Place Is at the Peace Table," *SAIS Review* 20, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2000): 79–83. Benderly is cofounder and codirector of the STAR project.

17. From STAR internal self-evaluation, May 1998.

18. The address for the World Learning Web site is http://www.worldlearning.org (October 10, 2001).

19. See the Catholic Relief Web site at http://www.catholicrelief.org (October 10, 2001).

20. "Bosnia-Herzegovina," Summer 2001, *Catholic Relief Services*, http://www.catholicrelief.org/where/bosnia/index.cfm (October 10, 2001).

21. The address of the Mercy Corps Web site is http://www.mercycorps.org/programs/bosnia.shtml (October 10, 2001).

22. Examples of international policies that were formulated in direct response to reports from and advocacy by the International Crisis Group include helping ensure that eleven thousand Serbs remained in Sarajevo when the city was reunited in 1996; winning the delay of the 1996 elections in the divided city of Mostar in order to address serious problems there; turning the divided and disputed region of Brčko into a separate, nonethnically defined district under the central government; causing USAID and

the World Bank to rethink their aid programs; securing reforms of the judicial system to remove individuals who were undermining the system; developing suggestions for ways to ameliorate the tense situation in Mostar; and convincing the international community in 1997 to take tougher action against local actors who were undermining the Dayton agreement.

23. Jim Hope, USAID officer, interview by author, Sarajevo, June 10, 1998.

24. According to Hope, USAID's attempts to use dollars as leverage with international NGOs will not succeed if they have alternate sources of money, and USAID is less effective if others are giving money "at cross-purposes" (Hope interview).

25. Ian Smillie, "Service Delivery or Civil Society? Nongovernmental Organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina," report prepared for CARE Canada, December 1996.