Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS AND NGOS IN POSTCOMMUNIST SOCIETIES

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Since the end of the cold war, postcommunist states in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia have been host to a virtual army of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from the United States, Britain, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe. These NGOs are working on various aspects of institutional development, such as helping to establish competitive political parties and elections, independent media, and civic advocacy groups, as well as trying to reduce ethnic conflict. A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, policy makers and scholars had barely begun to assess the effect of international efforts to help build democratic institutions.[1] Although opinions are strong, little is truly known about the influence of this assistance, carried out on a transnational level with local political and social activists. This book, which grew out of a project based at Columbia University, was designed to address this gap by focusing on the strategies that the international NGOs used to help build institutions and support activists in these countries.[2]

Initial hopes and enthusiasm for a rapid and smooth transition toward democracy have long since given way to the reality that the process is incremental and uneven and that it will likely continue to be so for decades. The premise of this book is that a better understanding of the process, one that differentiates the strategies of international NGOs rather than treating them as if they are the same, could lead to more effective support for the development of democratic

institutions. At the most basic level it could help in building healthier ties between international activists and those activists inside postcommunist societies who experience every day the chaotic, sometimes violent, usually nonlinear world of political and social transformations.

The political trajectory of these states and societies, especially Russia's, is central to peace and stability in Europe. A Russian descent into authoritarianism would, for example, affect not only its immediate neighbors but also Western Europe and the United States. However, the mechanisms behind these transitions are still poorly understood. Policy makers, scholars, donors, and especially activists working in the field need to understand to what extent these transitions are domestically determined and whether and to what extent international organizations and other outside groups, such as transnational networks, have affected them. What institutional designs common to Europe and North America have been transplanted to these regions in ways that are likely to be sustainable? What designs have been successfully adopted by existing indigenous organizations? Have international efforts helped, hurt, or been irrelevant to the transitions? Have these efforts been poor investments? What have been their unintended consequences?

To answer these questions the contributors to this book take a detailed look at efforts to support civil society in a number of the postcommunist Eastern European and Eurasian countries. The case studies presented here are part of a larger study that examined developments in several sectors of activity, including political parties, elections, media, and efforts at reducing ethnic conflict. Investigators interviewed activists from international NGOs and local activists, including those who had not directly received outside assistance, to assess the influence of international NGO strategies. They compared developments in a specific sector in the late 1990s with what the sector had looked like when the country's communist regime fell from power. Case selection included regions that are strategically important, such as Russia, parts of Central Europe widely viewed as successfully democratizing, and parts of Central Asia that are less so. The cases also address the types of institutions—such as civic advocacy groups—that are thought to be integral to democratic states and societies and that have therefore received considerable attention from international donors and NGOs. The project provides a portrait of the mechanisms by which ideas and practices commonly associated with democratic states have diffused to and evolved in formerly communist states and societies, revealing also some of the conditions that inhibit diffusion and development.

The cases show mixed outcomes. With relatively small amounts of money international donors and NGOs have played a large and important role in many formerly communist states, helping local activists to design and build institutions associated with democracy. However, they have done little as yet to affect

how these institutions actually function. Political parties, regular elections, independent media, and local NGOs are all now part of the political landscape in many states across Eastern and Central Europe and Eurasia; their links with foreign groups are considerable and often robust. In nearly every one of our cases, however, these new institutions function poorly and have but weak links to their own societies. Such organizations have proliferated but often serve the interests of foreign donors more than those of the local population. In certain cases, such as environmental groups in Russia and Kazakhstan, their vigor and effectiveness have actually declined, even as environmental degradation and international engagement have increased.

Historical legacies of the decades of communist rule account in part for the poor functioning of fragile new institutions, but in this book we show that these results are also in part a consequence of the international NGOs' strategies. Western groups tended to rely on practitioners with little knowledge of the region, such as political activists from U.S. communities or British civic organizers, to implement strategies for building democratic institutions that were developed in Western capitals. These technicians often were poorly prepared to anticipate how local activists, given local historical legacies, were likely to receive recommendations.

Beyond an assessment of which international NGO strategies worked and how, the book addresses other reasons for variations in outcomes, pointing to the conditions that affect the diffusion of ideas and practices. The ways in which international NGOs engage or ignore local political entrepreneurs and local political and organizational cultures emerge as particularly important. Context and the degree to which new ideas and practices complement or compete with well-established customs and beliefs play a critical role.

Below we discuss the state of the debate about democracy assistance, surveying policy and scholarly concerns about transnationalism and international relations. We describe the project from which the case studies were written and highlight the methods of evaluation that our investigators used in researching and writing the case studies. We present synopses of the chapters, drawing out the lessons learned from each case study. We close by identifying the limits of this project and summarizing the main findings of the study.

THE STATE OF THE DEBATE

Neither champions nor critics of democracy assistance have systematically grounded their discussion in detailed analysis of contemporary efforts at promoting democracy. Because the trajectory of the formerly communist states of East-Central Europe and Eurasia is a high-stakes issue in international relations and international security, assessments of the scope and pace of democratization and

the influence of democracy promotion on their transition deserve detailed research. Instead, particularly in the United States, political and organizational interests drove assessments for much of the 1990s.

Officials from the Clinton administration, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and American NGOs working in the regions tended to overestimate the role that democracy assistance played in fostering positive change and thus helped create expectations that contrasted negatively with what was actually happening in the recipient countries. The administration and the NGOs tended to talk only about success stories, because they feared losing funding from a hostile Congress if they openly discussed the difficulties of democratization and the limited role that assistance often plays in the process.[3] Democracy assistance, while growing in the 1990s, has been vulnerable to declines in overall foreign aid budgets. It remains a small proportion of the total amount of U.S. foreign assistance, averaging 16.5 percent of aid to Eastern Europe and 3.5 percent of total aid to the former Soviet Union from 1990 to 1999 (see table 1.1).[4]

Partly in response to this approach, there has been a backlash in policy journals, with critics arguing that assistance is a waste of money and could even be dangerous. In an influential article Fareed Zakaria implies that assistance helped to promote what he labels "illiberal democracy," where, although elections occur, rulers ignore constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.[5] Critics typically understand themselves not as ideological or partisan but as responding to specific events. For example, Russia watchers' criticisms of assistance became increasingly frequent following, among other manifestations of arbitrariness, Boris Yeltsin's firing of several prime ministers, a second war in Chechnya, and money-laundering scandals that appeared to involve both international assistance and the Kremlin.[6] Commentary on assistance became fodder for election campaigns: In the United States "who lost Russia" was one of the few foreign policy topics discussed in the 2000 presidential race.

Understanding the power and limits of external support for democratic development is important because of the changing, some say eroding, nature of state sovereignty. Foreign policy increasingly involves nonstate actors. While the promotion of democracy has been a central plank of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the cold war, it has frequently been nongovernmental organizations (occasionally funded by USAID) that have implemented this policy in the formerly communist countries. Similarly, while states have pursued such foreign policy initiatives as enlargement of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and the expansion of the European Union, successful integration into the Euro-Atlantic community may depend at least as much on the degree to which organizations outside the governments embrace norms, rules, and practices common in Western democracies. One way to understand the

TABLE 1.1 Western Governmental Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia 1990–1999 (millions of U.S. $)

	1990–99	Democracy Assistance	% of total to Democracy Assistance
To Central and Eastern Europe:			
U.S.	3,640	599	16.5
EU[1] (other than PHARE)	4,568		
EU (PHARE)	4,550	891[2]	19.5
To Russia:			
U.S.[3]	4,471	133	2.8
EU	1,417	272	19
To Eurasia (not including Russia):[4]			
U.S.	5,807	222	3.8
EU	3,597	393	11
To Eurasia (total):[5]			
U.S.	10,278	355	3.5
EU	4,995	665	13

Sources: U.S. Department of State 1998 *Annual Report*; Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act Implementation Report, 1998; TACIS; Kevin F.F. Quigley, *For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997); Janine Wedel, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989–1998* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

1. EU figures do not include 1998 assistance.
2. This is the minimum calculation, as provided by the PHARE program, based on the "Civil Society Democratization" subtitle figures: $231 million for "Administrative Reform" and $651 million for "Education, Training and Research." With these totals the "Democracy" spending would equal $891 million, that is, 19.5% of the total.
3. Totals of U.S. assistance to Russia and Eurasia include Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds and non-FSA funds, such as cooperative threat reduction. All "democratic assistance" programs are funded by FSA. From FSA, 6% for Russia went to democracy assistance (figures include percentage of funds expended for "Democratic Reform" and the "Eurasia Foundation"). About 7% of FSA funds for all of Eurasia were spent on democracy assistance.
4. Assistance to the countries of the former Soviet Union started in 1992. The figures here represent assistance expenditures in 1992–1998.
5. These figures do not include assistance distributed through the IMF, the World Bank, or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

potential for successful integration is to examine behavior in the nongovernmental realm and the effect of external support.

This book concentrates on democracy assistance to support the development of "civil society." The argument that a robust civil society is the basis for sustainable democracy is heard widely in public debate, from Robert Putnam's writings on civic culture to the management guru Peter Drucker's declaration that the main global challenge is promoting "worldwide civil society, without which there can be neither political nor social stability."[7] By contrast, others have argued that international assistance is simply irrelevant. The problem centers on how civil society might emerge within countries that lack traditions of independent organization or volunteerism and lack a legal framework that recognizes and supports not-for-profit activity. Claus Offe has claimed starkly that "the rise of a robust 'civil society' cannot be initiated from the outside." He explains that

> while democratic institutions and economic resources can be "transplanted" from the outside world (or their introduction facilitated and their durability protected by a host of positive and negative sanctions designed to support and strengthen new democratic regimes), the civic "spirit" or "mental software" that is needed to drive the hardware of the new institutions is less easily influenced by external intervention.[8]

Paul Stubbs declares that most "civil society" assistance programs become merely troughs at which local elites feed.[9]

The term *civil society* requires careful use: Sometimes the term refers to democratic opposition to communist regimes in Eastern Europe.[10] In formerly communist countries independent advocacy groups—the core of civil society—emerged in opposition to regimes that sought to repress all activity outside the control of the ruling communist parties. The success of such repression varied, with results ranging from vibrant underground activity in Poland in the 1980s to its total absence in parts of the former Soviet Union. At other times, however, the term seems to refer to a normative model of an economic and political "third way" between socialism and capitalism.[11]

In light of the contested debate and multiplicity of meanings, we use the term to mean public interest advocacy organizations outside the control of the state that seek to influence it on behalf of public aims. In this sense of the term the development of civil society is essential to democracy; a "third sector" of nonprofit organizations can serve as advocates for the public good and as watchdogs of political power.[12] Thomas Carothers observes that advocacy-oriented groups are crucial to democracy because they "seek to influence governmental policy on some specific set of issues" and thus serve to articulate citizens' interests vis-à-vis the state.[13] But as several contributors to this volume point out, the mere existence of NGOs, as part of this third sector, does not necessarily reflect

the strength of civil society. It merely points to its potential. Instead, we need to look closely at how NGOs actually function and their influence on both discourse and policy. To speak accurately about the vibrancy or weakness of civil society requires in-depth case studies.

Western support for the development of civil society and the ties that bind activists across borders is part of the larger debate in international relations scholarship on transnationalism.[14] This aspect of international life drew much attention from scholars in the 1990s. The main focus tended to be on human rights, on norms regulating behavior in the security realm such as those concerning the use of land mines or nuclear weapons, and on environmental policies.[15] Much international relations literature has focused on how the power of the norms explains various outcomes, such as changes in a state's human rights policy, prohibitions against using certain weapons, or the development of legislation to protect the environment. But scholars have begun to broaden their inquiries from the role of norms to the mechanisms by which norms diffuse (or do not diffuse) throughout the international system. In a groundbreaking book Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink established the influence of transnational advocacy networks (networks of nonstate actors), state actors, and international organizations that are bound together "by the centrality of principled ideas or values."[16] Increasingly, such networks have begun to alter traditional conceptions of and practices relating to national sovereignty by making new resources available to domestic challengers and by transforming the behavior of international organizations.

The transnational democracy networks in this book, like the theoretical models discussed in the literature, have multiple nodes. Principal nodes include the local activists in postcommunist states; the international NGOs that usually operate both within these states and from home offices in Western capitals; the assistance officials in Western embassies; international organizations and other donors; and some policy makers. As with Keck and Sikkink's work, these networks are advocating on behalf of others or promoting and "defend(ing) a cause or proposition."[17] The principled ideas underpinning the networks concern a range of "fundamental freedoms." Many are laid out in international conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act (1975), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1994), the U.N. Resolution on the Right to Democracy (1999), and the Warsaw Declaration (2000). The original rights outlined in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights and repeated in the other documents include freedom from "arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (article 9), the right to a "fair and public hearing" (article 10), the right to "freedom of opinion and expression," including the "freedom to . . . seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers" (article 19), "the right to freedom of peaceful assembly

and association" (article 20), the right to "periodic and genuine elections" (article 21), and "the right to form and to join trade unions" (article 23).[18]

The strategies that international NGOs have used for pursuing the institutionalization of various rights have been, with few exceptions, composed and carried out with relatively little interference or supervision from government bureaucracies or market interests, although the interests of donors, including foreign governments, have shaped NGO activities. In the postcommunist cases it makes sense to look closely at the work of NGOs, since they are the actors that provide much of the external support within the country.[19] By exploring the role of NGOs in these transnational networks, by examining what strategies have worked in helping to build institutions associated with democratic states, and by analyzing how best to coordinate efforts, we can add to a better understanding of the power and limits of NGOs in effecting change inside states. The lessons are not merely academic; they could help make Western engagement with the democratization process more effective and sustainable.

The work in this volume offers something of a corrective to the many uplifting stories that scholars (and policy makers) have focused on.[20] The closer one looks, the more one finds that developments in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and the transnational influences on these developments, are extremely complex. The cases here should help scholars further specify the power as well as the limits of these advocacy networks. The work by the contributors to this volume should encourage close examination of the behavior of NGOs. Most important, the cases in this book suggest that the diffusion of norms and practices associated with democracy has more to do with their interaction with regional norms and practices than much of the literature acknowledges. Local context matters more than the robustness of democratic norms in the international community.[21]

ABOUT THE PROJECT

In May 1997 Jack Snyder, then the chair of Columbia University's political science department, invited a group of experts on formerly communist states, practitioners of democracy assistance, and other scholars to explore ways of assessing international efforts at helping to build democratic institutions in East-Central Europe and Eurasia.[22] Funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, the editors of this book, developed a comparative research design and convened a group of seventeen investigators to research and write the case studies.. The investigators had social science training and regional expertise; many had worked in or previously evaluated democracy assistance projects. They completed their case studies by the winter of 1999. Mendelson and Glenn then wrote a general report with a synopsis of each

case study, which the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published and distributed to the NGO and donor communities.[23]

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Our project focuses on the strategies by which international NGOs sought to achieve their goals, emphasizes qualitative evaluation, and compares NGO strategies across different sectors of activity and regions. Recognizing that international NGOs often use multiple strategies at the same time, we distinguish four general types of strategies in terms of the targets of assistance and the terms of involvement. These include infrastructural assistance, or assistance to organizations to improve their administrative capacities by providing equipment or operating expenses; human capital development, or assistance to individuals intended to increase their skills, knowledge, or experience; proactive or imported strategies, in which Western groups advocate ideas and practices based on programs and projects designed outside the country; and responsive strategies, in which Western groups solicit requests from and respond to the requests of local representatives and potential grant recipients.

The investigators relied on the comparative social science method, which examines similarities and differences across contexts.[24] In most cases we asked the investigators to contrast either the same strategy in different contexts or different strategies within the same context. Three case studies in this book compare strategies in a specific sector in two different countries, such as assistance to media in the Czech Republic and Slovakia or to women's groups in Hungary and Poland. Five case studies analyze the influence of different international NGO strategies on a specific sector in one country, such as different approaches by international NGOs to rebuild civil society in Bosnia or to help support women's groups or the environment in Russia.

We asked our investigators to evaluate and describe a range of issues that would gauge the effects of international assistance. These included the emergence of local organizations that had not existed during the communist era; the professional development of activists and organizations, including their economic sustainability; national or international networking and access to technology such as the Internet; the ability to work with media to enhance public awareness of issues; new legislation resulting from NGO efforts; and the empowerment of new groups in society.

Our approach contrasts with standard quantitative methods of evaluation favored by the assistance community.[25] Quantitative methods do offer useful data: It is helpful to know, for instance, that at the end of the Soviet period, a state had one political party and no NGOs, while now it has many parties and thousands of NGOs. Important numbers also relate to assistance dollars spent,

particularly in Russia, where at one point eight times as many U.S. dollars were spent on economic assistance as on democracy assistance, in stark contrast to policy makers' declarations of the importance of building democratic institutions.[26] However, numbers tell only a limited story. NGOs are engaged in a long-term incremental process of changing behavior and perceptions that is simply not linear or quantifiable. The number of dollars spent on assisting NGOs, for example, does not tell us about the behavior or effectiveness of advocacy groups. Similarly, the number of NGOs in a country does not tell us much about the nature of its civil society or its social capital, both of which are seen by funders as central to a democratic state and thus to funders' overall goals.[27]

This project instead pursued *qualitative* assessments of international NGO strategies. This type of evaluation is labor intensive and requires regional expertise, but it provides a more detailed picture of developments. Because the investigators are social scientists and had independent funding, they were free from many of the usual constraints on evaluators, such as discussing only the parts of society that assistance had targeted (e.g., the "democrats") or focusing only on "good news." While local NGOs may resist external evaluation, the international NGOs and funders were cooperative, because the investigators were primarily academics and because this study was not done on behalf of an NGO or a major donor to the region.[28]

We asked our investigators to analyze whether and in what ways local settings shape responses to international NGOs, whether some settings are more conducive to positive response than others. At the most general level we analyzed the degree to which a country's integration into the international community affected the work of international NGOs. By integration into the international community we mean the degree to which both the government and the citizens in these new states have tended, over time, to embrace norms, ideas, and practices common to the democratic states of Western Europe and North America. These include the rule of law, respect for human rights, and transparency in competitive elections. They encompass formal institutional structures such as the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe and less formal ones such as a free press. The inclination toward integration does not strictly follow geography: Although more states farther west tend to favor these ideas and practices, there are exceptions. Estonia, for example, has been more inclined toward integration than either Slovakia or Serbia.

We identified three general types of integration that affect and constrain the effect of international NGO strategies:

- *Thickly integrated states*, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, are those whose populations and governments have largely embraced the international, and specifically European, community.

Their political and social institutions, while still fragile, are developing in a relatively uncontested fashion. Their officials widely follow Western political rules of the game.

- *Thinly integrated states*, such as Slovakia under the Meciar regime and Russia, are those where national identity is still highly contested; integration into the European community is uneven; institutions remain incomplete and function poorly; and officials follow Western political rules only in an uneven and often superficial way.
- *Unintegrated states* are those such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan where little or no integration into the international community has occurred and where one party or faction virtually rules the country without the participation of diverse groups.
- Bosnia makes up a fourth category, as a de facto international protectorate. It is unique in our study, but Kosovo since has become another example.

We expected that the more integrated the state and society within, the thicker the transnational democracy network would be. Conversely, in less integrated states and societies, such as those in the Central Asian cases, we expected to find a greater divide between the international donor community and the local population.

SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES

The case studies follow a common research design and presentation. Each begins by outlining the historical legacy and political context of the country. It highlights what the international NGOs found when they began work, as a baseline against which to measure developments. Each case study then explores the strategies that international NGOs used to pursue their goals. For example, it specifies whether international NGOs focused on infrastructural assistance to grassroots organizations or to elites and what the basic organizational issues were, such as whether they relied upon local staff or foreigners in decision making. Investigators pursued a set of questions with international NGOs as well as with the local groups that the international NGOs had worked with. Where possible, to provide comparisons investigators also interviewed or observed groups and individuals that had not come directly into contact with foreign assistance.

The cases offer comparisons across countries in different issue areas, as well as assistance from different types of international NGOs. The chapters examine support for women's groups in Poland, Hungary, and Russia; for independent media in the Czech Republic and Slovakia; for environmental groups in Kazakhstan and Russia; for civil society in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; and, finally, for the reconstruction of civil society in Bosnia. The international NGOs studied

include private foundations such as the Soros, Ford, and MacArthur foundations, as well as NGOs that received funding from national governments, such as the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal, the Network for East West Women, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), and the European Union–sponsored programs under Poland and Hungary: Action for the Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE).[29]

WOMEN IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

In Poland and Hungary the Communist Party intervened in almost every aspect of life until 1989. Women were able to establish mass organizations only under the direction of the party. Ambitious communist rhetoric and the existence of large and well-organized women's groups, however, did not mean that socialism's promise of gender equality had been fulfilled. As in other countries, women were paid less than their male counterparts and were barely represented in positions of power.

Since the fall of communism in 1989 the process of democratization has proceeded at a comparable rate in Poland and in Hungary, and women in both countries have experienced similar challenges. Changes in the early 1990s exacerbated existing economic disparities between men and women, and to one degree or another women throughout the region suffered disproportionately from political uncertainty and economic restructuring. Moreover, the anticommunist paradigm engendered a patriarchal backlash as these societies struggled to reestablish their traditional cultures. Yet despite their initial similarities, the diverse and fairly well developed landscape of women's NGOs in Poland looks dramatically different from the still fledgling and unorganized activities in Hungary.

In chapter 2 Patrice McMahon assesses the strategies of international foundations and NGOs for helping the women of Poland and Hungary respond to the challenges posed by the transition to democracy and the market in the postcommunist period. She distinguishes strategies in terms of the identity of the beneficiary (infrastructural assistance to organizations versus human capital development); the terms of involvement or method of transfer that the international NGO used (proactive or imposed strategies versus reactive or responsive ones, and elite-centered versus mass-focused approaches); project-based strategies in terms of their orientation to process or to product; and short- versus long-term involvement.

The effectiveness of international NGO strategies, McMahon finds, is constrained in these two countries by variations in governmental support for the sector, the strength of indigenous NGO culture and traditions, and the different challenges facing women in these countries. Ten years after the fall of communism the landscape of women's organizations in Poland differs tremen-

dously from that in Hungary. In Poland infrastructural assistance has had a large influence on the number and the diversity of women's organizations that were established after 1989 and that continue to exist today. Hungary has attracted fewer international donors and international actors to the plight of women's advocacy. Polish women's NGOs, McMahon observes, appear to be better organized and are far more active outside the capital than their Hungarian counterparts.

Overall, while McMahon's chapter provides more evidence of the power of transnational networks than others in this book, it also illuminates many of its complexities. McMahon argues that international NGOs have been crucial to institution building and that the strongest women's NGOs in Poland and Hungary are those that have had support from international NGOs. However, international involvement has not been the sole driving force in the development of women's advocacy groups. Indeed, its effect has been paradoxical: While international involvement has sped up the process of building a nascent women's lobby and has promoted the development of a feminist consciousness, it has also resulted in the isolation and even ghettoization of women's NGOs that neither depend upon nor seek to support local women or national governments.

WOMEN IN RUSSIA

For most of the Soviet period there were no independent public associations in Russia. The Communist Party did create a number of social organizations that enjoyed nominal autonomy, but they depended on the regime for funding and personnel and served more as a means of social control than of empowerment. During perestroika in the late 1980s, while official women's organizations promoted an ideal of Soviet womanhood, a number of activists came together to form the first independent women's movement since the 1917 revolution.

Although Russian feminists often met with indifference and hostility at home throughout the Soviet period, they were able to forge ties with women in the United States and Western Europe. In chapter 3 James Richter analyzes the efforts of transnational feminist organizations and donors to support a network. Richter categorizes strategies according to the tasks that the organizations and donors sought to accomplish (building NGO infrastructure, public advocacy, or community outreach), the identity of their beneficiaries (individuals or organizations), and their terms of involvement (comparing, for instance, grants to individuals or organizations for a specific project with multidimensional grants to enable organizations to accomplish a range of services).

As in Poland and Hungary, international support of women's organizations in Russia has been, Richter argues, a mixed blessing for the construction of civil

society. In many ways international engagement has made it possible for the women's movement simply to survive. Although some independent feminist organizations would have carried on without outside assistance—indeed, some have done so—they probably could not have remained sufficiently active and connected to be called a movement if Western money had not sustained a core of organizations. These core organizations have not only survived but become vigorous participants in Russia's growing third sector of professional nonprofit organizations that interact with state and market actors. Donors' efforts to encourage Moscow organizations to reach out to the regions have been particularly successful. The political successes of some organizations have also ensured that each of the three major power centers of the Russian government—the Duma, the Federation Council, and the presidential apparatus—has a committee or commission devoted to issues concerning women and families.

Yet by creating a cadre of professional activists involved in their own networks, norms, and practices, international assistance has in some ways widened the distance between the Russian women's movement and the rest of society. The nongovernmental sector may have been strengthened, but the effect on civil society is uncertain. As civic associations have become more institutionalized and professionalized, they have frequently been transformed into more hierarchical, centralized corporate entities that value their own survival more than their social mission. Their dependence on international assistance has often forced them to be more responsive to outside donors than to their internal constituencies. As in the case of Poland and Hungary, by selecting feminist organizations over other women's organizations, donors assisted organizations whose goals were, from the outset, more firmly based in the transnational network than in Russian society. Their dependence on that network has had the unintended consequence of removing incentives to mobilize new members and of fostering competition for grants, resulting in mistrust, bitterness, and secrecy between and within organizations.

MEDIA IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA

The Czech Republic and Slovakia share a common background, having been constituent republics of the Czechoslovak Federation from 1918 until the Velvet Divorce of 1993. They began the postcommunist transition in 1989 with similar legal and political environments and with comparable (albeit not identical) media cultures and structures. In both countries international democracy assistance—including projects designed to support the development of independent media—began at roughly the same time and with similar strategies. However, while the Czech Republic increased its integration with Western institutions by becoming a member of NATO and a first-round candidate for membership in

the European Union, democratic consolidation in Slovakia took a different turn. When Vladimir Meciar was reelected prime minister in 1994, he instituted a semiauthoritarian regime characterized by harassment of the political opposition, independent media, and minorities. Subsequently, both NATO and the European Union refused to grant Slovakia membership until it elected a new government committed to Western integration in 1998. A comparison of the Czech Republic and Slovakia permits examination of how the same strategies work, or fail to work, in political environments both hospitable and inhospitable and how in some instances international assistance organizations have subsequently adapted to these different political conditions.

Karen Ballentine's analysis of media in the Czech Republic and Slovakia focuses on the strategies of several international NGOs and especially on variations in the targets of their assistance. In chapter 4 she compares human capital development aimed at individuals with infrastructural assistance aimed at media outlets and at development of the regulatory environment. Within these categories she compares product-oriented and process-oriented strategies: those that focus on the long-range, incremental development of media skills and infrastructure and those aimed at delivering a specific product for a specific need, such as consultation on a draft media law. She also describes assistance strategies as either selective—those that restrict assistance only to beneficiaries that meet specified criteria of eligibility—or nondiscriminatory, those that aim to spread the benefits of assistance to the media sector at large. Most commonly, this meant limiting assistance to the media that were not state run or, in some cases, to media that could demonstrate their potential commercial viability.

Ballentine finds that international support has had a positive influence in shaping the norms and practices of the postcommunist media in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia: It has enhanced their professionalism and their viability and has helped to integrate them into the larger transnational media community, which in many cases overlaps with the transnational democracy network. Contact with Western groups has also made a large difference for many individual journalists and has helped keep some nongovernmental media alive. But Ballentine finds that the relative importance of this support depends in large part on more general trends. Where the consolidation of democracy has been relatively unproblematic, assistance may facilitate the development of the independent media but not determine its existence. In contrast, where democratic transitions remain partial or are threatened by significant reversals, assistance may be necessary to ensure the material and financial basis necessary for independent media to operate.

Context looms large in Ballentine's findings. She argues that strategies should include responsiveness to the needs of the various local media; attention to building strong local partnerships; a focus on infrastructural needs as well as individuals' skill building; provision of long-term, specialized, skills-oriented

training by local talent rather than short-term general training by outside advisers; and strategically limiting support to a small number of niche projects sustained for a longer period of time.

ENVIRONMENT IN RUSSIA

The environmental degradation in Russia as a result of the Soviet legacy is among the worst in the world. The controlling nature of the state aggravated the damage: Environmentalism in the Soviet Union was either an outright fiction or, at best, an effort by the Communist Party leadership to turn what could have been autonomous social organizations into state-sponsored and state-controlled entities. With Gorbachev's policies of perestroika in the late 1980s, however, an active environmental movement did emerge but fell into relative obscurity after 1992. In the post-Soviet context constant changes in state environmental institutions, their often conflicting responsibilities, and the shifting content of environmental legislation have produced a highly unstable and often perplexing setting in which environmentally concerned citizens, advocacy groups, and decision makers must operate.

Acknowledging that most programs encompass a wide range of activities and strategies, Leslie Powell compares strategies in terms of their goals (building civil society versus cleaning up the environment) and their recipients (grassroots versus elite). In chapter 5 she distinguishes strategies that originated indigenously from those that were imported and those that were project based from those that had interactive support.

Powell finds that the success of these assistance programs cannot be measured in terms of improvements in the environment or in terms of greater consciousness among national or local decision makers for environmental issues. Instead, the success of these programs lies in assisting in the establishment and development of environmental advocacy organizations in Russia and, to some degree, in helping to establish new democratic channels between civil society and the political elite for participation and the articulation of interests. Nearly all environmental aid from the West has gone to this third sector in Russia rather than to the state or commercial sectors. Western engagement has empowered social actors, created communication networks both horizontally and vertically, raised the level of public awareness of both environmental and democratic issues, and helped to make civil society groups more professional, organized, and strategic in their planning and activism. She finds that greater positive influence correlates strongly with the degree to which strategies are interactive or responsive to local concerns and to which they encourage coalition building, partly as a result of the demonstration effect of working alongside Western groups. Her findings add to our understanding of how ideas and practices diffuse inside states.

Powell finds that environmental aid has had conspicuously little effect to date on the environment itself or on the implementation of environmental policy. Powell identifies three major reasons for this failure. The first is the weakness of the state, which has exerted little control over industrial and commercial interests and has a difficult time policing itself. Second, channels for articulating societal interests are still weak: The state enjoys a high level of autonomy with respect to the mass public and is not accountable, while democratic processes are either absent or dysfunctional. Third, the link between environmental issues and economic-industrial issues is unbreakable: The sheer magnitude of the two types of problems and their connections to each other make addressing only one and not the other an ineffectual way to resolve environmental issues.

ENVIRONMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN

In the Gorbachev era environmental activism in Kazakhstan centered on protest movements against the testing of nuclear weapons in Semipalatinsk and elsewhere. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the political climate relaxed considerably, and Kazakhstan witnessed a proliferation of independent organizations across various issue areas. At the same time, however, the environmental situation worsened as the government began to develop the vast energy reserves in the Caspian Sea basin. The environmental NGO sector was fairly well developed in Kazakhstan at the time of independence, and it continued to grow for the first few years afterward. However, even as the environmental situation deteriorated, large-scale environmental movements disappeared from the political arena.

In chapter 6 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal focus on the energy sector. They analyze three primary strategies that environmentally oriented international NGOs in Kazakhstan pursued: the provision of small grants and technical support to local NGOs, assistance in information collection and dissemination, and training in decision-making techniques and grant-writing skills to empower local actors and communities to address their own problems.

While local NGOs have proliferated in recent years, the authors find that the NGOs have played a decreasing role in environmental policy making since independence. They argue that this is a result of both domestic and international constraints. At the domestic level local NGOs face institutional obstacles in a political system that has become more restrictive since 1994, and they lack access to organizational resources because of Kazakhstan's continued economic decline. These constraints derive directly from the Soviet legacy as well as from the political developments in Kazakhstan since independence: Limited democratization involves restrictions on press freedom and political mobilization.

At the international level the frequently conflicting interests and strategies of multiple actors—including international NGOs, international donor organizations, foreign oil companies, and foreign governments—have hindered rather than enhanced the role of local NGOs in promoting environmental protection in the energy sector. Efforts have left local NGOs atomized and depoliticized. While outside groups (many with funds from USAID) support local environmental organizations in the hope of promoting a vigorous civil society, they sometimes usurp the local organizations' role, for example, by sending in foreign consultants to draft legislation and advocate specific regulatory regimes. The economic interests of Western oil companies have also directly competed with local NGOs' efforts at democratic activism.

Paradoxically, the authors conclude, international efforts to foster democracy appear to have undermined, rather than contributed, to a robust environmental movement in Kazakhstan. Although local environmental NGOs have grown in numbers because of the financial support of international NGOs, the environmental movement is overwhelmingly reliant on international assistance for its survival, a dynamic that is reinforced by domestic political constraints on activism. In light of the domestic and international constraints, local environmental movements have had little incentive to increase their membership locally. Instead, the goals and strategies of environmental activism have converged with those of donors, toward education on less salient issues such as biodiversity and outreach to the international community while ignoring the most pressing local environmental issues, such as the need for clean drinking water.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN UZBEKISTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN

International organizations have spent millions of dollars to promote democratization in Central Asia. USAID alone spends more than $11 million annually in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, two countries that represent contrasting levels of democratization in Central Asia. Uzbekistan is a highly authoritarian state, while Kyrgyzstan has taken more steps toward democratic reform. However, the two countries share similar Soviet institutional legacies, have similarly high levels of corruption, are both marked by a disjunction between formal and informal political and economic institutions, have low levels of economic development accompanied by an uneven distribution of wealth, and are both characterized by a weakened public sector infrastructure.

Much of the money earmarked for fostering democracy in the region finances strategies and programs that are designed to strengthen civil society. In chapter 7 Fiona Adamson considers the efforts of international organizations, government aid programs, international NGOs, and local NGOs. Adamson

evaluates several strategies, specifying the methods and programs within each strategy and the actors pursuing each strategy.

Adamson details a considerable shortfall between the vision of democracy and the actual results of democracy assistance programs in Central Asia. Western groups and their programs have not succeeded in penetrating deeply into society, and many have interacted with local conditions in ways that unintentionally aggravate a number of problems, such as corruption, income inequality, and aid dependence, all of which are obstacles to democratic consolidation. She finds, however, that the Western efforts have not been without achievements, the most notable of which have been the incorporation of local elites into transnational civil society networks, a growth in official and societal acceptance of NGOs as legitimate social actors, and a few small-scale community development successes.

Adamson's work illustrates the potential for "structural decoupling," whereby the organizational forms and stated aims of international actors diverge from the realities in practice as they struggle to reconcile the conflicts in the environments in which they operate.[30] Much of the ineffectiveness of democracy assistance can be attributed to the challenges that Western organizations encounter as they try to work in contexts that are radically different from those with which they are familiar. Most assistance organizations, for example, have their headquarters in advanced industrial democracies; their overall organizational structure, mission, macrolevel strategies, and programs reflect this context. Local branches, by contrast, must interact with local conditions and must adapt to these conditions in order to survive. Adamson finds a great deal of internal incoherence within international NGOs as a result of such mismatches.

In highly restrictive political and economic conditions like those found in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, democracy assistance strategies must be especially sensitive to local context. International NGOs need to be responsive and are helped to be so if they employ staff members who are familiar with the context. International actors must be more willing to work with a variety of local groups, such as local community structures and even "government NGOs" and religious organizations. If Western groups work exclusively with the so-called independent NGO sector (largely created by Western assistance), they will continue to reach only a small sector of society. International actors must pay as much attention to the effect that informal processes and institutions such as corruption and patronage networks have on their strategies and programs as they do to formal institutions.

RECONSTRUCTING CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOSNIA

Bosnia-Herzegovina has become a de facto international protectorate since the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995. International organizations such as NATO

make crucial decisions, including establishing electoral laws and determining who will sit on the constitutional court. As in prewar Kosovo, the international NGOs operate under severe constraints. The power to manage violence lies well outside the NGOs' realm; it rests with the twenty thousand multinational U.N. troops of the SFOR (Stabilization Force) and with the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the extremely high level of international engagement, the lessons of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding the effectiveness of international NGOs in helping to rebuild civil society in postwar conditions should be particularly strong.

In chapter 8, V. P. Gagnon examines five NGOs that use four types of strategies to help support civil society. He finds that the most effective strategies involve the physical reconstruction of communities. A key ingredient of success is that international NGOs encourage local actors and local NGOs to determine both priorities and projects: Those that use local expertise and develop strategies in accord with the specific local political context have a greater effect. Success is also more likely where international NGOs engage in an interactive two-way process rather than importing ideas and practices.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina case highlights a number of important lessons for international NGOs that aim to reduce ethnic conflict or to rebuild civil society. Merely generalizing from experience elsewhere, while overlooking the specificities and complexities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has limited the effectiveness of NGOs. For example, international NGOs' own dependence for funding on institutions such as USAID has so constrained some NGOs that they have invested in strategies in Bosnia, such as party building, that actually exacerbate problems because the existing political power structure is far too dominant. International NGOs are best able to strategize when their funding comes from donors that allow the NGOs familiar with the setting to determine priorities and projects based on what they find there and to operate with a long-range goals in mind. This freedom to maneuver helps resolve what is often a mismatch of the interests of donors and those of the society in which the international NGO is operating.

Gagnon concludes that NGOs and donors need to resolve the disconnects between the needs of society and the interests driving projects and priorities. His work suggests that the efficiency of the democracy network is inhibited when the various nodes in the network are not equally weighted. When outside voices are seen as more authoritative, the distortion is significant. Instead, Gagnon argues that international NGOs in Bosnia should work mainly on helping communities rebuild themselves and their civil society, rather than on importing notions of political party and civil society development derived from Western experiences. Attempts to build democracy in such contexts must come initially from the society in question; it is a mistake to assume that the local environment offers nothing on which to build and that all must be imported.

LIMITS OF THE STUDY AND CONCLUSIONS

The range of cases in this volume is considerable but is not a comprehensive guide to Western democracy assistance strategies in East-Central Europe and Eurasia. No project of this size could reasonably examine the work of the hundreds of international and indigenous NGOs engaged in political transition across the regions. Even in the larger study we could not cover every sector or every country, and we have further limited our focus here to concentrate on a few main areas in which U.S. and European NGOs worked and a representative sample from across the regions. The lessons from these cases should, however, be of interest to practitioners in the field as well as to scholars engaged in the study of transnational influences on internal developments and world politics.

Although this project examined political and social change across the postcommunist states, the findings are by nature a snapshot. Transnational democracy networks and efforts at democracy assistance are extremely vulnerable to jolts, both from the states themselves and from the international system. Shocks come in a variety of economic and political forms, including currency devaluation and war. For example, events in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 had devastating effects on democratization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and negatively affected the West's relations with Russia. Russia's second war in Chechnya, starting in 1999, brought with it a general climate of fear spread by federal authorities under President Vladimir Putin and signaled a retreat from human rights in Russia.

Despite such shocks, this project's focus on strategy allowed participants to ask questions that were independent of the day's events and that pointed out changes that need to be made in Western efforts to help develop and sustain political and social institutions in postcommunist societies. Regardless of the institutionalization of certain practices and ideas, this book suggests that the democratization process is fragile and influenced greatly by issues and forces beyond the control of any one part of the network.

James Scott has observed that "a mechanical application of generic rules that ignores . . . particularities is an invitation to practical failure, social disillusionment, or most likely both."[31] Our investigators encountered this repeatedly in their fieldwork. Investigators often found the same strategies in use across a wide spectrum of states in different stages of international integration and internal transition; the implicit assumption was that one strategy fits many. In the final chapter Mendelson details the implications of these findings for the policy and scholarly communities and recommends changes in strategies to enhance the influence of international NGOs and transnational networks and thereby also the possibility of supporting sustainable institutions in postcommunist societies.

The outcomes of international NGO strategies depended in large part upon the kind of interaction that the NGO had within the local context. A comparison

of the case studies shows that international NGOs have played a large role in helping to build institutions commonly associated with democracies but have done little to help these new institutions function well. Because some of these institutions are functioning at a minimal level, if at all, the international NGO strategies have not yet contributed to their sustainability.

The case studies find, for example, that local NGOs and media outlets have become common all across East-Central Europe and Eurasia. In the Czech Republic and in Slovakia international assistance helped to launch self-sustaining media organizations and has supported the creation of local independent television stations. International assistance has been central to the formation of networks of women's organizations in Poland and Hungary. Similarly, in Russia international NGOs have had an impressive effect in helping to sustain women's groups. Such returns for relatively small investments are noteworthy, particularly when we compare these developments to how undeveloped the advocacy groups and other aspects of civil society were in these countries just a few years earlier.[32]

However, international NGOs have had little influence on the effectiveness of the institutions that they helped to create. In nearly every case the investigators found that the new institutions had weak links to their own societies. For example, local environmental NGOs have proliferated in Kazakhstan as a result of financial support from international NGOs, but their political influence has declined. Whereas an environmental movement was central to political reform and independence in the late Soviet period, today it shies away from addressing pressing environmental issues, such as uranium tailings in drinking water. In Poland, Hungary, and Russia women's groups have multiplied even as they have been unable to attract significant domestic support, growing closer to their transnational partners than to the constituents whom they are meant to represent or to the governments that they hope to influence. Each chapter, and especially the concluding chapter, suggests ways in which foreign donors and NGOs might alter their strategies and practices to address the operational nature of new institutions and thereby enhance their effectiveness and sustainability.[33]

Our investigators identified practices and ideas that had little or no local institutional history and traced them to the work of the international NGOs. In certain cases this tracing was relatively simple, because locals had begun to use new and imported terminology on issues ranging from focus groups to feminism and from biodiversity to election monitoring. Investigators could identify changes in behavior that correlated with Western efforts, but they could not say definitively that Western efforts caused the changes. In other cases they found unintended consequences of new speech and behavior. Giving aid to new political parties lacking deep ties to society, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, risks exacerbating divisions within society rather than creating channels for the democratic

articulation of citizens' interests.[34] For example, encouraging political parties to engage in door-to-door canvassing can provoke a backlash in a context where political visits to private homes may lack a peaceful connotation. Many local groups proliferated in Poland, Hungary, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan around issues that Western donors found important but that lacked wider local resonance. International NGOs providing assistance to women's groups frequently encountered clashes between Western and local perceptions of the most pressing issues for women. Rather than fostering ties with the broader groups that these local NGOs were to represent, these strategies often ended up isolating the NGOs from their communities.

In countries with little or no history of democratic tradition, postcommunist transitions appear to be influenced by how groups reconcile ideas and practices common in the international community with their long-held domestic beliefs and customs. In cases where Western ideas and practices in some way complement the organizational culture of a specific local group, activists are receptive to them. If ideas and practices help solve specific problems (such as increasing a candidate's electoral chances), local activists are particularly likely to adopt them. In contrast, NGOs tend to reject, based on a "logic of appropriateness," ideas and practices that appear to compete with local customs or beliefs.[35]

The case studies reveal frequent clashes of ideas and practices with local customs and beliefs. For example, in several new states in Eurasia local NGOs were, for much of the 1990s, reluctant to coordinate advocacy campaigns with political parties or trade unions because of the negative historical legacies from the Soviet period, when these states used parties and unions to suppress civil society. In Poland, Hungary, and Kazakhstan the interests of donors—whether in forming a network of feminists or in addressing biodiversity—competed with the everyday problems of feeding families and getting clean drinking water. The case studies in this project underscore the finding that a variety of forces—organizational, historical, economic, environmental, and political—limit international NGOs' efforts, although these efforts may be central to many small projects and capable of influencing change on a local stage. The influence of international NGOs appears to be particularly inhibited if they fail to pay attention to these forces.

The diffusion of ideas and practices beyond the people and organizations with which international NGOs work is an important unexamined dynamic in assistance. New practices in media and civic advocacy groups in many countries have, for example, spread across the political spectrum to nationalists and communists. Some NGOs are now considered legitimate in parts of Central Asia. The general public, not just self-proclaimed feminists in Eastern Europe and Russia, is beginning to recognize crisis centers that deal with the consequences of domestic abuse and rape. Such diffusion of ideas and practices underscores

the process by which larger populations begin to alter their conceptions of issues fundamental to democracy, such as advocacy on behalf of citizens and protection of civil liberties and human rights.

This summary cannot, of course, do justice to the complexities of each case in this book. We hope that this chapter will help orient the reader to the theoretical concerns at hand as well as the case studies that follow.

NOTES

1. No one yet has done a comprehensive study. For thoughtful analyses of aspects of the issue, see Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Nancy Lubin, "U.S. Assistance to the NIS," in Karen Dawisha, ed., *The International Dimension of Postcommunist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, pp. 350–78 (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1997); Thomas Carothers, *Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996); Mark S. Johnson, "An Evaluation of Strengthening Russian Democracy Through Civic Education" (an assessment prepared for the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C., September 1998); Sarah Henderson, "Importing Civil Society: Foreign Aid and the Women's Movement in Russia," *Demokratizatsiya* 8, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 65–82; Matthew Lantz, "The Democratic Presumption: An Assessment of Democratization in Russia, 1994–1998," Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University, September 1998.

2. The Institute of War and Peace Studies and the Harriman Institute of Columbia University obtained funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York for this project, which was overseen by Jack Snyder and other faculty. Sarah E. Mendelson was the director of research for the project, and John K. Glenn, who shared in the planning and direction of the research, was a postdoctoral fellow with the project.

3. USAID frequently asks the NGOs that it funds to supply it with success stories, which agency officials then use in testimony before Congress. See, for example, "Russia's Economic and Political Transformation: Some Results of USAID Support to Date," *USAID Report,* Spring 1995. See also Strobe Talbott, "Spreading Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (November–December 1996): 47–63.

4. Figures for democracy assistance are notoriously difficult to calculate. Carothers calculates the average funding for democracy assistance in this period as less than 10 percent of total aid to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (*Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 61). See table 1.1 for details of assistance from the United States and European Union to Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

5. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (November–December 1997): 22–43.

6. On problems associated with economic assistance to the regions, see Janine Wedel, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989–1998* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998).

7. See Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and the Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); and Peter F. Drucker, *Managing in a Time of Great Change* (New York: Dutton, 1995). See also Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

8. Claus Offe, "Cultural Aspects of Consolidation: A Note on the Peculiarities of Postcommunist Transformations," *East European Constitutional Review* (Fall 1997): 67.

9. Paul Stubbs, "NGOs and the Myth of Civil Society," *ArkZin*, January 1996, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/role/globdem/credib/2000/1121.htm (November 12, 2001). See also David Samuels, "At Play in the Fields of Oppression," *Harper's*, May 1995.

10. See Václav Havel, *Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965–1990*, ed. Paul Wilson (New York: Vintage, 1991); Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Antipolitics: Opposition and Reform in Poland Since 1968* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).

11. See Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992).

12. See Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, "Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross-nationally," working paper no. 22, the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Baltimore, Md., 1996.

13. Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy," *Demokratizatsiya* 4, no. 3 (1997): 114.

14. *Transnational* in this context refers to "regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization" (Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Nonstate Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], p. 3).

15. For a review of the literature see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887–918. On human rights see Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America," *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 411–42; Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 451–78; and Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On the security focus see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 613–44; and Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Nonuse," *International Organization* 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 433–68. On the environment see Paul Wapner, "Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics," *World Politics* 47, no. 3 (April 1995): 311–40.

16. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 1.

17. Ibid., p. 8.

18. The Universal Declaration for Human Rights can be found on the U.N.'s Web site, http://www.un.org (November 12, 2001). Other documents can be found at http://www.osce.org (November 12, 2001) and http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/ (November 12, 2001).

19. American NGOs include the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute; the Eurasia Foundation; the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia; the American Center for International Labor Solidarity; World Learning; the International Foundation for Election Systems; and Internews. Private foundations such as George Soros's Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation have additionally spent millions of dollars in the region. For a more complete list see M. Holt Ruffin, Alyssa Deutschler, Catriona Logan, and Richard Upjohn, *The Post-Soviet Handbook: A Guide to Grassroots Organizations and Internet Resources*, rev. ed. (Seattle, Wash.: Center for Civil Society International/University of Washington Press, 1999).

20. This volume is part of an emerging literature suggesting the pathologies as well as the power of transnational networks. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 324–48; Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstetler, "The Sovereignty Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in U.N. World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women," *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (October 1998): 1–35; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 699–732.

21. Jeffrey W. Legro has effectively highlighted the dynamic of international versus domestic norms in "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism," *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 31–63.

22. The group of invited experts included Jeanne Bourgault, formerly of USAID in Moscow; Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former legal adviser at the U.S. Department of State; Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; Larry Garber from USAID; Michael McFaul, associate professor of political science at Stanford University; and Kathryn Sikkink, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota.

23. Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, "Democracy Assistance and NGO Strategies in Postcommunist States," working paper series no. 8, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., February 2000. Cases that informed the project's findings but are not included here include developments in political parties and elections in Russia (Sarah Mendelson); technology assistance to women's groups (Tina Nelson); Ukraine (James Clem); the Czech Republic and Slovakia (John K. Glenn); developments in independent media in Russia (Anne Nivat) and Ukraine (Marta Dyczok); the promotion of civic education in Romania (Sandra Pralong); and attempts by Western NGOs to reduce ethnic conflict in Estonia (Vello Pettai) and in the states of Central Europe that are home to the Hungarian and Roma diaspora

(Sherrill Stroschein). For an overview of the findings see Sarah E. Mendelson, "Unfinished Business: Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Eastern Europe and Eurasia," *Problems of Postcommunism* 48, no. 3 (May–June 2001): 19–27.

24. See, for example, Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), and Max Weber, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation," in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, pp. 164–88 (New York: Free Press, 1949).

25. See, for example, "USAID/Russia Activity Description as of March 31, 2000," and "Russia's Economic and Political Transformation: Some Results of USAID Support to Date," *USAID Report*, Spring 1995. These documents are available on request from USAID, Washington, D.C.

26. For statements see then-secretary of state Madeline Albright's address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 16, 1999; and then-deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott's address to Harvard University, October 1, 1999.

27. Bill Clinton, "Remembering Yeltsin," *Time*, January 1, 2000; Strobe Talbott's testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, April 4, 2000, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/00040407.htm (November 12, 2001); and Clinton's address to the Russian Duma on June 5, 2000, all cite the presence of sixty-five thousand NGOs in Russia. None of these speeches mentions that NGOs have been subjected to a campaign of harassment by Russia's federal authorities. See Sarah E. Mendelson, "The Putin Path: Human Rights in Retreat," *Problems of Postcommunism* 47, no. 5 (September–October 2000): 3–12.

28. A partial explanation for the reluctance of local NGOs to welcome external evaluation may be found in the organizational constraints under which they operate. When NGOs themselves evaluate their work, they tend to keep the focus of inquiry quite narrow. In contrast to companies engaged in economic assistance in the regions, NGOs tend to have little financial flexibility and small staffs. They are often overextended in their work: Many have field offices in several countries and incomplete control of these outposts. Beyond basic attempts to demonstrate that they have met their short-term (usually six-month) goals—such as how many activists they trained—many NGOs have not viewed it as in their organizational interest to spend precious resources (time, staff, budgets) on anything beyond the evaluation of specific programs. Additionally, when strategies are determined from outside the countries in which they operate, NGOs may not focus on evaluations of these strategies or how they vary according to local conditions. Finally, like any other organization, many NGOs and their donors are reluctant to acknowledge a need for change in either strategies or programs.

29. PHARE originally was an acronym for the European Union's program called Poland and Hungary Action for the Reconstruction of the Economy. The program subsequently became the EU's main instrument for financial and technical cooperation in thirteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe and still is known by its original acronym.

30. John Meyer, *Organizational Integration in Lesotho Primary Education: Loose Coupling as Problem and Solution* (Meseru, Lesotho: Primary Education Project, 1995).

31. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 318. See also Albert Hirschmann, "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance for Understanding," *World Politics* 22, no. 3 (April 1970): 323–43.

32. The United States allocated approximately $10 billion (FY1992–FY1998) for all bilateral assistance to Eurasia; only $850 million went for democracy assistance to the even larger area of Eurasia and East-Central Europe combined.

33. See also Mendelson, "Unfinished Business."

34. In Burundi assistance to unformed political parties had the unintended consequence of increasing ethnic divisions, thereby paving the way for the mass killings that followed elections in 1993. See Michael S. Lund, Barnett R. Rubin, and Fabienne Hara, "Learning from Burundi's Failed Democratic Transition, 1993–1996: Did International Initiatives Match the Problem?" in Barnett R. Rubin, ed., *Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action*, pp. 47–91 (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1998).

35. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989).