The Cold War on the Periphery, by Robert J. McMahon

5. Forging an Alliance, 1953-1954

 

DURING THE 1952 election campaign, and throughout his early months in office, President Eisenhower tried to distance his approach to foreign affairs from that of his predecessor. Despite the more aggressively anticommunist pronouncements issued by Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, however, a strong degree of continuity obtained between the foreign policies pursued by Truman and those adopted by his successor. Indeed, the differences lay more in rhetoric than in substance. On the most fundamental issues, such as the definition of America's global interests and the identification of likely threats to U.S. security, distinctions between Truman and Eisenhower are almost impossible to draw.

Like its Democratic predecessor, the new Republican administration saw the Soviet Union as an implacable and dangerous adversary whose military power and ideological appeal had to be contained. Diplomatic and defense officials in the Eisenhower administration continued to view Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East as the principal theaters of Cold War conflict. But just as their counterparts during the Truman presidency came to accept the global scope of both American interests and the Soviet threat, so too did Eisenhower administration strategists view the entire world as a battleground between East and West. Not even the death of Josef Stalin early in 1953 altered the conviction that the United States was engaged in a death struggle with the Soviet Union and its allies. The "free world," according to this formulation, could not accept any additional loss of territory to the Soviet bloc without suffering a serious political and psychological setback.

For all these basic continuities, Eisenhower's foreign policy exhibited some important tactical shifts, one of which bore profound implications for U.S. policy toward South Asia. Convinced that fiscal realities placed limitations on Washington's capabilities, the Eisenhower administration cultivated allies and sought to construct regional alliance systems with much greater vigor than had the Truman administration. More alliances, according Eisenhower, Dulles, and their chief advisers, served several U.S. goals simultaneously. They enabled the United States to encircle the Soviet Union with nations formally committed to the West; they provided for the commitment of local manpower if a global or regional conflict erupted, thus promising to save American lives; they offered great deterrent power by erecting an American security shield that might discourage Soviet or Chinese aggression against any state aligned with the United States; and they provided a psychological boost to nations sympathetic to or aligned with the United States by demonstrating that history and momentum lay with the West. Dulles often remarked that nations needed to stand up and be counted. The Cold War involved issues of enormous historical and moral weight; fence-sitting was not a tolerable option. Given such views, which the new secretary of state expressed in public with frequency and passion, it should not be surprising that the ascension of Eisenhower and Dulles generated very different reactions in Karachi than in New Delhi. ₁

Indian leaders worried--and with good reason--that the new administration in Washington might create additional barriers to Indo-American cooperation and friendship. Despite their frequent clashes with the Truman administration, Indian policymakers recognized that a coalition of liberal Democrats in Congress had consistently expressed strong support for India and had worked hard to gain more economic assistance for India. They also realized that in Chester Bowles, a partisan Democrat almost certain to be replaced by the new administration, India had the strongest possible advocate of its cause serving as the chief U.S. representative in New Delhi. The Eisenhower administration, on the other hand, counted Congress's conservative Republicans among its core constituencies, a bloc whose members had issued some of the most stinging rebukes of Nehru's foreign policy. During the presidential campaign, moreover, Eisenhower's promises to prosecute the Cold War with greater vigor struck Indian observers as dangerously militaristic. ₂

The strained personal relationship between Nehru and Dulles added another obstacle to warm bilateral ties. Nehru considered the American diplomat an anticommunist ideologue unsympathetic to the stirrings of Asian nationalism. The two had crossed swords long before Dulles achieved his lifelong ambition of heading the State Department, the clashes exacerbated by the self-righteous arrogance so characteristic of both men. In January 1947, months before Indian independence, Dulles had complained publicly that "in India Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the Interim Hindu Government," a charge immediately challenged by an enraged Nehru. ₃ India's criticism of the Dulles-negotiated Japanese peace treaty, and its refusal to sign that pact in 1951, contributed to the personal animosity. Dulles attributed Nehru's opposition to an "Asia for the Asians" creed that India shared with China and that sought the complete elimination of American influence from Asia. Nehru found the accusation unfathomable and, along with Home Minister Rajagopalachari, turned to Alexis de Tocqueville's classic exploration of the American psyche for an explanation of what they agreed was an amazing impatience with the smallest censure and an insatiable need for praise and support. ₄

Eisenhower and Dulles sought to assure Indian leaders that they had nothing to fear from the transfer of power in Washington. Meeting with Ambassador Pandit shortly after the election, Dulles told her that the new administration would pay more attention to Asia than had its predecessor. The next day, Eisenhower instructed Dulles to send a message to Nehru, "assuring him of my great and continuing concern for his leadership toward peace and understanding in the world. . . . I believe that we must work hard to restore much of the damage that has been done to our friendship with the Arab and Indian worlds." ₅

Despite those assurances, early decisions by the Eisenhower administration revealed a diminished American interest in India and its problems. From New Delhi, Bowles repeated his by-then familiar arguments about India's crucial importance to the United States in a series of spirited messages to Eisenhower, Dulles, and other senior policymakers. He urged the new administration to adopt a tolerant attitude toward Indian nonalignment and to provide the economic aid essential to India's survival. Bowles especially warned against any military commitment to Pakistan, insisting that it would "be attacked by Indians of every shade of opinion and every walk of life" and would lead to "a definite and dangerous deterioration in our relations with India." ₆ Although top administration officials agreed with Bowles that American interests would be served by the development of India into a stable and prosperous state, they were sure that the ambassador exaggerated the case for India's importance. They also viewed Indian nonalignment with a more jaundiced eye than their envoy in New Delhi. "There is no indication, either privately or in the press," observed Henry A. Byroade, the recently appointed assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, "that India is prepared to abandon at this time or in the near future its non-alignment policy in order to give greater support to the free world." ₇

The new administration also parted company with Bowles on the contentious issue of economic assistance. The ambassador had succeeded in squeezing a $200 million commitment for India into the Truman administration's proposed mutual security budget for fiscal year 1954. NEA supported that figure in a recommendation sent to Dulles on March 3, 1953, but the secretary of state balked. "I doubt that this amount is either justified by the facts or could be justified to Congress," he informed Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith. He directed the State Department to make a significant reduction in the funds earmarked for India. In compliance with Dulles's instructions, the department suggested a $60 million cut in the India program, a recommendation that met with the secretary's immediate support. ₈ Predictably, Bowles exploded, blasting the aid reduction as "a prelude to disaster." ₉ Even the ever-optimistic Bowles must have realized, however, that Washington's shifting political currents worked against any expansion in the aid program for nonaligned India. The 1952 elections brought firm Republican control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives; strong conservative majorities in the two chambers ensured that India's needs would receive an even less sympathetic hearing than during the previous congressional session. Indeed, by the time Dulles appeared on Capitol Hill to defend the administration's foreign aid proposals, the House Appropriations Committee had already reduced the India allotment by an additional $30 million. Taken together, those reductions cut the Truman administration's original $200 million proposal almost in half. ₁₀

Despite Bowles's open campaign to retain his post, Eisenhower and Dulles decided shortly after the inauguration to remove their combative ambassador. His outburst over the India funding cut must have just confirmed for them the wisdom of that decision. On March 23 a despondent Bowles departed India. The new administration, he believed, had no understanding of Indian realities and even less appreciation for "the complete and fundamental change that we have managed to bring about in India's attitude." ₁₁ His proposed replacement, career foreign service officer George V. Allen, currently serving as ambassador to Yugoslavia, was a traditionalist as unlikely to adopt Bowles's missionary approach to diplomacy as he was unlikely to buck policy made by his superiors. ₁₂

The administration's initial attitudes and actions regarding South Asia demonstrate a much greater affinity for Pakistan than for India. Dulles sent an unequivocal signal of Eisenhower's intentions to Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan shortly after the election. The secretary of state-designate told Zafrulla during a private talk that developing stronger relations with the Muslim and Arab worlds would be a major priority for the new administration, and it realized that "the Government of Pakistan could be very helpful in this connection." Clearly Dulles had Pakistan's relationship to the muddled Middle East picture uppermost in his mind. ₁₃

The first test of their commitment to Pakistan came much earlier than Eisenhower or Dulles could possibly have anticipated. On January 28 Zafrulla and Pakistani Ambassador Mohammed Ali Bogra came to call at the State Department with an urgent plea. After detailing "with great grief" the rapidly worsening food situation in Pakistan, they requested that the United States supply 1 to 1.5 million tons of grain on an emergency basis. The State Department quickly recognized the opportunities--and risks--presented by the Pakistani request. "The political importance of assisting Pakistan in this matter is of a very high order," Byroade wrote Dulles. A career army officer and West Point graduate who had served in the China-Burma-India theater during the war and risen with amazing speed to the rank of brigadier general, Byroade had recently resigned that commission to become an assistant secretary of state. He was rapidly emerging as one of the most vigorous advocates within the State Department of deeper Pakistani-American ties. "Pakistan is potentially an important contributor to Middle East defense and is strategically located between free Asia and the Middle East," the former general argued. But its "basically friendly leadership has weakened during the last year," challenged by a diverse array of religious, anti-Western, and communist opponents. "Failure of the government to take adequate action in a food crisis," Byroade warned, "would most certainly lead to still greater internal disorders and difficulties with increased jeopardy to the security interests of the US." Consequently, the assistant secretary recommended that the administration agree in principle to meet Pakistan's emergency need for wheat, determining at a later date the exact amount and form of the aid. "The risk involved in our not acting to assist Pakistan in its food emergency is too great for us to accept," he concluded. ₁₄

Dulles agreed. Convinced that Pakistan was facing the specter of imminent starvation, and eager to help shore up a "most friendly" government that was experiencing severe financial and political problems, he urged Eisenhower to accept Byroade's recommendation. Since a request of such magnitude required congressional action, Dulles and Eisenhower agreed that a special mission be dispatched to Pakistan at once to collect additional data before submitting a formal request to Congress. That mission arrived in Pakistan early in April, only days before Dulles himself departed Washington for his first visit to Pakistan, part of a broader tour of South Asia and the Middle East. ₁₅

During the administration's early months, few international issues occupied policymakers' attention as much as the stability and security of the Middle East. As had their predecessors, Dulles and Eisenhower found the question of how best to preserve Western influence in that vital area unusually vexing. The Anglo-American position in the region seemed to deteriorate almost daily. The stalemated negotiations between Britain and Egypt over the future disposition of the mammoth British base at Cairo-Suez and the complex issue of sovereignty over Sudan effectively thwarted movement on the MEDO initiative. In early February Prime Minister Churchill pressed Eisenhower to reaffirm U.S. support for the proposed Middle East Defense Organization. The president agreed to abide by Truman's commitment. He and Dulles feared, however, that the increasingly acrimonious Anglo-Egyptian negotiations might further encourage the neutralist inclinations of the government headed by General Mohammed Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, thus fatally undermining MEDO's prospects. ₁₆

Eisenhower administration planners continued to emphasize Pakistan's strategic salience to any regional defense plan. But their thinking in this regard suffered from the same lack of precision and specificity that characterized the efforts of their predecessors. ₁₇ Eisenhower administration strategists in the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom still subscribed to the logic of aiding of sucPakistan in the context of a broader regional defense arrangement, just as they continued to pay homage to the MEDO concept. The Middle East's seemingly intractable disputes, however, forced the temporary shelving of those plans. ₁₈

Dulles's tour of the Middle East and South Asia in May 1953 afforded ample opportunity to reexamine the assumptions underlying those plans. The secretary of state conveyed his initial impressions to Eisenhower in a cryptic cable of May 17. "Bitterness toward [the] West, including [the] United States," he said, is "such that while Arab good will may still be restored, time is short before loss becomes irretrievable." ₁₉ That gloomy assessment only darkened further with each visit to another Arab capital. Dulles grew convinced that none of the Arab states possessed the vision, the will, or the strength necessary to help contain the communist threat to the area. He was particularly alarmed at the instability that obtained in Egypt. There was a singular bright spot, however. On May 26, following a series of meetings with top Pakistani civil and military officials, Dulles offered the State Department a glowing assessment of the "one country that has [the] moral courage to do its part in resisting communism." Emphasizing that Pakistan's "genuine feeling of friendship . . . exceeded to a marked degree that encountered in any country previously visited on this trip," he recommended early action on the wheat loan and proposed that the administration "need not await formal defense arrangements" in the Middle East before providing Pakistan with some military assistance. ₂₀

Dulles's trip to Pakistan occurred at a critical moment in the political evolution of the young country. On April 17, 1953, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin, appointing as his replacement Mohammed Ali Bogra, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States. The change of power at the center carried profound implications for Pakistani domestic politics and for relations between Karachi and Washington. Most important for the Eisenhower administration, it signified the ascendancy of the civil bureaucracy and the military establishment--groups that had actively courted American support--over their political and religious rivals. ₂₁

The reasons for the coup, as with nearly everything else connected to Pakistani politics during this turbulent period, are complex. The issuance of the Nazimuddin Report in December 1952, setting forth a blueprint for Pakistan's first constitution, brought to a head a number of sensitive religious, political, economic, ethnic, and provincial issues, issues that had plagued Pakistan since partition. Pakistan's senior civil servants and military officers found Nazimuddin's proposed constitution especially threatening in two areas: it gave too much power to the traditional Muslim religious leaders and it provided the province of East Bengal (East Pakistan), where more than half of the country's population resided, a majority in the lower house of the national legislative assembly. Essentially, Nazimuddin's vision of the future Pakistani state was incompatible with that held by the bureaucratic and military elite. Men such as Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, Defense Minister Iskander Mirza, and Army Commander-in-Chief Mohammed Ayub Khan believed that only a strong, centralized state with a powerful military and a strong bureaucracy could ensure Pakistan's survival--and, not least, their own fortunes. Given the nation's desperate financial plight, its deteriorating security situation, and various internecine disputes pitting provinces against center, devout against secular, and Bengalis against Punjabis, to name but the most prominent, they reasoned that American military and economic assistance might provide a measure of salvation. Yet Nazimuddin, with his opening to the mullahs, the Bengalis, and others whose interests ran counter to those of the civil-military axis, was moving the nation in a different direction. ₂₂

During the early months of 1953, key governmental and military mandarins grew increasingly disillusioned with the prime minister. Acting in concert with the high military command, Ghulam Mohammed ultimately decided to oust Nazimuddin in order to further secure his own grip on power, strengthen the institutional position of the bureaucracy and its military allies, staunch some of the religious, ethnic, and provincial tensions exacerbated during Nazimuddin's eighteen-month tenure in office, and present the United States with a more friendly, stable, and cooperative regime as a potential regional partner. General Ayub Khan told an American diplomat that the fall of Nazimuddin was a "God-given" act, confiding that "he had worked hard to have something along this line accomplished." ₂₃ Ghulam Mohammed deliberately chose a weak individual to replace Nazimuddin. A civil servant of mediocre abilities, with no independent base of support, Mohammed Ali Bogra was best known for his excessive praise of everything American. Indeed, he was so enthusiastically pro-American that during one of his conversations with Dulles in Karachi the new prime minister jokingly acknowledged the common rumor that he was "controlled" by Washington. Ghulam Mohammed likely saw the former envoy to Washington as a figurehead whose personal relationships with American policymakers might help Pakistan gain critically important military and economic support but who would not pose a threat to the senior civil servants and military officers who controlled the real levers of power in the country. ₂₄

American officials recognized immediately that the bloodless coup in Karachi created a much more positive atmosphere for the Dulles mission. The U.S. embassy in Pakistan called the action the most important political event since the Liaquat assassination, describing Nazimuddin's fall as a "definite triumph of progressive elements in Pak[istan] over religious reactionaries and those willing to give in to such reactionaries." ₂₅ The State Department agreed. "The change in government constituted a real turning point in Pakistan's short history," it noted in a summary dispatch. Applauding the emergence of the "energetic, progressive-minded Mohammed Ali" and his pro-American cabinet, the department hailed the likelihood "of a more active and determined approach to the solution of internal political and economic problems." ₂₆

As already noted, his visit to Karachi in May 1953 confirmed for Dulles the validity of those assessments. The secretary of state was gratified, especially so in the wake of his frustrating meetings with Arab leaders, to find a nearly total congruence of worldviews between the American team and its Pakistani hosts. Dulles came away from the discussions convinced that Pakistan would be a most worthy recipient of American aid--just as the new governing elite hoped he would. In addition to several friendly talks with Mohammed Ali Bogra, in which the new prime minister pledged Pakistan's support for any U.S. initiative aimed at strengthening regional defense, the secretary of state also spoke with one of the major, behind-the-scenes power brokers in Pakistan, Mohammed Ayub Khan. The Sandhurst-trained Ayub was characteristically direct about his two main concerns: the needs of the Pakistani army and the willingness of Pakistan to align itself with the United States. According to a State Department memorandum of Dulles's conversation with Ayub, the general expressed his conviction that the United States, "which admittedly is the leader of the free world today, should not be afraid to openly aid those countries which have expressed a willingness, and even desire, to cooperate with the United States. He reiterated the potential, both in manpower and bases that is available in Pakistan and [said] that his country under the present Government is extremely anxious to cooperate with the United States." ₂₇ Another key power broker, Ghulam Mohammed, was equally direct in his bid for U.S. support. During a meeting with Lt. Col. Stephen J. Meade, Dulles's military adviser, the governor-general said he was anxious to obtain a $100 million loan from the United States to help Pakistan weather the current economic storm. Assuring his American visitor that the new government had turned back the "fanatical" forces of religious fundamentalism, he declared that Pakistan "must turn toward the West, particularly the United States." ₂₈

On June 1 Dulles expressed his revised views about the Middle East in a report to the National Security Council. He stated that Egypt and many of the other Arab states were too preoccupied with internal problems and too complacent about the Soviet threat to be dependable allies. Consequently, the old concept of MEDO with Egypt as its nucleus, he said flatly, "was certainly finished." Instead, Dulles suggested that Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran--the so-called northern tier states--could be induced to form a regional alliance that would be far stronger than one based on Egyptian cooperation. Describing himself as "immensely impressed by the martial and religious characteristics of the Pakistanis," the secretary of state said he believed that Pakistan would serve as a "potential strong point for us" in any regional defense grouping. ₂₉

With the president's approval, throughout the summer and fall of 1953 State and Defense Department planners explored the northern-tier alternative. They focused particular attention on Dulles's suggestion that a pact between Turkey and Pakistan might provide the initial impetus for a broader regional grouping. This proposal was discussed in depth at a meeting of the NSC on July 9. In introducing a draft of a new policy paper on the Middle East (NSC 155), National Security Adviser Robert Cutler emphasized that Egypt could no longer be depended upon to provide the cornerstone of a regional defense structure. "On the other hand," he said, "the so-called northern tier of nations, stretching from Pakistan to Turkey, were feeling the hot breath of the Soviet Union on their necks and were accordingly less preoccupied with strictly internal problems or with British and French imperialism." The new policy paper, approved by the president at the meeting, criticized such previous efforts as MEDO as Western impositions totally lacking in local support. To build a viable, indigenous organization, the paper recommended that the United States first encourage Pakistan to enter into an agreement with Turkey--as those two nations were strategically located, friendly to the West, and willing to cooperate--and later expand the pact to include Iran and Iraq. The prospects for adding Iran to the proposed defense grouping improved substantially after a U.S.-supported coup deposed the aggressively nationalistic regime of Prime Minister Mossadeq in August 1953. The proposed Turco-Pakistani agreement, then, was to serve as the nucleus for a broader regional defense arrangement, with Washington relegated to a behind-the-scenes role and at least the pretense of an indigenous defense effort rigorously maintained. ₃₀

As those strategic designs were being refined, the administration offered Pakistan aid on another front. On June 10 Eisenhower sent a special message to Congress, requesting that one million tons of wheat be made available as quickly as possible to help alleviate Pakistan's severe food shortages. Two days later, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Agriculture and Forestry, Dulles shared the positive impressions he had gained about Pakistan during his recent trip and urged support for the administration's request. Pakistan's leaders were sincerely friendly to the United States and "will resist the menace of communism as their strength permits," he remarked. Their need for wheat, moreover, was great and urgent: "Failure on our part to help Pakistan promptly and in the measure needed would permit disaster." ₃₁

Congress moved swiftly to support the administration's proposed wheat loan. On June 25, just two weeks after Eisenhower's message to Congress, the president signed a bill that provided Pakistan with the one million tons of wheat it had first requested several months earlier. Republicans and Democrats joined in an unusual display of bipartisan unity to support the legislation. In sharp contrast to the sniping and acrimony surrounding the India wheat-loan bill of 1951, emergency food aid for Pakistan generated little controversy. Democratic Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia doubtless spoke for many of his colleagues when he cited Pakistan's consistent support for U.S. foreign policy as one of the key factors influencing his vote. "In my own scrutiny of the foreign-aid programs," he declared, "I propose to be much more generous with nations whose friendship to us is unquestioned." ₃₂ The implicit comparison with India was so obvious that Russell and most of the bill's other enthusiastic supporters saw little need to spell it out.

The issues presented by the wheat-loan request were relatively simple and straightforward, permitting a speedy response. Complex diplomatic initiatives, on the other hand, often entail a significant lag between conceptualization and actualization. Such was the case with the northern-tier proposal and the conjoined question of military aid to Pakistan. By late summer 1953 planners at the Defense and State departments had tentatively endorsed the rationale first advanced by Dulles for moving forward on both matters. Building on the strategic concept initially set forth during the Truman administration, they envisaged Pakistan playing a potentially significant military role in the Middle East region if global war between the Soviet Union and the West should suddenly erupt. In cooperation with Turkey, U.S. military strategists calculated, Pakistan might help retard a Soviet advance toward the Persian Gulf oil fields and toward important Western-controlled military installations, thus buying time for the United States and Great Britain to launch a full- scale air assault from their Middle Eastern bases against vulnerable Soviet targets, especially the crucial oil fields of the Caucasus region. ₃₃

Still, a series of unresolved details about this strategic concept proved especially nettlesome: How realistic were the prospects for Pakistan making a meaningful military contribution to such a defense effort? How much military aid would the United States need to provide in order to enhance sufficiently the capabilities of the Pakistani armed forces, and what form should that aid take? Should arms be given only if Pakistan adhered to a regional defense pact? Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted that the Pentagon's senior uniformed officers had not yet answered those questions satisfactorily in their own minds. The likely Indian reaction also vexed U.S. diplomatic and defense officials. How vociferous would it be? What could the United States do in advance to contain the damage to Indo-American relations certain to follow an arms deal with Pakistan? The complexity of those essential questions, coupled with normal patterns of bureaucratic caution, produced a decision-making process that many Pakistanis--who had already been informally notified of American plans--considered glacial. ₃₄

In an effort to force an immediate policy decision, General Ayub Khan insisted on meeting with senior American officials in the United States. On September 30, the man described by the U.S. embassy in Karachi as the "strongest individual in Pakistan" and the "person to talk to" met with Dulles in the secretary's office. ₃₅ Known for his direct, often blunt, manner, the Pakistani army's commander-in-chief told Dulles he had come to Washington for one purpose: to acquire military assistance for the Pakistani army. According to the official State Department record of that conversation: "The Secretary observed, smilingly, that it was none of his business but he hoped General Ayub would get what he came for." When Ayub expressed frustration with the slowness of the American policy process, Dulles explained that the Defense Department had to complete a study of the feasibility and desirability of the proposal before a presidential decision could be obtained. He counseled patience. Dulles closed this frank colloquy by assuring Ayub that he was fully prepared to assist Pakistan militarily regardless of the Indian attitude. Quite understandably, Ayub believed that he had obtained the firm commitment that he sought. ₃₆

On October 9 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John D. Jernegan informed British counselor Harold Beeley that the United States had just reached a decision in principle to extend some grant military aid to Pakistan and that it was exploring appropriate means for doing so. Until then, the Eisenhower administration had kept its ally completely in the dark with regard to its plans for aiding Pakistan. Not surprisingly, the sudden notification caused consternation in London. Not only had Washington evidently abandoned the well-established pattern of close Anglo-American consultation on South Asian matters, but the American initiative also threatened to scuttle chances for a regional settlement. British experts believed that continuing Indo-Pakistani negotiations over Kashmir were fast reaching a climactic point, with better chances for a breakthrough than ever before. Military aid, in the view of Foreign Office analysts, would almost certainly prejudice those talks. "In return therefore for the uncertain prospect of future assistance from Pakistan," wrote Asian expert R. W. D. Fowler, "the United States proposal will spoil the more immediate prospects of improved relations between India and Pakistan, which can provide the only real basis on which a strong Pakistan, capable of playing a valuable role in western defense, can be built." ₃₇

Yet the British found themselves in an awkward position. If they sought to dissuade the United States from aiding Pakistan, as the Chiefs of Staff pointed out, Pakistan would almost certainly find out and relations between London and Karachi would be strained indefinitely. On October 16 British representatives told State Department officials quite bluntly that their government did not like the American proposal. At the same time, they stressed that they "would not wish to stand in the way" if the Eisenhower administration chose to ignore London's advice. Above all else, the British diplomats implored the United States to delay any definitive offer to the Pakistanis and to maintain tight secrecy about all plans. ₃₈

Within weeks Pakistan had lifted that veil of secrecy through a series of calculated press leaks designed to force a quick decision by the United States. On November 2 the New York Times, in a dispatch from Karachi, revealed that the United States was planning to form a military alliance with Pakistan. Two days later most major Pakistani newspapers reported that Washington was contemplating a military assistance program of at least $25 million for Karachi. Predictably, India responded with great indignation. The Indian minister called at the State Department on November 5 to register his government's opposition to any American alliance with Pakistan. Repeating a charge by then familiar, he said that military aid to Pakistan would bring the Cold War to the subcontinent. In response, Assistant Secretary Byroade insisted that the published reports were greatly exaggerated while conceding that for some months the United States had been considering the provision of military aid to Pakistan within the broader framework of Middle East defense plans. Such an arrangement, he said, would have no adverse impact on India. Leaders in New Delhi, however, thought differently. Nehru angrily asserted to a British diplomat that he did not believe the State Department's disclaimers. The aroused prime minister made a number of barbed public statements decrying the reported U.S. plans to arm Pakistan. The ensuing tangle of rumors, charges, and countercharges had the effect of moving sensitive deliberations from the secrecy in which they are ordinarily shrouded into the harsh glare of publicity. Public disclosure raised the diplomatic stakes for the Eisenhower administration substantially while constricting its policy options. ₃₉

Such was Pakistan's intention. Its principal military and political leaders, convinced of the need for American arms and support, hoped to rush a favorable American decision through a combination of public and private pressures. Along with the newspaper leaks, Pakistani leaders availed themselves of every opportunity to press their case with senior American representatives in Washington and Karachi. Following Ayub's departure from the United States, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed and Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan joined the procession to Washington. Like the general, they too underscored the necessity for U.S. support; the consequences of a rejection, both leaders warned, would be disastrous for their country's future orientation. Vice-President Richard M. Nixon heard the same refrain when he visited the Pakistani capital in early December. Ghulam Mohammed complained to him about the long delay by the United States in reaching a final decision on the much-discussed military assistance program. If the United States were to refuse grant aid now, after all the publicity, the governor-general declared, "it would be like taking a poor girl for a walk and walking out on her, leaving her with only a bad name." Of course, he conveniently avoided mentioning that his government had been the major source for the newspaper stories. Regardless, those entreaties, coupled with the publicity to which Ghulam alluded, made an early American decision virtually imperative. Pakistan proved extraordinarily adept in forcing the United States to respond to its agenda. ₄₀

By the end of November 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, who had followed the lead of the State Department in the formulation of the northern-tier concept, added their formal support to the proposed military assistance agreement with Pakistan. Like their counterparts at Foggy Bottom, the Pentagon's senior analysts now saw four broad advantages of such a pact: 1) it would increase the defensive strength of a pro-Western state with a large military potential and a strategic location for defending the Middle East; 2) it would tighten American-Pakistani ties and help overcome any latent neutralist tendencies in Pakistan; 3) it would pave the way for regional defense arrangements along the northern tier and possibly for the later acquisition of base rights; and 4) the "failure to follow through after recent publicity and statements by Nehru would disillusion [the] Pakistanis and give Nehru (as well as others) good reason to think we dance to his tune." To these, newly appointed Ambassador Horace A. Hildreth added a fifth: the government of pro-American Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra would be strengthened politically and economically. A decision against aid at this point, on the other hand, would lead to deep internal disappointment and disillusionment with the incumbent Pakistani leadership. ₄₁

To be sure, all interested parties within the American government did not share that perspective. Ambassador Allen registered vigorous objections to the administration's plans. On October 19 the embassy in New Delhi informed the State Department that its senior officers agreed that the Indian response to direct military aid to Pakistan "will be bitter and vigorous and will color and perhaps change [the] course of [the] United States-India relationship for [a] long time to come." ₄₂ Similarly, Henry T. Smith, deputy director of State's Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA), argued in a memorandum to office director Donald D. Kennedy that "any assistance [to Pakistan] would have to be on the premise that we had considered India's cold war and hot war importance and had decided that the smaller and much weaker country of Pakistan was more useful to us." He fundamentally disagreed with that perspective, as did Kennedy and most of SOA's analysts. "India is the power in South Asia," Smith importuned. "We should seek to make it our ally rather than cause it to be hostile to us. Pakistan is distressingly weak." ₄₃ Such skepticism was expressed most often by officials, like Allen, Smith, and Kennedy, who had direct responsibility for U.S.-Indian affairs and tended to view the proposed arms deal with Pakistan primarily in terms of its impact on the South Asia region. Convinced that broader global security issues were at stake in the plan for aiding Pakistan, Dulles, Byroade, Radford, Wilson, and other senior officials from State and Defense dismissed that perspective as a product of the narrow focus so typical of area experts.

The British government sought, with no more success than dissidents in Washington, to slow down the proposed U.S. initiative. On December 7 Foreign Minister Eden warned of the dangers of a military alliance between the United States and Pakistan during a private conversation with Dulles in Bermuda. Top officials from the Eisenhower and Churchill administrations had gathered at the resort island for discussions on a number of pressing international issues. Meeting at the beach after breakfast, the foreign secretary inquired about American intentions with regard to Pakistan. Dulles explained that his government had not yet decided precisely what form American aid to Pakistan would take. He implied, however, that it would most likely be part of a general defense plan for the area, including Turkey and Iran. In response to Eden's expression of concern about the possible effects of that pact on Western relations with India and Afghanistan, the secretary of state conceded that "these were bad." He added, however, that India might choose to remain neutral, but it could not claim the right to prevent other nations from lining up with the West. ₄₄

That view was shared by Vice-President Nixon, another increasingly vocal proponent of a Pakistani arms deal. Speaking to the National Security Council on December 16, he averred that it would be a fatal mistake to back down on the proposed aid package solely because of Nehru's objections; such a retreat would risk "losing most of the Asian-Arab countries to the neutralist bloc." At the next meeting of that highest policy body a week later, Nixon was even more blunt: "If we do not give aid to Pakistan," he argued, "we've got to find a way to not give it without giving Nehru the victory." Referring to his recent trip to Karachi, Nixon continued: "Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for. The people have less complexes than the Indians. The Pakistanis are completely frank, even when it hurts. It will be disastrous if the Pakistan aid does not go through." ₄₅

Dulles sent his final recommendations to Eisenhower in early January 1954. He reiterated previous plans calling for limited U.S. military assistance to certain key states that were strategically located and prepared to "stand up" to the Russians. In response to secret approaches, the secretary of state continued, both the Turks and the Pakistanis had expressed themselves in favor of a mutual defense pact on the understanding that the United States would subsequently provide military aid to Pakistan. He acknowledged that "we must expect quite a storm from India if we go ahead with a military program for Pakistan" but predicted that "we can ride out the storm without fatal effect on U.S.-Indian relations." In conclusion, Dulles suggested that "we can gain a great deal by going ahead," whereas "failure to do so at this juncture would be disastrous both to our relations with Pakistan and to the position of the present pro-American Pakistani Government. It would probably also be disastrous to our standing with the other countries of Asia, who would assume we had backed down in the face of Indian threats." ₄₆ At a White House meeting on January 5, Eisenhower agreed in principle to provide Pakistan with military assistance. The president stipulated, however, that his final approval depended on "our capacity to present this in a reasonable way." He suggested that a conciliatory statement be issued publicly and its main points repeated in a formal diplomatic note to India, making clear that the United States was not "trying to help Pakistan against India." The participants at the meeting--Eisenhower, Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson, and Mutual Security Administrator Stassen--concurred that the arms package for Pakistan needed to be presented as part of a regional security project being initiated by Pakistan and Turkey. They agreed as well that a similar pact should be offered to India--a purely tactical gesture since all realized that India would refuse such an offer. ₄₇

On January 14, after reviewing a State Department draft incorporating those points, Eisenhower finally approved the much-debated initiative. As he assented to the program, the president once again revealed his personal ambivalence. Emphasizing a continuing concern about the likely reaction in India, Eisenhower insisted that every possible public and private means be used to ease the impact of the announcement there. ₄₈

On Eisenhower's instructions, Ambassador Allen delivered a carefully worded letter to Nehru on February 24, the day before the public announcement of the U.S. decision. It explained the broader strategic rationale for the U.S. commitment to Pakistan and insisted that the program was directed solely against communist expansion, not against India. The letter even raised the prospect of a similar mutual security pact in the future between Washington and New Delhi. Nehru managed to hold his anger in check throughout the meeting with Allen, probably in large measure because the official notification was somewhat anticlimactic after months of speculation and rumors. Instead, he offered a "surprisingly friendly," if familiar, point-by-point rebuttal of the American position. After reading Eisenhower's letter and listening to the ambassador's explanations, the prime minister replied calmly that he never thought that the United States sought to hurt India. What disturbed him were not the motives of the United States in aiding Pakistan but the consequences of the decision. In addition to the international complications and the increased Indo-Pakistani tensions about which he had already publicly voiced his apprehensions, Nehru expressed the fear that American arms for Pakistan might intensify Hindu-Muslim communal tensions within India and thus tear at the very fabric of India's secular state. ₄₉

The prime minister, who inwardly seethed with rage over American meddling in the subcontinent, proved unable to maintain that composure for long. U.S. protestations to the contrary, Nehru was convinced that the decision to provide military aid to Pakistan was in large part a move directed against India. In a private letter to one of his ministers, Nehru had earlier averred that the United States wanted a strengthened Pakistan in order to check India's power within the region. "The United States imagine that by this policy they have completely outflanked India's so-called neutralism and will thus bring India to her knees," he wrote. "Whatever the future may hold, this is not going to happen. The first result of all this will be an extreme dislike of the United States in India." ₅₀

He was right. Virtually all segments of Indian public opinion joined with Nehru in a condemnation of the U.S. arms offer to Pakistan. The prime minister responded quickly to Eisenhower's letter by reiterating India's commitment to a nonaligned foreign policy; under no circumstances would it consider American military assistance. In a blunt address to the Indian Parliament, Nehru warned that the consequences of U.S. intervention in the affairs of South Asia were "bound to be unfortunate." ₅₁ The Indian leader revealed the depth of his resentment when in early March he requested the removal of all U.S. nationals serving as members of the UN observation team in Kashmir. "To give military aid to one party to a conflict . . . is obviously a breach of neutrality," Nehru complained to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. "No person coming from that country can be considered as disinterested or impartial by us." He declared such individuals "persona non grata" and insisted that they be removed promptly. ₅₂

Following Washington's announcement on February 25, 1954 of its decision to provide Pakistan with military assistance, ties between the United States and Pakistan developed rapidly. On April 2 Pakistan and Turkey concluded a mutual cooperation agreement, the pact that American officials hoped would serve as the nucleus for a broader regional defense grouping. Then, on May 19 the United States and Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, providing formal confirmation of Pakistan's alignment with the West.

Critics of the American-Pakistani alliance in the United States and abroad almost immediately charged the Eisenhower administration with a major political and strategic blunder. They contended that military assistance for Pakistan would deeply alienate India and Afghanistan, force those two nations to turn to the Soviet Union for military support, foster an arms race in the subcontinent, and foreclose prospects for the peaceful settlement of regional disputes. Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright reflected those concerns in a strongly critical statement, delivered on March 2 from the floor of the Senate. "I think the decision to supply arms to Pakistan at this time is an unfortunate mistake," the Arkansas legislator declared. "It is unwise to arm Pakistan and risk the alienation of India and its possible loss to communism. . . . When the investigating committees or historians of the future are trying to ascertain why we lost the friendship of India, I want it to be perfectly resentment when in early March hclear where the responsibility should be placed." ₅₃

A number of State Department specialists in South Asian affairs, including ambassadors Bowles and Allen, most of their associates at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi, and many of the foreign service officers in SOA and NEA, had cautioned against such a pact for precisely those reasons. They had been joined by senior British policymakers whose attempts to dissuade the United States from arming Pakistan were as persistent as they were unavailing. Bowles well captured the principal fears of the skeptics in a personal letter to Dulles of December 30, 1953. "I believe we will isolate Pakistan," he wrote, "draw the Soviet Union certainly into Afghanistan and probably into India, eliminate the possibility of Pakistan-Indian or Pakistan-Afghan rapprochement, further jeopardize the outlook for the Indian Five Year Plan, increase the dangerous wave of anti-Americanism throughout India and other South Asian countries, open up explosive new opportunities for the Soviet Union, gravely weaken the hopes for stable democratic government in India, and add nothing whatsoever to our military strength in this area." ₅₄

The response from Dulles, while perfunctory, is revealing. "As you know from your own experience," the secretary of state wrote Bowles in January 1954, "one rarely has the luxury in diplomacy of being able to choose a course of action which is all on the `credit' side of the ledger and entails no `debits' at all." With respect to the subcontinent, he continued, "we shall do our utmost to see that the benefits of any action we take outweigh the difficulties." ₅₅ The confident Dulles similarly sought to assuage the concerns of Senator H. Alexander Smith. One of the administration's most reliable supporters, the influential New Jersey Republican backed the arms deal with Pakistan but feared that it was "full of dynamite" and might cause an "open break" with India. ₅₆ Although he expected "some bitterness for a time" from India, Dulles told the worried legislator that "all indications are that there will be no serious breach in our relations." ₅₇ He assured Smith in a subsequent letter that "this matter will straighten itself out very quickly and without any undue annoyance." ₅₈

From Dulles's perspective the advantages of an alliance with Pakistan clearly outweighed any potential drawbacks. The secretary of state was evidently convinced that military aid to Pakistan would serve the overriding strategic objectives of containing the expansion of Soviet influence into a region of vital national interest and augmenting the defense of that region if a global conflict occurred. Consequently, senior military and strategic planners in the Eisenhower administration could dismiss with equanimity the cautionary provisos issued not only by some of the administration's own top experts on South Asian affairs but by officials in Great Britain as well.

In spite of the air of self-assurance emanating from Dulles and other top policymakers, the strategic vision that animated U.S. plans for Pakistan remained curiously inchoate and inconsistent. How, specifically, would Pakistani adherence to a weak regional organization help stabilize the Middle East? What, precisely, did Pakistan require in terms of U.S. aid to transform its military into a force capable of playing a meaningful role in regional defense? And what, realistically, were the prospects for Pakistan assuming even a modestly helpful role in the event of a Soviet incursion into the Middle East? The failure of U.S. planners to address effectively those fundamental questions suggests that the American embrace of Pakistan rested on a deeply flawed strategic concept. One searches through the voluminous American planning documents in vain for a more concrete explanation of the role that Pakistan was expected to play in the containment of Soviet influence and power, in war or in peace.

Ever since partition, of course, defense officials had identified Pakistan as an inviting geostrategic target of opportunity for another reason: because its proximity to the Soviet Union might allow the United States to gain access to valuable air bases there. Respected military analyst Hanson Baldwin called attention to this aspect of the Pakistan aid deliberations in a series of articles appearing in the New York Times in November and December 1953. In one story, almost certainly based on Baldwin's privileged access to high-level Pentagon sources, the veteran reporter noted: "From the air point of view, airfields in Pakistan or northwest India, though not essential, would complement fields at Dharan in Saudi Arabia and in Turkey and British fields in Iraq." Such bases "would make more vulnerable to attack Soviet positions in Southwestern Asia." ₅₉ An article appearing at about the same time in U.S. News & World Report struck a similar note. "As a base for strategic bombers," it observed, "Pakistan's airfields, modern and numerous, are within easy reach of Soviet Central Asia, including the Ural and Siberian industrial areas far distant from U.S. bases in the Mediterranean and Arabia." ₆₀

Those highly publicized stories, which had erroneously speculated that Pakistan was prepared to swap air bases for U.S. arms, had prompted formal protests from the Soviet Union and China, as well as a series of angry public demonstrations in India. The resulting controversy impelled Pakistani officials to disavow openly any hint of a bases deal with the United States. There "has never been any question of granting military bases in Pakistan to the United States," Ghulam Mohammed insisted in a widely circulated public statement. ₆₁

Future negotiations over the acquisition of base rights could not be precluded, of course, a point cited by the Defense Department in its support of the Pakistani arms proposal. Clearly, the availability of Pakistani bases would be useful, although not indispensable, in any military conflict with the Soviet Union. Either implicitly or explicitly, that prospect was almost certainly factored into all U.S. assessments of Pakistan's overall strategic worth. The issue of present or future base rights, however, does not appear to have played any more than a secondary role in the genesis of the Pakistani-American security relationship. Pakistan's presumed salience to the defense of the Middle East stood as the primary force driving American policy at this time. ₆₂

Defense analysts in Great Britain fully shared the American commitment to defend the Middle East in wartime and to preserve Western influence in peacetime. They roundly criticized the U.S.-Pakistani defense pact, nonetheless, as a measure that was at best irrelevant to those broader objectives and at worst could be "positively harmful," especially in view of India's likely reaction. "It would also be ostentatiously provocative to the Soviet Union," the Foreign Office contended, "without providing any real deterrent." ₆₃ The British Chiefs of Staff agreed with their American counterparts that defending the Middle East ranked as a critical strategic objective for the West. The Anglo-American military aim, in the event of global war, was to hold the Soviets as far as possible to the north and east in order to safeguard the Anglo-American military bases required for the planned allied air assaults on Soviet territory, to secure the southern flank of Turkey, to protect as much of the Middle East as possible, and to secure at least a significant proportion of the region's oil fields. British and American planners were in essential agreement about those objectives; where they differed was on Pakistan's potential contribution to their achievement. Even if backed by Iran and Iraq, Foreign Minister Eden reasoned, Turkey and Pakistan would form only a modest deterrent that "would be insufficient to resist a serious Russian attack." ₆₄

However imprecise and flawed American strategic thinking might have been in this regard, there is little foundation for Nehru's conviction that the U.S. commitment to Pakistan derived primarily from an anti-Indian animus. A generation of Indian scholars has, unfortunately, repeated and embellished that charge. To this day it remains an article of faith in Indian academic circles that the initial U.S. commitment to Pakistan was intended largely as a rebuke to India. Standard accounts by Indian scholars of Indo-American relations hold that Washington's rancor toward New Delhi, more than any other factor, created the Pakistani-American alliance and has shaped the relationship between the two nations ever since. ₆₅ That Indocentric view slights the broader global dimension of U.S. policy. Diplomatic and defense officials had been carefully weighing Pakistan's geopolitical value to overall U.S. Cold War policies since shortly after partition. The rationale for a U.S. arms deal with Pakistan was framed especially by America's perceived military and political vulnerabilities in the Middle East and the possibility of acquiring at a later date base sites in Pakistan; those concerns had little or nothing to do with India.

This is not to argue, on the other hand, that American planners ignored the India factor during their policy deliberations. Quite to the contrary, U.S. officials recognized from the outset that Indo-American relations would be dealt a severe blow if Washington inaugurated a military aid program for Pakistan. That prediction gave the Truman administration pause, even after it had developed a compelling strategic justification for such a program. It caused President Eisenhower to make his final approval of an arms pact contingent on the strongest possible reassurances being given to India. But in the end most administration analysts simply did not believe that India's anticipated reaction provided sufficient grounds for delaying the agreement with Pakistan any longer. Intelligence specialists calculated that, even though the Indian leadership would with near-unanimity bristle at an arms program for Pakistan and tensions between Washington and New Delhi would surely escalate, those factors by themselves were unlikely to "cause any major alteration in Indian foreign policy." According to an interagency intelligence report, circulated by the CIA on January 15, India "would almost certainly seek to avoid a clear-cut break with the US and its allies, to whom India looks for markets and for economic aid." Its nonaligned policy left it "little additional room for maneuver"; moreover, "there is virtually no major act of reprisal India could undertake against the US without jeopardizing its own interests." Given their already parlous state, then, the additional damage rendered to Indo-American relations by a military commitment to Pakistan would be far from irreparable. ₆₆

The India factor influenced the consummation of the U.S.-Pakistani alliance in another important respect. India's noisy, public protests against the proposed arms deal, orchestrated by Nehru well before a final decision had been reached in Washington, forced U.S. policymakers to speculate about the possible repercussions of a decision not to grant aid to Pakistan. Such a seeming reversal of policy, according to the intelligence estimate of January 15, "would mean a loss of US prestige, since India has protested violently against such aid and the USSR and Communist China have registered objections." Dulles stressed the same point in his final recommendation to Eisenhower. U.S. officials feared, in short, that a decision against aid to Pakistan, whatever the actual reasons for such a decision, would be widely interpreted as a reluctant U.S. concession to Indian pressure. Not only would U.S. prestige suffer, but Pakistan would conclude that India possessed veto power over U.S. policy initiatives in South Asia. In addition, "India would probably be encouraged to use similar pressure tactics against the US on other occasions. India's attitude toward a Kashmir settlement would not change and its reluctance to bargain with Pakistan on other issues would increase." ₆₇ It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion, then, that India badly overplayed its hand; its vigorous protests against the rumored U.S.-Pakistani military pact, aimed at preemption, could scarcely have been more counterproductive. During the final stages of the U.S. policy debate about arms for Pakistan, Eisenhower administration strategists paid nearly as much attention to the political and psychological perils of a negative decision, in lieu especially of India's threats, as they did to the presumed strategic advantages of a positive decision.

Of course, the India factor influenced the U.S. commitment to Pakistan in a far broader sense as well. American disillusionment with and devaluation of India formed a necessary precondition for the American military commitment to Pakistan. Policymakers in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had come to disparage India's salience to U.S. Cold War objectives in much the same way that they had come to doubt India's willingness to support those objectives. Bowles, Henderson, McGhee, and a number of other diplomats had tried repeatedly to make the case for India's centrality to American interests in Asia. The case always rested on a weak foundation, however, especially for planners accustomed to evaluating military and diplomatic assets in more concrete terms. India lacked the crisis-driven significance typically attached to an area undergoing a major internal upheaval or subject to a serious external threat. Similarly, it lacked the manifest or latent strategic value traditionally associated with a nation possessing the industrial infrastructure, raw materials, skilled manpower, or base sites that contribute to military power. India, in short, did not fit any of the geopolitical and geostrategic categories that Cold War planners most valued. Dulles and most other top policymakers in the end proved unwilling to forfeit the gain of a tangible asset, in Pakistan, for the sake of appeasing temporarily an intangible and uncertain asset, in India.

If Indo-American relations had been spared some of the tensions present since independence, perhaps U.S. officials would have been less willing to run the risks associated with choosing Pakistan as an ally. If a stronger pro-India lobby existed in the United States, perhaps it could have brought more pressure to bear on the Eisenhower administration. With relations already deeply troubled on nearly every front, however, and with the ranks of those willing to make a case for India's importance depleted by Nehru's unyielding nonaligned posture and his persistent criticisms of American foreign policy, the cautionary pleas of Indiophiles like Bowles largely fell on deaf ears.

The harshly anti-Indian statements of politicians such as Senator William F. Knowland reflected attitudes about India much more widespread than those advanced by the apologetic Bowles. The California Republican, who assumed the pivotal majority leadership position in the Senate following Taft's death in July 1953, made known his distaste for India's "utterly unrealistic" brand of neutralism at every possible opportunity. Nehru did not speak for Asia, Knowland insisted. "When the chips were down [in Korea]," he declared disdainfully in January 1954, "India was not there." For him the contrast with Pakistan, "a country far more realistic about the dangers facing the world from communism," could not have been more stark. "To withhold American aid [from Pakistan] because of the protest of neutralist India would be discouraging to those nations willing to stand up and be counted on the side of the free world." ₆₈ Even former Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, a man who had come to epitomize postwar liberalism, acknowledged his unease with India's Cold War posture. Before journeying to India in the summer of 1953, the recently defeated Democratic presidential candidate noted that one of the questions that most puzzled him was: "Why do Indian leaders sometimes talk as though the United States was as great a threat to peace and freedom as Soviet Russia?" ₆₉

American misgivings about Indian foreign policy--coming from all sides of the political spectrum--were increasing rather than decreasing throughout Eisenhower's first year in office. Indeed, during the summer and fall of 1953, at the very time that diplomatic and defense officials in Washington were trying to reach agreement on the nature and extent of the proposed U.S. commitment to Pakistan, a series of knotty disputes once again exposed the raw nerves at the center of the Indo-American connection. Indian allegations about U.S. interference in Kashmir, stalled negotiations regarding an air transit agreement between the two countries, sharp differences over the Korean armistice talks in general and India's role on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in particular, and American anger with India's export of thorium nitrate to China--all bear eloquent testimony to profound differences between the two nations in terms both of national interests and cultural perceptions. Reflecting on those multiple problems, Jean Joyce of the U.S. embassy in New Delhi confided to her former boss, Chester Bowles, that Indian attitudes toward Americans were "at a low ebb" and that U.S. attitudes toward Indians--"equally low," in her opinion--were "touched with acid." Among Americans and Indians alike, she lamented, "bitter disillusion and low, abysmally low, morale are universal." ₇₀

The curious case of the thorium nitrate shipment is especially revealing of the gulf that separated Washington's view of the world from New Delhi's. The crisis was joined when, on July 17, 1953, an Indian government-owned firm consigned a shipment of just over two tons of thorium nitrate to a Polish vessel departing from Bombay and bound ultimately for China. The implications of this commercial transaction quickly became apparent to U.S. officials. An atomic energy material, thorium nitrate was listed as an embargoed commodity under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1951. According to the terms of that legislation, commonly known as the Battle Act, any nation trading embargoed materials to the Soviet Union or its satellites, which included China, could not receive any form of military, economic, or financial assistance from the United States. ₇₁

Ambassador Allen emphasized to Nehru the seriousness of a situation that might compel the Eisenhower administration to terminate all aid programs in India. The Indian prime minister "stated categorically and with some vehemence," Allen reported, "that India had never and would never submit to derogation of its national sovereignty in permitting United States law to determine with whom and in what commodities India could trade." As he had several times previously, Nehru insisted that India would never accept the "attachment of political strings to aid"; it could, therefore, not accept the provisions of the Battle Act as binding. The ambassador parried that while he had every respect and sympathy for India's sovereignty, all nations receiving U.S. aid, including India, had implicitly accepted the terms of the Battle Act. ₇₂

The two nations appeared set on a collision course, India's pride and sensitivity in the face of the unambiguous mandates of a U.S. law leaving little room for compromise. Nonetheless, diplomats on both sides, as is their wont, desperately explored every possible avenue for conciliating the dispute short of an aid cut-off. Nehru made those efforts even more difficult by remaining adamant about India's sovereign right to trade with whatever nation it pleased. Bending over backward to respect India's sensitivity, Allen assured the prime minister that the United States acknowledged that right. The veteran diplomat, who had handled his share of equally vexing diplomatic problems during previous postings in Iran and Yugoslavia, asked only that Nehru agree to inform the United States in advance before trading items on the Battle Act prohibited list. Nehru did not even pay Allen the courtesy of a response. Instead, he "stared at [the] ceiling for [a] full minute, smiled, turned to Ambassador [William J.] Donovan, who was present, and asked if he had ever been to Thailand before." ₇₃

Concerned about the implications of an abrupt cancellation of U.S. aid programs in India, looming ever more likely in the face of Nehru's intransigence, Dulles offered a compromise solution that India eventually found acceptable. Essentially, India agreed to state publicly that the thorium nitrate shipped to China was intended only for commercial purposes, that it had been unaware of the Battle Act implications of the transaction, and that, although it could not accept the provisions of that act as binding, there was no basis for anticipating future shipments of such commodities to prohibited destinations. For its part, the United States agreed to purchase all of the thorium nitrate that India desired to export at a price acceptable to the two nations. ₇₄

This unusually complex dispute demonstrates just how precarious, tentative, and infused with misunderstandings the Indo-American relationship had become even before the formal U.S. commitment to Pakistan. A commercial transaction that Nehru dismissed at first as a trivial matter nearly caused an abrupt cancellation of U.S. economic assistance, with results, as Dulles worried, sure to be "very unfortunate." If Battle Act strictures had been applied, the secretary of state realized, an early resumption of aid would have been extremely difficult. Consequently, "we would find ourselves in [the] rather untenable position of believing increased stability in India as very much to our interest but not being able to do anything about it. The boost to the communist propaganda line in India and the rest of Asia would certainly be very great." ₇₅ Dulles's compromise formula dodged those complications, at least temporarily, but it did little to ease the broader problems plaguing U.S.-Indian relations, problems of which the thorium nitrate controversy formed but a superficial manifestation.

Dulles alluded to some of these during a meeting with Ambassador G. L. Mehta on October 7. In response to Mehta's expression of concern about "the apparent deterioration in US-Indian relations," Dulles noted that India and the United States held fundamentally different attitudes about communism and the methods most appropriate for combating it. "The somewhat neutral or middle road" method for dealing with communism, he stressed, "could not be popular" in the United States. Waxing philosophical, the secretary added that the "general deterioration was unfortunate but not overly serious as popularity of Nations quickly change and as long as there was no real divergence of interests between the United States and India, the matter would correct itself with time." ₇₆

Whether Dulles's coyness was intentional or ironic cannot be determined. Regardless, his remark cut to the heart of the matter: a real divergence of interests between two countries cannot easily be adjusted. Yet at that juncture such a divergence already existed between the United States and India, a point that Dulles must have recognized. The thorium nitrate dispute, for all of its peculiarities, was not an isolated episode. Rather, it formed part of a much larger mosaic of conflicting views, sensibilities, and interests. The drama surrounding this affair, together with the crossed signals and bruised feelings so characteristic of dealings between the two nations, were symptomatic of the deep malaise afflicting Indo-American ties. The tidal wave of invective that greeted the announcement in India of the U.S.-Pakistani arms deal must be placed, then, within the context of the exceptionally brittle bilateral relationship that had developed between India and the United States. Indo-American relations were to endure their most severe strains to date as a result of the Pakistani-American alliance, to be sure. Yet in an important sense the disappointment and disillusionment on both sides were as much cause as consequence of the U.S. decision to aid Pakistan.

In Pakistan news about the long-anticipated military assistance pact with the United States generated a very different, and much more complex, set of reactions. On the one hand, Pakistan's civil and military elites were relieved to learn that the alliance on which they had staked so much of their own and their nation's future would not be scuttled at the last minute. On the other hand, that relief was tempered by their uncertainty about the depth and extent of the U.S. commitment. On February 25, 1954, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra expressed his "very great pleasure" with the U.S. decision to provide Pakistan with military support. "Pakistan today enters what promises to be a glorious chapter in its history," he declared solemnly; "it is now cast for a significant role in world affairs; it is destined to become the sheet anchor of international stability and security in this region." ₇₇

Behind the prime minister's confident words lay a series of unresolved doubts and questions. Only a month later he emphasized to the chief of a U.S. military survey team that military aid carried great political importance for Pakistan. If U.S. assistance amounted merely to "token" support, the prime minister warned, it would cause more harm than good. Such a result "would not only vastly encourage and increase opposition to [a] government which has definitely cast [its] lot with [the] free world" but it would have "disastrous repercussions" throughout the Middle East as well. ₇₈ The pro-American leader voiced similar fears in an unusually frank, earlier conversation with Ambassador Hildreth. "For God's sake," he implored, "if you once make an affirmative decision [regarding military aid], stick to it because we will have burned our bridges behind us." ₇₉

Bogra's apprehensions were as understandable as they were well founded. Since Nazimuddin's ouster, a civil-military elite whose key figures included Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza, and Mohammed Ayub Khan had consolidated its grip on power. Along with their figurehead prime minister, those men saw the proposed American connection as Pakistan's greatest opportunity for ensuring its domestic and international survival. Substantial aid from the United States, they hoped, would simultaneously serve several critical purposes: it would guarantee Pakistan's security vis-à-vis India, rejuvenate a stalled economy, bolster the strength of Pakistan's military forces, confer international prestige on a nation widely perceived as staggering under the weight of massive domestic problems, and more generally help provide the money and time essential for Pakistan to emerge as a viable state, both domestically and internationally. Plainly, much was riding on the American connection. ₈₀

The East Bengal provincial elections of March 1954, which exposed the depth of the nation's divisions, drove that point home forcefully. Despite Bogra's active support, the Muslim League suffered a crushing defeat, winning a mere 10 seats in the 309-member assembly, compared to 223 for the United Front. Not only did the elections represent a crushing personal defeat for the prime minister, himself a Bengali--a "thumping repudiation" according to a U.S. embassy report--but they highlighted the growing cleavage between Pakistan's eastern and western wings. The popularity of the victorious United Front derived primarily from its insistence on a greater degree of provincial autonomy, an issue that already constituted the most formidable obstacle to Pakistan's quest for political cohesion. The Muslim League, only six years after Jinnah's death, lay in tatters. Any lingering hopes that it might provide Pakistan with a unifying sense of national purpose, as the Congress Party had accomplished so masterfully in India, dissolved in the harsh light of the East Bengal vote. The election also bore ominous implications for the recently negotiated military pact with the United States. The United Front leadership, upon assuming political control in the province, immediately called upon the central government to repudiate the military agreement with the United States, a demand endorsed by a majority of the newly seated provincial assembly members. ₈₁

Tensions within East Pakistan just worsened in the aftermath of the election, fueled by political squabbling within the triumphant United Front and a series of violent labor confrontations. On May 30, 1954, the center intervened. In an effort to stem the chaos and reassert its authority, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed imposed governor's rule on the rebellious province and named his trusted associate, Iskander Mirza, as the new governor of East Bengal. The U.S. chargé in Karachi, John K. Emmerson, offered a perceptive analysis of the broader ramifications of the East Bengal crisis. "This situation has shown," he noted prophetically, "that Islam is not an adequate national force to maintain by itself a nation with the geographical handicaps suffered by Pakistan." ₈₂

As those dramatic events unfolded in Pakistan's eastern wing, revealing once more the fragility of the Pakistani state, Karachi's annoyance with Washington mounted. Even after the formal signing of the mutual assistance agreement on May 19, 1954, the nature and extent of the U.S. commitment remained extremely vague. Despite Pakistan's persistent--even desperate--pleas for specifics, American representatives carefully avoided attaching dollar figures to the promised military support. Critics of the arms deal within Pakistan had a field day, excoriating the government for abandoning any lingering pretense to nonalignment and Afro-Asian solidarity in return for an uncertain commitment from Washington. That accusation, which contained a strong kernel of truth, resonated especially among the restive populace of East Pakistan. Popular and elite opinion throughout the country, rarely in harmony, diverged significantly on the value of the American connection. The leftist Pakistan Times of Lahore likely spoke for many of the disaffected when it chided the regime for choosing "nothing less than a close military, political, and economic alliance" with the United States. "It can no longer be denied that for all practical purposes Pakistan has become a member of the Western bloc," the newspaper sneered. ₈₃

Pakistan's political troubles were exceeded only by its economic difficulties. On June 22 Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan visited Washington to plead for additional economic aid. During a meeting with Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen, the Pakistani diplomat acknowledged that he brought a "beggar's bowl" that he would not try to conceal. Alluding to the recent political turmoil, he said that even though Mirza had accomplished the immediate task of "damping the fuse on the bomb that was East Bengal," a "most explosive situation" still existed in the province. Equally worrisome to Pakistan, however, were its developmental needs, needs that necessitated generous U.S. aid. Laying his cards on the table, Zafrulla said that Pakistan faced an acute shortage of foreign exchange which could only be alleviated by the immediate infusion of additional U.S. dollars. Specifically, he estimated the need at $100 million for the coming year and perhaps $70 million for the next year. Stassen agreed to look closely at Pakistan's request, but made no commitments. ₈₄

Karachi's urgent appeal for additional economic assistance served notice on Washington's decision makers that their newest ally had multiple needs that would not easily be satisfied. Indeed, Zafrulla's "beggar's bowl" was but the latest example of Pakistan's inclination to look to the United States as the answer to its myriad political, economic, and defense dilemmas. In a cable of July 10, Ambassador Hildreth explored those dilemmas with unusual incisiveness. A lawyer by training, Hildreth had served as a legislator in his home state of Maine as well as a one-term governor. He subsequently assumed the presidency of Bucknell University, a position he still held when tapped by fellow Republican Eisenhower to become the U.S. envoy to Pakistan. "A series of actions during the past year has increased the stake of the United States in Pakistan," observed the tough-minded political appointee. Hinting that the administration may not have carefully "appraised and analyzed in advance" the full implications of the new relationship with Pakistan, Hildreth said several critical questions demanded attention. Precisely how important was Pakistan to the United States, relative to America's other worldwide commitments? How, specifically, was Pakistan to contribute to overall U.S. diplomatic and defense priorities? And exactly what level of support would the United States need to extend in order to make such a contribution possible? "Out of the answers to these questions," the ambassador noted, "must come the decision as to what the United States investment in Pakistan should be."

With a logical precision that betrayed his legal background, Hildreth appealed for the careful integration of various political, economic, and military factors as Washington deliberated about the investment it was willing to make in Pakistan. Although a strong advocate of bolstering Pakistan with U.S. aid, he recognized the gravity of the problems it faced. The "anti-communist and pro-American" regime headed by Mohammed Ali Bogra confronted a daunting panoply of obstacles in its search for stability, including "East Bengal, provincialism, constitutional difficulties, Muslim League incompetence, political immaturity, and vexing international problems." Hildreth and his associates at the U.S. embassy believed that the present ruling group could probably maintain political stability, but the veteran politician acknowledged that even that qualified prediction might have to be revised if an economic crisis occurred. And current economic prospects looked bleak. A "widening gap" existed "between the financial capacity of the Government and its essential requirements for minimum consumer demands." Pointing to "underlying weaknesses" in the economy "that will endure for some time," Hildreth cautioned that Pakistan's needs were probably "of an order of magnitude well in excess of present levels of United States aid." The military sphere contained a different set of problems. Mohammed Ayub Khan was already complaining that U.S. military assistance would fall far short of Pakistan's requirements. He and his top advisers, moreover, expressed growing frustration and irritation with the Eisenhower administration's unwillingness to indicate precisely how Pakistan fit into U.S. global defense planning. "Now that they have signed the contract," Hildreth quipped, "they ask to be assigned a role."

In concluding, Hildreth offered some wise--and portentous--advice. Pakistan, he ventured, seemed "a tolerable risk," especially in view of its decidedly pro-Western leadership. "However," the ambassador cautioned, "we believe our investment should be scrutinized with unrelenting care. . . . Prospects of returns must be compared with those expected from India and from Pakistan's Middle Eastern neighbors." As the State Department weighed Pakistan's request for emergency economic assistance, a request that he supported, Hildreth urged that it not lose sight of the broader questions raised by that recent plea: "Let us carefully appraise what we can and should do in Pakistan over a several-year period." ₈₅

Hildreth's cable stands as one of the most forthright, balanced, and penetrating assessments to date of the emerging Pakistani-American relationship. Its cautionary words should have given administration planners pause. The bonds tying America and Pakistan together were tightening inexorably; once knotted, they would not easily be unfastened. Yet the Eisenhower administration showed little inclination at this stage to grapple with the fundamental questions raised by its embassy in Karachi. Instead, it was forging ahead with a relationship that was fraught with hazards and plagued by a critical set of unresolved issues. Hildreth was certainly correct about the urgent need for the Eisenhower administration to decide, before it proceeded any further, just how important Pakistan was to the United States in relationship to overall global interests and exactly how much it was willing to invest there. The growing chorus of complaints in Pakistan about U.S. military aid, before an amount had even been agreed upon, should have sounded alarm bells in Washington. That portent, together with Pakistani pleas for more economic help, did not bode well for the future.

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Note 1: On Eisenhower's overall strategy, see especially Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 127-63; Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990):319-42; Steven Metz, "Eisenhower and the Planning of American Grand Strategy," Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (March 1991):41-71; Robert J. McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism," Political Science Quarterly 101 (1986):453-73. Back.

Note 2: Bowles to Adlai E. Stevenson, September 10, 1952, folder 622, box 157, Bowles Papers; Bowles to Paul Hoffman, November 6, 1952, folder 92, box 86, ibid; Bowles to Benton, November 18, 1952, folder 21, box 82, ibid.; Kennedy to Byroade, February 18, 1953, India 1953 folder, SOA Lot 57 D 462, DSR; NYT, November 6, 1952, p. 8. Back.

Note 3: Henry S. Villard, Deputy Director, NEA, to Dulles, January 23, 1947, box 32, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. Back.

Note 4: Gopal, Nehru, 2:137-39; memo by William L. S. Williams of SOA, August 29, 1951, FRUS, 1951, 6, pt. 1:1302-7; Bowles to Benton, November 18, 1952, folder 21, box 82, Bowles Papers; G. L. Mehta OH Interview, July 27, 1966, Dulles OH Collection, Dulles Papers; Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, pp. 98-99. Back.

Note 5: Eisenhower to Dulles, November 15, 1952, in The Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, edited by Louis Galambos (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 12:1429-30; Dulles to Eisenhower, November 14, 1952, Nehru folder, box 62, Dulles Papers; Nehru to Chief Ministers, December 22, 1952, JN: LCM, 3:209. Back.

Note 6: Bowles to Walter Bedell Smith, January 15, 1953, 611.91/1-1553, DSR; Bowles to Eisenhower, February 5, 1953, India-Misc. folder, International Series, WF, DDEP, DDEL, Abilene, Kan.; Bowles to Dulles, February 5, 1953, 611.91/2-553, DSR. Back.

Note 7: Byroade to Smith, February 5, 1953, 611.91/1-1553, DSR; Dulles to Bowles, February 20, 1953, 611.91/2-553, DSR. Back.

Note 8: Jernegan to Dulles, March 3, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1691-93; memo of discussion at NSC meeting, March 31, 1953, NSC Series, WF, DDEP, DDEL. Back.

Note 9: Bowles to DOS, March 2, 1953, 891.00-TA/3-253, DSR; Dulles to Eisenhower, March 16, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1693-94. Back.

Note 10: Dulles to Eisenhower, March 16, 1953, India--Misc. Folder, International Series, WF, DDEP, DDEL; FRUS, 1952-1954, 1, pt. 1:581-615; Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, pp. 99-100; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive Sessions, (1953), 10:209-10; Congressional Record, House, 83d Cong. 1st sess., June 19, 1953, 6923-25. Back.

Note 11: Bowles to Coombs, February 12, 1953, folder 47, box 84, Bowles Papers; Bowles to Coombs, March 3, 1953, ibid.; Bowles to Benton, February 12, 1953, folder 21, box 82, ibid.; Bowles to Kennedy, January 29, 1953, folder 268, box 95, ibid. Back.

Note 12: George V. Allen OH Interview, July 29, 1965, Dulles OH Collection, Dulles Papers. Back.

Note 13: Memcon between Dulles and Zafrulla, November 18, 1952, Middle East folder, box 62, Dulles Papers. Back.

Note 14: Byroade to Dulles, March 25, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1825-26; "The Pakistan Food Situation," undated study by DOS Working Group, attached to Kennedy to Byroade, April 18, 1953, Pakistan Wheat 1953 folder, SOA Lot 57 D 462. Back.

Note 15: Dulles to Eisenhower, April 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1827-28; DSB 28 (May 18, 1953):723; Report by the Special Study Mission to the Far East, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1953, Executive Sessions, 17:261-81. Back.

Note 16: Memo of discussion at NSC meeting, February 24, 1953, NSC Series, WF, DDEP, DDEL; JCS to Secretary of Defense, February 12, 1953, enclosure to JCS 1887/60, 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), sec. 14, JCS Records; NIE-76, "Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security," January 15, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:334-43; Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, pp. 156-58. Back.

Note 17: FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:195-213. Back.

Note 18: JSSC to JCS, April 1, 1953, 381 EMMEA (11-19-47), sec. 14, JCS Records. Back.

Note 19: Dulles to Eisenhower, May 17, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:87-88; Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, pp. 158-59. Back.

Note 20: Dulles to DOS, May 26, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:147. Back.

Note 21: Jalal, State of Martial Rule, pp. 136-44, 167-80. Back.

Note 22: Ibid; Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 32-35; Yusuf, Pakistan in Search of Democracy, pp. 40-44. Back.

Note 23: Raleigh Gibson, Consul General, Lahore, to DOS, April 28, 1953, 790D.00/4-2853, DSR. Back.

Note 24: Jalal, State of Martial Rule, pp. 179-87; memcon between Dulles, Mohammed Ali, and others, May 23, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:124; Laithwaite to CRO, DO 35/5106, PRO. Back.

Note 25: U.S. Army Attaché in Karachi to the Army Chief of Staff, April 24, 1953, 790D.00 (W)/4-2453, DSR. Back.

Note 26: Dulles to the Embassy in Pakistan, July 8, 1953, 611.90D/7-853, DSR; Lee Metcalf of SOA to Kennedy, April 21, 1953, Pakistan 1953 folder, SOA Lot 57 D 462, DSR. Back.

Note 27: Memcon between Dulles and Ayub Khan, May 23, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:131-34; memcons between Dulles, Mohammed Ali Bogra, and others, May 23 and 24, 1953, ibid., pp. 121-24 and 134-36. Back.

Note 28: Memcon between Ghulam Mohammed and Meade, May 23, 1953, ibid., pp. 131-32. Back.

Note 29: Memo of discussion at NSC meeting, June 1, 1953, ibid., pp. 379-86; memo by Dulles, "Important Points of Trip," May 1953, Middle East folder, box 73, Dulles Papers; Dulles statement, June 2, 1953, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Executive Sessions, 10:77-79. Back.

Note 30: Memo of discussion at NSC meeting, July 9, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:394-98; NSC 155/1, July 14, 1953, ibid., pp. 399-406; Dulles to certain diplomatic missions, July 30, 1953, ibid., pp. 406-8. See also NSC 162/2, October 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 2, pt. 1:592-93. Back.

Note 31: DSB 28 (June 22, 1953):889-91; House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1953), Executive Sessions, 10:88-89, 101-2. Back.

Note 32: Congressional Record, Senate, June 16, 1953, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 6611-19. The quote is on p. 6618. See also DSB 29 (July 6, 1953):16. Back.

Note 33: JCS to Secretary of Defense Wilson, August 11, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:410-12; Wilson to Dulles, August 17, 1953, ibid., pp. 408-9; Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. V, 1953-1954 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), pp. 483-85. On the role of Turkey and of Middle East bases in global U.S. war plans, see especially Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 237-39, 286-90. Back.

Note 34: Memcon between Horace A. Hildreth, U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan, and Norbert L. Anschuetz, Politico-Military Adviser, NEA, June 23, 1953, Pakistan Emergency Assistance 1954 folder, SOA Lot 57 D 462, DSR. Back.

Note 35: Jalal, State of Martial Rule, p. 185; Byroade to Dulles, September 25, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/9-2553, DSR. Back.

Note 36: Memcon between Dulles and Ayub Khan, September 30, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/9-3053, DSR. Back. Dulles statement, June 2, 1953, House Committee on Foreign Affai

Note 37: Minute by R. W. D. Fowler, October 14, 1953, FO 371/106935, PRO; Dulles to the Embassy in Great Britain, October 10, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/10-1053, DSR; Ambassador Sir Roger Makins to FO, October 9, 1953, FO 371/106935, PRO; FO to the Embassy in the United States, October 13, 1953, ibid. Back.

Note 38: Record of Chiefs of Staff meeting, October 15, 1953, FO 371/106935, PRO; FO to the Embassy in the United States, October 16, 1953, ibid.; Makins to FO, October 16, 1953, ibid.; record of Chiefs of Staff meeting, October 23, 1953, DEFE 7/152, Defence Ministry Records, PRO; memcon between Jernegan and Beeley, October 16, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/10-1653, DSR. Back.

Note 39: NYT, November 2, 1953, p. 2, November 12, 1953, p. 3, and November 17, 1953, p. 1; "A Real Ally in South Asia?" U.S. News & World Report 35 (November 13, 1953):44-46; minute by J. E. Cable, November 10, 1953, FO 371/106935, PRO; memcon between Byroade and N. Haskar, November 5, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/11-553, DSR; record of conversation between Nehru and Lord Swinton, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, November 13, 1953, PREM 11/456, PRO; Allen to DOS, November 16, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/11-1653, DSR. Back.

Note 40: Memcon between Nixon and Ghulam Mohammed, December 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1831-32; Hildreth to DOS, December 8, 1953, ibid., 1833-35; Dulles to Eisenhower, November 10, 1953, Pakistan folder, International Series, WF, DDEP, DDEL; Dulles to Nixon, November 25, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/11-2253, DSR. Back.

Note 41: Report by the JSPC, JCS 2099/326, November 9, 1953, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 97, JCS Records; Joint Logistics Plans Committee, 414/146/D, November 19, 1953, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 99, ibid.; Wilson to Dulles, November 24, 1953, 780.5/11-2453, DSR; Dulles to Embassies in India and Pakistan, November 27, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/11-2753, DSR; Hildreth to DOS, November 30, 1953, 790D.5-MSP/11-3053, DSR; JCS to Wilson, December 11, 1953, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 101, JCS Records. Back.

Note 42: Sheldon T. Mills, Chargé in India, to DOS, October 19, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:423-24; Smith Simpson, Consul in Bombay, to DOS, December 15, 1953, 611.90D/12/1553, DSR. Back.

Note 43: Smith to Kennedy, September 16, 1953, Military Aid to Pakistan 1954 folder, SOA Lot 57 D 462, DSR; Smith to Byroade, December 4, 1953, 790.5/11-2753, DSR. Back.

Note 44: Record of conversation between Dulles and Eden, December 7, 1953, FO 371/106937, PRO; Eden to the Cabinet, January 5, 1954, PREM 11/1520, PRO. Back.

Note 45: Memoranda of discussion at NSC meetings, December 16 and 23, 1953, NSC Series, WF, DDEP, DDEL. See also RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 132-33. Back.

Note 46: Dulles to Eisenhower, undated memo (most likely written on January 5), Meetings with the President 1954 folder, White House Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL. Back.

Note 47: Memcon between Eisenhower, Dulles, Wilson, and Stassen, January 5, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1838-39; memcon between Eisenhower and Dulles, January 5, 1954, Meetings with the President 1954 folder, White House Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL. Back.

Note 48: Byroade to Dulles, January 8, 1954, 790D.5-MSP/1-854, DSR; memcon between Eisenhower and Dulles, January 14, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 9, pt. 1:453-54. Back.

Note 49: Allen to DOS, February 24, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1737-39. Back.

Note 50: Quoted in Gopal, Nehru, 2:185. Back.

Note 51: Nehru statement on U.S. military aid to Pakistan, March 1, 1954, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 790D.5-MSP/4-554, DSR; Nehru to Chief Ministers, March 15, 1954, JN: LCM, 3:502-8; Allen to DOS, March 1, 1954, 790D.5-MSP/3-154; Baldev Raj Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1976), p. 62. Back.

Note 52: Quoted in Gopal, Nehru, 2:189. See also Allen to DOS, March 20, 1954, 611.91/3-1054, DSR. Back.

Note 53: Congressional Record, Senate, March 2, 1953, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 2481. See also Fulbright to Walter Lippmann, December 29, 1955, folder 24, box 103, J. William Fulbright Papers, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. Fulbright's statement was, however, one of only a handful of public criticisms of the proposed pact. The proposed plan generated surprisingly little public or congressional discussion. Most of those who did criticize the pact publicly, Bowles and Fulbright excepted, tended to concede Pakistan's strategic potential. See, for example, Michael Brecher, "Threat to India," Nation 178 (January 23, 1954):69-71; E. Stanley Jones, "Should U.S. Give Military Aid to Pakistan?" Foreign Policy Bulletin 33 (October 1, 1953):4, 8; William Clark, "The Pakistan-Turkey Pact: Many Bricks, Little Mortar," The Reporter 10 (June 8, 1954):24-26; St. Louis Post Dispatch, editorial, December 21, 1953. The NYT, which pursued as consistently a pro-Indian editorial policy as any major newspaper in the United States, strongly favored the military agreement with Pakistan. See, for example, NYT editorials of November 5, 1953 (p. 30), December 11, 1953 (p. 30), January 2, 1954 (p. 10), and March 25, 1954 (p. 28). Back.

Note 54: Bowles to Dulles, December 30, 1953, folder 192, box 130, Bowles Papers. Back.

Note 55: Dulles to Bowles, January 14, 1954, ibid. Back.

Note 56: Smith to Senator Alexander Wiley, February 23, 1954, India folder, box 119, Smith Papers. Back.

Note 57: Dulles to Smith, February 26, 1954, ibid. Back.

Note 58: Dulles to Smith, March 6, 1954, ibid. Back.

Note 59: Hanson Baldwin, "Pakistan Looms Large in South Asian Defense," NYT, December 20, 1953, IV, p. 5. See also Baldwin analysis in ibid., December 31, 1953, p. 2. Back.

Note 60: "A Real Ally in South Asia?," U.S. News & World Report 35 (November 13, 1953):44. On Pakistan as a potential site for U.S. air bases, see also James W. Spain, "Pakistan: New Ally," America 90 (March 13, 1954):623-25; Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "New Frontier for Freedom," Collier's 133 (June 25, 1954):34-40. Back.

Note 61: NYT, December 20, 1953, p. 4. For a similar disavowal, see Mohammed Ali interview, U.S. News & World Report 36 (January 15, 1954):34. Back.

Note 62: Surprisingly little of the documentation currently available to scholars touches on the specific nature of the American interest in Pakistani bases. Any judgments about the relative importance of this issue to the development of a Pakistani-American security relationship consequently must be tentative; important documentation, especially in DOD and CIA records, almost certainly remains closed to researchers at this time. Back.

Note 63: FO Brief for Berlin Conference, "United States Policy in the Middle East," January 15, 1954, DEFE 11/88, PRO. Back.

Note 64: Eden to FO, January 24, 1954, PREM 11/1520, PRO; Eden to Churchill, January 29, 1954, Anthony Eden Papers, FO 800/799, PRO; Commanders-in-Chiefs Committee, War Planning Directive, "Defence of the Middle East," January 21, 1954, DEFE 11/88, PRO; note by Chiefs of Staff, "Strategic Importance of the Middle East," November 26, 1953, ibid. Back.

Note 65: See, for example, Tewari, Indo-US Relations; Nayar, American Geopolitics and India; Tripta Desai, Indo-U.S. Relations, 1947-1974 (Washington, D.C., 1977). An important exception is Venkataramani, American Role in Pakistan. See also Gary R. Hess, "Global Expansion and Regional Balances: The Emerging Scholarship on United States Relations with India and Pakistan," Pacific Historical Review 61 (May 1987):263-64. Back.

Note 66: SE-55, "The Probable Repercussions of a US Decision to Grant or Deny Military Aid to Pakistan," January 15, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1839-45. Back.

Note 67: Ibid. Back.

Note 68: U.S. News & World Report 35 (October 30, 1953):39-43; Congressional Record, Senate, 83d Cong., 2d sess., January 22, 1954, 655; NYT, September 23, 1953, p. 3 and January 3, 1954, p. 3. Back.

Note 69: Adlai Stevenson, "Will India Turn Communist," Look 17 (July 14, 1953):38. Back.

Note 70: Jean Joyce, U.S. Embassy in India, to Bowles, August 23, 1953, folder 355, box 141, Bowles Papers; Dulles to certain diplomatic and consular officers, July 15, 1953, 611.91/7-1553, DSR; Dulles to the Embassy in India, October 19, 1953, 611.91/10-1953, DSR. Back.

Note 71: Byroade to Samuel Waugh, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Under Secretary Smith, July 31, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1702-5. Back.

Note 72: Allen to DOS, July 28, 1953, ibid., pp. 1700-2. Back.

Note 73: Allen to DOS, August 25, 1953, ibid., pp. 1714-15. Back.

Note 74: Dulles to Allen, September 3, 1953, ibid., pp. 1717-18. Back.

Note 75: Ibid. Back.

Note 76: Memcon between Dulles and Mehta, October 7, 1953, ibid., 1724-26. Back.

Note 77: Quoted in Embassy in Pakistan to DOS, February 25, 1954, 790D.5-MSP/2-2554, DSR. Back.

Note 78: Hildreth to DOS, March 23, 1954, 790D.5-MSP/3-2354, DSR. Back.

Note 79: Hildreth to DOS, December 2, 1953, 611.90D/2-1243, DSR; Jalal, State of Martial Rule, p. 187. Back.

Note 80: Ibid., pp. 180-87. Back.

Note 81: John K. Emmerson, Counselor of the Embassy in Pakistan, to DOS, March 20, 1954, 790D.5-MSP/3-2054, DSR; Dulles to the Embassy in Pakistan, July 9, 1954, 611.90D/7-954, DSR; NYT, March 28, 1954, p. 6, and April 6, 1954, p. 3; Ahmad, From Martial Law to Martial Law, pp. 323-25; Jalal, State of Martial Rule, pp. 188-89. Back.

Note 82: Emmerson to DOS, June 5, 1954, 790D.00/6-554, DSR. Back.

Note 83: Quoted in Jack B. Smith, Third Secretary of the Embassy in Pakistan, May 25, 1954, 790D.5-MSP/5-2554, DSR. See also Jalal, State of Martial Rule, pp. 189-90. Back.

Note 84: Memcon between Stassen and Zafrulla, June 22, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11, pt. 2:1849-51. Back.

Note 85: Hildreth to DOS, July 10, 1954, ibid., 1851-55. Back.

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The Cold War on the Periphery