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State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity
Kimberly A. Maynard
1999
8. The Next Phase in International Aid
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Development in the context of postwar reconstruction cannot simply be a question of rebuilding physical infrastructure, supporting the growth of productive capacity and generating new wealth. It must also be a matter of dealing with the hidden scars of warfare through policies and programs which support the reconstitution of the family and kinship ties and the social and cultural institutions that are critical to aiding recovery. |
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– Peter Sollis (1994:15) |
International assistance to communities torn apart by complex emergencies has made notable progress since the end of the Cold War. This advancement is, in part, due to the contributions of new disciplines and an overall growth of appreciation for the intricacies involved. Today, there are programs that address psychological trauma, peacekeeping units that coordinate with relief workers, and human rights monitors who live side by side with doctors and logisticians in remote locations. Still, the international community’s greatest challenges lie ahead. On the near horizon, it confronts further crises requiring a proactive, comprehensive, and coordinated strategy under growing financial and attention constraints.
While a collaborative response plan is possible in theory, the reality of global politics and human nature does not support a systematic, united, and preestablished approach. Judicious response is predicated on recognizing the situation, obtaining adequate resources, generating the political will to act, implementing appropriate and coordinated actions as well as on such situational factors as gaining country access. Agency desire for control and autonomy, individual aspirations, bureaucratic power plays, and basic apathy, however, tend to subvert such cohesive plans of action. For these reasons, conflict prevention strategies, a logical response to the proliferation of complex emergencies, are repeatedly ignored.
Nevertheless, the international community must continue to develop a range of viable actions to address complex emergencies. Prevention, early reaction, orchestrated programs, and the transition to rehabilitation and development all need proactive attention simply because it is the right thing to do. As Larry Minear states, “What the system lacks is not energy but vision, not good will but discipline. It is a time for tough-mindedness rather than warm-heartedness, for soul-searching rather than hand-wringing” (1994:13).
The conceptual and operational frameworks outlined in the preceding chapters attempt to define a structure for international intercession in complex emergencies. This chapter sets the approaches outlined thus far into an agenda for future action. First, it offers considerations that can affect the ability and way in which the international community intercedes. Next, it explores a systems approach to global intercession, suggesting several areas to amend. Then, it suggests reforms necessary to adapt general strategies to current conditions. And finally, it offers a vision of future international intercession.
International Assistance: Some Important Considerations
As the international humanitarian community redefines its role in complex emergencies, it must struggle with a number of factors that restrict its effectiveness, such as compassion fatigue, the appropriateness of international aid, and its limitations.
Compassion Fatigue
Public sentiment in foreign countries may simply grow numb from the continual bombardment of information about suffering people in foreign lands. Compassion fatigue can compromise any plan of action developed by international actors, no matter how noble. To date, concern for others has been the driving force behind much of the West’s outlay of billions of dollars and enormous energy assisting foreign disasters (the extensive influence of national interests, colonial ties, and natural resources, notwithstanding). Observers point out, however, that this moral obligation to the well-being of others that incites much of the international response may not sustain itself through many more intensive identity conflicts (Owen 1993). Many international experts have already highlighted compassion fatigue as a reason for the slow reaction to Rwanda and the lack of effort in the early years of Bosnia’s conflict. Some postulate that it is the limiting factor in our involvement in Kosovo. I tend to think that the reason for the inactivity in these examples rests more in a multiplicity of political and identity factors than in real donor fatigue. Nevertheless, sustained responses to complex emergencies undoubtedly require not only material resources but emotional resources as well.
Unlike some observers who see growing indifference as tragic disregard for our fellow human beings, I see it, in part, as a result of modern reality. As population pressures increase and the world becomes more interdependent, the West may be gradually coming to terms with an aspect of life that has become somewhat foreign to the more industrialized nations: physical suffering. The daily struggle for existence, frequent exposure to dying, and even war have been absent from the personal experience of most Westerners in the past fifty years. Poverty, sickness, physical malformation, pain, and death tend to be despised, hidden, avoided, and even shunned. When public images of such suffering appear on television, therefore, our response is a desire to eradicate them.
To much of the rest of the world, death and suffering are more familiar—though equally unwelcome—parts of everyday life. The apparently unstoppable global population growth may well force a higher level of pain on the world in the near future, as a result of food shortages, environmental destruction, population pressures on urban environments, natural resource demands, competition for space and access to land, and violent power struggles. The West may, therefore, inevitably be gradually exposed to greater pain and suffering.
What this means for international responses to foreign emergencies is more difficult to articulate. Ideally, growing interdependence, communication technology, and migration pressures may force a more comprehensive global strategy for handling world crises. Prevention would rest less on domestic financial or political factors than on a universal understanding of the need for international collaboration. Responses would be generated out of a comprehension of the larger picture, both regionally and globally. Considerations might include international resources and implications of actions on the local and worldwide scenes. Such a holistic approach, however, would also incorporate the limitations of international response, a greater tolerance for suffering, and host country accountability in favor of larger, more comprehensive goals. David Owen advocates “mutual obligations and responsibility” (1993:58), which, at times, may require participants in inter-identity conflicts to address the consequences of their actions themselves.
Appropriateness of International Assistance
A second factor to consider in reviewing the role of foreign aid in complex emergencies is the effectiveness of the assistance system itself. Beyond the micro-level issues discussed in the preceding chapters, such as effect on the economy and intergroup hostilities, international aid has its own impact on society. Policymakers and scholars are increasingly questioning the viability of foreign intercession—or at least aspects thereof—for improving conditions in receiving countries (Anderson 1996a; Awoonor 1993; Kumar et al. 1996; Leaning 1993).
The simultaneous decline in development assistance and increase in disaster aid in the 1990s points to a changing international picture. On the one hand, development has arguably been relatively ineffective in the past thirty years. USAID, for example, came to this realization in the Greater Horn of Africa. 1 The fruit of years of development efforts in most of the ten countries that comprise the Greater Horn (Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi) have been repeatedly destroyed by civil strife. The extraordinary amount of food assistance did nothing to reduce the growing numbers of famines in the region (Creative Associates 1997).
Development literature is also full of case studies of foreign-born programs that do not consider the cultural or local context, sometimes backfiring and making conditions worse. Despite the programmatic success of lowering mortality rates, improving water systems, increasing agricultural production, or developing commercial law standards, development aid has also had negative affects. Examples include unintentionally creating dependency, decreasing local resource capacity, reengineering social structures, diminishing cultural importance, and creating a resource problem by introducing foreign techniques and products. Despite its doubtless positive influences, international assistance nevertheless has developed a stigma of general failure.
On the other hand, the increase in funding for relief as a function of a decrease in development aid is due, in part, to the existence of complex emergencies. These emergencies draw organizations previously dedicated solely to development, as well as new ones, onto the relief scene, bringing into question the legitimacy of their activities. One consequence is the uninvited arrival of “do-gooder” organizations in a country to deliver goods not necessarily needed and in a manner conflicting with local custom, for the sake of relieving the benefactor’s conscience. Although such inappropriate actions are not universal, they have influenced the image of relief organizations. Conflict management also has a reputation for bringing inappropriate techniques into a foreign environment and entering the scene uninvited (Moore 1993).
Moreover, the stigma of charity can be seen as oppressing recipients and reducing their self-reliance (Awoonor 1993). Aid agencies attract empathy and money by picturing withered young children receiving bowls of cereal from the munificent foreigners. Assistance to refugee communities, as discussed in chapter 3, can create “DP apathy,” which in turn makes repatriation more difficult and reliance on outside assistance upon return more necessary.
Somalia raises another question about the appropriateness of aid. Although the international military intervention was said to have saved 100,000–125,000 lives (Sommer 1994a:2), it also left the country in protracted turmoil. The debate here is not over the viability of interceding in famines, but over ignoring long-term needs for short-term gains. While I leave the lively “to intercede or not to intercede” debate to other, more qualified policy analysts, I believe it is important for the international community to weigh carefully the implications of its actions.
Limitations on Aid
A third factor in considering intercession is the constraints of the international system in addressing crises. The expectation that outside assistance of any kind will ultimately be of benefit is not only misleading but potentially dangerous. It contributes to the kind of statement emanating from Liberia during its brutal uprising in the spring of 1996: “We are killing each other! Where is the international community?” To provide another illustration, in 1996 I participated in a group of humanitarian specialists gathered to discuss the situation in Somalia. The question from one who worked in the country and was acutely aware of its deteriorating stability was, “What will the relief community do to prevent the development of another all-out conflict?” These two instances illustrate the assumption that “the international community” (often used to refer to relief organizations) not only will respond but has the responsibility to respond to all crises. More fundamentally, it assumes that the response will positively affect the deteriorating social conditions.
My reply is twofold. First, accountability as a basis for individual action seems to have disappeared somewhat, perhaps a function of the abundance of development assistance since the mid-1950s. It is crucial, I believe, that each component of the global community take responsibility for its actions, whether it be initiating conflicts with its neighbors or providing assistance across borders. Second, it is equally important that each action be kept in perspective. Relief aid, after all, is essentially meant to help keep people alive. It does not solve political problems nor, by itself, does it increase security. In the former Yugoslavia over the past four years (i.e., since 1994), food and material aid were used regularly as a substitute for political action. In the same vein, foreign military presence, or even the foreign conflict management specialists, should not be expected to resolve internal conflict by themselves.
Having said that, I believe that the international community desperately needs to expand and refine its response toolbox. We need a methodical, comprehensive approach to foreign intercession in complex emergencies, incorporating the widest possible elements. I suggest we establish a systems approach, refine and restructure specific elements, and fine-tune our methodology in the field.
A Systems Approach to Intercession
“Unlike other regimes,” writes Minear, “the international humanitarian relief system is not framed by a body of law, principles, and norms; implemented by an institutional apparatus; and enforced by sanctions to assure accountability” (1994:2). It works on a much more informal basis, using lateral, voluntary collaboration (as opposed to hierarchical and dictatorial), with no governing body, and few rules, regulations, recourses, standards, or even common methodologies. However, the growing complexity of the humanitarian context—including greater security risks, diversions of supplies and expansion of NGOs—now calls for some degree of formalization. The establishment of a more systematized structure is necessary both to address the new issues facing the relief community today and to deal with the magnitude of the requirements in the world in an efficient and organized manner.
At present, there appears to be little coherent international rationale for responses to emerging or existing emergencies as exemplified in the disjointed approach to the Kosovo conflict. Similarly, there is no real systematic framework for analysis of the situation and no consistent global decision-making forum. To the contrary, most responses seem to follow certain patterns of communication (proposals for intervention, for example, in the UN Security Council, or meeting of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee), yet remain fundamentally uncoordinated and somewhat arbitrary.
Expanding the international reliability and capacity to deal with identity conflict and complex emergencies, I think, takes creativity, innovation, and a rare degree of interaction among many elements of whole bodies politic. Communication must expand in many directions, including between organizations—particularly UN agencies; between different types of organizations, whether it be UN agency, NGO, military, or diplomatic; between categories of response from peacekeeping to conflict management to human rights; and certainly between the levels of application (that is, field, policy, or academics). In my experience, adjusting activities based on in-house reflection alone can make only limited strides. This kind of comprehensive exchange reflects the reality of whole bodies politic. Developing it requires a systems approach to addressing the scope, time frame, preparedness, and coordination of international assistance.
Scope
The first aspect of regulating and expanding our capacity to address international crises is to include a broader geographic and population range. International actors should examine the entire spectrum of issues particular to each population, from the community level to the region. Looking more closely at the ethnicity of the fighters in certain areas, for example, might illuminate opportunities or, conversely, eliminate options based on ethnic tendencies.
At the same time, the international community should tend to refugee needs while attempting to address the reasons for flight (Loescher 1993). The importance of this is gradually being acknowledged in the international community. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, for example, cited the experience of Rwanda, where refugee situations were ignored by those working inside the country, and population particulars were neglected in some of the returnee operations (Kumar et al. 1996).
The second aspect of expanding the scope of international response is to increase the number of the disciplines employed. Using a wide variety of expertise offers the broadest input into an appropriate response. For example, the typical field coordination structure for humanitarian crises should be expanded to include the sectors of conflict management and human rights (Cohen 1996). In that way, those involved in health care, for instance, can integrate their assessments, work, and findings into human rights operations. At the same time, their work can incorporate conflict management considerations. 2
Unfortunately, many policymakers and field practitioners are reluctant to delve into the more controversial and ambiguous areas such as psychological trauma, conflict mitigation, and even human rights protection. Unlike the conventional sectors of water, sanitation, health, shelter, and food relief, these are less quantifiable, and their success may not be immediately apparent. With little data on the effectiveness of crisis prevention, for example, many donors are hesitant to invest time and money. Nevertheless, it is critical that they do so. It is in these programs, I believe, that the real future of a stable world order lies. At the same time, improved means of ascertaining, evaluating, and verifying the efficacy of various approaches is needed. For this the world needs to draw on the skills of sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists who are experts in qualitative analysis. Like all other elements, this process must be an international and interagency effort.
Time
A systems approach to intervention should include a broad time frame. Consideration of a disaster should not begin when an emergency is declared, but when the first signs of trouble begin to appear on the horizon. In fact, an even better approach would be to develop connections and monitor the situation before there is any sign of contention. Actual conflict prevention, however, is not a consistently achievable endeavor. Despite some international reluctance and a realistic skepticism about their use in a political world, prevention efforts, nevertheless, compose an important end of the international intercession time frame.
At the other end of the spectrum, reductions in morbidity and malnutrition rates do not signal the end to a crisis. Follow-through of international assistance to rehabilitation and political and social reconstruction is vital to sustainable peace. Beyond this time-consuming process, there need to be development efforts that help support a peaceful society. The systems approach should encompass this full range of interaction with the affected populations across a wide span of time from prevention to long-term development.
The international efforts in Bosnia are an example of the lack of an expansive time frame. Many observers claim that international reaction to prevent the escalation of hostilities was too slow. In particular, the warning signals acknowledged in the early stages were not heeded, and it was not until years into massive “ethnic cleansing” that the international community launched real efforts. When the United States first committed troops to the region, however, it was with a predetermined end date. Regardless of changes in conditions or needs at the time of demobilization, the United States’ military contribution to a sustainable peace was initially limited to one year.
Most Bosnia experts are intimately aware of the enormous rehabilitation needs of the country, both politically and socially. Human rights, which have been devastated, for instance, must be reestablished. The culture of impunity must be eradicated and institutional capacity rebuilt within the justice system. Reestablishing safety, communalization, redevelopment of trust and social ethics, and democratization all require enormous amounts of time, yet the international attention span is insufficient for these to come to fruition.
Donor investment in complex emergencies tends to peak dramatically just after the crisis itself reaches its peak. It then falls abruptly and tapers off to a lower level (USGAO 1992). International concerns typically become the most serious after the outbreak of violence, and diminish after the ceasefire. Donor investment in an emergency, I believe, should expand from the usual six-to-twelve-month time frame to a more intensive five-year investment. As the conflict develops, interest would exist in the periods of stable peace, and concerted efforts would build during the increasing instability. Optimally, international intercession would help to keep tensions from rising to the crisis point. The same amount of resources, then, could be used to reduce the extent of an outbreak, recover more rapidly, and build the national capacity to prevent and handle future problems. This capacity could include international strategic planning, national contingency planning, and regional prevention planning. Such a long-term strategy, according to Loescher, could also relieve immigration pressures on Northern countries, brought about by the massive refugee flows at the heart of the crisis (1993:168).
Preparedness
A systems approach to intercession logically involves early recognition of problems coupled with appropriate response. An important part of this approach is the need to incorporate preparedness planning, which would include predetermining an appropriate responsive action. The question then becomes, “What degree of humanitarian suffering under what conditions should justify what form of international action, by whom, through what operational mechanisms and with what precise objectives?” notes Francis Deng (1993:161). I would only add to his list, “When?”
I suggest an approach much like that used in the United States in fighting forest fires. All sections of each U.S. Forest Service Ranger District in a national forest are mapped according to terrain, elevation, fuel types, exposures, structures, roads, streams, anthropological sites, mines, and wildlife habitat. They are then analyzed according to their history of forest fires at various times of the year and monitored for fuel moisture content to maintain awareness of current volatility. A plan is drawn up for each section, predetermining the organizational response to a fire in a certain area, given specific fuel moisture and time of year. Under some conditions, the fire will be allowed to burn untended, as a natural method of brush disposal. Others may be monitored by airplane once a day. Still others may be corralled away from specific habitats or areas but otherwise left untouched. Of course, some may be extinguished altogether. In this way, planners are thoroughly aware of the conditions, have a tentative plan of action, can prepare for fire outbreaks, and use an appropriate methodology.
Granted, fighting forest fires and confronting complex emergencies are not directly analogous. For one, those drawing up the fire response plans actually have jurisdiction over the forests. Nevertheless, I believe some lessons can be learned from this approach. First, understanding the context is of utmost importance. Hence early, complete, and continual contextual analysis (as discussed in chapter 7) is important. This can be accomplished via more systematic monitoring, greater attention and care to potential trouble spots, and improved early warning and context information-sharing.
Second, developing concerted plans of action prior to outbreaks or even the development of trouble spots is important to addressing needs quickly and appropriately. Such plans require gathering or at least determining available resources, allowing greater specification and preparation. It also permits better understanding of the context on the part of the responding agency. Third, predetermining a plan of action, even if not followed exactly, can encourage much greater innovation and flexibility and help avoid automatic, uniform responses to all complex emergencies. Finally, if a range of alternatives existed initially, responses and resources can be adjusted more easily.
The drawback to this firefighting methodology is that it requires much greater attention and allocation of funds and resources to preparation, something many international organizations are reluctant to indulge in. Some might argue that it could also lead to self-fulfilling prophecies: too much attention given to minor hostilities might indeed exacerbate the problem.
Coordination
A final element in the systems approach is coordination, an essential element of disaster response. In a situation drawing hundreds of organizations of many varieties, collaboration is needed simply to eliminate overlaps for the sake of efficiency in the zero-sum game of humanitarian relief. Better coordination (a cry invariably heard in reference to every disaster) can serve several other functions as well.
First, as outlined above, it is important for cohesive planning over an expanded time frame. Conflict mitigation efforts need to be incorporated into development planning and diplomatic policy, for instance. The de-escalation in the emergency phase, as another example, should be closely choreographed with an increase in rehabilitation efforts. Second, coordination is vital for shared programming among the various sectors, from peacekeeping to food distribution to refugee repatriation. Cross-pollination ensures not only comprehensive strategizing but also the development of new ideas and collaborative efforts across sectors.
Third, such communication should occur among all international actors, including the donors themselves. Although various coordinating bodies exist, actual collaborative strategizing, in my opinion, is relatively rare. Because many NGOs are dependent on donor financing, their programs often reflect the will of their financier. It is important, therefore, that they share information, understand the availability of resources, communicate various interests, and, optimally, develop a cohesive strategy.
Finally, the international community should improve its communication with the affected population, country professionals, local authorities, and the host governments. Such coordination is indubitably a difficult task, given political agendas, agency efforts to maintain neutrality, cultural differences, and a host of other variables. Nonetheless, living and working in a foreign context demands acute attention and communication with the local citizens who are the hosts of the country, objects of the effort, and most informed about their own needs.
Under the rubric of “coordination” I might add two other elements. One is that interagency communication is more than simple sharing information on current activities. It also includes forward thinking. While current activity coordination has attracted a fair amount of attention in the past five years, strategizing, planning, and problem-solving have not. What is needed, I believe, is for all involved organizations, both in country and foreign, to develop think tank/problem-solving groups that can strategize on specific problems and focus on the larger picture.
The other element is standardization. Relief agencies use many different methods and technologies to address complex emergencies. While strict regulation is neither possible nor desirable, greater uniformity in approaches to capacity assessment, baseline information-gathering, relations with authorities, media, contextualization, security, institutionalization of human rights, local procurement, and hiring practices could minimize negative impacts and improve the appropriateness of international intercession. This is beginning to take place among international NGOs. In my experience in the field and at headquarters, coordination is a delicate thing. We need enough to harness the energy, but not so much as to thwart creativity.
The International Structure: A Need for Modification
One of the major tasks for devising a more appropriate and effective international system of intercession is to adjust and reorganize some of what we already have. For decades, observers have been calling for changes in the international regime, and various institutions have responded to some degree and at different times. In light of the increasing requirements levied on the international community as a result of the growing complex emergencies, however, I think yet another look at the system is warranted. My suggestions here are general and brief and meant primarily to focus attention on certain aspects of reform. In each area, experts have developed recommendations far beyond the scope of this book.
Mandates
Operational precepts that define an organization’s boundaries become sacrosanct in the field. They not only determine the requisite actions to be undertaken but limit their range to a specified population, geographic boundary, activity, or time frame. While somewhat adaptable to varying situations, many such precepts nevertheless need fundamental modification to fit today’s conditions.
In question are the mandates of such organizations as UNHCR, which frequently must expand its parameters to address today’s conditions. Other UN agencies, as well, face reorganization in order to streamline international assistance. Though I am not prepared to debate or advocate specific changes in the UN system, I join with others in stating that the large, bureaucratic, competitive structure of UN relief agencies desperately needs to be reformed for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness.
The challenge for the community as a whole is not to point fingers, but to carefully examine the strengths and weaknesses of each institution. Scholars of all sorts have recognized the need for a clearer division of labor based on the inherent or potential capabilities of each organization (Hathaway 1996; UNHCR 1993a). Many observers, for example, have identified the need for developing or assigning a UN organization to protect, care for, and collect data on internally displaced persons, returnees, and victims of conflict. Despite the fact that technical responsibility for IDPs lies within domestic jurisdiction, the demand for such a protectorate as well as a declaration of legal principles is mounting (Cohen 1996). Hence, the principle of sovereignty appears to be gradually succumbing to the reality that outside intercession may be necessary to preserve human rights. Still far from universal acceptance in international circles, the potential for designating a specific agency to care for citizens inside their country of origin is, nevertheless, evolving (Cohen 1996; Deng 1993; Girardet 1993; Ruiz 1993; UNHCR 1993a).
Another problem related to mandates is the care of refugee children. In part the responsibility of both UNICEF (as children) and UNHCR (as refugees), their specific needs are occasionally neglected altogether in the battle over obligation. Similarly, women’s issues in emergencies constitute another area that needs clarification. Their concerns are extremely important, given the role of women in society, the injuries they sustain in identity conflicts, and their vulnerability in complex emergencies. Nevertheless, few UN agency mandates specifically address women’s issues. Yet another problem area is human rights. Though the inception of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was a significant step in this direction and has brought greater operational capacity to the field, the issue of protection is still less than adequately addressed.
I would stretch the discussion of mandates to include mission objectives, specifically those of foreign military forces in humanitarian operations. As with UN agencies, the lines of obligation are often unclear, though here there are no mandates upon which to rely. The experience of many of my colleagues, and my own as a military liaison to humanitarian operations in several complex emergencies, has been that such confusion can and has led down dangerous paths. Without delineating areas of responsibility to exclude decisions pertaining to relief operations, military functions sometimes operate independently and outside their area of knowledge. Military forces should be limited to logistic and security assistance and operate in strict and continual communication with humanitarian components. To its credit, the U.S. military has made impressive efforts to understand the relief environment and improve its operations in humanitarian emergencies. Nevertheless, as with UN agencies, issues of division of labor still appear to require close scrutiny.
Funding Mechanisms
Many argue justifiably that it is not only UN mandates that require serious reevaluation and, in some cases, restructuring. The inadequacies of various funding mechanisms also contribute to overall ineffectiveness. For instance, in the UN, the reliance upon voluntary contributions through an appeal process for relief operations can exacerbate interagency competition, delay response, reduce continuity, and limit such activities as organizational development (Borton 1993).
Another problem is that donor funding for the full spectrum of early response through repatriation and social rehabilitation is inadequate. Partly the result of a lack of perspective, insufficient funding thwarts the implementation of such efforts as long-term, community-level field diplomacy. This kind of program becomes the victim of a shortening, rather than lengthening, international attention span.
The current focus on relief requirements over long-term development needs, though understandable given the immediacy of modern complex emergencies, should nevertheless be reevaluated for its overall effectiveness. As John Borton of the Overseas Development Institute contends, the immense power of Western governments “to influence the pace and direction of change within the international relief system” (Borton 1993:15) suggests that a prominent focus of any such evaluation lies within donor agencies. It would behoove donors to review their own organizational structure for priority of funding in light of the needs generated in today’s conditions.
Such a review might result in eliminating certain branches and building new ones or merely redirect energy toward programs that will most likely help build sustainable peace. Though donor structures often reorganize, the suggestion here is to reformat using longer-term, more comprehensive objectives within the larger conceptual framework. One commendable example is USAID’s creation of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, which attempts to address the root causes of complex emergencies in the region and redirects traditional development funds to that end.
Regional Structures
Other opportunities lie in the development of regional organizations. Many argue for restructuring the international system to rely more heavily on regional institutions, not only political entities such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) but other resources such as the All Africa Council of Churches, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Nairobi Peace Initiative. As Western countries draw down their funding for international intercession, regional organizations and institutions could fill the gap. Though limited in their own ways, using more local capacities helps develop skills, resources, and institutional competence to address future issues within a geographic region.
The United States, for example, passed the African Conflict Resolution Act of 1995 to support the development of Africa’s capacity to avoid and manage conflict on the continent. The act was intended to bolster the efforts of the OAU begun in 1993 to build a conflict prevention mechanism. Loescher suggests, as well, that regional organizations can be strengthened to participate in human rights monitoring. Such a change could contribute to “consciousness-raising” with regard to humanitarian, human rights, and democratic principles, and could, perhaps, reduce the impact of intercession on national sovereignty (Loescher 1993:190).
Restructuring the system to increase the use of cross-mandate approaches could allow much greater flexibility to address specific needs on a regional level. A cross-mandate approach is one in which all interested parties “pool their resources and work in close collaboration to provide community-based assistance” to all persons in need (Mechal and Simkin 1992). Instead of the usual geographic and operational restrictions, a cross-mandate approach offers greater flexibility to develop new options based on local and regional requirements.
Information Systems
Yet another challenge facing the international community is to improve information flow. While this is necessary simply because of the rapid technological changes in communication systems, it corresponds with a growing need for better intra- and interorganizational information-sharing. Improvements in technology have had a substantial influence on communication over the past five years alone and promise to affect it further in the future (Stephenson and Anderson 1997). The use of the Internet as a medium of information exchange has spawned such developments as ReliefWeb, an on-line disaster-information system housed in the UN. ReliefWeb has the potential to have application in data collection, information-sharing, response coordination, strategy development, contextualization, and standardization. UNHCR’s Reflink similarly offers an electronic database that gives users access to current academic and policy research about refugees and related subjects. Multitudes of other organizations offer information through their web pages. The growing use of e-mail list serves on various subjects and geographic areas of concern is further increasing the information flow among individuals and organizations.
The influence of such communication technology is evident in the crisis in Kosovo. In 1997, students protesting conditions in Kosovo received global attention as they publicized reports of the demonstrations on the Internet. In subsequent months, as conditions deteriorated and violence erupted, information has continued to pour through the electronic medium to list serve recipients around the world. The use of cellular telephones has further impacted the Kosovo emergency by helping organizations locate populations in need, compile information about current conditions, and coordinate relief efforts. As communication options continue to grow around the world, one of the challenges will be to refine and organize the data for the most efficient use. Another will be to define the method and protocols for information use. Issues of equal access—particularly in remote or underserved areas of the world—and information security are also on the agenda.
An encouraging sign of increased cross-agency information flow is the establishment of the Framework for Coordination, which links UN peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, political affairs, and (more recently) development and human rights departments in a joint decision-making structure based in the UN Secretariat. Through the Framework, desk officers in each department share data on conditions in specific countries and link response actions in an effort to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict and complex emergencies. This type of cross-fertilization among organizations needs to be developed further throughout the relief community.
Another necessary improvement in data collection is the building of objective needs-based indicators to help understand deteriorating situations. The objectivity of any analysis of a complex and politically volatile situation can be questionable. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus on the need to increase the even-handedness of the international community’s responses to crises. Restructuring could not only entail developing common indicators but enlarge the sources of information upon which to base the indicators. An expanded information structure should include some nonsensitive intelligence sources. To date, this kind of formal exchange has been small (albeit growing), and official inclusion might entail overhauling parts of the intercession coordination and information structure to include the intelligence community.
Weapons Export
A final area that requires immediate international community redress is that of small arms manufacturing and sales. The abundance of light weapons in circulation, which includes pistols, rifles, grenades, machine guns, antitank and antiaircraft rockets, mines, and mortars, contributes not only to the number of casualties in identity conflicts but also to a readiness to use them. A significant common denominator in today’s armed violence is this abundance of lethal weapons. “It is the flow of small arms and light weapons that is most relevant to the incidence of internal conflict and the outcome of recent wars,” claims arms researcher Aaron Karp (Morrison 1995). According to Karp, of the thirty major armed conflicts in progress, small arms were the major weapon in all but four (Dikshit 1995:41).
The inordinate amount of small arms distributed during the Cold War inundated the third world with the capacity to create and sustain armed conflict. Information on the exact numbers is unavailable since, during that time, only the transfer of larger weapons systems was regulated. Moreover, the recirculation of weapons throughout the world has made them impossible to track.
Despite the changes in global politics, the manufacturing and exportation of such weapons has not diminished but, many believe, has increased inordinately. Both Russia and the United States are still big players, according to weapons expert David Morrison, who states that Russian firms are attempting to gain more of the global market share. Where once they supplied 90 percent of all the weapons imported by the Angolan government between 1987 and 1991, they now also do business with anticommunist rebels (Morrison 1995). They have even reportedly expanded their weapons trade to their Chechen opposition during the conflict (Landay 1995; Morrison 1995). The United States, for its part, still has a big hand in weapons deals as well, ranking fifth among the countries with small arms industries (Landay 1995).
However, the image of superpower—or even industrial power—dominance over the arms trade is outdated in the post–Cold War era, as other countries get involved. By 1994, nearly three hundred companies in over fifty countries were producing small arms, according to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. A large part of this 25 percent increase in ten years is claimed by China, which has the world’s largest small arms industry (Landay 1995). South Africa, too, has become a major exporter, generating $187 million in profits in 1993 (Morrison 1995). In fact, in 1995, South Africa declared its intention to increase arms exports by 300 percent by the year 2000 (Cock 1995).
One of the worst offenders in the proliferation of violence is land mines. Over 110 million mines are spread across the globe in over sixty countries. In nine of the most serious infestations, land mines cause eight hundred deaths a month (Singh 1995:ix) and indiscriminatley maim tens of thousands of others, most of them unarmed civilians (Girardet 1994:7). More are planted cheaply and easily each year, for a cost of $10–$20 each, with some costing as little as three dollars. Now made of plastic, they are virtually impossible to detect, save with hand-held prodders. Therefore, clearing them costs between $300 and $1,000 per mine (Girardet 1994:22). As with other light weapons, the Western industrial nations are not the only or even the largest manufacturers of mines. In fact, China, India, and the former Soviet Union have been the biggest exporters of conventional antipersonnel mines in the early 1990s (Bond 1994:7).
The result of extensive circulation of countless light weapons throughout the world is not only actual violence but the perpetual fear of renewed conflict once a semblance of peace has been achieved. The presence of abundant weapons is undoubtedly contributing to the deterioration of stability in Angola. Not only government armies and recognized opposition groups pose a threat, but other political extremists, criminals, self-defense units, poachers, hunters, mercenaries, and private security forces now have access to arms (Cock 1995:91–96).
Although several countries in recent years have made attempts to address the larger issue of small arms, the strong political and economic interest attached to the arms trade make it a highly charged debate. In 1995, in fact, the United States approved new guidelines formalizing the use of U.S. embassies and agencies to market military hardware and expanding access to regional markets (Landay 1995). Nevertheless, the growing recognition that small arms contribute directly to internal turmoil and increase the lethal power of disputing identity groups seems to be growing. The U.S. Congress, for example, has written legislation attempting to establish a code of conduct for U.S. arms sales, among other things banning sales to foreign entities who violate human rights (Landay 1995).
Land mine reduction efforts are receiving greater attention. The designation of the Coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines as the Nobel Peace Prize recipient in 1997, and the Canadian-sponsored forum aimed at gaining international agreement on steps toward their eradication, put the issue at the top of the international agenda. Human rights and humanitarian organizations’ campaign to halt their use has also had an impact on the media and public opinion. Though these significant actions indicate a probable turning point in the acceptance of mines as a common weapon, their ultimate demise is still bogged down in political and technical quagmires. The new proposals to require metal inserts or self-destructing devises, for example, are considered too expensive and are therefore unlikely to be used by those intent on terrorizing a population or blocking supply routes. The United States’ resistance to joining the Canadian-led effort is another distressing indication of the probable difficulty of eliminating this scourge in the near future.
Although the weapons market is lucrative for those who sell arms, its human cost is dear. Curbing arms sales, which are a primary contribution to international crises, should be foremost on the humanitarian mind. As we move into the next millennium, this and other difficult issues facing the international community will have to be confronted head on.
A Vision of the Future
Looking back at the eight years since the end of the Cold War, one can argue that the global response to complex emergencies has progressed in some significant ways. Equally apparent, however, is the need for further changes. In the years to come, I envision the international community refining its understanding and attitude toward intercession to encompass the broader picture and incorporate the realities of today’s changing global dynamics.
In this vision, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers will combine efforts and expertise to create reality-based programs that more closely reflect the needs of the community threatened with, or engulfed in, identity conflict. These efforts will be determined by consistent and active monitoring of the country’s conditions (increasingly by regional organizations, which offer insight into potential trouble spots) as well as assessment of its humanitarian, human rights, or other needs. Early in the process, actors from all points in the range of whole bodies politic will lend their skills to prevent the deterioration in inter-identity relationships. They will select from the broadest possible array of approaches, ranging from noninterference to diplomatic means to economic incentives to humanitarian aid, based on intimate knowledge of the local conditions and capacities.
Later in the development of a complex emergency, the international community will view the entire scene in its full context and offer appropriate, proportional assistance. Organizations and international actors will work under standards and ethical principles to avoid exacerbating tensions. Safety zones, Open Relief Centers, and cross-mandate approaches will become standard in providing protection to IDPs and returnees. Refugees and resident citizens alike will be treated even-handedly by such programs as conflict management skills training and attempts to reestablish moral codes.
Reintegration assistance in the middle and later stages of a complex emergency will become a significant aspect of many organizations’ work, involving the use and development of local capacities, and efforts to begin the process of communalization. International NGOs will partner with local ones, building skills and resources as well as civil society. Issues of gender and identity will be incorporated into all programs, attempting to bridge the gap and encourage reintegration. In this vision, the international eye will not turn away when the crisis begins to abate. To the contrary, the camera will continue to portray images of the global and local community, each working toward a sustainable, peaceful society.
With such idealism, perhaps we can roll into the twenty-first century with new parameters for international intercession in complex emergencies. Lest I become lulled by my own wishful thinking, the words of Fred Cuny come to mind: “It is too innovative; they will never buy it.” Nevertheless, even without Fred’s own visionary leadership, perhaps some collective vision can serve as a common focal point for refining our global capacity in complex emergencies.
Endnotes
Note 1: As a result of this recognition, USAID established the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, which attempts to take a holistic approach toward development, including in it conflict resolution, prevention, food security strategies, civil society development, and other more comprehensive and innovative schemes. Back.
Note 2: Research conducted by Diane Paul begins the discussion on integrating human rights protection into humanitarian relief efforts. See Paul (1998). Back.
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