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State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity
Kimberly A. Maynard
1999
7. International Intercession in Community Rehabilitation
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The problem of rebuilding houses can be solved. But the problem of rebuilding souls is difficult. |
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— Tajik on the possibility of sustainable peace (Anderson 1995a:11) |
The international community—that is, the entire array of foreign actors interested in a country’s situation—intentionally or inadvertently plays a part in the process of recovery from a complex emergency. The course taken can either mitigate or exacerbate the effects of violent conflict. The challenge in this decade of global emergencies, therefore, is to improve the actions of the international actors so as to promote a healthy society and increase the chances for a sustainable peace.
Two factors hinder this task. First, individual foreign actors may not always have sustainable peace as their highest priority, particularly when political interests are at stake, such as natural resources, ex-colonies, military allegiances, geographic location, historical relationships, and even, in places, ideology. The task, then, extends to the whole of the international community to guide the overall efforts in a positive direction. The second obstacle is the dearth of understanding about the outcome of various actions. This likely stems from our relative inexperience with complex emergencies, and from the resulting inadequate evaluation of their circumstances and our inter-cessions.
The conceptual framework of community-level healing outlined in chapter 6 requires an operational framework for implementing the objectives, which is the focus of this chapter. First, however, we will look closely at the current state of international aid in complex emergencies. Then we will study its unintentional—but dangerous—negative effects. Finally, we will examine selected activities along the spectrum of international aid for promoting community healing.
The Evolution of International Aid in Complex Emergencies
In the preponderance of complex emergencies since 1990, the humanitarian seat has radiated under the spotlight of international attention. Though not a phenomenon entirely novel to the nineties, their increased numbers, size, and demands have focused diplomatic, media, and public interest, particularly in donor countries, on alleviating the suffering they bring and, to some extent, addressing their causes. This development has coincided with new conditions related to complex emergencies themselves.
New International Climate
The attention has brought some change to international intercession, including the addition of several new players. Most significantly, perhaps, the UN General Assembly created two posts to respond more directly to the field demands of complex emergencies. The first was the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in 1991, and the second was the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) in 1994. The new reform measures proposed under the new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, however, eliminated the Department of Human-itarian Affairs at the end of 1997 and rolled it into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
The 1990s also brought some additional resources and capacities. UNHCR’s budget doubled between 1989 and 1995, for instance, and contributions from major donors more than tripled from $1.4 billion in 1984 to its peak at $4.5 billion in 1993 (U.S. Mission 1995:11, 14). Several UN agencies, moreover, have increased their capacity to respond to emergencies. The UNDP and DHA, for example, created rapid response forces, the DHA and UNHCR established revolving funds to cover startup costs, and the World Food Program (WFP), UNICEF, and UNHCR have all expanded their mandates to some degree (U.S. Mission 1995:11). In addition, the inclusion of vast military sources in the relief equation since the turn of the decade has significantly augmented the resource pool. Private funding has also been substantial, accounting for nearly 30 percent of funding for humanitarian aid in 1995 (U.S. Mission 1997:17).
Recent years, however, show a slight decline in donor funding for emergency relief, and many observers maintain that the needs still far outweigh the available resources (Loescher 1993; USCR 1995; Walker 1996). While humanitarian relief funding has increased since the beginning of the decade, foreign aid across the globe is decreasing as a result of tighter fiscal policies, increased domestic concerns, growing population strains, and other factors. This decrease tends to diminish the nonemergency programs that may prevent the conditions that contribute to complex emergencies. Among these programs are family planning, education, health care, agriculture, and water resources (Borton 1993).
The pressure to respond, compounded by the complexity of these forms of disasters and our relative inexperience with them, has forced the international community to scramble for practicable actions to resolve the crises, particularly during the first half of the 1990s. Consequently, humanitarian assistance is often used as a substitute for political action in complex emergencies. The result is what could be termed the “politicization of humanitarian aid.” This is a play on terminology, in that the phrase is most frequently used in reference to the looting or diversion of relief supplies for the purpose of enhancing the political or economic position of local fighting factions (Loescher 1993:28). Here, however, I am using it to refer to international actors’ themselves substituting humanitarian aid for appropriate political action. Offering visible, popular, uncontroversial relief aid is often easier than the less tangible, sticky steps involved in political intercession. As such, relief becomes the subject of political manipulation and thus “politicized.”
On the other hand, the politicization of aid comes also from an apparent inadequacy of available options. The intricacies of today’s emergencies make it difficult to locate the appropriate tool for the job. In fact, to many policymakers and heads of international organizations, the toolbox looks surprisingly empty. New mechanisms are needed to respond to contemporary conditions. As will be discussed, however, many options exist currently that can be applied in concert with others, which together may address the situations effectively. 1 Appropriate response becomes all the more important now that the international community is beginning to recognize that its inadequacies only serve to extend and even exacerbate the emergency (Sollis 1994).
The New Disaster Climate
The humanitarian scene is also undergoing significant evolution at the field level. Just one of the many elements the relief community now has to face is the conditions brought about by failed states. In the absence of authority, the inevitable power struggles present serious security problems for aid workers (Minear and Weiss 1993b). One does not have to look further than Liberia and Sierra Leone to see why many field professionals have grown concerned about the increased threats, assaults, and physical dangers they face in relief work. The loss of Fred Cuny not only reminds us of the risks but causes us to rethink our concept of assistance. 2
The liability comes in part when humanitarian organizations lose control over relief resources. Such loss of control often results from diversions by the military, interference from fighting factions or government entities, looting of relief supplies, obstruction of convoys and distribution mechanisms, and so on (Anderson 1994; Minear and Weiss 1993a; Prendergast 1995). While such conditions are now common and concern for security has grown accordingly, appropriate responses have been elusive. Because of the pressure, international actors have recently made attempts to articulate new options.
At the same time as conditions in the field are becoming increasingly complex and dangerous, the number of new organizations responding to these scenes is rising dramatically (Aall 1996; Borton 1993; U.S. Mission 1997). In Rwanda, for example, NGOs poured into Kigali in August 1994 and literally overwhelmed the city. In a matter of weeks, white faces and four-wheel-drive vehicles began to dominate the cityscape, the price of housing doubled, and enterprising Rwandans began earnest appeals for jobs as office clerks, logisticians, drivers, house cleaners, or cooks.
There are several reasons for this growth. First, Western donors began to rely increasingly on NGOs for implementation of emergency aid in the 1980s, when they experienced greater difficulty working through bilateral channels and even international organizations, according to John Borton (1993), a research fellow of the Overseas Development Institute. As Borton points out, relief agencies often have greater flexibility, speed, and less rigid mandates in providing aid in areas of conflict, political instability, and disputed sovereignty. The United States, for its part, has dramatically increased the speed of its response through on-site funding of NGOs.
Second, as resources have moved from development to emergency in the zero-sum game of foreign aid, many organizations previously engaged in long-term programs have shifted to short-term relief operations. Organizations reliant on Western government financing for agriculture, public health, alternative energy, community development, small enterprise, natural resource management, and the like are receiving a small piece of the funding pie (Owen 1993). In response, they have followed the source and adjusted and augmented their skills base to react to emergency situations (Borton 1993).
Third, as startling images of ongoing crises are now broadcast around the world in seconds, the public appeal for immediate response has escalated. Concerned citizens react by starting their own organization in an attempt to alleviate the suffering as well as their own sense of helplessness (Awoonor 1993). In a benevolent gesture of goodwill, they often collect used clothing, medicine, canned food, excess medical equipment, and other unbidden transportable items and send an envoy along with the supplies to the affected country.
Finally, most countries place very few restrictions, if any, on individuals wishing to start an NGO, and even less constraints on NGOs entering a disaster-ridden country with the intention of helping. Given independent funding, whether from public contribution, wealthy philanthropists, religious fund-raising, or foundations, NGOs are generally limited only by their boards of directors and guiding principles. Most Western governments, however, require a degree—albeit minimal—of substantiation before providing financing for emergency programs.
In the absence of significant government regulation, it is widely recognized that the NGO community as a whole has had few institutional mechanisms for establishing and accepting standards of self-regulation (Minear and Weiss 1993b). As a conglomeration of independent entities, in the past NGOs have found it difficult to organize and commit to limitations on activities and agreed protocol. Much of the international NGO relief community, nevertheless, have recognized the need for standardization, and codes of conduct and best practices are currently emerging. 3 (The actual development of standards will be addressed later in this chapter.)
The consequence of the explosion of new NGOs responding to foreign complex emergencies is substantial. While there has been an impressive escalation in professionalization and capabilities among the leading organizations, the level of competence in the entire community varies widely. The increasing number of young agencies involved in any emergency and employing relatively unseasoned staff, therefore, translates into a drop in the average level of relief worker experience. On occasion in these complex, often hazardous, settings, one encounters foreigners in the field who are not only confronting their first political crisis, their first disaster of any sort, but sometimes their first experience abroad. In addition, the newer organizations have very little institutional knowledge, memory, or protocol with which to guide their employees in an appropriate response through the extremely intricate and dangerous maze of a complex emergency (Frohardt 1994; Minear 1994). The short-term nature and limited funding parameters of most responses, by definition, offer little time to build such experience in any single setting (U.S. Mission 1995). Furthermore, the general standards, procedures, and approaches that are being developed have not yet gained sufficient strength to effectively guide the notoriously independent nature of nongovernmental organizations in the field.
In short, the fragile environment can become more perilous and chaotic with the introduction of well-intentioned but inappropriate aid. Such foreign involvement can add to the difficulties of coordination, distribution of resources, housing, inflation, security, and the overall effectiveness of the international community. Cuny writes, “The arrival of massive amounts of useless relief goods, untrained personnel and volunteers, and untrained officials all add confusion to a disaster and delay recovery actions. Furthermore, the time and money spent sorting out and eliminating this unnecessary assistance cannot be recaptured” (Cuny 1983:201–202).
Because of their lack of experience, new organizations generally have even less contextual understanding of conditions specific to the complex emergency. Many observers consider this to be a problem across the board in the relief community. Inexperienced agencies, however, are at a particular disadvantage; since they have not learned lessons from related situations, they may not understand certain implications of their actions, and they may not have access to local information gained through long-term involvement in the region (Minear and Weiss 1993a). This inexperience can seriously degrade the professionalism of the international response and often offsets the positive work of others in the field. In the strong words of Fred Cuny, “In any case, international agencies rushing to the scene don’t have a clue about what they are doing nor are they aware of the complexity of the political environment in which they operate. The rest of us spend a lot of time picking up the pieces after these well-intentioned, but counterproductive, agencies” (Cuny 1990:12).
Another dimension of the lack of widespread professionalism in the field is the relief community’s relationship with the host country. The inundation of foreign organizations often overwhelms a nation struggling with internal problems (Awoonor 1993). Under these conditions, the government’s ability to manage and oversee the foreign-run activities is usually minimal and inconsistent at best. At the same time, particularly the less sophisticated NGOs may disregard the sovereignty and desires of the authorities and people of the country in which they operate. This became a serious issue in Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, in eastern Congo when the fragile new governments eventually gained strength and began a process of NGO registration. Not a few NGOs deemed it an affront to their independence and refused to comply. Eventually, thirty-eight of these organizations in Rwanda, as well as those the authorities considered to be ineffective, were expelled from the country (Kumar et al. 1996:97).
Except in those countries basically devoid of government, an attitude of disregard for local authority often results in tension between the host country and the relief community as a whole, which can compromise the positive outcomes of assistance as well as put aid workers at risk (Minear and Weiss 1993b; Van Brabant 1998). Other postures can be equally damaging, according to Kofi Awoonor, who speaks of the “recipient fatigue” of host countries: “Humanitarian assistance is guided by moral virtue, a sense of anticipated well-being that the gesture of giving is sure to bestow on the giver. . . . A mild degree of self-righteousness propels the gesture, the feeling of ‘but for the Grace of God, there go I’ ” (1993:74).
Awoonor goes on to berate the fund-raising efforts of NGOs as the “capitalization of mercy.” Their appeal to charity for the starving dark masses of Africa and the dazed refugees, “reinforce the stereotype of underdeveloped nations who can do nothing for themselves unless the rich and the powerful intervene. . . . Are we the peoples of the so-called Third World so helpless that we can only be portrayed as eternal objects of pity?” he asks (1993:78). Indeed, the concept of charity does have strong roots in the aid community. 4 At the same time, the broad array of organizations represents an equally wide spectrum of attitudes and philosophies. Our challenge, then, is to narrow that range to include only those that demonstrate deep respect for accountability, professionalism, and high standards of operation as well as for a host country’s culture. Equally important is to examine our own motivations in order to exclude pure self-interest and a condescending view of the recipients.
In the process of relief operations, NGOs, often either inadvertently or by necessity in the case of failed states, assume the responsibility of government agencies by providing health care, food, water, security, and shelter for the citizens. As a result, in conditions of the “atrophy of government,” 5 humanitarian organizations become the reigning authority. Their higher public image and local authority may become a thorn in the government’s side as it creates a new power structure in the region (Amoda 1996). This was particularly evident in Somalia as the public as well as community leaders began to turn to NGOs for answers to political questions. In the Belet Wayne area, I observed that clan leaders were both resentful of and reliant on international organizations’ often inadvertent influence on local decision-making. As a result of their actual and perceived power, agency representatives were the objects of intimidation and lobbying.
In defense of NGOs, there has been significant movement over the past years to rectify some of these problems and increase the level of performance in the field. Besides the development of codes of conduct and best practices, international NGOs have begun collaborating considerably more than in the past. This has created lively discussions over such difficult issues as security, accountability, limitations on aid, inclusion of gender considerations, and so on.
The Negative Repercussions of International Aid on the Conflict
Foreign aid can adversely impact host communities in a number of ways. Most relevant for this discussion is the fact that aid often inadvertently aggravates the inter-identity tension (Anderson 1994; Frohardt 1994; Prendergast 1995). Not many years ago, the common philosophy was that economic scarcity contributed to intergroup hostilities; deprivation was an ingredient to war. This reasoning prevailed during the insurrectionist period and was often used to incite movements against the dominant force. Today, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that injecting resources into conditions of poverty often exacerbates inter-identity animosity. The Local Capacities for Peace Project (mentioned in chapter 1 and headed by Mary Anderson) has been studying this phenomenon. Anderson says, “Evidence is that aid more often worsens conflict (even when it is effective in humanitarian and/or development terms) rather than helps mitigate it” (1996a:14). There seem to be four ways in which this occurs.
Introducing Resources into a Resource-Scarce Environment
First, according to Anderson (1994) and others (e.g., Cuny 1983), rather than alleviating the competition by augmenting the total amount available, adding new supplies seems to increase the intensity of the competition. There may be a natural element of human greed after periods of scarcity that multiplies the desire for sustenance in fear of another period of drought. Satiation, it appears, is a rather rare phenomena in identity conflicts.
Introducing vast quantities of resources into a resource-scarce environment alters the economic equation. Relief commodities often become the new currency in areas inundated with assistance (Minear and Weiss 1993b). In Guinea, for instance, rice functioned as the medium for bargaining, in some cases supplanting the need for actual legal tender. When it assumes this role, relief grows in value and is pursued by any means available, becoming subject to looting, manipulation, diversion, theft, and intentional mismanagement. In Somalia, where sorghum is the traditional staple and rice is considered a luxury, the massive quantities of rice brought into the country by aid agencies during the famine in the early 1990s spawned enormous thievery and diversion. According to John Prendergast of the Center for Concern, “Internationally donated rice in Somalia reached legendary status in terms of its attractiveness to looters, whereas sorghum drew little interest” (Prendergast 1995:12). These international aid practices clearly contribute to increased instability and violence.
The insertion of commodities into an area of need, moreover, often frees local resources to be used for combat (Anderson 1994:8; Creative Associates 1997:3/143). Without the daily requirement of cultivating, searching for, and preparing food, people, transportation vehicles, and time can be dedicated to the conflict. In Somalia, where the procurement and preparation of food required significant collective effort, relief lifted a large burden off the shoulders of all community members, but particularly those of young men inclined to fight.
As a valued commodity, aid itself can become the source of competition between identity groups. When relief becomes the regional focus, it can divert energy away from traditional occupations such as those in agriculture, cottage industries, and the like (Cuny 1990). The interdependence between local populations for commerce, information, transportation, and other aspects of daily life, moreover, can deteriorate with the introduction of international relief distributions. In Afghanistan, foreign assistance contributed to the competition for aid among the mujahidin that continued to divide the country, and in fact became an extension of the conflict (Minear and Weiss 1993a:37).
The repercussions of this kind of rivalry are compounded when territories are divided by faction, allowing them to regulate the movement of relief supplies (Prendergast 1995). By controlling aid routes, the combatants are able to manipulate civilian populations at the mercy of outside assistance, and thus prolong the conflict (Anderson 1996a). An example was the Bosnian Serb control over incoming aid to Sarajevo. The citizens inside the city were literally under siege, which served to exacerbate the regional tension. More recently, roadblocks controlled alternately by Serbian special police or the Kosovo Liberation Army excluded whole populations from receiving humanitarian aid, and consequently increased tensions.
Inadvertent Favoritism
A second way in which foreign aid can contribute to the conflict is when relief agencies wittingly or unwittingly exhibit bias in their assistance. Opposing groups carefully scrutinize organizations for their fairness in distribution, whether it is a matter of location, amount or type of aid, or the manner in which it is allocated. Perceived favoritism can not only diminish the legitimacy of the organization itself but can also create greater resentment against the other groups, again exacerbating existing tension (Anderson 1996a). Once it is labeled as biased, an agency usually finds it difficult to reclaim a reputation of neutrality. Subsequent assistance to any group is likely to be tainted and the “favored” populations, accordingly, viewed as opposition.
Favoritism may skew not only distributions but also other actions, such as hiring practices. More often than not, in the cases I have observed, international agencies enter a foreign environment and, unaware of the intricacies of the situation and in a rush to respond, hire the most qualified, available individuals, without paying close attention to identity. The organization may not be aware that a certain identity group may dominate the capital city, has more education, is more characteristically assertive (particularly when seeking employment), or has more of the skills required by relief agencies. As a result, an inattentive relief worker may hire many more workers from one group than another and thus give the impression of bias in the agency’s operation. In a Tamil section of Sri Lanka, for instance, donors established a reconstruction program in which administration of some resources was predominantly Sinhalese, leaving the Tamils with limited control over affairs in their area. As a result, the Tamils viewed every other aspect of the reconstruction program as unfair (Cuny and Cuny 1992:79–80). The identity of an agency’s translators can be particularly sensitive, since the bias of the individual is perceived to have a ripple affect throughout the organization.
Targeted assistance to specific populations such as returnees or internally displaced persons may also be perceived as unfair, since such groups normally consist of members of one identity group more than another. Providing specific aid to unaccompanied minors or women is less apt to be seen as an identity-based bias, but such programs might also create resentment and tension between community members simply out of perceived favoritism.
Proportionality across identity lines, therefore, is an important principle under contemporary circumstances. The guidelines of some organizations, such as Catholic Relief Services or the American Friends Service Committee, specifically dictate providing aid to both sides of the conflict. Nevertheless, some international organizations will inevitably be accused—justifiably or not—of bias no matter how careful many are to be fair (Prendergast 1995). Cultural differences inevitably leave foreign aid workers blind to important elements of discrimination. The influence of donors can also bias NGO activities by impelling the organization to carry out the political policy of the financing establishment (Minear and Weiss 1993b).
Regardless, in conflicts where opposing groups manipulate access to humanitarian organizations, avoiding bias may be nearly impossible at times. Many of the older NGOs have been reevaluating their operating doctrines as they struggle with inherently difficult conditions in complex emergencies. Even the ICRC, known for its strict adherence to the Geneva Conventions and its laws of impartiality and neutrality, has had to withdraw from situations as a result of its inability to adhere to its principles (Minear and Weiss 1993a). As a result of this dilemma, a growing debate over intentional partiality is emerging, and organizations are reviewing the appropriateness of neutrality under conditions of clear injustice, such as one-sided massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia.
Unintentional Empowerment of Factions
Humanitarian operations can serve in several ways to sanction and even assist the fighting capacity of the groups in combat, such as when supplies diverted from intended civilian recipients physically sustain the combatants. In El Salvador, for example, assistance distributed to civilians in zones controlled by the rebel forces reinforced the rebels’ political and military strength by providing them with physical sustenance. This had the added repercussion of provoking attacks by the government army on both the civilians and the rebels in the area (Minear and Weiss 1993b:33).
Additionally, the government may use hard currency introduced through aid projects to fund conflict efforts (Creative Associates 1997:3/150). When relief organizations negotiate with local factions for passage of relief supplies, employ armed elements to protect relief goods, and deal with factional heads for the release of kidnapped relief workers, they reinforce the status of the fighting elements (Frohardt 1994; Minear and Weiss 1993a; Prendergast 1995; Van Brabant 1998). Direct communication with combatants, according to Anderson, supports their claims to legitimacy—especially when a breakdown in governance increases theft and harassment of aid personnel and forces organizations to negotiate with factional leaders (1994:11; 1996a:48). Somalia offered several examples of fighting clans kidnapping, threatening, or killing relief workers. Under such circumstances, aid organizations understandably responded by enlisting local clan members to guard them. Several elements of the relief community have been scrutinizing this situation and examining alternatives.
Furthermore, the government or military can abuse international assistance to repress certain elements. In particular, development projects may be used for counterinsurgency, forced relocation, or pacification of the civilian population (Stein 1991). Pacification programs, for example, may be disguised to resettle rebel strongholds, redraw identity lines to redistribute populations of support, or to force citizens to choose sides between fighting elements (Cuny 1990). All these actions serve to promote the conflict by accepting the terms of war, bestowing legitimacy on warriors, and undermining peacetime values (Anderson 1996a).
Insisting on Conciliatory Gestures Too Early
A fourth element of relief operations that may hinder rather than help the healing process is foreigners’ “forgive and forget” attitude. Donor governments and international institutions may insist that the government grant a general amnesty for all refugees or establish plurality in leadership before they will provide significant financial aid. The European Union, for example, initially set implicit conditions on its funds to the new government of Rwanda based on “enlarging the government.” Doing so meant specifically including the party of those implicated in the genocide, a move that was highly unacceptable to the new government (Kumar et al. 1996:32).
Additionally, international organizations may put undue pressure on factional representatives and civic leaders to attend reconciliation conferences, problem-solving workshops, and the like. Many outside organizations proposed such conferences in Rwanda shortly after the genocide. These efforts either failed for lack of participation or, worse, forced individuals to confront each other before they were situationally and emotionally prepared, possibly reinfecting the open wounds and generally causing greater resistance.
Similarly, conflict resolution specialists may introduce training into communities and situations not prepared for outside intercession. This can be particularly dangerous since the vast majority of foreign conflict management organizations do not maintain a continual presence in the field. As a result, participants may begin the fragile process of internal healing and then have to face the daily reality of conflict alone. Further, according to Colin Rule (1993) of the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, some groups’ use of techniques and approaches that are inappropriate to the ethnic, gender, and cultural makeup of participants may inflame tensions. 6
The consequence of foreign entities’ insisting on rapid reconciliation and reintegration can increase rather than decrease hostilities. The attention focused on conflict-laden issues immediately after severe loss and social upheaval may simply draw attention to and reignite the underlying animosities. Such pressure may increase intra- as well as intergroup tension. Finally, outside intercession in community dynamics may exaggerate the actual level of hostility, creating a larger conflict than originally existed (Voutira and Brown 1995).
The negative repercussions of foreign assistance should be judged carefully; many elements are beyond the relief community’s immediate control and all must be weighed in balance with the positive outcomes. As long as there are situations that cause human suffering, there will be agencies attempting to alleviate it. The goal of the international community should be to reduce the negative impacts and expand the positive results by establishing concerted policies within a coordinated operational structure.
Building a New Operational Framework
The new conceptual framework requires a corresponding operational paradigm for guiding international aid programs. Such a structure might help international organizations detect and mitigate the negative effects of assistance as well as establish programs that specifically address the damaged relationships between groups and between individual community members. It incorporates designing long-term and comprehensive strategies for economic development, rebuilding social structures and institutional capacity, strengthening community cohesion, and developing civil society.
My field research and experience have led to five conclusions about community-level healing in a complex emergency. First, the return of displaced populations can offer enhanced potential for rebuilding relationships. Some returnees left sanctuaries that provided protection, supplies, and services, though not all were so well endowed. Nearly all returnees, however, risk poverty, retaliation, and rejection back in their home community and are, therefore, anxious to reinstate a degree of security. With that in mind, most re-turnees have a strong interest—at least initially—in restoring peaceful relations with fellow community members. At the same time, members who remained at home may be exhausted from fighting and in need of support and assistance in rebuilding the infrastructure and the economy. They, too, are often initially disposed toward attempting to live in peace. Together, these attitudes offer a window of opportunity to begin the healing process as displaced populations return.
Second, the problems inherent in a violence-ravaged community frequently demand immediate and concerted attention, thereby presenting opportunities for cooperative decision-making. In a postconflict environment, the often enormous needs, such as reconstruction, care of the marginalized members, reestablishing social structures, and economic rehabilitation, require practical solutions. Although conventional leadership may be absent, priorities must be set, resources assessed, and plans made to address the problems. These demands provide distinct opportunities to repair the community decision-making apparatus.
Third, international relief and development personnel already in the community offer a continual third-party presence. Because aid workers maintain a constant and potentially long-term residence in the community, they often serve as witnesses and unofficial monitors of the situation. The largest contact the international community has with the conflict—certainly at the grassroots—usually comes through relief operations. Consequently, community-based expatriate personnel tend to be relatively familiar with the local people, situation, context, and modalities, and can bridge the relief-to-rehabilitation gap by offering support for such ensuing intercessions as peace-building initiatives and human rights monitors.
Fourth, rehabilitation projects present occasions for cross-conflict communication, reintegration, and trust-building. Simply by virtue of their (ostensibly) continuous, relatively long-duration interaction over the life of a project, identity groups have multiple opportunities to reassociate with each other and relearn how to communicate across identity lines. The sheer number of possible projects multiplies this potential interaction.
Fifth, community-level reconciliation can contribute to reduced tensions nationwide and provide a broad grassroots base of support for high-level peace agreements. Widespread community healing can have a pervasive calming affect on the national temperament. As violence fails to reignite at the local level, leaders lose support for their struggles, and they may decide to engage in official settlement discussions (Meyer-Knapp, forthcoming). Conversely, accords negotiated among leaders can win support in the communities through broad-based healing tactics. Countrywide peace, in fact, requires community adherence; leadership-level and community-level efforts must work in tandem to bring about sustainable stability.
It is clear that the new operational structure must incorporate the big picture. As discussed in chapter 1, any useful conceptual framework should include not only a comprehensive analysis and consideration of the various factors bearing on the situation but also a larger time frame. The entire predisaster-to-development cycle must be borne in mind in designing an operational structure for rehabilitating wartorn communities. This process entails more than physical and economic reconstruction and more than the melding of preventive, relief, and development aid. It requires an even larger perspective, inclusive of an awareness of the nature and basic causes of the conflict, relief and development considerations, as well as attention to the social, political, and human rights dimensions—all of which may extend over a period of years, if not decades. Postconflict reconstruction must focus beyond the typical infrastructure, livelihood, and market rebuilding. To borrow the words of scholar Peter Sollis, it must also deal with “the hidden scars of warfare through policies and programs which support the reconstitution of the family and kinship ties and the social and cultural institutions that are critical to aiding recovery” (1994:15). Reconstruction, in short, offers the opportunity to redress previous inequities and to go beyond the status quo ante.
Strategies for Rebuilding Community
In outlining approaches for healing communities destroyed by violence, it is important to note that there are no easy answers and that each situation is unique, requiring individualized tactics. There is clearly no blanket prescription for peace. Developing peaceful relations, moreover, is an internal process, not one that can be imposed from the outside. Each step must be taken when the time is right and the participants ready.
Outsiders can, however, play an important role in preparing, supporting, and otherwise encouraging cross-conflict interaction and eventual reintegration. Providing an element of security, for example, or helping fighters disengage from the conflict can be roles for the international community. The Local Capacities for Peace Project found that while imagining reconciliation was difficult (particularly given the horrors of identity conflict), many combatants welcomed the opportunity to detach themselves from the hardship of fighting (Anderson 1996a). International actors are in a particularly good position to assist in this effort.
All efforts must be tailored to the unique conditions of each situation, based on in-depth understanding of the components making up the context and strict attention to their influence on the circumstances. Flexibility, innovation, and constant attempts to cater to specific needs are absolutely critical. In that same vein, it is also important, as Awoonor (1993) points out, to maintain a policy of working first with resources, ideas, and methods indigenous to the population before introducing outside elements. Such an approach requires eliciting suggestions rather than dictating them, investigating and increasing the local capacity, and enhancing regional competence.
A general approach to community rehabilitation might have four dimensions.
Do No Harm
First, and most fundamental, is the Hippocratic principle of “do no harm.” As the title of Anderson’s book (1996a) suggests, it is better to do nothing than to cause further damage. Literature by Anderson, Prendergast, and Creative Associates outline specific steps aid agencies can take to minimize the potential of causing greater injury in societies already suffering from complex emergencies. For example, both carefully selecting the site(s) to off-load relief supplies as well as carefully choosing which method(s) of distribution to use can avoid diversion of aid by military units. In Somalia, the ICRC contracted with entrepreneurs to transport relief goods throughout the country. The entrepreneurs themselves ensured the security, with the incentive of a 10 percent profit upon delivery. Looting dropped from 60 to 10 percent (Prendergast 1995:9).
Another way to minimize theft and manipulation by fighting forces (and thus to avoid increased tension) is to provide aid directly to family members rather than through an official intermediary. In recent years, the concept of supplying food relief to and through women in order to deliver needed goods straight to the mouths of the hungry, as well to diminish the risk of corruption or diversion, has received considerable attention.
Ethical Engagement
The second dimension in community rehabilitation is the concept of interceding under the guidance of moral principles. Thomas Weiss and Larry Minear, of the Humanitarianism and War Project, suggest eight maxims as ethical guideposts in humanitarian operations. Known as the Providence Principles(Minear and Weiss 1993a:19), they are:
The viability of some of these principles, particularly in light of identity conflicts, may be doubtful. 8 In a country consumed by civil conflict, for instance, it is difficult to imagine the government’s deference to humanitarian needs over, in its eyes, the larger concern for national sovereignty. In addition, it is generally accepted as good practice for organizations operating in a foreign country to communicate closely with host-government authorities. Such contact may make the independence principle difficult to uphold.
Moreover, the desirability of complete nonpartisanship is now being called into question in the context of such extreme cases as Rwandan refugee camps, where humanitarian agencies found themselves indirectly supporting the efforts of alleged genocide perpetrators to retool for a subsequent assault on the country. “The strict interpretation of traditional precepts such as neutrality has questionable utility for humanitarian organizations responding to current complex emergencies,” affirms Mark Frohardt of the Center for the Study of Societies in Crisis (1994:4). In fact, certain elements within the humanitarian community have recently debated the appropriateness of heretofore strict adherence to such principles as nonconditionality of assistance (though not of protection), free access, impartiality, freedom of movement, and no political involvement.
That said, humanitarian operations nevertheless increasingly require strong guiding principles to direct and standardize activities in the growing complexity of today’s emergencies. The recent focus on best practices, thus, provides welcome guidance for all agencies, not the least of which, the new ones. Contextualization, appropriateness, accountability, equal treatment, freedom of choice, proportionality, and participation are indeed vitally important in humanitarian activities and should be taken seriously by those working in strife-torn environments.
The Holistic View
The third aspect of community rehabilitation is the importance of maintaining a comprehensive approach that contains broad analysis and integrated programs. Economic incentives should be included in the effort to reestablish water and electrical systems; environmental considerations should be a regular component of infrastructure reconstruction; and the issues fanning the violence should be first and foremost on relief professionals’ minds in designing social rehabilitation programs. Prendergast (1995) argues that in analyzing a situation, an organization should look at the patterns of marginalization along class, identity, gender, and political lines. Indeed, it is necessary to consider how social relations predetermine much of the way external relief will be distributed, how communities set priorities in reconstruction, how leadership influences protocol, and how certain civic groups participate in the decision-making process.
Ultimately, a holistic approach requires use of the broadest possible resources, close coordination and collaboration between various elements working in the field, and continual reexamination in light of current conditions. The independent nature of NGOs provides them with advantages in terms of flexibility, even as it makes cooperation a challenge. “NGO experts and independent groups can get access to [disputants] and provide helpful insights, precisely because they are informal. They can analyze conflicts, find facts, and suggest creative violence-prevention measures at an early stage; they can, in principle, get into any society, start interviewing various actors, and feed the information into governments, other NGOs, the United Nations and humanitarian organizations,” writes Jan Oberg, director of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (1993:428). Humanitarian aid, for example, has been used to accompany ceasefire arrangements as well as to support indigenous dispute resolution processes (International Alert 1993). It is important to maintain a broad view of the situation and promote both top-down and bottom-up approaches to societal rehabilitation. Leadership-level settlement and grassroots dialogue are both enhanced when they accompany each other.
The Long-term View
The fourth and last aspect of community rehabilitation is the importance of keeping the distant future in sight. International aid workers should constantly analyze their programs for their impact on long-term development, social relations, environment, regional issues, and political affairs. Equally important, outside assistance should build self-reliance into all activities.
Each program should have an exit strategy—a carefully designed plan for leaving the community able to continue the program alone (or transitioning out of it, if it is no longer necessary). The exit strategy should include training, local leadership and participant responsibility, and nonrapacious funding mechanisms. Such a time frame, however, can rarely be determined at the outset. In fact, the exact timing of an organization’s departure should be subject to constant and careful review, so that it occurs when it offers the best potential for the population. In short, aid organizations should think in terms of sustainability with regard to peace, economics, social rehabilitation, and reconstruction.
Limitations on Aid
These rather strict and idealistic parameters may be difficult to implement for a variety of reasons. To be candid, most new relief agencies lack personnel who are sufficiently experienced, country-savvy, culturally sensitive, appropriately skilled, and situationally grounded for the complicated role they will almost certainly be required to play. Moreover, each organization is itself limited in the breadth of its actions by its mandate, which defines and restricts its ability to maneuver in any given situation. While this is not necessarily a handicap (and indeed is quite necessary), the inflexibility of field directors in adequately adjusting protocols to meet specific needs can inhibit innovation and interagency collaboration. This goes for donor agencies as well, which are often unable to adapt to the reigning circumstances or extend their support for novel or unconventional programs.
Each situation requires creativity and broad thinking. Solutions that work in one country cannot necessarily be transferred directly to another. Finally, and perhaps most difficult, quality work takes time, and in an emergency, time is a luxury. After the height of the emergency is past, the recovery process is usually prolonged. Capacity-building, reconciliation, and social rehabilitation require tremendous patience on the part of international aid workers used to fast-paced work.
Activities and Program Components
The following is a compilation of various programs or elements within programs that can contribute to the de-escalation of tensions in the community setting. All address at least one, and many address most, of the five phases of healing outlined in chapter 6: establishing safety; communalization and bereavement; rebuilding trust and the capacity to trust; reestablishing personal and social morality; and the reintegration and restoration of democratic discourse. Some of the elements listed here are vital to every community-based program, some are activities that may be integrated into other ongoing programs, and still others stand alone as programs themselves. 9 Thus, used in concert with one another, they may contribute to a community’s overall potential for sustainable peace and prosperity.
This selection of ideas is by no means comprehensive, as the possibilities are endless. While not strictly a compendium of activities, this approach is designed to provide an introduction to ways in which international organizations can tangibly and positively affect a conflict through field programs. Ultimately, as previously discussed, each situation requires unique answers, drawing on the creativity and innovation of individual organizations and constituents. In that regard, these suggestions might serve as a catalyst and inspiration for specific field operations.
Contextualization
Working in concert with the local context entails conducting all activities in a foreign environment based on extensive awareness of current conditions. It requires an in-depth understanding of cultural, social, and economic patterns, comprehensive knowledge of the conflict (regional, national, and local), a thorough grasp of international and humanitarian law, and a consideration of the entire situation in light of its political, human rights, social, development, and military implications. Contextualization entails researching background information on the country, including its culture and conditions; maintaining a high level of awareness of local factors; seeking and utilizing indigenous sources of information; establishing close communication with other organizations, local contacts, country specialists, and academics; and maintaining a broad perspective in the planning and implementation of all programs.
Maintaining a thorough understanding of the situational context can limit the number and size of costly and potentially dangerous mistakes by reducing the assumptions and errors caused by insufficient or false information. A closer view of a country may reveal needs not being addressed as well as opportunities to improve assistance. This can place program activities in a more realistic light and reduce false expectations based on theoretical models or those transferred from other environments. Contextualization also helps integrate humanitarian, human rights, environmental, conflict management, and development activities. An approach that focuses on understanding the fault lines of tension, on assessing areas for potential cross-identity cooperation, and on incorporating cultural or technical peacemaking capacities enhances the chances for successful reintegration by building trust; it also offers greater opportunity for using indigenous methodologies and resources.
All actors directly or indirectly involved in community rehabilitation can ultimately participate in gathering and updating their knowledge of the context. Participants in the contextualization process include (though not exclusively) country directors, program managers, relief workers, NGO partners, and donors.
In a five-step process of contextualization, the first involves a studious attempt to ascertain the various factors involved. 10 According to Peter Sollis,
the policy-maker’s view of the world is often less sophisticated than that of the poor people who must survive humanitarian emergencies. Policy alternatives conform to stereotypes about poor people’s lives as simple, monotonous, and predictable. Survival strategies, however, are wide-ranging and complete. As a result, while the poor use multifaceted criteria to define their well-being, external actors reduce these to one or two measurable indicators. (Sollis 1994:14)
As external actors, therefore, our analysis should be in-depth and incorporate several contextual aspects, one of which is a consideration of the current conditions. Such an examination should include the actual state of affairs in regard to humanitarian, political, human rights, military, conflict, geographic, demographic, migration, and physical concerns. It also should include the impact of programs on these elements and should analyze their potential for peacebuilding. Another aspect concerns standards. This demands an exploration of the political system, customs, methodologies, cultural practices, and communication systems of the society; the roles and responsibilities of various groups based on age, class, gender, ethnicity, geography, religious affiliation, or status; and baseline information on health, education, the economy, living standards, and so on. The assessment should employ ethnographic and sociological sources in examining various group dynamics. Of equal importance is the historical aspect, which should look at the recent and ancient past for significant changes in the cultural, political, social, or other realms of society as a possible way to uncover the roots of the violence. A viable historical study should also explore the development of the conflict, including its various stages as well as significant political and military events.
In-depth analysis must also assess local capacities, studying the innate capabilities of the community and region. These might include the technical expertise of medical personnel, engineers, computer programmers, or logistics specialists; the local decision-making capacity of committee systems, democratic forums, or consensus formats; and sources and channels of power such as local authorities, clan-based structures, religious entities, or ethnic groups. Such a study should also consider the society’s peacemaking systems, such as elders’ councils, designated conflict arbitrators, informal—or formal—justice systems, or civil authorities. International actors should also review local food distribution networks, local markets and natural resources, along with indigenous coping mechanisms for famine or social upheaval. Finally, the information should note specific individuals or groups inclined toward peaceful coexistence or engaged in peace-promoting activities. This type of data collection should both measure current activities and indicate gaps that require filling.
It is critical that international organizations conduct each in-depth analysis of the context unconstrained by official or unofficial guidance or interference. Particularly in conflict environments, individual assessors should be independent and as free from bias as possible, to ensure the most accurate reading of the situation and build trust in their approach. In addition, they should engage numerous and varied sources to limit the possibility of skewed or inaccurate data.
The second step to contextualization is to base international actions on the findings. The results of the assessment should be used to inform agency programs, approaches, and techniques. By working in concert with the given conditions and modalities, organizations will be less likely to make serious errors of omission or commission, and the probability of successfully negotiating the fault lines of the conflict toward better intergroup relationships will improve.
One significant aspect of this is the role gender can play in the relief and peacemaking processes. Because women tend to shoulder the heaviest burden in postconflict reconstruction, partly as a result of gender role delineation and partly out of sheer numbers, programs should use the information gathered in the assessment to directly address the needs of women. A careful in-depth analysis in El Salvador in 1994, for example, would have found that women headed six of ten displaced families (Sollis 1994:11). Appropriate programs, therefore, might have included specific economic assistance, family-related health care, or shelter construction, and used women’s roles as primary administrators of basic needs such as community drinking water, sanitation, utilities, fuel, and so forth to encourage joint community reconstruction (Sollis 1994:9). Such programs can also help reestablish social standards with respect to women’s roles in society.
The third step is to maintain a balanced approach to reintegration assistance. The methods used in promoting reintegration should reflect the context in which they are conducted and thus keep an even perspective on all aspects of community rehabilitation (Vieira de Mello 1993). It is therefore important to integrate the full spectrum of environmental, human rights, relief, repatriation, military, education, psychosocial, legal, and civil factors into a cohesive strategy aimed at sustainable peaceful coexistence. This clearly calls for close and continual field coordination and well-established lines of communication. At the same time, distinctions in operational mandates must be very clear between the sectors. This is particularly an issue between military and relief operations in complex emergencies. Confusion, overlap, disparity, and inappropriate, if not dangerous, actions can result from poorly defined lines of authority.
Once a full assessment has been conducted and balanced programs have been established based on the findings, the fourth step in the contextualization process—situation monitoring—begins. Continuous evaluation will present new information, changes in conditions, significant diversions from the original format, the impact of program activities, shifts in local structural support, acceptance by the community, and the like. While it is important to maintain an independent perspective on information, collaborative, internal, and participatory monitoring has proven beneficial in creating ownership of a program and its outcome (Prendergast 1995). Evaluations should be repeated regularly and alterations made based on the findings.
The fifth step in the process is to maintain a vigilant view of the larger context. It is important not to develop tunnel vision from intense scrutiny of a community or its conditions. Indeed, it is essential to be aware of the overall eventualities indirectly affecting the situation. This means keeping informed of international trends, global and regional conditions, the political milieu, the approaches of other organizations, and the relationship of the activities to the overall rehabilitation process, particularly with respect to its progression in the five phases of healing.
Above all, keep in mind that contextualizing the situation has several conditions and qualifications that limit its effectiveness. To begin with, cultural differences are only understandable and surmountable to a certain extent. At some point, the subtleties and unknowns are beyond the scope of even the most diligent expatriate. The information available, moreover, is never completely adequate, and it is difficult to determine how much is sufficient for establishing programs. Furthermore, as foreigners to the environment, we carry with us our own set of cultural biases that often blind us to the context in which we work.
Capacity Use and Capacity-Building
The process of utilizing and increasing the local population’s ability to provide for itself, manage operations, make decisions, solve problems, and locate resources is an invaluable tool for the international community. In so doing, organizations use local material resources, such as building supplies, food, and agricultural tools, and local technical services such as transportation, well-drilling, utility repair, road construction, trash removal, and excavation. They may also employ human skills in medicine, sanitation, computer programming, program management, logistics, psychology, peacemaking, animal husbandry, education, agriculture, and even urban planning, democratization, legal systems, and removal of landmines. International organizations can offer training and system development in these areas.
Building the ability of local communities to provide for themselves can decrease dependency on foreign sources by relying instead on regional specialists and supplies. It can also create alternative leadership to fighting factions by building chains of responsibility in, and receiving input from, other, noncombat lines of authority (Prendergast 1995). This ultimately removes support for fighting factions by reducing their role in decision-making processes. Increasing a community’s viability and its demand for appropriate support, moreover, can increase the accountability and reciprocity of authorities as well.
Capacity-building also elevates the regional status of the community and its members through their own resourcefulness and independence. Trust develops through the increased interaction, number, and duration of cross-group contact inherent in participatory programs. This helps weaken stereotypes, create shared perceptions of a common humanity with a shared destiny, and develop a sense of community through reliance on others (Klein 1995). As a result, self-esteem and empowerment grow through participation in and responsibility for community programs (Sollis 1994:4). Developing local capacity can also contribute to sustainable peace and development by establishing mechanisms for realizing community goals, which can ultimately breed community commitment. The renewal of interdependence can, in turn, reduce the chance of a reversion to conflict.
Relying on and building local resources affects nearly all phases of psychosocial recovery. The renewed interdependence between groups, for example, enhances safety, while intergroup cooperation can promote communalization across identity boundaries. Trust gradually builds through enhanced reliance on other community members. Personal and social morality, similarly, increase as a consequence of greater community and authority accountability. Ultimately, intergroup decision-making helps develop restoration of democratic discourse and promote reintegration.
Ideally, most members of the community participate in community projects, lending skills, ideas, resources, and labor. Initially, however, there may be three—not mutually exclusive—types of participants: those partaking specifically to share their skills, resources, and expertise; those who welcome and are particularly disposed toward training and resource development; and those who are specifically looking for ways to disengage from the conflict. Discovering the first and second requires the type of contextualization assessment discussed above to ascertain the skills and resources in the area—or the interest and capacity to learn. Local organizations employed in the region can provide significant input and knowledge about the capacities of local populations.
Locating members of the third category requires noting groups and individuals who resent the conflict. These are the same people who bear the least respect for existing factional leadership and may be the most willing to build an alternative structure (Anderson 1996a). Sources might include religious institutions (which can serve as a replacement authority to military leadership), schools (which are another form of community voice), and traditional consultative structures such as chiefs, clan elders, and village mediators.
Capacity utilization and building can be both a means to an end, by using local resources efficiently to address relief or development problems, and an end in itself, as a way of building commitment and skills for a self-sufficient society. It requires three specific and diligent actions on the part of the international community: using local rather than imported skills and resources in relief and development programs whenever possible; further assessing local capacities and supporting their development and use; and promoting local decision-making, planning, and responsibility.
In so doing, international organizations can buy, employ, and rent local capacities, while partnering with local NGOs, charities, and civic, work-related, and task-oriented groups. They can also insist on indigenous participation in the design, planning, implementation, and management stages of projects, and encourage and defer to local decision-making structures and leaders. As civil society strengthens, moreover, expatriates can help design nonrapacious revenue-generating mechanisms to increase organizations’ self-sustainability. For emergency response, international agencies can depend on such local structures as fire brigades and local physicians. If the capacity is lacking, they can provide skills training and offer guidance as well as resources, project assistance, and/or funding. International organizations can employ a simple seven-step process to maximize the use and building of local capacity. First, the international organization, local counterparts, and community members identify a problem or project. Second, they identify an appropriate solution to the problem and the resources required to carry it out. If such local resources are available, together they mobilize them to meet the needs. Third, they identify any gaps in capacity and any local sources that might be developed to fill these gaps. Fourth, the international organization and indigenous counterparts develop the local capacity through training, mentoring, and guidance. Fifth, if no local sources are available, they offer fundamental training and procure outside resources. Sixth, local and international entities work together in project decision-making, and, seventh, the international component gradually diminishes, and local capacities continue to manage the project.
Capacity-building requires conducting an in-depth contextualization assessment. This includes analyses of resources, needs, individual and community vulnerabilities, indigenous problem-solving methods, local civic institutions, traditional social networks, community technical committees, individuals and organizations particularly disposed toward peaceful coexistence, and local dispute-resolution systems. Participatory planning is also essential, engaging as many elements of society as possible and recognizing and supporting the resulting choices and strategies.
Ongoing training and development should include specific capacity-building activities for women, such as developing job skills, widows’ associations, women’s farming groups, cottage industries, and market cooperatives, and for the military and police, including training in discipline, the Geneva Conventions, Codes of Conduct for Combatants, juridical accountability, cross-cultural relations, and job skills for demobilized soldiers. Other training programs could address human rights, leadership and governance, problem-solving, democracy, technical skills, conflict management, business administration, and renewable and nonrapacious revenue generation. All capacity-building activities must be monitored for inequities, successes, opportunities, and gaps.
Capacity use and building has several drawbacks and difficulties. One limitation is that it is an inherently long-term process, and immediate, efficient results should not be expected. Because each situation is unique and evolves largely out of trial and error, developing local capabilities and resources requires enormous patience. Many practitioners view capacity utilization, let alone capacity-building, as unpractical during emergency operations.
The practice of capacity-building may entail several other difficulties as well. Supporting indigenous organizations can represent an alternative power structure, which could threaten the authorities and may therefore be dangerous. Skilled individuals are frequently drawn from government and civil society organizations to employment with the more lucrative international relief and development agencies, thereby creating a brain drain. Finally, the most successful capacity usage and building require coordination among all the actors, which may be difficult to orchestrate.
Increasing Protection
Improving physical security (usually inadequate in postconflict societies) is the first of the five steps to recovery. Doing so entails working through structures such as peace-keeping forces, military units, local brigades, and community members, using civilians and nonviolent tactics for safeguarding communities and, in the case of returning migrants, working with the UNHCR. Increasing the level of protection can bring respite from violence, allowing the first phase of healing to take place. Reducing fear and trepidation, then, can promote community interaction between groups and offer opportunities for communalization and trust-building. Furthermore, a program of protection can begin to eradicate the culture of impunity, and to establish legal structures for ensuring justice. This contributes to the reestablishment of social morals. Physical security is crucial to the implementation of long-term development programs that require a stable environment. Improved local confidence can, in turn, lead to an increase in local commitment to and investment in community rehabilitation and, at the same time, enhance the prospects for international financial investment.
While all members of society may be indirectly concerned with and undoubtedly benefit from protection programs, active participants generally include local police forces, individuals involved in the judicial system, military officials, government authorities, civil society organizations, and possibly demobilized soldiers. International participants include foreign militaries, peacekeeping forces, bilateral agencies, international relief agencies, and private foundations.
The fundamental goal of a protection program is to improve the overall security at the community and national levels. Several strategies might work in this regard, though presumably all in tandem provide the best results. Maintaining an international presence is often invaluable. Expatriates interspersed among hostile groups tend to serve as witnesses and monitors of the situation, thereby suppressing the level of violence. As eyes and ears for the international community, foreigners working with relief and development agencies, conflict management groups, and human rights organizations throughout the country maintain constant awareness of grassroots occurrences. Diplomatic missions visiting various locations could prove helpful in this respect, as well. The ICRC plays a special role in its interaction with detainees. The essence here is not the reporting of inflammatory incidents but the sheer presence of foreigners in the communities. Further, international organizations, because of their putative noninvolvement and available resources, can offer a safe space for cross-conflict meetings, individuals fearing persecution, local leadership pursuing peace initiatives, or others in need of sanctuary and protection.
A more formal aspect of using an international presence to increase security in unstable regions is the role of official security operations. Units such as observer missions, peacekeeping forces, and foreign militaries always deploy under specific rules of engagement—that is, they are authorized to use force only under a specified level of threat. Some may function strictly as a protective element, and not as a fighting unit, in an effort to induce a greater level of assuredness among the population. Other operations simply serve as an official third-party “eyes and ears” on security issues. Still others may be more aggressive in their effort to protect, as in the case of Somalia, where the rules of engagement were liberal.
An additional aspect of security is the establishment of safe havens, zones of tranquillity, and special protection areas inside hostile regions. These offer areas of refuge for the persecuted, displaced, or abandoned, in which there has been an agreed-upon ceasefire. International forces established within the zones theoretically ensure the absence of fighting. Bosnia is an example in which safe havens were initially effective but backfired when the internal ceasefire was violated.
Another official channel for security is UNHCR’s role as protector of returning refugees and, in some cases, of IDPs and even local residents. In Tajikistan, for example, UNHCR’s presence in the communes receiving returnees acted as an assuaging force, providing security for some and admonition to others. Another option for international protection is the use of Open Relief Centers. Such centers offer protection and material assistance, particularly for displaced persons but also for local residents and returnees (Stafford 1993; UNHCR 1993a). Open Relief Centers have been used effectively in a number of countries, including Rwanda and Sri Lanka.
Human rights monitoring missions, such as those deployed in Central America, Haiti, and Cambodia, provide another form of external protection. The newly created UN High Commissioner for Human Rights became operational by establishing its first official field program in Rwanda following the 1994 conflict. Its function, in part, was to provide international vigilance on human rights issues, in an attempt to decrease the number of protection violations.
Unofficially, there is a growing global interest in alternative protection arrangements. For example, witness programs typically post individuals and teams in areas of particular tension, and accompany individuals thought to be in serious danger. The more sophisticated operations may instigate conflict resolution efforts in a community or between individuals. Such programs have been implemented with relative success in Central America.
One important method of improving security is reducing the incentive for disruption. Since the high value of relief supplies invites malfeasance, decreasing the desirability of relief goods can avoid attracting the interest of fighting factions. This can be done through minimizing food distributions in favor of nonfood items, educational materials, and subsistence aid, which generally hold much lower value than food (Prendergast 1995). International organizations should also avoid using relief arms of military factions as counterparts in distributions. Such relief elements, though possibly legitimate, have other, higher motivations and may use the material aid to subjugate civilians or intentionally cause instability. Minimizing dislocation is also important since displaced populations and their supplies are more vulnerable to protection problems, such as manipulation and looting, than are resident populations (Prendergast 1995).
While foreign entities can play an important tempering role in hostile environments, establishing independent sources of order and an internal capacity to provide security fulfills long-term safety needs. International organizations can refine and routinize police force training, help fund and guide military demobilization programs, and provide military training to establish discipline as a fundamental element of military conduct. Strengthening formal internal protection units can ultimately diminish the level of misconduct and abuse of power and instead create disciplined units focused on protecting the civilian population.
The development of an equitable justice system can also play a critical role in eradicating a culture of impunity. (Re)establishing a rule of law, defining areas of responsibility, building experience and training into court and legal procedures, and expanding the number and level of trained and accountable judges, magistrates, lawyers, court officials, and police officers could play a major part in increasing security and reestablishing social ethics. International organizations can help fund and provide technical assistance in rejuvenating the judicial system. This kind of institution-building can potentially result in a well-formed and stalwart system of justice that can endure political turmoil and promote a strong sense of ethics in a society.
Externally, truth commissions, war crimes tribunals, and other international investigations into violations of international law can have a pacifying influence and contribute to the reestablishment of social ethics. Serious allegations of crimes against humanity can affect not only the individuals implicated but the status of a country itself. Arrests and convictions of war criminals remove the individuals and their influence from society; truth commissions give voice to victims of human rights violations; all of these condemn acts of aggression to the global public in a process of reestablishing social morality. This international attention may serve to mollify victims and cool down an otherwise hurt and angry population, thereby increasing the level of security.
Programs attempting to increase protection in an inherently insecure environment, however, can be riddled with uncertainties and problems. The introduction of external forces is often seen as an invasion and an affront to national sovereignty. Peacekeeping forces and the like can, in fact, increase tension by introducing another element of physical force into the equation. It has been well noted that attempting to abate force with force can simply endorse the notion that strength and the threat of violence are the best means for resolving issues. Yet alternative tacks such as witness programs are often unprofessional, lack consistency and standards, and fail to coordinate with other international aid elements.
Extensive controversy exists over the appropriateness of training military and police units. Many believe that training may simply increase the potential of already powerful forces in a society, preparing them for greater violations. Others contend that a well-disciplined armed force can introduce accountability and pride into a socially corrupt system, thereby instilling order. Certainly, abuse of power remains a legitimate fear.
There are other potential dangers to the protection approach. One is that rebuilding a society’s judicial process may eventuate in a corrupt system that virtually paralyzes the country and further emboldens violent factions. Another lies in the fact that international organizations are inevitably labeled with biases, justifiably or not, that can jeopardize their protective attributes if put into the wrong context. UNHCR’s presence in a community, for example, if seen as discriminatory toward one group or another, can endanger recipients by inviting retaliatory attacks by opponents. Yet another pitfall is that a country’s reliance on an international presence to impart an element of stability is limited by time and can develop into dependence.
Furthermore, war crimes tribunals and other official investigations based on international law are usually slow to begin, commencing long after the worst of the violations have been committed. The assuaging influence, therefore, may have lost some force as the country sinks into martyrdom when the crimes have seemingly gone unnoticed. The preventive capacity of these official channels may, consequently, be limited.
Collaborative Community Rehabilitation
Reconstruction projects can incorporate components that help facilitate reintegration by engaging and benefiting a broad spectrum of community members. Organizations implementing collaborative community rehabilitation projects employ participatory project management methods, carefully select the project location and nature, and ensure that direct beneficiaries represent diverse community membership. A project, for example, may include joint decision-making in its design and management; it may target marginalized individuals of all identities, thus easing the burden of the whole community; or it may be located in an area accessible and beneficial to all groups.
Rehabilitation assistance with both physical and social objectives can advance many of the five phases of psychosocial healing. Through tangible, community-based projects, it can draw displaced populations back home, attracting them with both community renewal and improved social relationships, thus beginning the healing process. Reconstruction programs invariably provide employment for some members of the community, which not only boosts the local economy, thus rewarding the community for efforts at reintegration, but increases the sense of individual and communal security (Anderson 1994).
Collaborative projects, moreover, can help rebuild intergroup trust through cross-conflict interaction over an extended period of time (OTI 1995). Such programs can also develop community problem-solving skills by involving all identity groups in the design, development, and management of the program (OTI 1995). Under certain conditions, this may also contribute to communalization. Joint decision-making can discourage the concentration of resources of any one group and promote empowerment and recognition of minorities by involving them equally in the project. This promotes the democratization phase. Ideally, whole-community collaboration reduces social and political isolation and promotes interdependence, which benefits the entire community.
All elements of society can participate in collaborative community rehabilitation, depending on the project. Minimally, however, a project includes members of all identities, both genders, a variety of ages, and all social ranks. International participants can be NGOs, the United Nations, development, bilateral, philanthropic, relief, or institution-based organizations.
The fundamental objective of this methodology is to improve intergroup relationships while contributing to the reconstruction of community infrastructure or economic rehabilitation. Direct physical engagement in reconstruction activities can serve as a relatively safe step toward committing to the future of a community. Project selection for collaborative rehabilitation can incorporate several aspects—the location, type, or methodology of the project—emphasizing one over the others, or integrating them all.
Location of Project
Reconstruction programs ostensibly renew dysfunctional community structures and increase employment. The selection criteria for appropriate communities in which to implement a project should be based not only on economic and physical needs but on social factors, such as the tranquillity of the area, an indication from the community of its desire to improve relations, the self-motivation for community renewal, and the agreement of leaders of all parties to support and collaborate on the project.
An example of this is “spot reconstruction,” a concept adopted by Fred Cuny in Sri Lanka. Spot reconstruction specifically targets villages located in low-conflict zones—often with mixed representation—with reconstruction aid in support of formal peace initiatives. It focuses on areas of minimal conflict and mixed groups, such as those containing recent returnees or urban areas with large numbers of voluntarily resettled displaced persons (Cuny 1989; Cuny and Cuny 1992). In Cambodia, small-scale projects were introduced into villages known to have sizable returnee populations, in an effort to facilitate integration (Rogge 1992). This type of whole-community approach to improving village infrastructure can raise the general living standard, presumably reducing competition for resources as well as creating new foci of activity apart from the conflict.
Type of Project
The form a reconstruction project takes can also encourage cross-group collaboration. In selecting projects to promote reintegration in Bosnia, for instance, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) developed operational guidelines for project selection. These included projects that bridge ethnic divides in mixed communities or develop bridges between ethnically distinct communities; involve both sides in the implementation process; ensure that results benefit both sides; promote reintegration and interdependence; involve multiethnic labor forces; promote groups outside the conventional lines of authority; and benefit a broad constituency such as the disenfranchised and the apathetic (OTI 1995). Thus, project selection in this context is based on the intended benefit of all conflicting parties as a way of developing a mutual interest and point of collaboration among adversaries. Road reconstruction, repair of telephone lines and public utilities, and rehabilitation of shared social ministrations such as hospitals and schools are good project candidates.
Another consideration is projects that require the benevolence of adversarial parties for the benefit of all, with the intention of initiating the trust-building process. In several conflict-ridden situations, for example, international NGOs instigated housing reconstruction projects for returning refugees and displaced persons that required the labor and even material contribution of the community residents. This personal investment in the fate of the returnees resulted in their greater overall accommodation, and the gesture of goodwill on the part of the community was a large first step in restoring trust.
A third consideration is the potential for the project to increase local stability. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) can work in this capacity as an incentive for greater cooperation at the community level. QIPs are “small-scale micro-projects that require a modest, one-time investment and must be carried out locally” (Fagen 1993:33). Usually implemented during the fragile “swing” period when refugees and internally displaced persons return home, QIPs, with their high potential for rapid results, often provide an immediate boost to the whole community. In Cambodia, for instance, QIPs facilitated returnee reintegration through water and sanitation improvement, agriculture, fishing, and income-generation activities (Vieira de Mello 1993).
In Tajikistan, one QIP proposal was to establish a weaving brigade among women of one ethnic group and a wool manufacturing enterprise among women of another, requiring collaboration for mutual benefit (Anderson 1995a:30). These types of community efforts offer an immediate return on cooperation, encourage reintegration as well as rehabilitation, and provide a bridge between relief and development. “The presence of QIPs unquestionably has enhanced movements toward reconciliation,” writes Patricia Fagen, head of the UNHCR office in El Salvador (1993:33).
A fourth related point is the project’s potential for supporting economic recovery. Beyond immediate aid in the form of QIPs and initial resettlement kits, such as seeds and tools for agriculture, projects focusing on economic rehabilitation can both improve local conditions and shift attention away from the conflict toward livelihood regeneration. As Cuny emphasized, credit, in particular, is critical to stability, since it is often necessary for any substantial rehabilitation (1983; Cuny and Cuny 1992). Moreover, both a willingness to accept a loan and a willingness to risk the offer, indicate trust in the future.
Foreign organizations can establish a milieu of commitment and reliance through credit incentives and joint small enterprise programs. They can encourage or mandate certain kinds of interaction as a condition to funding. Small business start-up credit or small-scale revolving loan funds, for example, may be granted more readily to those proposing cross-conflict partnership, those hiring across identity lines, or those intent on locating in mixed identity areas, high-tension zones, or areas traditional to other groups.
Methodology
The way in which a program is selected, designed, implemented, and managed will also affect community relations. International organizations that intentionally employ staff who represent all groups, identify diverse project participants, hold joint meetings, insist on cooperative decision-making, and orchestrate shared management and maintenance of projects can ultimately invite long-term, intergroup interaction. 11 Foreign agencies can specifically gear programs to intergroup interaction by designating roles for individuals of mixed identity makeup and requesting tasks requiring growing levels of trust.
In reconstruction projects, foreign agencies using local purchase for materials should consider explicitly buying across conflict lines. In doing so, they can thereby establish confidence in the manufacturing, delivery, and quality of goods produced by the various groups. In-kind donations of labor and materials from all beneficiary groups further necessitate cross-conflict communication and demonstrate goodwill. In Bosnia, for instance, an International Rescue Committee water project that benefited both groups in the community stipulated bi-ethnic construction and management as well as labor and material contribution (OTI 1995).
Another innovative model of this approach is that of the African Community Initiatives Support Teams (ACIST) in Rwanda. Teams supported by international NGOs and made up of Africans and non-Africans worked within communities on local improvement initiatives such as agriculture, small enterprise, artisanship, education, cultural arts, and sports. Because they emphasized grassroots conceptualization and participation at the lowest level of society, and required community contribution of labor and resources, they necessitated whole-community interaction and decision-making (CWA-ACIST 1995–96).
As with every approach to responding to complex emergencies, a collaborative community rehabilitation program has its downside. An intensive focus on economic development, for instance, may undermine the slower and more subtle social development, thereby creating a lopsided society vulnerable to renewed conflict. That is, without a balanced approach of addressing with equal fervor such issues as care of the disenfranchised, psychological recovery, deprogramming of demobilized soldiers, social welfare, and rehabilitation of dispute management systems, the reconstruction effort may simply lead to greater conflict.
Moreover, since international aid introduces tremendous power into an area, the channels used for its distribution affects traditional roles, authority, and relationships (Anderson 1996a). NGOs and their staff, for example, can become the supreme local command, usurping community leaders and reengineering community relationships. Similarly, because skills and resources between identity groups are often different, equal distribution of responsibility and allocation of funds may be nearly impossible. Skilled labor for specific tasks, for example, often rests primarily with individuals with certain credentials that may be more common in one group than another. A concerted effort to pay attention to identity makeup, however, could in fact increase divisions between groups by reinforcing awareness of differences. Save the Children Federation in Tajikistan, for example, found that “staff who have both enough closeness to the situation to have credibility and enough distance to be seen as non-aligned and disinterested may be better able to play localized reconciling roles than those who represent different alliances” (Anderson 1995a).
Rehabilitation projects can also fall prey to violence in areas still embroiled in conflict. This may be literally the result of an outside attack on the community, as has happened repeatedly in Sudan, or the work of embittered insiders resentful of the project or its supporters. Ultimately, the challenge of integrated program management may simply prove to be too difficult or too early for some mixed communities. It may, in fact, exacerbate tensions among community members and lead to further deterioration in community relations (Anderson 1995a).
Conflict Management
In this context, conflict management involves community-level activities that attempt to directly and positively affect inter-identity relationships, and to enhance the prospects of peaceful coexistence among community members. This usually entails increasing the instances of positive cross-conflict contact, which can ultimately promote many phases of the healing process.
Conflict management activities can alleviate tension simply by providing a voice to underlying grievances that otherwise may not be articulated. This can initiate the communalization and bereavement process which, for cultural or other reasons, might not commence on its own. International participants in such a program often serve as external monitors, which can reduce the number of violations and thereby enhance the sense of security, particularly in the initial phases of recovery. The international organization can provide a neutral, safe space for participants to explore the root causes of the conflict and begin to rebuild working relationships, develop trust, and ultimately request forgiveness.
Programs incorporating a conflict management focus can legitimize, support, and give power to individuals and groups working in concert toward better inter-identity relationships. As community leaders, they, in turn, can begin to redraw the lines of moral behavior, creating boundaries for tolerance of hostile acts. Certain conflict management activities, such as incorporating peace education into the school curriculum, can directly teach moral behavior. Others have the potential to employ and build decision-making capacities or, through the process of reintegration, help restore the voice of the ostracized to the community system. Use of conflict management skills in the reconstruction of infrastructure, moreover, can facilitate whole-group decision-making and enhance the democratization process. These skills have a potentially long-lasting effect that can remain as a resource for the prevention of future conflicts.
In the host country, participants in a conflict management program might include government officials, local authorities, national NGOs, academics, professionals, educators, community members, elders, business leaders, media reporters, representatives of work-based groups, and religious, civic, and social leaders. Expatriates involved can include academics, conflict management specialists, diplomats, international NGOs, foundation personnel, and UN representatives.
A more integrated approach to conflict management is beginning to emerge (Minear and Weiss 1993a:36; Montville, forthcoming:4). The fields of humanitarian assistance and conflict management are simultaneously converging, from different angles, on issues of community-level violence in identity conflicts. The concept of “field diplomacy,” 12 which integrates conflict management skills into long-term community-based programs, for example, is developing, at least in theory. Several humanitarian and human rights organizations are beginning to apply aspects of conflict management in their programs. The vision of close collaboration, however, is still in the distance, as very few relief, development, or conflict management activities have actually bridged the gap.
The study of British conflict resolution NGOs, mentioned in chapter 1, illustrates the conflict management approach. The study found that the NGOs do not normally intervene directly in the conflict, but instead try to indirectly affect behavior and “promote a general ethos of well-being.” Specifically, the study concludes, “they see their role as building networks and facilitating the transformation of group dynamics amongst people who might in the future play a role in conflict resolution interventions” (Voutira and Brown 1995:19). The researchers divided the NGOs into three categories offering three different approaches. The first consisted of those working at the top level and using the UN vocabulary. They relied on international bodies and government funding, conducted short field trips, and organized high-profile conferences. Their basic premise was that misunderstandings generated conflicts.
The second group was NGOs whose main purpose was to influence public opinion. For this purpose, they conducted broad-based field research, encouraged citizen diplomacy and grassroots awareness, and attempted to influence leaders. They used development vocabulary and relied on membership, public, church, and some government funding. Their assumption was that conflicts resulted from obstruction of the free flow of information across identity lines. The last category was comprised of organizations that targeted conflicts at the grassroots level. Their vocabulary was that of peace activism and they relied on information from the grassroots, the techniques developed by the other two models, and funding from membership and foundations. Their main premise was that conflicts were the result of human rights violations. None of the NGOs, however, established field programs attempting to help rebuild relationships and resolve fundamental issues over an extended period of time (Voutira and Brown 1995).
Community-based conflict management in complex emergencies can be divided into three basic approaches, each containing specific activities:
This involves marshaling local leaders and community members in community-level efforts of crisis management and possibly prevention. When members of the local population become major stake-holders in the rehabilitation process, they generate broad-based will and accountability toward peaceful coexistence.
Peace committees. Foreign organizations can advocate, help establish, and empower local peace committees. Made up of noncontentious, mutually respected, and diverse community representatives, peace committees can help counter rumors and exaggerations, serve as go-betweens for international agencies and the local community, and mediate between contentious individuals and groups or between groups and the government. They can also advocate nonviolent solutions to potentially violent conflicts, support local peace initiatives, and provide incentives and support for local authorities to advocate conciliatory actions. In so doing, they often help improve the sense of local security and take significant steps toward reestablishing codes of ethics. Both in Nicaragua and South Africa, peace committees have had substantial success. Similar in many ways, ethnic reconciliation commissions have been established in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Poland.
Indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution. Virtually every society has some mechanism for dispute settlement, such as mediation by elders, meetings among local leaders, settlement by a designated peace official, popular justice, legal procedures, or arbitration (Rule 1993). Although these mechanisms may exist in identity conflict contexts, they often disintegrate along with the social order. International organizations, thus, may attempt to rehabilitate and strengthen existing indigenous dispute resolution systems. This could involve recognizing, providing support for, and encouraging the revitalization of the elders’ council, the role of the traditional peacemaker, the justice circle, the tribal court, and representative committees, or the mediating role of women’s organizations. It clearly requires intensive investigation into local methods, cultural practices, and nuances as well as enlisting the support of, and empowering, groups, individuals, and organizations in the area that are inclined toward reconciliation. 13
International agencies can further serve as catalysts for revitalization by initiating and facilitating meetings, offering incentives, lending facilities or resources, and increasing protection by acting as impartial witnesses. Several NGOs have worked at this level. In southern Sudan, for example, international organizations played the initial role of go-between in restarting a traditional dispute-settlement process. This entailed extended communalization, and then provided support in the form of food, funding, transportation, and documentation (Lowrey 1995). In Burundi, an international NGO attempted to revitalize the traditional peace process at the commune level by restoring the role of traditional mediators as an official, legal, and binding system for local dispute resolution (Refugees International 1995).
Activities involved in the promotion of dialogue attempt to generate a willingness and ability to understand opposing views, develop conditions of trust, transform group dynamics, and acknowledge the mutuality of legitimate needs, rights, and obligations. The primary focus is on the process itself rather than specific outcomes.
“Conflict transformation” workshops. Although they use a variety of names and models, generically, these are interactive sessions held by third parties for members of conflicting groups in an attempt to improve understanding. Participants usually include societal and religious leaders, academics, and professionals representing a variety of perspectives. The third party is normally an NGO, professional organization, religious group, or academic institution, or possibly a bilateral or multilateral organization, foundation, or philanthropic association. The third party’s objective is to encourage cross-conflict sharing and begin to conceive of a peaceful, mutually interdependent existence.
One specific example is the “problem-solving workshop,” pioneered by scholar John Burton. In the workshop, participants analyze a conflict and its psychological and emotional dimensions, gradually gain a better perspective of both parties’ fears, needs, priorities, and constraints, and ultimately move into the realm of collaborative problem-solving (Gutlove 1992:10; Montville, forthcoming:114).
Public forums. An open discussion forum, which may be hosted by a local entity and supported by an international organization, offers communities the opportunity to consider various issues and problems, candidly and as a whole. The objective is to bring out various, perhaps previously unheard or potentially mediating views, offer a safe meeting-ground for cross-conflict interaction, and ideally, come to agreement on proceedings. The discussion might address technical issues (such as the reconstruction of water systems, hospitals, roads, and houses, the care of the unaccompanied children, assistance for widows, burial sites for the war dead, and the opening of schools) or more contentious problems (land ownership, new leadership, council membership, and political affiliations). It may also entail broader opinions and attitudes toward the more complex and visceral aspects of the conflict, such as rights and responsibilities of displaced persons, community response to group violence, local perspectives on national issues, and new ethics for individual conduct.
International organizations can help establish ground rules, procedures, and methods for handling disagreements, as well as provide guidance and facilitation during the initial discussions. Optimally, this will develop into a healthy decision-making process that could be used as a format for rediscovering unity, discussing differences, and developing a common vision, all of which contribute to intercommunal reintegration. Communities in Nicaragua and Tajikistan have conducted such public forums with relative success.
Sustained dialogue. These efforts attempt to redefine the relationship between conflicting parties and work through the underlying contentious ingredients. Sustained dialogue generally involves third-party commitment over years of intermittent interaction in an effort to come to long-term solutions. The extended time frame enables participants to explore the deep-seated roots of the contention, to communalize and to mourn, and, ultimately, to develop trust and moral recovery. Throughout their protracted—though not resident or uninterrupted—engagement with local populations, facilitators encourage sharing and exploring the experience of violation and loss. Generally, participation begins with interested individuals and expands to include higher authorities.
The Kettering Foundation is a leader in sustained dialogue. It employs a six-step approach that begins with an extensive background study of the parties in conflict. It then develops interdependence and a process for continuing interaction. This leads to a scrutiny of the power relationships and sets limits on certain behavior, eventually evolving into new perceptions of each of the opposing parties (Saunders 1993b). The Kettering Foundation has been holding bimonthly discussions using this format with conflicting factions in Tajikistan since 1993. The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy also carries on long-term programs in more of a training format, notably in Cyprus and the Middle East. In its periodic meetings, it focuses on basic principles of interpersonal communication, providing conceptual tools to analyze and deal more effectively with conflict-related issues, developing skills to express needs and interests more clearly and to understand those of others (Klein 1995).
Conflict management training. A more common approach is that of improving skills and methods for handling conflict nonviolently. A conflict management institution, private foundation, conflict resolution professional, or NGO usually conducts the training session, which is held in a setting removed from the visible battle. Participants normally include representatives of the disputants or, at a minimum, members of the various antagonistic groups, usually professionals, intellectuals, academics, and leaders. However, training may also include managers of significant social services such as unaccompanied children’s centers and educational institutes, as well as community officials, religious organizers, civil society leaders, and tribal or ethnic leaders.
Such forums attempt to develop greater understanding of the conflict and improve the dispute-handling capacity of antagonistic groups. A conflict management skills training usually spans no more than several days and may be repeated or continued in several ensuing sessions. The format of these sessions does not generally engage the process but, rather, emphasizes the value of, and techniques of initiating, new forms of communication. Conflict management training content usually includes presentation of the issues of contention from various points of view, communication skills learning and rehearsal, collective reflection, techniques in mediation and negotiation, and possibly conflict analysis.
The philosophies and variations of conflict management are unlimited. Some methods are elicitive in their approach, others more prescriptive; some go so far as to try to establish a new paradigm of interaction. Moreover, the application is potentially expansive. International relief and development agencies might offer their expatriate and national program staff conflict management training, workshops on specific issues such as human rights, or internal seminars on related topics, such as traditional dispute resolution methods. Such in-house training can broaden the skills of the participants as well as develop community-level understanding of the issues. Programs can also address specific components of civil society, such as managers of large businesses or journalists. On the other side of the border, conflict management training may be presented to refugee communities with the intention of developing greater facilitation and communication skills for use both within the camps and upon repatriation. An interesting example of a more comprehensive approach to conflict management training is the Nansen Group in Kosovo. Begun by a Scandinavian NGO, Kosovo citizens attend three seminars in conflict management as a basis for membership in the group. Following this orientation, participants can engage in any number of cultural, education, or social programs, each of which is conducted by one Albanian and one Serb.
Cultural and physical programs can help reacquaint individuals in conflicting groups, change perceptions, stereotypes, and images, and renew respect through integrated, mutually interesting activities. Interactive activities of cross-conflict appeal can create an atmosphere of shared learning and cooperation.
Sports. Athletics in particular are a medium through which various international groups have attempted to break down the cultural divide by bringing conflicting parties together in a spirit of mutual gain and enjoyment. Over time, such repeated activities can help develop intergroup trust. This can be especially apropos in conflict and postconflict conditions when intense boredom has set in, little entertainment exists to remove the image of conflict, and young men in particular occupy themselves with nefarious activities. In Bosnia and Somalia, for example, several NGOs and bilateral agencies have supported cross-conflict athletic matches, reconstructed sports arenas, and funded equipment.
The arts. Art, music, dance, and drama offer modes of intergroup interaction and appreciation. Many have found that even in the divisive setting of identity conflict, cultural presentation often remains highly esteemed and can serve to revitalize cultural traditions. This can be critical to healing a tormented community (Maynard 1997). In Croatia and Bosnia, CARE uses theater and dance to help schoolchildren integrate emotional and conceptual understanding of the regional conflict. By acting out a hypothetical dispute and eventually transforming it to a state of peace, the children experience both the emotions of conflict and the process and satisfaction of resolution.
The arts represent an important method of expressing the shared experience of crisis as a form of communalization. This can be particularly useful in helping children to externalize and share traumatic events through activating the imagination and social awareness. Through these programs participants engage in creative, wholesome activities that encourage them to participate and share, rather than withdraw. Foreign organizations can support projects in the arts through revitalization of professional organizations, encouragement of local arts center projects, and support of children’s school and community-based programs.
Professional and recreational activities. Professional and recreational organizations also offer opportunities to communicate across conflict barriers on subjects of common interest, and to begin to renew trust. These groups may be work-related or even union-based, such as railroad workers’ alliances or nurses’ coalitions, or philanthropic associations, such as committees for the restitution of historic monuments. They may also be professional associations, such as psychologists’ or teachers’ boards, hobby groups, such as ham radio or chess clubs, or leisure groups, such as sewing or singing leagues. In this respect, the focus is not on the development of the group, as in rebuilding civil society, but in renewing specific integrated activities. In Bosnia, for example, OTI funded the printing and distribution of an academic journal and the reopening of a karate club (OTI 1995).
Unfortunately, the limitations to concerted international efforts at conflict management can be substantial. Perhaps the single largest obstacle is the time inherent in coming to terms with the contentious issues. Healing from the wounds of violence, as we have seen, requires enormous dedication and patience, neither for which the international community is known. The rapid pace of the Western world seems to create—perhaps justifiably—an innate impatience in donor responses to complex crises. This coincides with shortsightedness in foreign policy, which can result in lack of financial commitment to long-term and less tangible programs such as conflict management. Furthermore, the unglamorous, uncertain, and often dangerous character of life in a remote community immersed in a complex emergency understandably does not attract international conflict resolution specialists, thereby resulting in few resident, community-based conflict management programs. For these reasons and perhaps others, the focus of foreign intercession is usually brief and without substantial follow-up, which tends to prevent comprehensive exploration of the roots of conflict and can leave participants without a cohesive strategy or durable support. Bosnia, for example, is replete with individuals who have been trained in conflict management by any number of international organizations during and after the conflict. Somewhat abandoned as the rehabilitation phase proceeded, no structure exists to support their facilitation skills and many have not used them since.
A comprehensive approach, once again, requires close coordination between all entities working in the region, including human rights, diplomatic, humanitarian, and development agencies. Thus far, concerted cooperation between groups has been relatively rare. The inherent lack of collaboration at the grassroots level results specifically from the fact that humanitarian and development organizations live and work directly in the community, whereas most conflict management and diplomatic activities, and to a lesser extent human rights, occur in a removed setting. Thus, the opportunity for sharing programs and opportunities is limited.
Another problem, as the study of British conflict resolution NGOs illustrates, is that none of the three types of programs examined deals specifically with armed combatants. While there is good reason to engage academics, officials, professionals, religious leaders, and the like in conflict management efforts, the personal and grassroots nature of identity conflicts, I believe, demands that the common civilian fighter also participate in conflict reduction. By limiting the process to more intellectual elements, the exclusion of small militia bands, armed young men, and neighborhood gangs removes a vital component of the fighting force from the discussion. Moreover, conflict management training sessions, in particular, tend to attract individuals already inclined toward peacemaking and may ignore the attitudes of the common citizen.
It is also essential to consider the broad range of cultural assumptions that naturally accompany international intercession in foreign conflicts. Such issues as direct versus indirect manner of conduct; attitudes toward cooperation, competition and conflict, orientation toward tasks, authority, social rank, status and caste, modes of communication, and time management; and attitudes toward third parties, vary enormously between cultures (Moore 1993). More fundamental is the Western assumption of a universal response to, and recovery process from, exposure to violence. Though an area of interest to many in the conflict management field, not enough is known yet about the cross-cultural implications of Western concepts, the transference of techniques, or even the benefits, risks, or appropriateness of discussing feelings or expressing loss in different cultures. Although many organizations endeavor to use primarily responses and activities elicited from local participants, the spectrum among the international programs is wide. By all accounts, avoiding introducing foreign methods into a culture, without consideration of identity and cultural differences, is imperative. 14
Influencing Public Consciousness
Public impressions can be shaped through formal education structures, informal instruction programs, and media outlets to affect attitudes and perceptions across society. International organizations can support reforms in educational curricula and teaching methodologies, help initiate integrated learning programs, and promote the dissemination of nonbiased, constructive information through radio, television, and public education programs. Using such public forums to influence public consciousness can counter negative propaganda being expounded through social networks or through clandestine or even official media channels; help reverse escalating prejudices through specific activities aimed at developing cross-identity appreciation; and introduce factual information that sheds new light on confusing or conflicting precepts of identity groups. This can have a positive influence on nearly all phases of the healing process.
One benefit of such forums is their ability to enhance security through broadcasts of information on the location and extent of violence and protection mechanisms. Open discussion of the issues directly contributes to the communalization process, while public media can offer programs that support bereavement. By presenting various opinions and perspectives on issues of conflict in an open dialogue across identity boundaries, public education programs can help guide moral recovery while ridding forums of biased and harmful material. They can also present new guidelines for moral behavior and acceptable social standards. A public forum for discussion of national and communal issues, moreover, can enhance the democratization process and give voice to the otherwise unheard.
The use of educational and media outlets could include those involved in formal schooling, such as teachers, students and administrators, or staff and participants in informal programs at community and activity centers, as well as professional journalists, radio and television station managers, journal and newspaper editors, columnists, show hosts, and the general public. International organizations involved in such activities could include foreign journalists, reporters, and media specialists, educators and administrators, conflict specialists, NGOs, and bilateral and multilateral institutions.
The first approach to creating a public forum concerns reforming the curriculum and teaching techniques. Formal school curricula, including textbooks, teachers’ guides, educational devices, and visual aids, may be riddled with biases or influenced by previous regimes’ partiality. Redressing the material can not only improve the teaching platform but also demonstrate an unwillingness to contribute to segregation or prejudice. Included in the revision of educational texts and teaching curricula can be the insertion of material promoting mutual cooperation. Additionally, teachers can use tools for generating discussions and eliciting responses in the classroom aimed at increasing awareness and changing prejudicial behavior.
International organizations can suggest, promote, and support such efforts. UNICEF and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), for example, have supported peace education programs within school systems in Lebanon and Rwanda in which all prewar educational materials were scrutinized for biased and unethical influence and were subsequently replaced with stereotype-reducing curricula that support moral development. Teacher training was conducted to elicit and encourage methods of cross-group sharing as well as discussion of moral principles and appropriate, nonprejudicial behavior with students (Hansen 1995; Kumar et al. 1996).
Peace radio and television comprise a second approach. Public media programs can range from those with broad-based appeal broadcasting nonbiased, mutually interesting, and beneficial information or entertainment, to those directed specifically at undermining or confronting the conflict by addressing stereotypes, issues of conflict, and historical events. NGO, bilateral or multilateral organizations, or independent institutions can conduct such programs in partnership with local broadcasters and editors.
Foreign entities can not only offer general financial support, material resources, counsel, and program material but also entreat public and government or authority endorsement. Further, they can help develop programming and public interest in debates, presentations, and interactive networks on important ethical topics. In this way, media programs can promote healthy intergroup relations by airing various views on issues of rehabilitation, publicizing successful intergroup cooperation and programs rebuilding community relations, and presenting discussions on topics of civic import. Bosnia, Burundi, and Rwanda all have organizations supporting alternative radio broadcasts, and include multiethnic staffing as well as alternative information forums promoting healthy dialogue and messages of integration and peace (Kumar et al. 1996).
Those involved in influencing the public consciousness may face several obstacles. First, tacit public opposition to pervasive oppressive attitudes may endanger the promoters. Editors, show hosts, and educators could risk physical harm by presenting contrary views in public forums. At the same time, personal danger might inhibit the participation of necessary partners such as school administrators, journalists, or public personalities. If the threat were extreme, it could minimize public participation, since listening to a radio station, reading a journal or textbook, or attending a class others deem as controversial might be grounds for harassment.
The fact that schoolrooms constitute an environment removed from the rest of society limits the effect educational reform can have on a student. Thus, the social pressures placed on children outside the classroom by family members, peers, social institutions, and society as a whole might simply reduce the effectiveness of school education (Voutira and Brown 1995:27). In addition, studies show that mass media appeal is more effective at strengthening already-held views than changing them, and better at developing basic understanding of new notions than persuading the adoption of such notions (Montville, forthcoming). To have a significant effect on public opinion, moreover, the media must be multifaceted, credible, consistent, and persistent, which is often difficult in postconflict societies.
Psychological Rehabilitation
Helping to heal those psychologically traumatized by exposure to extreme violence can take the form of trauma training, direct aid, or community-based communalization programs. Because memories of violence and bloodshed tend to remain fresh in the minds of affected populations, they can not only hurt individuals but undermine intergroup harmony and cooperation. Highly traumatized individuals such as widows, disabled soldiers, unaccompanied children, and sexually abused women can continue to harbor resentment and anger toward former adversaries (Maynard 1997). Their presence, furthermore, serves as a community reminder of past offenses. Therefore, programs addressing psychological trauma can benefit the individual as well as the community as a whole.
Psychological rehabilitation programs have many potential merits, not the least of which is improving the state of the severely traumatized, allowing them to care for themselves and, ultimately, to contribute to society. This can reduce the guardianship burden on society and free resources for community-building. By assisting the severely traumatized, rehabilitation activities can lower community-wide fear and distrust while increasing individual skills in preventive psychological maintenance in times of extreme violence. Indirectly, this can contribute to an increased sense of security. Rehabilitation programs can enhance the second phase of the healing process through communalization and mourning as an integral part of psychological recovery. Joint care of the traumatized, if done cooperatively, can help improve community relations and rebuild trust. Further, programs that promote women’s recovery from rape improve the overall condition of women as well as their contribution to society. Rape information campaigns that increase awareness of the effects of violence can also contribute to reestablishing moral codes of conduct. Complete rehabilitation of the psychologically traumatized ultimately allows them to partake in community discussions, thus contributing to the democratization process.
Those involved in psychological rehabilitation could include government officials, primary caregivers (such as teachers, unaccompanied children’s center workers, family members of the traumatized, and health center workers), women’s groups, medical professionals, psychologists, and social workers. Internationally, rehabilitation can involve NGOs, UN agencies, psychological associations, and bilateral agencies.
The primary activity in psychological rehabilitation entails training. The objective of trauma training sessions is to provide caregivers with information on the nature and signs of mental distress, encourage its early recognition and treatment, and suggest ways to approach caregiving. A new phenomenon to most societies, training generally covers the causes of psychological disturbance, identification of susceptible individuals, the typical symptoms and psychological nature of the disorder, and the dangers of prolonged neglect. Training also usually includes a discussion of the activities that can mitigate negative effects, such as the value of grieving, communalization, treatment routines, and the role of specific individuals in the care process. In Rwanda, several international agencies, most notably UNICEF, engaged in such training aimed primarily at trauma in children, and consequently involved primary caretakers, teachers, and health professionals. International organizations may work in partnership with local NGOs or professionals as a way of more closely involving local custom, culture, and language.
Psychological rehabilitation can also be enhanced through direct aid. Trauma counseling itself poses many difficulties across cultures and may, in fact, be an inappropriate activity conducted by an outside entity. International agencies can, nevertheless, support it through local avenues such as funding, training, and technical assistance to psychologists and social workers who work directly with victims of psychological trauma. Women’s health care centers, for example, can train and employ local medical professionals in psychological trauma counseling of rape victims. Moreover, such facilities can offer special health care programs or establish groups specifically oriented toward women’s psychological needs, as they did in Rwanda (Kumar et al. 1996).
Another form of direct aid involves not psychology but conflict management. Field diplomacy—that is, the long-term, resident engagement of conflict specialists in local contentions—offers potential for improving the communalization and bereavement process, which is an inherent part of psychological healing. In this vein, through community-wide programs sponsored by conflict specialists, members have regular opportunities to discuss experiences and feelings, obtain psychological and physical support, and begin to reconcile their lives with the suffering and losses they have endured.
One of the major objections to psychological intercession in foreign cultures is the danger of imposing Western values and procedures on others. The growth of interest in the psychological affects of war on civilians emanated from Western study of combat veterans (Shay 1994). Many programs that began with this background may not have taken cultural factors into consideration in their application abroad. It is difficult if not impossible for outsiders to fully understand cultural nuances. In approaching psychological problems head on, Western programs may even cause further damage to the delicate social structure, including health centers, school systems, or unaccompanied children’s programs, by imposing activities that contradict traditional healing patterns.
Rebuilding Civil Society
Reconstructing civil society entails reestablishing “civic space” in which “individuals and their associations compete with each other in the pursuit of their values” (Voutira and Brown 1995:5), free from overwhelming identity group or state influence. Civil society is comprised of active, voluntary organizations, social coalitions, and corporate associations representing different interests and concerns, which serve as both critics and grantors of civil liberties within a democracy (Blair 1992). In the course of political upheaval, civil society usually breaks apart, therefore, no longer serving as a control or guide to government. The reconstitution of this influence is an important link in rebuilding a democratic, sustainable, reintegrated society. Developing a civic space requires reestablishing such organizations as NGOs, environmental groups, unions, media, business and professional associations, human rights organizations, youth and women’s leagues, academic institutions, special interest groups, community health associations, and cooperative credit societies. It also entails helping them find their voice in the new political and social context and to begin to play an active role in reshaping the state of affairs.
An inclusive civil society can provide a voice to the disenfranchised, war-weary, and those with special interests and help disengage them from the conflict by offering them an occupation for their time and an alternative outlet for venting disagreement. During the conflict, many such groups and individuals may have become separated. Through interaction in such civil society activities as association meetings, organizing, advocacy, public information campaigns, and fund-raising, they have the opportunity to become reacquainted. This can contribute to the trust-building phase of recovery. Moreover, by using nonviolent means of advocating change and presenting ruling authorities with guidance, controls, and demand for accountability, civil society institutionalizes the process of democratization and nonviolent conflict management. Through this type of diverse public pressure, a strong civil society can promote long-term stability, thereby reinforcing the tenets of democracy. 15 In this manner, civil society can have direct influence on reestablishing social standards of conduct.
Theoretically, all sectors and individuals of a society can have a voice through participation in civil formats. Similarly, virtually every interest can be incorporated in some aspect of civil society. International agencies engaged in the rebuilding process could include international NGOs, bilateral aid organizations, private foundations, and special interest groups and their international civil society counterparts.
Since civil society is, by definition, a citizens’ forum, outside entities cannot actually conduct the process or provide the voice. International organizations can, however, suggest, guide, and offer consultation, funding, and encouragement. They can also offer support for civil society initiatives through their daily relief and development activities. For example, establishing a food distribution system that meets the needs of the population with as few diversions as possible may lead NGOs to channel goods through a network of women. This, in turn, may develop into an organization that becomes the voice for women’s issues in the community and perhaps across the country.
The Kettering Foundation’s work in Tajikistan illustrates how the development of civil society can promote the peace process. During the foundation’s sustained dialogue, participants began to discuss their desired components of postconflict Tajik society. As a result, several participants who saw the need for greater civic responsibility established organizations for citizenship education. The Kettering Foundation supports this effort through civil society fellowships and workshops, and through assistance to Tajik university professors in designing courses on conflict prevention, resolution, and civil society development (Saunders 1996b).
Another example in the advancement of civil society is the work of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Directly or through partner NGOs, it funds projects that range from building and strengthening democratic institutions, supporting NGOs, and making improvements in the administration of justice, to supporting small business associations, trade union development, and citizen participation. It also contributes funds for training in market-based economies, education in the rule of law and human rights, and the development of natural resources and environmental policy (Blair 1992).
Mercy Corps International, an international NGO, helps other countries develop their civil society through its own grassroots development activities. By working closely with farmers, educators, women’s groups, health care workers, and local merchants, it assists local citizens to define their needs, establish a plan for meeting their needs, and organize themselves and encourage others to participate. It also helps them to recognize appropriate and inappropriate government leadership, and strengthen their collective voice to have their desires heard. It has aided regional development committees in Honduras, for example, articulate their needs to mayoral, congressional, and presidential candidates and hold them accountable to their campaign platforms.
Several limiting factors are apparent in civil society development. To begin with, third-party, particularly Western, encouragement of civil society development may be more of an imposition of foreign standards of democracy than a contribution to internal interest (Amoda 1996). Civil society, as mentioned, is inherently an internal function, demanding devotion and persistence on the part of a country’s citizens, and is not something that can be bestowed by outsiders. Another limitation is that development of civil society is intrinsically a long-term process that demands years of patience and support. As with conflict management, international interest often wanes after a short period of time, potentially leaving NGOs, associations, and other groups alone in their pursuit of increased civic capacity. Furthermore, civil organizations frequently bear the mark of elitist institutions and therefore may exclude the participation of the lower classes. Indeed, engaging in civil society activities can be more conducive to educated individuals with a certain amount of leisure time. The nature of many such organizations presumes, in fact, a degree of literacy and professional experience. This is by no means universal, however.
Given the immense unknowns and rapidly changing circumstances, the international community faces some of its biggest challenges ever in today’s complex emergencies. Still, its arsenal of options, extensive as it may presently be, is growing and is unlimited. What now lies ahead is global collaboration on a scale as yet unseen in the international community. Coordinated strategy, collective innovation, and cooperation of effort will be required of us in the years to come in order to deal with the enormity of the problem of complex emergencies. The next and last chapter attempts to outline some of these areas for international action and offers specific mechanisms to address them.
Endnotes
Note 1: One excellent resource for tools is a manual by Creative Associates prepared for the U.S. government, Preventing and mitigating violent conflicts: A revised guide for practitioners (1997). Back.
Note 2: The concern over security for aid workers has increased in the mid-1990s to include training courses on security management and preparedness measures, new safety protocols in many agenices, and more sophisticated threat assessments. For more discussion, see Van Brabant (1998). Back.
Note 3: For a list of recent works related to the development of a code of conduct, see Minear and Weiss 1993a:89&-;90. Also, as of this writing, the Sphere Project, probably the most comprehensive effort to date supported by a wide array of international relief agencies, was finalizing its publication on a humanitarian charter and minimum standards for humanitarian assistance. The project is scheduled to be completed by late 1998. Back.
Note 4: Cuny gives a good insider’s overview of the motivation behind providing humanitarian assistance to foreign disasters and the lack of professionalism in the relief system at that time (1983:110, 125–37). Back.
Note 5: A phrase aptly coined by Professor Eghosa Osaghae, head of the political studies department of the University of Tanskei, South Africa, at a conference on “Empowering NGOs for Conflict Resolution in Africa,” sponsored by InterAction, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1996. Personal notes taken from lecture. Back.
Note 6: Rule offers a good critique of Western dispute resolution and its assumptions and practices in foreign cultures in questioning dispute resolution (1993:407–12). Back.
Note 7: Articulating guiding principles for humanitarianism in and of itself is valuable, particularly as the situations become more complex and the number of inexperienced players entering the scene rises. To some extent, however, one might question the validity of the underlying assumption. Relief of physical life-threatening suffering, though undoubtably important, perhaps should not be the absolute highest goal of humanitarianism. Such abhorrence for physical suffering may be more of a Western construct than a universal one. It may be our own suffering derived from the ache of overindulgence and privilege, the painful guilt of inaction, and an injured sense of virtue that we are trying to alleviate. Taking the broadest possible view, there may in fact be higher moral goals, which at times demand that we submit to a larger degree of suffering in lieu of a greater and more encompassing end. For a broader discussion on the moral dilemmas and responsibilities facing relief agencies, see Slim (1997). Back.
Note 8: To Minear and Weiss’s credit, however, they do not merely propose these principles as ideals, but present substantial discussion as to their application in complex emergencies. See Minear and Weiss (1993b). Back.
Note 9: In Humanitarian Action in Times of War, Minear and Weiss outline a functional checklist for agencies working in war zones that offers specific suggestions on how to analyze a situation and orchestrate activities according to their Providence Principles (1993a:45–54). Back.
Note 10: Both Prendergast (1995) and Anderson (1996b) have good discussions on context analysis. Back.
Note 11: Interestingly, research on interethnic community relations in the United States found that involvement in common projects reduced conflict and improved the climate between newcomers and long-term residents (Voutira and Brown 1995:25). Back.
Note 12: A phrase used by professor Luc Reychler, University of Leuven, in Leuven (Louvain), Belgium. Back.
Note 13: For more discussion on the disintegration of internal mechanisms and phases of response, see Rupesinghe (1991). Back.
Note 14: For more on dispute resolution mechanisms in different cultures, see Rule (1993:409). Back.
Note 15: John Moyibi Amoda (1996) offers a good discussion on the nature of civil society in Africa, arguing that, as much as it might exist as a tenant of democracy, it does so solely as an aspect of the evolving nature of Western societal influence. Back.
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