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State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity
Kimberly A. Maynard
1999
4. The Process Of Returning Home
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Today, most voluntary repatriations occur during conflict, without a decisive political event such as national independence, without any change in the regime or the conditions that originally caused flight... frequently without an amnesty or a repatriation agreement or program, without the permission of the authorities in either the country of asylum or of origin, without international knowledge or assistance, and without an end to the conflict that caused the exodus. |
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—Barry Stein and Frederick Cuny (1991:2–3) |
In the postconflict environment, the viability of remaining in exile for refugees and IDPs diminishes with time. By most measures, prolonged asylum is both undesirable and increasingly unsustainable. Camp establishments, by definition, are temporary structures meant to fulfill emergency needs when individual lives are threatened. Other settings, such as garrison towns and extended family residences also offer only temporary refuge; only urban migrants seem to acquire a semipermanent status. Thus, when the exodus abates and conditions in exile are no longer attractive, both the displaced populations and relief communities begin to search for the appropriate next step.
An obvious option is to return to the place of origin. In reality, however, the transition in the home country from persecution to peaceful coexistence is neither rapid, guaranteed, nor smooth. Returning home, therefore, is not necessarily the clear choice. Many choose instead to remain in place, others move to yet another asylum, and some do indeed repatriate. For those who do return, the reintegration process poses many difficulties. Research and field observation reveal that returnees face not only financial challenges and struggles to reestablish living quarters, occupations, and relationships but also the potential of targeted oppression (Stein 1991; Zinser 1991b). At the same time, the receiving communities confront increased contention, competition, and uncertainty. These difficulties, however, can be ameliorated by experience of cooperative reconstruction, renewed friendship, and commitment to mutual aid. Still, the original issues of conflict invariably lurk beneath the surface, ready to undermine rehabilitation and development activities to the point of social disruption and renewed violence.
Understanding the motivations for and the process of return helps illuminate the issues facing both the returnees and the community to which they return. The return phase can thus become a deciding point in the greater picture of societal reintegration and rehabilitation. This chapter examines the options facing uprooted populations, the patterns of return, the returnees’ decision-making processes, and issues involved in reintegration into the home community.
Alternatives to Displacement
Continued temporary exile is widely and understandably considered undesirable. With a few exceptions, the host countries and communities, the home government, the international community, and the uprooted people themselves all view displacement as disruptive and negative, “not only because of the cost and burden on host countries and the international community, as well as the waste of the refugees’ lives, but also because in their second, third and fourth generation refugees can become a violent and destabilizing social element,” write Stein and Cuny (1991:2).
Despite these problems, however, many refugees and IDPs do choose to remain in long-term temporary asylum. At some point, temporary asylum fades into semipermanence, muting the distinction between sanctuary and resettlement, particularly among IDPs. Some situations remain unresolved for years, as is the case of many Tibetans who fled to India in 1959. In recent decades, periods of refuge have extended into generations, exemplified by the celebrated case of nearly 350,000 Palestinians who have been living in asylum in Lebanon since 1948 (USCR 1996:120).
By virtue of their international status, refugee situations receive special consideration. Unfortunately, while the problem is compounded with each new refugee flow, the conventional answers are becoming less and less plausible. The three classic durable solutions for refugees—third-country resettlement, permanent residence in the country of first asylum, and voluntary repatriation—each presuppose the refugees’ full synthesis into the society in which they ultimately settle. Recent history, however, shows that first and third countries of asylum are increasingly reluctant to assimilate refugees, and home countries are also often resistant to repatriation. Still, these alternatives remain the most considered options available.
Third-country Resettlement
Recent analysis from around the globe indicates that widespread third-country resettlement is perhaps the least viable option of the three, given the increase in worldwide xenophobia and a conceivable trend toward cultural segregation. The decreasing acceptance of immigrants appears to stem in part from domestic economic pressures, fear of social instability, and the disappearance of Cold War political and ideological motives to welcome refugees from socialist states in Western countries. In reality, however, permanent refugee asylum in industrialized nations has never been equitable or necessarily generous. In the United States, for example, between 1980 and 1988, refugee admittance dropped by two thirds while the world’s refugee population nearly tripled in the decade preceding 1988. Of those admitted during that period, 93 percent were from ten countries, all but one of which were communist (Loescher 1993:102, 153).
In the last few years, European countries have also tightened control over immigration and shown less tolerance of third-world foreigners. Germany, for example, enacted a new asylum law in 1993 that reduced the number of asylum applications by 60 percent, indicating a shift away from its previous universal acceptance of asylum seekers (USCR 1995:142). Legal scholars such as James Hathaway charge that industrialized nations have developed ever more sophisticated methodologies “to prevent refugee flows from challenging their sovereign authority over immigration.” “Governments increasingly deal with refugees on a harsh and unregulated basis,” he claims, “because they see international refugee law’s mechanism to reconcile state interest to refugee interest as an anachronism” (1996:16). Many countries rely on improved border-control technologies and other non-entrée mechanisms to prevent immigrants from entering the country. This avoids the international legal obligation to assist refugees and thwarts increasing claims of refugee status, according to Hathaway. Studies show, however, that despite these discouraging odds, many long-term refugees will remain in camps with the hope of eventually receiving refugee status in a Western state.
Residence in the Host Country
Permanent settlement in countries of first asylum is becoming less feasible as well. According to Loescher (1993), the more restrictive Western immigration policies have had a corresponding effect on the willingness of third world nations to grant exile. Host countries seem to be growing increasingly weary of the problems inherent in accommodating a large refugee population. In Guinea, serving as the long-term host for Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees has threatened the fragile harmony among regions within its own territory. Offering refugees permanent status might further erode what internal cohesion exists. Even when stability is not the issue, allocating large tracts of land to foreigners and providing them with housing and other amenities near citizens with lower living standards is politically controversial and injudicious. Moving refugees from a refugee camp to an independent, self-sufficient setting, moreover, is extremely costly. Donors are confronting the needs of the large numbers of refugees around the world, while simultaneously examining their own domestic resources more critically. They appear to be increasingly reluctant to expend the substantial sums needed for permanent resettlement of large populations.
There is abundant evidence that, despite the lack of an official process, many long-term refugees slowly assimilate into the life of the host country, finding employment and even becoming illicit landowners, though never obtaining citizenship, as in the case of many Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Sorenson 1992; USCR 1995). Children born to such refugees may never know their homeland and may feel greater affinity with the host culture than with their parents.’
These first two solutions may, therefore, be more attractive in theory than in practice. As of 1991, less than 1 percent of the world’s refugees had resettled officially in first or third countries of asylum, according to the ISSVR study (Stein and Cuny 1991:2). Given current international conditions, it is likely that figure is even smaller today. That leaves the final option: voluntary repatriation.
Voluntary Repatriation
While returning to the place of origin is the optimal and common solution, it is also technically the most difficult to implement for two reasons. The first is the limited resources and attention span of the international community. Beyond the usual immediate expenditures for transportation home and a minimum of material aid, successful reintegration requires long-term physical reconstruction, political, economic, and social rehabilitation, rebuilding community networks, restoring sources of livelihood, and (re)establishing the rule of law. This demands a lengthy commitment, which does not come easily to most relief organizations. My experience has been that it is at this critical but anticlimactic juncture in the rehabilitation of war-ravaged populations that international aid provision traditionally diminishes, both in terms of security protection and assistance. Ironically, refugees remaining in camps in a comparatively low-risk environment on the other side of a border usually maintain the full complement of international assistance, including protection and material aid. It is when they attempt to rectify their situation by returning home that they face the greatest personal risk and lose their international advocacy. Though conditions in violence-torn communities have always warranted transition assistance, the abundance of such situations around the world has illuminated this gap in the relief-to-development continuum especially clearly. Because of the social disintegration that accom-panies violent conflict, it is at this juncture that support in the form of reintegration and rehabilitation assistance is vital to developing long-lasting stability. Tajikistan offers an example of where such assistance was more forthcoming. NGOs and UNHCR provided relatively extensive on-site aid to returnees in the form of protection, housing reconstruction projects, quick impact projects (QIPs) aimed at immediate local economic gain, and other revitalization programs.
The second reason why repatriation is the most difficult durable solution comes from the refugees themselves. They may simply be unwilling to return home. Studies show that for reasons of politics, economics, intimidation, entrenchment, indolence, and/or security, many refugees prefer to remain in camps. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, of the 15.3 million refugees in the world in 1995, less than one million repatriated 1 “voluntarily” and at least 303,000 were expelled from their place of asylum (USCR 1996:4, 7). 2
Whether reasonable or unsound, international law upholds the right of refugees to remain in asylum until such time as they choose to return (UN General Assembly 1951). Although forced repatriation by host countries or other authorities is strictly prohibited under international law, the interpretation of refoulement—forced repatriation—is fiercely debated. From a practical standpoint, the notion of “voluntary” return may be a misnomer since persuasion, encouragement, incentives, and pressure in one form or another have all been used to promote repatriation in the past. Research shows that even in refugee-induced returns, intense peer pressure, coercion, internal intimidation, or conflict in places of asylum can compel refugees to return against their better judgment or will (Cuny, Stein, and Reed 1992). The 1996 return of over 700,000 and 500,000 refugees from Zaire/Congo and Tanzania respectively to Rwanda, for example, raised many questions about its true voluntary nature. In any case, if the refugee population is not disposed to return, voluntary repatriation will not occur under the legal definition.
Although repatriation is considered the optimal solution to displacement, it has, ironically, received the least amount of scholarly inquiry. The bulk of the literature on the larger issue of population migration, moreover, has focused primarily on legal and institutional aspects, and the social implications have only recently begun to gain much intellectual attention. As a result, many of these issues—prolonged asylum, internal displacement, refugee warriors, intimidation factors, the role of rumors and indigenous communication networks, the reintegration process, and the social implications of displacement—remain largely misunderstood. This void leaves international organizations with few guidelines for aiding the transition toward viable, integrated community development.
Though the options facing internally displaced persons are the subject of even less solid academic research, I think certain deductions can be made simply from field observation. The majority of IDPs appear to have four basic choices in responding to their predicament of temporary asylum. First, with the exception of those in camps, they can remain permanently in their place of refuge. A prerequisite for abiding residency, however, is an adequate source of income, which is often difficult to secure under such circumstances. IDPs living in camps rarely have the option of such permanence. Historically, internal camps, by virtue of their assumed transient nature, perceived threat to domestic security, and inadequate resources, are generally disbanded rapidly. Thus, IDPs in camps must resort to the second, third, or fourth alternative.
The second option is to flee across an international border and become a refugee, thereby becoming eligible to receive protection and assistance and face the same choices outlined above. Third, displaced persons in one area can flee to another. Because this destination is often the capital city (as we have seen in chapter 3), it is usually a one-way excursion, and few return home permanently. Finally, IDPs, like refugees, can decide to return to their place of origin. Since they are closer to the source, as mentioned earlier, they often have better and more accurate information on the conditions in their home communities. This makes them better able to judge the appropriate timing and circumstances for return.
These simplified scenarios demonstrate certain observable patterns. Each situation of displacement obviously presents unique conditions and obstacles. A closer look at some of the more common aspects of the final option—return—helps illuminate some of the issues at stake.
Common Patterns of Return
In virtually every situation, the vast majority of forced migrants, whether long- or short-term, crisis-induced or precautionary, internally displaced or refugees, state emphatically that they wish to return home. Although huge portions, particularly of IDPs, remain uprooted for extended periods of time, a significant number do eventually make their way back home. According to Cuny’s study of migration phases, those most prone to leave are city dwellers, such as professionals, teachers, business owners, and government officials (assuming they still hold an office). Also highly likely to return are migrants residing near the edge of the conflict, since their proximity allows them better information on community conditions and opportunities for a safe return. Similarly, agriculturists will return to farm their land and prevent others from taking it (Cuny 1991).
A major finding of the ISSVR study mentioned in chapter 3 is that most returns occur while the conflict is still in progress, not after peace has been established, as had been commonly thought (Stein and Cuny 1991; Stein and Cuny 1992). As a result, many returnees face formidable risks, especially since they can expect little international protection once they are in the home country. Continued conflicts in El Salvador, Sudan, and Cambodia, for example, did not deter repatriation. They did, however, make it impossible for some refugees to go all the way home, relegating them to displacement within their own country (Fagen and Eldridge 1991; Hogan 1992; Vieira de Mello 1993).
Return occurs in a wide range of contexts with different degrees of internal violence: from fundamental political change (including victory), at one extreme, on to basic political settlement, to a divided country with areas of relative calm, to ongoing, low-level, or sporadic violence, to an unmitigated conflict zone at the other extreme (Stein 1991). Presumably, the closer to the former, the greater the potential for major repatriation (Cuny and Cuny 1992). National elections or a change in state apparatus, for example, precipitated the eventual mass returns in South Africa, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Nevertheless, closer to the other end of the spectrum, many internally displaced persons and 200,000 Somali refugees returned home despite the dim prospects for long-term peace in Somalia (Sommer 1994b).
Another example of repatriation under conflict is the case of Afghanistan. Half of the refugees living in Pakistan repatriated following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, despite a lack of political structure. Continued violence forced many more to flee their homes, yet again they returned in large numbers, although there was still no political solution (Sorenson 1992). By the end of 1995, nearly three million Afghans were uprooted. During that same year of ruthless fighting, 347,000 repatriated from Iran and Pakistan, and more than 187,000 displaced persons returned to the capital only to find themselves, yet again, in the midst of violence (USCR 1996:94). Barry Stein suggests that one reason why refugees repatriate under grave danger is a general change in attitude. Their experience of being collective social outcasts, Stein offers, makes them more aggressive and willing to take risks and hence return to a conflict zone (Stein 1991).
While each culture, conflict, and asylum is ultimately unique, it is possible to make several generalizations about patterns of return. The ISSVR study found five distinct patterns that seem to fit the common experience of return. (I make assumptions about the parallels between the refugee situation and internal displacement, using my own experience as a guide where research on the latter is wanting.) Ricochet return is the first type of return, which begins almost immediately after the exodus. Ricochet repatriation, according to the ISSVR study, occurs in nearly every crisis-induced migration, when those who fled out of the panic and chaos of the moment, but did not feel particularly threatened or fell into disagreement with their fellow refugees, promptly return home. One exception to this pattern is the exodus of Sri Lankan refugees to India, which did not induce any immediate rebound (Cuny and Cuny 1992). Ricochet returnees may have crossed an international boundary or simply fled to the nearest sanctuary before they reversed their decision.
The second pattern is relocation-stimulated return, which occurs among those not immediately attached to a camp, but living independently along the border or in regions inside the home country. This takes place when host country officials attempt to relocate these refugees into camps or, similarly, when the home government tries to round up IDPs and place them in a designated zone. Facing relocation, many will decide to return home instead, according to the ISSVR study (Stein and Cuny 1991).
Community and alienation are the roots of the third pattern, which occurs as the “space” for return gradually increases. The ISSVR study indicates that this type of return may be triggered by a decrease in intensity of the conflict in the home territory, improvement in the political or economic situation, or a more porous border and easier internal access, allowing cross-border trade and emissary missions to scout the homeland for return potential (Stein and Cuny 1991). Experience shows that refugees will, when feasible, carefully watch the actions of IDPs. When they see internal movement, the more peripheral members of the refugee community, in particular, will begin to repatriate. In El Salvador, for instance, the return of 600,000 IDPs precipitated three years of refugee repatriation (Fagen 1993).
Since any attrition among the exiled population undermines the political and moral authority of the exile elite, refugee and IDP leaders and others who benefit from asylum may try to obstruct any return (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). They may use verbal intimidation, physical threats and actual abuse, misinformation campaigns and rumors, or planted evidence of the dire consequences of return. I have also seen refugee warriors go back to the homeland for the express purpose of carrying out threats against those who have returned, or use repatriation as a cover to instigate subversive activities inside the country of origin. Both of these occurred frequently during the two years Rwandan refugees were in eastern Zaire (Kumar et al. 1996).
The fourth mode of return is secondary relocation-stimulated repatriation, which occurs when the host government proposes to relocate the camps away from the border, or the home government once again attempts to collect the displaced and relocate them to specified areas. As in relocation-stimulated return, many refugees and IDPs may decide to return home rather than move elsewhere. Such measures often signal the beginning of the disintegration of strong refugee cohesion, opening the space for further repatriations (Stein and Cuny 1991).
Historically, these patterns of return have tended to be relatively quiet, often with the intention of concealing the process and previous absence both from camp and home authorities. Nevertheless, UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and NGOs may offer transportation and material packages consisting of bulk food, blankets, cooking and cleaning utensils, agricultural tools, and plastic sheeting. The aid is meant both to assist those who need it and to provide added incentive to return. According to Stein, however, the majority of returnees are not likely to take advantage of external aid, preferring to remain anonymous and avoid public exposure (Stein 1991). Their reluctance, especially initially, may be in part because such international assistance is usually accompanied by a processing procedure that involves identification and registration. Under such circumstances, the return migration may be perceived as more risky and traumatic than the exodus. Because most such returns occur without significant international assistance and under difficult conditions, many returnees arrive home in dire physical condition, according to Stein and Cuny (1992).
The ISSVR study’s last category of repatriation is a major return, such as those that occurred in Namibia and Cambodia. These large-scale refugee repatriations are generally marked by the heavy involvement of UNHCR and other international agencies and may accompany a peace settlement of sorts. In addition to the assistance mentioned above, in a major return international agencies plan the repatriation operation, coordinate the logistics, and facilitate the initial resettlement. An exception was the massive “spontaneous” return of Rwandans from Zaire and Tanzania in October and November 1996, which was unplanned by international agencies, though aided to some extent. Though rare and on a smaller scale, recent international efforts have also assisted major returns of IDPs in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Iraq. Still, in both types of migration, actual transition assistance at home has generally proved to be short-lived, lasting only long enough for basic reconstruction (Kumar et al. 1996; Stein 1991).
International experience over many years has shown that in all patterns of return, the decision involves multiple factors and complex reasoning, which contribute to or inhibit the will to go home. Presumably, the stress inherent in making such a critical judgment puts a tremendous burden on the head of household, particularly when the decision contradicts the will of the refugee or IDP leaders.
Deciding to Go Home: Variables Affecting the Decision
Many elements influence the decision of refugees and IDPs to return. Considerations include the state of the home community (such as conditions of houses, water systems and the like), land ownership, degree of insecurity, length of time in displacement, income-generation opportunities in the home community, location of family and identity group members, and the judgment and influence of community leaders. Each migration home is unique. Generally speaking, however, the foremost concern is protection and security, followed by economic considerations, both of which are affected by the available information and the length of time in exile (Deng 1993; Stein 1991; Stein and Cuny 1991).
Security
Most experts agree that, particularly in the initial stages, safety takes precedence over material considerations (Ruiz 1993; Zinser 1991b; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). In this early phase, displaced persons move cautiously and stay within familiar territory. Because many are adverse to moving further into unknown environs, secondary relocation often results. For them, the option to assume preestablished social identities with understood rights and obligations offers greater stability and control over their lives than does remaining in precarious circumstances with undetermined consequences (Stein and Cuny 1992).
Experience also reveals that uprooted populations frequently fear registering in camps or applying for assistance upon return. They often believe that the list of beneficiaries will circulate among government forces or insurgent groups and associate them with a specific faction, possibly putting their lives in jeopardy. In Guatemala, returnees avoided official channels in order to reduce military control over their location and material assistance (Zinser 1991a). International agencies in Rwanda sometimes had difficulty locating those in need, for the very reason that they wished to remain anonymous rather than make themselves and their needs known.
Another concern of returnees, emphasized especially in Fred Cuny’s work, is being recruited by insurgents to participate in the struggle. Many Sri Lankan refugees repatriated from India out of fear of conscription by the factions that controlled the camps. When they arrived home at one point, however, they became targets for terrorist attacks and were unprotected by the mandate of UNHCR (Cuny and Cuny 1992). Opposing ethnic groups in Sudan similarly raided IDP camps, ostensibly in an effort to increase ethnic tensions and the sense of insecurity (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). Conversely, experience shows that some may take advantage of a massive return to gain leverage in the fight and intentionally increase insecurity. Refugee warriors, for example, may repatriate with others in order to instigate subversive activities, thereby creating greater apprehension at home (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). Large numbers of such antagonists were said to have returned in the massive repatriation to Rwanda in the fall of 1996, causing serious security concerns.
Such fears of personally targeted violence and association with certain groups have often proven to be well-founded, particularly in the context of identity conflicts. In Cambodia, for instance, despite its public appeal for repatriation, the home government reportedly encouraged locals to view returnees with suspicion, though outwardly welcoming their arrival (Rogge 1992). In El Salvador, returnees protested what they characterized as a “campaign of systematic harassment by the military” (Fagen and Eldridge 1991:170).
Another security issue that has received a great deal of global attention is the threat of land mines. In Cambodia and Afghanistan, arguably the two most heavily mined countries in the world, refugees and IDPs alike fear to return home because of the indiscriminate and widespread mining. Out of populations of 8 million and 12 million, Cambodia and Afghanistan have 25,000 and 20,000–30,000 amputees respectively, as a result of land mine injuries (Jean 1995:105). In countries subjected to extensive violence, whole regions have often been rendered uninhabitable by mines, which requires enormous resources, energy, and time to clear.
In addition, in the decision to return, each refugee and IDP has considerations based on his or her involvement in the conflict. I witnessed the great power such concerns had on Rwandan refugees, large numbers of whom chose to flee further into eastern Zaire rather than repatriate when their camps were dispersed in the fall of 1996. For some, returning meant risking individual retaliation or arrest and legal persecution, whether merited or not. I spoke with one woman who lived in the Kibeho IDP camp, six kilometers from her home community, about her fear of returning. During the genocide she had killed a man at the threat of being killed herself. Though her desire to return was strong, her trepidation was obvious, not knowing whether she would find arrest or other possible reprisal awaiting her at home.
Culpability is not necessarily a simple issue. Different degrees of latitude may be appropriate for the various types of involvement. Those who committed crimes under threat of death, for example, might deserve a different judgment from those who aided the participants but did not commit crimes themselves, or from those who are related to or closely associated with known criminals. For this reason, the existence of an operating judicial system might either deter or encourage repatriation, depending on the level of individual culpability, among other factors. Publicized arrest procedures and established legal means of reclaiming property, for example, might promote the return of those who fear arbitrary arrest and disputes over land, while deterring the return of those heavily involved in the fighting and therefore legitimately at risk of imprisonment. Under such conditions of nebulous security, unknown intentions of adversaries, and unclear judicial policy, personal protection becomes the critical
factor in the decision to return. Because most repatriations occur in small numbers and under conditions of conflict (Larkin, Cuny, and Stein 1991; Zinser 1991b), each family and individual must weigh the security risks at their destination location against the benefits of return.
Over the years, we have found that when the state of security and other determinants appear to permit relocation, IDPs, who are the best informed about local variables, will begin to return, and refugees—particularly those from the same area—will follow. Assuming these initial moves occur in relative calm and are reasonably well-received, others in exile will take it as an indication of relative local security and will join the movement (Zinser 1991b). The process of return thus builds on itself. The momentum often continues unless or until serious security violations reintroduce overwhelming anxiety. In Tajikistan, for example, almost half the exiled population had repatriated when cross-border fighting broke out and abruptly suspended the return migration (Maynard 1993).
Many factors influence the security of returnees, not the least of which is third-party protection. The existence of a substantial international presence has served to avert major human rights abuses in the past (Fagen and Eldridge 1991). The lack of such a consistent presence in many parts of Kosovo presumably had an encouraging effect on violations against Kosovars in the summer of 1998. At the same time, strong community ties and local identity-group presence contributes to a sense of guardianship, presumably adding to the attractiveness of the return option (Zinser 1991b).
Economic Considerations
The ISSVR study concludes that, after security, the next most important factor in the choice to return is personal material resources and economic welfare. Refugees and IDPs may repatriate for the express purpose of regaining proprietorship over income-generating sources (Zinser 1991a; Zinser 1991b). Field experience shows that reestablishing businesses, planting crops, or reclaiming professional occupations are high priorities in the minds of most uprooted persons. They seek semisustainable opportunities that will provide adequate subsistence for the entire family. Given the notoriously inadequate employment options in refugee situations and the intense competition for jobs in areas supporting internally displaced persons, the pull of potential return to previous occupations can be strong. For example, the lack of job opportunities in India equal to those they had left impelled many self-settled Sri Lankan refugees to repatriate (Cuny and Cuny 1992).
Several factors relating to material welfare play roles in the decision-making process. First, knowledge of conditions affecting displaced persons’ former source of livelihood, whether a factory, store, government office, herd of animals, fishing boat, or parcel of land, influences their sense of potential for renewed employment. If their shop was located in a section of the city that has been razed, for instance, or their land has been occupied by others, the pull of potential income generation will be weak.
Second, new skills learned while in asylum offer possible fresh opportunities in the country of origin. Some trades, in particular, are better plied in certain areas than in others and may add to the probability of relocation within the home country. Newly trained electricians, for example, are likely to find more work in a city than in the countryside, while health workers may gravitate toward provincial hospitals. More insidious forms of income generation pull participants into particular, often sordid, corners of the home country (Rogge 1992). Drug trading, for instance, is more likely to take place near the borders, in and around financial centers, and near transportation hubs such as ports, airports, or trucking routes. Third, changes in the political and economic fronts at home may offer new opportunity for gain. Aspiring entrepreneurs may take advantage of the lack of competition and high demand for products. In the aftermath of significant destruction in a complex emergency and during the reconstruction phase, it is common to see enterprising individuals peddling building materials and repair services.
Some ambitious or well-placed individuals may also consider the opportunity for employment in a new government, should one have emerged from the turmoil. The potential for active participation in deciding national or local issues, as well as aspirations for personal power, may spur the return of aspiring politicians. In Guinea, I spoke with several young refugee men for whom this was a serious factor in their decision to return to Liberia. Many Ethiopians have returned with the promise of new opportunities with the new government. Conversely, those directly opposed to the new rulers have little political employment incentive to return and may even leave.
Finally, personal assets and resources influence a family’s decision. Those who possess large amounts of material goods in exile, whether acquired while away or taken from the place of origin, are likely to consider the transportability, security, salability, and value of the commodities at the various locations (Intertect 1993). Those who left behind substantial resources while fleeing, particularly houses, are likely to consider returning sooner in hopes of recovering their possessions.
Displaced populations may also have economic disincentives to return, as is the case with many Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, according to John Sorenson, a contributor to the ISSVR study. Some work in trades, providing manual labor or transportation, while others are involved in drug and arms smuggling or profiteering from diverted relief aid. As a result, many refugees accrue much larger incomes than they would were they to return home. This is not the case for all Afghan refugees, and those who profit least from the economic opportunities are presumably more likely to repatriate (Sorenson 1992). Experience shows that large debts accrued while in exile further inhibit return until enough funds can be earned to both pay the amount due and cover the expense of relocating (Larkin, Cuny, and Stein 1991). This can be a formidable task, given the difficult employment environment in places of refuge.
Material Assistance
External assistance also influences the decision to return, although, according to the ISSVR study, it plays a much less significant role than is commonly thought (Zinser 1991b). UNHCR guidelines insist that four conditions must be fulfilled before it will support refugee repatriation: the conflict that spawned the flight must have diminished substantially; a tripartite agreement must be established among UNHCR, the host country, and the country of origin; the return must take place in safety and dignity; and the repatriation must be voluntary. These stipulations call for ideal conditions for repatriation, which, in reality, are rarely met. Were it to adhere strictly to these guidelines, UNHCR would be limited in its participation in the return process (Stein and Cuny 1991). In addition, the ISSVR study found that return is a purely self-regulating process, in which the returnees are in complete command as the decision-makers. The study contends that the timing and conditions under which repatriation occurs have surprisingly little to do with international efforts, but are based solely on the displaced population’s perception of their situation in exile and the conditions at home (Stein and Cuny 1992:16–17).
The international community has traditionally used the terms unorganized or spontaneous in reference to refugee repatriations not directed, assisted, or managed by international agencies. These words imply an image of unplanned, haphazard, and perhaps unruly events. Such returns, however, are not necessarily disorganized or even unassisted. Research shows that refugees themselves may facilitate the process, or be aided by guerrilla forces or even host governments, as happened in the repatriation organized for Cambodian refugees by the Thai government in 1980. 3
According to the ISSVR study, the vast majority of refugee repatriations and virtually all returns of internally displaced persons take place “spontaneously.” Over 90 percent of the seven million refugees who repatriated between 1975 and 1991 returned without significant international aid and in a nonorganized fashion (Stein and Cuny 1992:25). In Guatemala, for example, the refugees themselves negotiated an agreement with their home government that assured their collective return to self-chosen areas and guaranteed government security, access to land, and exemption from conscription for three years (Guatemala Partners n.d.).
Information
Each return is predicated on incoming information. Especially in refugee camps, the decision to return may be complicated by a lack of adequate and accurate information on conditions at home or the larger political situation (Zinser 1991b). In Afghanistan, for example, refugees were ignorant about which mujahedin groups controlled their home regions and about the movement of government troops. In contrast, Mozambican refugees had detailed knowledge about their home areas, but they lacked information on political developments, including the protocol allowing safe return of refugees (Norwegian Refugee Council 1992).
Some international observers, as mentioned above, dispute this assessment and claim that refugees are connected to extensive verbal networks that provide accurate and efficient information about site-specific details. Aldolfo Zinser, a participant in the ISSVR study, claims that Guatemalans had particularly good communication across the border, in part because they were not totally isolated and were able to use local languages and ancient forms of communication to stay informed (Zinser 1991a). The experience of others, including myself, however, has been that, in general, refugees’ isolation removes them from the source and makes it difficult for them to ascertain the accuracy of reports. Their vulnerability also makes them an easy target for manipulation from both sides of the border, as I’ve witnessed in various camp settings.
As we have seen, displaced populations may be exposed to intimidation in camps, disinformation campaigns, coercion, and peer and leadership pressure. In Cambodia, for example, a refugee study indicated that only a small percentage of the population had any direct or recent communication with relatives in the homeland. At the same time, the camps were inundated with political propaganda, reducing the probability of a realistic view of conditions at home (Rogge 1992). Each refugee situation is affected by different conditions, offering some more direct, reliable information than others. Most experts agree that internally displaced persons, by virtue of their proximity, have the advantage over refugees in this regard, having access to more avenues and direct lines of communication. This enables them to better determine the hazards and benefits of return and take advantage of a lull in the conflict to go home. In Sudan, for instance, IDPs exchanged information all along the migration route about current government relocation policies, drought-affected areas, economic conditions, labor markets, and the location of other displaced populations. Because of this communication network, they were able to determine the appropriate timing of their movements, the composition and size of the returning groups, transportation, stopover points and destination, as well as the security risks en route, and the conditions and prospects at the destination point (Hogan 1992).
Length of Time in Exile
The amount of time spent in exile also appears to have significant effect on the return decision-making process. First, as time passes, uprooted populations are more prone to take risks, particularly if conditions in the host country or place of asylum deteriorate (Stein and Cuny 1992:19). Prolonged asylum under difficult living conditions commonly leads refugees to request formal repatriation assistance from the host, home, and international communities.
Second, economic concerns and job opportunities appear to take on a higher priority the longer the time in exile. Extended periods of refuge afford greater time to acquire new skills, and displaced persons become anxious to begin profiting from them (Zinser 1991b:204). Because farmers and business owners, in particular, fear eventual loss of previously owned skills and enterprises, they may have greater resolve to return and salvage their trade. Lifestyle habituation, a third potential consequence of long-term exile, may also discourage the return home (Stein 1991). While in asylum, refugees become accustomed to certain standards of living, benefits and services. If these constitute an improvement over previous standards, they may be difficult to reach upon return to the homeland. Assistance provided to returnees by home government and relief and development agencies is generally insubstantial compared to that of refugee camps. Those long-absent from their rural roots, therefore, may understandably be reluctant to return to areas that offer few of the services to which they have become accustomed, such as utilities, education, and health care. In contrast to the poverty, illiteracy, and disease they experienced in Afghanistan before leaving, for example, many Afghans enjoy substantially higher living standards and basic services in Pakistan, in part as a result of the relatively lucrative employment opportunities (Sorenson 1992). Consequently, Afghan refugees—perhaps 15 percent of whom were born in the densely populated camps in Pakistan—are not inclined to repopulate remote rural areas to pursue agriculture, something to which the young people have hardly been exposed (Sorenson 1992). The large number of widowed and female heads of households may also have difficulty repatriating to an agricultural way of life, particularly if they are inexperienced or have lost their skills during the long absence.
The literature indicates that after long-term exile and the ensuing change in ability, attitude, and lifestyle, many refugees will choose to return not to their home of origin, but to the capital city. Those with newfound skills will attempt to compete with urban professionals, frequently adding to intergroup tension (Intertect 1993). Those without a legitimate vocation will likely remain at the outskirts of urban society, often continuing antisocial activities learned in camp, such as gambling, prostitution, drug dealing, and product smuggling. In Cambodia, the young, usually male, refugees who learned a trade while in the camps, or were involved in the camp’s antisocial underworld and thus developed street smarts, were the most likely to return to urban areas, along with demobilized soldiers. In contrast, adult males with small families who were at least somewhat educated and were cognizant of the situation at home, yet not aligned with any political faction, were the most likely to return to their former agricultural lifestyle (Rogge 1992).
In another example, the long-term asylum of Guatemalan refugees in southern Mexico had notable repercussions on refugee attitudes that eventually served to facilitate their repatriation. While in exile for ten years, the refugees developed skills and training in organizing, health care, education, literacy, problem-solving, leadership, trades, human rights, and political awareness. The women in particular assumed larger roles in the community, increased their wage-earning capacity, and became literate. This social development spawned a self-assuredness that led to a unique repatriation process, planned and carried out by the refugees themselves (Guatemala Partners n.d.).
Facing Reintegration
Considering the debilitating effect of violence on individuals and society as a whole, the reintegration of diverse groups is understandably a fragile and tentative process. Because identity conflicts and extensive human rights abuses sever cooperation and divide societies, they create a difficult environment in which to reintegrate. To complicate matters further, those repatriating from exile in another country may find huge portions of the local population internally uprooted. Many repatriating refugees may join others from their identity group elsewhere in the country rather than return to their home community (Zinser 1991b), thus exacerbating social chaos throughout the homeland.
In this state of disarray and confusion, the home government, the resident population, and the returnees all confront huge challenges. While each group has its own particular issues to confront, collectively they face the task of national reconstruction. Among the more daunting uncertainties is their own readiness and willingness to reintegrate.
Attitude
The experience of asylum can radically alter the individual and the collective sense of identity. This experience, as we have seen, can dramatically affect the attitudes, standards, and customs of exiled populations. As outlined in the findings from the ISSVR study, group priorities tend to supersede individual needs, whether communities seek refuge together and remain largely intact in exile or form a new group upon arrival. In El Salvador, for instance, this sense of subordination to the greater good continued following repatriation, with the understanding that unity was a prerequisite for survival. This attitude helped returnees maintain a sense of community, enabling them to persevere in an endless war zone. It also, however, set them apart from those members who had remained, creating another division in the community (Fagen and Eldridge 1991).
At the same time, corrupting influences encountered in exile can introduce new forces, values, and ethics that contribute to a breakdown of traditional society and ultimately diminish the potential for reintegration. In Cambodia, for instance, the traditional role of parents and the accompanying respect they received diminished when survival became preeminent and children resorted to petty theft, which was subsequently rewarded for its contribution to the family’s resources (Rogge 1992).
Psychological problems also frequently result from long periods of asylum and lethargy. This can add to the dysfunctionality of individuals, general distrust, and lowered community spirit (Maynard 1997). In the end, uprooted populations returning to their home communities may have fundamentally different values and attitudes than those who remained.
Reception
The extent of welcome given to returnees appears to depend on a number of factors. Although the return can help alleviate residents’ political fears of external insurgent movements from refugee and IDP camps, it brings with it a host of other potentially volatile problems, not the least of which are the roots of the original conflict. The fact that only 30,000 of the 350,000 Bosnians who had returned by the end of 1997 had gone back to areas in which they are the minority speaks directly to the issue of fear of hostile reception.
The return phase, however, can also represent a potential window of opportunity for reestablishing community cooperation and overcoming separatism. I have witnessed occasions during the early period of reintegration when both returnees and resident citizens seem strongly predisposed toward better relations. I credit this to the fact that fundamental to the displaced populations’ decisions to return home is the perception that life will be better at the place of origin than in the place of asylum. Hence, often at great risk, some opt to move their families and their remaining belongings back to their home community. Under these conditions, they presumably are willing also to risk confrontation with their antagonists and are thus anxious for peaceful relations. At the same time, depending on the state of the conflict, the resident population in the communities may be suffering from lack of human resources for agricultural production, social services, commerce, and reconstruction. They may also be war-weary and, therefore, similarly disposed to overcoming mutual animosities. (Chapter 5 explores the state and attitude of the home community in more detail.) Under these conditions, I have seen home communities reach out in acceptance and welcome to homecoming members. On several occasions in Tajikistan and Rwanda, for instance, community members helped rebuild the houses of returnees and offered other gestures of goodwill.
Where conditions are adverse, however, due to substantial illegal occupation of houses, subsumed land or looted property, or if the source of the conflict still rages within the core of the local community, the return of displaced populations can exacerbate the hostilities. The intensely complex checkerboard-like situation in Bosnia, in which houses of one ethnic group are occupied by another because theirs, in turn, are also occupied, makes return not only physically difficult but socially and politically dangerous. Historically, in fact, there have been few warm receptions from the home government or population for returning citizens. In the repatriation of more than a million Africans between 1988 and 1991, only Burundi, Namibia, and Zimbabwe were at peace and openly welcomed returnees (Stein 1991:23). Cambodia serves as another example in which the government gave public support to the repatriation of its citizens (Vieira de Mello 1993).
Upon close examination, it appears that part of the uneasy relationship between returnees and those who remained is that the former are frequently viewed as traitors to the homeland or suspected of opposition involvement. Community, government, or military officials may thus bear tremendous hostility toward returnees, particularly in areas where the fighting continues (Zinser 1991b). Indeed, studies show that during their time in asylum, the political view of refugees, in particular, may move closer to the insurgent group, and subsequent returnees may have hidden agendas of bringing in arms, gathering support, or inciting revolt (Kumar et al. 1996; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). In this case, home country officials are justifiably suspicious of returnees.
As a result, returnees fear accusation—whether accurate or not—of association with subversive elements and consequent rejection, persecution, or continual dispute. In the case of Guatemala, for example, the military considered all refugees to be allies of the guerrillas and thus reportedly detained, harassed, “disappeared,” or even killed some of those who returned (USCR 1995:178–79). For the same reason, refugees feared that by returning they might put their home village and even their ethnic group and culture in jeopardy of military attacks. In contrast, El Salvador and Cambodia committed themselves to progressive reintegration of refugees into the economic, political, and social development process (Fagen 1993; Fagen and Eldridge 1991; Vieira de Mello 1993). These two cases, unfortunately, are anomalies. The general rule appears to be that the longer one stays away, the more difficult the absence is to justify in the eyes of the resident population, and the more suspicion and contention exist upon return.
Returning refugees, moreover, often assume that their plight during the period they were gone was far worse than that of those who remained. In actuality, however, refugees generally fare better than others with the assistance and protection they receive from international agencies (Zinser 1991b). It is possible to understand how conflict could develop when refugees believe that their internationally recognized status makes them deserving of special compensation, and they fail to see the needs of those who remained, possibly under far worse conditions.
Economic Conditions
Whether the return process contributes to a restoration of normalcy or leads to further destabilization appears to be in part determined by the economic conditions of the receiving community. In areas where basic needs and living standards are met, the return of displaced populations seems to represent a welcome and vital ingredient to pacification. In these situations, land and property disputes are likely to be minimal, and the community may even assist the returnees in reintegrating and resettling. The other extreme occurs under conditions of intense competition for resources and employment and massive infrastructure damage. Communities struggling with a floundering economy and damaged traditional methods of livelihood are understandably more prone to harbor intergroup hostility and resort to scapegoating. Unfortunately, most contemporary returns occur under circumstances closer to the latter extreme than to the former.
Assistance
The fact that most returnees go back to impoverished communities, suffering from destroyed homes, lands, and livelihoods, tends to predispose them to depend on material assistance. This is particularly true during the transition phase but may continue for long periods thereafter (Stein 1991). In the case of Kosovo, because of the 70 percent unemployment among Albanian Kosovars, many residents were dependent on material aid even before the 1998 outbreak of violence and massive displacement. Because the domestic economy and government finances, not to mention internal political will, are often meager in the postconflict period, the majority of initial aid usually comes from international sources.
Sri Lanka, however, serves as a notable exception. The Sri Lankan government established an elaborate assistance program that benefited all those affected by the war, declaring all citizens loyalists unless proven otherwise. The aid included payments for injuries, lost property, and loss of income, as well as grants, in-kind donations, and loans. The government, moreover, offered assistance to spontaneous returnees in the form of cash, food, and material contributions for housing repairs. Unlike in most civil conflicts, the aid program became a major pull factor in the return process (Cuny and Cuny 1992).
The usual international assistance provided to returnees, particularly in major repatriations, offers initial material support in the form of food, agricultural tools, and household items. In contrast to NGOs, which may have somewhat longer aid programs, this is where UNHCR’s mandate for the care of migrant populations normally ended and the responsibility of the state began again, at least until recently (UNHCR 1993a). In current conflicts, however, the lack of a viable government, the continued disarray of political and social affairs, and a devastated economy have left many returnees without means to make the transition to self-sufficiency. Consequently, UNHCR on an ad hoc basis has offered programs designed to aid returnees during this stage, including help in rebuilding livelihoods, homes, and community structures. In Tajikistan, UNHCR operated inside the country, establishing not only small economic revitalization projects but also protection (Maynard 1994). In Bosnia, it is involved in income-generation and reintegration projects. However, UNHCR’s mandate, as Barry Stein points out, still officially only extends a small step beyond resettlement, leaving a significant gap in international agency assistance during the transition period in most cases (Stein 1991:17). Consequently, postemergency aid tends to be rare, usually short-lived and minimal, seldom spanning the period to actual self-reliance. History shows, moreover, that the transition period may be extended by dependence built up through long-term asylum in camps. The recent upsurge in international interest in postconflict rehabilitation, however, may bring new external resources and research to this critical period in the recovery process. 4
Practitioners and scholars alike have begun to document the occurrence of increased intergroup hostilities resulting inadvertently from well-intentioned international assistance designed to reestablish peaceful homelands (Anderson 1994; Prendergast 1995). (Chapter 7 will discuss this phenomenon in more detail.) Government authorities, suspicious of or hostile toward returnees, for example, may try to control or disrupt the deliveries. In so doing, they may divert the supplies or request return payment or favors for them. On the other hand, as was the case in El Salvador, they may insist on delivering the goods themselves, possibly for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of each returnee for potential future harassment, or intercepting the goods for their own purposes (Fagen 1993; Fagen and Eldridge 1991). The community thus may be faced not only with returning homeless and resourceless members but accompanying unwanted attention from militia or military units. Their presence may then reignite hidden animosity or create new contention based on current problems. Community members, in addition, may be more likely to resort to force with the experience of violence so near the surface.
Recent scrutiny shows, furthermore, that targeted relief aid can create inequities between the beneficiaries and other members, leading to tension or further violence (Anderson 1994, 1995b). I have observed in places like Tajikistan, that it can also focus unwanted attention on the beneficiaries, such as returnees or women, making them potential targets of manipulation, isolation, coercion, or persecution. More fundamentally, aid intended only for returnees simply ignores the needs of the community as a whole and the most vulnerable elements in particular, potentially causing further deterioration in its overall well-being. The Cambodia repatriation illustrated the repercussions of such selective aid practices: when returning refugees who had benefited from international assistance reintegrated together with internally displaced persons who did not receive many services, tensions rose out of the disparities and led to intergroup violence (Deng 1993:105–106).
Property Rights
Communities that attempt to reintegrate returning members confront not only the original issues that divided them and the now divergent social values but a host of new problems as well. Land and property rights tend to be among the more volatile issues. Frequently in conflicts, agricultural parcels are severely damaged, made useless by the planting of land mines or, alternatively, taken over by others. The process of restoring rightful ownership or compensating for unusable tracts can be extremely contentious, and legal proceedings may be biased or nonexistent.
A multidonor evaluation of the Rwanda crisis, for example, found that two sets of returnees often laid claim to the same property. One of these groups was from the 1994 evacuation, while the other was from the exodus thirty-five years earlier. Although the government upheld the agreement that abrogated the right to claim property abandoned before 1982, animosity has grown out of the dispute (Kumar et al. 1996:88). Furthermore, some members of Rwanda’s military occupied homes and refused to relinquish them to the returnees upon presentation of the appropriate papers. In the absence of an operational judicial system, claims have largely gone unheard officially and have been resolved only on an ad hoc basis. In Guatemala, the land exchanged hands from one set of refugees to a different set of returnees, which created an extremely delicate situation and impeded refugee return (Fagen 1993).
Ultimately, resolution of land problems—and thus significant incentive or disincentive to return—rests with the government of the country of origin. It may leave the disputes to the contenders (or even exacerbate the situation by confiscating more property), or it may intervene in buy-back schemes, land reform legislation, enforcement of equitable and strict legal regulations, transference of public lands, and the like. The contentious land issues in Rwanda, for instance, led the government to seek new options in public lands, national parks, and rangeland.
The Issues of Conflict
The bulk of research shows that, although repatriation and return are not contingent on a peace settlement, a substantial change in the conflict can radically affect the process (Stein and Cuny 1992; Zinser 1991b). Conceivably, then, addressing the basic causes of the exodus can favorably affect the return and, more fundamentally, create a positive atmosphere in which to begin reconstruction and rehabilitation. In addition, ensuring the accountability of both resident individuals and returnees for crimes committed during the strife could have a substantial pacifying effect on the population as a whole by providing a sense of justice.
Establishing peaceful conditions is undoubtedly a long, ambiguous, and intricate process. Peace efforts conducted at the leadership level often tend to be focused on the most tangible issues. As such, third parties approach the problem with the goal of achieving an agreement that will end the fighting but may disregard the historical matters, psychological issues, long-held animosities, and other complex elements, which at the grassroots level become extremely important. In discussions with Kosovars, for example, I found that Albanians understood the absolute need to arrest the fighting, but saw an exigency in addressing existing inequities in Kosovar society before all fighting could cease.
The society’s ability to address its own issues is most likely severely damaged by the fighting. Understandably, returnees and receiving communities alike may be initially paralyzed by fear, unable to help themselves or to make efforts toward integration or development. In the throes or aftermath of identity conflict, the justice system may be collapsed, too weak to function, or extremely corrupt and partial. Moreover, the local structure for conflict management, whether it be elders’ councils, community committees, tribal authority, or a conflict resolution designate, has also often disintegrated, leaving few traditional alternatives. These structures may have been inequitable or inadequate even before the onset of violence.
Under such conditions, opportunists can exploit the confusion, reaping the material and personal benefits of a weakened social order. Unjustified public accusation of criminal wrongdoing may result in the arrest or expulsion of an individual, leaving his or her property for the taking, as occurred in Rwanda and Guatemala (Kumar et al. 1996; Zinser 1991a). Without a bona fide judicial system, accusations and penalties for assumed participation have been left up to local authorities or individual action. This appears to be precisely one of the fears that inhibit return.
I strongly believe that the reintegration process is a determining point in the future of intergroup relations and country stability as a whole. As we have seen, both returnees and resident populations face tremendous challenges in reestablishing social, political, economic, and cultural interaction. Unfortunately, very little research to date has studied these situations, leaving much room for speculation. Precisely for this reason and because of my estimation of its importance, the next chapter will turn to the other side of the equation and explore the experience of the home community embroiled in armed violence.
Endnotes
Note 1: The term repatriation is somewhat indistinct in that to some it means returning to the home community, while to others it is simply returning to the home country. Back.
Note 2: USCR figures are drawn from multiple sources, reflecting the inherent ambiguity of refugee statistics. Back.
Note 3: This example of Thailand’s assistance and generally hospitable nature toward Cambodian refugees is in sharp contrast to its forced expulsion campaign in June 1979 (Rogge 1992). Back.
Note 4: Interestingly, a host of multilateral and bilateral donors are now establishing institutional mechanisms to address postconflict issues—the U.S. government’s Office of Transition Initiatives and the World Bank’s Post Conflict Unit, among them. Back.
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