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State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity
Kimberly A. Maynard
1999
3. Forced Migration: A Consequence Of Conflict
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The scale and complexity of today’s humanitarian crises are a reflection of the instability of the period in which we live. The collapse of the old order has given rise to a more volatile world in which new refugee movements are likely to continue to occur. At the same time, the nature of the refugee problem has undergone fundamental changes which call urgently for new approaches. |
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—Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 1993b:iii) |
Forced migration has been a common consequence of violence since the beginning of human history. When security is sufficiently threatened by war, military coups, insurrection, religious persecution, human rights abuses, political despotism, or “ethnic cleansing,” people flee their homes in search of safety. 1 Although the major causes of flight have varied over time, one element of forced migration has remained the same: desperate and homeless people who are in danger of persecution, starvation, or disease.
Over the years, the impact of forced displacement on international relations and on the health of society has attracted interest from psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists, social policy analysts, and ecologists. In the past decade, scholars have begun to look more closely at the repercussions of displacement on host countries and communities (Chambers 1993) and at social changes that occur within the refugee camp setting (Cuny, Stein, and Reed 1992). More recently, environmentalists have been studying the effects of camps on the local ecology. Today, the implications of myriad requests for asylum in Northern countries is drawing extensive review (Hathaway 1996).
Like other issues, the end of the Cold War has changed the nature of population displacement and has dramatically increased its scale. Identity conflict and complex emergencies have contributed to such problems as internal displacement, protracted refugee situations, psychosocial trauma, legal culpability of refugees for crimes related to the conflict, and the increased use of camps for political and military purposes. Many scholars are calling for a renewed look at population migration in light of these current conditions (Chambers 1993; Cohen 1994; Hathaway 1996; Loescher 1993).
These issues are clearly of vital importance. We have seen how forced migration can not only seriously disrupt social stability but can jeopardize security in the region, particularly given the large number of displaced populations 2 worldwide. Therefore, this chapter first examines the phenomenon of displacement, including the different types, the motivation for and stages of migration, and life in asylum. Then it explores the repercussions of displacement on the region, the home country, the community, and the individual, and the particular impact of internally displaced persons on recovering societies.
The Profile of Today’s Migrants
As Gil Loescher, author of Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (1993), points out, in the post–Cold War era, new conditions and scenarios brought about by rapidly changing global dynamics have affected the nature of forced migration. With the diminishing importance of geographic frontiers, for example, crossing a border no longer necessarily signifies safety. And despite international law guaranteeing refugee rights, asylum for those fearing persecution is increasingly being denied. One example of this occurred in the spring of 1996, when Ghana repeatedly refused a boat of Liberians fleeing civil war. Contemporary circumstances, moreover, undermine the traditional concept of forced migration by calling into question the defining characteristics of refugees, internally displaced persons, and others in personal danger.
Refugees
The definition of “refugee” itself is the subject of intense debate, as distinctions between types of people leaving home have begun blur. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees distinguishes a refugee as any person with “a well-founded fear of being persecuted [in his/her country of origin] for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (UN General Assembly 1951). 3 According to international law, then, refugees are persons outside their states of origin, whose former positive relationship with their government has collapsed, leaving them without protection or assistance.
Conditions of refugeeism were, of course, extremely different in 1951, when the statute was formed and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) conceived. Today, migration results not only from persecution but also from conditions such as poverty, famine, disease, massive human rights abuse, ecological disaster, civil strife, fear of retaliation, and political or religious conviction (Loescher 1993; Newland 1993). Many of these new migrants do not fit neatly under the Convention definition, which specifies a fear of persecution but does not specify those conditions. The waters become even more turbid in the fact that economic and political motivations for migration are frequently intertwined. Since the reason for seeking asylum in both cases is a threat to life and freedom, there may be little distinction today between a person seeking freedom from starvation and another freedom from violence.
Economic migrants—that is, those compelled to move in search of work—now comprise a large percentage of the total number of people seeking asylum and are at times difficult to distinguish from those fleeing persecution (Cleveland 1993; Loescher 1993). They may be victims of diminished agricultural capacity, foreign business takeovers, changes in cultural norms, declining economy due to political or social turmoil, urban growth, political restructuring affecting employment and production, or simply increasing population pressures. Environmental refugees are also visibly growing in numbers. They are forced to leave their homes due to deteriorating ecological conditions from pollution, overuse of resources, contaminated or lost resources, overpopulation, or physical hazards causing loss of income and/or ill-health.
Consequently, the debate rages in international circles over the definition of “refugee” and over the appropriate application of the founding refugee statutes to today’s conditions (Hathaway 1996). UNHCR, for one, in deference to its mandate, still gives priority to those who fall under the original definition of refugee. It provides qualifying refugees with basic security and material aid while in asylum, as well as assistance in voluntary repatriation or resettlement. 4 Ironically, these refugees often become a privileged minority who, because of their particular condition, gain access to sparse resources, legal protection, and possible admission into a country ahead of numerous prospective applicants.
Lately, however, UNHCR has extended assistance and protection beyond those who meet the formal definition of refugee—to nearly twelve million people in 1996, including IDPs, resident populations, “others of concern,” 5 and, most recently, those considered stateless (UNHCR 1996:12; UNHCR 1997). In Bosnia, for example, UNHCR played the lead role in providing humanitarian assistance to the besieged residents of Sarajevo; in Tajikistan it established resident operations in adverse areas; and in Sri Lanka it offered aid to displaced persons via Open Relief Centers. Nevertheless, many observers are calling for formal adjustments in the UNHCR or another UN agency mandate, or the creation of a new agency to cover the assistance and protection needs of migrants falling outside the conventional definition of refugee. Most significantly, perhaps, this would include the status of internally displaced persons (Cohen 1994; Cohen 1996; Deng 1993; Girardet 1993; UNHCR 1993a; UNHCR 1997).
Legal definitions notwithstanding, this book explores conditions relating to all persons who have fled their homes as a result of identity conflict and complex emergency, regardless of their motivation.
Internally Displaced Persons
The case of internally displaced persons is both parallel to and distinct from that of refugees. Although technically only a border crossing separates the two situations, the international community is becoming more aware of several important differences that distinguish IDPs from other victims of conflict. First, in today’s world of internecine violence, IDPs vastly outnumber refugees by more than two to one, and the disparity grows with each new identity conflict and ensuing complex emergency. One reason for this changing dynamic may be that the increasing refusal of asylum has simply kept many inside the bounds of their own country. Second, the animosity inherent in such strife is often focused on IDPs who may have difficulty finding sanctuary and are therefore more vulnerable to abuse. They may be targets of human rights violations by opposing groups or the government itself, which may view them as the source of social disruption (Cohen 1993; Cohen 1996; Deng 1993).
Third, because IDPs still live under the jurisdiction of governments that may be directly or indirectly a cause of their flight, not only can they not expect domestic protection, but international law and institutional agreements do not cover their situation. In fact, many human rights provisions can be suspended when the state deems its security is threatened (Cohen 1996; UNHCR 1993b). UNHCR concedes, “In an internal conflict, the protection needs of displaced people are likely to be at least if not more serious than their assistance needs” (UNHCR 1993a:18).
Finally, my experience in various emergencies has been that humanitarian assistance to internally displaced populations is often inadequate, slow, and highly contentious. One reason for this is that IDPs most often flee to relatives living in other parts of the country, retreat to garrison towns, or eventually move to the capital city; only rarely do they stay in established camps. They are therefore difficult to locate and hard to distinguish from the local population. Mogadishu, for example, was teeming with IDPs, some of whom had been drawn by the arrival of the international military force in the capital. Except for those obviously still en route with personal belongings at their side, they blended in with the city residents. IDPs in urban areas usually form small independent enclaves in shanty towns on the edge of the city and learn the life of the urban slum dweller. Another explanation is that the government, whose responsibility it is to care for its displaced citizens, may either have collapsed or assumed IDPs are opposition members and refuse to help them. In fact, authorities may adamantly oppose any assistance, charging IDPs with subversive action (Cohen 1996; Cuny 1991; Deng 1993). As a result, the government may also object to and interdict international assistance. Serb authorities often prevented humanitarian aid destined for Albanian Kosovars, for instance, from reaching the communities in need.
Yet another reason for insufficient aid to internally displaced populations is that even if the government does have the will to help, it may be unable to act due to a dearth of resources. Impoverished countries may already have inadequate funds for social assistance. A change in perceived priorities during civil strife often shifts any remaining funds to support wartime activities. In the case of Rwanda, the government that took control after the conflict was devoid of any funds for operational expenses, let alone social assistance. Though to the donor community it indicated a strong interested in helping both IDPs and returnees, the government was plagued with an empty coffer (depleted by the departing leaders), little international financial aid, and a strong external security threat that demanded expenditures for military maintenance.
Furthermore, since they technically fall within the domestic jurisdiction and therefore lack an international protectorate, IDPs are traditionally among the lowest priority for international donors (Deng 1993). ICRC is one of the only international agencies mandated to provide aid and protection to victims of violence within their own country. However, given large numbers of IDPs, the difficulty in locating them, and possible restrictions imposed by the authorities, ICRC may be overwhelmed while aid from other relief agencies may be negligible. Their sheer numbers and the inadequacy of assistance lead many experts to consider IDPs the greatest single group at risk in the world today. 6 The International Organization for Migration, for example, found that IDPs in Angola in 1995 experienced worse conditions than returning refugees; in Rwanda in 1994, the DHA reported that the nutritional status of the general population far surpassed that of the internally displaced (Cohen 1996:24).
Despite the lack of institutional support for IDPs, their circumstances and numbers have begun to draw significant concern. In recent years, the UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General have periodically asked UNHCR to formally expand its conventional mandate in certain circumstances and provide care for other displaced populations, such as IDPs, most notably in Iraq, Liberia, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia (UNHCR 1993a), and recently in Kosovo. (Only 5.4 million IDPs, however, were listed as “of concern” to UNHCR in 1995 [Cohen 1996:26].) In 1992 the UN Commission on Human Rights requested that the Secretary-General appoint a representative to specifically study the concerns and conditions of IDPs. The resultant appointee, Francis Deng, subsequently enlarged the meager information base and championed the IDP dilemma, contributing to a growing awareness of the problem. (Nevertheless, effective action has been hobbled by concerns for sovereignty as well as debate over appropriate international jurisdiction among the various UN agencies, or indeed the creation of a separate agency to house these matters [Cohen 1994; Girardet 1993; UNHCR 1993a; UNHCR 1997]. Under Deng’s recommendation for the current UN reform measures, the IDP Task Force will be disbanded, folding IDP issues into other emergency relief structures but still not solving the question of agency dominion.)
In addition to the new types of forced migrants, the number of people fleeing persecution increased significantly until the mid-1990s. In 1951, when the UN drafted the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and created UNHCR, there were approximately one million people under its care around the world, all of them refugees. By the end of 1997, there were approximately 22.7 million protected by UNHCR, including refugees, some internally displaced persons, returnees, and others (UNHCR 1997). 7 Interestingly, for the twenty-year period prior to the mid-1970s, refugee figures worldwide remained relatively unchanged at about two to three million (Hakovirta 1986:147). At that point, however, the count began to rise exponentially and reached approximately twelve million a decade later.
The dramatic changes in the global refugee situation in the latter half of the 1970s increased not only the overall number of refugees but the scale of individual evacuations, their urgency, and their duration (Hakovirta 1986; U.S. Mission 1995). But it was the end of the Cold War that literally opened the spigot. A review of the various statistics shows that the shift from insurrection movements to identity conflicts corresponded to a 28 percent increase in displaced persons worldwide in the first five years of the post–Cold War era. The addition of new categories of populations in need in the mid-1980s accounted for much of the newly displaced. The numbers continued to rise for the next decade, reaching a total of almost 50 million uprooted people around the world by January 1995. That amounted to one out of every 115 persons in the world (UNHCR 1995). Then, in 1995, the number of displaced people began to decline. This can be attributed in part to the growth in refusal of asylum, as well as to several recent large repatriations, including those to Rwanda, Uganda, and Mozambique.
The massive movement of people has not occurred equally around the globe. Before the return of Rwandan refugees from Zaire and Tanzania, Africa accounted for seven out of the top ten countries of origin, amounting to 11 million uprooted people on the continent (Creative Associates 1997; UNHCR 1995). Second only to Afghanistan, Liberia alone had 778,000 refugees in 1997 (UNHCR 1997). The poorest of all continents, and the most politically tumultuous, Africa has the fewest resources with which to care for its displaced populations, yet still accounts for half of the top ten countries of asylum (USCR 1996:6). This creates a downward cycle, as identity conflict victims flood into neighboring countries for refuge, only to contribute to the host country’s own instability. In 1996 Sudan, for example, was the world’s eighth largest source of refugees, while simultaneously the place of asylum for refugees from Chad, Eritrea, and Ethiopia (UNHCR 1996:30; USCR 1996:6).
While Africa has been the source as well as the host to refugees and internally displaced persons for decades, the new republics from the former communist bloc are a relatively recent addition to the global forced migration scenario. Since the breakup of the old order, identity conflicts in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the former Yugoslavia, the Caucuses, Central Asia, and portions of Russia have spawned large numbers of forced migrants, creating new challenges to the international community. According to UNHCR (1996:33–39), in 1996 1.6 million refugees emanated from former Soviet states alone.
These dynamics create an entirely different international scenario than that of the 1980s, producing a multitude of security, humanitarian, and social dilemmas. Statistics and definitions, however, do not speak to the repercussions of mass displacement on families, villages, or geographic areas. The decision to leave home is part of a series of events that ultimately affects virtually all members of society directly or indirectly.
The Impetus to Flee: A Search for Security
Knowledge and policy about refugee and displaced person issues have improved significantly over the past decade, due largely to greater academic and field study of the issues. The work of Fred Cuny, former president of Intertect, a private relief and reconstruction firm, has been one of the more notable influences. As both a practitioner and a scholar, Cuny was a leading and influential thinker in the field of disasters and accompanying migration. In the early 1990s he participated in the International Study of Spontaneous Voluntary Repatriation (ISSVR), which considered multiple refugee case studies in Central America, Africa, and Asia, resulting in Repatriation Under Conflict in Central America (Larkin, Cuny, and Stein 1991) and Repatriation During Conflict in Africa and Asia (Cuny, Stein, and Reed 1992). He also examined the issues of internal displacement in Displaced Persons in Civil Conflict (Cuny 1991) and with me in “Assessing Emergencies Involving Civilians Displaced by Conflict” (Intertect 1993). Cuny’s work has significantly influenced the way international organizations address issues of forced displacement.
In Displaced Persons in Civil Conflict, Cuny outlined some of the fundamental motivations behind an individual refugee’s migration. In his view, based on vast field experience, the primary reason for flight was security, followed by economics and then control over one’s life. Despite their new profile and copious numbers, today’s migrations seem to be induced by the same basic perceived threats to security and way of life as in the past. These are conventionally referred to in terms of push and pull factors.
Common push factors triggering exodus from a conflict zone include imminent fighting or human rights violations; food insecurity such as destruction of crops, collapsed agricultural networks, or food shortages; economic deterioration, including loss of assets, severe market volatility, or economic collapse. Pull factors include established assistance networks; the potential of finding sanctuary with relatives or other identity group members; the prospect of selling assets or gaining employment; and the possibility of relocating to an urban environment (Cuny 1991; Hakovirta 1986). In the modern experience of migration, the search for greater security and personal well-being might be modified by the depth of one’s personal involvement in the dispute. By all accounts, the migrant’s perception of the situation at both ends, which may or may not correspond to reality, is the critical factor.
Several social groups have historically tended to flee more than others (Cuny 1991; Intertect 1993). Early on in the conflict, those who live in the countryside, including rural laborers, farmers, and pastoralists are the most prone to leave. This is in part because their relative isolation creates greater exposure to attack, and partly because farms and herds are more vulnerable to disruption than many other economic enterprises. Obviously, those closest to the fighting and therefore most at risk are also inclined to flee, as are those specifically targeted in the conflict, such as members of specific religious, ethnic, tribal, or linguistic groups. In addition, extremely mobile sectors of the population like traditional nomads or migratory laborers usually leave the conflict area directly. I witnessed this repeatedly in the nomadic regions of Somalia, where vacating an area is a natural reaction to adverse conditions.
Cuny describes three types of displacement. One is crisis-induced, when fighting in or around the home region spawns a sudden exodus from the community. The intensity of today’s identity conflicts creates large flows of crisis-induced migrants, as seen in April and May of 1994, when Rwandans first crossed the border into Tanzania in mass numbers. In contrast, community members may evacuate early, at an advance sign of trouble, in order to avoid violence or possible conscription. This second type, precautionary evacuation, affords families time to sell some of their assets and leave in an organized fashion. Many Bosnians fit into this category, particularly those I encountered in Macedonia in the early days of the conflict and in Kosovo in 1998. Finally, people flee for economic reasons, such as food and commodity shortages, dire financial problems as a result of a collapsed local or national economy, ruined agriculture or other means of income, or lack of business and trade (Cuny 1991). Much of the televised images of Somalis leaving their homes in search of food fit into this category.
The causes of migration affect the conditions under which it occurs and the choice of a destination. Crisis-induced migrants usually have few assets and flee to the closest perceived safe area; for those nearest the border, this may be a refugee camp. Precautionary and economic migrants generally carry more resources with them and thus tend to go farther away, possibly to a labor pole, the capital city, or in the case of the former Yugoslavia, to Europe. In such movements, migrants usually wait until the end of the harvest, the majority leaving two to three months later (Cuny 1991; Intertect 1993).
The season as well as the quality of the crop similarly affect farmers not under immediate duress. If the harvest is adequate to sustain the family for the next season, the farmer will likely stay at least long enough to determine the potential for the next cultivating period (Cuny 1991). Not uncommonly, the farmer will move the rest of the family to a safe zone and return home often and long enough to plant and work the fields, particularly if the place of asylum is nearby. In Rwanda there was noticeable field cultivation in areas that had been evacuated near refugee and IDP camps. Under today’s circumstances, this type of long preplanning may not be as feasible as in the past. The typically rapid disintegration in social conditions is more likely to force an immediate evacuation, which allows little time for preparation.
Another finding of Cuny’s is that the prospects for economic advantage traditionally affect the destination choice. IDPs searching for job opportunities will go where the economy is still functioning, which in most cases is in government-held territory (Cuny 1991). What I have found to be a more influential factor in identity conflicts, however, is group association. Uprooted populations choose destinations based on areas of like tribal, cultural, linguistic, or ethnic attributes, and particularly locations where relatives or associates reside. In contemporary conflicts, affinity to a group becomes paramount in virtually every decision. In Tajikistan, for example, the mixed ethnic and geographic community living in the capital quickly dispersed back to their respective regional bases when the conflict erupted (Maynard 1994).
Refugees may set out immediately to cross an international boundary—due to proximity, urgency, or personal threat—or may do so only after a series of migrations from sanctuary to sanctuary. In Rwanda, I watched whole communities roam the countryside, sometimes staying at IDP camps for weeks or months before many left the country. At the destination, strife may erupt in a microcosm of the bigger conflict or out of contention over resources and employment, particularly in areas occupied by several identity groups (Intertect 1993). Such conflict can provoke further migration to places of greater perceived safety. The infamous massacre at Kibeho IDP camp in southwestern Rwanda epitomized this. Hostility against the IDPs who had become en-trenched in the area developed among local residents and military units and broke into a brutal battle. In today’s conflicts, however, identity association usually more strictly defines destinations, minimizing the likelihood that mixed groups will occupy a contested area.
Stages of Migration
Cuny (1991) divides the process of displacement into five phases. He describes the preliminary phase as the period prior to departure, in which pressure builds from insecurity, diminished employment, increased competition for general resources, conscription, deterioration in the food supply, or decreased income with which to purchase food. Next is the evacuation or emergency phase, which includes the decision to leave, the process of evacuation, and the arrival in a place of relative safety. In addition to the general push factors mentioned earlier, according to Cuny, other considerations play a role in this phase. Loss of a family member due to violence, or imminent threat of physical danger or conscription, for example, can affect the decision to move.
Other community members’ evacuation or the judgment of a community leader may also precipitate the decision. I observed this in both Somalia and Rwanda, where whole communities and subclans fled under the direction of a local leader. The destination, as mentioned above, is influenced by several factors, including the location of the nearest sanctuary, the distance to an international border, location of perceived income sources and employment, route access and safety, and, particularly in identity conflicts, location of relatives or other identity group members, as well as receptivity of identity groups in neighboring countries (Cuny 1991; Intertect 1993).
Field observation reveals that upon arrival at a destination site, most crisis-induced migrants are often traumatized, sick, or injured from the journey and are without many assets. For this reason, internally displaced persons will often gather around a health center, a relief post, or a watering hole, which may then develop into a camp. Most will immediately search for an income source. Some, particularly the earlier arrivals, may find work in nearby towns or on local farms, especially during the planting or harvest season (Cuny 1991).
According to Cuny, the emergency phase ends when there are no more new arrivals, health and nutrition rates have stabilized, and there is relative security, or when migration continues on from the initial place of sanctuary. The latter occurs if the area is invaded by conflict or overwhelmed with new arrivals. In that case, the job market soon becomes saturated and the wage scale severely depressed. Therefore, subsequent arrivals unable to find work, and those who can no longer survive on a reduced wage, may move on in search of adequate employment, or they may cross an international border and become refugees (Cuny 1991; Intertect 1993).
The third stage, then, is the secondary migration phase, when the displaced move out of their initial place of sanctuary in search of employment and better living conditions. Early in the migration pattern, secondary displacement may only take migrants as far as a spontaneous settlement near the sanctuary where farm or other work can be found. Logically, labor poles such as large industries or farming schemes become a major destination. But soon such job markets too may become saturated; when wages decrease, many eventually move on, often to the capital or other cities. It is at this point, it seems, that the volume of uprooted people flooding into urban areas becomes notable.
Thus the fourth phase, settlement, begins when the displaced reach a location where they can remain without overwhelming fear of physical insecurity, and without being forced to relocate again in search of income. For those who cross an international border, this is typically a UNHCR-managed camp, where refugees generally register, receive food and health assistance, and situate themselves in the camp setting. For those arriving at a refugee camp during this stage, the camp structure and procedures have already been defined, and they essentially integrate themselves into the surroundings.
IDPs may also stay in a camp, particularly if they have no nearby friends or relatives. However, in part because assistance is usually less forthcoming, security nebulous, and morbidity and mortality rates high, many ultimately move to an urban center, settling in squatter sections on the periphery of the city where they have family or identity group members (Cuny 1991). Those seeking refuge in the city are generally less likely to return home. Nevertheless, many IDPs and refugees alike attempt to reintegrate into their country and community of origin. The final phase, then, is the return passage, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Life in Asylum
Studies of refugeeism have found that, as a rule, living in exile substantially changes the attitudes and perceptions of displaced persons, whether they are inside or outside their home country (Deng 1993; Norwegian Refugee Council 1992). Their experience is marked by exposure to new influences, isolation, deprivation, and often a radically different environment. These experiences affect the skills, resources, and political views of a significant portion of the overall population.
Refugees
International aid specialists increasingly recognize that the experience of refugeeism is vastly different from that of internal displacement. The majority of those seeking sanctuary in a neighboring country stop initially in camps that spring up along the border. Almost immediately, however as Cuny (1991) notes, a portion of them will repatriate in the “refugee ricochet” process. This occurs when those swept up in the exodus abruptly return after determining the level of insecurity was not sufficient to warrant an evacuation, or that conditions in exile were not worth jeopardizing resources at home. Those who stay typically receive material assistance in the form of shelter, food, sanitation, water, medical care, and possibly education from UNHCR and partner NGOs. Under international law, moreover, UNHCR provides refugees with physical protection from outside aggression (UNHCR 1993b).
Despite the support from the international community, many experts acknowledge that refugee camp living is usually anything but healthy. Though physical needs are generally accommodated, the relatively languid environment of a camp usually offers little in the way of productive activities. Schools for children may or may not exist; when they do they are frequently inadequately supplied, especially initially. Nonetheless, the creation of an education system, many argue, offers productive occupation for both the teachers and children in the camp.
Other adults may search for work in the outlying areas. Those who are successful tend to be poorly paid, due to the size of the willing workforce. Some take up nefarious activities such as scams to pilfer relief supplies that may later be sold or bartered for services or other goods, refugee mafia circles, prostitution and drug rings, weapons trafficking, or intimidation of fellow refugees for material goods or services. In Afghanistan, this came to be known as the “Kalashnikov culture,” in which drug trafficking, arms trading, smuggling, and other illegal activities contributed to a climate of violence and a general breakdown in social and civil order (Sorenson 1992). Still others simply become lethargic and while away time in inactivity.
The conflict that provokes their migration generally unites refugees under a mutual animosity against their aggressors, presumably members of other identity groups. In the crowded, apprehension-laden setting of a refugee camp, such as those along the Zaire border between 1994 and 1996, leaders garner support and consolidate means to battle the establishment at home. Using inculcation and indoctrination, displaced political, quasi-military, civic, or religious authorities are known to influence their captive audience into believing—legitimately or not—that they have been wronged, that their cause is just, and that they must fight for their rights, including that of return (Stein and Cuny 1991).
The camps, with their abundance of disillusioned, ostracized, and isolated young men, offer ready recruitment sources for malcontents (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). In Sri Lanka, rebel recruiters were enormously successful, particularly as the prospects for employment dimmed and economic reality began to take hold (Cuny and Cuny 1992). Many studies reveal how refugee warriors, in clear violation of international law, subsequently use the border camps as a safe haven from which to conduct cross-border raids and attacks on political leaders and opposition identity groups, thus harming the area’s general stability. Clearly, the more refugees inspired by enmity who support the struggle, the greater advantage and leverage the leaders have against the reigning home establishment. The refugee leadership may use various forms of coercion, including threats, torture, and murder against those contemplating or attempting repatriation. The camps in Goma, Zaire, that held Rwandan refugees present a prime example. For many months, intimidation kept return at a near standstill, while bodies of those trying to, or suspected of, escape were found in and around the camps and rumors of rape and torture of the “disloyal” circulated the region (Kumar et al. 1996).
Access to, and accuracy of, information is another powerful influence over refugee action. Deliberate misinformation campaigns bias refugees’ understanding of the situation in their country of origin. Such crusades affect their perception of the state of politics, the attitude of opposition identity groups, security, available assistance, legal procedures, military conditions in various home regions, the number and type of people living in their home communities, and their physical circumstances. Moreover, in an enclosed environment like that of a refugee camp, rumors of all sorts inevitably circulate (Harris 1994).
Most refugees lack adequate and reliable alternative sources of information about conditions at home. Radio and personal emissaries are among the few means at hand, and these may be altogether insufficient or unavailable. In some cases UNHCR or an NGO may establish a mail system from the camps to home communities, allowing cross-border communication in the form of letters from friends and relatives at home. Fundamentally, however, the refugees’ isolation and distrust of information reduce their confidence in incoming news. (Some observers argue the opposite, that refugees are in fact privy to many indigenous news channels and reporting mechanisms, generally unavailable to the international community, yet surprisingly accurate. Unfortunately, little data has been collected to confirm the legitimacy and influence of such communication.)
The accuracy and availability of home community information is critical to the refugees’ decision to repatriate. Families may not decide to repatriate until a member or trustworthy friend has visited the home and deemed the situation safe enough for return. Other refugees learn of conditions through these exchanges, which may be official programs sponsored by an NGO or UNHCR, such as that carried out among Tajik refugees in Afghanistan.
Some refugees may take advantage of the situation and travel back and forth across the frontier many times, possibly receiving assistance in both countries, conducting business, and perhaps playing the role of political go-between. This was conspicuously the case in northwestern Rwanda in 1994–95, where many way stations designed to assist repatriating refugees on their way home were frequented by the same faces many times over the course of several months. These travelers provide people on both sides of the border with information on conditions and the social disposition of various groups. In Guinea, Liberian refugees floating between their homeland and exile kept a small but almost constant trickle of information flowing between the otherwise remote refugee pockets and relatives at home.
Internally Displaced Persons
The IDP situation is vastly different from and in many ways invariably worse than that of refugees. Because they have not fled the country, IDPs have no international protection. Instead, they remain the responsibility of their government, which may be the source of their flight. Away from home, they usually lack access to resources or immediate employment. They are consequently more vulnerable to persecution, starvation, and disease (Cuny 1991; Deng 1993).
Beyond considerations associated with the conflict itself, the actions of IDPs are dependent upon the economic, cultural, social, and geographic makeup of the country. These elements become important factors in deciding whether IDPs migrate in clusters or as individual families, seek out personal connections or stay together with their identity group, leave the area entirely for a separate geographic region or flee to a cultural stronghold and, therefore, to perceived security. Generally, however, those leaving en masse will stop where they feel some semblance of safety. Such locations may become camps similar to those of refugees, and IDPs may find themselves only slightly less subject to intimidation while they must still face problems of reduced self-esteem and dependency (Intertect 1993).
Unlike refugees, however, IDPs require significant self-sufficiency. Without a governing international agency to draw attention to their plight, IDPs are a lesser priority for foreign assistance. Even when aid is available through ICRC, UNHCR, or NGOs, logistical problems often tend to obstruct or severely hinder distribution of relief supplies. Field analysis shows that IDPs, extremely conscious of continuous security threats, are likely to camp in remote, well-hidden areas that may be particularly inferior in terms of access to water, sanitation, and firewood, putting their health at risk.
The difficulty in locating and accessing these areas can cause what aid is available to be delayed. Assistance is generally more forthcoming once the groups have been located and either moved or the site rendered more accessible and developed into an official IDP camp. In Sudan, poor communication networks, insufficient data, and huge influxes into resource-poor regions resulted in delayed deliverance of food and medical supplies, culminating in extremely high mortality rates (Hogan 1992).
If a ruling government exists, however, it may adamantly oppose international aid for IDPs, under the justification that unbidden assistance is a threat to its sovereignty. Indeed, under international law it is the responsibility of the government to care for its own citizens. International assistance, therefore, may be negatively perceived as an intrusion into domestic affairs. Since many IDPs relocate to the more economically sound government-held regions of the country, international agencies must work through government channels to obtain access to the displaced populations. In Kosovo, for example, Serb authorities denied NGOs access to IDPs in part as a means of controlling the population. Those migrating to rebel-held territory are not only often faced with an extremely weak economy but are even less likely to receive international aid, since, typically, fewer agencies operate inside these zones (Cuny 1991; de Waal 1993).
IDPs living in camps are generally more likely than refugees to maintain contact with their home community, either through personal visits, written communication, movements back and forth, radio or television, interaction with other community members, or possibly by telephone. They may, in fact, begin to rebuild houses, rehabilitate businesses, and continue to cultivate crops through regular visits home while maintaining their registration in the camp. One of Rwanda’s southwestern IDP camps, for example, was made up of a majority of people from within six kilometers of the camp. They openly continued to farm and repair their homes during the day, retreating to the safety of the camp at night. As a result of such movement, the fluctuation in IDP camp populations is often much greater than that of refugees. Moreover, as relief workers have noted, IDPs commonly have a better awareness of conditions at home and are likely to return sooner than refugees. Further reducing the likelihood of long-term entrenchment is the fact that conditions in IDP camps are usually inferior to those in refugee camps.
The circumstances surrounding internally displaced persons not living in camps are drastically different. These are usually families who have fled to friends and relatives in other, presumably safer, areas of the country. Living together in overcrowded conditions puts an extreme burden on the extended family. These IDPs, moreover, blend into the local community, making them virtually impossible to find, recognize, and verify. Assistance in these circumstances, therefore, is often unfeasible, except when it is addressed to the community as a whole. In Tajikistan many IDPs lived under these conditions. Some were reluctant to admit to being displaced for fear I would divulge their whereabouts to the authorities, while others hoped for assistance and therefore came forward. IDPs searching for employment to help in their own upkeep often meet with difficulty, given the generally poor economy and high unemployment. Frequently, they incur large debts to local residents, which serve to prevent them from returning home and make them vulnerable to manipulation by the surrounding community (Cuny 1990).
All else being equal, many IDPs, particularly young men, will choose to migrate to the capital city. Some may have considered such a move before the forced relocation, in the expectation of better opportunities for employment. The added residents contribute to the global pattern of urban growth. Once established in the city with at least some prospect for survival, the displaced may send for the rest of the family and generally do not return home. In Afghanistan, while regions of the countryside nearly emptied, the population of Kabul doubled during one period of the war (Sorenson 1992:280). Such urban migrants usually set up residence in shanty towns at the outskirts of the city. Although seriously marginalized initially, it is nearly impossible to distinguish the IDPs from other slum dwellers after six months (Intertect 1993). In this setting, they find relative anonymity and thus refuge from human rights attacks. The government, on the other hand, may become further aggravated with the IDPs for contributing to the country’s urban growth and slum problems.
In the Aftermath of Migration: Facing the Consequences
As is evidenced in the forced migrations of recent years, displacement can have significant consequences on the region, state, locale, and individual. It can threaten international peace, border stability, economic, political, and social reconstruction, the national and community healing process, and even familial relations. Although the trauma of displacement is not a phenomenon specific to identity conflicts, it does carry with it serious new concerns.
Regional
Large numbers of refugees can constitute a threat to international peace, both physically and legally (Loescher 1993; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). Border violence increases both with the targeted raids from refugee camps and with the export of the primary issues of the conflict into border host communities. Moreover, the weapons trade, drug dealing, and other nefarious activities associated with refugee camps disrupt normal economic conduct and draw members of the host society into antisocial behavior (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). In Zaire, the government itself reportedly helped facilitate million-dollar deals with arms dealers in Britain, China, and South Africa for Rwandan refugees, while its secret police provided private cargo planes for the weapons transfers (Reed 1997:5).
Integral to regional deterioration is the well-documented economic burden a refugee establishment places on the surrounding host community. Beyond the fact that the sudden influx of abundant cheap labor lowers pay scales and diminishes indigenous opportunity for employment, local resources (such as firewood) may be overused or entirely consumed. The standard of living of the surrounding population may be significantly lower than that of refugees receiving aid from the international community (Chambers 1993). Consequently, as we have seen in many countries, contention may arise between the host nation and the refugee population. Entrenchment becomes a more serious obstacle the longer the camps remain in place. Establishing school systems and permanent structures can add to this aura of permanence. Some observers argue that as long as all their basic needs are met, refugees have little incentive to return home where they have to provide for themselves and services may be inferior.
However, the future of long-term international support is becoming increasingly doubtful. For several reasons, the international community is beginning to question the viability and appropriateness of sustaining large populations of refugees for long periods of time. The debate is occurring at a time when many conflicts appear intractable and periods of asylum indefinite. The continued requirements for humanitarian assistance worldwide amounts to a significant financial burden—currently amounting to billions of dollars annually. The approximately two million refugees resulting from Rwanda’s 1994 civil war alone cost the international community a million dollars a day to support (Kumar et al. 1996:5). In addition, most donor countries are themselves experiencing greater domestic fiscal pressures and are consequently beginning to tighten their own belts.
Finally, and more controversially, some are beginning to question the moral obligation to assist all forced migrants regardless of circumstances. A border crossing does not presuppose innocence; in fact, it is increasingly used to hide legal responsibility and continue insurgent activities. For this reason, many in the international community believe refugee assistance may actually abet aggressive behavior. The Rwandan camps in Zaire are a recent example where sectors of the international community withdrew relief aid and others argued for only selective support (Jean 1995). The large numbers of people implicated in the Rwandan genocide who lived in these internationally managed camps, and the innumerable nefarious activities that took place there, flew in the face of international law and humanitarianism.
Therefore, fear of inadequate international assistance is beginning to cause regional trepidation about protracted refugee situations draining local resources. This may be contributing to the growing occurrence of refusal to grant asylum (Hathaway 1996; Ogata 1993). Some contend that selective closure of refugee camps would eliminate many of these problems, increase regional prosperity and security, and encourage repatriation. Two arguments, however, counter this notion. First and foremost, international protocol guarantees a safe haven and generally grants international assistance for as long as necessary. Depending on the circumstances, camp closure may be construed as a step toward forced repatriation and may therefore be in violation of international law. 8 Second, despite the reality of entrenchment and potential disincentive, there is little conclusive evidence to indicate that reduction or elimination in aid to refugees results in massive repatriation.
One question that arises, then, is whether massive voluntary repatriation is plausible. On the one hand, unwillingness to repatriate can become stronger the longer refugees remain in exile, in part due to reduced self-esteem, a hardened attitude toward the situation at home, lack of accurate information, deterioration of skills due to lack of use, assumed loss of property at home, and simple inertia. The refugee assistance system, therefore, may actually discourage repatriation, many contend. On the other hand, a “space” for repatriation may open up, particularly if the situation in the host country deteriorates or conditions in the homeland improve. Return IDP movement may indicate improvement in internal security or government outreach to the internally displaced populations. Refugee populations carefully watch for and consider these indicators of better conditions in their decision to repatriate. Significantly, most major repatriations have occurred in conjunction with a notable change in home country conditions (Norwegian Refugee Council 1992). Cambodia, for example, experienced substantial political change and national elections; Namibia went through a peace process that dramatically transformed internal affairs; Nicaragua’s elections transferred power to the opposition; Mozambique underwent a national reconciliation process of sorts; and Guatemala similarly signed peace accords.
Home Country
Mass migrations clearly affect the state of domestic affairs as well. Large numbers of internally uprooted people attest to the home government’s continued inability to solve its national problems. Paradoxically, conditions in the country of origin are unlikely to improve to any large extent as long as large numbers of refugees along the border pose a menace to national security and rehabilitation, and internal displacement drains resources and contributes to social instability.
The issue of security looms perhaps largest on the domestic screen. Border raids from refugee warriors, insidious activities inducing social disruption, and attacks on individual officials would give any government reason for apprehension. Similar activities may be planned and carried out by IDPs from within the confines of the country, as reportedly occurred in the IDP camps in southwestern Rwanda. Until the majority of both populations have returned home, therefore, comprehensive rebuilding of the economy, social structure, political system, and civil society may be constantly undermined by the threat of insurgency, conspiracy campaigns, guerrilla warfare, public inculcation, social infiltration, and economic sabotage. (Comprehensive repatriation, however, does not guarantee stability either, as is evident in Rwanda since the massive return of refugees in 1996.)
The absence of large sectors of the population can wreak havoc on the economy as well. The usual concomitant decline in domestic production further deteriorates an economy already taxed by excessive spending on military outlays. Even a government genuinely concerned with the welfare of its internally displaced persons may not have the means to provide support. At the same time, monetary assistance from international lending institutions and bilateral aid depend at times on general amnesty or substantial reconciliation with refugee opposition groups and the return of displaced populations. The U.S. government’s “Open City” program in Bosnia, for example, made aid contingent upon the return of displaced ethnic minorities. Genuine peacemaking efforts, however, may be long in coming and, as we have seen, superficial conciliatory actions to appease international donors are often short-lived.
The potentially grave political implications of forced migration are evident. Political pluralism, for instance, is a virtual impossibility without the physical presence of opposition members. Refugees, moreover, can intentionally undermine any movement toward free and fair elections through social intimidation, sabotage, or misinformation campaigns conducted from the safety of an external camp (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). Other issues under contention such as land rights, leadership positions, and legal accountability cannot be fully resolved while significant portions of the population remain displaced. In protracted displacement situations, one can imagine how these issues fester and become even more troublesome the longer populations remain absent. More profoundly, the process of national reconciliation cannot commence until adversaries begin to face each other. Before that time, each side presumably maintains a negative image of the other, which merely hardens over time and postpones a sense of justice and renewal until all sides come to terms with the events. (The process of overcoming these negative perceptions and intergroup healing is discussed further in chapter 6.)
Internal displacement alone presents a unique set of complex issues on virtually all aspects of national life. Foremost, perhaps, is the relationship between IDPs and their government. In conflicts involving government forces on one side, and the identity group(s) associated with the IDPs on another, officials may view those leaving their homes as subversives (Deng 1993). In the recent case of Zaire cum Democratic Republic of Congo, contention grew between the newly formed alliance of several ethnic groups that led the national rebellion and the tribes they displaced. Ensuing distrust, subtle manipulation, provocative malicious behavior and mistreatment, and outright aggression further undermine relationships. In Guatemala, for example, the army labeled those who had fled as guerrilla sympathizers and consequently threatened and abused displaced populations (Zinser 1991a).
Authorities may attempt to obstruct international relief activities for the displaced and resident populations. I have seen governments substantially undermine relief operations by denying visas, declaring certain organizations or individuals persona non grata, creating an inordinate amount of red tape, taxing incoming relief goods, confiscating equipment and supplies, arresting or otherwise hassling foreign relief workers, denying access to certain areas, or threatening international or local aid personnel with bodily harm. As Loescher points out in Beyond Charity, “In the 1990s, internal wars are fought not only by military means but by preventing international aid from reaching people living in conflict areas” (1993:77). This can ultimately affect not only IDPs but also besieged citizens and resident populations who are targeted by warring factions or simply become pawns in the geographic tug–of–war—precisely the case of Kosovo.
In addition, the government may develop aid programs for the internally displaced as a cover for pacification programs. Such tactics include removing the opposition’s support base by resettling IDPs back into government-held regions in housing developments or “peace villages,” forcing nonparticipants to join the government’s side, or attempting to control IDP populations through location of relief distributions (Cuny 1990). Ethiopia’s controversial “villagization” program appeared to numerous observers to be such a manipulative pacification scheme, forcing many citizens to seek refuge in northwestern Somalia (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989).
Eventually, lack of adequate relief assistance becomes a national problem, regardless of the government’s relationship to the displaced. Basic depletion of national reserves, destruction of the environment, and the increased looting that frequently results from the struggle for survival are generally associated with poor government control. Continued disorder and deteriorating humanitarian conditions, such as those observed in early 1996 in Liberia, undermine any semblance of progress toward a stable domestic situation.
Furthermore, protection of IDPs becomes a visible and highly charged issue on the international front. Donors, international monetary lenders, regional contingents, and refugees carefully watch for mistreatment of, or disregard for, IDPs as an indicator of government loyalties and intentions. Such conditions do not go entirely unnoticed. Watchdog and human rights organizations keep an observant eye on the lookout for signs of abuse, which reverberate throughout the world, sending negative messages about the home government or local authorities (Africa Rights 1994; Ahlström 1991; Cohen 1994; Deng 1993; Jean 1995; and Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). Reports of abuse of both refugees and citizens in eastern Zaire/Congo between 1995 and 1997, for example, received much publicity (Human Rights Watch Africa 1997; Physicians for Human Rights 1997).
Finally, significant IDP relocation to the cities can have immense implications for national development, the economy, and social issues. The fact that most such migration is into the poorer outskirts of the cities contributes to the growth of urban slums and deteriorates overall living standards (Intertect 1993). Since provision of assistance is difficult and rare, new residents may turn to antisocial activities such as petty theft, drug dealing, or prostitution to survive.
The flood of IDPs to cities often brings with it a host of social problems such as low employment, diminished regard for cultural values, illiteracy, antisocial behavior, and decrease in the number of agriculturists (Intertect 1993). Moreover, IDPs carry with them a microcosm of the conflict, thereby transporting the potential for further violence (Deng 1993). In sum, domestic problems reverberating from massive displacement both outside and within national boundaries are ominous and potentially paralyzing.
Community
At the community level, social cohesion is permanently scarred by the violence, and the absence of large portions of the membership serves as a continual reminder of the rift that divides the population. Not until a significant percentage of people has returned can real healing begin. Moreover, those who remained at home often do not appreciate the personal anguish endured by those who fled, while displaced populations falsely perceive themselves as uniquely traumatized by events, failing to recognize the suffering sustained by the resident population (Intertect 1993).
Many difficult issues confront the home community as a result of the displacement. Though these will be explored in greater detail in chapter 5, they merit some discussion here as they relate to the return process. The community faces ongoing battles over property rights, for example, when land taken over by others becomes subject to dispute among the membership. Another dispute develops when community members loot the homes of displaced persons. In Tajikistan, for instance, local residents took apart vacant houses for the valuable wood framing the doors and windows. This forced returnees to either attempt to recuperate the material or find other sources.
Individual status within the community also changes as new patterns of social interaction and responsibility emerge in the absence of traditional leaders. In addition, the dearth of adequate manual labor may cause farms and other enterprises to go untended. The community, therefore, lives in constant anticipation of the impending return of its displaced members. A significant return has the potential to change the solidifying status quo in welcome and unwelcome ways.
In areas housing IDPs, other issues emerge. The ad hoc, slow, and insufficient nature of relief aid compounded by the difficulty in locating the internally displaced often puts a tremendous burden on the local population to provide assistance. As a result, coveted community food reserves may be spent on the newcomers, and health and medical facilities may be overwhelmed with demand. In the isolated Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan, for example, the additional population taxed the normal resources, and difficult road and air access impeded resupply (Maynard 1994).
Extended families and women fostering unaccompanied children, in particular, face special difficulties securing food, clothing, care, and housing. In complex emergencies, the number of female heads of households often increases, putting further stress on them and, by extension, on the community to provide assistance. In Rwanda, between one third and one half of all women in the hardest-hit areas were widows. At the same time, an estimated 21 percent of all households fostered unaccompanied children (Kumar et al. 1996:61, 66).
The presence of internally displaced populations may also lead to an upsurge in localized violence. The population pressure generated from secondary displacement, for example, frequently leads to employment and resource competition, potentially contributing to intergroup animosity and resentment by the host population (Intertect 1993). Factions that recruit and use IDPs to their advantage, or systematically try to disparage them, may intentionally or accidentally target the entire local population. Given a lack of adequate security protection, the host community may be at continual risk. Moreover, in city slums and labor poles and conceivably in host rural communities, the mixing of various identity groups can create a microcosm of the original conflict, replicating all the factors that can lead to localized violence (Cuny 1991). Thus, both the absence and the presence of displaced populations can contribute to instability at the community level.
Individuals
Displacement has a lasting effect on those individuals forced to flee. Languid refugee or IDP camp environments, for example, tend to decrease the level of self-reliance and grow what refugee scholar Harto Hakovirta describes as “DP apathy”: the feelings of alienation and physical deprivation bred from dependence on free food and services common in camp settings (Hakovirta 1986:35). Livelihood skills and personal resources may also be casualties of displacement, and their loss may contribute to an overall sense of indifference. Moreover, the introduction, in some cases, and the rise, in others, of the antisocial behavior discussed above can change the dynamics of society. As a result of indolence on the one hand, and unprincipled conduct on the other, moral and personal ethics tend to decline, leading to reduced self-respect and resourcefulness. In Cambodia, for instance, boredom, indifference, and the lack of structured activities cultivated such practices as gambling, prostitution, illegal videos, and alcoholism, contributed to mental illness, and reduced refugees’ abilities to make decisions (Rogge 1992).
Findings from the ISSVR study, however, emphasized another side of the refugee experience of asylum. They found that, given the frequently long duration in relative isolation, their difficult predicament, and the lack of contending influences in their closed environment, refugees were inclined to coalesce into politically organized communities and often supported activists’ struggle for economic or social change. Those who disagreed with the political opinions and values expressed by leaders were more likely to separate from the rest and possibly repatriate (Larkin, Cuny, and Stein 1991).
The ISSVR study further observed that the experience of living in close quarters for extended periods of time with others tended to unify refugees’ needs. The case studies indicated that the adversity in the camps engendered a willingness to subordinate certain individual rights for the greater needs of the community. Interestingly, upon repatriation, the refugees held on to this attitude, continuing to view unity as necessary for survival (Cuny, Stein, and Reed 1992).
As we have seen, then, the experience of uprootedness can have a profound and enduring influence on personal perceptions and attitudes. These powerful repercussions on the displaced persons as well as their community, country, and region lead to the quest for solutions. Given conditions of prolonged displacement, moreover, the potential for continued conflict and destruction of an integrated society demands serious attention. Though the complexity of the situation obviates simple answers, especially important is the possibility of widespread return home. The next chapter explores this possibility and its alternatives, the difficulties in achieving it, and the repercussions when it does occur.
Endnotes
Note 1: The term flee is a misnomer in those instances where citizens are forcefully relocated by military or government authorities. Back.
Note 2: The term displaced populations here is used in the broad vernacular of all those removed from their homes, meaning both refugees and IDPs. Internally displaced persons specifically denotes those who have not left their country of origin. Back.
Note 3: The Organization of African Unity (OAU) offered what is considered the most significant and comprehensive regional treaty on refugees, in part by expanding the definition to include contingencies beyond the “well-founded fear of persecution.” According to the 1969 OAU Convention, the term for refugee also applies “to every person who [qualifies], owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality” (United Nations n.d.:9). Later, the Cartegena Declaration of 1984 on the treatment of Central American refugees echoed the OAU’s expanded definition. Back.
Note 4: For various reasons, however, not all qualifying refugees receive assistance. This in part explains the discrepancy in the figures of overall displacement, and those under the care of the UNHCR. Back.
Note 5: “Others of concern” are “those who are in a refugee-like situation, that is, those who are outside their country of origin, but who have not been formally recognized as refugees,” as well as other specific categories receiving assistance from UNHCR (UNHCR 1996:1). Back.
Note 6: This statement could be arguably qualified with an acknowledgment of the uncelebrated plight of resident war victims, who by all reckoning account for the greatest proportion of war-related indigence and suffering and who, by virtue of their ubiquitous and indistinct nature, receive little international recognition or assistance. The lack of identification and distinction creates a catch-22 situation in which little is done to ameliorate their plight for want of adequate understanding of their conditions and needs. Back.
Note 7: According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees annual compilation of statistics on displaced populations, at the end of 1997 there were 13.5 million refugees and 17 million internally displaced persons (USCR 1997). Exact figures for the number of displaced populations in the world today are, needless to say, impossible to obtain. This is in part a function of definition and in part faulty and less than diligent record-keeping by host and home governments, and by local and international agencies. It is also the result of intentional figure inflation for political purposes or to obtain increased assistance or funding; it may also reflect attempts to deny the existence of refugees in country. Back.
Note 8: The principle of non-refoulement, which states that forcible return or expulsion to a life-threatening situation is strictly forbidden, is stipulated in both article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and article 3 of the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Back.
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