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State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity
Kimberly A. Maynard
1999
1. The International Humanitarian Context
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The gist of the new internal conflicts is that the ethnic pieces put together by colonial glue and reinforced by the old world order are now pulling apart and reasserting their autonomy. Old identities, rendered dormant by the structures and values of the nation-state system, are reemerging and redefining the standards of political participation, distribution of goods and services, and government legitimacy. |
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— Francis M. Deng (1993:115) |
In July 1994 the world watched as hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled across the Zaire border in a human migration reminiscent of biblical times. On the other side of the globe, Serb, Croat, and Bosnian Muslims viciously battled for ethnic dominance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon thereafter, in yet another corner of the world, Chechens and Russians launched endless, gruesome attacks against each other. Such conflicts, though not unique in history, reached unprecedented proportions that year, causing immense humanitarian catastrophe.
My experience in these kinds of crises has led me to reevaluate the explanations for and possible responses to such events. Around the world, study of international relationships has illuminated patterns in the seemingly chaotic and ever-changing global scenario. An exploration of these relationships provides insight into the more specific context of humanitarian crises. This first chapter examines conditions as we emerge from the Cold War era of the past fifty years and how the accompanying changes in the nature of violent conflict have contributed to the growth of complex emergencies. It then looks at the character and implications of these crises and the ensuing international response, including the rights and methods of foreign involvement.
The Post–Cold War World
The breakup of the Soviet bloc and the end of communist rule has conceivably been the most significant political change in twentieth-century history. Not long ago, in the early 1980s, the Cold War checkerboard globe was clearly divided between black and red, and superpowers moved, took positions, and plotted strategies in proxy wars of ideology. Governments, opposition parties, and insurgent groups all knew where their allegiance lay, who would supply them with armaments and training, and to whom they could turn should they need assistance if turmoil erupted in their region. But by the mid-1980s the crisp colors and clear lines were fading, and by the end of the decade the game was no longer being played the same way.
The period following the Cold War not only saw the emergence of twenty new states (Rotfeld 1997:4), but has brought dramatic shifts in international relationships. Though the world has not yet begun to understand the implications of an end to dual superpower dominance, two trends appear to have particular impact.
Growing Global Connectivity
First, global interaction seems to be increasingly based on linkages across borders among all elements of society, not simply through official channels. Whole sections of the world have opened up to foreign goods, tourism, business, cultural and professional exchanges, and civic institutions. The dramatic impact of the crash in Asia’s financial systems on Western economies is a glaring example of our global connectivity. Communications technology and the growth of the information age further enhance globalization, as once-isolated societies gain access to greater international information through computers, satellite systems, and the media.
Though governments continue to engage in diplomacy, unofficial contacts are playing a greater part in influencing individual and national attitudes toward other countries. Foreign travel, for example, brings greater contact between peoples and cultures, joint ventures foster ongoing partnerships, professional organizations develop cross-national interests, and people-to-people exchanges offer close contact with other cultures. Most of us have been affected by the rise in independent television, as well as by international media such as CNN and the BBC, which brings events affecting the lives of people across the globe into the homes of ordinary citizens.
The arts, film, literature, and even fashion, now internationally intermingled, offer further insight into foreign cultures. Components of civil society–that is, those nonstate individuals and organizations that influence or have the potential to influence relations between government and citizens, such as human rights advocates, environmental or women’s groups, charities, the media, business associations, academic institutions, religious affiliations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or professional associations–have similar international counterparts. On the insidious side, drug cartels, mafia rings, terrorist groups, and religious extremists also find easier access abroad and have greater representation all over the world.
Increasing Decentralization
Second, a trend toward decentralization appears to be weakening the role of governments and distributing a portion of the power among a broader base. One can observe this trend from the grand view of the global scale all the way down to the local community level. The breakup of the communist bloc, for example, involved the transfer of power from several large central command structures to many smaller republics. Russia once served as the economic nucleus for all of the Soviet Union, collecting and distributing goods to and from the other regions. Now, each republic has established import and export agreements, and goods no longer pass freely across their borders.
In the United States, as another example, the federal government has given the states more fiscal and regulatory control over domains such as public assistance and speed limits. The world has watched the old, colonial-style, centrally governed commonwealths of Somalia and Sierra Leone meet their demise as local leaders assumed decision-making roles in a continuous struggle for greater control. In China, economic decentralization has given the growing middle class greater control over its own resources. In the larger, worldwide arena the nearly four-fifths of the global population in the third world has grown concerned about foreign domination. As a result, the heretofore less advantaged countries are demanding greater access to resources and power through such avenues as the North-South dialogue and stronger regional coalitions. In effect, this is decentralization on the largest scale.
As a result of these trends, the world seems to be shifting its allegiance from powerful central governments toward smaller individual entities. Trend forecaster John Naisbitt contends that, increasingly, “the world is about the individual, not the state” or even the corporation (1994:45). In this new phase, Naisbitt claims, the strongest power is fast becoming the smallest entity–more mobile, flexible, and innovative, and no longer dependent upon a mammoth support system. Consequently, coordination and networking among the entities have assumed some of the functions of monolithic governments, which at one time more stringently controlled communication and oversaw interactions among elements of civil society.
The trend toward individualization and public participation in political affairs is also causing tremendous turmoil. Logically, the presence of more numerous, smaller entities multiplies the problems of communication and potentially increases contention for power. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a prominent illustration of newly established states fighting for power as they struggle to understand and establish their self-identity.
Although the breakup of the communist bloc has recast the international power structure, the emerging global dynamics have other causes as well. The world has witnessed, for instance, a growing debate over the redefinition of sovereignty, upsurges in religious extremism, the globalization of economics, the proliferation of weapons technology and accessibility, and environmental devastation. In addition, general changes in the world’s population seem to influence many developments. Changing demographics, including huge population increases, are overwhelming the financial and administrative capacity of governments. Similarly, a redistribution of resources and power may encourage civilian populations to become politically, economically, and culturally empowered. Citizens appear less willing to grant categorical control to an omnipotent and distant leader as the era of absolute governmental authority wanes.
This small but significant transformation in the global power structure radically affects the way groups interact. Political scientist James Rosenau contends that “the more rapid the rate of social change, the greater the likelihood of intra-societal violence” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981:344). Indeed, these tumultuous times have escalated the intensity and altered the character of violence (chapter 2 explores this transformation in more detail). Its important role in the context of global affairs, however, deserves brief scrutiny here as a foundation for later discussion.
The New Face of Contemporary Conflict and Its Implications
Much of today’s armed violence is born of intense animosity among identity groups based on ethnicity, language, culture, race, religion, regional roots, or other fundamentally differentiating factors and hence can be labeled identity conflict. Extreme brutality, widespread citizen involvement, and societal implosion characterize such hostilities. Many of the transitional governments evolving out of communism have been overrun by social enmity among their highly diverse populations and subsequently embroiled in identity conflicts. Joseph Montville, a scholar in conflict studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, speaks for a number of his colleagues about the importance of identification with a larger group and the contribution of this identification to aggressive behavior (1995). The number of people affected is considerable, largely as a function of their indiscriminate nature. Although identity conflict has appeared in the past, its emergence in the 1990s as the prevalent form of violence has produced such notable trouble spots as Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Caucasus, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and Kosovo.
At the end of the Cold War, the world was shocked to discover the force of animosity among many of the world’s five to eight thousand ethnic groups, sparking pockets of internal armed violence around the globe. Although the world has experienced a decrease in the total number of major armed conflicts since 1990, the vast majority, unlike the previous era, have been of an internal nature. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 1989, the last year of the Cold War, there were thirty-six major conflicts&-;that is, those resulting in more than one thousand deaths–and of these, five were international (Stolenberg and Wallensteen 1997:17). A few years later, in 1993, there were thirty-two major armed conflicts, and all of them were internal (Wallensteen and Axell 1993:7). Then, in 1995 the number declined to thirty conflicts, all of which, again, were within states (SIPRI 1996:15). 1 Although the total continued to decrease in 1996 to twenty-seven conflicts, one–that between India and Pakistan over Kashmir–was international (SIPRI 1997:17).
Another change in the nature of conflict is the proportion of civilian casualties. Now nine out of ten deaths from armed violence are noncombatant victims of massacres, personal vendettas, indiscriminate attacks, or collateral killings in cross-fires. In World War I this figure was between 5 and 14 percent (Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues 1986:25; Ahlström 1991:8).
The abundance of weapons left over from the superpower legacy and the vast machinery of international small arms exports no doubt contribute to the easy access to firepower and the ensuing deaths. I believe, however, that a significant reason for the number of people affected by today’s identity conflicts lies in the grassroots nature of these conflicts, which defines virtually all humans and all areas as fair game. The players involved are both state and nonstate actors of all levels, types, and authority. The results include massive casualties and social disruption, which undermine even the basic means of survival, sending the country into a terminal tailspin. The outcome is a complex emergency.
Repercussions of Modern Conflict: The Complex Emergency
Complex emergencies are so termed because of the breadth of variables involved and their complicated pattern of interactions. With the emergence of identity conflicts at the turn of the decade, the world witnessed a significant rise in this kind of disaster. The period between 1978 and 1985 saw an average of five complex emergencies 2 per year; in 1995 there were twenty-three. At that point, however, the number began to decline, and in 1996 there were twenty complex emergencies (U.S. Mission 1995:1; U.S. Mission 1997:5). The hardest-hit area has been sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the regions bordering Russia (Rotfeld 1997:9). Most of these disasters are the result of identity conflicts. By virtue of their convoluted nature and extensive damage, complex emergencies also seem to have long recovery periods. The number of these emergencies and their duration has a significant impact on national, regional, and international resources.
A direct consequence of complex emergencies is the need for humanitarian relief. As both the intensity and number of emergencies began to decline in the mid-1990s (Sollenberg and Wallensteen 1997:19), so too did the number of “people at risk,” that is, those who require emergency aid to avoid malnutrition and death. That figure worldwide declined 13 percent, from approximately 41.5 million in 1996 to around 36.2 million in early 1997, according to the United States Mission to the United Nations’ 1997 compilation of statistics. Nevertheless, that figure is still three times the number of people in need of similar aid in the early 1980s (1997:5). In 1995 the sub-Saharan region of Africa alone had over 24 million citizens requiring humanitarian assistance (U.S. Mission 1995:4). While this number decreased in 1997 to between 16.9 and 17.9 million, the region still represents almost half those in need worldwide (U.S. Mission 1997:8).
Another fallout from complex emergencies is economic devastation. During the course of a crisis, national financial resources are usually depleted through expanded military expenditures, looting, corruption, and, in some cases, humanitarian assistance to citizens. Complex emergencies also undermine domestic economic production by destroying livelihoods, discouraging investment, disrupting trade and commerce, and hindering capital formation. Ultimately, this process ruins individual and national economic solvency and undermines the country’s ability to sustain itself.
From the global perspective, a serious consequence of complex emergencies is the regional instability they generate. This is caused by large numbers of refugees 3 fleeing to neighboring countries to escape violence; an upsurge in regional arms trade to support the conflict; increased drug trafficking; the rise of antisocial networks as means of collecting revenue; and the export of violence to neighboring nations. It is important to note the particular destabilizing influence of refugees upon the region. Though similar in many ways to past migrations, population movements emanating from identity conflicts tend to generate greater resistance to those seeking asylum, to result in protracted stays in exile as well as increased violence and social disruption, and, therefore, to cause larger problems for regional and home country governments. Furthermore, the number of refugees has escalated substantially since the 1970s. Although their numbers have begun to decline most recently, there are still anywhere from 13 to 15 million refugees and between 10 and 24 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and “others of concern” 4 in the world today (UNHCR 1996:11; USCR 1996:4–6). This compares to twenty years ago in the 1970s, when there were about 2.5 million refugees and IDPs were not even a consideration (UNHCR 1993b; U.S. Mission 1995:3).
The intense animosity inherent in identity conflicts accompanies refugees across borders and creates a more volatile asylum scene. Refugee camps have been used as home bases for pursuing personal vendettas through cross-border raids from the safety of an internationally sanctioned asylum. In addition, camps often constitute a haven for criminal activities that breed trouble and normalize antisocial behavior. Floods of refugees, moreover, often financially and politically destabilize countries of first asylum. Despite international aid to refugee camps, the large number of people using local resources and seeking employment inevitably disrupt the economies of host countries and communities (Chambers 1993). This disruption can increase tension between regional and local populations. By 1998, for example, Guinea Conakry’s years of hosting Liberian and Sierra Leonine refugees has arguably taken its toll on the country’s economic and political stability. International resources, moreover, are dwindling, and the likelihood is remote that the seemingly inexhaustible coffer will remain as generous. Thus, today’s protracted refugee situations may become increasingly precarious.
Complex emergencies stemming from identity conflicts caught the world off guard. In a state-centered system designed for national defense, the kind of internal implosion caused by identity conflicts goes beyond past experience, even in humanitarian circles. Since the old allegiances are no longer valid, and new ones are still forming, it is difficult for us in the donor community to determine which groups deserve support. Moved to take action, we sometimes make decisions based on such insubstantial or incongruous grounds as old colonial ties, control of natural resources, or media appeal. The international response to complex emergencies has frequently been ad hoc, using short-term relief aid to address long-term political crises. Sadly, such largely inappropriate responses are draining the diminishing pot of global resources for international assistance. The lack of a comprehensive analysis and global plan of action creates a surge reaction to fight spot fires, rather than a concerted and coordinated approach to addressing the larger conflagration.
Humanitarian Intercession: A Comprehensive Concept
The international community still appears to be at odds over the definition and parameters of humanitarian response. The conventional term, humanitarian intervention, for example, despite its benevolent connotations, has been tainted by such cases as Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 to protect Japanese settlers, Hitler’s takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1938 to protect ethnic Germans from mistreatment, and the United States aid to the Contras during the 1980s to provide tents, communications equipment, and boots, all under the name of humanitarianism (Minear and Weiss 1993b:9, 24).
In UN matters and international law, humanitarian intervention usually has a narrow meaning, referring to foreign involvement in a country to improve poor humanitarian conditions, that is, suffering, malnourishment, homelessness, injuries, or sickness. Such involvement generally appears to be a reaction to the demise in human rights or physical circumstances. Kimberly Stanton of the MacArthur Foundation states that previously “in international law, humanitarian intervention has meant the use of force to end genocide or other massive atrocities. As the practice of intervention has evolved during the twentieth century, the phrase also has come to mean the provision of assistance to threatened populations, especially victims of war. Intervention in this sense is designed not to get at the root causes of a crisis but to relieve the worst of its effects” (Stanton 1993:14).
More specifically, international involvement is conventionally divided into forcible and nonforcible actions. (As is evident in Stanton’s statement, further ambiguity rests in what characterizes each, and more importantly, which constitutes humanitarian intervention.) Although there is an abundance of recent analysis on the issue by international relations and legal specialists, there is little agreement on specifics. The word intervention itself implies invasive interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign state against its will. Many activities along the spectrum of humanitarian action, however, may be welcomed. For that reason, I believe that “intervention” is essentially an inaccurate usage when referring to the broad context. Furthermore, although the term humanitarian intervention entails activities along a broad spectrum, it has come to be viewed as specifically relating to the deployment of armed forces, such as in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The term humanitarian intercession might better denote the range of possible activities when foreign entities attempt to stop human rights abuses or correct conditions that contribute to human suffering. 5 I will use “humanitarian intercession” to signify all actions from outside that have the potential to halt the escalation of conflict in a growing complex emergency. This includes, but is not limited to, diplomacy, conflict resolution, human rights promotion, humanitarian assistance, deployment of armed forces, and not least, utilization of the media. I use “intervention” only to refer to specific invasive actions that run contrary to the will of the government, or within the context of specific international law that still uses this terminology. “Military intervention,” in this context, means the invasive use of foreign armed forces for humanitarian purposes under Chapter VII of the UN Charter but against the will of the government involved.
International legal experts continue to debate whether humanitarian intercession necessarily involves forcible actions. Stanton (1993), for example, maintains that intercession is coercive, and that the coercive aspect is in fact central to the notion. Nancy Arnison (1993), law professor of international human rights, on the other hand, holds intercession could entail both forcible and nonforcible actions. According to Arnison, nonforcible actions include diplomacy, UN resolutions, or cross-border food delivery. They may further include bilateral or UN-sponsored high-level peace negotiations, special rapporteurs, observer missions, or conventional peacekeeping forces. Forcible action, on the other hand, may involve use of foreign military units, sanctions, medium- and lower-level conflict resolution teams, unbidden relief assistance, or human rights commissions (Arnison 1993; Stanton 1993).
These categories are themselves controversial. UN resolutions, for example, may be considered both forcible and nonforcible actions. Their collective origin implies a collaborative effort, although certain resolutions specifically outline coercive actions against the state in question. In addition, nonforcible mechanisms, such as observer missions, can recommend or instigate forcible action such as military or legal interference to prevent or suppress acts of genocide (Genocide Convention Article 8). In a stateless society, moreover, factions controlling a portion of the country may welcome and invite peacekeeping forces, while those in another section adamantly oppose such foreign involvement.
Although these ambiguities have been the object of much academic discourse in recent years, the obscurities have only deepened. A legalistic definition of humanitarian response appears far too confining, and, as Stanton notes, its application does not necessarily address either the root matters involved, related human rights issues, or even the full extent of humanitarian assistance. In fact, not only have the conditions outgrown the terminology, but humanitarianism itself has expanded beyond its conventional form. On the basis of these arguments and my own observations, I suggest that humanitarian intercession is no longer only the process of saving lives and reducing suffering. Indeed, in identity conflicts and complex emergencies, it may also be an integrated response to the entire range of factors causing physical and nonphysical human pain.
My experience, furthermore, shows that affecting the physical condition of human beings does not necessarily ameliorate their situation nor does it eliminate the potential to inflict greater pain. Rather, such amelioration is something akin to the Band-Aid approach on a much larger wound. Some of the greatest suffering I have witnessed results from separation from one’s family, the destruction of community solidarity, an inability to create an adequate livelihood, continual fear of abuse, deep resentment against former friends, physical torture, personal remorse and guilt, the death of one’s spouse, or homelessness.
The operational persistence of the old model of relief has created a fundamental gap between conventional methods of humanitarian assistance and the realities of modern disasters. The crises are being played out in the complex interdependence of today’s international relationships, described by Harold Saunders, director of International Affairs at the Kettering Foundation, as “whole bodies politic.” “Whole bodies politic” refers to the notion that international environments are shaped by the continuous interaction of relationships on the full range of human experience and on many levels of society across permeable borders (Saunders 1990, 1993a). Therefore, not only do all sectors and echelons of society affect a crisis, but ameliorating the situation over the course of its development also requires the full range of influences. I suggest that to confine by definition the options, levels, or players involved is to limit the range of potential solutions. Rather, a complex emergency inherently requires an equally diverse and multilevel reaction. A larger conceptual framework seems necessary to address the full spectrum of humanitarian issues inherent in today’s disasters.
Such a structure for humanitarian intercession should include an expanded time frame from pre- to postcrisis phases, should embrace the complete range of interconnecting problems, and should consider the entire array of mechanisms available to address the issues. This coincides with former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (1992a), in which he suggested a more comprehensive approach to international peace and security, outlining a continuum of steps from preventive diplomacy, to peacemaking, to peacekeeping, to peacebuilding.
Consider the following five-phase response to a developing complex emergency. The first step might include preventive and continual education and training as well as concerted intergroup dialogue, forums for discussion of contentious issues, and continued support of civil society. Second, early-warning mechanisms could be expanded to include international, interagency, intragovernmental information-sharing from all sources of whole bodies politic, including NGOs, government agencies, corporations, media, UN organizations, religious institutions, travel exchanges, scholars, observer missions, international associations, educational institutions, and businesses. Today’s extensive communication networks could enhance this potential. Critical is a proactive and well-defined approach to data collection, followed by organization and dissemination of the information. (While early knowledge of a looming crisis can be improved, such knowledge does not necessarily inhibit the evolution of the emergency. More useful in this regard, perhaps, is the fact that better information-gathering mechanisms can contribute to the overall understanding of the emergency’s context.)
A third phase in the conceptual framework would entail early reaction. For this phase, the tools in the proverbial toolbox may need to be augmented to include such options as targeted training, elicitive conflict mitigation, diplomatic intercession, human rights alerts, economic incentives, mediation, development of specific elements of civil society, peacekeeping missions, and constructive media campaigns. I believe, however, that international intercession should not be the only option available at this stage. A potentially viable response might very well be to do nothing. This option should be selected after careful scrutiny of the situation and comprehensive understanding of the potential repercussions have produced the conviction that to do nothing is the most beneficial choice for the populations involved in the long run.
The fourth phase employs a wide spectrum of resources in the response to an existing complex emergency. These could include human rights monitoring, humanitarian assistance, sanctions, regional political and humanitarian support, refugee aid, diplomatic pressure, conflict mediation, arms embargoes, foreign military intervention, zones of tranquillity, and other measures to alleviate the hardship and halt the violence. The fifth and final phase addresses the postcrisis situation, employing such tactics as encouraging refugees and IDPs to return, reintegration of displaced populations, (re)building civil society, war crimes tribunals, sustained dialogue, peace education, building plurality in government, conciliatory media programs, infrastructure reconstruction, collaborative community development, psychological assistance, economic development, truth commissions, and (re)constructing a civilian police force and fair legal system.
Many of these activities in all five phases occur independently. However, contributing to a sustainable peace, not merely alleviating the pain of violence, requires a broader conceptual framework, which must be reflected in the operational strategy. In the past, international responses have rested chiefly in the fourth phase. In this larger conceptual framework, phases one through three and five form an expanded focus. The broader picture allows international players to see the signs of developing complex emergencies and the broader operational framework allows us to respond more effectively at each stage.
Such a view creates a link between social health and sustainable stability, placing an emphasis on healing the damaged relationships between individuals and groups. This latter phase, then, requires long-term and comprehensive strategies for economic development, rebuilding violence-torn communities, strengthening community cohesion, and developing civil society, all of which are interrelated. (Chapter 7 explores some of these prospects in more detail.) In sum, of top importance in humanitarian intercession (no matter its avowed benevolent intentions) is the appropriateness of the aid and legitimacy of the action inside the sovereign host nation.
The Right of International Humanitarian Intercession
Until recently, the “sovereignty” of a nation, a term originating in the sixteenth century, was considered to be virtually absolute. Over the centuries the international system has vehemently upheld the right of a government to control the activities and resources within its borders (Roberts 1993). Strict sovereignty, however, appears to be gradually succumbing to the infiltration of high technology and the pressure of massive populations. Under present conditions of expansive transportation, international communication, and global economics, state boundaries no longer seem sacrosanct, and government dominion no longer absolute. It is against this backdrop that humanitarian intercession is apparently becoming more plausible and ultimately more acceptable.
Nevertheless, as a pillar of international law, state sovereignty still poses a formidable obstacle to humanitarian intercession, particularly when the latter involves military units. The United Nations Charter, for one, explicitly prohibits intervention in a country’s internal affairs except when there is a threat to international peace and security. The “threat to peace” provision under UN Charter Article 2 (VII) reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
In fact, nearly every international instrument developed over the past century–a period in which the number of states subject to international law has tripled (Rotfeld 1997:4)–is rooted in the notion of strict domestic jurisdiction. The majority of international laws were founded during the bipolar period when conflicts were primarily between states. In today’s struggles, however, the source of violence more often lies within a single country, diminishing the relevance of many previous legal precepts. Consequently, the application of international law to current conditions is under intense scrutiny in diplomatic circles, particularly vis-à-vis humanitarian intercession.
As a result, in the post–Cold War era, the notion of inviolability appears to be gradually waning in favor of international efforts to intercede in deteriorating human rights and humanitarian conditions (Arnison 1993). As complex interdependence displaces state-centric politics, one can observe the multivariate aspects of whole bodies politic, including the various levels, categories, and modes of interaction beginning to emerge in the form of humanitarian actions.
Since 1991, the United Nations has selectively intervened in multiple cases of mass suffering, regardless of the home government’s approval or lack thereof. These actions launched a new phase of debate over sovereignty and the right of collective intercession, provoked by each new UN resolution. The first move was made on April 5, 1991, when the Security Council passed Resolution 688, prevailing over Iraq’s affirmation of sovereignty and demanding that it allow humanitarian access to its population. The proclamation specifies that, “as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region, [Iraq must] immediately end this repression.” The proclamation thus draws a link between human rights violations and ensuing massive displacement, and threats to international peace. This established a precedent for future interventions under Chapter VII’s “threat to peace” provision of the UN Charter.
Later that year, on December 17, 1991, the General Assembly further eroded the dominion of sovereignty in humanitarian crises with the passage of a resolution that strengthens the ability of the UN to respond to humanitarian emergencies when a government denies access (Arnison 1993:39). According to Arnison, this action changed the prerequisite for humanitarian intercession from a request by the affected country to “the consent of the affected country,” falling just short of recognizing a collective right to intercede for humanitarian purposes (1993:39).
It was not until 1992 that foreign military force was formally linked to humanitarian intercession, and then only by inference. The Security Council passed Resolution 770, which called on states to facilitate the relief effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina by “all necessary measures,” a phrase taken to include military force (Arnison 1993:39). The right of military intervention was further expanded with the UN operation in Somalia at the end of 1992. In this case, which included six UN resolutions, the use of foreign military forces rested on the (albeit contentious) international legal premise that an international military presence in a collapsed state could help restore order, thus justifying the intervention on the “threat to peace” basis (Roberts 1993:440). Security Council Resolution 794 authorizing Operation Restore Hope this time explicitly sanctioned massive military intervention without government invitation.
The UN justified these military interventions on the grounds that internal conflict constitutes a threat to the peace for two fundamental reasons. First, the destabilizing influence of large refugee flows and potential subsequent cross-border raids and arms trade arguably compromises security in the region. Second, massive human rights abuses can jeopardize political stability. Whereas previously, individuals were considered objects of state action, more recently the internationalization of human rights recognizes the extensive rights of the individual under international law, including some procedural capacity to act (Pease and Forsythe 1993). In this respect, the rights of the individual have gained over the rights of the state. In 1998 the strength of these arguments drove the debate over international military intervention in Kosovo.
In addition, humanitarian relief efforts themselves have contributed to the erosion of state sovereignty by prevailing over governments attempting to block relief operations. Aid agencies all over the world have brokered humanitarian ceasefires, established corridors of tranquillity, and implemented no-fire zones for the safe passage of relief supplies to affected populations. Despite such successes, it is my experience that the safety of supplies and personnel is far from guaranteed in many complex emergencies, and this fact continues to play a major part in the sovereignty debate.
As Arnison explains, however, the controversy over intercession in the diplomatic arena goes further than the debate over sovereignty in several respects. First, some, mostly Southern countries, argue that the absence of agreed-upon guidelines for intercession permits stronger nations to arbitrarily meddle in the affairs of other states, particularly former colonies, under the pretext of humanitarianism. Second, since international intercessions have (thus far) been conducted under the umbrella of the United Nations, sanctioned by the Security Council, they strengthen the control and interest of those countries with a seat on the Council (which also supply a good portion of the funding for such ventures). Third, many developing countries with limited representation in the UN do not want to rely on Security Council votes for intercession. Fourth, in collective responses, foreign governments can hide under the cloak of the UN as an excuse for not taking earlier action, clearly an issue for several years in the case of Bosnia. Fifth, such action may mask an unwillingness of states to grant asylum to victims. Sixth, humanitarian intercession may hold people in place who need asylum from the threat of persecution. And finally, the presence of foreign entities can either suppress or exacerbate persecution of individuals or targeted groups (Arnison 1993).
Clearly, the question over the appropriateness of intercession, whether collectively under the auspices of the UN, or independently in the name of an NGO, is far from decided. “Many argue justifiably, that refusing to act with imperfect means in an imperfect world is an inappropriate nicety representing an attempt to achieve moral purity at the expense of other’s suffering,” claims Mary Anderson of the Collaborative for Development Action and its Local Capacities for Peace Project (Anderson 1994:16). Some appeal for new international laws to override the sovereignty argument in favor of intercession in cases of massive human suffering. Others claim new interpretations of current international law could allow the “threat to international peace” justification to include widespread internal displacement, even if the threat is not yet apparent (Arnison 1993). Still others, such as Eftihia Voutira and Shaun Brown, in “A Cautionary Tale: A Review of Some Non-governmental Practices in Conflict Resolution” (1995), contend that the greatest public good should be the deciding factor and that outsiders have no right to determine what constitutes the collective good within a country.
Ultimately, however, advocates of strict sovereignty are in a losing battle as the complex interdependence of global interaction becomes less confinable and whole bodies politics weaves its way into virtually all aspects of society, including humanitarian intercession. I believe that the task remains to evolve a full range of tools within an integrated strategy with which to address complex emergencies at every stage of development. Only with a wide variety of options, including that of noninvolvement, can the complete spectrum of issues have the possibility of being appropriately considered and addressed.
Tools for Humanitarian Intercession
Those of us involved in contemporary complex emergencies face an enormous challenge: to assess, plan, and respond to a multitude of rapidly changing conditions. Moreover, the means at our disposal do not necessarily address the needs of today’s situations. In response, as practitioners, researchers, and policymakers, we are attempting to keep pace with the new requirements by adapting conventional tools and developing new options. The bulk of the efforts, however, remain within the standard arenas of diplomacy, conflict resolution, human rights, humanitarian relief, and armed intervention; only modest attempts at innovation have sought to exercise other components of whole bodies politic.
Those working in the field admit that the range of options available may be further restricted or otherwise altered by mandates, finances, experience, available personnel, or the time frame of particular institutions. This includes the United Nations and its individual agencies, independent representatives and member states, national governments, inter- and nongovernmental organizations, “experts” (both academic and practitioners), and “transnational” organizations such as the Red Cross family.
The following is a brief review of some of the mechanisms to provide a basis for assessing the potential for humanitarian intercession to affect complex emergencies.
Diplomacy
The diplomatic arena offers individual or combined efforts aimed at resolving differences. The United Nations alone has a number of avenues of intercession using its “good offices.” For example, Chapter VI of the UN Charter outlines diplomatic and nonforcible measures for the settlement of disputes. Under a Chapter VI deployment, the rules of engagement for peacekeeping forces restrict the use of force solely to self-defense. The Rwanda peacekeeping intercession, for instance, was initially under Chapter VI. In contrast, Chapter VII allows “whatever means necessary” when there is a threat to the peace. This implies overt use of force and offensive action to carry out humanitarian operations, such as was used in Somalia. In today’s conflicts, however, the 1945 rulings often fail to address the complexity of contemporary conditions. Consequently, the Security Council in recent years has expanded the rules of engagement occasionally to include protection of humanitarian convoys or relief workers, under what is commonly called “Chapter VI and a half.”
Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace (1992a) defined specific tactics for addressing global conflicts, beginning with the concept of preventive diplomacy. The Secretary-General can send fact-finding missions for the purpose of collecting information and may designate a Special Envoy as an emissary to the country. A stronger option is to establish a Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG). Unlike the Special Envoy, the SRSG resides in country and becomes the primary official link between the country’s authorities and the United Nations.
Either delegate can request contact with leaders and government authorities in an attempt to resolve the dispute and promote peace. They can further request diplomatic initiatives by regional organizations and member states. Furthermore, if conditions warrant, the SRSG or the Special Envoy can recommend that the Secretary-General advocate to the Security Council severing diplomatic relations with the country involved (Chapter VII, Article 41). The SRSG has the benefit of long-term interaction and has access to a whole spectrum of individuals and organizations including peacekeeping forces, humanitarian assistance, resident ambassadors, and conflict resolution teams. SRSGs are common in areas of ongoing or increasing tension such as Burundi, Somalia, and Bosnia.
A second UN diplomatic intercession mechanism is through the Security Council. The Security Council, for example, can pass resolutions requiring regional organizations to assist in the termination of a member’s domestic conflict, or recommend terms of settlement (Chapter VI, Article 33). More powerful resolutions under Chapter VII can impose sanctions (Article 41) or, as has been the case several times since 1991, it can impose foreign military forces. As a membership organization, the UN, however, generally works with the recognized government of the country. The UN has the access and mandate to persuade high-level authorities to desist from aggressive actions and take steps leading toward peace. For precisely the same reason, its conduct is limited, since it may not have regular contact with opposition leaders.
Bilateral diplomatic missions may also try to bring about a peaceful resolution to the fighting. Usually conducted by Western donor governments, these missions are made up of high-level negotiators, country specialists, and even psychologists, whose aim is to develop a mutually acceptable settlement on the most visibly contentious issues. Prominent examples are the various Middle East peace accords and the 1998 efforts by U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to broker an agreement in Kosovo.
Similarly, regional organizations may send diplomatic missions or representatives to mediate peace settlements. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), for example, has recently begun to develop its own conflict resolution capacity. Finally, individuals and independent organizations may attempt diplomatic measures to help settle contentious issues. Former President Carter and the Carter Center are notable examples of this type of diplomacy.
Not quite as visible perhaps are the efforts of academic institutions and private foundations that often intervene at the leadership level via conferences and meetings with representatives of the disputing sides. As noted, the diplomatic efforts of various entities may be combined to bring about a joint settlement. The SRSG potentially has contact with many sources of political and international pressure that may be brought to bear in tandem. Regional organizations may work closely with the UN or private negotiators, such as occurred in the first Bosnian peace mission, which was conducted jointly by the UN and the European Community.
Nevertheless, the level at which it takes place and the fact that its objective is to come to a settlement, not to resolve the root problems, limits diplomacy. Conflicts based on long-held, broad-based animosities are not easily resolved by top-level, diplomatic negotiations, which generally ignore the source of the conflict and, often, public sentiment. Hizkias Assefa, director of the Nairobi Peace Initiative, explains that the level of mutual participation in search of a solution correlates directly with the effectiveness and sustainability of the agreement. The less depth sought in addressing the root cause of the conflict, the lower the effectiveness and the shorter the life span of the agreement (Assefa 1993).
Conflict Management
A second instrument in today’s intercession toolbox, and one that overlaps with diplomatic efforts, is conflict management. Used here in the broad sense to include resolution, transformation, and mitigation, conflict management can be largely distinguished by the level at which it is directed–whether upper, middle, or grassroots. 6 (A range of activities is possible at each level and will be discussed in chapter 7.) High-level efforts include diplomatic attempts to reach a settlement. Additionally, NGOs or transnational organizations may be involved in larger peace negotiations, such as engagement by the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches in brokering the Addis Ababa Accords of 1972, which ended Sudan’s seventeen-year civil war (Minear and Weiss 1993a:60).
Middle-level conflict management involves civic and religious leaders, professionals, intellectuals, mid-range officials, and intermediate-level leadership of opposition groups. Conflict management specialists, including NGOs, foundations, and professional groups, are usually the principal actors at this level. Activities include training in conflict resolution skills or short meetings between the contending sides. A few notable exceptions offer hands-on, long-term interaction aimed at abating fundamental animosities. The grassroots level essentially addresses public opinion and occasionally ordinary citizens. The few international players involved at this level generally focus on conflict management skills training and improving cross-identity exposure and information flow.
Human Rights
Advancing human rights principles is yet a third avenue through which the international community can intercede under the humanitarian cloak. The assemblage of international and UN conventions and resolutions have set the standards for the treatment of human beings. The Geneva Conventions specifically apply to wartime protection and are the mandate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC conducts prison visits, provides humanitarian assistance, oversees prisoner exchanges, exercises a protection role for internally displaced persons, and generally attempts to ensure that international law is being followed by all sides (UNHCR 1993a). For their part, NGOs deploy fact-finding missions all over the world to ascertain the human rights status of countries. They publicize their findings worldwide, warn of serious violations, and confront perceived offenders with their allegations.
The UN itself has various human rights mechanisms with which to intervene in a state’s conduct, including special rapporteurs, monitoring committees, working groups, the 1503 confidential procedure system, and human rights monitoring missions such as those conducted in Guatemala, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti. In March 1994 the Secretary-General designated a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), which in turn deployed human rights field officers to Rwanda as a first mission of its kind. Though the deployment was initially fraught with problems, the establishment of UNHCHR and its first operational effort are indications of the new priorities of the post–Cold War era and the change in attitude toward intercession and human rights compliance.
Here again, the issue of sovereignty comes to play, as illustrated when the Democratic Republic of Congo successfully refused to allow a human rights team to investigate allegations of gross abuse in mid-1997. Human rights protection instruments function definitively better for refugees and commonly disintegrate upon repatriation. They are generally weaker for victims of noninternational–that is, internal–armed conflict and are basically nonexistent for individual targets of human rights abuse (Stafford 1993). However, as the color of state sovereignty grows more muted, individual human rights have gained some leverage over domestic jurisdiction. Concurrently, international organizations are increasingly perceived as having the responsibility to protect these rights.
Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian assistance offers a fourth tool in intercession. The institutional pillars of the relief system are UN agencies, NGOs, donor relief agencies, the ICRC, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. UN agencies such as the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), and the new Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), again, generally work through host governments (the United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF; formerly the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund] is a possible exception). UNHCR assists conventional refugees, although it is increasingly also caring for several other types of forced migrants. In addition to physical assistance, UNHCR provides security protection for refugees, aids in voluntary repatriation, and negotiates safe passage for returnees. UNICEF typically assists in the areas of childhood immunizations, health facilities, sanitation, and supplementary feeding programs, among others, under its mandate of caring for children, while the WFP provides food aid and logistics. OCHA is a new organization, replacing the Department of Humanita-rian Affairs (DHA) under the UN reform measures instigated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Its mandate is to coordinate among all entities working in an emergency, as well as to collect and disseminate information and provide general oversight in the development of response mechanisms.
Besides these standard UN relief agencies, other UN organizations are increasingly engaging in emergency operations. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for example, maintains a resident representative in most developing countries, who may be appointed Resident Coordinator responsible for the UN response in the early stages of a disaster, before a Humanitarian Coordinator is appointed. UNDP further interfaces with relief operations in the throes of a disaster through its own emergency response branch. Moreover, in recognizing the serious disruption in development that disasters cause, UNDP promotes crisis mitigation and prevention strategies through its development programs. Despite the prophylactic efforts, 40 percent of UNDP’s budget currently is spent on emergencies. 7
Nongovernmental organizations make up the largest number of players in a complex emergency, and their proportion is continuing to grow. They offer a range of expertise and a variety of policies and orientations. Each has its own mandate in terms of specific tasks, parameters, and methodologies. For example, some might work in the emergency phase only and are quick to respond, while others may arrive on the scene later and continue through the reconstruction period. Some NGOs require the close participation of government structures, while others operate virtually independent of any local authority. Religious denomination is the foundation and support of many NGOs. Several have their own funding sources, others rely on UN or donor country support, while still others refuse government financing altogether. NGOs often specialize in target populations such as refugees or children, particular world regions, or specific sectors such as water and sanitation, medical assistance, or food delivery.
NGOs often appear uninvited into a country during these emergencies. At times, there may be no legitimate government to authorize relief aid and specify types and providers of assistance. Other times, however, NGOs may circumvent or neglect interaction with authorities about needs, locations, and procedures, and simply arrive on the scene with good intentions. In my view, this constitutes a breach of professionalism and is one of the more serious issues the NGO community faces.
Nevertheless, the past decade has seen substantial progress in the field of humanitarian aid as a whole. The level of individual and organizational professionalism has risen significantly, leading to dramatic improvements in the conduct of relief operations. In addition, relief agencies are replacing or augmenting conventional methods of response with new techniques specific to complex emergencies, which present a host of concerns and considerations unknown in natural disasters. (Chapter 2 will delve more deeply into these issues.)
Military Forces
Military units may be used to intervene in humanitarian crises as another option in the toolbox. Traditionally, this has meant the use of UN peacekeeping forces under a Chapter VI mandate to monitor peace agreements. One of the longest-standing such forces has been the Palestinian mission. Recently, however, foreign militaries have intervened under much stronger rules of engagement to protect humanitarian principles. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali remarked, “The 1990s have given peacekeeping another new task: the protection of the delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians caught up in a continuing conflict” (1992b:91). These have all been joint international operations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions. The recent peacekeeping engagements have had four major objectives: (1) to protect relief efforts and reverse deteriorating humanitarian conditions, as in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and the protection of Kurdish peoples in Iraq; (2) to provide logistical assistance through the use of military aircraft, communication, and transportation, as was the case in Rwanda after the ceasefire; (3) to enforce a ceasefire long enough for peace to take hold, as is currently the situation in Bosnia; and (4) to serve as a deterrent force in an effort to prevent the deterioration of stability, as is the case in Macedonia, the only one of its kind. In Zaire in late 1996 a slight variation for military use was proposed: to use highly technical equipment and personnel to locate and help the return escort of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees who were hiding in extremely dense, inaccessible jungle.
The use of foreign militaries explicitly for humanitarian purposes in internal conflict is new to the post–Cold War era. It is extremely controversial on a number of fronts, not the least of which is the issue of sovereignty. In addition, within the deploying countries, the national foreign policy and appropriate use of domestic military come under criticism. Furthermore, many argue adamantly that the use of military units in support of humanitarian intercession and peace renewal is a contradiction in action (Dewey 1993). The use of armed force, they believe, simply reinforces the notion that coercion is necessary as a means to settle disputes.
The newness of identity conflicts strains the still-developing methodology of intercession. As discussed earlier, complex emergencies, by definition, require a multifaceted response, which in turn necessitates close coordination. Unfortunately, most of these mechanisms for humanitarian intercession operate with relative independence, each one developing in its own capacity amidst a rapidly changing global scenario. While the long-held recognition of coordination’s vital role supports greater collaboration, the interplay among the various components is still notably limited. For example, recent strides made in human rights monitoring, new information about the impact of relief aid on the development process, and changes in humanitarian law have yet to be fully disseminated and incorporated into planning by the other sectors.
Beyond such inadequate sharing and cooperation, there are large gaps in our collective understanding of complex emergencies that have yet to be filled. Psychological, anthropological, military, political, environmental, and geographic input, for instance, are insufficient. Serious academic research in disciplines other than international relations and international law has only relatively recently focused on humanitarian intercession. Consequently, the bulk of available resources comes from organizational material and ad hoc publications, which are often lacking in comprehensive data or substantive analysis.
Media
The media have had a profound influence on intercession debates. Sophistication in technology now makes it possible for the press to reach remote places suffering from violence, to capture the images in engaging and poignant pictures, films and interviews, and to broadcast them around the globe in a matter of minutes. Radio is a standard means of communication even in the most remote regions, and television is increasingly common. Referred to as “the CNN factor,” for the Cable News Network’s role in publicizing the Gulf War, the press significantly raises the level of awareness of an otherwise removed and uninvolved audience. Though ostensibly a nonpolitical entity in most countries, it directly influences public opinion, frequently generating collective pressure for immediate response, particularly in donor states. As Arnison reflects, “Public outcry seems to be the only unifying theme bringing attention, albeit late, to these crises [i.e., Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia]” (1993:40).
As a result of the media’s influence, John Naisbitt sees potential for a “new global code of conduct to protect rights, spread by reach of communication technology, ensuring community adherence to standards” (1994:25). The press up to this point has not achieved this potential. Despite their enormous capacity to spread information, the media have severe limitations vis-à-vis complex emergencies. First, reporters commonly lack understanding of the nature of complex emergencies and the specific context of the country in question. Combined with the sensationalist nature of journalism, this ignorance often leads to dangerous inaccuracies in the media’s depiction of a crisis. The result can be a biased or erroneous public perception of the situation. Second, the depiction of suffering, usually of third world peoples, and the ensuing cry for foreign assistance, can be demeaning. Moreover, such images can increase the perception of Southern countries as incessantly in need and incapable of self-reliance. Third, public pressure takes time to build and does not always result in significant action, as seen in the first few years of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Last, since the stories’ sensationalism requires graphic images depicting human suffering, the media are typically not interested in the predisaster phase of deteriorating conditions. Early warning of an impending crisis, therefore, is out of the mainstream public’s reach until the situation becomes serious enough to offer drama. This was clearly the case in Kosovo for most of the 1990s as the Albanian population struggled to address economic and social inequity through nonviolent resistance, but garnered little international attention. When, in early 1998, they resorted to violent means, they suddenly gained the eyes and ears of the international press and, subsequently, foreign diplomats. Despite their limitations, the media nonetheless offer a powerful motivating tool for provoking a range of responses to complex emergencies, as all who witnessed the events in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Zaire through media channels can attest.
Preventing Complex Emergencies
The increased number of complex emergencies over the past decade and the limited resources with which to respond should lead us to look toward prevention. If successful interference in the development of a crisis precludes the need for further action, a proliferation of complex emergencies might be averted by the broad use of preventive measures. In the broad conceptual framework employing an expanded intercession time span, prevention occupies the first three phases of the framework–prevention, early warning, and early reaction. The discussion of intercession, therefore, logically must include anticipating or interrupting the progression of complex emergencies. A remarkable effort to address these issues came in 1994 when the Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Its task was to study the causes of violent conflict and to identify requirements and a process of implementation of a system necessary to prevent them. The final report of the commission, Preventing Deadly Conflict, was published in 1997 and suggests a multitude of ways in which the international community can avert the progression of armed violence. It includes such categories as economic measures, use of civil society, UN actions, security options, and judicial measures. This systematic review of such a colossal and important subject–perhaps only possible in the post–Cold War period–deserves special acknowledgment.
One of the areas the commission reviews and which has emerged in recent years as a new subject of academic and institutional focus is early warning. Barbara Harff (1993) of the University of Maryland, for instance, is researching models of the causes and dynamics of violent conflict, particularly centering on intense communal conflict and gross human rights violations. Various other studies and efforts are examining common phenomena, significant indicators, and the process of development in identity conflicts in order to ascertain advance signals. Another example is the UN’s Humanitarian Early Warning System, which considers various factors in determining probability and potential for humanitarian crises.
Policymakers began to explore the options for prevention during the upsurge in complex emergencies. Boutros-Ghali developed the concept of “preventive diplomacy” in his An Agenda for Peace (1992a). The U.S. government contracted Creative Associates to develop a manual entitled Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners (1997), which presents activities specifically designed to forestall complex emergencies in the Horn of Africa. The UN created a Framework for Coordination within which the operational UN agencies collaborate on early detection and action in regions of increasing concern. An evaluation of this model showed that while combining the expertise and resources of political, peacekeeping, and humanitarian agencies improved interdepartmental communication, it did not necessarily result in preventive actions. The process is currently being enhanced in an effort to find new ways to institutionalize preventive actions within the UN structure (D’Angelo 1997).
Other tools for prevention might include the use of conflict management sessions and training in areas of tension. In an effort to thwart the development of hostilities, conflict management specialists might present problem-solving workshops or skills development sessions to leaders of contentious parties. Theoretically, by addressing the root causes of the problem and developing skills with which to handle contention early on, the conflicting sides may be able to reduce the potential for a violent outbreak.
Human rights education campaigns similarly propose to introduce greater respect for international law and human dignity as a means to dissuade the public from violence. Proponents of such efforts maintain that a public understanding of fundamental human rights and the laws intended to uphold them provide a baseline for addressing human rights issues through legal means rather than through violence. They might offer training sessions to government officials and members of opposition groups, introduce basic human rights programs into the formal education system, and present programs for public consumption via the media. In a broader sense, development of all the aspects of civil society ultimately provides a voice to express discontent, and therefore an avenue for peaceful change.
International accompaniment is another tool that focuses on prevention of individual human rights abuse. Foreign persons physically accompany targeted or threatened individuals either in all of their daily activities or only on those occasions when their security is threatened. Successfully employed in Central America during the 1980s, accompaniment attempts to provide an element of safety as well as visibility to the situation. This is an area of growing international interest; a coalition of like-minded groups is developing a “peace teams” alternative to UN peacekeeping forces.
Lastly, development activities are thought to have a preventive component. The relief to development continuum, a much-discussed topic in recent years, implies a connection between emergency response and its long-term implications on the progress of the country. In reality, this seems to be more of a cycle. In a postcrisis situation, recovery and development efforts repairing physical, political, and social structures can be directed specifically toward deflecting hostility, encouraging joint decision-making, developing mutual appreciation and intergroup understanding, addressing issues of contention through nonviolent means, and encouraging the growth of civil society organizations. Thus, in the progression of the cycle, targeted development and civil society-building activities can contribute to the prevention of future crises.
Conceptually, therefore, prevention is the natural and ultimate solution. Careful monitoring, constant information exchange, and appropriate diplomatic, political, or other intercessions conducted continuously or at the first sign of trouble could arrest the development of a crisis. In reality, however, the international capacity has not yet arrived. Prevention philosophy presupposes accurate and early information, the political will to intercede, funding, and appropriate methods. None of these is sufficiently developed to a point where preventive action can reliably and effectively thwart complex emergencies. In fact, the interest in prevention mechanisms appears to have stalled somewhat, and less attention and resources are currently being allocated toward addressing the constraints. One could offer several explanations.
First, the information required to foretell and therefore avoid a crisis is inadequate. Although international organizations working in the field routinely collect copious data, it is often restricted to intraorganizational use. Moreover, prevention advocates have not yet agreed upon the content of the information necessary for disaster early warning. Therefore, even public field data lacks an established format as well as a method of distribution to potential forecasters. The concept of a centrally administered, standardized information collection and distribution system attracts substantial opposition on the legitimate grounds of expense, sovereignty issues, and the potential misuse of intelligence. Several Internet-based data-sharing systems such as the UN Relief Web and UNHCR Reflink, however, are helping to overcome some of these objections. Though not specifically early-warning tools, their usage could entail field-level information-sharing leading to early recognition of potential trouble spots.
Second, the international diplomatic community is unlikely to agree to prearranged standards for automatic intercession at an early stage of conflict development. Unpredictable factors such as the current national interest in the country in question, availability of funds, priority of individual conflicts relative to others, and media attention prevent general political will from being preestablished. Third, because the trend over the last decade has been toward applying international resources to emergencies rather than development or prevention, there is little funding available with which to research or conduct preventive action. Fundamentally, many observers argue that the global perspective falls far short of the ten- to fifty-year minimum for investment in preventive actions that can preclude the development of complex emergencies.
That said, many in the international community hope that prevention will provide the answer, as the multitude of complex emergencies continues to inundate the world with requests for assistance. To expand our time frame of intercession, we must deepen our understanding of the problems confronting us. Hence, the next chapter explores the nature of conflict itself as the roots of today’s complex emergencies. In examining the underlying character of armed violence, perhaps we can come to a better understanding of the basis for today’s conflicts.
Endnotes
Note 1: Figures for conflicts vary somewhat, complicated by definitions, changes in conflict status over the course of the data collection period, and criteria for collection. Back.
Note 2: The term complex emergency did not actually come into common use in the humanitarian community before the end of the Cold War. Sometimes, such disasters born of political and social conflict have been called “slow-onset” or “man-made” emergencies. These figures refer to emergencies that put more than 300,000 lives at risk. Back.
Note 3: The conventional definition of a refugee is a person who is compelled to leave his or her country due to fear of persecution, armed conflict, or civil strife and whose life or security would be endangered if he or she returned. (See chapter 3 for further discussion of these definitions.) Back.
Note 4: “Others of concern” could include besieged populations, returnees, vulnerable sectors, resident victims of violence, or seriously marginalized populations. Back.
Note 5: In selecting this term, I refer to Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, which defines “intercede” as, “1: to interpose in behalf of one in difficulty or trouble . . . [and] 2: to mediate; attempt to reconcile differences between two people or groups.” However, it has been pointed out that this is an American understanding of the term “to intercede,” connoting a nonpartisan, benevolent action. British usage of the word imparts a different understanding, implying interfering on behalf of one side and is often used in reference to the Catholic Church. For lack of a better term, I nevertheless find it acceptable in this context, given an understood American interpretation. Back.
Note 6: An interesting study of British NGO conflict resolution programs conducted by the then Overseas Development Administration and the Refugees Studies Programme concludes, “The effectiveness of operations . . . is not so much one of ‘disciplinary affiliation’ (psychology, sociology, or international relations), size or budget of the NGO, but the level at which intercessions are addressed [high, mid, or grassroots]” (Voutira and Brown 1995:26). Back.
Note 7: The comments of Sarah Burns, a UNDP representative, as given at a United Nations Association meeting March 6, 1996, in Washington, D.C. Back.
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