America’s Peace Dividend, by Ann Markusen (ed.)

 

Comments on Lawrence J. Korb's
"U.S. National Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War World"

Dov S. Zakheim

 

This paper makes some good points, and clearly outlines a set of prescriptions for the future. Its tone is uneven, however, and is at some places rather polemical, especially with respect to General Colin Powell.

Although it is true that General Powell was concerned about reductions in force levels, he in fact anticipated their necessity, and not merely because he accurately forecast a reduction in available defense resources. For Larry Korb to assert that Powell "feared a large peace dividend" is not only unfair and polemical, but simply inaccurate. Korb himself acknowledges that Powell’s planned resource reductions exceeded those of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.

Moreover, as Lorna S. Jaffe points out in her study of The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992, Powell saw earlier than others in the Department of Defense that the Soviet Union no longer posed a serious threat to the West, but there were emergent threats in the Middle East, notably Iraq. Indeed, Powell began developing his ideas for an altered Army force structure while Commander in Chief of Forces Command in early 1989. At that time, talk of a peace dividend was still very much in the future.

It is true that Jaffe’s study, which is very flattering to General Powell, was published under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs, at a time when General Powell was its chairman? Nevertheless, there can be no denying that Powell had actively pressed for a new defense strategy well before he assumed that office. Moreover, and again in contrast to Korb’s implied assertion that planning for the Base Force began when Powell became Chairman, other senior military officers also argued for a new strategy, and the Joint Staff had itself begun to draft a new strategic document in May 1989, well before Powell became chairman in late 1989. The Joint Staff was responding to President Bush’s National Security Review 12 (NSR 12), which was issued on March 3, 1989, and which called for a major review of U.S. defense strategy. Incidentally, both NSR 12 and the Bush speech of August 1, 1990 (which announced its findings) regarding the new military strategy belie Korb’s assertion that "the President assumed he would have a second term for him and his team to develop their own defense strategy."

Powell was haunted by the military’s potential reversion to the "hollowness" of the 1970s. He wanted to ensure that those resources that were available fully supported the remaining force structure. It is noteworthy that Powell was not alone in driving the Department of Defense in a new direction, nor was the Bush Administration prepared to take his views "uncritically," as Korb asserts. In fact, as Jaffe notes, Powell was forced to compromise with Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was not as ready as the chairman to jettison all planning against the Soviet threat.

Contrary to Korb’s assertion, Powell did not oppose peacekeeping missions when he was developing the base force. The debate over peacekeeping emerged in the first year of the Clinton Administration and in the aftermath of the Somalia debacle.

Korb’s argument that the Base Force was intended to allocate parallel cuts among the services, thereby preserving their budgetary "shares," is also off the mark. Powell planned to reduce Army divisions by as much as 40%, all Navy warships by 25% and Air Force wings by 27%. Powell also planned a highly controversial cut in Marine Corps force levels. The final numbers, which included the restoration of much of the Marine Corps cut, were the result of compromises that Powell made with the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Korb asserts that the Base Force approach to modernization put the Pentagon in an arms race with itself. It is his well-known view that U.S. force levels can be reduced because they outnumber those of our potential enemies. Nevertheless, as the Gulf War demonstrated, the United States requires at least three times the number of forces it actually puts in any one combat theater. In addition, it requires forces to sustain its presence in other theaters, notably East Asia. Indeed, the impact of reductions in force levels was felt strongly during the U.S. operation in Kosovo. For example, no carriers were deployed in East Asia due to requirements for carrier forces in the Balkans.

The United States thus was not in an arms race against itself. Rather it required, and still requires, the wherewithal to meet its far-flung commitments. Only if the U.S. were to renege on its alliance commitments, and plan to fight its wars on its own territory, could it contemplate some of the reductions that Korb claims are easily achievable.

Korb’s ascerbic description of Bush Administration policy is not sustained when he addresses the shortfalls of the Clinton program. For example, in describing the Bottom Up Review as one in name only, he says that this resulted "despite [the] best efforts" of the Aspin-Perry team. Again, Powell is blamed for the failure of the BUR, since he remained as chairman. In fact, the BUR was purely budget driven, an exercise to justify spending levels already determined by the Office of Management and Budget. Moreover, by the time the BUR appeared in print, the Pentagon had already been forced to reduce its warship levels below those that the review had provided for. All of this had little to do with General Powell.

While I take issue with Larry Korb’s characterization of the development of the Base Force, I find many of his concluding recommendations interesting, and regret that he did not expand upon them. Although he asserts that "a more cost effective defense policy could easily be developed," his own paper demonstrates why that development is not easy. His rejection of a two war strategy is worthy of serious note. Nevertheless, his solution–a strategy that enables the United States to continue fighting small scale wars, in addition to one major war–begs the question of whether the U.S. should continue the Clinton Administration’s policy of unrestrained peacekeeping adventures. How should the U.S. treat the potential for a conflict with China? Or with Iran for that matter? Should the U.S. think about the consequences of being sucked into the Colombian crisis? Korb might well have dwelt at some greater length on these issues.

Korb does not explain how he justifies a 75 percent cut in US forces in Europe, particularly if he accepts the notion of fighting small scale contingencies in the Balkans. How did he arrive at 25,000? Why not 50,000? Or 20,000?

Korb’s recommendation that we be more ambitious about reducing strategic warheads is also worthy of serious consideration. But why 1000? Should we reduce our warheads to the point where China, or India, might be tempted to match our force levels?

I fully agree that we should try to skip a generation in defense procurement. Whether the F-22 is part of the skipped generation, given that it is on the verge of production, or whether systems like the Joint Strike Fighter, still a paper plane, might be skipped, is an entirely different matter. Moreover, the decision on future fighter levels will also have to account for other tactical aircraft needs. Korb might have developed his case a bit more.

Larry Korb is a thought provoking analyst. He is also a seasoned observer of defense policy for many years. Not everyone will agree with all of Larry Korb’s prescriptions; I certainly do not. But he addresses issues that can no longer be ignored, as they have been for some time.

The United States does need to revamp its strategy. It has underfunded research and development. It has not directed resources towards a truly transformed military that is lighter, faster and more responsive to urgent overseas requirements. It has not evaluated how far it should commit itself to the support of multinational peacekeeping exercises. Finally, it has not been bold enough in proposing reductions in its strategic nuclear warhead inventory, nor in finding the most effective way to defend American territory against ballistic missiles. The new American Administration can ill afford to avoid these issues if America is to remain as secure in the future as it appears to be today.

 

America’s Peace Dividend