THREE

STATE INTERESTS, HUMANITARIANISM, AND CONTROL

A country torn apart by war, and ruled by an oppressive regime for many years, is now beginning political reform under foreign supervision. The ultimate goal is for the country to be a self-sufficient and independent democracy. Meanwhile, foreign administrators are helping locals to set up the basic building blocks of a parliamentary and judicial rule-of-law system. The country's social institutions, ranging from primary education to health care, are all being overhauled, so that they can be brought closer to developed world standards.

This foreign effort is supported by a large deployment of military personnel. In part the soldiers are there to provide safety and security for the authorities, who are challenged by armed rebels who do not recognize the legitimacy of the new system. In part, however, the soldiers are being employed in very nontraditional duties. In the absence of reliable local institutions, soldiers are serving as policemen, judges, jailers, and customs officers. They are also training a new national military force for the country, which will concentrate on internal security problems. Foreign soldiers are meanwhile engaged in a great deal of humanitarian activity, building roads and schools, distributing food in outlying areas, reorganizing garbage collection services, and serving as medics.

Military personnel are instructed to use the minimum amount of force necessary in order to avoid civilian casualties. They are also told to respect local customs and to treat people humanely. Officers are encouraged, in fact, to try to win the rebels over to their side by offering them preferred

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access to foreign aid and trade opportunities. One overarching military goal is to win popular support for the foreigners' presence, in the hopes that this will make security in the country easier to maintain.

These paragraphs could depict an idealized version of the international peacekeeping going on in Kabul in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan in 2002. With a few changes in detail, they could just as well describe the situation of international peacekeeping forces throughout many areas of the world in the mid- to late 1990s. But those cases are not the source for these paragraphs. Instead this description is drawn from the history of the U.S. colonial occupation of the Philippines in the early twentieth century.[1] Large parts of this vignette could also describe the policies followed by Great Britain and France in many of the colonial areas they occupied in the same era.

It may grate on liberal Western sensitivities to think that international peacekeeping operations have something in common with colonialism, but they do, despite all of their differences. The United States, Great Britain, and France were all relatively liberal (if flawed) democracies a century ago. Each nonetheless took colonies, and attempted to reshape them to a greater or lesser extent to look more like themselves, using military force to back up their attempts at persuasion. Leaders in each imperial country believed they were doing good for humanity even as they were doing well for themselves, contributing not only to their country's own wealth and security but also to the betterment of those living in unfortunate circumstances. It is probably not a coincidence that each of these three countries have been dominant actors in recent complex peacekeeping operations, nor is it a coincidence that it is their leadership as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council that has shaped the evolution of peacekeeping since the end of the cold war. Peacekeeping has a colonial heritage.

In the last chapter I defined what I meant by complex military peacekeeping operations, and examined how and why those operations evolved as they did in the 1990s to become efforts to control political and economic developments in particular societies. In this chapter, I will continue to explore the comparison between complex peacekeeping and the colonialism practiced by liberal states at the turn of the last century by examining the political goals that motivated each type of operation. They were similar in many important ways. Both were characterized by a desire to

control foreign societies, and both were driven by a combination of state security and humanistic goals.

There are obvious differences between the two types of operation. I do not mean to imply, as some more radical analysts today do, that the peacekeepers of today have old-fashioned colonial intentions. The imperialism practiced by London, Paris, and Washington a hundred years ago was, at base, about securing profit for their own nations, and this is certainly not what peacekeeping is about. In fact peacekeeping is an expensive business that saps state treasuries without providing many investment opportunities for international business. Imperialism was also about gaining possession of territory for competitive reasons; Great Britain, France, and the United States at that time were engaged in a form of balance of power politics where the amount of land controlled by individual states was seen to matter. Peacekeeping is not that, either. Peacekeeping is usually done cooperatively, and the chief difficulty lies in convincing countries to agree to contribute to operations, not in trying to keep them out of territory claimed by someone else.

Complex peacekeeping operations are largely centered on humanitarian activity and liberal political development, and while these things were components of the era of colonialism that I am considering, they did not define colonialism the way they define peacekeeping today. The balance of humanitarian and self-interested goals shifted significantly to favor humanitarianism in the peacekeeping era. In fact the imperial states that are considered here at one time or another all had military personnel or civilian governors who committed what would now be considered atrocities against civilian populations. All three colonial states also behaved far differently in outlying areas where they had not yet established full control—the interior of Africa, the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, and the northwest frontier of the Indian empire (what is now Pakistan and Afghanistan), for example—from how they behaved in the more stable regions of their colonies. In those outlying areas, the empires were focused on fighting rebels who opposed colonial rule, using any means necessary to win. The imperial pacification campaigns that Rudyard Kipling termed "the savage wars of peace" do not bear much resemblance to complex peacekeeping operations today.[2]

Yet if we stop at the list of differences, we miss the striking similarities in motives that have compelled states to be leaders of imperialism and of complex peacekeeping operations. I begin, therefore, with a list of caveats to make clear that I am not equating peacekeeping with colonialism. I then turn to some of the important similarities between the two types of operation, and draw out why those similarities should matter to today's policymakers.

The Caveats: How Colonialism Differs from Peacekeeping

A deeper look at the American occupation of the Philippines makes clear by example that colonialism was in many ways far different from today's peacekeeping operations. The American use of military force in the outlying areas of the Philippines was much harsher than it was in the scenes described above from Manila. In those outlying areas, intentional human cruelty was a defining aspect of the Filipino experience with the American occupation, in a way that would be unacceptable on today's peacekeeping missions. Despite instructions from home to use minimal force and to respect the local population, the "men on the spot" in colonial operations could violate human rights arbitrarily with a great deal of impunity.

The worst example of a brutal American commander in the Philippines occupation was Major General Leonard Wood (who in spite of his viciousness has been eulogized since 1940 in the name of the basic training camp for the U.S. Army in Missouri). While the United States in Wood's era easily controlled the more urban parts of the Philippine islands, rebels in some outlying areas remained violently opposed to foreign rule. On the island of Mindanao in 1905, Wood's counterinsurgency troops were ambushed by a group of Muslim Moro fighters, whose compatriots had a long history of armed resistance to foreign occupation. After the ambush the Moro fighters withdrew into a closed-off volcanic crater, where hundreds of Moro families (including unarmed women and children) were holding a traditional political meeting. Seeing his opportunity to rid the area of rebels, Wood ordered his 800 troops to deploy secretly around the rim of the crater and use their machine guns to mow down everyone inside. Many hundreds of Moros were left dead. When the American press got word of what had happened, there was a heated congressional inquiry and a great deal of public outrage and editorial criticism. Wood was clearly not serving U.S. interests in the Philippines, as the broad American public understood them, and was not following doctrinal protocol for treatment of the Filipino population. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt nonetheless bucked popular opinion and commended Wood for his bravery, promoting him to the command of the entire Philippines Division.[3] Similar incidents happened regularly in the British and French colonies, too.

The harshness of colonial military actions is not the only thing separating colonialism from peacekeeping. Some of the fundamental goals of empire also differed significantly from the goals of today's peacekeeping operations. The Philippines, for example, were part of the booty won by American forces after fighting a war against Spain over spheres of geographical influence in the western hemisphere. The United States did not

go into the Philippines because of any preexisting sympathy for the Filipino population or its humanitarian situation. Instead, American leaders hoped to use Manila as a base to gain a competitive foothold against other imperial powers in Asia. The fundamental purpose of the American occupation was territorial competition, not humanitarian assistance. The notion that the United States was in the Philippines to help the Filipino population became the official explanation for the occupation, but this occurred mostly because it was what was most acceptable to the American public. A large number of American interest groups could all agree to publicly support such a policy, whatever their real underlying motives for occupation may have been.[4]

Over time the United States did establish some democratic institutions in the Philippines, and scholar Tony Smith argues that this historical experience provided a reference point that encouraged the emergence of real democracy in the country in the 1980s.[5] Washington heavily criticized the despotism of the earlier Spanish colonial rulers on the islands, and attempted to distinguish its own colonial administration from what the Spaniards did. At first, democratic development in the Philippines was limited to the community level. But as the decades progressed, a national legislature was formed under American tutelage, which was elected by universal male suffrage and made decisions about most non-defense related domestic economic and social policies. Washington still kept control over the foreign and defense policy of the Philippines, nonetheless, from the turn of the last century until the Japanese invasion of the islands during World War II. Ultimate sovereignty over the territory was ceded to the Philippine people by the Americans only in 1946.

Despite the autonomy on some issues that Washington granted to the Philippines legislature, true political reform in the country was circumscribed by the existing class structure of Philippine society. While the United States did establish universal male suffrage in the Philippines, this was not a real indicator of political equality. Rather than seeking to establish a more equitable socioeconomic system in the country as part of its political reform package, the United States used the existing land-holding class in the Philippines to cement its own imperial control, rewarding local elites who put down dissent with political appointments.[6] This system encouraged political corruption and office buying, and ensured that a few prominent families actually controlled what appeared on the surface to be a functioning democracy. In all three empires considered here—the British and French as well as the American—it was common for the occupiers to work with a chosen set of political favorites in their colonies, since that way the imperialists' own political control would be cemented by support from within.

This more jaundiced view of American colonialism in the Philippines points out the important differences between colonialism and peacekeeping. In today's peacekeeping operations, individual soldiers may still take actions on the ground that violate human rights. But they do so in spite of immense training efforts to the contrary, and they often face court-martial by their own countries when they are caught. In today's operations, foreign military organizations usually have no desire to dominate foreign societies; instead they want to go home as soon as possible to concentrate on more pressing defense needs. Leaders of peacekeeping operations believe that the way to accomplish this is to convince the local populations to take "ownership" of the processes of peace and change in their countries, turning over control to locals as soon as it is feasible. And in contrast to the state competition motivating the occupations of the colonial era, today's UN-authorized peacekeeping missions represent the multilateral, cooperative efforts of people from a wide variety of countries, including both states and NGOs.

Today's actions are supported by universal international law. Accompanying foreign aid programs are designed so that powerful states give to the weak, rather than profiting off of them. Political goals often focus on class transformation, attempting to replace the economic power of the old system's corrupt elites with that of new owners of small businesses. International political advisors seek to establish independent functioning democracies quickly, not over a period of decades, and they encourage the broadest possible political participation by all members of the target society.

Given these significant differences between the two eras, it may seem as though they are not worth comparing. But they are. Both constitute attempts by strong liberal democracies to control foreign political societies. And there are crucial similarities in motives and means between the two eras as well.

Common Characteristics of Colonialism and Peacekeeping

It has to be noted up front that the characteristics of colonialism, both good and bad, varied across time and place. In some ways it is hard to say with any precision what "colonialism" entailed, even when the concept is limited to these three countries in this particular era. Different governments over the years, as well as different individual colonial administrators, held varying philosophies about the design of colonial policy. The policies actually implemented by colonial officials in the field often deviated from the official directives issued by the capitals, leading to further

variations in intention and effect.[7] Yet despite these variations, the three imperial states examined here made a common set of key political choices that shaped much of their colonial policy. In turn, these commonalities are reflected in today's peacekeeping operations.

All three states who engaged in colonialism in this era, like the leaders of peacekeeping operations more recently, took on new missions in order to further their national interests as defined by the domestic coalitions who kept their governments in power. In both types of cases, this primarily involved concerns about national security as it was defined at the time. (As we will see below, profit had become less of a motivating factor for territorial control by the late 1800s than it had been earlier in the colonial era.) All three states, just as the leaders of peacekeeping operations do today, simultaneously tried to serve what they considered humanitarian ends in the countries where they intervened. Often state self-interest and humanitarian goals were intertwined with each other, so that motives falling into one or the other category could not easily be distinguished from each other. The same holds true of peacekeeping operations today.

It is sometimes tempting to treat states as if they have unambiguous motives, and to say that they act, for example, on behalf of power and profit. It is also commonplace in the academic political science literature to try to separate out state interests from normative or ethical ideas, and to argue that as global understandings of ethics and appropriateness change, states redefine their interests to align them in accordance with those understandings.[8] The dying out of colonialism in the twentieth century is one example often cited of how changing international norms about self-determination led states to believe that colonialism was no longer in their interests.

Yet in the colonial era, as in peacekeeping operations today, interests and ethics reinforced each other. Control over foreign territory was justified by the great powers as a way for the civilized nations of the world to bring economic development and political enlightenment to those who would otherwise be without them. As we will see below, both the leaders and the publics of the great powers seemed genuinely to believe that colonial occupation was a kind of charitable act. At the same time, bringing Euro-American values, institutions, and assistance to new territories was a means to enhance the security of the colonial powers, because it served as a mechanism of political control in territories whose economic and geographic resources were believed to be important for great power competition. Despite the differences in how security has been defined in the two eras, concerns that are to some extent similar motivate the great powers today, who believe that anarchy and instability in regions near their own

borders threaten their well being (often including their economic well-being). The growth of liberal democratic values and institutions in territories that have undergone peacekeeping operations is something that the great powers believe would benefit everyone, themselves as well as the local inhabitants. Self-interest cannot be juxtaposed against a sense of morality as the motivating factor of either colonial actions or peacekeeping operations, because both have been important sources of policy choices.

Interests and norms have been intertwined; the states who are primarily responsible for creating international law have been concerned to legitimate their policy choices through international agreements. The colonial powers considered here wanted to be seen as following common norms of behavior in their colonies; since they were among the lead designers of those international laws, they could ensure that it was the pursuit of their own interests and their own definitions of humanitarianism that were legitimated. The same thing is true of the leaders of most peacekeeping operations today, who have championed the legitimacy of their own intervention, based on a universal obligation to uphold individual human rights, against the arguments of those who would instead privilege the importance of state sovereignty as a legal precept of the United Nations Charter.

National Self-Interest and Control Over Colonies

As in any era, it is difficult to define exactly what the state interests were of the liberal colonizers at the turn of the twentieth century, and where those interests came from. Yet as Philip D. Curtin notes in his sweeping history of Western empires, while some territory may have been acquired "in a fit of absence of mind" (according to an old saw about British imperialism in particular), there is no question that from about 1870 to 1910 the European powers were "out for conquest."[9] A complex mixture of military and economic motives was at work in defining imperial state interests, buttressed in the cases of Britain and France by ideologies of empire that seemed to transcend any interest that could be measured with cold, hard facts. All the great powers of Europe (as well as the United States) were competing against each other for control over new territory, and this meant that empire was a tool to use in the European balance of power game. Colonial occupation helped maintain national security, as it was then defined.

The great powers by this point were not occupying colonies primarily for profit. In fact, they perceived that having colonies was in their interest

even though the expense of controlling imperial territory probably outweighed the competitive benefits that empire provided. Some *private* international trading companies got rich off of the colonial ties that their governments provided for them, but as time went on the imperial states themselves were probably spending more on the maintenance of colonies than they received in return from their possessions. The pursuit of empire was difficult to justify on a rational basis, given its expense.[10]

For example, Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback performed an exhaustive economic analysis of the British Empire in this era, using a cost/benefit perspective to examine the impact of everything from taxes to defense expenditures, and from business development expenses to investor returns. They determined that while some individual investors benefited from the colonies, the British state as a whole did not. (The one exception was the colony of British India, which was self-sufficient in providing for its own expenses and required little financing from London; it did turn a profit for the British state.[11]) Davis and Huttenback discovered that after 1880, even business interests taken as a whole did not profit much from the colonies. While certainly there were individual companies that did well, most businesses based in the British Isles had higher rates of return on their investments than most businesses based in the colonies.[12] According to Davis and Huttenback, "For the general investor in the years after 1880, the Empire was probably a snare and a delusion—a flame not worth the candle."[13] As theorist Michael Doyle and others have argued, colonialism may have been mostly an exercise in national prestige, supported by the particular domestic interest groups who benefited from it.[14]

Yet crucial state interests *appeared* to be at stake in the colonies in spite of their expense, because of how states defined their national security goals. By the turn of the last century, leaders in all three imperial states came to believe that maintaining colonies abroad was in their long-term security interests—something that had not been true in previous times. Earlier, states had been content to claim ownership over land without keeping much of an ongoing personnel presence there. Maintaining functioning colonies was expensive and difficult; it required occupying territory, which in turn required the planning of complex political and military actions on the part of the imperialists. Earlier, the European states had not been so interested in the notion of territorial control.[15]

Now, though, the imperial states considered each other competitors, believing that great power warfare at some future point was likely and that the wealthiest and most powerful states would win. National wealth revolved around access to raw materials, including agricultural products, even if maintaining access to them was costly; and many of the colonies

were rich in these resources. (Indeed, Davis and Huttenback found that agricultural and extractive industries like mining were the most profitable type of colonial businesses.[16]) When states possessed a colony, they could prevent their competitors from having equal access to those resources. What had earlier been a desire to open up new areas for free trade became, in this era, a drive for exclusive control over territory. State competition, not surprisingly, also included control of the seas that led from the capitals to the colonies and allowed access to the resources in question. A big part of what provided control over the seas was the ownership of ports far from home, even ports in areas which were not rich in raw materials themselves. States' ability to hold territory in distant areas helped them define their relative standing in relationship to each other, and commercial and military interests were mutually reinforcing.[17]

In earlier times, state leaders had often delegated control over their colonial territories to the same private trading companies who were now trying to grow rich off of them. These private companies would field their own armies and fight wars without a great deal of interference from their patrons.[18] Some of these chartered companies continued to operate in central Africa as late as the 1920s.[19] But for the most part, imperial governments by the late nineteenth century cared more about their colonies' long-term upkeep than they had earlier, and sent their own representatives out to occupy and govern these spaces rather than entrusting them to private interests who were hard to oversee without government officials being stationed there. It became ownership and control of the space that mattered for great power competition, not merely the planting of a flag.

These changes in how states viewed their colonial territories, and hence in how they viewed their security interests more generally, were enabled by structural changes in the environment, specifically changes in technology. Occupation of the colonies was possible now, in a way that it had not been earlier, because of new inventions and scientific discoveries.[20] The invention of the repeating rifle and the machine gun gave a huge military advantage to the Europeans and Americans who owned them. Large groups of angry people could now be more easily cowed by a small number of foreign troops. (One of the reasons why colonialism declined as the twentieth century wore on was the proliferation of weapons to the colonized, who could begin to fight back.[21]) The discovery of quinine and other prophylactic drugs also allowed European officials who had grown up in northern climates (and who therefore lacked any natural resistance to tropical diseases) to live in the tropics more comfortably. Steam ships and railroads made navigating immense distances easier, and along with the telegraph improved communication between the capitals and their colonies. These

technological changes meant that states were able to invest their own scarce resources into their colonies to an extent that hadn't been prudent earlier, because European and American officials could now live in the colonies in relative safety and security. Structural changes enabled states to take on new definitions of their own security interests.

Since international security concerns appeared to be at stake in the colonies, and since structural changes allowed occupation by state officials to occur, the imperial actions taken by the great powers came to have components that resembled modern-day complex peacekeeping operations. The imperial capitals now had reasons to care about the long-term viability and stability of these territories. Earlier, the British and French private companies and plantations who were sent abroad had been allowed to plunder the colonial territory that they were granted. The political support that the capitals received from these small but wealthy groups of traders was so great, in comparison to the relatively insignificant state interest that the imperialists had previously believed they held in their colonies, that the consequences of short-term thinking in the colonies seemed unimportant. Now, on the other hand, states became interested in preserving and husbanding colonial resources for the future.[22] These resources included not only the obvious ones of land and raw materials, but also the more abstract good will of those who were subjected to imperial control. Without that good will, colonial governance would have been more difficult to accomplish, because people who hate those who occupy them tend to carry out violence against the occupiers and thwart them economically.

The need to establish good will meant that the imperial capitals believed they had an interest in encouraging economic development in their colonies. Development would relieve poverty, and make the subject population more appreciative of the benefits of being in the empire. Simultaneously, development would expand the trading opportunities for home-state companies, and improve the climate for potential investors. This would broaden the spectrum of industries at home who benefited from colonial possession, and in turn would help cement political support for the continuation of colonial control. It would also create a tax base to help make the colonies self-financing, minimizing imperial expenditure on their upkeep while silencing critics at home who doubted the colonies' real utility.[23] In other words, the imperialists encouraged economic development and improvement in their colonies, or what the French called *mise en valeur*,[24] at least in part because it served their self-interests to do so. The better the colonies were doing, the easier it would be politically to maintain them.

Colonial occupation hence became self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing: once it was in place, it created the economic and political momentum to

propel itself forward. The burgeoning interests of imperialist states in the long-term health of their colonies motivated them to make life in their colonies more secure. That way their own officials and traders could live in the colonies without fear of internal instability. If the environment were made secure, imperial possessions could also be more easily defended from predatory moves by state competitors in the race for territorial control. Permanent colonies, in other words, required what amounted to peacekeeping operations for the sake of imperial national interests.

The Humanitarian Impulse and Colonial Control

Today's international community may not like to hear it, but humanitarian concerns were also a component of the colonialism practiced a century ago by Great Britain, France, and the United States, even though the form of those concerns was very paternalistic and even though they came second to the desire for conquest. The liberal leaders of empire wanted to share European and American values, institutions, and achievements with areas of the world that were less fortunate, and each of them believed that the superior attributes of their own civilizations were a gift to bestow on others.

There is an irresolvable scholarly debate about how *genuine* the humanitarian impulse was among imperial leaders. Some scholars argue that while the imperialists said they were acting out of a desire to be moral and generous, their humanitarianism was in fact just window-dressing for naked self-interest.[25] There is no way to determine the truth about this question, since one can't probe the minds of dead leaders and people's psychological motives are usually mixed. Yet certainly their writings indicate that they believed themselves to be sincere.

More important, there is no question that Great Britain, France, and the United States all *justified* imperialism to their domestic populations through its purported humanitarian benefits, and in turn this justification influenced how their policies toward their colonies had to be designed. All three of these countries were relatively liberal democracies a hundred years ago; even if none of them had universal suffrage, all of them had elected legislatures that were subject to criticism by the opposition and the press. Public opinion mattered. That means that however false the original claims about humanitarian motives may have been, humanitarianism became a necessary element of colonial practice, at least in part because home publics demanded it. Daniel Philpott has argued that "civic liberalism," or a public moral sense, is one of the major factors

propelling recent peacekeeping operations.[26] Civic liberalism mattered in the colonial era, too.

Colonialism could not have been sustainable without the tacit support of the voters. The creation and direction of colonial policy was answerable to the people at home who read the papers, and hence it had to be seen as ethical. Most of the good citizens of these imperial states believed themselves to be morally upright. The vast majority of the population in all three countries was Christian, and it wanted to fulfill what it saw as the Christian obligation to show benevolence to others, especially those who were weaker. People did not want to see themselves as exploiting others for the sake of economic gain, but instead as missionaries on behalf of progress. The voters expressed outrage and conducted legislative investigations when word leaked out about atrocities that were committed by their representatives in the colonies.[27] Governments therefore had an incentive to try to ensure that colonial rule appeared benign. Voters also felt a sense of responsibility to the disadvantaged of the world, and wanted their officials in the colonies to act on behalf of justice and with noblesse oblige.[28]

Imperial leaders provided a variety of moral justifications for their colonial actions. For the U.S. in the Philippines, the legitimating principle of occupation was to bring democratization to a country steeped in Spanish despotism. For France, the legitimating principle of actions in Africa was the *mission civilisatrice*—the belief that the superior achievements of French language, culture, philosophy, and science could be transmitted to foster cleaner, more efficient, more prosperous and more rational societies in the non-European world, which would eventually become part of greater France.[29] For Great Britain, the term "trusteeship" was used to indicate that, each at its own pace, the colonies and their indigenous leaders would sooner or later be guided along the path toward good self-government.[30] For all three colonial powers, these moral goals led to certain common policy choices. The abolition of slavery abroad, along with other practices that were considered barbaric (such as polygamy), was a common justifying theme—even though in practice some French officers traded in slaves themselves.[31]

Beyond the need to justify their actions, imperial leaders also had a second straightforward incentive to follow relatively humane practices in the colonies. The capitals tried to minimize the cost of maintaining their empires,[32] and caring for the well being of the colonial population was one means to lower the costs of occupation. Humanitarianism, in other words, was a cheap way to gain control. Fighting wars is a very costly business, especially against rebel insurgents who are willing to die for their opposition

to colonial rule. To win without fighting was better, as the classic military theorist Sun Tzu would say; the imperialists needed to find a way to control their colonial populations short of constant violence.

Direct rule by multiple layers of colonial officials, who arrived in the field after having had comfortable, relatively easy lives in the imperial capitals, was not a cost-effective solution. Those officials had to be paid handsomely to convince them to move halfway across the world and live in relative deprivation, isolated from their families and communities (at a time when communication was slow and unreliable), and beset by the threat of violent unrest and disease. The fewer officials that had to be sent out from the capitals, the cheaper the occupation. A means for political control had to be found that involved neither the expense of traditional military operations, nor a great deal of oversight by foreign bureaucrats.

The ideal mechanism, used to a greater or lesser degree by all three powers, was psychological: it was to try to make the people of the colonies *want* to be connected to the empire. Life inside the empire had to seem better than the alternative. As Michael Doyle has argued, subjects needed to be persuaded that foreign rule was to their benefit, with force used only as a last resort.[33] As Jeffrey Herbst has pointed out, the use of violence was a sign of the weakness of the occupiers, and their inability to maintain control using other means.[34]

Sometimes control was accomplished using indirect rule, allowing existing political structures in the colonies to continue to function under imperial oversight. As Curtin notes, "actual rule over the conquered societies was far more in local hands than in those of European administrators."[35] Members of the local population who cooperated with the empire would be paid off for their support. This might mean granting particular local figures public office, as was the case in the Philippines. It might mean giving weapons and other provisions to those on the right side of rebel insurgencies,[36] or protecting particular local markets from both taxes and attack.[37] It sometimes even meant turning a blind eye to the practice of slavery by one's friends, while condemning it in one's enemies.[38] In all three empires, it was often imperial military officers who made or helped make the judgment about whom to reward. Like today's peacekeepers, their village patrols gave them good intelligence about who among the locals was doing what.

Other times, political control was furthered by providing direct humanitarian aid to the population. While there is no question that much of colonial practice was violent and inhumane,[39] there is also no question that rule by brute force alone was not in the interest of the imperial states—it was simply too expensive. In the words of Louis Faidherbe, founder of the

French colonial administration in Senegal, the imperial powers had to "maintain tranquility so that the natives may work and produce in all security to feed our posts with their products, and so that they may recognize the advantage of our domination."[40] All three of these imperial states therefore pursued some form of a "hearts and minds" campaign, designed to convince the population at both an emotional and intellectual level that imperialism was a good thing.

Hearts and minds considerations permeated the doctrine given to military forces on the ground, who were regularly involved in humanitarian aid and civil construction projects. Such benevolent acts were combined with highly structured educational systems,[41] designed to inculcate the lesson that imperial administration served local interests. The imperialists believed that education was one of the major fruits of civilization they could share with their colonies, even as it privileged one vision of civilization in comparison to any other. Gerrit Gong argues that colonial expansion was in fact a clash of civilizations, where the Europeans and Americans would set the rules about what was civilized and what was not, and would convince those in the colonies to accept their views.[42]

Some aspects of these hearts and minds campaigns were blatantly racist and classist. For example, one of the goals of the French Empire in Africa was to discourage the use of local languages and replace them with French (in some Muslim areas, Arabic was a tolerated alternative). French was seen both as the language of unity across cultures, and as culturally superior to other languages because of the legacy of French literature.[43] Free public schools were therefore established in France's colonies to improve the natives by teaching them French. The best opportunities for educational advancement were provided to urban students, who were seen as more capable of cultural assimilation than their rural counterparts. Yet in spite of the arrogance of these policies, there appeared to be a genuine belief in Paris that to learn French and to receive a European-style education provided an opportunity for those in the colonies to lift themselves out of a life of misery. The same can be said for efforts to provide the colonies with basic French-model hygiene and sound architectural planning.

Simultaneously, the provision of these services to the locals was a mechanism for institutionalizing imperial control at a relatively low cost. As Timothy Mitchell notes, when locals are trained to follow carefully constructed imperial procedures—in education, in social policy, in building construction, and so forth—eventually the structures and practices of colonialism become so embedded in society that they seem natural and are much less likely to be questioned.[44] At that point most of the colonizers can stay home in their capitals, because the colonies will run themselves peacefully.

Beyond the need to justify colonialism to their home populations and the interest that the empires had in maintaining control at minimal cost, humanitarian aid also furthered imperialist interests for a third reason: it fostered investment and trade. Development assistance worked hand in hand with commercial interests, and the two were philosophically intertwined. One indicator of this was the fact that Christian missionaries in the colonies, such as British explorer David Livingstone, cooperated with home-state traders and investors in the belief that the spread of Western values, culture, and trade links were part and parcel of their main mission of religious proselytizing.[45] All things European, both Christianity and commerce, were seen as moral.

The economic development that occurred in the colonies in fact tended to benefit the citizens of Europe and America more than it helped the locals. Colonial administrators, for example, used conscripted local labor to build pieces of infrastructure and to transport goods to port cities from rural areas, tending to undermine the moral imperative of ending slavery. Health programs concentrated on wiping out the diseases that bothered the European occupiers rather than those that killed the native population. Nonetheless, in spite of these hypocrisies, part of the civilizing mission included the desire to lessen the ills of poverty, and it was widely believed that international trade integration would help achieve this goal.[46] Peace was seen as a necessary background condition for trade to flourish, which meant that deploying military troops in what would now be called peacekeeping roles was also part of the developmental philosophy.[47]

These three requirements—the need to justify colonialism in the public eye at home, the need for cheap security in the colonies and local acceptance of outside rule, and the need to foster trade and investment through development—meant that colonialism in this era was not simply about economic exploitation of one group by another, nor was it simply about the unthinking use of force. It was constrained by principles that could be seen as a means for improving the lives of the colonized,[48] even as they served the interests of empire. Humanitarianism was part and parcel of state self-interest, even as some idealists pursued it in the colonies for its own sake.

National Self-Interest and Complex Peacekeeping

Clearly the particular set of national interests that supported imperialism, defined by great power competition to control and exploit foreign territory, is not what motivates peacekeeping today. The kind of complex

peacekeeping operations talked about in this book are mostly multilateral, necessitating the cooperation of many states, and done under the authorization of the United Nations. Yet, as in the colonial era, powerful states today tend to become involved in complex peacekeeping operations largely when they perceive that their national interests are involved. They act out of strong humanitarian impulses as well. But peacekeeping forces are not sent everywhere that violent human suffering exists. Once again, self-interest and humanitarianism are intertwined.

Perhaps the most searing example of state self-interest overcoming the humanitarian impulse is the tragedy of Rwanda, outlined in the previous chapter. Both Al Gore and George W. Bush, the major candidates for the U.S. presidency in 2000, agreed that the United States did the right thing by not intervening to stop the genocide.[49] Gore was Vice President when the United States made its decision not to intervene, and Bush's campaign included a pledge to lower the U.S. commitment to peacekeeping, so it is understandable that these two would affirm the choice that was made. Yet it is unlikely that this affirmation is shared by the larger liberal democratic international community. In most corners, including the UN Secretariat itself, the failure to act in Rwanda is viewed with shame. Humanitarianism in response to terrible suffering did not prove a strong enough impulse to overcome the desire by states to save their political capital, their economic resources, and the safety of their troops for areas of the world that were more central to their national security interests.

Humanitarian concerns were involved in all of the complex peacekeeping missions of the 1990s, and humanitarianism cannot be discounted as a motive in any of the cases. But that does not change the fact that the humanitarian impulse is insufficient to explain why peacekeeping happens sometimes and not others. National self-interest almost always motivates those who lead complex operations, at least in part.[50] A return to the examples of complex military peacekeeping outlined in the previous chapter helps illustrate some of the self-interested motives behind the missions.

Haiti

It took three years for the United States to take strong action in response to humanitarian concerns about the situation in Haiti after the 1991 coup, and the delay in this case is perhaps the best illustration that humanitarian concerns alone are not sufficient motivation for complex military peacekeeping operations to be deployed even in areas that border the great powers—even when the decision is eventually taken to intervene.

In 1991, Haiti's brutal and corrupted military forces ousted the newly democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, after he had been

in office for only seven months. What had seemed like a possible new beginning for a country steeped in centuries of poverty and political violence was cut short. Coup leaders and the militia who supported them—the Front for Haitian Advancement and Progress (FRAPH)—killed more than a thousand of Aristide's supporters. The new regime, led by General Raoul Cédras, was harsh in its smashing of dissent. Its security forces, the Force Armée d'Haiti (FADH), meanwhile ignored street crime and encouraged Haiti's tradition of deadly popular vigilantism, leading to even more chaos and death.[51]

While the international community, represented both by the United Nations and by the Organization of American States, publicly deplored these events, it was not until 1993—following two years of misery—that the United Nations Security Council authorized the United States to lead a complex peacekeeping mission to help restore Aristide to power. An initial attempt by U.S. and Canadian forces to land in the capital of Port-au-Prince in 1993 was aborted when angry crowds appeared on the shore, deterring the ships from docking. Under the threat that a full-scale invasion would be launched if they met further resistance, Cédras finally ceded to the Americans and peacekeepers arrived on the island in September 1994.

A violent humanitarian emergency near American shores did eventually lead Washington to intervene, but it took three years to galvanize sufficient political will for it to happen. Humanitarian concerns in this case were voiced most loudly by African-American political pressure groups who argued that an American failure to act to restore democracy to Haiti would amount to racism. But humanitarianism failed to lead to immediate action. Washington's primary interest was instead to stop the influx of tens of thousands of Haitian refugees who had set out by boat for U.S. territory as the dictatorship became more oppressive. What convinced U.S. leaders that some kind of direct military action on their part was finally necessary was that a caucus of African-American legislators began loudly protesting the U.S. policy of turning away Haitian boat people, and of imprisoning those who would not turn back at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.[52]

Beyond the domestic political furor involved, American national security concerns were associated with this refugee question. The need to rescue, intercept, and process Haitian refugees approaching U.S. territory by sea was tying up U.S. military and Coast Guard resources that might otherwise be used for counter-narcotics activity or for monitoring the actions of Cuba's Communist leader, Fidel Castro.[53] In other words, pressure from particular domestic interest groups coupled with strong national security interests was required for intervention to take place; humanitarianism

alone did not lead to strong action in the first three years of the Cédras regime. In part, the humanitarian impulse was tempered both by the recent seeming failure of American troops in Somalia, and by the fact that major security crises were simultaneously underway in the Balkans and Rwanda. There were limits to the military actions that U.S. leaders were willing to take.

In 2004, in contrast, U.S.-led multilateral intervention into the newly resurgent chaos in Haiti was quicker than it had been a decade before. While many liberal commentators criticized the Bush administration for its reluctance to provide more *economic* assistance to Aristide before the crisis point was reached, it took only a few weeks for Washington to send in the Marines once political violence broke out in Haiti in mid-January 2004. A close reading of events reveals once again, however, that humanitarian motives on their own were insufficient to motivate intervention. As late as mid-February, senior Bush administration officials were announcing that no military intervention was likely, especially since the Pentagon was so focused on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the potential for serious crises elsewhere (ranging from North Korea to Iran).[54]

What apparently caused Washington to call for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council on February 29, 2004 to authorize the dispatch of troops to Port-au-Prince—and to use the offer of safe passage to urge Aristide out of office—was once again the threat of a refugee exodus spinning out of control. This time around, the idea of keeping intercepted Haitian asylum seekers for processing at the U.S. military installation in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—the policy followed in the early 1990s—would have been difficult, given that the United States had set up a major military prison camp there to house accused terrorists captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Washington's policy in 2004 was instead to return all Haitian boat people back to the Port-au-Prince harbor. When armed Aristide supporters seized the Haitian Coast Guard facilities at Port-au-Prince, leaving Haitian Coast Guard personnel "fleeing for their lives," Washington decided it had had enough.[55] This time around, it was not domestic interest-group pressure that motivated U.S. actions, since the Congressional Black Caucus voiced its support for keeping Aristide in place as the democratically elected leader of Haiti. Instead, it was national security interests plain and simple that led Washington to call for a UN-authorized peace mission.

The Balkans

The motivations underlying NATO intervention in the Balkans remain hotly contested, with cynics arguing that NATO's major goal in both cases

was to increase NATO's own sense of purpose and strength, and others responding that humanitarianism was the primary impetus behind the efforts. As was noted in the previous chapter, NATO military intervention in the form of air strikes in both Bosnia and Kosovo was undertaken largely for humanitarian reasons. Intervention in Bosnia was championed (among others) by Jewish-American lobbying groups, who argued that genocide should never be allowed to happen again.[56] Intervention in Kosovo was supported, again among others, by humanitarian NGOs who feared that the Albanians being driven from their homes by Serbian paramilitary groups would face mass starvation and death from exposure if the raids were not stopped.[57]

In both cases it was clear that the international military representatives on the ground—lightly armed in the case of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, unarmed in the case of OSCE observers in Kosovo—were incapable by themselves of stopping the ethnic cleansing that was either underway or threatened. UNPROFOR was unable to hold the safe areas inside Bosnia or stop the ongoing military onslaughts in Bosnia and Croatia. OSCE monitors in Kosovo were unable either to protect themselves against growing Serb paramilitary harassment, or to stop what appeared to be plans for a major Serbian anti-Albanian campaign in Kosovo in spring 1999. Shocking news about death camps and mass rapes in Bosnia, and about massacre sites and village attacks in Kosovo, mobilized popular support for the interventions. Yet similar conditions in Rwanda had not prompted intervention. Something besides pure humanitarianism must have separated out the two sets of cases from each other.

The self-interested motives for intervention and peacekeeping in both Bosnia and Kosovo are easy to enumerate. As in the case of Haiti, in both Balkans cases a major motivation for NATO intervention was that NATO member states feared refugee crises. Balkan refugees who had fled their home countries were consuming state welfare resources and competing for low-wage jobs to an extent that was perceived to threaten the economic stability of Western Europe, especially in Germany and Italy.[58] Just as was the case in Haiti, refugee movements, especially in the case of Kosovo, carried with them broader security threats. When the start of the NATO bombing campaign caused Serbian forces to expel the Muslim population from Kosovo, the presence of large numbers of Kosovar Muslim refugees in Macedonia began to empower hard-line anti-Albanian politicians in Skopje. Macedonia had been a country which seemed up until that point capable of avoiding the ethnic violence that plagued so much of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. The refugee crisis in Macedonia spawned real fear that European stability was threatened once again, in an era when Europe

was supposed to be drawing together as never before in the European Union. This meant that a stabilizing presence was required in the region once the bombing campaign was over.

At least part of the motivation for NATO involvement in both of these cases was also to demonstrate allied (and especially American) resolve to maintain the credibility of the alliance as a European security institution after the cold war was over.[59] Humanitarianism in the Balkans was buttressed by clear self-interest. The relative ranking of the two motivations in NATO's hierarchy of goals may never be firmly established; they were intertwined.

East Timor

When Australia led the initial UN-authorized mission to restore peace following East Timor's popular vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999, Canberra was motivated at least in part by the national guilt felt for its 20-year recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over the island. Most of the rest of the world had condemned Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor, while Australia had opted for cooperation with the Indonesian authorities instead.[60] The Australian population now demanded humanitarian action by the government when Indonesia did nothing to stop the massacres following the independence vote. A sizeable Timorese émigré population in Australia was particularly vocal about this issue.

But Australia's concern for East Timor was not based solely on emotion. As noted in the previous chapter, Australia was not willing to challenge Indonesia militarily over the question of protecting the East Timorese; it did not sacrifice its national security interests for the sake of humanitarianism. Instead the intervention was delayed pending Indonesia's permission—even though there was good intelligence available about the chaos that would result after the referendum, and the referendum results themselves technically ended Indonesian claims to the territory.

Australia did react very quickly once Indonesia's permission for intervention was gained, and there is no question that humanitarianism was a major part of Canberra's motivation; indeed Australia pushed hard to ensure that Indonesia would support a UN intervention sooner rather than later. But Canberra's interests were also caught up with East Timor's territorial proximity to Australia. The island is located around 650 km (or around 350 mi.) from the key northern naval base at Darwin, and the major factor shaping Australia's defense policy since the end of the cold war has been the perceived need to protect itself from potential instability in the areas surrounding its territory.[61] The crisis in East Timor gave the Australian Defense Forces an opportunity to demonstrate their continuing

value to the state after the cold war ended, since one of the scenarios that had motivated defense planning had come to pass.

While not mentioned publicly, concerns about a refugee influx were probably part of Australian decisionmakers' concern as well.[62] Canberra has struggled in recent years to erect barricades against an influx of economic refugees from Southeast Asia, amidst great public outcry about unfair treatment of these beleaguered groups. If a large number of real humanitarian refugees were to join the hordes seeking entrance, Australia's immigration system might have been overwhelmed. Australia also hoped that a peaceful resolution in East Timor might encourage Indonesia to pursue cooperative solutions in other parts of its territory that were suffused with ethnic violence, leaving the sea lanes around Australia more stable in the future.

Furthermore, Australia also has a large potential economic interest in the development of the oil and gas fields that lie in the seabed between itself and East Timor, the so-called Timor Gap. While Australia's earlier support for Indonesia had ensured that Canberra would get favorable treatment in the Timor Gap oil agreements signed in previous years, instability in East Timor threatened the potential return on Australia's state investments. While the final disposition of the contracts on these fields remains unclear—despite a treaty signed in 2002, both a border dispute and a commercial lawsuit continue to stall progress—one argument that Australia can make to the government in Dili for favorable treatment on this issue is that it provided peacekeeping help when East Timor most needed it.

While humanitarianism certainly played a crucial role in all of the complex military peacekeeping operations of the 1990s, in each case state self-interests were also clearly involved. In each case, bringing stability to a war-torn region served the security interests of militarily powerful states. While the purpose was not at all the territorial competition that had motivated the great powers during the colonial era, it did involve territorial pacification abroad for the sake of security at home. Military intervention was once again followed by at least short-term occupation, in order to ensure that state self-interests in territorial stability were met.

Philpott argues that the security issues involved in these cases did not involve a "direct and significant stake" for the states involved. He believes that concerns about refugees, or about a vague definition of future European stability, "were hardly the direct challenges to security that realists expect as occasions for intervention."[63] Instead, he sees the humanitarian concerns of domestic actors inside liberal democracies, and the convergence of these concerns across countries, as the primary engine for complex peacekeeping operations. Certainly, in each case discussed above, political pressure from domestic groups concerned about humanitarianism

was a major contributing factor explaining the decision to intervene. Yet that factor alone does not explain why intervention happens in some cases and not others, nor does it explain the reluctance of states to intervene and what is often a long delay in the timing of intervention. Philpott's "civic liberalism" in democracies is balanced by the concerns of hard-headed realists, who demand that clear national interest direct both budgetary expenditures and the use of military force. As in the colonial era, intervention occurs because national security interests and humanitarian goals reinforce each other, and the two motives cannot be teased apart.

As in the late colonial era, structural changes made the expansion of intrusive peacekeeping possible. Humanitarianism and state security interest were buttressed by enabling factors. In part, superior technology again played a role; this time around, the key military advantages held by those who led the complex peacekeeping operations included advanced night-vision and reconnaissance equipment that allowed the tracking of rebel formations and gun smugglers, as well as stand-off precision-strike aircraft that permitted the international community to easily enforce its will on those who might otherwise be recalcitrant—all technologies that underwent massive improvement in the 1980s and 1990s in the service of other military goals of the United States in particular (directed first against the Soviet Union, and later against other enemies like Iraq).

Change in the structure of the international political system also played a crucial role. The end of the cold war meant that Russia could be persuaded to allow the Euro-American states to lead peacekeeping interventions without interfering, giving the United Nations Security Council the ability to authorize humanitarian action in a way that would have been unthinkable in the earlier era of frequent vetoes. Russia could even be persuaded, in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, to contribute significant military resources to joint peacekeeping efforts, enhancing the multilateral legitimacy of the actions taken. Structural change made the idea of occupying territory for the sake of liberal democratic development possible, in a way that it earlier would not have been.

Humanitarianism and Complex Peacekeeping

The intertwining of humanitarian and self-interested motives has an interesting twist in today's operations. In contrast to the imperial era, when colonialism was accepted as a normal component of state policy by a broad spectrum of political actors, today there is no agreement that complex peacekeeping missions serve the national interest. As a result, the

United States government has felt that it must convince the domestic public (and especially the U.S. Congress) that its goals are *not* purely humanitarian when American troops are sent abroad, and that national interests are truly at stake.[64] Rather than using humanitarianism to publicly justify policies that are pursued for underlying state security reasons, state security interests are sometimes used to justify policies that may truly be motivated by more idealistic humanitarian impulses.[65]

The need to demonstrate that self-interest lay behind peacekeeping decisions was one of the requirements laid out by President Bill Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, "U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," promulgated in Spring 1994.[66] One of the reasons that the Clinton administration did not take action to stop the Rwandan genocide was because such action could not be justified on the narrow grounds of self-interest that this policy laid out—a choice that received harsh criticism from NGOs and liberal commentators.[67] Yet from the other side, PDD-25 was lambasted by conservative Republicans for its failure to go far enough. It would not prevent peacekeeping overextension, in their view, because "self-interest" was too ambiguously construed.[68] A somewhat similar debate about humanitarian overreach, and whether the national interest was served by peacekeeping deployments, unfolded in Great Britain in late 2001.[69] Humanitarian motives do not serve the same justificatory purpose that they did in the colonial era.

Yet self-interest and humanitarianism remain intertwined in today's complex peacekeeping operations. Not only is this because peacekeeping operations are undertaken for both interest-based and humanitarian reasons. It is also because humanitarian actions have rational, objective benefits for the countries leading these operations, and help to motivate the choices that are made. At some level, all humanitarian efforts undertaken by peacekeeping forces have a self-interested component, since they help to demonstrate the good will of those who have intervened (especially military troops who might otherwise look intimidating).[70] In turn this can serve an intelligence function for the peacekeepers, since the citizenry who believe that the military presence is benign are more likely to be forthcoming with useful information.

Beyond this, though, examples from Haiti and Bosnia help to demonstrate the range of state political motives lying behind the design of humanitarian actions. These examples illustrate once again the twin dangers of complex peacekeeping operations: either doing too little because of the lack of political will to see an operation through to its conclusion, or trying to do so much that it becomes impossible to leave while still maintaining control over developments.

In Haiti in 1994, the primary goal of the U.S. government was to get out quickly and hand over operations to the United Nations. Despite the managerial role that U.S. forces initially adopted inside Haitian governmental institutions (outlined in the previous chapter), American troops were specifically instructed not to engage in humanitarian activities that could be classified as economic development. Those tasks were to be left to nongovernmental aid organizations,[71] while the troops were to focus only on humanitarian tasks related to their immediate mission goals of overseeing secure elections and then leaving. In the words of one of the officers deployed to Haiti, "The MNF had to walk a fine line between restoring critical services and infrastructure and supplanting the very institutions they were trying to resurrect."[72] As a result humanitarian assistance was limited to fulfilling the immediate, pressing needs of the population, rather than anything that might be considered "nation-building."[73]

The United States wanted to ensure that it did not create a situation where the Haitian population became dependent on its presence in the country.[74] Military engineers rebuilt electrical and water supply systems in Haiti to get them functioning again, and put major effort into reconstructing prisons to make them both secure and humane. These things were consistent with the goal of restoring immediate order so that elections could be held. But the troops in Haiti did not get involved in village reconstruction or business development aid, the way they later would in the Balkans.

It turned out that the nongovernmental aid organizations arrived on the scene later than expected, and there was a sense that they lacked good coordination of their activities. This meant that while the strategy of limited aid allowed the United States to leave the country in quick order (serving Washington's primary interest in conserving its national resources for other tasks), it also contributed to a sense among the Haitian population that the United States was half-hearted in its intervention.[75] This may explain why the fundamental tenor of life in Haiti did not change very much in the ensuing years despite the change in government that the U.S. helped oversee. Serving immediate interests in state aid policy may have detracted from the longer-term interest in Haitian stability. This was reinforced by press reports in 2004, where Haitians on the ground were quoted as saying things like, "Last time around they didn't do much."

Bosnia presents a very different picture. Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative appointed to oversee the transition process in BiH in 2002, wrote that "Bosnia will be seen as a new model for international intervention—one designed not to pursue narrow national interests but to prevent conflict, to promote human rights and to rebuild war-torn societies."[76] Ashdown is correct that narrow national interests have been, at least for

the most part, subsumed under the interests of the international community as a whole in BiH.[77] It is nonetheless the case that the primary focus of humanitarian action there—reconstruction designed to foster the return of people displaced by the war—has been in tune with the national interests of the surrounding West European countries. Their goal has been to send their Balkan refugee populations home.

Germany's humanitarian policy in the Balkans stands out in this regard. German military construction units that are earmarked for humanitarian assistance work were deployed alongside other NATO troops in Bosnia, but not under NATO command; instead they were "co-located for national purposes." Their goal was specifically to encourage refugee returns, rather than other possible humanitarian goals, because Germany felt economically burdened by the presence of Balkan refugees on its soil.[78] This caused some officials at NATO headquarters to believe that the German troops were there primarily to serve German national interests.[79]

Yet Germany is not unique. While NATO troops as a whole have engaged in more immediate, purely humanitarian aid (such as flood relief and clothing donations), a major goal of all military humanitarian assistance work in Bosnia has been to encourage refugees to return. Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units have engaged in everything from road and bridge reconstruction around targeted villages,[80] to demining operations in destroyed housing sites,[81] to the rebuilding of electrical infrastructure,[82] for one major purpose: to facilitate the return of minority groups to their original homes. Even when the immediate relocation of displaced people has been merely from one area in BiH to another, the process had positive feedback on the overall refugee situation, since the internally displaced were themselves often occupying homes left by others because of the war.[83] When one group left, the other could return. Analysts for the U.S. Naval War College have called SFOR's policy in Bosnia "a policy of deliberate politicization of assistance."[84]

These military efforts have complemented the strategies of civilian aid agencies working in BiH. The European Commission, for example, has funded small-scale projects to encourage refugee returns, often disbursing this money through SFOR military civil affairs projects.[85] The European Union and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees together created what was called an "Open Cities" program, which targeted international reconstruction assistance to villages whose mayors expressed a willingness to allow and encourage refugee returns, and denied financial aid to those whose mayors opposed this goal.[86] National aid agencies supporting the peacekeeping efforts, including both the British Department for International Development (DFID) and the Canadian International Development

Agency (CIDA), have similarly focused their efforts on the return and reintegration of displaced persons to their original homes. Their conditional aid has gone, for example, to small business owners who employ multiethnic returnees, and who donate a significant share of their profits to multiethnic community rebuilding efforts.[87]

All of these efforts at encouraging returns in BiH have been designed to control political developments in the country, to ensure that an ethnically mixed polity emerges in the future. But their results have been indeterminate. On one hand, the overall number of returnees seems large. As of late 2002, UN High Commissioner on Refugees data indicated that 367,000 "minority returns" had occurred in BiH—in other words, cases where people chose to reclaim or rebuild homes in locales where they are members of ethnic minority populations, surrounded by members of the ethnic groups who had engaged in ethnic cleansing against them during the war. There are many examples where individual towns have regained the mixed ethnic balance levels they enjoyed before the war broke out.[88] This has happened under strong pressure from the international community for local officials to enforce the property reclamation laws that were put into effect under the Dayton process. It often required the international community to intrude into the details of local contracts and land survey assessments.[89]

Yet many of those who have taken repossession of their homes have done so merely to sell or exchange them, because they believed that as ethnic minorities they lacked good opportunities for education and employment in hostile ethnic areas.[90] When home-owners have returned, it is often older members of the family who have gone back, since working-age people have found better jobs in other locations. The schooling available to ethnic minority children is also often inferior to that available elsewhere.[91] Perhaps the greatest indicator that ethnic reintegration has moved more slowly in BiH than the international community had hoped is that in the October 2002 general elections, held seven years after the Dayton accords had been signed, the same nationalist parties responsible for waging the war still did quite well. Even durable and well-funded humanitarian efforts that are directed at political change are difficult to make succeed.

International Law and the Justification of Foreign Control

One key indicator of the importance that countries place on justifying their actions in the public eye, whatever their true underlying motives, is their decision to turn to international law to support their choices. Great Britain, France, and the United States all actively participated in the drawing

up of a series of international agreements about colonialism in Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They wanted to legitimate their actions in the eyes of international law as it existed at that time. They also saw international law as a means for furthering their control over territory, by limiting what their competitors could do in response to their own actions.

The diplomatic agreements of that era reflected the obligation these states believed themselves to have to work toward humanitarian goals in their colonies. The most prominent example was the Berlin Conference General Act of 1885, an international agreement signed by the major European and American powers at a conference convened by Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the German Empire. The primary purpose of the act was to draw up borders and divide the African continent into distinct colonial jurisdictions, to prevent unnecessary war and protectionist trade competition among the imperial states. This contributed to the imperialists' overall goal of saving money; when geographical areas were recognized as belonging to particular empires, there was less need to defend them from the predatory ambitions of other states.[92]

But this agreement also contained a humanitarian plank. It said that:

> All the powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforementioned [African] territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the Slave Trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favor all religious, scientific, or charitable institutions and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.[93]

A later conference convened in Brussels in 1889–90 continued to focus the attention of the imperial states on the need to abolish the slave trade, as well as to control the trade in small arms, in their African colonies.[94]

The *legal* components of these agreements have been criticized for their frailty. There were no binding treaties passed, merely agreements that did not require ratification in parliament. Boundaries between imperial holdings in Africa were recognized primarily because it was in the imperialists' self-interest to do so, and not because of the existence of the accords themselves.[95] And as far as humanitarianism is concerned, some analysts claim that the good intentions reflected in the documents remained only on paper.[96] The references to moral obligations were vague, and may have been inserted primarily to satisfy the missionaries who attended the pro-

ceedings. Tellingly in this regard, the Berlin Conference did not recognize the principle of self-determination. Africans themselves were not invited to participate in the meetings.[97] The American representative to the Berlin Conference raised this as an issue for discussion, suggesting that local consent and self-determination were important humanitarian issues, but he was rebuffed. The European imperialists wanted to preserve their freedom to make ad hoc arrangements with individual local chieftains whom they might buy off from time to time, and to avoid overarching legal recognition of any specific model of local African authority.[98]

The neglect of self-determination was seen to be legitimate because the international legal principles of that time did not apply universally to all international actors. Instead, as Robert H. Jackson eloquently notes, sovereignty, or the right (and responsibility) to control one's own territorial destiny, was assumed to belong only to states who accepted the norms of Western civilization. States were recognized as legitimate holders of "positive sovereignty" when their existence was based on some kind of constitutional order, and when they were considered to be responsible actors by other holders of sovereignty.[99] This meant that the legal principle of sovereignty divided the world into two categories: those who were members of the club because of their high moral standing, and those who were fated to be dependencies because of their continuing threat of unruliness. In effect, there was the world of the settled and acceptable West, and the backward, disordered rest.[100] Africa was considered *terra nullius* (land without prior ownership), even though it was populated, because no "civilized" state had owned the land before.[101]

The effort to legitimate colonialism through the use of international law reflected the paternalism of the entire humanitarian impulse at that time. The imperialists had to take care of their colonies because the colonies were incapable of taking care of themselves. The colonies were like children, needing guidance from states who were more mature. International law, in the words of Ethan A. Nadelman, had its roots "in the notions and patterns of acceptable behavior established by the more powerful Western European states," reflecting European dominance.[102]

It would be easy to stop there and say that there is only a surface resemblance between the colonial use of international law to justify empire, and the modern use of international law by the United Nations system in its peacekeeping operations. Today's international law, after all, is universal, not imposed by the great powers. But the two-tiered legal system of paternalistic oversight continued throughout the era of decolonization, first with the League of Nations mandate system, and then through the UN Trusteeship Council. It began to unravel only when Third World states

started to be granted independent voices in the UN General Assembly in the late 1960s.[103]

Some might suggest that it would be better to compare complex peacekeeping operations, and the way that the international community uses them to control political developments in particular territories, to the UN trusteeship system than to colonialism. Trusteeship is a less politically charged term, and its oversight by the UN implies a multilateralist beneficence that colonialism lacks. Conceptually, however, trusteeship was based on the same legitimating principles of inequality and paternalism that colonialism used, and was no more palatable to its subjects. When it was devised as a system, shortly after the UN was founded at the close of World War II, the UN was dominated by the same three powers whose imperialism is discussed here: the United States, Great Britain, and France.

International law plays a much more important role today in legitimating state action on complex peacekeeping missions that it did in the imperial era. Resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council are binding on all UN members, and the mandates they set for peacekeeping missions genuinely direct and limit the actions that are taken in the field. States tend to accept the norms behind these international laws because they wish to maintain reputations for being good international actors. This means that international discussions about who will administer a war-torn territory under which sets of laws, about who will command a peacekeeping mission and which rules will limit the use of force, and about who is responsible for which kinds of political and economic development assistance, have practical implications and are not just paper agreements.

Yet a similarly tiered system of international authority is still in place, even though it no longer divides sovereign from nonsovereign states. The most crucial tier is based on the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain were the victors in World War II. Together they set up an international legal system, the UN Charter, which they hoped would guarantee their continued cooperation after the war and would reward their allies while ensuring that neither Germany nor Japan could threaten international security in the future. They made themselves, their ally France, and (what was then nationalist) China the permanent five (P-5) members of the UN Security Council, thereby giving themselves and their friends the authority to create and enforce binding resolutions on the international community.[104] The veto power that they maintain to this day helps to determine what is considered legitimate and illegitimate in international intervention (even though it does not determine whether such intervention takes place). It helps to ensure that UN authorized peace operations remain under the control of the great powers.

All UN member states must abide by the resolutions passed by the Security Council, including resolutions that set up peacekeeping operations. Only the P-5 may veto a resolution, and this means that their tacit support is achieved through private negotiation before any realistic peacekeeping resolution is brought to the table.[105] This makes them an exclusive club for important negotiations. Ten additional states sit on the Security Council as rotating members, and nine affirmative votes from the 15-member Council are required for a measure to pass, so the P-5 cannot rule without the support of other UN members. They nonetheless effectively control the mandates behind the creation of peacekeeping missions, because nothing can be implemented in the Security Council without their approval. In the words of Barry O'Neill, the rotating members of the Security Council have "tiny power," since "it is rare that a nonveto player will be in a position to make a difference."[106]

This same P-5 has an overwhelming level of influence over who gets appointed to the position of UN Secretary General, since each of them can veto potential candidates. While the Secretary General's office has little direct authority, its holder can set the agenda of discussion through public pronouncements and quiet diplomacy. As a result the Secretary General helps influence where and how peacekeepers are sent on missions.

Together these things mean that the viewpoints of the P-5 end up dominating current discussions in the international community about what limits should be placed on complex peacekeeping activity. P-5 member China (which was granted the seat previously occupied by Taiwan in the early 1970s) sends very few peacekeepers abroad. Unless the question of recognition of Taiwan is somehow involved in a peacekeeping mandate, Beijing tends to remain relatively quiet about how peacekeeping missions are carried out. It may abstain on a key vote, rather than supporting a resolution, but its vetoes are rare.[107] Russia, the fifth member of the club (which inherited the seat occupied by the USSR when the Soviet Union ended in 1991), can sometimes stand in the way of peacekeeping mission approval. But in practice in recent years, Russian support for complex peacekeeping missions is usually obtained by the United States and Europe either through including Russian troops on missions near Russian territory (as was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo), or by making it clear that consensus is part of the overall package of Russian entry into the community of developed democracies.

Effectively what this means is that it is still the United States, Great Britain, and France who are the decisive voices in making complex peacekeeping policy. While most complex peacekeeping decisions now are multilateral, requiring support from other states in a way that colonial policy

did not, the same three states remain dominant players when it comes to decisions about intervening into the political systems of other countries. The same set of players still have the ability to make sure that international legal norms meet their own state self-interests. Universalism is not as strong a norm as it might first appear.

This was seen as recently as spring 2003 in the wrangling over intervention in Iraq: the crucial actors were the United States and Great Britain on one side, and France on the other, supported by Russia. One of the fundamental reasons that agreement could not be reached between them on authorizing an invasion of Iraq was that France and Russia came to loggerheads with the United States over their conflicting state interests. France and Russia wanted to maintain the oil contracts their state-supported companies had signed under the regime of Saddam Hussein, and also to limit Washington's ability in general to use its unprecedented military power unilaterally in ways that might be opposed to the interests of Paris and Moscow. The United States wanted the freedom to use its military resources as it saw fit for the sake of increasing its own ability to influence political developments in the region, and perhaps its own control of economic resources in the long run. All of the players used legal terminology in their debates in the United Nations, but it was fundamentally state interest that set the boundaries of international legal interpretation.

The fact that state interest underlies international law matters a great deal, now in particular, because peacekeeping operations have changed so much in recent years and are much more intrusive than they used to be. As the previous chapter makes clear, over the past decade complex peacekeeping operations have infringed more and more on the sovereignty of the areas where they are deployed. This has been done largely on the initiative of the liberal democratic great powers, who see intervention to safeguard human rights as a legitimate activity. The practice has been strongly endorsed by UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan—again reflecting the importance of the power to choose the Secretary General—who argued in 1999 that individuals have sovereignty as well as states, and that state sovereignty should not be a shield for human rights violations.[108] Many non-Western states, who are less powerful and who have contested human rights records themselves, objected to Annan's statements.[109] They pointed out that the UN Charter is based on the fundamental principle of defense of state sovereignty against aggression. The controversy was reflected in Annan's Millennium Report a year later, which spoke of the dilemma the UN faced between defending humanity and defending sovereignty.[110]

But the liberal democratic mindset is clearly winning the struggle. With

time, peacekeeping operations in practice are becoming more and more associated with the ceding of territorial sovereignty to the international community. The 1995 Dayton Accords set up the intrusive Office of the High Representative for BiH, which has the right to fire democratically elected officials and mandate laws by fiat in order to move the country in the direction the international community wants it to go. The interim administration for Kosovo was appointed by UN officials in 1999 to oversee everything from the creation of new police and judiciary systems to education and health policy. While a Kosovo-wide assembly was democratically elected in November 2001, and a president chosen the following February, UNMIK refused to accept a framework text that said "the express will of the people" would determine Kosovo's future, because the Security Council has not yet reached agreement about whether Kosovo should become an independent state or remain a province of Serbia.[111] And in East Timor, the United Nations effectively ran the country for more than two years, amidst complaints that outsiders were not taking sufficient measures either to encourage or to train members of the local population to take over government duties.

In other words, even though the international legal framework that guides peacekeeping operations is much more robust than the one which justified (at least in the minds of the occupiers) colonial occupation, and even though there is no question that peacekeeping operations have a strong humanitarian component, the same basic power structure (with its attendant set of state interests) continues to function today. Despite many statements that peacekeeping is designed to assist self-determination, the great powers (with the exception of the 1994 Haiti mission) have not been overly eager to relinquish sovereignty to the people living in the areas where peacekeepers are sent. Instead, as the previous chapter emphasizes, their goal has been to maintain international dominance in these regions until the trajectory of events demonstrates that liberal democratic values have taken hold. The goal is to control political developments in territories not yet ready for independent statehood.

It appears that the United States in 2003 began to take this trend a step further. It acted unilaterally in Iraq with a few well-chosen friends, not truly multilaterally, and its policies thus flew in the face of international law. Yet it appears that one major goal of the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq was to forcibly establish a more liberal democratic regime in Baghdad, which would then spread its influence to the entire Middle East region.[112] In other words, the conjunction of interests and humanitarianism in empire may have come full circle, in ways that set the course of peacekeeping operations in the future.

Why the Similarities Matter

When all of these comparisons are drawn together, the fundamental message that comes through is that states leading complex peacekeeping operations, like states leading colonial occupations, will make choices that they perceive as being in accordance with their security interests. They will intervene in ugly humanitarian crises, as they earlier intervened in their colonial possessions, only when they can do so at limited cost, and only when they can justify their actions as preserving important national goals. On these peacekeeping missions, they will pursue liberal democratic assistance policies that are designed to further their ultimate ends of establishing a secure international environment, much as the humanitarian actions of a century ago furthered the desire to expand the boundaries of the "civilized" world. In both cases, these ultimate ends are associated with a desire to control the direction of political developments in the countries where intervention is occurring.

This means that the designers of complex peacekeeping operations may be able to learn something from the colonial experience about what happens when outsiders try to control the political events in foreign societies. In the earlier imperial era, these attempts often backfired because concern about costs, coupled with insufficient political will, meant that the grand humanitarian goals of the capitals were not realized in practice. For different reasons and through different trajectories, a similar disconnect between goals and means is evident today. It is this topic that the next chapter addresses.