TWO

PEACEKEEPING AND CONTROL

Vitina, Kosovo, April 2002

The American platoon, wearing Kevlar helmets and bulky flak jackets over their camouflage gear, left their humvees and moved out on a foot patrol. These patrols happened several times a day in Vitina, now a relatively peaceful town in the American-led military peacekeeping sector of Kosovo. Soldiers armed with large automatic weapons walked at the edges of the main patrol, scanning the surroundings for trouble.

Today was Wednesday, market day. Hundreds of townspeople milled around the soldiers, seemingly without fear. Most of the people were on foot, but some drove trucks or tractors. One tractor pulled an open trailer, on which was perched a calf. Brightly colored stalls sold everything from live, trussed-up chickens to newly made wooden cabinets, and fruit and vegetable sellers lined the streets. Albanian music blared from stalls selling CDs. Small boys slapped high-fives with the soldiers, and groups of teenage girls giggled as they threaded their way, hand in hand, past the troops. Through their local interpreters, the American soldiers chatted occasionally with passers-by, looking in particular for information about either smuggling or ethnic disturbances in town. One man tried to interest the soldiers in some rolled-up posters of local scenery he was selling, but the soldiers were forbidden by U.S. military regulations from buying anything off base. This kept a certain distance between the troops and the populace. Later there would be random vehicle inspection points set

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Vitina, Kosovo, April 2002 (*continued*)

up, checking for guns, drugs, or illegally shipped cigarettes that circumvented the taxes the internationally led administration of Kosovo imposed on imports.

Before the war in Kosovo, Vitina had had a troubled history. Over the years its population had shifted back and forth between being dominated by ethnic Albanians and Serbs, depending on how political developments favored one group over the other. Now, according to the American forces, it was 91 percent Albanian, and the remaining Serbs were mostly elderly people who were there either because they lacked the money to move back to Serbia proper, or because they wanted to die at home. The rest had fled in fear of revenge attacks from the ethnic Albanians, following NATO's victory over Slobodan Milosevic in June 1999. The Americans had tried to encourage ethnic Serb merchants to come into town on market days to sell their goods, but so far with little success. Those on the ethnic Serb side of the river that cut through town didn't mingle much with the Albanians thronging the market.

At the end of their patrol the soldiers crossed the bridge to the town's Serbian Orthodox church. One wall of gold-embossed icons inside the church dated from the Middle Ages. Guard towers built by the Americans loomed over both entrances to the walled church compound, which also included the residence of a key religious leader, and coils of concertina wire surrounded the rest. The church was guarded 24 hours a day by American soldiers dressed in "full battle rattle," automatic weapons at the ready. The commanders of the American sector would like to remove the guards and use their scarce resources elsewhere, but there is no one else to do the job. The local (primarily ethnic Albanian) police say they will investigate if anyone harms the church, but insist that guarding religious buildings is not their responsibility. Awhile back in the nearby town of Podgorce, the Americans had tried removing a similar set of church guard posts after months of seeming peace. Within hours of the American withdrawal, the Podgorce Serbian church had burned to the ground. It is generally believed that if the Americans were to leave Vitina, the Serb population here would have to leave as well.

Two members of the foot patrol relieved the guards at the Vitina church, and the platoon returned to its humvees for the ride back to base. It was another ordinary day in Kosovo, where ethnic harmony was absent but ethnic peace was preserved by foreign troops. Experts agreed: there was no reasonable prospect that international military forces could leave the territory anytime soon.

As the Vitina example makes clear, international peacekeeping operations have changed drastically in recent years. While some more traditional UN missions are still in place (as in Cyprus), and a few new ones in the old style (as in Ethiopia and Eritrea) have been created, the trend has moved toward operations that blur the distinctions between peacekeeping, postwar societal reconstruction, and forceful intervention. These new operations intrude much more deeply into the domestic political institutions of the societies where they are based, and the use of military force (especially to achieve deterrence, protection, and law enforcement) is intimately connected with their attempts to create political change in foreign societies. If liberal, tolerant political cultures refuse to emerge on their own, then foreign troops will attempt to facilitate them.

Military personnel on peacekeeping missions have taken on the roles of police officers and humanitarian aid decisionmakers in the service of their governments. The governments that send the troops are often the same ones who help direct the path that political developments take in the societies where military operations are deployed. The overall goal of the international community in these cases, led by the states of North America, Western Europe, and Oceania, has been to build liberal democratic political institutions and to foster tolerant and cooperative social orders in societies where these things would not occur naturally on their own.

These goals are decent and progressive. They speak to the desire of good Samaritans throughout the world to stand up for the rights and dignity of the dispossessed and unfortunate. Yet they raise a set of ethical and practical dilemmas. The international community believes itself to be acting on behalf of popular self-determination, in areas of the world where brutal autocracies have silenced democratic expression and have arbitrarily picked political winners and losers. But what should be done when unbridled popular self-determination would lead to an illiberal and intolerant outcome in a foreign country? As Fareed Zakaria has pointed out, democratic states are not necessarily liberal, and attempts to foster democracy may result in policies that the liberal international community finds distasteful.[1] In the example outlined above, independent democratic governance in Kosovo—where many of the dominant ethnic Albanians retained their distrust and hatred of the ethnic Serbs whom they saw as their former persecutors—would likely have led to the expulsion or marginalization of Serbs as a group. This is something that the international community does not want to tolerate, and that is why American troops have been guarding Serbian churches.

A further dilemma arises because the international community is using military force to try to ensure that a favored set of democratic liberal institutions becomes accepted in the country in question. In Kosovo, for

example, a majority of both the ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serb popula-
tions would probably have favored partition of their territory along ethnic
lines, since that would give each of them a sense of security and control over
their destiny. But the international community did not want to allow that
to happen because ethnic separation would undermine the message of tol-
erance it wanted to send. There was concern that if ethnic separatism were
to be tolerated here, it would encourage nationalists in other states to
undertake similar ethnic cleansing campaigns without fear of international
reprisal. Yet what message has the peacekeeping regime sent the population
of Kosovo about how politics really operates? If foreign troops are used to
impose institutions against the will of a domestic majority, it is still might
that determines right inside that society. The only question then remaining
is whether the good guys or the bad guys are the stronger element. If liberal
democratic outcomes are imposed by outsiders rather than truly freely cho-
sen, what will happen when the foreign military forces leave? Finally, if the
answer is that those forces can't leave until years or perhaps generations
pass and the societal culture changes to accept the validity of the new insti-
tutions, how do the powerful states of the world deal with the resulting
practical problems of overextension and limited resources that they face, so
that halfway, temporary measures don't become the politically expedient
alternative?

This chapter describes how these dilemmas arose in the peacekeeping
operations of the 1990s. Members of the international community, espe-
cially the wealthy liberal western democracies who have typically led com-
plex peacekeeping operations, have a tendency to seesaw back and forth on
these questions, either doing so much for a society that their presence is
resented as an intrusion, or doing so little that their presence is resented for
its half-heartedness. The world casts about for the correct combination of
trying to force change on recalcitrant societies, while trying to encourage
those societies to "own" the process of change themselves. The question that
keeps on returning is how much control outsiders can and should try to exert
over societies where western enlightenment values—of individualism, toler-
ance, and appreciation for the marketplace of both goods and ideas—are
absent. At what point does the effort to exert control become self-defeating,
and even counterproductive to the international community's goals?

The Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations

The idea that peacekeeping forces can help influence political trajectories
in the societies where they are deployed is a new one. Peacekeeping didn't

used to be so complex, costly, or dangerous; it didn't used to try to do so much. When "peacekeeping" as a concept was first invented in response to the Suez canal crisis of 1956[2] (the concept does not appear in the UN Charter), the international military forces deployed on such operations were used for a very different purpose from today. Their main mission then was simply to bolster the confidence of each side involved in a ceasefire that the fighting had truly stopped. Traditional peacekeeping forces monitored each side's military activity and reported what they observed. They often provided a buffer against a resumption of fighting, by deploying in border regions so that they would serve as likely victims of any renewed military attacks. This was thought to deter both sides from resuming the battle, as the international community would supposedly be outraged if peacekeepers were killed—although it is questionable whether that proved true, since UN facilities in Lebanon, for example, have repeatedly come under attack. Sometimes traditional peacekeepers also collected the weapons of forces who were voluntarily disarming, and oversaw exchanges of prisoners of war.

International military personnel then went in with the full agreement of all the parties to the conflict. Indeed, they were usually asked in by the parties themselves, who believed that the impartiality of the multinational troops made them trustworthy observers of the situation. They served under United Nations command. The UN Secretary General would appoint the head of each military operation, usually choosing an officer from a neutral country located far from the region where fighting had occurred. Battalions of soldiers were provided to these missions by a wide variety of neutral countries. These countries had varying motives for doing this, but were not particularly interested in the outcome of the conflicts at hand. Some so-called "middle powers" in the international system believed that contributing troops to UN operations would bring them greater respect and authority in international institutions, allowing them to exercise more voice in international security issues than they would otherwise be able to do.[3] Canada and India are examples of countries that frequently participated in UN peacekeeping operations for this apparent reason. Other very poor countries seemed simply to value the money the UN sent them, up to $1,000 per soldier per month,[4] which more than covered their costs and provided a boost to their defense ministry budgets. During the cold war, the great powers almost never donated troops to UN operations, in large part because to do so would appear to violate the impartiality that the UN was supposed to maintain in every operation. At that time, the Soviets and Americans took sides in virtually every conflict anywhere in the world.

The goals of the peacekeepers in previous times were not complicated, and their work was often dull. General Lewis Mackenzie noted that the major problem Canadian officers faced in that first peacekeeping mission in the Gaza strip in 1963 was that their soldiers drank too much because they didn't have enough work to do.[5] A few years later in Cyprus, he recalled that the soldiers sometimes did have shots fired at them from the formerly warring sides, but said that the shots appeared to be designed to miss.[6] Another retired Canadian officer who served in the Cyprus mission jokingly called it "Club Med, in comparison to what these guys do today," since he remembers spending most of his time there at the beach.[7] Traditional peacekeepers used their military training to carry out traditional military activities in ways that provided reassurance after ceasefires had been attained. They did not get involved in trying to create political change. (The one exception was the controversial ONUC mission to Congo in the early 1960s, which was transformed mid-mission into an attempt to put down regional rebel resistance against the authorities in the capital.[8])

Traditional peacekeepers were not assigned to help international aid agencies decide which villages were deserving of assistance, and which were recalcitrant and hence undeserving of help. Nor were they there to control ethnically motivated rioting and mob violence in the absence of honest local police. They did not attempt to oversee the humane treatment of displaced people returning home after a war, to ensure the equitable handling of the concerns of ethnic minorities, or to stop the smuggling of guns and drugs across porous borders. (All of these things are tasks that peacekeepers do perform today.) They were not there, in other words, to control political events on a piece of occupied territory. In fact traditional peacekeeping operations were usually set up in empty strips of land where no civilians were likely to be present. As Erwin A. Schmidl notes, they were most successful when they operated in the desert.[9]

The peacekeeping operations which began to emerge in the early 1990s look quite different from this. Many scholars and policy analysts have written detailed histories of these developments, and it is not necessary to repeat those histories here.[10] The striking change was that the United Nations became willing to get involved in civil conflicts, not just wars between sovereign states, in areas of the world ranging from Cambodia to Somalia and Bosnia to Haiti, where the underlying level of intractable violence and political uncertainty was extraordinarily high. The notion of monitoring simple ceasefires became meaningless in conflicts where the warring parties were not sovereign states but informal rebel groups with factional splits. There was often no way to determine definitively which party had ordered a ceasefire to be broken. The motive for war was often

no longer simply to change geographical boundaries but to divide political spoils inside societies; and the conflict was over who would control the wealth and who had the power to allocate it.

This meant, in the eyes of the international community, that peace would now come only through change in domestic political institutions, especially electoral and legal and judicial systems. The international community hoped that if all members of a conflict-ridden society could achieve adequate political representation and the opportunity for economic advancement, then peaceful competition would replace war as the primary means for conflict resolution. Perhaps the best statement of the international community's sentiments on these matters is contained in the August 2000 "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," convened by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and led by Lakhdar Brahimi. Peace operations are thought to encompass the activities of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building, and the latter category is said to include "reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law . . . , improving respect for human rights . . . ; providing technical assistance for democratic development, and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques," among other things.[11] The international community wanted political change to last in war-torn societies that had earlier been subject to the whims of corrupt and sadistic leaders, which meant that the United Nations had to change its traditional approach to peacekeeping. The goal was no longer just to stop the fighting, but also to fix the political and societal conditions that had made war seem attractive to those who waged it.

At first the international community struggled to address these new, complex humanitarian crises with minor modifications of traditional peacekeeping tools. These attempts largely failed. Throughout the early 1990s, the United Nations learned again and again that halfway measures were futile. Yet repeatedly, the international community raised high hopes for lasting peace while deploying inadequate resources, with insufficient political will to see the process through to its conclusion. Members of the international community, especially the wealthy western states who had sufficient resources to assume the lead, were reluctant to take on the burden of imposing change on foreign societies. As a result, change did not occur.

The Failures of the Early 1990s

The decade of complex peacekeeping operations began with a partial success, as what was originally designed to be a more traditional operation—

the UNTAC mission deployed under UN command to Cambodia between 1992 and 1993—was able to adapt on the ground to some of the complex circumstances it faced. Following the achievement of a ceasefire between forces fighting a long civil war, the primary goal of the mission was to ensure security in the country so that presidential elections could go safely forward. As would become standard in other missions as time went on, the UNTAC operation was plagued by inadequate resources, especially too few civilian police personnel, and by the inherent difficulties the UN always faces in coordinating troop activities among the different states who donate forces.

The military component of the UNTAC mission was unable to achieve its original mandates of disarming the various factions that had fought Cambodia's bloody civil war, and of establishing a neutral political environment throughout the country in the months leading up to democratic elections. The idea that lightly armed troops under traditional impartial rules of operation could do this was an illusion. Yet UN military troops did succeed in adapting to a different set of needs that they discovered on the ground after they arrived. The police protection that had been envisioned for international poll workers and voters turned out to be inadequate, so military troops, led by their Australian commander Lt. General John Sanderson, stepped in to provide security instead, even though that technically exceeded their mandate. They also succeeded in establishing a successful mine-clearing operation, and educated local Cambodians to take over the process themselves. Sanderson in particular is further credited with convincing the brutal Khmer Rouge faction in Cambodia to cooperate with the international community to a surprising degree,[12] despite its unwillingness to forswear violence. Military officers, in other words, turned out to be good diplomatic negotiators.

Political order was never completely established in the country, and Cambodian civilians never gained a satisfactory level of personal security.[13] Retribution killings and other forms of political violence remained common. Nonetheless, civilian UN officials also claimed some significant successes in the operation. They reworked Cambodia's governmental institutions to make them more compatible with democratic rule. Elections were successfully held, and a new regime was voted in.

Ultimately, however, intervention by the international community failed to accomplish the goal of achieving lasting political change in Cambodia. Political violence continued long after the UNTAC mission went home, and a 1997 military coup heralded the return of autocratic rule in the country.[14] In the absence of continuing oversight by the international community, liberal democratic change did not endure. No one from the outside

world had a sufficient stake in the outcome, or was willing to provide sufficient resources, to maintain the trajectory that the 1993 elections set. The international community began to understand that the old model of peacekeeping, based on the impartiality of the players rather than any strong state interest in the outcome of the crisis, needed rethinking.

The mixed outcome of the Cambodia operation was followed by the first dramatic failure of the new era, as the international community attempted to grapple with the difficult new circumstances of peacekeeping. This failure occurred in a series of missions to the east African state of Somalia, during the period 1992–1995. The original goal of the first UN–commanded peacekeeping mission there had been simply to feed the starving population, in a country where warlords intercepted all the emergency relief that crossed the border in order to resell it on the black market. With time it became clear that a stronger military presence in Somalia was required to protect humanitarian aid workers; the old model of impartial troop deployments was inadequate for these new circumstances. The strongest Somali warlord, Mohammed Aideed, was a particular thorn in the UN's side as he continued to attack aid convoys even after the UN-commanded troops arrived.

A new and separate U.S.-commanded mission was deployed under UN Security Council authorization to try to deal with this problem, but failed to establish sufficient coordination with the ongoing UN-commanded mission on the ground. At times the political purposes of the two missions seemed at odds with each other. U.S. leaders who saw the UN bureaucracy as inefficient and even corrupt wanted to avoid being tainted by their contribution to the operation. In the words of U.S. Army colonel Kenneth Allard, "What aggravated this situation . . . was a perception problem of avoiding even the appearance of having our forces under UN command."[15] The Pentagon, supported by key Republican congressional leaders, wanted to maintain American control over U.S. troops, and seemingly did not recognize the difficulties that complete independence created in the midst of an ongoing and overlapping UN operation.

One particular sore point was the question of how Aideed should be treated, and whether he should be punished for his actions. Some members of the UN-commanded mission wished to maintain the traditional peacekeeper's neutrality toward all the players in the civil conflict. This was reinforced by the fact that Aideed had been a diplomatic player in years past, serving for awhile as Somalia's ambassador to India, and had friends among those states who were big donors to UN operations. India indeed had a large number of peacekeeping troops in Somalia. The U.S. forces, on the other hand, were specifically tasked by the UN Security Council to go

after Aideed, in an attempt to capture him or at least curtail his ability to operate freely. When the poor coordination of missions led by two different authorities was combined with a muddled understanding of the international community's ultimate political purposes in the country, the results were tragic.

The tragedy is chronicled in the popular movie *Black Hawk Down*, drawn from the book of the same title written by Mark Bowden, who interviewed dozens of both Americans and Somalis involved in the events of October 1993. Eighteen American soldiers and more than 1,000 Somalis were killed in a marketplace fire-fight in the capital of Mogadishu, after U.S. forces attempted on their own to capture some of Aideed's top men in an area where Aideed was buoyed by large numbers of civilian supporters with guns.[16] Two of the dead U.S. soldiers' bodies were dragged through the streets by the warlord's armed vehicles afterwards, and graphic footage of these events was broadcast to the U.S. public by CNN and other media sources. The perception arose, especially within the Pentagon and among outspoken Republicans in the U.S. Senate, that American soldiers were being killed far from home for no good reason. The United States military gradually withdrew from the mission, and became reluctant to involve itself in future humanitarian efforts where a clear-cut sense of national interest was not at stake.

No other state stepped in to take the lead after the American withdrawal. As a result, what had been some very successful efforts at refugee relief and local institution-building in the earlier days of the Somali peacekeeping mission were overturned as chaos returned to the country.[17] Without a robust force deployment by a lead state with the will to remain, the warlords managed to drive the UN away. A decade later, Somalia continued to be a leading example of a failed state, with no real central government to provide for the protection and well-being of its citizens.[18]

Immediately on the heels of the Somalia debacle came the Rwandan genocide.[19] This time around, the UN Security Council did not even attempt to grapple with the disconnect between the mandate and resources of the traditional peacekeeping operation already on the ground in the country, and the reality of the events that it faced. In spring 1994 more than 800,000 people in the small central African state of Rwanda, mostly innocent civilians who were ethnic Tutsis, were massacred by their fellow citizens who were ethnic Hutus. The butchering of neighbors by neighbors was fomented by extremist Hutus who had taken charge of the country's government, broadcast ethnic hate messages on the radio, and stockpiled machetes to hand out to their frenzied supporters. These extremists saw themselves as gaining retribution for the humiliations of an earlier era,

when ethnic Tutsis had ruled the country and relegated them to the status of an underclass.

A United Nations peacekeeping force of 2,000 troops was deployed in Rwanda at the time, designed to act as a traditional separation and monitoring force between the Hutu-dominated government and an armed, largely Tutsi rebel organization that had been fighting it. But the international community did not take account of the Rwandan government's hatred of all *ethnic* Tutsis. Most Tutsis in the country did not support the rebel force, and in contrast to the simultaneous war going on at that time in the Balkans, the Rwandan civil war did not seem on the surface to be about ethnicity. UN troops were authorized to act only as a traditional buffer force between the government and rebels, and were prohibited from taking any action to stop the violence among civilians. Their commander was in fact repeatedly told to continue to work with the Rwandan government, since the UN was there with that government's permission. The traditional notion that peacekeepers were there with the consent of the host state limited what those in Rwanda could do.

As signs of impending government-instigated mass violence began to appear, the commander of this UN force, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire, made repeated requests to the United Nations to beef up his operation with more troops and a broader, stronger mandate. His requests were denied. Neither the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations nor the Security Council paid much attention to the warnings, even though we now know that the international diplomatic community received adequate intelligence about what was happening on the ground and should have been aware that genocide was a real possibility. As a result of the international community's failure to act, Dallaire's peacekeepers were forced to watch helplessly as the genocide unfolded. Some Belgian troops on the UN mission were themselves butchered in the massacre.

Dallaire testified afterward that if only he had been given 5,000 adequately armed troops, along with the authorization to use force to seize key points, patrol the streets, and disarm those who were threatening others, the carnage could have been prevented. Many seasoned observers with military and peacekeeping experience second Dallaire's estimation. Even those who disagree with his complete analysis believe that early action by a robust peacekeeping force could have saved many thousands of lives.[20] Instead the international community failed to deploy military personnel in a way that would have changed the political situation in Rwanda, fearing the danger both to their own personnel and to the UN's reputation if another peacekeeping disaster were to happen. Especially following the earlier debacle in Somalia, the United States government was unwilling to

become involved in what was seen as yet another doomed humanitarian military mission in Africa. This reluctance to provide leadership to the rest of the international community has been singled out by most observers as the major cause of the UN's failure to act.

The next year, to add to the carnage plaguing the world, the newly independent Balkan country of Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed the horrors of yet another ethnic massacre, this one in the town of Srebrenica. A UN-commanded peacekeeping mission, UNPROFOR, had been sent to the former Yugoslavia in 1992 after several of its republics were recognized as independent countries. The hope was that UN involvement could dampen what everyone recognized was a tinderbox of ethnic nationalist conflict. Forces were deployed under a traditional peacekeeping mandate to try to stop war in its tracks by acting as a buffer between the parties, but the troops quickly learned that they were inadequately armed to deal with the violence they found on the ground. They also learned that to remain impartial toward the various warring sides didn't make sense in the face of the murderous ethnic cleansing, including death camps, massacres, and mass rapes, that was sweeping the region.[21] As time went on, UNPROFOR operations were further hampered by the kind of coordination problems that had plagued the mission in Somalia. This time, there were disagreements and unclear lines of control between the UN-commanded forces on the ground, and supporting strike aircraft from NATO, which had been authorized by the UN Security Council to lend force to the UN mission after the challenges of ethnic warfare became clear.

These factors together all played a role in the 1995 tragedy. The UN had established a supposed "safe area" in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, where Bosnian Muslim civilian refugees would be protected from the Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups who were trying to persecute them. But lightly armed Dutch peacekeeping troops on the UN mission were unable to stop the brutal murder of thousands of Muslims after Serbs overran the town. (It turned out that some Muslim forces had illegally retained guns inside the safe area. They were accused of using the town to stage strikes against the Serbs, who felt justified in retaliating against them, even though a later UN investigation found no evidence to support the claim.) Once again there were political disagreements within the international community about the importance of maintaining peacekeeper impartiality. Some advocates of traditional peacekeeping operations feared that if peacekeepers were perceived to be taking sides, they would then become targets of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary soldiers. (This fear turned out to be correct; some Canadian soldiers on the UN mission were taken hostage and used as human shields by Bosnian Serb fighters, and some French troops on the

UN mission were picked off by snipers.) These concerns prevented NATO forces from intervening in Srebrenica in time to stop the massacre.[22] Men and boys were separated from the women and girls in the town, without interference from the UN troops; approximately 7,000 males were systematically executed, with their bodies dumped in mass graves. It was this final failure of the international community to stop suffering and murder, while being forced to take sides in a brutal conflict anyway, that caused the wealthy western states to push for change in how peacekeeping operations would be undertaken in the future. Three tragedies, the last in Europe, were finally enough to cause change.

Complex Military Peacekeeping as a Concept

Led by the West European and North American states in the United Nations, the international community plunged into rethinking the purpose and design of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers now encountered not merely more violence among the fighting parties, but also a much greater threat to their own safety and ability to operate. This meant that they needed better armament and better coordination. The very presence of peacekeepers changed the political balance inside countries, since even if state parties to the conflicts accepted the international community's involvement at a technical level, these states did not always control the proxy groups who were actually involved in the fighting (or at least they found it convenient to pretend that they did not control them). Reassurance about the durability of ceasefires and the recognition of geographical boundaries was no longer sufficient to stop the fighting; wars were caught up in the design of domestic political institutions. As peacekeepers encountered incidents of atrocities committed against civilians by the warring parties, doubts grew about the wisdom of the old UN policy of absolute impartiality. To protect civilian populations against harm required the international community to take sides, and to declare that some of those engaged in the war had perpetrated wrongful acts that required punishment.

All of these factors caused the states sending troops on these missions to rethink their priorities. Operations had become very difficult, very expensive, and very dangerous, in a way that traditional peacekeeping didn't used to be. Peacekeeping began to look much more like war-fighting than it used to. After a brief period of euphoria following the end of the cold war about the chances for peacekeeping to change the world—exemplified by then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's calls for the United Nations to put political divisions behind it and intervene in the face of

virtually any threat to what he called "human security"[23]—what emerged was a rather cynical (if realistic) sense in the international community that everything hinged on "political will."

Such will is something that powerful and wealthy states tend not to display very often in the service of altruism. The states that were the best prepared to deal with complex military situations, and who could most afford to pay for them, did not need to prove themselves in the international system the way the middle powers did. Instead, state self-interest in the outcome of a conflict became a primary motive for complex peacekeeping intervention. Humanitarianism alone was no longer enough to warrant large, expensive and dangerous missions.

When combined with the new kinds of conflict being faced, the need to find peacekeepers with enduring political will also caused the international community to rethink the wisdom of keeping operations under UN command. In the old system, military units were contributed from dozens of countries who had usually never worked together before and lacked the ability to communicate easily with each other. They found it hard to coordinate their operations smoothly and to reach common understandings on key elements of the rules of engagement. The UN commanders themselves were often appointed at the last moment, just before deployment, and had little in the way of intelligence background reports to use in planning their operations. (With its stress on impartiality and its almost universal membership, the UN has not been able either to collect much intelligence on its own, or receive intelligence from states who obtain it for their own security purposes. The UN cannot be seen to be "spying," and states who do spy don't want their information or methods to become known to their potential enemies.) What was needed in these complicated new circumstances was instead well organized, trained and equipped troops who knew in advance what they were going to face and who had the political will to stay the course over the long term. Such troops tended not to come from neutral nations without an interest in the conflict. Instead, they came from powerful countries who had an incentive to see that peace was maintained.

When all of this was added together, it resulted in a new model of peacekeeping operations—what I call complex military peacekeeping. This new model has three basic components.

First, the goal was no longer simply to build confidence among formerly warring parties that the conflict had ended. Instead it was to rebuild domestic institutions from the ground up, to encourage societies to be both politically and culturally more tolerant and inclusive. War was no longer seen to be the result of miscalculation or misperception among states about the other side's intentions. Instead it resulted when deeply divided societies

encountered political and economic transition crises, where some groups were winners and others were losers, and resentment between the groups ran high. To stop war from happening again in the future, it was thought, the UN and other international organizations and NGOs had to become extensively involved in designing constitutions and legal and judicial systems, planning and overseeing elections, encouraging the development of political parties and free media, fostering refugee resettlement, economic reconstruction, and educational development, all of which would be directed toward building diverse and tolerant societies where everyone's basic needs were met. The international community intruded much more deeply into domestic societies than it had in the past, influencing and even directing the institutional development of countries where peacekeeping operations took place.[24]

Second, the military forces sent on peacekeeping operations now had to go in prepared for battle. In this new style of peacekeeping there is usually resistance to the international community's intervention. There are always certain parties on the ground who hope to gain something from continuing the war that the peacekeepers are trying to stop, or from undermining the institutions that outsiders are trying to build. Stephen John Stedman has called this the "spoiler problem," where war-enamored parties try to wait out or drive out the peacekeepers, and spoil the peace at a later time.[25] The international community has therefore tried to convince potential spoilers that the peacekeepers mean business. Large numbers of well-armed and well-equipped peacekeeping troops must be deployed for extended periods of time.

Soldiers now are required to be more heavily armed and better trained than before for a wider variety of contingencies. They are sent in under more robust mandates, approved by the UN Security Council, that have allowed them to use force if necessary to protect themselves and the other personnel involved in the broader UN and other international community missions that they are supporting, such as those from the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Sometimes the mandates have also allowed them to use force to protect the civilian populations they encounter on the ground. Earlier peacekeeping missions had been created under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, which allows the Security Council to "make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute" (this was the legal justification originally cited for peacekeeping, to make up for the fact that the concept is not in the Charter). Now the need for robust forces meant that mandates were created under Chapter 7 of the Charter instead, which allows the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or

restore international peace and security."[26] The use of force (including the implied threat of its use to deter new outbreaks of conflict) became a constituent component of peacekeeping missions as the 1990s wore on.

Third, because the risks and stakes of the operations were higher, they were most successfully conducted when carried out under a unified command, by states who had a strong interest in seeing peace succeed. As a result, the traditional style of UN command was replaced by the command of single states or state alliances like NATO, whose own troops were expertly trained and equipped to work together and who could lead so-called "coalitions of the willing" into difficult circumstances. State action was still authorized by the Security Council, and peacekeeping mission leaders reported back to the Security Council regularly, but states made their own decisions about how to proceed within the Security Council's mandate. They worked out their own rules of engagement, chose their own deployment locations and strategies, and selected who would be sent where to conduct which activities.

Together these things meant that the international community largely gave up on the notion that the parties involved in war were capable of determining their own futures. Peacekeepers were no longer there with the true and full consent of all parties—often the technical consent of the states involved was coerced under threat of military attack (as in Haiti in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995), or even after full-scale war (as in Kosovo in 1999)—and they were now expected to use force when necessary to achieve their goals. State sovereignty—the norm of mutual respect among states that had earlier kept civil war within states mostly off the UN agenda—would no longer be tolerated as a cover for armed brutality against innocent civilians, according to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.[27] At least this was true in wars where the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council were not direct participants. Those five members, who wielded the veto in Security Council resolutions, were spared the intrusiveness that other states faced. The key example here is the Russian war in its breakaway republic of Chechnya, where massive human rights violations on both sides have been well documented, but where the international community's access to the region has been tightly controlled and at times curtailed by the authorities in Moscow.

Elsewhere in the world, the international community, and especially its wealthy western members, declared that there was a preferred direction of domestic institutional development in war-torn societies, one which favored tolerance and liberal democratic values. Force would be used to protect the right of the international community to stay on the ground and oversee these transitions, against those who would use violence to threaten

the presence of outsiders. And those who had a national interest in seeing that the international community's preferred outcome was reached would take command, to provide more assurance that progress would be made.

Peacekeeping and Political Change

This combination of shifts in operational design, where societal change is directed by outsiders through the use of force, has led analysts to conclude that peacekeeping might bear some resemblance to colonialism. Obviously the intentions of the international community are benign in these recent cases; unlike the European and American empires of previous centuries, these new operations are not designed to plunder subject societies. But the level of control that outsiders attempt to maintain is very strong and very paternalistic, and it is that relationship of paternalism that has bothered some observers.

A new philosophical understanding of the rights and obligations of the international community has justified this use of force in complex peacekeeping operations since the middle of the 1990s. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan calls this understanding "induced consent,"[28] and Jarat Chopra, an academic who served as a UN administrator in East Timor during its transition to independence and democracy, believes that such induced consent is a necessary component of what he calls "peace maintenance."[29] The argument is as follows. When a society is led by corrupt and sadistic tyrants—whether those tyrants are state leaders or warlords—who practice violence and threaten international security, then the international community has the right to use force to promote peace, justice, and political change in that society even if the tyrants and their followers object. Intervention is not just about stopping wars, but about ensuring that societies move in a direction that the international community favors. In other words, it is about forcing societies to accept political change, even when such acceptance means eradicating patterns of ethnic intolerance or political violence that have been in place for generations.

Chopra bravely states that "Peace-maintenance is not some colonial enterprise. . . . The purpose and behavior of peace-maintenance is the opposite of colonialism."[30] Yet while Chopra's meaning is clear—complex peacekeeping is designed as a means to share the international community's wealth in both resources and experience, not as a means for one country to steal wealth from a weaker group—his statement is not quite right, and his insistence that the two concepts are opposites leaves an analytical gap. Indeed, as Michael W. Doyle points out, John Stuart Mill, one

of the classic nineteenth-century philosophers on the subject of state sovereignty and liberalism, argued that benign colonialism by the "civilized" countries in the "uncivilized" areas of the world was justified as a form of humanitarian intervention.[31] Colonialism and complex peacekeeping share the requirement that outsiders use military force to create political change inside a society that would not move in that direction on its own. They also share, as Neta Crawford puts it, "the failure to treat the intervened upon as if they were active agents" who were capable of determining their own futures without help from the outside world.[32]

It is arguable whether protection of *human* security has actually been the motivating idea behind complex peacekeeping. While humanitarianism has certainly been a fundamental goal of this intervention, there are plenty of places in the world where human security has been threatened and peacekeepers have not been deployed. What is clear, though, in the complex peacekeeping operations that have been put in place in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor and that were emerging in Afghanistan and Iraq by 2003 (and that were first undertaken in 1994 with some hesitation in Haiti), is that the international community has acted in the belief that without fundamental societal and political change, threats to *international* security emanating from unstable areas would not go away. Unless societies were remade, the outside world would continue to face danger as a result—from an outflow of refugees or organized crime and drug networks that destabilize foreign economies, from ethnic hatred that threatens to make wars wider, and from divided states whose implosions become chain reactions of retributional violence and humanitarian disaster demanding a response. This means that the goal of peacekeeping in these places has not been just to stop the killing and restore the immediate peace. Instead, it has been to encourage lasting institutional change.

The most successful instances of this new kind of operation have occurred where external authorities from the international community have a high degree of executive control over events in the territory, including political controls that limit the full expression of popular will.[33] The world learned by watching the events in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia in the early 1990s that the free expression of popular will can lead to mayhem, since popular will does not always equate with tolerance and peaceful conflict resolution. When outside control is missing, it becomes too easy for local actors opposed to liberal political change to obstruct the international community's efforts, and to subvert attempts to establish more tolerant and democratic political systems on their territories. Yet at the same time, a high degree of external control breeds both dependency and resentment among the subject population. It entails the danger of creating

new examples of the weak and angry postcolonial societies whose poverty and authoritarianism challenged the world in the cold war era.

The Eastern Slavonia Model?

The United Nations likes to have success stories. One example of complex military peacekeeping success that is repeatedly cited as showing the wisdom of firm control by the international community is the relatively short-term mission (known by the acronym of UNTAES) which was deployed in the small section of Croatia called Eastern Slavonia from 1996 through 1998. The goal of the UN-commanded mission was to supervise the return of this territory, which had been seized by ethnic Serb paramilitary forces during the Yugoslavian conflict of the early 1990s, to the control of the Croatian government. UNTAES successfully oversaw the withdrawal of Serbian troops, and the cessation of the ethnic cleansing campaigns that had earlier terrorized the population.

The administrator of UNTAES, Jacques Paul Klein, a civilian appointed by the UN Secretary General who was simultaneously a reserve major general in the U.S. Air Force, attributes his success in large part to the strong degree of control over societal developments that he was granted.[34] He could override the local population on any administrative issue without consulting them first,[35] and even had the power to limit the ability of non-governmental aid organizations to operate in Eastern Slavonia, "vett[ing them] to ensure their relevance and capability before letting them into the region."[36] In other words, he played a role similar to that of a colonial governor on the territory, determining the area's political shape on behalf of outsiders who wished to control its destiny.

UNTAES succeeded in stopping the violence in Eastern Slavonia and returning the territory to Croatian state sovereignty. Yet it is not clear how typical the UNTAES mission was, or how useful the example is for the missions that followed. Eastern Slavonia was situated within a unique set of military and diplomatic circumstances. In 1995 the Croatian military had clearly demonstrated its ability to defeat the Serbian forces in the area in battle, using the assistance of United States military advisers. Hence the work of the international community in UNTAES was buoyed by the implicit threat that Serbian noncompliance would lead to direct military action, especially since NATO military aircraft made regular overflights of the territory to bring this point home.[37] In other words, it was not the peacekeepers alone who kept order, but the ethnic Serbians' fear that major war against the NATO coalition could descend upon them if they did not

comply. Furthermore, Croatia was a state that had already established relatively well functioning administrative structures, and it had a population well versed in the skills necessary to run a country. This was not really a neophyte state. It was also located on the strategic coastline of the Adriatic, directly across from NATO member Italy, and with a longstanding special relationship to NATO member Germany. (That special relationship was cemented by the fact that large numbers of Croatian guest workers had immigrated to Germany over the years, making ethnic Croats a political force to be reckoned with domestically for the German government.)

For this combination of reasons, the nationalist leaders of both Serbian (rump) Yugoslavia and newly independent Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, had strong incentives to cooperate with the international community's dominance of Eastern Slavonia. Neither had much to gain by supporting breakaway paramilitary forces there. This left the local parties on the ground, including paramilitary forces who might otherwise have been spoilers of the peace process, with no one to turn to for support.[38] The political outcome on Eastern Slavonian territory—integration into Croatia, under the diplomatic and military pressure of powerful western liberal democracies—was virtually predetermined, whatever its opponents may have attempted. The peacekeepers merely gave extra support to the Croatian state in reaffirming its own authority in the region.

That kind of peacekeeping—temporary military governorship which quickly leads to peaceful outcomes and integration into relatively stable societies—is not typical of the new situations the international community is facing today, in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Nor was it typical of the much more complicated situations that the international community faced in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor in the 1990s, where the goal was not integration into a larger stable state, but instead creation of a functioning state out of whole cloth. In these locations, shaky national governments without legitimate or well established military and police forces have been threatened by strong, armed internal dissension. With the partial exceptions of Haiti and East Timor (neighbors of the U.S. and Australia respectively), these countries are surrounded by states with a history of illiberal authoritarianism and weak democratic traditions, not strong western states or NATO members. Not only do most of their neighbors fail to provide good role models for stable governance; but also these neighbors may actually feel threatened by the emergence of strong, western-leaning states nearby, and may try to undermine change from without.

These new governments require more than deterrent fly-overs to boost their new authority. Successful change requires what amounts to long-term international occupation. In spite of this daunting challenge, the notion

that outsiders could and should impose control over the political futures of unstable, conflict-ridden societies, using executive fiat backed up by military force, took hold in succeeding years. The idea that the occupations would need to be interminable was downplayed, despite the accumulating evidence.

The following brief summaries of the four major cases of complex military peacekeeping in the 1990s will highlight some of the concerns that have relevance for current and future missions. In each case, the international community approached peacekeeping operations with the idea of achieving political control, in order to move these subject territories in a liberal democratic direction. Yet in no case was this drive a resounding success. Either the international community put too few resources toward the task, leading to temporary solutions that fell apart with time; or the international community put all of its political will into situations that forced it to become a permanent occupation force. All of these cases demonstrate how difficult it is to impose a liberal, democratic, tolerant future on a society where such a direction does not come naturally.

Haiti: The Inadequacy of Halfway Measures

The first effort to create a complex military peacekeeping operation that included the elements outlined above—an attempt at domestic political institutional change, overseen by the international community, backed by the use of force, and led by an interested state—occurred in Haiti beginning in 1994. Yet while U.S. intervention in Haiti was couched in terms of securing lasting change in the country, it lacked the strength of political will that would have been necessary to make change endure in a society beset with overwhelming levels of poverty, violence, and hopelessness. Ten years after the original decision to send in troops, Haiti looked much as it did before forces were deployed—and in late February 2004, the United States and its allies intervened in Haiti with UN Security Council backing once again. The individuals sitting in the top leadership positions in the country had indeed changed, but the basic elements of the political system had not.

In 1994, three years after a military coup ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first democratically elected president of Haiti, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, which authorized the United States to lead a military mission there to restore peace and democratic government to the country. Haiti had a long history of instability and violence, and the attempt to overcome that legacy was daunting. As one group of analysts points out, "Since winning its freedom from the French in 1804, Haiti had

21 constitutions and 41 heads of state, 29 of whom were assassinated or overthrown."[39] Haiti had been occupied by the United States in what had amounted to a colonial effort between 1915 and 1934, and the Haitian army that the U.S. created then became a key player in the authoritarian system that the country adopted afterward.[40] The U.S. military continued to support the combined military and police forces of authoritarian Haiti with technical training throughout the cold war.

Now the United States was trying to help reestablish the constitution that Haiti had optimistically adopted in 1990, under international supervision, in an attempt to create a democracy where none had existed before. The desired end state, according to operational commander U.S. Major General Joseph W. Kinzer, was "a safe and secure environment with a functional and duly elected national government; a professional public security force loyal to the constitution and the national leadership; [and] a growing economy focusing on improving the infrastructure, improving public utilities, and reducing unemployment."[41] In the words of one military officer who served on the mission, "The United States employed its military, under U.N. auspices, as a vehicle to facilitate political change."[42]

Originally it appeared as if the U.S.-led, UN Security Council–authorized Multinational Force (MNF) would have to essentially invade Haiti under hostile conditions. After one false start, followed by tough UN sanctions and a long period of negotiations, Haitian military leaders finally backed down and agreed to rescind their positions and go into exile. U.S. forces went in unopposed. Their primary goal was to work alongside UN-appointed International Police Monitors (IPMs), who for the first time in UN history would be armed, in order to establish safe and secure conditions in the country. At the initial entry phase, when they discovered the disarray that characterized Haitian governmental institutions, U.S. Special Operations Forces—particularly reserve officers employed as civil affairs specialists who worked in administrative roles full-time back home—also took over key positions in governmental bureaucracies, both in the central ministries in Port-au-Prince and in the countryside.[43]

The U.S. military forces were supposed to oversee the voluntary disarming and demobilization of the Haitian military forces, and the IPMs were supposed to oversee Haitian police activities. After this was accomplished they were then to turn over operations to a UN-commanded force, the UNMIH. Realizing that a traditional UN force would be inadequate for Haiti's complicated situation, however, U.S. forces remained in Haiti after the MNF period was finished, and the previous U.S. MNF commander, General Kinzer, was appointed by the UN Secretary General to command what were now labeled the UNMIH military forces.

The operation did not run smoothly. The United Nations IPMs did not arrive in the promised numbers when scheduled, and many of the international police who were sent in to Haiti lacked the training and experience necessary to deter violence and restore public order.[44] Later in the operation, better trained French and Canadian police officers with appropriate skills (as well as the appropriate French language capability for the Haitian population) did arrive in the country, but there was a gap in police deployment at the start of the operation, and there were never a sufficient number of highly motivated francophone IPMs to carry out the training operation as planned. As a result, U.S. military forces had to pick up the slack.

Three days into the MNF operation, many world news organization cameras caught U.S. soldiers standing by as a Haitian mob lynched a member of the old regime on the street. After that instance of bad publicity, the U.S. military was suddenly tasked with taking on police duties. The previous U.S. rules of engagement had not allowed the troops to intervene in Haitian on Haitian violence, but now those rules were reinterpreted to allow American soldiers "to detain and, if necessary shoot, people committing serious criminal acts" such as murder, rape and robbery.[45] Yet U.S. military commanders were reluctant to get bogged down in police work, which they saw as outside their scope of competence. They did not have the resources or training to conduct criminal investigations or provide constant patrol coverage of the whole country. As a result, little direct action was taken to stop the violence the rules were designed to control.[46]

Remnants of the Haitian military who refused to disarm were indeed arrested and detained by U.S. forces, at least temporarily; that was considered a traditional military task,[47] and American troops put great effort into rebuilding jails that had been insecure and inhumane. There were also occasional firefights between U.S. troops and breakaway factions of the Haitian security forces,[48] but U.S. forces were careful to react only after they had been fired upon, so that they could make clear they were acting in self-defense. But these things did not really resolve the security problem faced by the locals. Much of the violence that plagued the ordinary citizens of Haiti was not directed by the ousted forces themselves, who for the most part melted away fairly quickly after the U.S. arrival. Instead, violence was a result of revenge attacks by civilians against suspected members of the old regime, as well as street justice meted out by civilians against other Haitians who were suspected of ordinary crimes. In the old regime, the police forces had been integrated into the brutal Haitian military, and were hence not trusted by the population. The police were known for their corruption and brutality. As a result, Haitian citizens had gotten into the habit

of avoiding the authorities as much as possible, and preferred to take the law into their own hands when they felt justice needed to be done.

During the time that U.S. and UN military forces were present in Haiti, regular foot patrols throughout the country helped to deter many violent attacks. Yet there was general agreement that the violence continued wherever the troops were not physically present at the moment, and after outside military forces left, nothing much remained of their efforts. Despite the best attempts of the international community, including repeated training efforts and aid incentive programs, a reliable new Haitian police force that observed international human rights standards never really took hold. Even more important, Haitian judicial institutions remained unreliable, and arrested criminals often ended up right back on the street; after awhile, even the most dedicated Haitian police gave up. The traditional vigilantism practiced by the population continued.[49] No lasting institutions were created to take the place of foreign troops. In the words of John Ballard, who served in the MNF and later became a professor at the National Defense University near Washington, DC, "The operation was not intended to remake Haitian national institutions, but instead to permit Haitians to return themselves to democratic governance. That responsibility still lies with the Haitian people."[50]

As conditions deteriorated in Haiti in the late 1990s, the UN presence was gradually withdrawn. There was agreement among the international community, led by the United States, that it was not worth the continuing expenditure of resources to try to help a country so consumed by intractable social problems, so stubbornly refusing to reform itself.[51] The desired end state was never reached. American military sources call the MNF Uphold Democracy mission in Haiti a success, because it met its original goals: it got rid of the military junta, it restored Aristide to power through new democratic elections, and U.S. forces were able to leave in six months and turn authority over to a UN-commanded mission.[52] Yet the notion of real political change turned out to be illusory. After stepping aside in accordance with Haiti's constitution in 1995, Aristide was reelected to the presidency in 2000; but by that time he and his party were widely seen as corrupt (following parliamentary elections that failed to meet the standards of international observers), and Haiti's opposition movements boycotted the 2000 presidential election. In the following years some of Aristide's supporters took up arms and began terrorizing their opponents, following Haiti's well worn traditions of political violence. Aristide's government paid little attention to human rights despite intense pressure from the Organization of American States, and meanwhile poverty, illiteracy, and HIV/AIDS infection rates remained tragically

high.[53] In Haiti in 1994, the international community avoided intensive societal intrusion. They feared that intrusion might have led to dependency, and the United States in particular was wary of getting bogged down in another potential Somalia. In the words of one high-ranking U.S. Army officer who had been stationed in Haiti, complex peacekeeping operations can turn into "tarbabies." He noted, "The military is, and always has rightly been, concerned of being overcommitted."[54] While a complex military peacekeeping operation was attempted, it was not designed to remain in place for the long term. Force was used only to encourage the disappearance of the old regime, not to ensure the consolidation of a new, more liberal democratic one. The peacekeeping operation in Haiti did not, in the end, attempt to control a subject society. While it avoided the dangers of colonial-like occupation, it ultimately proved inadequate to restore security in the country as well.

Ten years later, those who knew Haiti's troubled history hoped that this time around the United States and the international community would stay over the long haul and commit the resources needed to do the job right. Yet once again the U.S. was preoccupied with more pressing peacekeeping needs elsewhere; in the mid-1990s it had been Bosnia that absorbed Washington's attention, and now it was Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2004 Washington would commit to staying in Haiti only 90 days before turning the operation over to the UN, and in early March (as this book was going to press) complaints abounded once again in Port au Prince that the U.S. Marines on the ground were not doing enough to stop political violence and restore order.

Bosnia and Kosovo: Imposing Control over Sovereignty

NATO-led peacekeeping in both Bosnia and Kosovo, supported by other international organizations including the European Union (EU) and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in addition to the UN, stands in sharp contrast to the case of Haiti. In these two cases in the Balkans, the liberal democratic international community has made a strong effort to control the political destinies of the involved territories. Neither Bosnia nor Kosovo has been allowed to exercise sovereignty. In the case of Kosovo, the international community has not yet even decided who will be granted ownership over eventual sovereignty in the territory, or how a transfer of sovereignty will be accomplished.

The history of the peace accords that followed the ethnic wars and set up these conditions in both cases is well known, and need not be recounted

in great detail.[55] A brief summary sketch will be provided here, to set the background for the arguments that follow.

As noted above, when Yugoslavia disintegrated into civil war in the early 1990s, the United Nations attempted to preserve and restore peace in the region through a lightly armed mission (the UN Protection Force, or UNPROFOR) that operated under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter—in other words, via a mission that operated with the permission of the sovereign states where it was deployed (the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, often abbreviated BiH, and its new neighbor Croatia) and that recognized these states' political sovereignty. UNPROFOR failed. Its legitimacy was not recognized by the breakaway ethnic groups who were fighting inside each of the newly declared states, and its effectiveness was shredded by paramilitary forces who kidnapped and killed its personnel and massacred civilians in the safe areas it was supposedly guarding. Following paramilitary massacres of thousands of civilians in towns that were supposed to be UN-guarded safe areas, and after a great deal of political discussion and delay both within NATO and within the UN Secretariat and Security Council, NATO forces finally gained UN approval to carry out air strikes against Serbian paramilitary formations. At this point, the international community was intervening on behalf of basic human rights, and no particular agenda for the area's political future was yet in play.

As a result of the NATO air strikes, and bolstered by U.S. military advisory assistance, Croatian forces were able to expel ethnic Serb formations from the ethnic Croatian territory in BiH that they had earlier seized. The Serbs who ruled what remained of Yugoslavia were thereby forced to recognize their own military limits and to come to the negotiating table. Ultimately they had to recognize Bosnia's independence as a state. But the ethnic Serbian entity inside the state of BiH never recognized the legitimacy of the international presence in their part of Bosnia. This created enforcement problems for the international community from the beginning, because it meant that external control was being imposed against the wishes of one of the key actors in the country.[56] Peacekeeping was being done without the full and true consent of the peace-kept.

What emerged from the negotiations between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims (or Bosniacs) and the Contact Group of six outside powers who had a self-declared interest in Bosnia (the U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) were the Dayton Accords of 1995—an imperfect compromise in everyone's minds. The accords reflected the de facto division of territory in BiH that resulted from the fighting, rather than what any group considered "fair," since this was the only way to convince the various parties that they had achieved as much as they could through

warfare. It was believed that any other division would cause the fighting to flare up again. The accords were based on the idealistic notion that three separate regions in BiH, each dominated by a particular ethnic group, could manage their own affairs without returning to the nationalist hatred of the past, and could then cooperate at a national level to forge a cohesive government for BiH as a whole. Crucial to the success of the accords was the notion that minority refugee groups would return to their original homes, making each region ethnically integrated. In this respect, the accords reflected the underlying beliefs of the liberal international community that both liberal democracy and ethnic integration were necessary components of Bosnia's future—and that with a little prodding, Bosnian citizens would come to realize this.

The Dayton Accords marked the international community's transition from acting as gut-level humanitarians (protecting the lives of innocents) toward imposing a particular political vision on the future of Bosnian society. This political vision included the idea that ethnic separatism was an evil to be eradicated, that the demographic effects of years of ethnic cleansing had to be undone for the sake of both human rights and stability in the region, and that the international community had an obligation to encourage ethnic integration through refugee returns. The embodiment of these obligations was the creation of a federated government in BiH designed to force the three major ethnic groups to cooperate for the common good. Yet it was necessary, in order to get all the involved parties to sign the peace accords, to divide the country into two separately governed ethnic entities—the Muslim/Croat Federation, and the Republika Srpska for the Serbs—inside that common federal structure.

These accords (officially known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace, or GFAP) gave the international community, or at least parts of the international community, control over both civilian and military affairs in BiH during the transitional period to sovereignty. Annex 10 granted ultimate civilian political authority to the Office of the High Representative (OHR), a newly created international agency not directly affiliated with either the United Nations or NATO. The individual serving as the High Representative is nominated by a steering committee, representing a group of 55 countries and international organizations involved in the peace process, and is then confirmed by the UN Security Council.[57] As the OHR itself declares on its website, the High Representative "is the final authority in theater regarding [the] interpretation [of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords], authorized to impose legislation and to dismiss obstructive officials."[58]

The OHR has regularly dismissed freely and fairly elected officials in

Bosnia by fiat. For example, in March 1999 High Representative (HR) Carlos Westendorp fired the freely, fairly, and democratically elected president of Republika Srpska, Nikolai Poplasen, for obstructing refugee returns and the fulfillment of the Dayton Accords.[59] In November 2000, the new HR Wolfgang Petritsch unilaterally fired the freely, fairly, and democratically elected Croatian member of BiH's tripartite presidency, Ante Jelavic, for corruption and for trying to incite separatism among the Croat population.[60] According to one NATO report, "As many as 22 people have been removed from office in a single day for anti-Dayton activities,"[61] even when they have been appointed in accordance with Bosnia's democratic constitution. In other words, the political vision of the (largely western) international community about the future of BiH is inconsistent; ethnic integration often conflicts with democratic institutions, and when it does, integration trumps democracy. Control trumps self-determination.

Laws, too, have sometimes been managed by fiat. For example, in January 2002, six Algerians who had become naturalized Bosnian citizens through marriage were suspected of planning to bomb the U.S. embassy in the capital of Sarajevo in support of the al Qaeda terrorist network. The BiH Interior Ministry detained the suspects, stripped five of their BiH citizenship, and later extradited all of them to U.S. authorities. This occurred with full approval of the BiH Council of Ministers. Yet the BiH Supreme Court had earlier ordered the men released (saying that their citizenship had been revoked without sufficient evidence), and the BiH Human Rights Chamber, a body set up under the Dayton Accords to monitor human rights in the country, had demanded that extradition be delayed for a month and that the BiH authorities try to stop their forcible deportation despite American pressure. In other words, Bosnian actions violated the BiH constitution. The OHR was informed of all of these proceedings and chose not to act in support of the Supreme Court or Human Rights Chamber decision, despite criticism from the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights that the "rule of law was clearly circumvented in this process," and despite the OHR's continuing public statement that "we do call for compliance" with Human Rights Chamber decisions, since such compliance is a part of BiH's planned accession to the Council of Europe.[62] OHR concerns about the security of western states trump OHR concerns about Bosnia's legal process, even though that process was set up by the Dayton Accords and is part of the overall plan for Bosnia's European integration. Americans may all feel safer as a result of these suspected terrorists being extradited to the holding camp at Guantanamo Bay, but the example nonetheless illustrates the degree to which western interests control the sovereignty of Bosnian political institutions, in a direction that looks

uncomfortably like colonial intervention. Control trumps liberalism. By late 2003, analysts and policymakers were engaged in a spirited debate about whether the OHR constituted a "European Raj," and about how much weight should be given to the opinion of local Bosnian elites who prefer OHR oversight to untrammeled democracy.[63]

Beyond the civilian powers granted to the international community by the Dayton Accords, Annex 1A gave military authority in the country to a UN Security Council-authorized implementation force (IFOR), which "may be composed of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations, deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to help ensure compliance with the provisions of this Agreement."[64] IFOR was authorized under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which meant that it could use force as necessary to fulfill its mandate even without the permission of the involved parties. It could act in the absence of consent. Originally IFOR was intended to focus only on the military aspects of the agreement, overseeing such things as the withdrawal of foreign troops, the disarming and demobilization of ethnic militias, and the creation of a joint BiH military organization. However, it received a great deal of criticism from the international community for not intervening to protect minority ethnic groups in the face of continuing paramilitary threats and violence.[65] In December 1996, IFOR was replaced by SFOR (the stabilization force), again led by NATO, and authorized by the UN Security Council (again under Chapter 7) to contribute to the creation of a safe and secure environment in BiH and to offer selective help to civilian organizations, including the OHR, involved in the peace process.[66]

The international community hoped it was thereby creating a more cohesive framework to shape the political society of BiH. The cohesion of this arrangement often broke down, as various state and international actors with differing visions for Bosnia's future failed to coordinate their policies with each other. The intention, however, was clear. Unlike the earlier case of Haiti, in BiH the liberal democratic international community wished to control the territory's sovereignty so that, backed up by the use or threat of force, Bosnia would move in the direction the international community wanted.

As David Chandler has reported, the officials who have been overseeing the Bosnian transition recognize the philosophical contradiction inherent in their roles. The less democratic they allow BiH to be, the more success they have in achieving ethnic tolerance and the establishment of liberal institutions inside Bosnian society[67]—even if those liberal institutions are sometimes ignored by the OHR. Chandler argues that the international community is trying not merely to create new institutions in BiH, but to

instill a new culture, with values and attitudes that would not have arisen on their own.[68] In other words, the international community is engaged in a mission to bring western liberal democratic values to an area of the world where they had not taken root before—even when the means that are used are sometimes neither democratic nor liberal.

Despite the many differences between the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, the political intentions of the international community have been similar in the two cases, and went through a similar evolution over time. In Kosovo, as in Bosnia, the international community intervened initially largely because of gut-level human rights concerns, but followed this by superseding state sovereignty (in this case, the sovereignty of what remained of the state of Yugoslavia) and attempting to create a society based on ethnic tolerance where one had not existed before. In Kosovo the degree of political control exerted by the peacekeeping operation was even stronger than that in Bosnia.

In the late 1990s, following a long history of ethnic unrest in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo (whose earlier autonomy within Yugoslavia had been taken away by Serbian nationalists in the mid-1980s), Serbian paramilitary groups began carrying out what they saw as retaliatory strikes against Kosovar Albanian villages which were said to be harboring armed insurgents. Ethnic Albanian guerrilla groups had been attacking the outposts of Serbian government authorities in the region for several years, sometimes killing Serb police officers and other officials in the process. The Serbian paramilitary groups conducting the raids, however, did not distinguish between the armed insurgents and innocent civilians. Their brutal actions created a massive crisis of internally displaced persons as Albanian Kosovars fled their homes for the mountains, raising fears of another round of ethnic cleansing and mass murder in the region. Many humanitarian aid agencies were especially concerned that the Kosovars would starve or freeze to death in the cold winter, and they pressured western governments to take action.

NATO threatened to carry out air strikes unless Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo and reached a negotiated settlement to the crisis in the province. Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Milosevic first stalled, but then agreed to this demand, and the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an unarmed observer force from the OSCE to oversee the withdrawal. But in late 1998 and early 1999, OSCE observers received credible evidence that a major Serbian military offensive into Kosovo was planned for the spring. Once again the Contact Group of six interested outside nations attempted to convince the parties to sign a peace agreement, this time in Rambouillet. The agreement would give political over-

sight of the province to the international community and allow NATO peacekeepers to act as enforcers of the accord. Kosovar Albanian paramilitary representatives signed the agreement in hopes of getting NATO support for Kosovo's eventual break from Serbia, but Milosevic refused to do so, seeing the language of the agreement (probably rightly) as the first step toward independent statehood for Kosovo. Serbian paramilitary forces then began impeding and attacking the OSCE mission.

Shortly afterward the NATO military offensive against Yugoslavia began, involving progressively more intensive air strikes. As the Serbian position weakened over a period of many weeks, and as Russia intervened as a mediator, Milosevic was reluctantly brought back to the negotiating table. A Military-Technical Agreement was signed between Yugoslavia and NATO, under which Milosevic agreed to the deployment of KFOR, an "international security force" of NATO-led troops which would be sent under a UN Security Council Chapter 7 mandate "with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission."[69] The KFOR commander was given final authority in the interpretation of the agreement and in overseeing the security situation in Kosovo. Shortly afterward, in June 1999, the UN Security Council both authorized KFOR and created a new UN mission, UNMIK, to oversee the civilian reconstruction and political transition period in Kosovo.

UNMIK operates through four "pillars," which are together mandated (among other things) to "perform basic civilian administrative functions, promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo . . . , maintain civil law and order, promote human rights, and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo."[70] UN agencies are responsible for the first two pillars (police and justice, and the civil administration of the province), while the OSCE is responsible for the third (democratization and institution building) and the European Union is responsible for the fourth (reconstruction and economic development).[71] This time the international community congratulated itself for successfully consolidating its attempts to control the sovereignty of political society from the start. UNMIK encompassed a much broader array of functions than what the OHR in Bosnia supervised alone, and KFOR, unlike the IFOR mission in Bosnia, was authorized from the beginning to use force on behalf of the UNMIK mission. In other words, civilian and military functions were integrated under international control. The international community approached Kosovo as if it were a protectorate—a territory unable to function on its own and in need of foreign assistance, since it had not yet reached political maturity.

Outside political control would be cemented with the support of outside military force.

Kosovo's status as an international protectorate has taken on a life of its own, because the international community has been unable or unwilling to decide how and when the territory's future status should be settled. As Simon Chesterman notes, UNMIK's mandate "avoids taking a position on the key political question of Kosovo's relationship to Serbia," and as time has gone by the issue has remained unresolved.[72] It was decreed that for the period of the complex peacekeeping operation, however long it lasted, political institutions should be built in Kosovo that gave the territory "substantial autonomy." Beyond that, however, the next step remains uncertain. The notion of declaring independent statehood for the territory, or of giving it the status of an autonomous province within the state of Serbia, or of partitioning Kosovo to reflect the ethnic divisions between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, are all proposals that have been put on the table. But each of them seems fraught with danger.

On one hand the territorial losers in any division of the territory might be so dissatisfied that they would restart the armed conflict, should international forces be withdrawn. On the other hand, after years of effort, the international community's intervention might in the end accomplish nothing in terms of its goals of ethnic integration and tolerance, perhaps even serving as a precedent to encourage ethnic cleansing elsewhere.[73] No solution seems able to answer both of these objections. As a result, the UN and NATO are shackled with the responsibility for keeping the peace, and running the country, in Kosovo for the foreseeable future. The international community believes that popular will in Kosovo cannot be safely allowed to determine the territory's sovereignty. Once again, control trumps self-determination.

The intentions of the international community in both Bosnia and Kosovo have been righteous: the creation of peaceful, ethnically integrated, liberal democratic societies with free markets. Their peacekeeping methods are strictly restrained by both international law and (in the case of military contingents and national aid agencies) by the national laws of their donor states. Outside forces cannot do whatever they please. Yet there is no question that outsiders have attempted to control the political destiny of Bosnia and Kosovo by force, and to move their societies in directions they would not go on their own. They cannot withdraw if that trajectory is to have any chance of being maintained; otherwise the Balkans may suffer a similar fate to Haiti. This, then, is where the comparison to colonialism has been made.

East Timor: A Brief Infatuation with Trusteeship

A bloodbath enveloped East Timor following its referendum on autonomy in September 1999, and the world failed to prevent it, even though many international observers had predicted that chaos would erupt if no one intervened. Militia groups supported by the Indonesian military launched a furious attack against civilians suspected of supporting independence from Jakarta, and razed as much of the infrastructure of East Timor as they could after the vote went against them. Australian government officials had expected violence if the referendum went as it did—with the East Timorese population voting against autonomy within Indonesia, and hence implicitly supporting independence—and the government in Canberra had prepared long in advance for its defense forces to evacuate Australian nationals from the island.[74] The United Nations had even obtained copies before September of the orders sent to the Timorese militia commanders who were paid by the Indonesian army to oppose independence, which described the campaign of violence that was to be waged if the population voted "no" on autonomy within Indonesia.[75]

But the Indonesian government refused to give permission for the United Nations to send an armed mission to East Timor to preserve order during the referendum, and the international community did not yet push to intervene. Instead, an unarmed UN observer mission (UNAMET) was in place, which was itself attacked in the melee. It would have required an act of war—or at least of strong diplomatic coercion—for anyone to intervene militarily in advance of the vote. UNAMET did, however, gain permission from Indonesia to have Australia send in an evacuation mission for its own workers, as well as for foreign diplomatic personnel.[76]

Within two weeks of the territory's eruption, which was astonishing in its level of fury and destruction, Indonesia was convinced under pressure from its international financial benefactors and trade partners to permit a Chapter 7 mission led by Australia to enter East Timor and restore order. What this INTERFET mission discovered was a wasteland. The East Timorese capital of Dili was relatively empty of people, outside of the remaining militia forces and their armed opponents on the other side, because everyone who could leave had either fled to the countryside or been forced across the border into Indonesian West Timor by the militias. Buildings had been looted and torched, food stores and electricity generators had been destroyed, garbage and human waste covered everything and vermin were everywhere, and several large massacre sites were found.

INTERFET did a remarkable job of restoring order, first inside Dili

within a few weeks, and then in East Timor as a whole over the next several months. Food and humanitarian assistance got through to where it was needed, the leaders of the militia violence were convinced to leave the territory, and the militias themselves were disbanded and more or less reintegrated into society. But the international community did not stop there. Ending the violence was not considered sufficient. Instead it deployed the UNTAET mission, whose goal was to create a functioning independent government in East Timor where none had been before.

The East Timor case illustrates the dilemma the international community faces when it tries to do so much for a society. The UNTAET operation was in place from 1999 through 2002, and it effectively ran a country where both preexisting infrastructure and a trained professional local population were nonexistent. Non-Timorese Indonesians had run the territory before, and the Timorese population lacked both education and experience, so the UN came in to give the new country a jump-start. UNTAET, like the UNTAES case in Eastern Slavonia described above, is lauded by the United Nations as a complex peacekeeping success story. It was indeed successful, in the sense that the brutal killing and destruction that brought the UN in to the country was stopped; but that was largely accomplished by INTERFET very quickly, before the more massive UN presence arrived.

UNTAET was also successful in that it did indeed largely rebuild the country's government institutions, and East Timor (now officially known as Timor Leste) gained its sovereignty and independence from Indonesia. Yet the UN was criticized for ignoring the views of local Timorese leaders, including the pro-independence guerilla leader who was later overwhelming elected president, Xanana Gusmao, and the man who had been the international voice for Timorese human rights throughout the Indonesian occupation era and then became Foreign Minister, José Ramos-Horta. East Timorese leaders had submitted a proposal to the earlier UNAMET mission in the country about how locals after the referendum might be integrated into a transition government, but the UN ignored the proposal. The follow-on UNTAET mission was widely perceived to have failed even to explain the policies it chose to the East Timorese population.[77] After almost a year of foreign control the UN did appoint a new cabinet of ministers that put locals in charge of infrastructure and administration, but foreigners retained control over the key portfolios of finance, the police, and justice, and largely ran the local district governments.[78] In the words of Jarat Chopra, who headed UNTAET's Office of District Administration until he resigned in protest over the UN's actions there, "Rather than trying to render itself obsolete as swiftly as possible . . . UNTAET resisted

Timorese participation in order to safeguard the UN's influence."[79] Once again, control trumped self-determination.

Believing that it was more important to establish a competent administration in the country quickly than to give control to the East Timorese, the UN kept foreigners in key positions and paid them according to international standards while the native population remained largely unemployed. (The one exception to this was the judicial system, where UNTAET "Timorized" institutions as quickly as possible by appointing local officials to a system whose characteristics were borrowed from external models.[80]) One consequence of this two-tiered social system, something that made world headlines, was the fact that UN employees routinely ordered cappuccinos from the cafés that sprang up to service their needs, which cost more than the average Timorese daily wage.

In 2001 and 2002 East Timor held a successful election for a new Constituent Assembly, adopted a new constitution by popular referendum, and elected its first president. At this point East Timor was granted recognition by the United Nations as a sovereign state. UNTAET closed up shop, being replaced by the smaller and much less intrusive UNMISET mission. UNMISET is still authorized under Chapter 7 and includes both a UN military and police component (with heavily armed Australians and New Zealanders continuing to guard the border with Indonesian West Timor) in addition to a civilian one. But its role is to support the East Timorese administration, not to administer East Timor.[81]

East Timor thus underwent an odd combination of situations: it was first administered by foreigners who did not pay much attention to local Timorese views, and was then almost precipitously given over to Timorese control without much time for on-the-job learning by local administrators. In addition, the UN mission was not allowed to use any money to build anything that would be left in East Timor when it was withdrawn, or to finance healthcare or education; it could only finance its own mission, and it took all of its equipment with it, including communication lines and power generators, when it left.[82] Individual state foreign donors fund the East Timorese government budget, which faced difficulties in the aftermath of the UN withdrawal. The business climate in the country has dried up because there is no local wealth to support the cappuccino cafés and the other facilities that foreigners patronized. By early 2003, the average per capita income of the population was less than $100 per month and the unemployment rate stood at 70 percent, in a country with few indigenous resources, a population that remained largely uneducated, and many trained guerrilla fighters who now found themselves with nothing to do.[83]

While the sea between East Timor and Australia has a wealth of oil and natural gas reserves, the UN did not do much to help East Timor with this resource, either. The country found itself stuck in prolonged negotiations with Australia about how access to the petroleum would be divvied up between them, without an experienced legal staff to help its side.[84] Economic hardship in the country was exacerbated by a drought that cut East Timor's agricultural export earnings, especially the coffee that was traditionally sold abroad. Perhaps as a result of all of these things, a December 2002 popular protest in Dili against police brutality turned into violent rioting that attacked foreign businesses. Meanwhile cross-border raids continued into 2003 from dispossessed former militia members in West Timor, as well, and it was not yet clear that domestic police and military forces would be up to the task of dealing with any of these things in the absence of UN forces.

Granting total administrative control over the country to foreigners, who then quickly withdrew as peace was achieved and their political will to remain declined, left East Timor a potential powder keg of economic resentment. It is not clear that all the effort at liberal democratic institution-building there will amount to much in the long run, because the will to rule in the short run was not backed up by adequate resources or long-term planning. It is too early to tell for sure what will happen in Timor Leste, but that means it is also too early to call the progression of peacekeeping missions there successful.

The Horns of the Dilemma

What these examples show is that the international community in the 1990s faced two dangers as it attempted to control foreign territory for humanitarian purposes. Either it went in to these countries saying it was going to remake society, and then exhibited inadequate political will to do the job completely, as happened in Haiti; or it tried to do too much, creating political systems that depended on forceful outside supervision in Bosnia and Kosovo, and an economic system that depended on foreign occupation in East Timor. In all four cases, the international community had good intentions. But in all four cases, the gratitude felt by the local community for the foreign assistance it received has been tempered by resentment at foreigners who either don't seem to care enough, or who want to control too much. The initial presence of the peacekeepers may have been welcomed by many ordinary people on the ground, but in the end the international community's lasting benevolence has been questioned.

It is too early to know what the ultimate political results of all of these interventions of the 1990s will be, since peacekeepers remain on the ground in all four countries as this book goes to press. It is perhaps too early to declare that failure is the certain end result. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Timor Leste, new political institutions have been built under international oversight. It is impossible to know for sure what will happen to those institutions once foreign troops withdraw, although the continuation of nationalist political party strength in Bosnia and Kosovo and of abject poverty among the vast majority of East Timorese puts the notion of long-term success in doubt.

In thinking about future interventions, however, it may be useful for the international community to draw out the lessons from these cases, while recalling the experiences of most postcolonial societies. The examples outlined above demonstrate that despite the differences between colonialism and complex peacekeeping operations, the efforts in the latter cases to control political developments in particular countries do to some extent resemble colonial governorship. Institutions are structured to match the goals of outsiders, and political winners and losers are chosen based on their responsiveness to outside pressure. The resemblance between complex peacekeeping operations and colonialism will be explored more in the next chapter. Meanwhile, what might the experience of post-colonial societies portend for the future of peace-kept societies?

In the words of historian A. E. Afigbo, the political choices and styles adopted by colonial governors in Africa at the turn of the twentieth century were "emulated by their successors"[85] in the postcolonial era. Those colonial rulers were often brutal, arbitrary, and illiberal, and so were many of the indigenous African leaders who emerged to take their places after the colonial yoke was thrown off by independence movements. There are, of course, examples where at least relatively strong democracies have emerged out of a colonial past. India is a favored case of historians like Niall Ferguson, who argue that British colonialism helped rationalize disorderly and conflict-prone societies.[86] But while India proper may have a functioning (if imperfect) democracy, autocratic Pakistan and parts of unstable Afghanistan were territories of British India, too, areas particularly subject to the brutal whims of rogue imperial officers. And while the Indian Army today is renowned for its professionalism and its adherence to British regimental values, the citizens of the Indian province of Jammu and Kashmir rightly fear the arbitrary violence used by state security forces trying to flush out terrorists. While British colonialism may sometimes have been less nasty than its French counterpart, it is hard to sustain the argument that its overall legacy was positive.

The peacekeepers of the 1990s certainly did not mimic colonial governors in their political choices, so we have no reason to suspect that the presence of peacekeepers will make these countries any more brutal or authoritarian in the future than they would have been in the absence of intervention. But would the international community nonetheless be content to see the future leaders of the peace-kept countries emulate the decisions that the peacekeeping states did make? Should the leaders of Haiti follow the example of the international community and give up on the idea of police and judicial reform because the problems are just too recalcitrant in the face of ingrained social norms of violence? (This does seem to be the choice they have made.) Should the leaders of Bosnia (and whatever Kosovo becomes in the future) intercede, as the international community has done, to overturn democratically made decisions when those decisions do not square with their own ideal visions of what the country should become? (Certainly, for nationalists that choice will be tempting.) Should the future leaders of East Timor do as the international community did and ignore the ideas of their own population about institutional reform, and then withdraw into foreign investments the resources that are necessary for the institutions to continue to function well? (The experiences of other new democracies in the world indicate that such a result would not be unprecedented.)

If the international community (and especially the liberal democratic western states who dominate its decisions) wants to have a lasting impact on stability and security in these kinds of cases, it must come up with a better model of how to intervene. One such model will be proposed in the final chapter—a model that focuses on providing immediate security to the population, rather than attempting to control long-term political developments in foreign societies. In the meantime, it is time to make the comparison to colonialism explicit.