Introduction

The object of this study is the production of national identity and national culture within Jordan as both a typical and an atypical postcolonial nation-state. Recent studies of nationalism describe the nation as "invented"[1] or "imagined,"[2] by intellectuals and/or political elites who are producers of, or produced by, the political discourse of nationalism.[3] In this study, I am more interested in whether *institutions* play a role in the production of colonial and postcolonial national identity and culture. More specifically, I examine whether two key state institutions, law and the military, assist in the production of the nation. Do these institutions contribute to the identification of people as "nationals"? Do they play any role in the production of ideas and practices that come to constitute "national culture"? In posing these and other related questions, what I am proposing is not a general or generalizable theoretical model for the study of nationalism but rather a general and generalizable mode of inquiry.

Law and the military were central institutions set up by the colonial powers in the colonies. They replaced existing juridical and military structures, or introduced them to societies that did not have them before. Both law and the military retain their colonial markings as European institutions established to serve the colonial state. As Frantz Fanon has shown, however, once national independence is achieved, the new nation-state elites replace their colonial masters in administering the same institutions that were used to control them.[4] Furthermore, the postcolonial state, as Partha Chatterjee states, has "expanded and not transformed the basic institutional arrangement of colonial law and administration, of the courts, the bureaucracy, the

police, the army, and the various technical services of government."[5] Colonial institutions and epistemology are thus adopted and adapted to the national condition. Instead of serving European colonialism, law and the military come to serve national independence, or its state representatives.

To study national identity and culture through these colonial institutional mechanisms, we must begin by understanding the general role these institutions play in governance within the postcolonial nation-state and their inception under colonial rule. As a background, I will discuss the major theoretical contributions dealing with questions of law, military, and discipline, and with nationalist ideology and its relationship to questions of cultural tradition and modernity. I will also provide a brief history of Jordan from 1921 to the present.

Law, Military, and Discipline

In his studies of the transformation of western European state power in the modern period, Michel Foucault speaks of the development of modern government. For Foucault, western European state rule was initially based on law on which sovereignty itself was founded. Any illegality was an affront to the power of the sovereign, which had to be redressed with corporeal punishment as public spectacle. With the emergence of penal reform, discipline emerged as the art of managing the population "in its depths and details." Its object was "not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body."[6] Foucault asserts that the "point of application of the penalty is not the representation [as in public executions as spectacle], but the body, time, everyday gestures and activities; and the soul, too, but in so far as it is the seat of habits. The body and the soul, as principles of behaviour, form the element that is now proposed for punitive intervention."[7] This does not lead to a restoration of the "juridical subject who is caught up in the fundamental interests of the social pact, but the obedient subject, the individual subjected to habits, rules, orders, an authority that is exercised continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow to function automatically in him."[8] According to Foucault, discipline has not necessarily replaced previous modalities of power, "it has infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, but serving as an intermediary between them, linking them together, extending them and above all making it possible to bring the

effects of power to the most minute and distant elements. It assures an infinitesimal distribution of power relations."[9]

Government, which emerged in the eighteenth century, was to become the new form constituting the state's function.[10] Foucault describes modern "governmentality" as constituting this triangle of "sovereignty–discipline–government."[11] For Foucault, indeed, "if it is true that the juridical system was useful for representing, albeit in an inexhaustive way, a power that was centered primarily around deduction and death, it is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus."[12] Foucault insists that power in the modern period controls not necessarily by *repressing* individuals but by *producing* them in the first place as subjects subjected to power.

Foucault seems to be echoing Antonio Gramsci's notion of *hegemony*. Unlike Foucault, who overstresses production at the expense of repression, Gramsci describes the modern state's techniques of controlling the population as both coercion *and* hegemony. Hegemony is that "which the dominant group exercises throughout society . . . on the other hand of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government." Hegemony, for Gramsci, has the central function of producing "[t]he 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group." As for coercive power, Gramsci describes it as a state apparatus that "legally" imposes "discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed."[13]

Although Foucault contends that a productive disciplinary power has "infiltrated" repressive juridical power, he proceeds in a way that indicates that productive discipline has indeed *overtaken* the repressive rule of law. In doing so, Foucault underestimates the importance of law in the organization of state repression. Nicos Poulantzas correctly states that Foucault's approach treats the state's repressive apparatuses as "mere parts of the disciplinary machine which patterns the internalization of repression by means of normalization."[14] Although, in line with Foucault, disciplinary power's infiltration of juridical power has reconstituted law as a series of productive and normalizing tactics, law is also constituted by a repressive technique engineered to penalize those who remain outside the norm. One could even

contend that production and repression as techniques of control are fully imbricated in each other. Disciplinary and juridical production implies disciplinary and juridical repression. To produce the new, the old has to be repressed. The very production of a normalized subject requires the production of its *other*, the "abnormal," whose abnormality has to be *repressed* and buried to reveal the normal as essence.

In this study, I examine whether the nation-state's repressive apparatuses, especially law and the army, are indeed parts of a disciplinary machine as they are *also* parts of a juridical one. Does the juridical itself acquire the double function of production and repression? Weber contends that the modern state has a monopoly of the *legitimate* means of coercion and physical violence, and that this coercive ability is organized in a "rational-legal" manner. I demonstrate how the nation-state also acquires a monopoly over the *legitimate means of discipline*, which is then generalized through the institutions of law and the military across the surface of society. Schools and the media, through which education is institutionalized, also become favorite channels for enforcing disciplinary normalization of the population, although both remain subservient to the juridical power of the state. I take Gramsci's initial contention as operative for the nation-state. Hegemonic methods are used unless they fail to be effective with the subjects of the nation-state, in which case coercive methods are used. I take Foucault's notion of discipline, or the set of practices, rules, habits, and orders that it generates for the purpose of normalizing and controlling the population, as central for the maintenance if not the continual reproduction of the hegemony of the state and its nationalist ideology. I will rely on Foucault's important contribution of the *productivity* of disciplinary regimes.

Unlike Foucault, however, and in line with Poulantzas, in this study I show how the nation-state governs through a disciplinary-juridical dyad, which is both *productive and repressive*, formative and destructive. In the course of our examination of the journey traversed by what becomes national identity and national culture, these repressive and productive mechanisms are shown to be working hand in hand, destroying what exists and forming what is new. More important, through their control of the time and space of the nation, they formulate the *new* as that which has always *been*. This is accomplished not only within the confines of the law and the military but also by these institutions' generation of processes of cultural production that overflow into society and other state institutions. It is these cultural productions that augment the juridical and military strategies to which they owe their very existence.

Law and the military, however, are not always the servile instruments of political elites. They do not only translate decisions made by these elites. These institutions develop an independent momentum that produces outcomes not necessarily envisioned by state elites and that lie outside their immediate control. Law and the military, which play their designated repressive role, prove to exceed their control mandate by playing a *productive* role not initially envisioned by those who deployed them. They set new demarcations on who is and who is not a "national," what is and what is not "national culture." They come to constitute and produce the subjects and the categories they seek to discipline and/or repress. Moreover, the strategies through which these subjects are produced generate a range of processes outside the realm of the military and the law, which carry their production to the realm of national culture. It is these series of productions and their repressive correlates that I study.

Tradition and Modernity

Nationalism is ideology. However, as Louis Althusser emphasizes, "Ideology always exists in an apparatus . . . and its practice, or practices. This existence is material."[15] One of the most obvious ideological underpinnings of anticolonial nationalisms is the combining of modernization and tradition. While one of anticolonial nationalism's dual goals is the achievement of technological modernization in the Western sense, its other goal is the assertion of a traditional national culture.[16] As Chatterjee has argued, for nationalism to achieve its dual goals, it divides the world into two domains, "the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the 'outside,' of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. . . . The spiritual, on the other hand, is an 'inner' domain bearing the 'essential' marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one's spiritual culture."[17]

In the Arab East, as in the rest of Asia, national identity was the site of negotiating not only East and West as conceptual anchoring categories, but, as importantly the foundational ruse of gendered citizenship. The respective responsibilities of men and women to the nation emerged as cornerstones of nation-building in the colonized world just as they had been and continue to be in European countries.[18] I examine how national identity conceives of

masculinity in defining nationalist agency. The category of masculinity itself is shown to be embedded in a temporal schema, whose telos is European modernity; a geocultural schema, whose core is urbanity at the expense of the countryside and the desert; and a class schema, organized by bourgeois economics replacing previous rules of property and ownership. In examining masculinity within nationalist philosophy, my objective is not to describe the unfolding of a masculine-based nationalism but rather to show the process through which masculinity itself, *and* femininity, are lived within the modality of the nation-state—indeed, how masculinity and femininity are nationalized.

In accordance with liberal ideology, the colonial state sets up the binary of the public and the private. Chatterjee claims that nationalists "operated in a field constituted by a very different set of distinctions—those between the spiritual and the material, the inner and the outer, the essential and the inessential. That contested field over which nationalism had proclaimed its sovereignty and where it had imagined its true community was neither coextensive with nor coincidental to the field constituted by the private/public distinction."[19] This is partially true. It proves to be quite inaccurate, however, when describing the realm of the juridical. It is within the law that the material/spiritual, the outer/inner, the modern/traditional, male/female distinctions are divided into the realms of the public and the private. The arena of law becomes one where modernity and modern European codes can adjudicate matters of statecraft and the economy while religious and local "traditions" adjudicate matters of sexual and family relations and culture. In the case of Jordan, for example, European legal codes were to run the public sphere (inhabited by modern urban men), while religious laws (Muslim and Christian) and Bedouin customary laws (until 1976) were to run the private (inhabited by women and the Bedouins who constitute parts of the "inner", the "traditional," and the "spiritual" essence of the nation).

Benedict Anderson claims that Asian and African nationalist intellectuals "imagined" their nations by imitating the already existing "modular" forms of nationalisms in Europe and the Americas. Chatterjee criticizes Anderson's contentions by asserting that if "nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms . . . what do they have left to imagine?"[20] Indeed, for Chatterjee, since nationalists adopt European models of the "material," it is in the spiritual realm that they can be imaginative: "Here nationalism launches its most powerful, creative, and historically significant project: to fashion a "modern" national culture that is nevertheless not Western. If the nation is an imagined com-

munity, then this is where it is brought into being. In this, its true and essential domain, the nation is already sovereign, even when the state is in the hands of the colonial power. The dynamics of this historical project is completely missed in conventional histories in which the story of nationalism begins with the contest for political power."[21]

I am in agreement with Chatterjee on this point, although with some reservations. Whereas nationalists are agents in the construction of national culture, or what Chatterjee calls the "spiritual," this domain is hardly "sovereign" or independent from productive colonial machinations. The colonial state, through its institutions, is, in fact, instrumental in the production of national culture. Colonial economic relations, the military, colonial schools, law, are in fact *repressive* of a range of cultural material and *productive* of another. Nationalists later adopt the colonial cultural product as "traditional," with no reference to its colonial genealogy of repression and production. From repressing existing cultural practices to producing "traditional national" dishes and music, clothes, personal grooming, flags, and sports, colonial institutions are central. Chatterjee is correct in asserting that the nationalist attempt is to *dress* these products up as traditional and modern simultaneously, without implicating them in the *Western* modern project. It is in doing so that the nationalists manifest their agency, an agency they had initially shown in their refusal of the racial/cultural hierarchical epistemology within which colonialism had imprisoned them. However, in putting this project into effect, the nationalists' combining of European and existing gender, religious, and aesthetic (in short, "cultural") norms does not result in cultural syncretism; rather it is a process whereby European norms *sublate* (*aufheben*) traditional ones. The new cultural norms are modern inventions dressed up in traditional garb to satisfy nationalism's claims of a national culture for which it stands. This new culture, however, is not so much *traditional* as it is *traditionalized*.[22]

The military is especially important in this regard. In schooling its soldiers in the art of warfare, the colonial state also introduces them to a new way of apprehending the world, a new epistemology, underlain by the *modern* colonial order and that of the nation-state. This epistemology is maintained with little variation on the assumption to power of anticolonial nationalists. Whereas the anticolonial nationalist struggle questions the colonial hierarchy of Europeans and non-Europeans by according "Orientals" and Africans agency, it fails to question the colonial epistemology of governance. Traditional sociological and political science approaches to the military have been limited to its "praetorian" role, to its role in the formation of modern states,

or to its "politics" in relation to the state, political society, and civil society.[23] Samuel P. Huntington, for example, defines praetorianism "in a limited sense" as "the intervention of the military in politics."[24] He discerns this "phenomenon" within states in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Alfred Stepan, on the other hand, seeks to uncover the different roles played by the military under authoritarianism and democracy and its relationship to other state agencies and society at large.[25] What these approaches fail to account for is the *productive* role of the military: how the military *produces* politics rather than how it is related to it or what "its" politics actually are. What kind of repressive techniques underlie the military's *productivity* of identities and practices? And what kind of productive techniques underlie its *repression* of identities and practices? In constituting itself as a machine of coercion and discipline, the military represses existing forms of being and produces a new species of citizen-nationals that permeate the rest of society. In the context of the modern nation-state, these militarized citizen-nationals impart to the rest of society, through a variety of mechanisms (media, official propaganda, schools, family, military conscriptions, songs, music), new cultures and traditions that are identified as "national." Following Timothy Mitchell, the military as a state organ is indeed as permeable as are other state agencies and society itself more generally.[26] This permeability between society and the army, between the realm of the civic and the realm of the military, is what facilitates the normalization of society that had begun within the military. Here, I am referring not only to the generalizability of the military's disciplinary function to schools, universities, hospitals, sports clubs, and the family, but also to the generalizability of the specific normalization of citizens within the military—as nationalist agents defending the nation—to the rest of society at large.

Historical Moments

Examining the roles of state organs, such as law and the military, in the fashioning of a postcolonial national identity reveals national identity to be a non-essence, a product overdetermined by a variety of mechanisms and discourses of which it is the effect. It also reveals it to be a dynamic entity. Its *self* and its *other* change according to different historical moments.

In analyzing how bourgeois revolutions and hegemony are achieved, Antonio Gramsci identifies three historical moments of the "relation of forces" whose resolutions are determinative of the outcome of political struggles. The first is that of the structure of the economy, "objective, independent of

human will"; the second is "the relation of political forces"; and the third is "the relation of military forces."[27] In studying Indian nationalist thought, Partha Chatterjee adapts Gramsci by positing three moments in its development, the moment of departure (that of its encounter with post-Enlightenment thought), the moment of manoeuvre (that of mobilization), and the moment of arrival ("when nationalist thought attains its full development").[28] As I am studying the role of state agencies in the production of national identity, I have chosen a different set of historical moments that are definitional of that identity. Like Chatterjee, I am not positing a teleological model of ascending evolutionary stages. I am positing these moments as transformative moments that are at times, but not necessarily always, historically discontinuous.

The first moment is the colonial moment. This is the moment when colonialism establishes a state-framework on a colonized territory/country, either replacing an existing state structure or inaugurating one where it had not existed before.[29] This inaugural moment establishes the political, juridical, administrative, and military structures of the colonized territory/country, effectively rendering it a nation-state (laws of nationality, governance, and citizenship are codified, borders and maps are drawn up, bureaucratic divisions and taxonomies of the territory and the population are imposed, conscription and/or induction of colonized men into colonial military structures is established). This moment constitutes a radical discontinuity with what existed before the colonial encounter.

The second moment is the anticolonial moment. This is the moment when the struggle against colonial rule becomes generalized and hegemonic, leading to the ultimate establishment of national independence. This is also the moment when the administrative colonial framework is adopted by the colonized to set up their independent nation-state. The nationalist representatives of the colonized will oversee the colonial state's institutions, which are now in the service of the postcolonial independent state. This moment is discontinuous from the previous one in that it overthrows the existing discursive and material structure of colonial governance. The nation-state and its apparatuses are now staffed and run by anticolonial nationalists for the benefit of the nation and not colonialism. However, as far as the techniques of governance are concerned, there is almost complete institutional continuity. The colonial structure of governance survives the "rupture" unscathed.

The third moment is that of the expansion and contraction of the nation. Here, I am referring mostly to the territorial and demographic expansion and contraction of the nation-state through annexation or loss of territory

(including India, Indonesia, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, North and South Yemen, Morocco, Pakistan, Ethiopia) or the incorporation and/or denationalization of sectors of the population. However, this moment also includes the expansion of the rights accorded to citizen-nationals to groups that have hitherto been denied such rights (women, certain ethnic groups and classes). As a result, this moment might in reality be a series of historical moments during which these expansions and contractions took place.

The fourth moment is the moment of internal implosion, generally characterized by civil war or revolution calling for an identitarian redefinition of the nation-state itself or for secession from it (a moment experienced by a large number of postcolonial nation-states but not necessarily all).

Although the first moment is also the first chronologically, the next three do not necessarily follow a chronological order. Expansion and/or contraction of a country can take place before or after independence from colonialism. Civil wars and revolutions can also take place under colonial or postcolonial rule. Therefore, with the exception of the colonial moment, the remaining three moments follow no systematic chronology, but all remain central definitional moments of national identity. In the course of this study, I identify the transformation in law, the military, political rights, and cultural discourse in the context of these historical moments.

The self that constitutes national identity and the other to which it is opposed also change depending on the historical moment. Whereas the period between the colonial and anticolonial moments is generally characterized by the constitution of a national self that is opposed to the colonials, this schema changes, especially after the end of colonialism. Whereas colonial *divide et impera* policies can and do bear fruit during the colonial period and continuing after it (India is a case in point), most of them are articulated in the postcolonial period where the constitution of a national-self that is no longer besieged by an *external* colonial other now organizes itself against an *internal* other (ethnic groups, groups from different geographic regions in the country, religious groups, racial groups, language groups, political groups). Examples include Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, India, Lebanon, and so forth.

Jordan's Historical Moments

A cursory perusal of recent books written about Jordan reveals titles such as *The Jordanian Character*,[30] The Political History of East of the Jordan in

the Mamluk Period,[31] and *Jordan in History: From the Stone Age until the Establishment of the Emirate*.[32] The intent of this book is to narrate the story through which Jordan came to *acquire* a history in the Stone Age or in the Mamluk period and how Jordanians came to have a specific national "character."

Before 1921, there was no territory, people, or nationalist movement that was designated, or that designated itself, as Transjordanian. Transjordan as a nation-state was established in the wake of World War I, in 1921, by the British and the recently arrived Hijazi Amir ʿAbdullah. This was Transjordan's colonial moment, its very inaugural moment. The British replaced the few existing state structures left by the Ottomans, and the small, short-lived regional governments that regionalists had established in 1920 to 1921 during the interregnum period following the end of Ottoman rule and the beginning of British rule. The first decade of rule was characterized by the British and the Amir's attempts to set up a governmental structure, an army, a police force, and a bureaucracy followed by the establishment of laws that began to be decreed in 1927. Transjordan's first constitution was set up in 1928, as the "Organic Law," concomitant with many other laws governing every aspect of life in the new state. Also, Transjordan expanded demographically and geographically through the annexation of an area extending in the south from Maʿan to ʿAqaba, which had been part of the Hijaz before. Several changes of the bureaucratic guard and of the institutional framework of the army and the police took place during the first decade. Moreover, several popular uprisings against encroaching state institutions and against the age of the nation-state were staged. Some of them targeted the bureaucracy and political apparatus, which was wholly staffed by people from outside the newly designated borders of the country. They were all defeated by the might of British military force and/or the will and diplomacy of the Hijazi Amir. It is the institutional establishment of the state, especially its juridical and military organs, that, as we will see, was detrimental to the production and repression of identities and cultural practices within the newly demarcated borders. During this period, a Jordanian nativist self developed that was opposed to an assortment of non-native others (the British, the Amir, and the Hijazi, Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi bureaucrats and politicians).

Consolidation of state power proceeded apace in the 1930s through coercion and co-optation of local elites, whose resistance to the non-representative state in the late 1920s and through the mid 1930s was crushed or neutralized by different means and through the recruitment and subjugation of the hitherto recalcitrant Bedouin population, constituting almost half the nascent country's population. Anticolonial uprisings took place in the second

half of the 1930s in solidarity with the neighboring Palestinians who were revolting against the British and the Zionist project. These were also crushed. The 1940s saw major changes in the country. The war years were profitable to Transjordan's merchant class, a majority of whom had Syrian and Palestinian origins. Transjordan's mostly Bedouin army, the Arab Legion, acquired an international role through intervening in Iraq and Syria on behalf of the British government, and a domestic one of disciplining the Bedouin population itself through its integration into state structures. Transjordan itself was transformed from a mere mandated emirate into an independent kingdom in 1946 with its ruling amir declaring himself king. Independence, however, was nominal, as the country's army continued to be led by a British officer and the country continued to depend on massive British subsidies. The very name of the country, Transjordan, which had been invented by British parliamentarians after World War I, was changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This was not accompanied by anticolonial revolts on the part of the populace but was rather the result of international changes following World War II and local diplomatic pressure by the amir and his politicians. The newly independent country experienced even more radical transformations before the decade was over. It had expanded to include central Palestine, the largest chunk of Palestinian land that the Zionists did not conquer, and a large Palestinian population consisting of the natives of central Palestine (which was renamed the West Bank), and the refugees expelled from the part of Palestine that became Israel, more than tripling the population. This was the second time that Jordan had expanded geographically and demographically. The 1925 and 1948 to 1950 expansions constitute an important moment in the country's history as the country's physical boundaries and demographic constitution were transformed in ways detrimental to its national identity and culture.

The 1950s saw more radical transformations. ʿAbdullah was assassinated in 1951. His son Talal assumed the throne for a brief period, followed by regents who ruled the country until Talal's son, Husayn, came of age in 1953, at which point he was enthroned. The state had begun to Jordanize the Palestinian population and territory through co-optation and manipulation and at times coercion. An anticolonial current overtook the country in the mid 1950s, demanding complete independence from the British as well as democratic reforms. Influenced by the anticolonial rage in the Third World more generally and the recent anticolonial triumphs in neighboring Arab countries, the movement acquired immense momentum, so much so that for a time the young King Husayn was swept by its zeal. Jordan's anti-

colonial moment was ushered in then and culminated in the expulsion of General John Bagot Glubb, the British head of the army, in March 1956. The anticolonial momentum did not subside following Glubb's departure and the "Arabization" of the army. Democratic reforms as well as Jordan's realignment in international politics were the big items on the agenda of the anticolonial nationalist movement. The king and his coterie of family and friends worried that the tide might sweep the monarchy away. With the help of the British and the Americans, a palace coup took place in 1957, putting an end to the liberal experiment and releasing a tide of political repression under which the country lived for the next three decades, if not to the present. Jordan's anticolonial moment also had many implications for its national identity and national culture. It is during this historical moment that the Jordanian self was radically opposed to the colonial British other.

The 1960s brought even more changes and transformations to the country. While Palestinian-Jordanians were now represented in government and among the country's economic elite, the Palestinian poor living in refugee camps were continuing to agitate to end their exile. The 1967 War with Israel cost Jordan the West Bank, forcing its *de facto* demographic and geographic contraction. The rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and that of the Palestinian guerrilla movements after the 1967 War challenged the Jordanian government's claim that the West Bank and the Palestinian population it acquired are now Jordanians for whom it alone can speak. Moreover, the guerrillas began to encroach on the country's very sovereignty. The situation exploded into a civil war between the Jordanian army, which includes Palestinians, and the Palestinian guerrillas, which include Jordanians. This is the country's moment of implosion, which proved crucial for national redefinition. Much of the country's elite, including the Palestinian-Jordanian elite, backed the regime. The guerrillas were defeated and a major campaign of Jordanization, which had already been in existence before the Civil War, went into full swing after it. The other of the Jordanian was no longer the external British colonialist but an internal other, namely, Palestinian Jordanians. The merchant class, which had few Transjordanians, lost much of its political power to the strong bureaucracy, the mainstay of Transjordanians of settled origins. The army, in Transjordanian hands since Arabization, continued to be the major force at the disposal of the regime. Discriminatory policies against Palestinian-Jordanians (constituting more than half the population) became increasingly institutionalized: there was less government representation, less employment in the public sector, fewer academic opportunities, and less access to public

funds. The private sector, the mainstay of Palestinian power, continued to favor Palestinians in its employment practices.

The country, however, saw a constitutional expansion of rights through the normalization of citizens. Women were granted the vote in 1974, and the Bedouin population, living under Bedouin customary laws and quasi military/police rule since 1929, were normalized by the cancellation of these laws in 1976, finally equating the Bedouins and women with male urbanites juridically, as far as political and civil rights were concerned. The country was stabilized and its economy began to improve as a result of increasing remittances from its labor migrants in the Gulf states, from foreign aid from Arab Gulf states and the United States, and from land speculation, which skyrocketed by the end of the decade.

The 1980s brought yet more transformations. Jordan's economy began to teeter on the edge of collapse by mid decade. The Palestinian Uprising in Jordan's West Bank was not only questioning the Israeli occupation but also the very Jordanianness of the West Bank, whose Palestinianness was being asserted more strongly than ever. With the PLO increasingly recognized as the only political representative of the revolting Palestinians, Jordan's king "disengaged" from the West Bank, effectively giving up the territory *de jure*. Its Jordanian population was soon denationalized with the same peremptory power that ʿAbdullah had nationalized them almost four decades earlier. The country's expanding moment had come full circle through this contraction. Moreover, the governing arrangement itself was to be transformed with the inauguration of a liberalized period in 1989, leading to parliamentary elections and the expansion of liberties that were still as restricted as they had been since the Palace coup of 1957.

The 1990s ushered in a new liberal age that opened up pent-up frustration on the identity issue. Transjordanian exclusivists began agitating for a more Transjordanian-only Jordan, bringing to the political battlefield anti-Palestinian frustrations that had been growing and made more legitimate by the regime since the Civil War. Some of these essentialist claims are also questioning the Jordanianness of the royal family itself.

This study intends to describe and analyze the processes through which peoples and territories that were constituted as a nation in 1921 came to accept this designation and within a few decades began to agitate for political rights based on it. How did the peoples and the territories that the British and the Hijazi amir captured in 1921 become Jordanian is the main question that this book seeks to answer

This book, however, is not *only* about how Jordanian national identity and culture are historically contingent, resulting from colonial and post-

colonial state institutions that actively produce and repress identifications and practices, it is *also* about how national identity and culture in general are produced. The Jordanian case is especially illustrative of these processes because of its more recent constitution as a nation-state and the clear markings stamped on it by its architects, markings that are less visible in other postcolonial settings. Although Jordan is not unique in the postcolonial world, it is one of the less common cases: "Outsiders" conceived of its borders and identity; they led its national army well after independence; people whose roots within existing memory lie outside the new borders of the country, ruled and continue to rule it; its population consists in its majority of people whose geographic "origins" within living memory are located outside the borders of the nation-state (this does not refer only to Palestinian Jordanians, but also to Syrian-Jordanians, Hijazi-Jordanians, Egyptian-Jordanians, Iraqi-Jordanians, Lebanese-Jordanians, Turkish-Jordanians, Circassian-Jordanians, Kurdish-Jordanians, Chechen-Jordanians, and Armenian-Jordanians); the country has a large dependence on foreign money to support its resource-poor economy; and claims are put forth by neighboring powerful states on its very identity (Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Nasirist Egypt, to list the more prominent ones historically), or on parts of it (the West Bank and Palestinian Jordanians) by a strong nationalist movement (namely, the PLO). It is in the context of this wide array of factors that Jordanian nationalist discourse has a more difficult time stabilizing the terms and essences it posits than the nationalist discourses of other postcolonial nation-states. Whereas Jordanian national identity is no more "imagined" or "invented" than other national identities, its more recent exclusivist defenders have a harder battle to wage than their counterparts elsewhere in the world. It is this characteristic of the Jordanian case that makes it more clearly illustrative of nationalization processes that are better dissimulated elsewhere, and thus it allows the exposure of such dissimulation.

This study is not intended to tell the whole story of how national identity is produced, nor does it imply that law and the military are the only factors relevant to the production of national identity and national culture. Due to the absence of any examination of these institutions in recent studies of nationalism, the contribution this study makes to the debate lies in its demonstration that law and the military are *central* to the production of the nation and are generative of other discourses that infiltrate other state agencies and society at large in their defining of national culture.

The first two chapters examine the juridical production of national identity and national culture. I look at laws of nationality, election laws, and civil laws, as well as at the organization of law itself into three separate realms:

European codes, religious codes, and Bedouin customary law. The third and fourth chapters examine the military's production of national identity and national culture. I examine the role of the British in organizing a population that resisted the order of the nation-state, and their transformation, through repressive and productive techniques, not only into obedient citizen-nationals but also into defenders of the new order. I also examine the impact colonial legacy had (and has) on anticolonial nationalists. Chapter 4 also presents a lengthy but needed diplomatic history of politics within the military and of politics between the military and the regime. A fifth chapter discusses the juridical, military, and political aspects of the relationship between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians, and its productive and repressive impact on Jordanian national identity and national culture. This is important as it reveals how disciplinary strategies used by the colonial and postcolonial state organize national identity by identifying its self and its other. This chapter will also include diplomatic history, especially as relates to the PLO and its relationship to the Jordanian State and regime. I will end by examining the current nationalist discourse in Jordan and its increasingly exclusivist and essentialist claims. Throughout the five chapters, the discussion will center not only on the law and the military but also on the important discourses on national identity that both institutions generate outside their institutional rubric and that spill over into other state agencies and society at large. These discussions (e.g., music, food, sports, tourism, archeology) are not extraneous to our examination of law and the military; rather, they are the effects of the different processes generated by the law and the military, albeit processes that exceed their institutional boundaries.

Throughout the book, you will notice that I identify the geographic origins and the religious and ethnic backgrounds of people. This is done deliberately. As contemporary Jordanian nationalism adheres to a set of essentialist markers that are geographically, ethnically, and at times religiously constant, and that it claims "constitute" Jordanian identity, my identification of people's backgrounds is intended to interrogate that claim. The elements that constitute today's Jordanian national identity and Jordanian national culture and the backgrounds of individuals who uphold the essentialist character of Jordanian identity are much more varied geographically, ethnically, and religiously than the guardians of contemporary Jordanian nationalism would like to believe. Drawing attention to people's varied "origins" then is itself an argument against an essentialist notion of national identity.

When applied to different national contexts, this mode of inquiry will not result in the same outcome that it does in the specific case of Jordan. As

each national context is particular, the mode of inquiry I am proposing will elicit different results in each case. Its strength then is in asking a new set of questions that prevailing methods have not asked and in explaining specific outcomes that as of yet have not been explained adequately. This is not to say that the case of Jordan (and indeed of every country) is so specific that we cannot use it to illustrate other cases. It is simply asserting that this mode of inquiry does not seek to "normalize" all nation-states under the banner of one model. It does, however, aim to pose important questions of how nation-states *in general* impose their modality where one had not existed before. Jordan's case is in fact generalizable insofar as the colonial institutional and philosophical legacy that Jordan inherited from British colonialism is one that is shared by many nations in Asia and Africa. What is specific is the outcome these institutions produced (or produce) in each national context. What follows then is not a study of nationalist movements or necessarily of nationalist thought in the colonial world. It is a study of how the state, colonial and postcolonial, participates in the *identification* of the nation, and the role it plays in the production of national identity and culture, which nationalist thought adopts as objective essences.