5 The Nation as an Elastic Entity

The Expansion and Contraction of Jordan

In this chapter, I discuss the geographic and demographic expansion and contraction of Jordan and their impact on the development of a Jordanian national identity and national culture. I demonstrate how the arrival of the Palestinian population to what came to be known as the East Bank, as well as the addition of central Palestine to the kingdom, served to consolidate the already developing political unity of the people of Transjordan, and how through the years, the presence of the Palestinians in the country was crucial to the emergence of a specific configuration of Jordanian national identity and national culture that became increasingly exclusivist of large sections of the Jordanian citizenry with every passing decade. The Palestinians, who came to be identified as "other" by the Jordanian regime and its allies, were instrumental in helping the formation of a Jordanian national self opposed to that other, wherein, for the new exclusivist nationalists, citizenship and nationality were no longer to be conflated as one. Although, initially, ʿAbdullah and Glubb never thought that the Palestinians could serve such a purpose, nor did any state agency at the time, it became clear to ʿAbdullah and Glubb as well as to most state agencies (especially the military, the judicial system, and the bureaucracy) that they could marshal their resources to foster such an identification, which would help dispel the threat that the Palestinians brought with them—namely, that of a non-Hashemite Arab nationalism. Although ideas of Arab nationalism, as we saw in chapter 1, had already permeated the Jordanian national movement long before the arrival of the Palestinians, the Jordanian state feared that the Palestinians, through their sheer numbers and their level of despair, could

tip the balance against Hashemite hegemony. The Jordanian state, however, was ambivalent about this new project. Whereas the discourse of Jordanian nationalism was the more readily available weapon at its disposal to ward off enemies of the Hashemite monarchy, be they Transjordanian or Palestinian, wherein the regime identified itself with the Transjordanian population so much that opposition to it came to be identified as opposition to Jordan and Jordanianness, the Jordanian regime feared an exclusivist Jordanian nationalism, which, like the one it encountered in nativist form in the 1920s, would exclude the Hashemites themselves from Jordanian identity on the same basis that it would exclude the Palestinians. We will see in the course of post-1948 history how the Jordanian state's ambivalence manifested itself and on what occasions it opted to resolve its ambivalence in favor of partiality. Moreover, this chapter shows how state policies unleashed a Jordanian nationalist momentum with its own nationalist discourse that the state itself could no longer control, and which, it feared, would engulf it at the end by redefining it according to its own dicta.

Although ʿAbdullah's expansionist ideology was constitutive of his entire political thought and strategy since before 1921, including the tactic of accepting the formation of a state that came to be known as Transjordan as a basis for such expansion (schemes to rule over and unify Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan continued to be pursued by ʿAbdullah until his death in 1951[1]), the concrete geographic and demographic expansion of Transjordan was not to take place until 1948. At that moment, the installation of the European-Jewish settler colony on the geographic and demographic majority of Palestine led the way for ʿAbdullah's annexation of the remaining central-eastern part of that territory to Jordan (renamed upon independence in 1946). Like his previous attempts to impose his expansionist will on Syria, his bid for Palestine had always faced intense opposition from a large Palestinian nationalist bloc (not to mention the ambivalent support from Zionist colonial settlers), which by 1948 was no longer able to muster political or military power against ʿAbdullah's takeover. Although such resistance was ubiquitous and continuous, ʿAbdullah and his local Palestinian allies were able to co-opt or coerce a large number of powerful Palestinians to the cause of annexation, inaugurated at the Jericho Conference in December 1948. This process of geographic and demographic expansion had a major impact on Jordan in all areas of political, economic, and social life, the effects of which served to redefine and reconstitute Jordan in ways that became ineradicable. The difficulty encountered by the surging Jordanian nationalist exclusivism, which was cemented in 1970, is precisely in its inability to

disentangle a pre-1948 mythologized vision of a pure and purified Jordan from an equally mythologized vision of a post-1948 contaminated Jordan. The success of more recent attempts (since the late 1980s) to recreate a nationalized Jordanian historical memory whose purpose is to return contemporary Jordan to a mythical idealized view of a pre-Palestinians Jordan for the purpose of reestablishing a post-Palestinians Jordan remains to be seen. What is visible, however, to all who live in Jordan today, is the impossibility of such complete disentanglement, much less such purification.

The Project of the Unification Decision (or Mashru‘ Qarar al-Wihdah) was the way the Jordanian government titled the annexation proposal. The opening statement of the government's declaration, inaugurating parliamentary debates on the question, asserted that its and Parliament's decision was based, inter alia, on the "reality [waqi‘] of both banks (of Jordan), the Eastern and the Western, its nationalist, natural and geographic unity ["wihdatiha al-qawmiyyah, wa al-tabi‘iyyah, wa al-jughrafiyyah"], and the necessities of their common interests."[2] The parliamentary decision called for the "complete unity between Jordan's eastern and western banks, and their consolidation into one state which is the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom" or al-Mamlakah al-Urduniyyah al-Hashimiyyah (wrongly translated into English as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan).[3] ‘Abdullah's Speech from the Throne (Khitab al-‘Arsh), which inaugurated the parliamentary session that voted for "unity," stressed that this "is the first time in the history of the constitutional life of Jordan that the people's council [Parliament], which grouped both banks (of Jordan), emanates from the will of one people, one homeland and one hope. And that this is a blessed step which the two banks have embarked upon and which the people, who are the concerned party, has set to achieve, aiming to strengthen its nationalist unity, its patriotic pride [wihdatihi al-qawmiyyah wa ‘izzatihi al-wataniyyah] and its common interests." ‘Abdullah analogizes the new expanded Jordan to "a bird whose wings are its East and its West, and who has a natural right to have its people and relatives come together."[4] Whereas the bird's wings correspond concretely to the East and West Banks, the bird's body representing Jordan has no concrete geographic correspondence. It is unlikely that the Jordan River is its concrete representation, as a river in this metaphoric concept is not even abstractly considered a country. Jordan, as a country, is abstracted here into a concept with no geographic correspondence. Jordan, in fact, as a malleable entity that expands and contracts, exceeds its geographic reality of East and West Banks, which are mere wings that help it fly. As an abstracted concept then, Jordan is immaterial; it is beyond geography and physicality. In line

with such metaphors, in its response to His Majesty's Speech from the Throne, the senate described the East Bank as the "sister" of the West Bank and described ʿAbdullah as an "experienced captain of a ship . . . ploughing a way for his ship in the middle of raging storms of whims and inclinations."[5] Whereas this biological metaphor—wherein Jordan is a mother whose daughters are the two banks—like the bird metaphor, renders Jordan, the mother, abstract, incorporeal, and immaterial, the ship metaphor endows the project of annexation, as a means of transportation, with a *body* (that of the ship) traveling through a sea of moods and psyches seeking a safe port. It is unity that constitutes this teleological safe port of Abdullah's annexation project: "the unification of the West Bank with its sister the East Bank . . . in one kingdom shaded by [or under the protection of] the Hashemite crown."[6]

ʿAbdullah asserts that the unity of both banks is "a nationalist and factual reality." Its nationalist reality is attested to through "the entanglements of [people's] origins and branches and the coalescence of vital interests and the unity of pain and hopes." Its factual reality is attested to by "the establishment of strong unionist links between both banks since 1922. . . . Those important and notable links included unity of currency [in reference to Transjordan's use of the Palestinian pound as its official currency], common defense, utilization of ports, reinforcement of border security, and facilitation of custom and travel barriers, [all] based on the unity of interests and cultural and legislative exchange which have rendered each of the two banks an excellent center especially for the other."[7] The discourse permitting this union, like the one used to found Transjordan itself back in 1921, is Arab nationalism. ʿAbdullah stresses that "when Great Britain surrendered its mandate over Palestine, which has been excised from the mother country [al-watan al-umm] and the storms of the Arab-Zionist dispute raged, it became imperative to assert the rights of the Arabs and to stand up to aggression through a general Arab cooperation . . . and, in our opinion, there is no security to any Arab people except in its real unity and in the coming together of its scattered parts wherever this is possible and reflective of the general will and is not a breach of any covenant or agreement."[8] ʿAbdullah views the parliamentary elections in both banks preceding their "unification" as "evidence of a sense of self" that the people of both banks have.[9] His speech further stipulated plans to unify the laws of both banks. He concluded by saluting and congratulating members of Parliament and stressing that "you have marched with me in past years and I shall march with you in forthcoming years under your constitutional responsibility and with my paternal guid-

ance, wishing the best for the homeland."[10] Jordan's Parliament "voted" for unity based on "the right of self-determination, the reality of (Jordan's) two banks, the Eastern and the Western, its nationalist, natural and geographic unity, and the necessities of their common interests and vital domain."[11] Whereas the senate likened the Jordanian kingdom to the *mother* of both banks, ʿAbdullah is clear on his role as *father* to all whom this kingdom encompasses. His "paternal guidance" was much appreciated by the Lower House's "Response to the Speech from the Throne." In it, those pretending to speak for Parliament "praise . . . Your Majesty's paternal affection [ʿAtf] toward the [Palestinian] refugees and your work to save them from their despair."[12] (Certainly, such metaphors are not specific to Jordanian nationalism, as they are rampant in all European nationalisms where the idea of the nation as a motherland, or fatherland, depending on the context, and its leaders/founders as fathers—note the use of the term *Founding Fathers* in the U.S. context—was first instituted.[13]) Whereas Arab nationalism is the discourse deployed to "unify" Jordan and Palestine, it is Transjordanian nationalism, not Arab nationalism, that must define the new "unified" and expanded entity. We will see soon how this was not an unintended outcome of the absorption of a stateless territory and people by an existing state, but rather an intended policy of Jordanization and de-Palestinization.

Expanding the Nation: The Road to Annexation

The background to annexation was a full-fledged campaign launched by the Jordanian government to establish itself as the representative of the aggrieved Palestinians.[14] Contingency plans for such a campaign had in fact been in preparation since the United Nations voted to partition Palestine. Whereas the members of the Peel Commission on Palestine were the first to recommend the annexation of the "Arab" parts of Palestine to Transjordan as early as 1937, which led ʿAbdullah to submit a proposal to the British government calling for the establishment of "a unified Arab kingdom composed of Palestine and Transjordan under royal Arab rule,"[15] practical plans to achieve this goal were put in place following the UN partition plan.[16] King ʿAbdullah was very clear on his right to represent the Palestinians soon after his army entered Palestine on May 15, 1948. He states with no equivocation that "the Arab Higher Committee no longer represents the Arabs of Palestine."[17] This situation became more complicated after the establishment of the General Palestine Government (Hukumat ʿUmum Filastin) in

September 1948, which was supported by the Arab League, and especially Egypt. To counter the authority of the new Palestine government, ʿAbdullah convened a conference in Amman on October 1, 1948, (which he dubbed the Nationalist Conference on Palestine, or Muʾtamar Filastin al-Qawmi), the same day the Palestine government had called for a conference in Gaza, to which he "invited" 500 Palestinian community leaders and notables.[18] To ensure that the Palestinians attended the Amman conference and not the one convened in Gaza, a number of repressive measures were taken by the government (it should be noted that at the time all the parts of central Palestine that were under Jordanian army control were being run under the 1935 defense law), including preventing delegates from going to Gaza and forcing them to go to Amman instead (many parts of central Palestine were still at the time under Iraqi and Egyptian army control).[19] The conference delegates issued a number of resolutions stating that they "confer upon His Majesty full and absolute authority to speak in the name of the Arabs of Palestine and that he negotiate in their stead and that he resolve their problem in the way he deems fit. He is our representative [wakil] in all matters pertaining to the future of Palestine." Furthermore, the delegates decided to send a telegram to the Arab Higher Committee informing it that the delegates are "removing from it the trust of the Arabs of Palestine, for it does not represent them and it does not have the right to speak in their name or to represent their opinions."[20] As ʿIsam Sakhnini points out, the Amman conference was ʿAbdullah's first step to exact an authorization for himself from the Palestinians to represent their cause, while simultaneously denying the legitimacy of the General Palestine Government, thus rendering him the sole representative and caretaker of Palestine and the Palestinians. On October 5, ʿAbdullah called formally for the dissolution of the Palestine government. A month later, on November 15, 1948, and upon ʿAbdullah's visit to Jerusalem, he was proclaimed by the Coptic bishop as the King of Jerusalem.[21]

The Jericho Conference

Whereas the Amman Conference took preliminary steps to ensure ʿAbdullah's free hand in dealing with central Palestine and the Palestinians, the Jericho Conference, which he convened on December 1, 1948, strengthened his grip and his resolve to annex the area. As mentioned, central Palestine had already been emptied of anti-Hashemite opposition and

resistance through a number of repressive measures undertaken by the Jordanian army, and with a swift and wide-ranging campaign to destroy the Army of Sacred Struggle (which during the war used to answer to the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni), thus eliminating any organized resistance to ʿAbdullah's plans. Concomitant with these repressive measures were a series of appointments of ʿAbdullah's allies as provincial governors and municipal mayors throughout central Palestine, in addition to the deportation of many members of the anti-ʿAbdullah Palestinian Arab Party, and the imposition of strict surveillance on those members who remained (especially in the big towns of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nablus).[22] In addition, the king ordered ʿAbdullah al-Tall, military governor of Jerusalem and one of ʿAbdullah's chief negotiators, to sign an armistice agreement with the Israelis, which he did on November 30, 1948, the day before the Jericho Conference convened. It was with this as background that over 1,000 Palestinian delegates, most of them refugees from the war, were transported in military vehicles by the Jordanian army to Jericho to attend ʿAbdullah's conference.[23] ʿArif al-ʿArif reports that many state employees were also brought to attend the conference, while those who refused were dismissed from their jobs or were forced to resign.[24] ʿAbdullah al-Tall reports how the Jordanian government met with Shaykh Muhammad ʿAli al-Jaʿbari, Hebron's mayor, and a protégé of ʿAbdullah, before the conference and informed him of its plans for the conference and its projected goals. The government along with ʿAbdullah, according to al-Tall, provided al-Jaʿbari with the declarations that the conference was supposed to issue with a consensus vote at its conclusion.[25] Al-Tall adds that the largest delegation attending the conference came from Hebron, where al-Jaʿbari coaxed many "who do not mind spending a vacation of a day or two at the government's expense! Had travel costs been at the expense of the delegations themselves, only a few people would have come to Jericho."[26] At the conference, al-Jaʿbari was elected president of the conference. The mayors of Jerusalem and Nablus (the latter was under the control of the Iraqi army) along with many Palestinian notables refused to attend the conference despite all of ʿAbdullah's measures.

The conference resolutions called for a "Palestinian-Jordanian unity" and affirmed that the only way the Arab nation would be able to confront the dangers it faced was through complete national unity: "we must begin by unifying Palestine with Transjordan as a prelude to real Arab unity." The conference also declared that it "elects [yubayiʿ] His Majesty King ʿAbdullah as king of all Palestine and it salutes Him and His brave army and the Arab

armies who have fought and are fighting in defense of Palestine." At the conclusion of the conference, its delegates headed to the king's palace in Shunah, in the Jordan Valley, where they informed him of their resolutions, including his election as king of Palestine.[27] Some accounts add that one of the resolutions called on the Jordanian government to "change its name so that it becomes the Hashemite Arab Kingdom in addition to removing all borders between Palestine and Transjordan."[28] This, however, would have brought more condemnation from other Arabs and Palestinians. Twelve days later, Jordan's twenty-member Parliament, which had no constitutional authority whatsoever over the executive branch, issued a declaration supporting unification and the government's positive response to the Jericho conference.[29] The Arab League and its member states, including the Palestine government, in turn declared their open hostility to the conference and to 'Abdullah's annexation plans. Soon after, however, all member states established diplomatic relations with the kingdom, implicitly recognizing its expansion—although not a single Arab state has ever recognized it officially. The United States and Britain also declared their recognition of 'Abdullah's annexation, except for Jerusalem.[30]

The renaming of central Palestine as the West Bank did not take place officially until a year following the Jericho Conference, and before juridical unification, when the government issued an ordinance stipulating that "sheep and cattle are allowed to be exported to the West Bank of the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom."[31] The government term used prior to this ordinance was "the western territory," or "the western territories" or "Palestine."[32] Later, the word *Palestine* itself was to be erased and replaced by *West Bank*. In a postal ordinance issued on March 1, 1950, the third article specified that "the word 'Palestine' is hereby abolished as a reference to the West Bank of the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom wherever it appears in the ordinances and decisions and instructions that are listed in the first article of this ordinance."[33] John Bagot Glubb commented in this regard that "the names Palestine and Trans-Jordan, used in the past, were no longer entirely suitable."[34] Moreover, in 1953, the government issued a new law, which it termed "the law unifying the laws of both banks of the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom," which transformed the expanded country into a juridical unity.[35]

In preparation for "unification," other measures were undertaken by the government. A new cabinet was formed in May 1949, which included three Palestinian ministers, one of whom, the Nablusite Ruhi 'Abd al-Hadi, served as foreign minister—an important choice especially with regard to the Arab states and their expected reaction to 'Abdullah's annexation (a fourth Pal-

estinian became temporarily minister of refugees, a ministry that was later abolished).[36] After the war ended, the military government set up by the Jordanians on entering Palestine in May 1948 was dissolved and replaced by an administrative government in March 1949.[37] The government appointed former military officers to top civilian positions of ruling central Palestine: 'Umar Matar, a Transjordanian who served as general military governor of Palestine during the war period, was appointed administrative governor of the territories, a position that answered to the Jordanian interior ministry. The position of administrative governor was abolished by royal edict on January 16,1950, in preparation for annexation.[38] After that date, the administration of central Palestine was to be directly linked to the interior ministry.[39]

As mentioned in chapter 1, the Palestinians were nationalized through an amendment to the Law of Nationality in December 1949. Prior to that, however, and as a preliminary step on the way to nationalization, the Jordanian government had enacted in February 1949 an amendment to the passport law, wherein "any Palestinian Arab holding Palestinian nationality can obtain a Jordanian passport according to the Passport Law number 5 for the Year 1942."[40] In July 1949, a law was enacted rendering the Jordanian dinar the only currency in the country.[41] It should be noted that the Jordanian dinar was being invented during this period to replace the Palestinian pound that had been the official Transjordanian currency since 1927.[42] Soon after, the Jordanian consulate in Jerusalem was closed down, as Jerusalem, by then, was under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry.[43] Moreover, all customs and tariffs between Palestine and Jordan were abolished in December 1949.[44] By the end of 1949, all steps, administrative and legal, were taken to unify central Palestine, now renamed the West Bank, with Jordan. This process was so thorough that the Jordanian prime minister declared early in 1950 that "on the occasion of the lifting of barriers between the East and the West Banks of the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom, there is no longer a reason to consider the country [al-bilad] located in the West Bank a foreign country . . . the two countries located in said two Banks are considered one unity [wihdah wahidah]."[45] It was with this as background that the postal ordinance (mentioned previously) of March 1, 1950, abolished the word *Palestine* and replaced it with *the West Bank*.

There remained one crucial step to be taken to seal the upcoming juridical unification—namely, parliamentary elections. The preparation for this step had begun on December 13, 1949, when the Jordanian Parliament was dissolved by royal decree to take effect on January 1, 1950. It was further decreed that new elections would be held that would include Palestinians.

To achieve this, the electoral law was amended so that "twenty representatives elected on behalf of the western territory administered by the government of the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom are added to the representatives whose numbers and districts are specified in the seventeenth and eighteenth articles of the Electoral Law of Parliament."[46] April 11, 1950, was the date set for the new elections.

The debate over the elections in what has become the West Bank was intense. Factions ranged from those completely opposed to the elections (especially the Palestine government and the Arab Higher Committee), who saw participation in the elections as an admission that Palestine had been lost forever to the Zionist colonial settlement, to those who saw holding the elections as a *fait accompli* and urged people to participate so that they can at least have a voice in running their own lives, to those who were completely in support of "unification" [members of ʿAbdullah's new bureaucracy, remnants of the Defense Party (Hizb al-Difaʿ), and remnants of the British Mandatory apparatus]. The Communist Party, which had supported the UN Partition Plan in 1947, opposed ʿAbdullah's elections and called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in accordance with UN resolutions.[47]

The government interfered in the elections, supporting and opposing candidates according to its loyalty criteria. It also used army votes, as members of the army were allowed to vote at the time, to ensure that government candidates won. Glubb Pasha tells of how he provided his soldiers with lists of candidates with marks next to government candidates, although he claims that "[n]o pressure would be used to make them vote for the government's candidates."[48] This is aside from the unfair seat distribution, as East Bank voters numbered 129,000 and West Bank voters numbered 175,000 but each Bank had twenty seats in Parliament. In addition, much gerrymandering was undertaken to ensure a loyal Parliament.[49] A new cabinet was set up the day after the elections that included five Palestinian ministers.

On March 24, both chambers of Parliament met to begin deliberations on the annexation (or "unification") of central Palestine. A number of Palestinian and Jordanian members of Parliament (MPs) walked out in protest, as many had asked that the constitution be changed before deliberations began on the question of "unification." After some mediation, the MPs returned and one of them proposed that deliberations on unification be postponed. The matter (of postponement) was put to a vote and lost, thanks to the vote of the upper chamber senators (Aʿyan), who were in their entirety (as they remain today) appointed by the king. The postponement vote that lost was considered by the government a vote *for* unification, as the matter

of unification itself was never put to a vote! At the end of the parliamentary session, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, former prime minister (of many terms) and ʿAbdullah's right-hand man, who was elected speaker of Parliament, issued the parliamentary "decision" of unification as a decision approved by a parliament that represents both Banks.[50] Soon the British government recognized the new expanded Jordan (except for Jerusalem, which, according to the UN Partition Plan, was supposed to be under UN rule), as did the Israelis, although less unequivocally. On being prodded by the Palestine government in Gaza, the Arab League, which had remained largely silent about all the preparatory steps taken by the Jordanian government to annex central Palestine, issued a decision opposing the annexation and called for the dismissal of Jordan from league membership.[51] The Jordanian government reacted by asserting that it had reached the conclusion that "the matter of unification is a done deal with no room for discussion."[52]

On Friday, July 20, 1951, after touring the West Bank, ʿAbdullah, accompanied by his young grandson Husayn, headed to al-Aqsa mosque to perform their prayers. The mosque was full, with 1,000 worshipers attending prayers. The service was being broadcast live on radio. On entering the mosque, ʿAbdullah was shot dead by a young Palestinian, Mustafa ʿAshshu, who was shot and killed immediately afterwards by ʿAbdullah's guards. Army soldiers on guard outside rushed into the mosque, shooting indiscriminately and killing, in the process, twenty people and wounding 100 more. The Hashemite regiment guards then ran amok in Jerusalem, firing at people, destroying windows, looting property, and beating people with their rifle butts and fists.[53] Hundreds were detained and questioned. Two days later, some of the worshipers at the mosque were still not allowed to go home.

Rumors of the Old City being turned over by the army to Israel as punishment for the Palestinians were rife. Cars with Palestinian license plates were stoned in Salt. At some refugee camps, however, there was public rejoicing. At a camp near the Philadelphia Hotel in downtown Amman, angry Transjordanians attacked and killed three Palestinian refugees and wounded others.[54]

Ten people were accused of plotting the assassination with ʿAshshu and were presented to a military court, headed by three Transjordanian officers.[55] The prosecuting lawyer was the Palestinian Walid Salah, who also served as the court's judicial advisor. Four of the ten were acquitted and the remaining six were sentenced to death. Two of the six were Transjordanians who had fled to Egypt. One of them was ʿAbdullah al-Tall, former military governor of Jerusalem, who had recently defected to Cairo, while the other was Musa

Ahmad Ayyubi, originally from Salt. They were sentenced to death in absentia. The four Palestinians in custody were speedily executed by hanging on the recommendation of the British ambassador Sir Alec Seath Kirkbride.[56]

The New Jordan

The Arab-Israeli War of 1948, along with the Zionist expulsion of close to a million Palestinians from their homeland, led to hundreds of thousands of refugees' flooding those parts of Palestine not yet conquered by Jewish forces as well as neighboring Arab countries. Almost 360,000 refugees entered central Palestine (soon to be renamed the West Bank) and 110,000 refugees entered Jordan proper (soon to be renamed the East Bank). At the time, the population of central Palestine was 425,000 people, and Jordan's population was 375,000.[57] As a result, the total population of the East Bank rose to 485,000 while that of the West Bank rose to 785,000 people, making the total population of the new expanded Jordan 1,270,000 people. Therefore, Jordan was transformed demographically overnight from a country of 375,000 people to one of over a million, a rise of almost 300 percent. As a result, the proportion of the newcomer Palestinians in the 1951 to 1952 period was 64.57 percent of the total population of Jordan (which includes all the West Bank Palestinians as well as all registered Palestinian refugees in the East Bank). If we include the Palestinians who were living in Jordan before 1948, the proportion rises at least to 68.81 percent. As for the East Bank, the proportion of newcomer Palestinians to the total population was 19.77 percent, which rises to 29.31 percent if the pre-1948 Palestinians living in Jordan are included. This proportion increases further to 34.42 percent if we count Palestinian refugees registered in the East Bank, pre-1948 Palestinians living in Jordan, and West Bank Palestinians who moved to the East Bank between 1948 and 1952. Thus, around the time of "unification," Palestinians constituted one third of the population of the East Bank alone. In 1961, that proportion rose to 43 percent, and it further increased to 47.1 percent on the eve of the 1967 War. Moreover, the proportion of the total Palestinian population to the whole population of the East and West Banks had risen to 70.35 percent on the eve of the 1967 War.[58]

After the 1967 War, due to the new wave of refugees expelled by the conquering Israelis, the proportion of Palestinians living in the East Bank increased to approximately 60 percent (although estimates are inaccurate

for this period).[59] The population increased substantially again after the Gulf War in the early 1990s, when the return of 200,000 to 300,000 Palestinian Jordanians who lived in Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf raised the proportion of Palestinians—the majority of whom live in Amman and neighboring cities—in the East Bank even further.

Indeed, this immense and sudden demographic expansion had a major impact on all aspects of life in the new Jordan. It is important to stress here the urban nature of much of that expansion in the East Bank, as the majority of the Palestinian population who took refuge there resided in the cities. Amman had already seen much expansion during World War II, when its population increased to 30,000 in 1943. It rose again to 70,000 in 1948, then to 120,000 in 1952, and still further to 246,475 in 1961.[60]

In addition, there existed a number of socioeconomic differences between the incoming Palestinian population and the indigenous Transjordanian population. Palestinians were more urban, more educated, and more experienced in political participation, and they had more exposure to the mass media (newspapers and radio). The Palestinians were also used to better medical care and higher health standards as well as lower child mortality rates.[61] Palestinian merchants brought with them their capital as educated Palestinians brought with them their expertise and skills. Palestinian workers also brought with them their organizational expertise and political experience. These differences placed new economic, social, and political demands on the Jordanian state, and on Jordan's pre-war population more generally.

On the social level, these visible markers of difference created more tension. There was a general perception among the Transjordanian urban population that the Palestinian upper and middle classes, expelled from their cities to relatively less developed small towns in Jordan, were engaging in a nation-class narrative of superiority over Transjordanians. Such a discourse was clearly offensive, especially to those in the Transjordanian upper and middle classes who had an education comparable to that of the Palestinians, although they were smaller in number. Jordanian Christians, disproportionately educated thanks to missionary schools, especially took offense and felt endangered by Palestinian competition. The Palestinian elite, however, lacked political power that would allow it to institutionalize this discourse against the Transjordanians, as its political power had always derived from the Hashemite regime, whose antipathy to Palestinian nationalism (and sympathy to a Transjordanian nationalism of its own making) was always in evidence. Moreover, the Palestinian working classes and former peasants, who were living in refugee camps, did not partake in this discourse of su-

periority, as they lacked any real material superiority over indigenous Transjordanians. On the contrary, their economic lot came to infuriate rich landowning Jordanians, including Circassians, on some of whose lands the refugee camps were set up by the government. At the time, the land had very little value. As the 1970s (the decade of land speculation) encroached and the land appreciated measurably, many of these Transjordanians expressed horror at these squatters, whom they wanted to evict. Thus, nation and class were intertwined in the discourse of both Palestinian and Transjordanian chauvinists at different periods since 1948.

Palestinians and the West Bank

Despite early Palestinian opposition to annexation, most Palestinians came to accept their new status as a *fait accompli* that they did not wish to challenge. Whereas Palestinian Jordanians were politically active in the anticolonial struggle of the 1950s, which centered on Jordan's relationship to Britain on the one hand and to Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's Egypt on the other, they did so in conjunction with Transjordanians who spearheaded and led the nationalist mobilization efforts. If anything, the popular discontent of the mid 1950s manifested itself in demonstrations, which mostly took place on the East Bank where the opposition was based (although many occurred on the West Bank also). Moreover, imaginary and real threats that the regime claimed to have faced from the military centered exclusively on Transjordanian figures, as, with very few exceptions, there never were high-ranking Palestinian officers in the army.

This does not mean that Palestinians were completely satisfied with their new situation as Jordanian citizens. Palestinian demands that the Jordanian government treat the West Bank like the East Bank as far as development policies were concerned were being voiced from the start.[62] In 1950, Palestinian merchants, for example, claimed that they were discriminated against in the issuance of import licenses, "a complaint that seems quite reasonable given that two-thirds of the import licenses were given to East Bank residents."[63] The Jordanian government, in fact, did channel most development funds into the East Bank, expanding its transportation systems (including railways), as well as developing its agriculture and industry. Jamil Hilal states that the Jordanian government, faced with an economically more advanced West Bank, "followed a specific economic policy based on encouraging investment and the development of some industries only in the East Bank,

hoping in the meantime to weaken the productive base of the West Bank. . . . This regionalist/chauvinist (iqlimiyyah) policy manifested itself toward the West Bank through specific practical procedures, the most important of which was the concentration of large industrial projects in the East Bank of Jordan and the placement of obstacles and difficulties in the way of the employment of Palestinian capital in productive projects in the West Bank of Jordan."[64]

This situation led to the migration of many West Bank Palestinians to the East Bank, where the bulk of work was, and to the Gulf Arab states.[65] Plascov remarks that the "development of the East Bank was carried out mainly by Palestinians, who, having little option, put their knowledge, skill, and talents at the disposal of the regime. Amman, the kingdom's backward capital, was to become a flourishing town thus shifting the center of economic gravity."[66] The only sector that was developed at all in the West Bank was tourism. One Palestinian explained it this way: "Since they could not transfer Jerusalem . . . the only thing they allowed was the development of the tourist industry."[67] As Yazid Sayigh asserts, however, it is unclear if government discrimination was directed at Palestinians generally or at the West Bank more specifically.[68]

Competing Representatives: The PLO and Jordan

The Jordanian government had opposed any Palestinian body claiming to represent Palestinians, such as the General Palestine Government set up in Gaza in 1949, or the Higher Palestine Organization (al-Hay'ah al-Filastiniyyah al-'Ulya), based in Cairo and Damascus, which was presided over by Haj Amin al-Husayni. However, it decided to support the Arab decision to establish the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964, albeit hesitantly,[69] especially so since the PLO did not claim at the time to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people and made no claims of sovereignty over the West Bank. Its position, therefore, did not challenge the existing Jordanian claims to both.[70] In fact, the PLO's Palestinian Nationalist Charter stressed that "this organization does not exercise any regional sovereignty over the West Bank in [*sic*] the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom or the Gaza Strip or the Himmah area."[71] Moreover, PLO head Ahmad Shuqayri, in a press conference in Cairo, declared that the new Palestinian organization will cooperate with the Jordanian government and that this cooperation will have "a special character because the majority of the Palestinian people live

in Jordan as does Palestinian land [exist therein]."[72] Responding positively to these assurances, in his letter designating his new prime minister, Wasfi al-Tall, King Husayn wrote that one of the "central" points of the new government's policies toward the Palestinian cause should be "the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and close cooperation with it in Jordan, the Arab World, and all international fora. This position is surely based on our faith that as long as our brothers, Palestine's children, in Jordan and outside it, choose the Organization as a way to mobilize and organize the efforts of Palestine's children, we shall stand by the Organization, support it, agree with it, and back up its efforts until Palestine's children and the Arab nation reinstate Arab rights in Palestine."[73] In a speech that he gave in April, the king stressed his belief that the new Palestinian organization "will not at any moment harm the unity of our one Jordanian family . . . rather, on the contrary, it will strengthen and deepen this unity and double its abilities to grow and take off."[74]

The situation began to change rapidly as the PLO began to make demands on Jordan that the Jordanian government felt competed with its own interests as a representative of the Palestinians. Such demands included calling on Jordan to institute compulsory military service and fortifying frontier villages. In an attempt to echo the Jordanian position that the Palestinians and Jordanians are one people, Shuqayri declared in an Amman press conference his choice of Transjordanians such as Najib Rushaydat for membership in the PLO's executive committee and ʿAli al-Hiyari (former head of Jordan's army) as general director of the PLO's military division. Moreover, he added that Jordan is "the homeland of the [Palestine Liberation] Organization and Jordan's people are its people." He also reminded his audience that the "East Bank" had been "torn" from Palestine in 1919 and that "the return of the East Bank to the motherland, in mind and conscience, and in spirit and body, is a basic step on the road of the return of the stolen homeland."[75]

However, with the deterioration of relations between the PLO and Jordan within a short period after these declarations, especially regarding the PLO demand that Jordan institute compulsory military service, Jordan's response changed. In a speech he delivered at the royal palace, King Husayn insisted that "we shall not discriminate between the eastern Jordanian and the western Jordanian and no one will be able to tear this unity asunder and take the brother away from his brother and take the soldier away from his unit . . . and much of what we have recently heard and continue to hear . . . is only meant to break apart the one structure, and to tear apart the one entity,

which is what we shall not permit under any circumstances."[76] In a famous letter that King Husayn wrote to Egyptian President Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir, the king insisted that "the argument that Mr. Shuqayri uses in his vituperations is that Jordan obfuscates the work of the Organization and does not permit it freedom of activity . . . wherein freedom of activity, in his understanding of it, and as it has been clearly revealed, aims to tear the Palestinian-Jordanian citizen west of the River Jordan from his brother the Palestinian-Jordanian citizen to its east, and to stir up hidden rancor [hazazat] and dormant discord [fitnah], and to break up the people's and the army's unity."[77] The Jordanian government countered by insisting that Jordan was a country where "human and nationalist melting" or "al-Insihar al-Bashari al-Qawmi"[78] takes place. Finally, King Husayn did not mince words when he declared in a speech he delivered in the northern city of ʿAjlun in June 1966 that "the [Palestinian] cause ceased to have a Palestinian character the moment the Arab armies entered the land of Palestine . . . and we in this country have a solid belief that the unity of both banks is a unity blessed by God and supported by the people and that it constitutes a vanguard nucleus for the larger [Arab] unity." He proceeded threateningly to declare that "we shall cut off every hand that extends itself in harm to this unity, to this one struggling country, and we shall gouge out every eye that looks askance at us, and we shall not be lax or tolerant, not even a fingertip, from this moment on."[79] These words were addressed not only to Shuqayri's PLO but also to the Palestinian guerrilla movement that was outside PLO authority. Between 1965 and 1967, the guerrilla movement, spearheaded by Yasir ʿArafat's Fath, the reverse acronym for the Palestinian Movement of Liberation (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyyah), was already launching a number of attacks on Israel from Jordanian territory. The Jordanian government sought to prevent such attacks by force. In fact, Fath's first "martyr" was killed by the Jordanian military rather than the Israeli enemy. The rest of the movement was continually pursued by the Jordanian military aiming to curb its activities. This led to more mutual recriminations between the PLO and Jordan, on the one hand, and between Fath and the Movement of Arab Nationalists [the precursor to George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)].[80]

It was with this as background that the Israelis attacked the West Bank village of Samuʿ on November 13, 1966. The Israeli raid was followed by massive demonstrations in the West Bank against the government's ineptitude in protecting the population. It was in this context that the Jordanian government opted to institute compulsory military service, as mentioned

earlier, to satisfy popular demands. This was the first time since annexation that demonstrations against the government were limited to the West Bank exclusively. This situation prevailed only seven months before the outbreak of the June 1967 War, which resulted in Israel's occupation of the entire West Bank in June 1967.

The occupation of the West Bank led to a massive exodus of tens of thousands of Palestinians from the occupied territories to the East Bank, thus further increasing the proportion of Palestinians in that part of the country to around 60 percent of the total East Bank population.[81] The "setback" (al-Naksah) of 1967 led to the emergence of a new era, one wherein Palestinians were beginning to take matters into their own hands. Although most Palestinian guerrilla groups had been forming since the late 1950s, many were consolidating themselves and improving their organization following the 1967 War. The Fida'iyyin (Sacrificers) were coming of age through larger mobilization of the Palestinian refugee population, especially in Jordan. Prominent among these groups was Fath.

Despite their increased presence in the lives of Palestinians, the guerrillas had not yet distinguished themselves in any major battles, until the famous Battle of al-Karamah in March 1968. Al-Karamah, a small Jordanian town (on the East Bank) in the Jordan valley, and the site of a Palestinian refugee camp where many guerrillas were stationed, became the target of a major Israeli operation. Through coordination with Jordan's army, the guerrillas and the Jordanian army were able to force the Israelis to withdraw after inflicting heavy damages on them. The Israelis, however, were not defeated. On the contrary, before withdrawing they had leveled the town of al-Karamah and inflicted heavy damages on the guerrillas and on the army. What was different this time, however, was that the Israeli military, successful as it might have been in its operation, could not escape unscathed (as it had during the 1967 War and on many other occasions). For the first time in its history, it received heavy damages in personnel and *matériel*.

Depending on whose account one reads, both the Jordanian army and the guerrillas minimized the role of the other in the operation and claimed victory for themselves.[82] Still, al-Karamah (which also means "dignity") became the rallying cry of the Palestinian masses, who were thirsty for any kind of victory over their always victorious enemy. In the wake of this victory, thousands of Palestinians in Jordan volunteered to join the guerrillas.[83] For the Jordanian military, al-Karamah also became one the most important victorious occasions in its recent history, one that it would commemorate every year henceforward. The disproportionate public attention given to the

Palestinian guerrillas infuriated many in the Jordanian military who had, in fact, been the more effective party (on account of their weaponry and numbers) in forcing the Israelis to withdraw. Still, the popularity of the Fida'iyyin guerrillas had reached such international levels that King Husayn himself declared in an interview on British radio and television on May 4,1968, that "there will come a day when we all shall become Fida'iyyin in that part of the world."[84]

As a turning point for the guerrillas, however, al-Karamah signaled the beginning of the most serious challenge the Jordanian state and regime were to face since their inception in 1921. This was a challenge not only to the Jordanian state's authority and sovereignty, or to the throne itself, but also to the state's claim to represent Palestinian Jordanians, and in some cases, a challenge to the very Jordanianness of parts of Jordan itself (and sometimes all of it), not to mention the Jordanianness of its Palestinian-Jordanian citizens.

Toward Civil War

The popularity of the guerrillas was such a serious challenge to the Jordanian state and regime that a whole campaign was unleashed by the military and political leadership of the country against the guerrillas. This campaign included military confrontations with the guerrillas, who were accused of "provocations," leading to what came to be known as Black September.[85] Serious guerrilla misconduct, in a number of instances initiated by Jordanian agents who had infiltrated the guerrillas, came to be seen as a *casus belli* by the regime.[86] An internal propaganda campaign was in full swing in the military: the guerrillas were accused of a battery of crimes ranging from atheism and recklessness to outright collaboration with the Zionist enemy. Moreover, the tribal leadership was mobilized through tribal conventions throughout much of 1970, preparing them for the upcoming confrontation.[87]

It is unclear how many Palestinians were in the Jordanian army in 1970. Some accounts claim that the army was 60 percent Palestinian.[88] King Husayn himself asserted that the majority of his army consisted of Palestinians.[89] These figures, however, seem exaggerated. More accurate calculations are provided by Yazid Sayigh, who assesses the percentage of Palestinian soldiers in the Jordanian military as close to 45 percent in the mid sixties (at the time when two thirds of the population of the country was Palestinian), with

the percentage of Palestinians in some infantry units in 1968 not exceeding 15 percent to 20 percent,[90] and even this decreased measurably after the civil war. Sayigh puts the percentage of Palestinians in the military at fewer than 25 percent in the mid 1980s.[91]

One of the major complaints of the Jordanian government was its claim that the basic contradiction between the guerrillas and the Jordanian state was the presence of the former in the cities. However, this is belied by the fact that the government's enmity to the guerrillas predates their entry into the cities. For example, after the February 1968 Israeli "retaliatory" raid on Jordan killing forty-six civilians and ten soldiers, King Husayn asserted that the "Jordanian authorities will strike with an iron fist all elements who, through their actions, provide Israel with a pretext to apply pressure on Jordan," adding that "those persons who expose Jordan to enemy attacks will be prevented from crossing Jordanian territory after today."[92] At the time, there existed no guerrilla presence in any of Jordan's cities; rather, they were all concentrated on the border with Israel and the Israeli-occupied West Bank. This, of course, does not underestimate the increased level of threat to the Jordanian regime and state that the guerrillas constituted, but it reveals the Jordanian state's and regime's perception of such a threat at a much earlier moment, even before al-Karamah, when the Jordanian government was vehemently opposed to a separate Palestinian army. The exclusive rights that the Jordanian state arrogated to itself in representing its Palestinian-Jordanian citizens and its Palestinian-Jordanian territory could not be sustained much longer in the presence of such a rival power. The fact that the guerrillas were divided among several groups under several leaderships (mainly Fath and PFLP) and that these leaderships were not always in control of their rank and file's activities in the cities (e.g., brandishing weapons, collecting "donations" from shop-owners, and in some cases, harassing people, which alienated many), gave the Jordanian government a golden opportunity to attack the guerrillas ideologically as well as militarily. This was made easier by the Palestinian nationalism of the guerrillas, who ignored Transjordanians in their mobilization campaigns and gave credence to regime claims (borne out by PFLP slogans, for example) that the guerrillas wanted to turn Jordan into a Palestinian state.[93]

The Jordanian government renewed its call for mandatory military conscription in January 1968 with a new law increasing the period of mandatory military service from ninety days to two years,[94] an injunction engineered to prevent the likelihood of Jordan's youth joining the guerrillas. It decided to cancel military service in July 1970, however, as this policy failed to yield

positive results and as the military training of the entire population (Palestinians and Transjordanians) might prove fatal to the regime itself.[95] However, the government opted for a different military alternative that would implicitly select only Transjordanians for such service—namely, the setting up of the voluntary al-Jaysh al-Sha'bi (the Popular Army). The idea of a popular resistance (composed of civilian militias in Jordanian East Bank and West Bank cities and villages) first appeared after the Arabization of Jordan's army under nationalist rule in November 1956 for the purpose of fighting back Israeli military attacks. It was never put into effect, however, due to the 1957 palace coup.[96] The regime was to revive it, however, following its first crisis with the guerrillas in February 1968, and Prime Minister Bahjat al-Talhuni expressed the government's plan to set up such a force on February 20.[97] It should be noted that the situation in 1968 was substantially different from that in 1956: in 1968, such a force could not be formed in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, so it would be limited to the East Bank only. Moreover, although the popularity of the guerrillas following the battle of al-Karamah increased exponentially among Palestinian-Jordanian and Transjordanian youth,[98] the Jordanian civilian population (irrespective of geographic origins) was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with guerrilla arrogance and harassment, exaggerated by government propaganda, and the government was certain that only Transjordanians would join the force, a logical conclusion that was to be justified by subsequent events. The force did not materialize until mid August 1969, when the government began to organize it, to train it, to arm it, and to prepare it for a possible confrontation with the guerrillas. An ordinance calling for the organization of the popular army was issued on January 2, 1970, replacing the 1956 ordinance and renaming the popular resistance the Popular Army.[99] The force consisted mainly of Jordanian army officers who undertook the training of mostly rural Jordanian volunteers (mainly peasants). The importance of this force was further alluded to in February 1970, when a government communiqué banned possession of weapons by citizens except those in "popular resistance organizations."[100] Moreover, on February 11, the commander of the popular resistance declared that by January 1970, more than 45,000 Jordanians had been trained as part of the popular resistance, and that they were armed and prepared and deployed throughout all of Jordan's cities and towns. The king himself confirmed the government's policy of viewing the popular army as a division of the Jordanian armed forces when he instructed Khalil 'Abd al-Dayim, second in command of Jordan's army, to supervise all "our fighting units . . . added to which our popular army which is supervised and directed by

me personally."[101] Units of the popular army were organized at the town level and were given the task of defending the towns during the civil war in September.

The Jordanian government's mobilization campaign extended beyond the enlistment of Jordanians in the Popular Army. It included explicit statements criticizing and condemning the Fida'iyyin, rumormongering, press campaigns (especially in the military press), and the convening of tribal conferences attended by tribal chiefs, who would be incited by government representatives.[102]

The mobilization of the Bedouin tribes was one of the more important elements in the government strategy, as the monarchy had always relied on their support in society and on their members in the military. This was carried out with the help of high-ranking army and police officers as well as high-ranking intelligence officers (Mukhabarat) who themselves hailed from Bedouin tribes. The government also enlisted the help of retired officers, and tribal chiefs and high-ranking government administrators of Bedouin origins. This campaign was coupled with financial donations, taken from the military budget and made to the tribes for the purpose of arming tribal members.

The first convention was held on February 20, 1970, in Umm Rummanah, north of Amman, where 200 tribal Bedouin chiefs and notables met. They pressed the king "to strike with an iron fist those who defy Jordanian law," all the while assuring him of their "total support for the application of the laws of the state." The king responded on February 23 by announcing the promotion of fifty security (Mukhabarat) officers, of mostly Bedouin backgrounds.[103] Other conferences followed before and after the June crisis unfolded, when the most important military confrontation (with the exception of the coming civil war) took place between the regime and the guerrillas. One such conference was convened in Sahab (a city whose population consists mostly of mid- to late-nineteenth century Egyptian Bedouin settlers) a few kilometers southeast of Amman, near the Wihdat refugee camp. It is said that more than 1,000 delegates attended. According to one tribal chief at this conference, the delegates demanded that the government put a stop to "subversive activities," that it support only "honest" Fida'i activities, and that the Fida'iyyin organizations put a stop to "bad behavior."[104] Another conference was held in the small town of Suwaylih, near Amman, on August 21, which issued a communiqué, distributed widely in the country, calling for a general tribal conference.[105] The communiqué stressed the unity of the two Banks, and it criticized the Fida'iyyin for deviating from their important

task of liberating Palestine through subverting public order in Jordan. In addition, the communiqué praised the Jordanian armed forces and praised soldiery: "As our Jordanian people believes with all its pride and might [ʿIzzah] that soldiery is the most honorable service in the most honorable arena, it believes categorically that our Armed Jordanian Forces are the fence of the homeland and its protector, it [the homeland] is the pupil of their [the Armed Forces'] eyes, and the reason for their pride, and that it is always in the vanguard of their struggle, the title of their authenticity, the repository of their hopes and the guarantor of their desires. . . . Our Jordanian people affirms its denunciation and contempt of all statements and actions that attempt in any way to undermine the reputation of our family, our army, and our régime.[106]

After the king's motorcade was attacked on June 9, 1970, Bedouin units shelled two refugee camps in Amman. As ʿAdnan Abu ʿAwdah states, the "army reaction was both revealing and alarming. The choice of two refugee camps as the target of the army's anger implied that the army looked on all Palestinians as an extension of the fedayeen and vice versa."[107] According to Abu ʿAwdah, the king attempted to defuse the issue.[108] In the middle of the summer of 1970, crown-prince Hasan, Husayn's brother and designated successor, paid a visit to the southern city of Tafilah, where he met with tribal leaders and attempted to rouse them against the presence of Fidaʾiyyin physicians who practiced in their city, and calling on them to evict the Fidaʾiyyin altogether from Tafilah. One tribal chief responded angrily, telling the crown prince, "when you evict them from Amman, we will evict them from here."[109] Another conference was held in the south of the country in Maʿan on September 4, 1970, less than two weeks before the monarchy's final onslaught on the Fidaʾiyyin. It was presided over by Parliament member Faysal Bin Jazi, of the southern Bedouin Huwaytat tribe. At the conference, it was decided that the Fidaʾiyyin must be evicted from the entire south of the country. Following most of these conferences, Bedouin forces would attack the offices of the guerrillas' organizations and of individual Palestinians.[110] It should be noted, however, that the events in the south of the country remain unclear and contested. Mahjub ʿUmar, for example, shows a much more ambivalent stance taken by tribal chiefs toward the monarchy during its preparation for a showdown with the guerrillas.[111]

The two-week fighting that began in mid September killed thousands and destroyed large sections of Jordanian cities, especially the capital Am-

man, in the process. Although the government and King Husayn insisted that the death toll was somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000,[112] the guerrillas and foreign journalists reported that it was much higher, between 7,000 and 20,000 people, some of whom were said to have been buried in mass graves by the Jordanian army.[113]

In the few days preceding the civil war and in the days during which it was fought, 5,000 Palestinian and Transjordanian members of the Jordanian armed forces deserted their posts and joined the resistance.[114] Jordanian Military Chief of Staff, Mashhur Hadithah al-Jazi (of the southern Huwaytat tribe) resigned his position and was subsequently placed under house arrest by the government because of his perceived sympathies for the guerrillas.[115] One Jordanian officer, Bahjat al-Muhaysin, from the southern town of Tafilah, was convicted by a military court for disobeying orders by refusing to fire on the city of Irbid during the civil war.[116] Furthermore, the government-appointed military governor, the Palestinian Muhammad Dawud (who was asked by the government to form his military government on September 16 as a prelude to launching the government's military campaign against the guerrillas), resigned and requested asylum in Libya after being disowned by his daughter Muna on September 19, 1970, on Voice of the Palestinian Revolution radio station broadcasting from Baghdad.[117]

After the defeat of the guerrilla forces in 1970, their remaining power in the country continued to erode until they were routed to the northern towns of Jerash and ʿAjlun. There, they were finally assaulted by the Jordanian army, which forced all remaining guerrilla units outside the country. To erase the memory of the civil war and the competing but now defeated Palestinian political presence, the Jordanian government destroyed the Tomb of the Unknown Martyr on May 31, 1971, which had been erected by the PLO in Amman (in Jabal al-Ashrafiyyah) on October 21, 1970, after the September 1970 massacres.[118] As an act of final revenge on the part of the Palestinians, Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tall, who had coengineered Black September and who was in office during the final assault in the summer of 1971, was gunned down in Cairo on November 28, 1971, by a new Palestinian guerrilla group calling itself Black September.[119]

The triumph of the Jordanian army over the guerrillas forced the PLO to review its record in Jordan, and it admitted to a number of mistakes that helped precipitate the clash.[120] On the other hand, the Jordanian government as well as politicians and individuals, with few exceptions, continue to insist that the government had no other option but to act militarily.[121]

A New Nationalist Era

In the wake of the civil war, the new civilian government of Wasfi al-Tall embarked on massive purges of the government's bureaucracy and military, ridding them of any guerrilla supporters. This effectively meant that large numbers of Palestinian officers and bureaucrats, and a number of Transjordanians, were dismissed from their jobs. This was concomitant with al-Tall's war on the newspapers and the massive arrests that the government launched against "subversives."[122] Many newspapers were closed down (such as *'Amman al-Masa'*, *Al-Sabah*, and *Al-Difa'*) and had their licenses withdrawn and their Palestinian editors dismissed (including 'Arafat Hijazi, Ibrahim al-Shanti, and 'Abd al-Hafiz Muhammad).[123] Al-Tall started a new newspaper in 1971, called *Al-Ra'y*, or *The Opinion*, which remains to this day Jordan's largest daily.

Within two months of the final liquidation of the Palestinian guerrillas in the country, the Jordanian monarch, on the advice of his prime minister, Wasfi al-Tall, embarked on a new national project, which he called the National Union, or al-Ittihad al-Watani. Husayn declared, from his Basman Palace, the formation of the union on September 7 amid much media fanfare. It was going to be the only legal political organization in the country, as all parties remained banned. He addressed the "one Jordanian family," asserting that after the preceding year and as a result of its difficult events, there arose "the need for the establishment of a general organization [tanzim] which includes all the people, men and women, wherein [this organization will] organize the energies and potential of society and will direct it toward specified and clear goals."[124] The king insisted that the National Union was not a political party at all; rather, he conceived of it as "a general framework which organizes life and human beings in our beloved country, it is an immense crucible which melts all our energies, with all the differences and varieties [of these energies], in order to make of its outcome the Jordanian miracle which will open for us the road to victory." This union, the king asserted, will help Jordanians achieve the goals of "al-Huriyyah, al-Wihdah, wa al-Hayat al-Afdal," or "liberty, unity, and the better life," which Wasfi al-Tall had used as his slogan when he first became prime minister in 1962. The king offered the press and the people of Jordan the union's charter, which, he asserted, was the outcome of numerous discussions with the "representatives" of the people. The charter, in line with what we discussed in chapter 2, had separate sections for women and for Bedouins.[125] In fact,

the National Union, which was conceived by Wasfi al-Tall, had another important purpose—namely, the formation of a popular base of support for the regime. Still, its declared purpose was to unify the citizenry into one national identity that had been torn asunder by the civil war.

Al-Tall was the son of the famed Jordanian intellectual and poet Mustafa Wahbah al-Tall, who back in the 1920s had coined the anti-Hashemite and anticolonial nativist slogan "Jordan for the Jordanians." Wasfi was born in 1919 in Iraqi Kurdistan (his mother was an Iraqi Kurd), where he spent the first five years of his life. When he arrived in Transjordan in 1924, he spoke only Kurdish.[126] Before becoming prime minister, Wasfi Al-Tall was always interested in the new emergent class of intellectuals who lacked traditional powerful backgrounds, whether military, tribal, or even bourgeois. He conceived of the National Union as a forum for many in this class to assert themselves. He even foresaw himself as presiding over the Union after his term as prime minister ended.[127]

The first National Union Conference took place on November 25, 1971, in Amman. The king invited 2,400 "representatives" of the people to attend. He took the opportunity to affirm to the people of Jordan, whom he addressed as "my brothers and sisters in the two beloved banks," that "the Union is your Union. It is for every one of you and of every one of you."[128] Wasfi al-Tall, the Union's architect, did not live long to pursue his project. He was killed three days later. Still, the king pursued the project and on December 9, 1971, appointed a Temporary Higher Executive Committee for the National Union.[129] The National Union included a large number of Transjordanians, some of whom were former leftists, such as Ibrahim Habashnah, who used to be close to the communists and had been active in the national movement of the 1950s, but who more recently had experienced a *volte face*. It also included a number of Palestinian Jordanians who had stood by the regime during its confrontation with the guerrillas. Such figures as ʿAdnan Abu ʿAwdah, a West Banker, formerly an operative of the Mukhabarat who later served in the king's military government set up a week before the Black September massacres (he later occupied several ministerial and ambassadorial positions, as well as the position of advisor to both King Husayn and King ʿAbdullah II), and Mustafa Dudin, formerly part of the national movement of the 1950s and later a collaborator in the 1970s and1980s with the Israeli occupation authorities in their Village Leagues scheme in the West Bank,[130] were, at the time, ministers in al-Tall's post-liquidation government. Dudin (who was minister of social affairs) was appointed secretary-general of the union, and Abu ʿAwdah (who was infor-

mation minister) was appointed a member of the executive committee and, later, secretary general of the union.[131]

The union became very active, especially in the northern part of the East Bank, from which al-Tall himself originally hailed.[132] Hani Hurani explores the class politics of the National Union, charting the rise to power of what he terms the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie," mainly consisting of Transjordanians, alongside the military-tribal alliance that the regime had depended on in its most recent crisis, and the erosion of the power of the merchant bourgeoisie (of mostly Syrian and Palestinian origins), which, until the 1970 to 1971 crisis, represented the most important pole of societal support for the monarchy. The union's executive committee consisted of thirty-six members, six of whom were current ministers. It also included three women, one of whom was Sa'diyyah al-Jabiri al-Tall, Wasfi's Syrian widow.[133] The committee also included Wasfi's brother Sa'id.[134] The union used the mass circulation newspaper *Al-Ra'y* as its mouthpiece. Despite all the attention surrounding the union, interest in it began to wane slowly after al-Tall's assassination, leading the government to finally dissolve it in February 1976.[135] However, this was not caused by the government's disinterest in redefining the country's national identity (the express goal of the National Union), but rather the government found a new framework for that redefinition, namely, the United Arab Kingdom.

The United Arab Kingdom (al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttahidah) was proposed by the king in March 1972 in response to the increasing threat that the PLO came to constitute to Jordanian claims in international fora. It was slated to include a federated Jordan comprising two autonomous provinces, the West Bank and the East Bank, each with its own governor, parliament, and government, which would deal with all matters except foreign affairs, the military, and the unity of the kingdom. These matters would be controlled by the central government. The capital of the United Arab Kingdom was going to be Amman. Arab reaction to the king's plan was swift. Syria and Egypt broke off relations and the PLO accused the king of liquidating the Palestinian cause by proposing autonomy rather than independence for the Palestinians.[136] The project for the United Kingdom went nowhere as the vociferous Palestinian opposition to it continued unabated. The project was quietly withdrawn as the king and the Jordanian government no longer made references to it.[137]

The PLO continued to pursue its recent claim of being the sole representative of the Palestinian people—a claim that began to be firmly asserted after the guerrilla groups took over its leadership. Such declarations were

being made at the Palestine National Council (PNC) meetings as well as to the press and in PLO publications. The Jordanian government refused such statements vehemently. The Jordanian Parliament responded by affirming that "every claim and pretense of representing the Palestinian people is a conspiracy based on killing national unity and inciting division and separation among the sons of the one homeland." The Parliament proceeded to "declare that the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom, with its two banks, includes one people within one state represented by His Majesty the Exalted King and legitimate state authorities."[138]

Jordanian and PLO jockeying for position on the issue of representation continued unabated. In 1973, the PLO was recognized by the nonaligned nations at the fourth summit of the movement in Algiers as "a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," and in November it was recognized by the Arab League in a secret resolution as the "sole representative of the Palestinian people," about which Jordan expressed its reservations. Jordan's King Husayn, taking advantage of the increasing hostility between Syria and Egypt, met with Anwar Sadat in Alexandria in July 1974, and the two issued a joint declaration stating that the "PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people except for those resident in the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom," which ostensibly includes the West Bank. Arab and PLO anger followed, forcing Sadat to retreat from the declaration at the meeting of the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, and the PLO in Cairo in September. Finally, the situation came to a close with the open Arab League decision issued at the Seventh Arab League Summit, held in Rabat in October 1974, recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they are, which was soon followed by international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by the United Nations' General Assembly. In response, King Husayn declared at the Arab Summit that, based on this recognition of the PLO, Jordan had been rendered practically exempt from all political responsibility toward the Palestinian cause, for this responsibility has been demanded by the PLO for itself. Following these developments, the king reorganized the Jordanian cabinet, whereby Palestinian representation was reduced.[139] In a speech he gave after his return from the Arab Summit, however, the king asserted that the Jordanians, whether "Muhajirin or Ansar," are "one tribe and one family."[140] He was referring to Palestinians and Transjordanians, respectively, with terms from Muslim history (the Muhajirin consisted of the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslims who immigrated to the town of Yathrib, whereas the Ansar are the indigenous Yathribis—the Aws and

Khazraj tribes—who received and supported them; the two communities established the first Islamic state). He continued to use the "Muhajirin and Ansar" analogy for the rest of his life.

Clothes, Accents, and Football: Asserting Post–Civil War Jordanianness

Simultaneously with these political events at the level of the state, other developments were taking place in society. As we saw in chapter 2, the palace was rearranging its relations with the country's Bedouin tribes through a number of meetings and conferences. Moreover, the increasingly popular Jordanian television (founded in 1968) was airing many programs on the military as well as a number of soap operas about Jordanian "Bedouin life." Similar programs were also aired on the radio. As already discussed, a large number of songs were being aired on radio and television, exalting Jordan, Amman, the army, and King Husayn, in addition to the new genre of Bedouin songs which were becoming popular even outside Jordan. It was none other than Wasfi al-Tall, in his capacity as director of Jordanian radio broadcasting in 1959, who began forming music groups to collect folk songs from their "original sources." These groups, with the help of the lyricist Rashid Zayd al-Kilani and the composer Tawfiq al-Nimri (a Transjordanian Christian from the northern town of Husn), recast these songs and launched the Jordanian "folk" song on the radio.[141]

The search was proceeding for new popular symbols of the new Jordanianness. On the official level, the government was setting up a number of clubs fostering the celebration of "Jordanian national culture." One such club, named Nadi Ihiaʾ al-Turath al-Shaʿbi al-Urduni (the Revival of Jordanian Folk Culture Club), was headed by none other than Wasfi's wife, Saʿdiyyah. The club organized its first show of Jordanian folk fashion (al-Aziaʾ al-Shaʿbiyyah al-Urduniyyah) in the summer of 1971, representing both banks.[142] On the societal level, for example, Transjordanian urban male youth began to assert their Jordanianness sartorially. They started to wear the red-and-white *shmagh* or *hatta* (which, as we saw in chapter 3, was originally coined as exclusively Jordanian by Glubb Pasha) as a winter scarf around their necks as an assertion of national pride. Palestinian Jordanians followed suit by wearing the black-and-white *hatta* as a scarf; those among them seeking assimilation wore the red-and-white *hatta*. The urban youth's donning of the red-and-white *hatta* was, in fact, following in King Husayn's

footsteps, as he had begun to wear it as a head-gear much more frequently after 1970, especially when he addressed tribal leaders or the military, or when on trips to the Arab states of the Gulf.[143] Moreover, the king's picture wearing the *shmagh* appeared on Jordanian currency bills and on Jordanian postage stamps.

Clothing items, however, were not enough to assert national loyalty. There emerged a whole new corpus of markers to assert it more strongly. One of the most important developments of this period was the battle of the accents, or what came to be defined as a Jordanian accent and a Palestinian accent. An example is the letter *qaf* in classical Arabic. Whereas most urban Palestinians pronounce the *qaf* as a glottal stop in colloquial speech (so *qalb*, meaning heart, is pronounced *alb*), as opposed to rural Palestinians, who, depending on their region, pronounce the *qaf* as it is, or as *kaf*, or as *ga* (*qalb*, *kalb*, or *galb*), and Palestinian Bedouins, who pronounce the *qaf* as a *ga*, most Jordanian men after 1970, regardless of urban, rural, or Bedouin backgrounds, began to pronounce the *qaf* as *ga*. Jordanian accents also varied from north to south, and between the rural population and the Bedouins not to mention educated town Jordanians, who from the 1920s through the 1960s studied in Palestinian and Syrian schools in Palestinian and Syrian cities and acquired urban accents. Also, most Palestinian and Syrian Jordanians whose families had been in the country since the 1920s or earlier also spoke with an urban accent. Moreover, for many Jordanian villagers, not all words with *qaf* are pronounced with a *ga* sound: many are in fact pronounced with a *kaf* sound.[144]

This situation changed drastically after the civil war. The Jordanian and Palestinian accents were redefined rigidly as national markers. They also acquired a gendered attribute. After 1970, most urban Jordanian men began pronouncing all *qaf*s as *ga*, asserting this as "masculine" and as "Jordanian," whereas Jordanian urban women retained their glottal stop as a "feminine" characteristic. Many young Palestinian-Jordanian urban men, feeling feminized by the new accent configuration, began using the *ga* instead of the glottal stop as an assertion of masculinity, especially when in the company of men (particularly if these men were Transjordanian).[145] What is interesting about this new situation was that most Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians believed that these indeed were essential and rigid accents that were national markers, when in fact, a large number of Palestinian refugees living in Jordan's refugee camps, and who hailed from rural backgrounds in the south, have always pronounced the *qaf* as *ga* and not as glottal stop. The difference between the two pronunciations, for these Palestinian refugees,

remains one between an urban accent (madani) and a rural accent (fallahi). Increasingly, many Transjordanian nationalist feminist women are questioning the gender criterion of the accents and are beginning to use the *ga* to assert the equal-access nature of this new Jordanian nationalist marker.

The age criterion of this development is also noteworthy. As the accent became nationalized and gendered, urban Palestinian and Transjordanian prepubescent boys who use the glottal stop transform their pronunciation on reaching puberty in line with the *ga* pronunciation as another way of affirming their newly acquired masculinity. Most urban Transjordanians continue to speak with an urban accent and continue to use urban idioms with the slight change of their *ga* pronunciation. Transjordanians hailing from nonurban backgrounds, however, also have local idioms and expressions in addition to the *ga* pronunciation that urban Transjordanians do not use, as they retain their urban expressions. Moreover, there was and is no gender distinction between men and women in those sectors of Palestinian or Transjordanian society who spoke with a *ga* before the ideological cooptation of the *ga* by exclusivist nationalists. The gendering began with the process of nationalization.

It is important to note the vantage point of these judgments of accents as masculine or feminine. Whereas the *ga* pronunciation was being identified as tribal and Bedouin by both Transjordanians and urban Palestinian Jordanians, it was a Bedouin vantage point that was used in identifying the urban accent as feminine, a judgment that is in line with predominant Bedouin views of city folk, which denigrate and feminize them. This shows that the state's efforts to Bedouinize Jordanians were increasingly successful wherein the varied population had internalized the state-imposed nationalist definitions. Whereas the *hattas and shmaghs*, as sartorial gendered symbols, serve to identify the men who wear them visibly, the transformation of nongendered, location-based accents (urban, rural, or desert Bedouin) into gendered national accents (Palestinian or Jordanian) became the universal *audible* marker of national identities in Jordan.

Anthropologically speaking, an interesting exercise to do in Jordan would be to locate the slips in everyone's accents, be they *assimilated* Palestinian-Jordanian men or nationalist Transjordanian *urban* men and women, especially when their *ga* slips into a glottal stop, as the new national mask becomes more difficult to wear all the time, because its artificiality is too recent and has yet to be completely naturalized. The nationalized *hatta/shmagh*, along with the nationalized accent, thus became corporeal and verbal performances that guarantee national identity. Affirming both pub-

licly became part of the daily rituals of staging Transjordanianness and Palestinianness.

Another aspect of further polarization in the Jordanian population was the new reference to Palestinian Jordanians as Baljikiyyah, or, in line with colloquial Jordanian/Palestinian Arabic, Baljikiyyih, meaning Belgians. It is unclear what the origin of this anti-Palestinian epithet is, although a number of stories circulate. The most credible states that the Palestinian guerrillas wore Belgian-made military boots and fatigues, which distinguished them from the U.S.-equipped Jordanian army. Other stories include that during the 1970 civil war, many Transjordanians suggested that they get rid of the Palestinians by shipping them to Belgium (a far-away country), or that there was supposed to be some shipment of arms coming to the guerrillas from Belgium (there is nothing in fact to support this claim). Still, *Baljikiyyih* is intended to render Palestinian Jordanians foreign—non-Jordanian and non-Arab—thus denationalizing them. This epithet continues to be used as a national insult against Palestinian Jordanians today.

More expressions of Palestinian identity emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s leading to confrontations between the Jordanian state and Palestinian Jordanians. One such example is the case of the Committee for the Annual Palestinian Folklore Day, which was established in 1981 by Nimr Sarhan in conjunction with other Palestinian institutions. Sarhan, a specialist in Palestinian folklore, was detained and later imprisoned by the government. His passport was confiscated, and he was prevented from returning to his job. His folklore exhibits and other cultural events were canceled by the police or were the objects of police harassment.[146]

Other expressions of Palestinian-Jordanian and Transjordanian solidarity with Palestinians outside Jordan were also muted. During Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon, many Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians volunteered to go to Lebanon to fight with the PLO. Large demonstrations were held to push the government to permit the volunteers to go to Lebanon. The government responded with bullets, killing a number of demonstrators (mostly students and one teacher) and arresting a large number of them. Many Transjordanians participated in these demonstrations, especially from the town of Sahab, a neighbor of the Wihdat refugee camp southeast of Amman. The king intervened, chastising the police and ordering the release of those arrested, while at the same time the government issued directives against the holding of any public demonstrations.[147] The situation repeated itself after Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, when many of the volunteers were sent home by the Jordanian government after their passports were con-

fiscated and after being subject to intense interrogations by the Mukhabarat (Jordan's ubiquitous and highly efficient intelligence service).[148]

Moreover, as a number of cultural groups (dancing troupes and singing bands) were formed in the late 1970s at local initiative in the Palestinian and Transjordanian communities, the state sought to co-opt them with new initiatives. It was in this context that the state launched its project of the annual Jerash Festival of Culture (Mahrajan Jarash), which was inaugurated in the summer of 1981.[149] Despite the commercialism endemic to the festival, not to mention the privileging of foreign performers over Jordanian artists regardless of geographic origins, a number of local bands began to emerge on the national scene, while others were discouraged by not being granted permits to perform. The emerging groups include the talented and now popular al-Fuhays Band or Firqat al-Fuhays (formed in 1982), from the Christian Transjordanian town of al-Fuhays near Amman. The festival, whose head was Michel Hamarnah (a Transjordanian from Madaba), was criticized by many for its elitism.[150] Still, the Jerash Festival pushed for certain cultural performances over others. Bedouin male line-dancing, or Dabkah, and Bedouin songs were always featured. Although, outside of Samirah Tawfiq's "Bedouin" songs, few state-sponsored songs were ever popular, a new Bedouin singer emerged in the early 1990s with a song that came to be the most popular song sung by a Jordanian ever. The singer is ʿUmar al-ʿAbdallat and his song was "Hashmi Hashmi" or "Hashemite Hashemite," whose refrain "our Jordan, the Hashemite" (Urdunna ya Hashmi) combined allegiance to the new Jordan and its king with an affirmation of Jordan's Hashemiteness. Al-ʿAbdallat followed with another popular "Bedouin" song called "Ya Saʿd" which, along with "Hashmi," is still played at wedding receptions (including those of middle- and upper-class Palestinian Jordanians) throughout the country as well as at night clubs. Palestinian-Jordanian groups, however, are still denied such backing by the state's cultural commissars.

Another battle that has raged in the country from the 1970s to the present is the football (soccer) battle. As in other nations, sports have come to play an important role in nationalist mobilization, both domestically and internationally. Jordan is not an exception in this regard. As in many ex-British colonies and mandates, football came to play an important role in the life of Jordanians.[151] It is said that two brothers (Husni and ʿAli Sidu al-Kurdi, of Iraqi Kurdish background, residing in Amman) brought the game back to Amman from Jerusalem in 1922, where they attended high school.[152] The Palestinians, of course, had been introduced to the game through the British

and through European missionary schools, which have a longer history in Palestine than in Transjordan. The first football team was formed in 1926 and used to play against British teams stationed in Markah, outside Amman. In 1943, King ʿAbdullah took an interest in the different teams (many of which were Circassian teams[153]) and instituted an annual competition (dawri) beginning in 1944.[154] That year, a Circassian club (the Ahli Sports Club) was founded by young Circassian men who were fleeing the control of their community elders, who controlled the Circassian Charity Association (founded in 1932).[155] The young men wanted to call their club the Circassian Sports Club, but the governor of Amman objected to the name. One of the members of the club was Amir ʿAbdullah's driver. He brought the matter before the amir, who told the young man, "My son, you are my family [Ahl], so call it the Ahli club." [156] The Ahli club included Arab players in it also.

In the early 1950s, football received a boost. The annexation of the West Bank brought a number of Palestinian football teams to join the annual competitions, in addition to the many Palestinian football players who joined the East Bank teams, such as Jabra al-Zarqaʾ and Marcus Daʿdas, who joined the Ahli club for a period.[157] Al-Zarqaʾ had played in the 1934 World Cup football games.[158] Moreover, in the 1950s, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) set up some youth clubs in the refugee camps on both banks, some of which (e.g., in the Wihdat refugee camp in the eastern part of Amman) became major sports clubs in the 1970s.[159]

By the early 1960s, King Husayn launched the project of building a sports city with a football stadium, as the country still did not have a single stadium. Most of the teams used to play in the al-Husayni Mosque plaza downtown, the Kuban playground in a Circassian neighborhood west of the city, a number of playgrounds in Jabal ʿAmman (including that of the Bishop School for boys), and finally, from the late 1940s until 1968 when construction on the football stadium was completed, in the playground of al-Kulliyah al-ʿIlmiyyah al-Islamiyyah school in Jabal ʿAmman. The first match played in the new stadium was between the Jordanian and the Egyptian national teams, and the outcome was 6 to 1 in favor of the Egyptians. Muʾnis al-Razzaz, Jordan's well-known contemporary novelist, states that most of the Jordanian youth in the country, who were Arab nationalists, rooted for the Egyptian team. There were only a minority of Jordanian nationalists who rooted for Jordan's team.[160]

To organize athletic activities in the country and to set a new plan in motion for Jordan's youth, the government issued in 1968 the Law of the

Foundation of Care for the Youth.[161] In 1977, the foundation was placed under the institutional rubric of the ministry of culture and youth.[162] Jordanian government philosophy governing the kind of athletes Jordanians were supposed to be included the following: "The Jordanian athlete is a citizen who is loyal to his homeland, loving toward his parents, his family, his neighbors, and his co-citizens, brothers and sisters. He defends the honor of the homeland and of its soil, and seeks, as much as he is able, to improve his psychological, spiritual, physical and ethical abilities. . . . The Jordanian Athlete is a citizen whose manliness is strong [Qawiyy al-Rujulah], an adorer of heroism . . . who believes that Jordan is one cohesive family and that the Arab nation [al-Ummah al-'Arabiyyah] is one big loving family."[163]

As is clear, sports here is staged as an arena for the performance of gendered citizenship by the nation-state, and, as will become clear shortly, by citizen-nationals themselves. Moreover, a Jordanian athlete, by definition, is said to be a nationalist who adheres to national unity ("one cohesive family") and is inhabited by a strong manliness in support of it. This coupling of gendered citizenship with sports is meant to nationalize sports and masculinity, and to render all sports activity a national performance, which is the supreme function that sports have within the modality of the nation-state.

With the waning of Arab nationalism after the death of 'Abd al-Nasir, Jordanian football did not encounter much politics until the mid to late 1970s. UNRWA funding cuts deprived the refugee youth centers of paid staff to direct their activities. As a result, club members assumed responsibility for activities such as fund-raising, and they formed sports leagues that competed with each other annually in football, volleyball, basketball, and boxing. In 1975, the camp teams decided to compete with other Jordanian East Bank clubs and their teams.[164] The situation became explosive in 1980 when the Wihdat team won the annual competition (al-Dawri), defeating the Ramtha team. This gave a boost to refugee Palestinian Jordanians, especially of the Wihdat camp, who had taken a heavy human casualty toll during the civil war.[165] Supporting the Wihdat or the Ramtha team became a national act of loyalty to one's Palestinianness or Jordanianness, respectively. Absent any other legal political expression, these matches occasioned Palestinian protests and assertion of national identity. Many fights and brawls broke out between the Transjordanian and the Palestinian-Jordanian fans, leading to police intervention and the arrest of many. As Laurie Brand puts it, "For many fans, Palestinian and Transjordanian alike, each time a refugee camp team locked horns with an East Bank squad, it was, on a very basic and emotional level, as if the civil war were being fought again."[166]

After a particularly bloody confrontation in 1986, the Ministry of the Occupied Territories' Affairs asked UNRWA to surrender control of the youth centers. The ministry moved in and dissolved the administrative councils of the centers, replacing them with new councils consisting of many high-ranking government officials. Crown Prince Hasan renamed the Wihdat Youth Center, Nadi al-Diffatayn or "the Two Banks Club." Transjordanians were included in the administration of the club, in line with the Ministry of Youth's recommendation. With government pressure and the reorganized administrative council, a majority voted in favor of the crown prince's bid to rename the center. The situation lasted only a short time, as people continued to refer to the club and the team as Wihdat. In 1988, following the disengagement from the West Bank, administrators of the government and the center restored the original name of the club and the team—Nadi al-Wihdat. It is notable that in addition to Wihdat and other camp teams, most of the East Bank "Jordanian" teams include a large number of Palestinian-Jordanian players.

Football serves not only to divide the population, but, as happened more recently, also to unify them. At the Arab football championship held in Beirut in the summer of 1997, the Jordanian national team (composed of the best players from all Jordanian clubs including Wihdat) won the championship, defeating the Syrian national team. At the end of the game, which most of the people of Jordan watched on satellite television at home or in cafes, thousands of people and cars crowded the streets of Jordan's cities and towns, especially Amman, where cars stopped in the middle of the streets and young men and women danced, bringing traffic to a complete halt for hours. King Husayn chartered a plane to bring the players home from Beirut. On arrival, the team toured Amman's streets in a massive convoy, with supporters (men and women) lining all the major thoroughfares. Many Jordanian news columnists saw this as a sign of Palestinian-Jordanian unity under one Jordanian identity. Fahd al-Fanik, Jordan's most outspoken exclusivist Jordanian nationalist, stressed that this unity was certain, because it did not express itself against a non-Arab foreign team but against an *Arab* team, affirming that Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians inhabit the same national identity, at least in an international context.[167] When the games were held in Amman in August 1999, the Jordanian team played against the first Palestinian national team, which was formed under the Palestinian Authority. West Bank Palestinians, who had traditionally rooted for the Jordanian team, were now rooting for the new Palestinian team. The Palestinian team lost to the Jordanians, 4 to 1. Some clashes among fans ensued in the streets but were contained by the heavy police presence. It is interesting that

eight of the eleven members of the Jordanian team are Palestinian Jordanians. During the game, the crowds chanted a rhyming couplet: "This is what al-Husayn taught us, one people, not two."[168] By all accounts, most Palestinian Jordanians, like their Transjordanian compatriots, supported the Jordanian team, especially because they were heavily represented in its ranks.

Contracting the Nation: The Road to "The Severing of Ties"

As the seventies proceeded, relations between the Jordanian state and the PLO remained at odds until Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977. Attempts to disengage from the West Bank were put forth by Prime Minister Mudar Badran (a Transjordanian) in 1976 when he proposed that the Jordanian government cut off the salaries of West Bank Jordanian citizens who were state employees. Palestinian-Jordanian loyalists in the West Bank opposed the measure, and the proposal was not pursued. Although such tactics were used early in the seventies, their use in 1976 was signaling Jordan's realization that the Jordanianness of West Bankers could no longer be ascertained. That year, the mayoral elections that took place under Israeli occupation resulted in PLO mayors in all major cities except one. In Jordan, the proportion of Palestinian Jordanians in the cabinet was dropped from one half to one quarter, with many Palestinian-Jordanian government personnel dismissed and replaced by Transjordanians.[169] It was around the same time that Jordanian universities began an unofficial quota system for employing Transjordanian professors. Whereas Palestinian Jordanians, by virtue of their disproportionately high level of educational attainment, had dominated most faculties at the University of Jordan in the 1960s and 1970s, the new quota system drastically transformed these demographics. This situation, which proceeded more belligerently after 1989 and to the present, has resulted in emptying Jordan's state universities of Palestinian faculty, as few if any new positions go to Palestinian Jordanians.[170]

Following Sadat's move in 1977, Jordan and the PLO experienced a rapprochement. Relations in fact warmed up so much that the PNC, the Palestinian parliament-in-exile, was convened in Amman on November 21, 1984, and was addressed by none other than King Husayn himself. The king saluted the PNC with "an effusion of happy and loving feelings. . . . On Jordan's soil and in its name, I welcome you; and from the heights overlooking [masharif] Palestine, I send a salute of loyalty to the people of Palestine, and through you, the representatives of the Palestinian people, I sa-

lute every Palestinian. [We] welcome you in Amman, among its people, or rather, [we] welcome you among your people, your tribe [ʿAshirah], your brethren and family, your brothers and your brothers-in-law; [we] welcome you in the vastness [rihab] of the twin brother [of Palestine], we welcome you in Jordan, the lighthouse of men and the castle of steadfastness."[171] The king proceeded to review Palestinian-Jordanian relations, with no mention of the civil war, stressing that Jordan had done its utmost to "prove to our Palestinian brethren Jordan's recognition of their national identity, and that Jordan has no ambitions on their land. . . . Your meeting here today under the umbrella of your National Council testifies to the victory of the Palestinian will, Palestinian legitimacy, Palestinian decision, and Palestinian determination to uphold one loyalty toward one goal, that of Palestine and the people of Palestine."[172]

Less than three months later, on February 11, 1985, Jordan and the PLO reached an agreement on Jordanian-Palestinian coordination. The rapprochement, however, did not last long. As Jordan and Syria (the latter considered by the PLO to be its archenemy in the Arab camp at the time) were restoring warm relations, Jordan began to move away from the PLO in February 1986, particularly because the United States was not responsive to Jordan's initiatives based on the February 11 agreement.

Jordan proceeded to make changes in its relationship to the West Bank, and in certain cases toward Palestinian Jordanians residing in East Bank refugee camps. This manifested itself in the new election law of 1986, where parliamentary seats were increased to 142, with each Bank assigned 71 seats. The change, however, was in the law's consideration of East Bank camps as West Bank districts, thus having eleven seats (one per camp) out of the seventy-one assigned to the West Bank reserved to the East Bank camps. This juridical rearrangement of geography and demography, wherein people who reside in actuality on the East Bank are considered West Bankers, was an Orwellian move designed to decrease alleged Palestinian political "influence" on the East Bank. In addition, the actual districting of the camps as separate from the districts within which they were located was a juridical act of separation of Palestinian-Jordanian refugees from Palestinian and Transjordanian Jordanians living outside the camps. This was an unprecedented move, as the 1960 election law did not include any such provisions.[173] This sentiment of separatism was shared by some in Parliament. For example, Zuhayr Dhuqan al-Husayn, a Transjordanian parliamentarian representing the northern city of Salt, proposed during parliamentary discussions of the law that East Bank Palestinian Jordanians not be permitted to vote for

East Bank candidates, and that they be allowed to vote only for West Bank candidates. He was heavily criticized by West Bank deputies, who asked that his proposal be removed from the minutes. Parliament voted against Mr. al-Husayn's measure and approved its removal from the minutes. However, Parliament approved a proposal banning West Bank Palestinians from nominating themselves for East Bank seats (which no candidate had ever done in the past), and vice versa.[174] Still, many opposed the new districting measures. Prominent among these was Jordan's former prime minister, and, until recently, member of the senate, Ahmad 'Ubaydat. 'Ubaydat saw the measures as creating divisions between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians.[175]

With the eruption of the intifada in the West Bank and Gaza in December 1987, and its increasing militancy against Israeli occupation and for Palestinian independence, the Jordanian government opted to take its thirteen-year rhetoric and political measures (pursued since its recognition of the PLO in 1974 as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they are) to their logical conclusion. Four months into the intifada, beginning in late April 1988, King Husayn delivered a number of speeches to tribal conventions in the country in which he stressed Jordan's support for the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and his support for the end of Israeli occupation and for an international peace conference at which the PLO would be represented.[176] In his speech to the tribal leaders of the Mafraq governorate, for example, the king stressed, "As for here, on this land [East Bank], everyone is equal, for we have inherited from our fathers and our forefathers the principles of the Great Arab Revolt . . . its purposes and its goals. . . . [F]or every Arab is a patriot [watani] regardless of the place from which his father or forefather came . . . he is a Jordanian with full rights but also one who has duties to respect the constitution and the [Jordanian] family to which he belongs. . . . My talk [of this] is for the purpose of strengthening national unity. . . . As for Palestine and our Jordanian brethren of Palestinian origins, we are with them and to them as we have always been and their rights there will be restored."[177]

Another important speech was delivered internationally in Algiers on June 7, 1988, at the opening of the Arab summit, in which the king affirmed Jordan's commitment to support the PLO and chastised critics of Jordan, who claimed that the help some Jordanian institutions were extending to the intifada was intended to achieve Jordanian hegemony on the West Bank to the detriment of the PLO.[178] These series of speeches were the dress

rehearsal for what came to be known as the decision to sever legal and administrative ties between the East Bank and the West Bank, or Qarar Fakk al-Irtibat, which was announced in a now famous speech that the king delivered on July 31, 1988, thus ending, by royal decree, the Jordanian unity between the West Bank and the East Bank that had lasted thirty-eight years.[179] The day before the "severing" of ties, the king had dissolved Parliament.[180]

Indeed, as the king affirmed in his speech addressing the Jordanian people, "in your cities, villages, camps, tribal areas [fi madaribikum], factories, schools, offices and institutions," the severing of ties between the West and the East Banks "will not surprise you as many among you have been expecting it, and some of you have demanded it some time before it was made."[181] The king stressed that after a long and deep study of the issue, his government decided to undertake a series of measures aiming to "support the Palestinian national direction and to render prominent [ibraz] Palestinian identity, aiming [to achieve] through them the interests of the Palestinian Cause and the Palestinian Arab people."[182] These measures, which will help the PLO "to concretize Palestinian identity on Palestinian national soil," will result in the "*separation* of the West Bank from the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom [emphasis added]."[183] The king stressed,

> It must be understood clearly, without any confusion or ambiguity, that our measures which are related to the West Bank only deal with the occupied Palestinian land and its people, and, naturally, not with Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins in the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom. All of these have full citizenship rights and duties exactly like any other citizen, irrespective of origin. They are a part, that cannot be subdivided [juz' la yatajazza'], of the Jordanian state to which they belong and on whose land they live and in whose life and entire activities they participate, for Jordan is not Palestine, and the Palestinian state will be established on the occupied Palestinian land after its liberation, God willing. . . . [T]hus, the preservation of national unity is a sacred matter with which we will not be lax [la tahawun fihi] and any attempt to manipulate ['abath] it under any slogan or title, will only be assisting the enemy in executing his expansionist policies at the expense of Palestine and Jordan equally. Hence, supporting and buttressing it [national unity] is true patriotism [wataniyyah] and authentic nationalism [qawmiyyah]. Thus, it is everyone's responsibility to preserve it so that there will not be among us any room for a misleading informer, or a traitor with ulterior motives, for we shall not be,

> with God's help, except as we have always been, one cohesive family whose members are characterized by brotherhood, love and consciousness, and with combined patriotic and nationalist goals.[184]

As the link between the West Bank and the East Bank was severed, the government moved to denationalize Palestinian Jordanians residing in the West Bank. They were issued temporary, two-year Jordanian passports to facilitate their international travel, it being understood that these passports do not signify any national belonging to Jordan.[185] The decision to sever ties, however, was never published in the *Official Gazette* and thus it does not have the status of law, nor was it ever issued in a legal form, although many provisions based on it were (e.g., amendments to the election law, the passports law). Because the unity of both Banks is enshrined in Jordan's constitution, the decision to "separate" the West Bank from the kingdom, as many of its critics have pointed out, is in fact unconstitutional and therefore illegal. Until the present, no constitutional amendment has been issued or even contemplated by the regime or by Parliament. Cases against the government questioning the constitutionality of the denationalization of the West Bank and its Jordanian citizens are still pending in Jordan's courts.

Whereas the "unification" of Jordan and central Palestine in 1949 and 1950, like the establishment of Transjordan in 1921, was legitimated politically by appeals to Hashemite Arab nationalism and was effected through juridical measures, the "separation" of the West Bank from the East Bank in 1988 was carried out by appeals to regionally based Palestinian and Jordanian nationalisms and the repudiation of Hashemite Arab nationalism, and it was effected by new juridical measures (although the actual separation was carried out extra-juridically, as already mentioned, all commensurate measures to denationalize the West Bank and its Jordanian citizens were carried out juridically). The state's official adoption of an East Bank–based Jordanian nationalism as the new ideology (although central Palestine had been incorporated into Jordanianness in 1949–1950, the regime still insisted oxymoronically that, in that context, Jordanianness stood for Hashemite Arabness, which included both Banks) gave a strong push to societal forces, which the state and the regime had encouraged since the 1940s; these forces were calling for a separation between citizenship and nationality and asserting an exclusivist nationalism that excluded large segments of the citizen population as non-Jordanian. The societal forces were unleashed in 1989 after the partial democratic opening liberalized the press and the political process. They took the denationalization of the West Bank Jordanians as

their cue and evidence that not all Jordanian citizens belong to the Jordanian nation, and that, as foreigners, they must therefore be excluded from it.

Who Is Jordanian?

Many East Bank Palestinian Jordanians are content to be both Jordanians and Palestinians; they realize that their Palestinian identity is thoroughly inflected by its development in the national context of Jordan, and for the majority among them Jordan is the only physical home they ever knew. They vehemently reject the recent attempts to de-Palestinize them by an exclusivist Jordanian nationalism. Moreover, although a large number of Palestinians supported the PLO in 1970, many others did not, evidenced by those who served the regime. In fact, only 5,000 (among them, Transjordanians) out of tens of thousands of military personnel actually defected to the guerrillas, and as Palestinians they have not staged any revolts against Jordan, not even during the 1970 civil war or in its aftermath (the 1986 University of Yarmuk student uprising, which was put down violently by Bedouin military units, was mostly composed of Palestinian Jordanians but also included Transjordanians—Communists, Islamists, and many others).[186] If anything, all internal military threats to the regime, as we saw in the last chapter, came from Transjordanian elements in the military. The more recent popular uprisings took place in southern, almost exclusively Transjordanian cities with no Palestinian-Jordanian participation whatsoever. The facts that after 1970 many Palestinian men, like Transjordanian urban men, began to speak in a hybrid accent of Palestinian and Jordanian; that since 1970, *mansaf*, Jordan's invented national dish, is cooked as often by urban Palestinians (who, unlike southern rural and Bedouin Palestinians, did not know it before) as by Transjordanians, and is served on certain occasions (e.g., weddings and funerals) as it is in the Transjordanian community; and that intermarriage between the two communities is so high in the cities that it would be difficult to disentangle the national "origins" of the offspring except through paternalist conceptions of nationality (as we saw in chapter 1), all attest to the conclusion that these aspects of state-sponsored Jordanian national identity are not repudiated but rather are adopted and internalized, and that they are not taken as substitutes for or competitive with Palestinian national identity but rather as complementary.

In fact, urban and rural Palestinian Jordanians, like urban non-Bedouin Transjordanians, have been susceptible to the state's Bedouinization of Jor-

danian identity, especially after 1970. They also use aspects of tribal law to resolve many social disputes (especially deaths resulting from car accidents and intentional or unintentional shootings) and to inaugurate important social occasions (such as the *Jahat al-Tulbah*, the man's family delegation asking for a woman's hand in marriage, which was practiced only among the rural and Bedouin but not the urban Palestinian population before). Indeed, Jordan's football victory in the summer of 1997 over Syria was seen as a victory by Palestinian Jordanians, too, because they recognize themselves as Jordanians in this inter-Arab context, wherein many of the Jordanian players are Palestinian Jordanians. This situation became even clearer when Palestinian Jordanians supported the Jordanian national team against the Palestinian national team in 1999. Transjordanian exclusivist nationalists were watching the crowds with a hawk's eye for any signs of national "disloyalty." This litmus test that the exclusivists require is predicated on their belief that the Jordanian national team represents "Jordan" as defined by their exclusivist terms. Palestinian Jordanians, however, view it clearly as inclusivist and thus as reflective of *their* own national presence in the country and therefore see no contradiction in supporting it. What the exclusivists demand as a litmus test, however, is for the Palestinian Jordanians to view the team as Jordanian in an exclusivist way and still support it. It is unclear if similar tests would be required of Transjordanian Christian or Muslim nationalists, or Transjordanian Arab or Circassian nationalists, or Transjordanian northern or southern nationalists, if members of one community were competing against members of the other, or of the Chechen community if the Jordanian national team were playing against the Chechen national team. If the results of these tests reveal the limits of Jordanian national identity and its constitutive parts, then, for the sake of consistency, they should be required of all of Jordan's varied communities. The fact that it is Palestinian Jordanians who are the main group subjected to this inquisition shows how much their recent production as an "other" has become the organizing principle of constituting the new Jordanian "self."

Following an uprising in the south protesting Jordan's economic austerity measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in mid April 1989, the Jordanian government decided to liberalize its political system. This resulted in the expansion of debates in the Jordanian public sphere, and media outlets, mainly independent newspapers, began to emerge from all corners of the political spectrum. One of the most pressing of the debates that occupied the Jordanian public sphere since then has been the question of Jordanian national identity and whether East Bank Palestinian Jordanians

can be part of it.[187] The tone of these debates became much more acrimonious following the signing of the Oslo Accords between Yasir ʿArafat and Israel on September 13, 1993, with Transjordanian Christian voices being some of the loudest (although many Transjordanian Christians actually fought on the side of the PLO against the Jordanian army during the civil war,[188] and some of them, such as Nayif Hawatmah, head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, became leaders in the Palestinian movement[189]). Fahd al-Fanik and Nahid Hattar stand out as two of the most exclusivist voices in the Transjordanian Christian community (Hattar in fact faced a lawsuit for his editorial "Who is a Jordanian?"[190]). They are paralleled in the Muslim community by Ahmad ʿUwaydi al-ʿAbbadi[191] (also facing a lawsuit) and former director of public security and current speaker of Parliament ʿAbd al-Hadi al-Majali, to list just two.[192] Hattar, in an infamous newspaper article, marvels at how the Jordanian political regime was able to invert the "historical formula" that stresses that "the people are constant while regimes of government change" into a new formula whereby "in Jordan, the regime of government is constant while the people change."[193] For Hattar, those who are Jordanians include those living in the three Ottoman Mutasarrifiyyahs that became Transjordan, added to whom are the Syrians, Palestinians, Hijazis (in reference to the Hashemites), Circassians, and Chechens who were "Jordanized in a natural manner and were dissolved into this country's flesh and greatness." Hattar stresses that "Jordanians . . . do not increase except through natural reproduction and not through élite political decisions." He proceeds to depict Palestinians who were Jordanized after 1948 as playing the same role in Jordan that the Zionists play in Palestine. Hattar, uses his vehement support for the establishment of a Palestinian state on Palestinian land to stress that it is "the right of Palestinians—the refugees and the displaced ["Laji'in wa Nazihin," those made refugees in 1948 and 1967, respectively]—indeed their duty is to return to their lands and homes." This call for the expulsion of post-1948 Palestinian Jordanians is the core of Hattar's ideology of returning Jordan to a pre-Palestinian past as a way of asserting the Jordanians' "full and nonlacking sovereignty over their land." For him, the Palestinians' presence in Jordan is a triumph for Zionism. Therefore, "Jordanizing the Palestinians means the Judaization of Palestine." Hattar concludes that, for all these reasons, "the Jordanian, precisely, specifically and exclusively, *is the non-Palestinian* [emphasis added]." Hattar is quite clear that the marks of modern Jordanian culture and cultural heritage are fabricated by the state and the regime. He sees Jordanians who support the regime and its policy of Jordan-

izing Palestinians as not real Jordanians but as fabrications by the regime and by the state, although they may speak "in the name of Jordan, Jordanianness, the [Bedouin] coffee pot, the [Bedouin] tent and that leftover dish [*al-Tabkhah al-Ba'itah Iyyaha* in reference to *mansaf*]."[194] Hattar's reference to the three original *Mutasarrifiyyahs* demonstrates his confusion. As we saw in chapter 2, these three *Mutasarrifiyyahs* included parts of Syria and Palestine and excluded the southern third of the country from Ma'an to 'Aqaba (although Ma'an had been part of the Karak *Mutasarrifiyyah* for a while before its inclusion in the Hijaz and later annexation to Transjordan in 1925, 'Aqaba shuttled between Egypt and the Hijaz of which it remained part until the 1925 annexation). Moreover, it is unclear why these so-called residents of the *Mutasarrifiyyahs* are considered the *real* Jordanians. Many among those residents were themselves recent arrivals from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and the Caucasus, who had been residents for no more than four to five decades before the establishment of the state. If their length of stay in the country is the operative criterion, then this would apply equally to Palestinian Jordanians who arrived in the country in 1948 and who, by now, have lived in Jordan for just as many decades. Hattar's views were not unique: Marwan al-Sakit, a Muslim Transjordanian nationalist, proposed that Palestinian Jordanians answer the Palestinian Authority's call to accept Palestinian passports, give up their Jordanian citizenship, and work in the country as foreign labor, as other Palestinians do in the Gulf.[195]

To be sure, the discourse of exclusivist Jordanian nationalists has a material basis, which is in turn interpreted through a nationalist interpretive grid. This goes back to the dawn of the Transjordanian-Palestinian relationship in the country. To begin with, they view the arrival of Palestinian refugees in the country in 1948 as having had a negative impact on Jordan's economic situation. As state financial resources were stretched to their limits, Transjordanians suffered measurably. Many Transjordanian exclusivist nationalists point to that period as important, wherein the Palestinian refugees, as recipients of UNRWA largesse, were better off than the poorer Transjordanians who had to compete with the Palestinians for meager state resources without access to UNRWA benefits. Moreover, the influence of the merchant class (composed largely of Palestinians and Syrians and a small number of Transjordanians) on the regime was seen as detrimental to the majority of Transjordanians, who were heavily employed in the public sector (in both the military and the state bureaucracy). The failure of the economy in the late 1980s and the IMF-induced drive for privatization was viewed by exclusivist Jordanian nationalists as detrimental to the economic welfare of Trans-

jordanians, as the beneficiaries of privatization would inevitably be the country's merchant class and foreign capital at the expense of the bureaucracy. To these nationalists, this signaled a loss of bureaucratic power, which, as mentioned earlier, was one of the mainstays (along with the military) of Transjordanian influence in the country.

What these exclusivist nationalists fail to account for, however, is that privatization, in addition to benefiting the existing merchant class, was in fact expanding the ranks of the Transjordanian bourgeoisie by accelerating a Transjordanian exodus from the overinflated bureaucracy to the private sector through preferential treatment. Most of the new bids solicited by the state and its bureaucracy were given to Transjordanians (albeit of settled origins or of northern Bedouin origins), who are also the beneficiaries of bureaucratic favoritism on account of Transjordanian hegemony in the bureaucracy. Members of the existing merchant class (who are mostly of Palestinian and Syrian origins) have complained privately of loss of business to this new class of Transjordanians, as well as of bureaucratic discrimination by state institutions. Some see privatization as a sort of "affirmative action" redistribution of wealth from the ranks of the existing business class to the new bureaucratic-cum-business class composed of Transjordanians. The difficulties facing the Palestinian-Jordanian business elite are such that they have recently "resorted to employing Transjordanians whose job it is to ensure that their company's official transactions get through the obstructive bureaucracy."[196] Adnan Abu ʿAwdah, who recently served as advisor to King ʿAbdullah II, states in a recent book, "Some Palestinian-Jordanian businesspeople who returned to Jordan in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War (1990–1991) have adopted the Gulf states' model, in which one cannot start a business without an indigenous partner. When such business people do not find a willing Transjordanian with whom to start a business, they resort to seducing one with free shares. The higher the Transjordanian's official connections the better. Ironically, then, the discriminatory attitude of the Transjordanian bureaucracy has generated new jobs and perhaps a different means of redistributing income."[197]

After the U.S. publication of his book, which details discrimination against Palestinian Jordanians in the country, a major campaign in the press was launched against Abu ʿAwdah by, among others, the Christian Transjordanian nationalists Fahd al-Fanik and Tariq Masarwah. In April 2000, Abu ʿAwdah was asked by the king to submit his resignation, which he immediately did. ʿUrayb Rantawi, a Palestinian-Jordanian columnist, spoke of how Jordanian society had a division of labor, wherein Palestinian Jor-

danians (who are mostly employers and employed in the private sector) pay state taxes while Transjordanians (mostly employed in the bureaucracy and the military) consume them.[198] These nationalist discourses completely elide the class differentiation in both communities. The reality of the matter is that the southern, poorer part of the country, like the urban poor throughout Jordan's cities, is suffering disproportionately, as most southern Transjordanians are more dependent on the state for employment. As the state bureaucracy contracts, so do their incomes. As for the poor urban Palestinian Jordanians, thanks to IMF and World Bank policies, they can no longer eke out a living in a globalized economy.

Concomitant with these developments was the second Gulf war, which led to the arrival of between 200,000 and 300,000 Palestinian-Jordanian refugees from Kuwait and other Gulf states, further stretching state resources and worsening an already weakened economy. This led to more impoverishment of Jordan's poor population (both Palestinian and Transjordanian). Exclusivist nationalists saw this as "drowning" Transjordanians deeper in a "sea" of Palestinians that only gets bigger with time. The protests of these exclusivist nationalists became even louder.

What is problematic, however, in this nationalist discourse of nation-class is that the exclusivist nationalists positing it see the Palestinian segment of the merchant class as representing *all* the Palestinians in the country. Whereas the Transjordanian section of the merchant class has increased measurably in the last two decades (capital accumulation in this sector resulted from profits made during the 1970s land speculation drive, as most of the country's land is owned by Transjordanians, and from IMF-induced privatization since 1989), these accounts ignore such developments. In fact, conspiracy theories among these exclusivist nationalists abound. One conspiracy theory sees any Palestinian land purchases in the country as attempts to transfer lands from Transjordanians to Palestinians as part of a larger project of transforming Jordan into a Palestinian state.

Jordanian Christians have come to play a very important role in these debates, ranging from the Communist left to the neo-liberal right. Figures such as Jamal al-Shaʿir, Tariq Masarwah, Mustafa Hamarnah, Marwan Muʿashshir, and Yaʿqub Zayyadin occupy very different positions on the Jordanian political spectrum, although, with the exception of Zayyadin, they remain within the official establishment (Hamarnah's more recent fall from grace with al-Rawabdah's government notwithstanding). Zayyadin, the celebrated head of the underground Jordanian Communist Party for decades, has come out recently claiming that the PLO was the one who "destroyed

the relationship between Palestinians and Jordanians [in 1970]," and also as a supporter of the cause for the rehabilitation of the right-wing anti-Palestinian Wasfi al-Tall, Jordan's late prime minister, among the Transjordanian left—an increasingly popular cause among Transjordanian nationalists in recent years.[199] This cause is espoused equally by Christian and Muslim Transjordanian nationalists, and increasingly by erstwhile leftists such as the novelist Mu'nis al-Razzaz (a Muslim whose father is Syrian-born and whose mother is Palestinian-born), who continues to be critical of the regime, albeit mildly.[200] Conferences honoring Wasfi al-Tall's contributions to Jordan's history as well as those of the late Prime Minister Hazza' al-Majali were recently sponsored by the ministry of culture and the Jordanian Center for Studies and Information (headed by Bilal Hasan al-Tall). Al-Tall and al-Majali have become canonical figures for Transjordanian nationalism, a choice that is hardly mitigated by the belief that Palestinians or their cohorts are blamed for assassinating both of them.[201]

Following the signing of the peace agreement with Israel, the Jordanian government contemplated three candidates for the position of the country's first ambassador to the Jewish state. These candidates, Aktham al-Qusus, Kamil Abu Jabir, and Marwan al-Mu'ashshir, are all Transjordanian Christians. Mu'ashshir was finally chosen. Many Transjordanian nationalists (although certainly not all) are as committed to an anti-Palestinian-Jordanian chauvinism as they are to supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state and to opposing the Jordanian peace agreement with Israel (Nahid Hattar stands out in this group). Their international support for non-Jordanian Palestinians is not in contradiction with their national anti-Palestinian positions, as the two can be complementary—if Palestinians have a state to go to, they will no longer have to be in Jordan. This position, in fact, is neither unique nor new. Since the nineteenth century, European anti-Semites (including subsequently the Nazis for a time) have always supported Zionism while attacking Jews in their communities, as anti-Semites and Zionists were equally committed to emptying Europe of Jews and transporting them elsewhere. This comparison is not to suggest that exclusivist Jordanian nationalists are necessarily like the Nazis (as the most extreme among them have never called for anything beyond "repatriating" the Palestinians) but simply to illustrate that there are non-Jordanian precedents to such arguments.[202]

This new anti-Palestinian exclusivist nationalism should be contrasted with the support Transjordanians had given to the Palestinians after the 1920s and especially in the second half of the 1930s, when the Palestinians staged their now famous anticolonial revolt. During that period, as explained

in chapter 1, anticolonial Jordanian nationalism saw itself as Arab, and British colonialism as its "other." Although some groups attempted to build on the nativist struggle of 1920s, their attempt to build an exclusivist Jordanian nationalism in the 1930s failed. It was this Arab dimension of the Jordanian nationalism of the 1930s that propelled it to support the Palestinians. Immediately after the declaration of the Palestinian revolt, Jordanian anticolonial nationalists held a conference at Umm al-'Amad in June 1936 and called for the collection of money and arms, which they sent with hundreds of Jordanian volunteers to Palestine to fight alongside the Palestinians. At the time, the government, which could not stop them, opted to open up the Arab Legion for volunteers. Later, the Amir 'Abdullah prevented Transjordanians from traveling to Palestine. The government also responded to the Umm al-'Amad conference by banning all political meetings, and it threatened its attendants with arrest. When many of them attended the solidarity conference in Bludan, Syria, in September 1937, they were arrested on returning to the country. In addition, many Palestinian rebels who sought refuge in Transjordan were hidden in people's homes and treated by Jordanian physicians. This was in addition to massive demonstrations that were held in Amman in solidarity with the Palestinians. Jordanian rebels, furthermore, undertook a campaign of sabotage of British installations in the country, including cutting off telephone lines and bombing petroleum pipelines going from Iraq to Haifa. Moreover, by early 1937, Jordanian rebels attacked government buildings throughout the country (in Irbid, Salt, Madaba, 'Ajlun, and Tafilah, and even in small towns such as Kafr Najd, Umm al-Rumman, and Karimah, where they attacked police stations). The rebellion continued until the spring of 1939. The Arab Legion under Glubb and the British air force were sent in hot pursuit of the rebels, cornering them in 'Ajlun and killing many of them. Ten airplanes were used to strafe the positions of the rebels. With the defeat of the Palestinian revolt, the Jordanian rebels were also defeated. They fled to the Syrian border where they engaged in a battle with Glubb's forces. Many were killed and injured. Some fled into Syria, and others were caught and tried.[203]

The Arab dimension of Jordanian anticolonial nationalism continued in the forties, with the rise of the Group of al-Shabab al-Ahrar, or the Free Youth, who were influenced by Subhi Abu-Ghanimah of national congress fame. This group was suppressed, leading to the exile of many of its leaders. Those who remained continued to attack the mandate and the colonial relations that continued after independence was nominally granted in 1946. They formed a new party called the Jordanian Arab Party, which the recently

self-declared King ʿAbdullah refused to license. The king was able to co-opt some party members, however, by including them as ministers in the government. These included Sulayman al-Nabulsi and what was called at the time the Damascus intellectuals (in reference to Jordanians who obtained their high school or university education in Damascus); some among them were close to the regime but opposed British presence in the country.[204]

Whereas in the 1920s, Jordanian national identity was initially formed representing nativist interests against a foreign British-Hashemite state staffed by the British and by a coterie of Arabs from neighboring countries, it later adopted a pan-Arab nationalist vision, which manifested itself in the 1930s through active solidarity with the neighboring Palestinians' struggle against the British and the Zionists, and during the 1940s through its continued opposition to the British and their presence in Jordan after independence in 1946. Its pan-Arab vision was further strengthened in the 1950s through ʿAbd al-Nasir's Arab unionist nationalism. Concomitant with the Arab nationalist identity that was solidified during the 1950s, however, a particularist/exclusivist Jordanian nationalist trend was emerging. The arrival of Palestinians in 1948, along with the annexation of the West Bank, inaugurated this trend, which was given a push after the assassination of King ʿAbdullah by a Palestinian in 1951. Exclusivist nationalists attempted to draw comparisons between their post-1948 exclusivist nationalism and the nativist opposition in the 1920s to the colonial and Hashemite apparatus. This trend continued during the 1950s, albeit checked by Arab nationalism until the end of the decade, and it acquired momentum in the 1960s after the failure of the Egypto-Syrian union, which signaled a major blow to unionist Arab nationalism. The trend was further strengthened by the emergence of the Palestinian guerrilla groups that threatened Jordanian regime claims to represent Palestinian lands (the West Bank) and the Palestinian people (those who became Jordanian citizens after 1948), and by the *coup de grâce* delivered to Unionist Arab nationalism by the 1967 June War. This particularist/exclusivist Jordanian nationalist trend was finally solidified in 1970 during and after the civil war between the Jordanian armed forces and the Palestinian guerrillas.

Whereas the Jordanian nativist identity, and subsequently Jordanian Arab nationalist identity, saw foreign colonial powers as the *other* against whom they defined themselves, the particularist/exclusivist Jordanian national identity that was developing since the 1950s, and that was solidified after 1970, saw Palestinian Jordanians as the *other* against whom it defined itself. Following the 1988 disengagement from the West Bank and the 1989 liberali-

zation of the regime, exclusivist Jordanian nationalists emerged in the open as enemies of Palestinian Jordanians. For them, the very presence of Palestinian Jordanians in Jordan had placed Jordanian national identity in jeopardy. Mustafa Wahbah al-Tall's 1920s nativist cry "Jordan for the Jordanians" was appropriated and mobilized by these exclusivist nationalists against the Palestinians. However, their discourse of exclusivist nationalism not only is based on the internal history of Jordan vis-à-vis its Palestinian-Jordanian citizens, but also results from increasing Israeli claims since the 1970s that Jordan *is* the real Palestine and thus should be converted into a Palestinian state. With the recent impasse in the Arab-Israeli peace process and recent claims made by Israeli Likud leaders, and even by Labor leader Haim Ramon, the second man in the Israeli Labor Party, who claimed in 1999 that Jordan will certainly be transformed into a Palestinian state in a few years, Jordanian exclusivist nationalists have increased their attacks on the Palestinian *other*.[205]

With the increase of the anti-Palestinian exclusivist discourse in the press, King Husayn, in exasperation, asserted on September 19, 1993, in response to those who were fostering national disunity in the country, that "here, we must concentrate on national unity; and as for anyone who hurts a brother with an injurious word or with harm, or expresses a sense of superiority [yuzayid], I shall be his enemy till Judgment Day."[206] The king reiterated similar sentiments in October, affirming that "our national unity is too strong for it to be harmed . . . and he who harms it is not of us."[207] He continued to call for equality for all Jordanians "of all origins and birthplaces" ("min jami' al-usul wa al-manabit") until his death, as does his son, King 'Abdullah II.[208]

Jordan's journey of expansion and contraction, however, did not end with the 1988 "severing of ties." Jordan's territorial and demographic expansion of 1949 to 1950 was only partially reversed, as the Palestinian population interpellated as Jordanian in 1949, a major segment of which continues to reside on the East Bank, remains Jordanian. Whereas Jordan fully reversed its territorial expansion of 1950 by renouncing sovereignty over the West Bank in 1988, the denationalization of West Bank Palestinian Jordanians was only a partial demographic contraction. Although 1988 acted as the inaugural moment for the release of the new and exclusivist Transjordanian nationalism in light of this contraction, much of this new and eruptive nationalist exclusivism was not directed at the parts of the nation that had just been severed but rather at an internal part whose status remains tenuous, namely Palestinian Jordanians who were nationalized after 1948 and who are residents of the East Bank.

Jordan as a territory and as a people has proved to be quite elastic, expanding and contracting while retaining an unchanging territorial core, the Jordan of 1925, and a demographic core, the various peoples who lived in the country until 1948. This expansion and contraction were produced both politically and juridically. Still, it is not only post-1948 Palestinian Jordanians who are being targeted—although they remain the easiest and most frequently chosen target: many nationalists question the Jordanianness of many other groups in the country, Syrians, Circassians, Chechens, and even some of the Bedouin tribes themselves. Fahd al-Fanik launched a campaign beginning in 1994, assailing Jordanian Chechens for being active in providing help to the Chechen republic besieged by Russian troops, and calling on them to choose one identity, Jordanian or Chechen, as if the two need to be mutually exclusive.[209] No one has yet joined al-Fanik's anti-Chechen inquisition. Ahmad ʿUwaydi al-ʿAbbadi, the well-known author of books on the Bedouins and a current member of Parliament, until recently considered the indigenous Jordanian al-ʿAdwan tribe "non-Jordanian."[210] Many in the new camp of exclusivist nationalists, such as al-ʿAbbadi and Hattar, are also questioning the Jordanianness of the Hashemites themselves, and consequently, the latter's right to rule the country.[211] These debates continue to rage in Jordan. Increasing divisions between northerners and southerners, present since the inception of the state, are also evident. The king's use of prime ministers hailing from the south in recent years (Majali is from Karak and Kabariti is from Aqaba) is further aggravating the problem, especially because the military has always been the mainstay of southern power. The more recent appointment of ʿAbd al-Raʾuf al-Rawabdah and ʿAli Abu al-Raghib (both northerners) by King ʿAbdullah II seems to have restored the balance. Moreover, the continuing backward economy of the south compared to the more prosperous north is making the south (historically perceived as more loyal to the regime) the hotbed of instability, as evidenced by uprisings in 1989,1996, and 1998, all of which erupted in southern cities.

The recent uprising in February 1998 in the southern city of Maʿan is important to note in this regard, especially in relation to the way the regime dealt with it. Because of the increased threat of a U.S. military attack on Iraq in February 1998, demonstrations opposed to U.S. aggression against an Arab country began to rage throughout the Arab world. This also included Jordan, where demonstrations took place in a number of cities, from Irbid in the north to Maʿan in the south. The Maʿan demonstrations turned violent as the police and the Special Forces (headed at the time by the king's eldest son, Prince ʿAbdullah) intervened violently to quell the demonstrations, which the government had outlawed. One person was killed and

twenty-five injured, including a number of police officers. It is said that Saudi flags were flown by the demonstrators. The king ordered the deployment of the army in the city, which was immediately placed under curfew. The government also cut off all phone lines connecting Maʿan to the outside world. The king, in full military uniform, flew in his chopper to Maʿan and met with army units as well as with Maʿan's tribal leaders in an attempt to placate (some say chastise) them. The regime was distressed over the assertion by Maʿanis of their Arab identity, whose *other* is colonialism/imperialism. As Jordanians felt besieged by colonial/imperialist powers again, their Arab identity reasserted itself, manifesting its other as the colonial and imperialist powers, as it had done on numerous other occasions before (especially in the 1950s). The king's strategy was to remind Maʿanis that they are Jordanians first. In light of the events in Maʿan, he stressed that the "riots" were an insult to Jordan and to Maʿan and that they were the work of foreign infiltrators. He spoke to army officers, telling them that some "infiltrators and those with ulterior motives" have fomented discord in "Maʿan from which the beginning of the foundation of the kingdom was launched."[212] The king is referring to the fact that Maʿan had been the launching point of ʿAbdullah's nation-state project back in 1921. The king also spoke of "Maʿan the origin" and "Maʿan the history."[213] He further added that Jordan might be engulfed with refugees as a result of a U.S. attack on Iraq and a possible expulsion of the Palestinians eastwards by Israel, thus "realizing the alternative-homeland [project] wherein Jordan would be finished."[214] In doing so, the king was attempting to shift the attention of Jordanians and Maʿanis from their larger Arab identity, whose other is colonialism, to their exclusivist Jordanian identity, whose other is the Palestinians, an identity, despite its attendant risks, that is safer for regime survival.[215]

Whereas the Jordanian state effectively used the post-1948 Palestinian Jordanians as an *other* to consolidate a Jordanian national identity, of which it was the initial architect and subsequent sponsor, it could no longer control the independent momentum that this identity later acquired, and which, if anything, could turn against the monarchy itself, thus redefining the Jordanian state that had been organized around the monarchy since its inception. In fact, the state's attempt to Jordanize Palestinians was always in contradiction to its express policy at many moments since 1948 to foster divisions between Transjordanians and Palestinians (especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s) in order to prevent any class alliances between the two groups that might turn against the monarchy itself.[216] However, whereas the Palestinians' presence in the country was a *sine qua non* for the consolidation of

an exclusivist Jordanianness, it no longer plays that role exclusively. Jordanian national identity, like all national identities, is in flux today. As a reactive identity—and indeed all identities are reactive—it seems to have a better idea of what it is not than of what it actually is. Whereas the exclusivist nationalists insist on a further contraction of the nation into yet smaller and smaller segments and tribes, Palestinian Jordanians, in defense of their national citizenship rights, insist on their status as Palestinians and Jordanians simultaneously. Although the current trends in the country range from an ambivalent state policy that hovers between exclusivism and inclusivism to Palestinian Jordanians, torn between Jordanian and Palestinian national identities, to exclusivist Transjordanians, who want to subdivide the nation into smaller and more parochial groupings, Jordanian national identity (which includes in it Palestinianness and Transjordanianness) is waiting for a new definition. What that will be will depend on the ultimate victor or victors in these raging battles. Indeed, this political and juridical national journey, which, as we saw in chapter 1, began as a debate between British colonial officials on whether Transjordan should have a "nationality" at all, or if its population should be called, in the words of Winston Churchill, "Transjordanian Palestinians," has been a productive one.[217] What started as a British-Hashemite idea has exceeded its architects' intentions, their designs, and, most of all, their control. As we have seen through the course of this book, this was to be achieved through a series of juridical and military procedures and measures and the cultural productions they generated. These not only repressed existing identities and cultural practices but also produced a Transjordanian national identity and the national culture this identity came to constitute.

Unless the new Jordanian nationalism reconstitutes itself in terms that are not oppositional to and exclusive of Palestinian Jordanians and redefines itself in an inclusive manner to include all those who are citizens of the state, the future of Jordan and its Palestinian-Jordanian citizens will be far from stable. By charting the inclusivist history of Jordanian national identity, its new exclusivist manifestation is shown to be contingent on specific historical conditions, and on juridical and military strategies that are far from permanent. Through inclusive policies (especially juridical and military) and an inclusive nationalist discourse, the Jordanian government and Jordanian nationalists might be able to unify the country under identities that are not mutually exclusive, thus averting a second civil war in which all Jordanians, no matter what their geographic origins might be, will be the losers.