4 Nationalizing the Military

Colonial Legacy as National Heritage

As we saw in the last chapter, the colonial concept of modernization that was deployed in Transjordan by the British Mandatory authorities and by Glubb Pasha was racially and imperially inflected. By virtue of their interrelated racial and colonial status, the colonized had no agency. This colonial modernization aimed at producing the colonized as obedient subjects who can be employed to serve imperial aims. In Jordan, as in many colonized countries, this situation produced two different yet related kinds of anticolonial nationalisms.

One type, that which rallied around a non-Hashemite Arab nationalism, sought to achieve technological modernization in the European sense, while adopting a certain selection of "traditions" and religion for use in the private sphere. As discussed in chapter 2, the new subjects of the nation had newly defined gender roles that permeated their national identity and their citizenship. These roles were inspired by Western juridical and political practice, which had become ideologically hegemonic within this strand of nationalism. As far as the public sphere was concerned, symbols of these traditions, including religious traditions but not necessarily faith, were deployed in the public sphere. These nationalists saw Jordan as part of a divided Arab world with which it should and would be ultimately unified, be that in a confederal or unionist form. For these nationalists, the army was seen as a central institution to unify the nation. Its role was to integrate a varied citizenry within the framework of national defense, the supreme duty of a nationalist. For these nationalists, Jordanian Arab national identity was constituted in opposition to colonialism, which constituted its *other*.

Another kind of anticolonial nationalism was also deployed in the country, and it was spearheaded by the Amir ʿAbdullah. The amir's Arab nationalism was mainly anti-Ottoman and unionist. A unified Arab world would be ruled under the banner of the Hashemites. Internationally, this nationalism was friendly to the West and collaborated with Western powers in driving out the Ottomans and in setting up the new states in the region. It also saw Western powers as its natural allies against myriad enemies. This type of nationalism was the ruling one in Jordan until the early 1950s. The role of the Arab Revolt, which was led by the Hashemites against the Ottomans, and in alliance with Britain, has been a constant symbol of Hashemite Arab nationalism. Its use for regime legitimation remains constant after seven decades, especially in confronting those who accuse the regime of a lack of Arab nationalism. Commemorating the revolt is an annual regime ritual that remains strong to this day. This Hashemite Arab nationalism portrayed the West as a friend and ally against Israel, communism, internal subversion, and other undefined enemies that might threaten national security. Its alliance with the West was always justified rhetorically as being primarily beneficial to the nation. The king's palace nationalism constituted itself originally as anti-Ottoman. Absent the Ottoman threat, however, it was to reformulate itself in opposition to an internal *other*, represented by "subversives" and followers of "foreign" ideologies.

This nationalism shares with colonial modernizationists their view of Jordanian national culture, tradition, religion, and gender relations, in that it does not aim at replicating European norms completely but more syncretically. It participated in the creation of a colonially based national culture that it now claims to defend as the *true* national culture. Issues of religious faith were deployed in the public sphere as part of a legitimating ideology. Muslims with different folk practices (e.g., the Bedouins and the Circassians) were duly Islamicized according to state dicta, supported by a team of religious shaykhs and religious government departments and official rhetoric. The army was seen both as unifying its adherents and as dividing them from its opponents, who had to be cast out. By the late 1950s, this nationalism itself was transformed into a more particularist and exclusivist Jordanian nationalism unifying Bedouins and Hadaris, Arabs and Circassians, but excluding Palestinian Jordanian citizens. The new exclusivist nationalism continued with the same philosophy that ʿAbdullah's Arab nationalism had espoused in relation to questions of tradition, modernization, and national culture more generally.

These two kinds of nationalisms are not peculiar to Arab countries. We see similar trends in Africa and the rest of Asia, where new postcolonial elites

espouse pro-Western nationalisms, and where popular nationalisms insist on an anti-Westernism as definitional of their anticolonial ideologies. In this chapter, I discuss the history of both nationalisms in the context of the Jordanian army, and their clash in the 1950s. I present a thorough history of that clash based on new material, including the memoirs of army officers who played central roles during the period. The subsequent emergence of the new particularist nationalism and its clash with Palestinian Jordanians is also discussed, as it constituted a turning point for the consolidation of the new particularist nationalism. At the end of the chapter, I analyze the gendered strategies used by the state to mobilize soldiers and the role of religion in the legitimation of state power and the delegitimation of the opposition. I also discuss the impact of the changing role of women in society on the military's policy toward women. The military's gendered strategies combined with the new military policy on women are shown to be part of the nation-state's project of nationalizing a certain brand of masculinity and femininity, which it then identifies as "national tradition."

Anticolonial Nationalism and the Army

The defeat that befell the Arab armies in the Palestine War in 1948 devastated morale among army officers as well as the rank and file, especially in the Jordanian Arab Army. Although British officers (who had joined the Jordanian army in the last few years and who led it during the 1948 war) tried to exhaust the Jordanian officers with excessive training exercises to prevent them from having the time to join or form political groupings, the level of despair among many of the recently trained Jordanian officers had to find a political outlet. Whereas, as we saw in the last chapter, the military's disciplinarian role was hegemonic in its production of soldiers as juridical national subjects with specific national cultural practices, as Timothy Mitchell stresses, we should not overstate the "coherence of these technologies. . . . Disciplines can break down, counteract one another, or overreach. They offer spaces for manoeuver and resistance, and can be turned to counter-hegemonic purposes. Anti-colonial movements have often derived their organizational forms from the military and their methods of discipline and indoctrination from schooling."[1]

In the case of Jordan, disciplinary strategies indeed overreached themselves and began to break down. The first signs of their overreach were felt among officers who had been trained at British army barracks in Palestine in the early to mid forties in places such as Sarafand. These officers began

to publish a weekly magazine in the summer of 1948, which they called *al-Qunbulah* or "The Bomb," to express their resistance to the prevailing order.[2] According to Shahir Abu-Shahut, one of the magazine's founders, all artillery officers partook in editing the weekly, which was issued handwritten. Contributors included the future head of the army and close regime confidant Habis al-Majali.[3] The magazine was distributed to other army units, where it was received with much excitement. *Al-Qunbulah*'s editors were also able to build bridges with civilian nationalists Kamal Nasir and Hisham Nashashibi, who began publishing the magazine *Al-Jil al-Jadid*, or the "New Generation," in Ramallah on the West Bank. A working relationship ensued between the two magazines, which won them much popular following. Soon, however, *Al-Qunbulah*'s editors received an oral warning from Glubb Pasha conveyed through Muhammad Ma'aytah (a Karaki and future Free Officer) commanding them to put a stop to this "childish behavior." They obliged by stopping publication of the magazine and by destroying all published issues.[4]

A Jordanian officer, 'Abdullah al-Tall, who was at the time the military commander of Arab East Jerusalem, would come and lecture to artillery officers about the importance of the Palestinian struggle and the imperatives of liberating Palestine from Israel's occupation. He would also share with the officers the opinions of the country's political leadership, as he was privy to the armistice talks with the Israelis in his capacity as one of the king's negotiators and go-betweens. In his account of that period, Abu-Shahut insists, however, that 'Abdullah al-Tall never recruited anyone for any secret or open organization, contrary to subsequent accusations leveled against him by the government.[5]

The story of 'Abdullah al-Tall is important to note here, as he came to constitute in the minds of Jordan's rulers the first military threat to the regime. His importance also stems from his espousal of an Arab nationalism that defined itself in opposition to British colonialism, thus countering the state's and 'Abdullah's brand of British-friendly Arab nationalism. Al-Tall was born in 1918 in the northern city of Irbid, the center of northern opposition to 'Abdullah's emirate project in the early 1920s. He enlisted in the Arab Legion in 1942 and rose quickly within its ranks, becoming a major in 1948. Within a few months, he was noticed by King 'Abdullah, who took a liking to him and promoted him to the rank of colonel.[6] Al-Tall was the hero of the battle of Jerusalem, after which stories of his heroism became commonplace in the Jordanian press. He became a confidant of the king, serving later as his emissary during Jordanian-Israeli negotiations after the 1948 war.

He commanded the 6th Battalion during the war, but he was dismissed from his command by Glubb because of his vociferous political views and was appointed military ruler of the city of Jerusalem in September 1948. Glubb later dismissed him from the army, entirely against King ʿAbdullah's wishes. The king, bypassing Glubb, appointed him the civilian governor of the city in March 1949, a position he held until his resignation (or dismissal) in June 1949.

Al-Tall speaks of a concerted campaign by the Jordanian army's British officers against him (due to his public expression of anti-British views), which led the Jordanian authorities to decide on his dismissal and transfer to the Washington or London embassy as Jordan's military attaché there. He cites an Israeli newspaper report (in *HaMashkif*) as early as April 27, 1949, stating that he was viewed by the British and Jordanian authorities as inimical to Jordanian-Israeli *rapprochement*, which is why they decided to transfer him to Washington.[7] When he saw the newspaper report and heard the palace rumors about his impending dismissal, al-Tall submitted his resignation on June 7, 1949, retiring to his native city of Irbid. He left the country in October 1949 not to return for 16 years.[8]

In Jerusalem, al-Tall made alliances with Palestinian nationalists who opposed ʿAbdullah's control of central Palestine and those Palestinians who supported the Mufti and the Husayni family, whose archenemy was King ʿAbdullah. Moreover, he also befriended Palestinian Baʿthists and other Arab nationalists. Al-Tall also sought alliances with Transjordanian Arab nationalists including the Group of Free Youth (Jamaʿat al-Shabab al-Ahrar), in existence since the mid forties. He also sought the support of King ʿAbdullah's son, Amir Talal, rumored to oppose his father's policies toward the British, the Israelis, and the Palestinians.[9] Moreover, as early as December 1948, al-Tall began making individual contacts with Jordanian army officers to recruit them to stage an anti-government (but not anti-regime) coup d'état.[10] He names only two of these officers, ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar and Mahmud al-Musa (who at the time of the writing of his book were already in exile); he refrains from naming others to protect them from government retaliation.[11] Al-Tall also sought contacts with neighboring Arab governments, especially with the Syrian coup leader Husni al-Zaʿim. In his talks with al-Zaʿim, al-Tall asked that in the event ʿAbdullah is deposed, al-Zaʿim would send him into exile in the eastern desert around the Syrian town of Dayr al-Zur without harming him physically.[12] Al-Tall also met in April 1949 with the Amir Talal and devised a plan wherein the government would be changed, Glubb and his coterie of British officers would be arrested, and

Talal himself would take over the management of the kingdom. The amir was assured that no physical harm would befall his father or any member of the royal family.[13] It is important to note, contrary to subsequent government claims, that al-Tall was opposed to the British presence in the country as well as to King ʿAbdullah's support of that presence, but not to Hashemite royal rule in Jordan per se. His Arab nationalism did not necessarily lead him to espouse republican ideas. In fact, republicanism never became part of the anticolonial nationalism of any group in the army, before him or after him.

Glubb had become increasingly uncomfortable with al-Tall's reported activities. Based on intelligence information he obtained, Glubb submitted in June 1949 a report to King ʿAbdullah detailing al-Tall's preparation for a coup. It was based on this report that the government reasserted the necessity to distance al-Tall from the political theater of the country by dispatching him to Washington or London. No legal proceedings were filed against al-Tall, however, as no material evidence existed to support Glubb's claims. Finally, after al-Tall consulted with the Egyptian authorities, the Amir Talal, and members of the Free Youth Group and the "Free Officers," it was recommended that he leave to Egypt and resume his national struggle from there.[14] Following al-Tall's departure, Glubb created a new military surveillance outfit charged with spying on Jordanian officers. Soon, this outfit grew to include all army departments and answered directly to the Department of Military Intelligence. ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar mentions the establishment of a second intelligence office called Daʾirat al-Mabahith, operated by a number of Jordanian officers loyal to Glubb.[15]

In addition to having alliances with local anticolonial nationalist leaders, al-Tall also met with the famed Jordanian nationalist Subhi Abu-Ghanimah, who had been Jordan's most vocal voice against British rule for decades and had been living in exile in Syria at the time.[16] While in exile in Cairo, al-Tall published his memoirs in 1950 in Egyptian newspapers, accompanied by photostatic copies of secret documents and letters that he had carried between King ʿAbdullah and the Israelis during the armistice talks, detailing the king's dealings with the Israelis in a manner considered treasonous by the prevailing Arab consensus at the time.[17] Al-Tall's story, however, did not end with his self-imposed exile. He was later accused of conspiracy in the assassination of King ʿAbdullah in 1951 (although no material evidence existed against him) and was sentenced to death in absentia.[18] Glubb Pasha, his archenemy, testified against him in court.[19] Al-Tall denied the charges completely.[20]

ʿAbdullah al-Tall did not seem to play any lasting role in the formation of nationalist groups in the Jordanian army. He did not recruit many people in the army and made few contacts outside civilian nationalist circles. He also was not to play any future role in the nationalist politics of the country, in the military or otherwise, as evidenced by his absence during the 1954 to 1957 nationalist agitation in society and the military.[21] His, however, remains the first recorded defection by a Jordanian military man. His emergence was a reflection of how the political realm outside the military establishment was infiltrating the military. This was the result of the increasing enrollment of settled Jordanians in the army. These were less susceptible than the Bedouins to Glubb's ideological influence by virtue of having come from Jordanian towns with politically active public spheres. This, coupled with the increase of anticolonial nationalist sentiment in the country since the Palestinian revolt of 1936 to 1939, which many Transjordanians actively supported, and the continuing events through the 1947 to 1948 Palestinian exodus and the defeat of the Arab armies, created an unprecedented situation in the army that Glubb could not contain. In fact, during the Palestinian uprising, many Transjordanian volunteers joined the Palestinian guerrillas. To stem the nationalist tide, the government opted to open the Arab Legion for volunteers (mostly of settled origins). Later, the Amir ʿAbdullah prevented Transjordanians from traveling to Palestine altogether (see chapter 5).[22]

A more politically aware kind of Arab nationalism began making inroads throughout Arab societies in the aftermath of the Palestine defeat. Prominent among those calling for Arab unity at the time was the Baʿth party. A number of Jordanian officers were attracted to the Baʿth's nationalist ideology and decided to join it in 1950. The first were Shahir Abu Shahut and Mahmud Maʿaytah. Soon, however, these two officers began recruiting other officers to their cause. These included Dafi Jamʿani, Mundhir ʿInnab, ʿAzmi Mihyar, Salim al-Tall, Fawzi Abu-Nuwwar, and ʿAbd al-Qadir Shuman.[23] When the civilian leadership of the party was informed of these activities, it rejected them vehemently—as the large-scale incorporation of military personnel, they feared, could lead to a deviation from the party's principles and goals—and asked that they be discontinued. Abu-Shahut and Maʿaytah opted, as a result, to have their military group independent of the party, and they named it al-Tanzim al-Sirri Lil-Dubbat al-Urduniyyin (the Secret Organization of Jordanian Officers), with its professed slogan being "the liberation of the Jordanian army [*sic*] from the influence of British officers, and the establishment of military unity with Syria."[24] Soon, many more officers joined the

organization. Abu-Shahut, Ma'aytah, and Dafi al-Jam'ani were nominated as the collective leadership of the group whose name was modified to al-Tanzim al-Sirri Lil-Dubbat al-Wataniyyin fi al-Jaysh al-Urduni, (the Secret Organization of Nationalist Officers in the Jordanian Army), with Abu-Shahut, later the same year, being nominated as its leader.[25] In 1950, the organization's members were mostly artillery officers. By 1951, membership expanded to include officers in engineering, armor, mechanics, and infantry.[26]

Following the coup d'état in 1952 by the Egyptian Free Officers, whose leaders were initially on good terms with the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brothers), a meeting was arranged in Jordan between the Jordanian officers' organization and the leader of the Jordanian Ikhwan, Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifah, to arrange through him a meeting with the Egyptian officers. Khalifah agreed to arrange the meeting on condition that they join his movement. Committed to a secular brand of nationalism, the officers refused and the proposed meeting with the Egyptians never materialized. Still, the impact of the Egyptian Free Officers was far reaching. Soon the Secret Organization renamed itself Harakat al-Dubbat al-Urduniyyin al-Ahrar (the Movement of Free Jordanian Officers) and embarked on establishing a founding committee that included representatives from all the branches of the army who were elected by the movement's cadres.[27] The committee issued internal bylaws for the movement, which continued to be led by Abu-Shahut. They decided to contact some of the higher-ranking Jordanian officers for the purpose of inviting them to be advisors and honorary members of the movement. These included Habis al-Majali, Muhammad al-Ma'ayta, 'Ali al-Hiyari, Radi al-Hindawi, Mahmud al-Rusan, and 'Ali Abu-Nuwwar, all of whom were to play important roles in the coming few years.[28]

Following the death of King 'Abdullah, the government and Glubb were consulting about the possibility of preventing the Amir Talal from acceding to the throne. The amir was in Switzerland at the time, receiving treatment at a mental institution. Rumors in Amman had it that the government and Glubb were preventing him from coming back and that reports about his health problems were British fabrications. In the army, a British-educated officer, 'Ali Abu-Nuwwar (born to a Jordanian Circassian mother and a Jordanian Arab father[29]), called on the Free Officers informing them of a plan to bring prince Talal back to Jordan and place him on the throne by force. Abu-Nuwwar asked for the Free Officers' military support once the operation began.[30] Abu-Nuwwar had dispatched the Palestinian Jordanian doctor 'Awni Hannun (who was in the Jordanian army) to Switzerland to check on the amir and bring him back. Hannun, however, was not allowed

to see the amir, as the British authorities had given strict instructions to the hospital that no one was to see him. The amir did ultimately return to Jordan and acceded to his throne without military intervention. Hannun, on returning to Amman from Switzerland, was shocked to find that Glubb had already dismissed him from the army on the grounds that he incited discord between Jordanian and British officers and that he urged Jordanian officers to quit the army and join the Egyptian Fida'iyyin fighting the British at Suez. No evidence was presented to support either claim. Still, the matter was not over. King Talal himself intervened on Hannun's behalf but was turned down by Glubb after a noisy argument between the two.[31] According to some reports, Talal, who had served briefly in the Arab Legion in 1943, hated Glubb and argued with him constantly.[32] For example, such reports abound in the unverifiable memoirs of King Talal, which were said to have been communicated to one Subhi Tuqan from Talal's exile in Turkey.[33] Glubb reports one hostile interaction between himself and Talal as early as 1939,[34] but otherwise he sings the praises of the king and laments his mental condition.[35]

Later, when the government was preparing to put a vote before Parliament to depose King Talal because of mental incapacity, many in the army thought that this was another plot against Talal. They sought a meeting with the king to arrange for a response to the alleged plot. The meeting was to be arranged by the king's aide-de-camp ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ʿAsfur, who was a Free Officer himself. ʿAsfur, however, confirmed the king's mental condition, which shocked the officers, who strongly believed that the king had been set up.[36]

By the time the brief reign of Talal had ended, anticolonial nationalist officers in the Jordanian army were already a force to be reckoned with. Although committed to the monarchy, they were equally committed to ending the colonial presence in the country. Whereas they had disagreed with ʿAbdullah, they agreed with Talal. After the latter's deposition, the officers decided to wait until succession took place to decide the next step.

King Husayn and the Nationalist Officers

A unified front was suddenly to emerge in the country, one consisting of nationalist officers, nationalist politicians, and the young and increasingly nationalistic king, all of whom were to stand up to Glubb and to British military influence. As this section will clarify, King Husayn's shuttling be-

tween his grandfather's Hashemite Arab nationalism and the new Nasirist Arab nationalism sweeping the country was to define the outcome of the coming clash.

As was the case for ʿAbdullah al-Tall, the fate of any officer who was discovered to be harboring political views inimical to British military control in the country was banishment by Glubb to one of Jordan's embassies abroad. Prominent among those who faced such a fate was ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar, who is originally from the northern city of Salt. Abu-Nuwwar was one of four Jordanian officers who had returned at the end of 1950 from Britain after graduating from a British military academy, where they studied for one year. The other three were Mahmud al-Rusan, ʿAli al-Hiyari, and Sadiq al-Sharʿ.[37] Abu-Nuwwar was exiled to the Paris embassy by Glubb during Talal's reign, on suspicion of conspiracy against the British.[38] Glubb also accused Abu-Nuwwar of contacts with a foreign government (namely Syria), which Abu-Nuwwar denied, and of conspiring against the British presence in the country, which he did not. Glubb further accused him of preparing a coup, and then he decided to dismiss him from the army. A number of ministers intervened on Abu-Nuwwar's behalf but to no avail. He was finally exiled to the Paris embassy as a military attaché.[39] Mahmud al-Rusan, in turn, was exiled to the Washington embassy.

With the deposition of Talal, the entire nationalist movement in Jordan, both civilian and military, received a major blow to its anticolonial plans. It seemed that the British, and their archrepresentative Glubb, were there to stay. Talal, however, was not the first or the last Jordanian king to espouse part of the anticolonial nationalist agenda. The young King Husayn was to flirt with the nationalist anticolonial project from his first days on the throne and for some years to come.

When Husayn reached the legal age (18 lunar years) to assume his responsibilities as king, he was called back from London where he was attending Sandhurst military academy. On his way back to Jordan, Husayn stopped in Paris where he met Abu-Nuwwar, who shared with the king his nationalist anti-British ideas. According to Abu-Nuwwar, the young king was very attentive. A few months later, in August 1953, King Husayn invited Abu-Nuwwar to London to attend a party honoring the king. The king was accompanied by a number of Jordanian officers.[40]

When Abu-Nuwwar arrived in London, he met with Shahir Abu-Shahut, who was also in London at the time attending military school. In an attempt to recruit his friend, Abu-Shahut told Abu-Nuwwar about the Free Officers and their goal of "Arabizing" the Jordanian army. Abu-Nuwwar in turn in-

formed Husayn of the existence of the group, in order to enlist the king's support. The young king was impressed and asked to meet with some of the officers including Abu-Shahut, whom he met later at the party. The two agreed to meet soon in Amman.[41] The meeting, however, was not to take place for more than two years.

At the party, Abu-Nuwwar condemned the British presence in Jordan, drawing applause and support from the Jordanian officers. The king was impressed and sought to strategize with Abu-Nuwwar about what was to be done. It was decided that the king would order the return of Abu-Nuwwar and Mahmud al-Rusan to their posts in the army back in Jordan. From the late summer of 1953 to the end of 1955, the king tried to do just that, but to no avail, as Glubb rejected his requests to transfer the two officers back. In the meantime, however, the young king continued his contacts with Abu-Nuwwar, visiting him in Paris and later sending him as his envoy to Egypt to consult with ʿAbd al-Nasir. He also called him to Amman in 1954 for consultations.[42] Finally, in November 1955, the king made up his mind and issued a decision to transfer Abu-Nuwwar back to Jordan against Glubb's insistent rejection.[43] On his arrival, Abu-Nuwwar had an audience with Glubb, who refused to give him a military job and threatened to "shorten his life" if he attempted to foment discord in the country.[44] As a result, Abu-Nuwwar was appointed a senior aide-de-camp to the king.

In the meantime, Abu-Shahut and the Free Officers made contacts with Syrian and Egyptian nationalist military elements. The Syrians suggested that the Jordanian Free Officers undertake a campaign of blowing up British air force jets as well as a campaign of assassinating British officers. The Jordanians were shocked at these suggestions and insisted that they were a group of anticolonial nationalists and not a band of thugs.[45]

Abu-Shahut himself was to undergo a fate similar to that which befell al-Tall and Abu-Nuwwar before him. In 1954, he sat for a promotion exam and was told by the examining officer that he passed with flying colors. However, when the formal results were announced, Glubb informed him that he had failed. Incensed, Abu-Shahut resigned from the army, only to be invited later by Glubb for a tête-à-tête. Glubb confirmed to him that he had failed him in the exam because of his political involvement, as intelligence reports stated that Abu-Shahut had been critical of the government when he was studying in London. Glubb's strategy was to co-opt Abu-Shahut by appointing him as his military aide-de-camp. Abu-Shahut, relieved that Glubb did not know of the Free Officers or of their contacts with the king, accepted the position. He met with his colleagues, who agreed that they

should be more circumspect as Glubb had eyes everywhere—something Habis al-Majali, one of the Free Officers at the meeting, stressed strongly.[46]

Abu-Nuwwar's arrival in Jordan coincided with the country's rising opposition to the British and U.S. attempts to include Jordan in an anti-Soviet pact dubbed the Baghdad Pact, which included Iraq and Turkey as members. British Chief of Staff General Gerald Templer visited Jordan on a mission to sell the pact to Jordan's rulers. The king and his ministers, especially Hazzaʿ al-Majali, supported the venture,[47] while the anticolonial nationalist tide in the country vehemently opposed it. Within the officer corps, the nationalist officers opposed the pact, whereas officers more loyal to Glubb supported it. For example, the Circassian officer Musa ʿAdil Bakmirza Shirdan was one of those who supported the pact, condemning all opposition to it as "communist" and pro-Soviet.[48] Abu-Nuwwar wavered at first and then came out against it.[49] The Free Officers insisted that the enemies of Jordan were the *British and Israel*, and not the USSR.[50]

As a result of the massive demonstrations against the Baghdad Pact and the British, the army was deployed in the streets of Jordan's cities and began to shoot at civilians. Tens of demonstrators were killed.[51] Still, the nationalist tide did not ebb. Police were hit by stones, as were British army officers. The crowds burned army Land Rovers. Many Hadari and some Bedouin soldiers deserted the army and joined the crowds.[52] The demonstrations took place all over the West Bank and the East Bank. East Bank cities and towns from Amman and Zarqaʾ to Irbid, Salt, ʿAjlun, Ramtha, and even the village of ʿAnjara were full of demonstrators. People in Ramtha, on the border with Syria, were said to have moved the border demarcations and raised the Syrian flag. They also stoned the minister of defense. ʿAli al-Hiyari, a Free Officer, was sent to Ramtha and rectified the situation by forcing every household to fly the Jordanian flag.[53] Around the same time, the Free Officers issued pamphlets condemning British army officers as well as Arab collaborators.[54]

One of the British officers in Zarqaʾ, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Lloyd, was killed by a mob while his entire army regiment (composed of Hadari soldiers) stood by watching without firing a shot.[55] Peter Young, a British officer in the Army, states, "It is easy to condemn his soldiers for not opening fire in his defence, and I feel that bedouin soldiers would have used their rifles. For the haderi soldiers the strain was becoming so great. The mob were their kith and kin, and at least to that extent the soldiers sympathised with the rioters."[56] Zarqaʾ police refused to enforce the curfew and would release violators arrested by the army.[57] In fact, the stress became so high

that some Bedouin soldiers (of Syrian tribal origins) deserted their army regiment.[58] To regain control of Zarqa', military aircraft flew over the town for reconnaissance, terrifying the populace.[59] According to Young, the "bedouin as ever were solidly behind anything that the Pasha approved. In 9 Regiment this was so much the case that it was hardly necessary to lecture the men and tell them what the [Baghdad] Pact was for."[60] Still, Young is forced to acknowledge that some among them, even in his own Bedouin Regiment 9, "had not cared for operating in Zerqa. It was too near home."[61] Young rationalizes their reluctance: "Every battalion in every army has in its ranks a few of those aptly described by the Americans as 'weak sisters.' I reckoned there were not many left in 9, and that Saoud [Rashdan, a loyal Bedouin officer from the central Saudi Arabian Mutayr tribe] and I had a pretty good idea who they were. In fact, in February 1956, the Regiment was better than it ever had been. . . . Most of the duds had gone."[62]

Abu-Nuwwar arrived in Amman in the middle of this upheaval. According to Abu-Shahut's account, Abu-Nuwwar met with him immediately after his arrival and arranged for a meeting with the king, who had not yet met with the Free Officers since the London meeting two years earlier. Abu-Shahut told the king of his new position as Glubb's aide-de-camp and informed him that Glubb was going to submit to him a long list of twenty or more nationalist officers to be dismissed from the army. Abu-Shahut warned the king that Glubb was going to represent the officers as enemies of the throne itself. Husayn insisted, "I would kick the throne with my foot if it were going to prevent me from serving my people and my country and my good brothers. Worry not, for I shall protect you from this injustice."[63] Abu-Shahut was thrilled with the nationalist king. The king decided that Abu-Nuwwar and two more Free Officers, Mazin al-'Ajluni and Mundhir 'Innab, be appointed as his aides-de-camp. As a result, the king came to be identified more openly with the anticolonial struggle that had overtaken Jordan in the last few years.[64] As for the matter of the dismissal of the officers, according to the king, the night before Glubb's dismissal "I was presented with a list of officers about to be dismissed. Their only fault was that they were nationalists and ambitious. How could they be anything else? . . . I refused to sign the document. I threw the list on the table in my office and told the Prime Minister: 'Tell Glubb Pasha I refuse to sign this.'"[65]

For his part, Abu-Nuwwar does not mention the meeting with Abu-Shahut. He claims that in light of the Baghdad Pact debacle and its resolution in favor of the anticolonial nationalists—with the king finally resolving to be on the nationalist side—King Husayn approached him and reopened

the discussion about an army revolt against British control. At the same time, according to Abu-Nuwwar, pro-British and pro-Iraqi government elements in Jordan began recruiting among army officers for the removal of the nationalist king and for establishing a government that would be unified with Iraq under the rule of the Hashemite Iraqi throne. Nothing came of the plan. By February 1956, the army had gone back to the barracks and the situation calmed down. However, anti-British rage among the nationalist officers had intensified as a result of the clashes that Glubb had precipitated between the army and civilians. It was around the same time that flyers bearing the signature of the Free Officers circulated in Amman.[66]

The emergence of the Free Officers was reflective of the changing features of the Jordanian Arab Army itself. Whereas in 1948, the army had 300 officers, in 1956 it had 1,500, and a number of them were graduates of the newly built cadet school.[67] They were for the most part young officers under the age of twenty-four, and they had junior military ranks ranging from first lieutenant to second lieutenant. Few of them led military units. Moreover, a number of them were sent to British military schools for training.[68] A number of Palestinians had also joined the army and served in the newly formed air force, engineering, artillery, signals, and administrative services.

A training center for the army was established in 1950, and in 1951 a formally organized cadet school to train subalterns (Murashshahin) was opened. The training center included a school for boys, which recruited from Bedouin and other tribal groups. Boys (as young as ten years) would spend seven years in the school before they were inducted into the army. The school was known as the education wing of the training center.[69] The center also included a training wing, which in turn included schools and sections for tactics, small weapons, provost marshal, administration, military justice, basic training—boot camp lasting 16 weeks—and a police training college. The center was commanded by a British officer, with an Arab officer as second-in-command. Cadre officers on the staff were all of Hadari origins, as were all the instructors. A number of British officers instructed drill and physical training. The school for boys was staffed mostly by recently arrived Palestinians. The training center was controlled by the general headquarters of the army in Amman through its newly established education branch.[70] By 1953, knowledge of English became required of officers. According to P. J. Vatikiotis, a historian of the Arab Legion, all officers until 1956 came from either the school for boys or they were regular noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Members of both groups would be selected to go to cadet school. By 1953, at least two Arab officers would be sent to Britain to attend Cam-

berely or Sandhurst. As other Army branches expanded (artillery, engineers, and armor), more Arab officers would be sent to Britain for training in their respective areas.[71]

In view of this expansion, Glubb opted to ensure the separation between the Bedouins and the Hadaris within the army. In the meantime, he continued to recruit Bedouins from within and without Jordan, as a large number of Bedouins were of Syrian, Iraqi, Hijazi, and even Nejdi origins, the latter having been at odds with the Saudi regime.[72] Vatikiotis claims that in "some of the infantry and armoured car regiments over half the men came from tribes *outside* Jordan, that is, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. To this extent, these recruits constituted an essentially mercenary group that would have been difficult to interest in political movements aimed against the regime short of lucrative material promises."[73] Jordanian Bedouins mainly came from the Huwaytat and the Bani Sakhrs, although members of northern tribes such as Bani Khalid and Ahl al-Jabal (mainly from the Syrian Druze Mount) also joined. Later, after 1948, Palestinian Bedouins from the Beersheba region in the Naqab desert also joined.[74] Not all Bedouins were loyal to Glubb. In fact, a number of Bedouin officers, like Salamah ʿAtiq, were part of, or sympathized with, the Free Officers movement, although the majority were indeed loyal to Glubb and to their British commanders.

The three infantry brigades of the Jordanian Arab Army comprised ten regiments: five Bedouin and five Hadari. The armored brigade was almost entirely Bedouin. The entire army comprised eighteen regiments, of which seven were exclusively Bedouin, not counting the camelry of the Desert Patrol and the Reconnaissance Squadron, which were also exclusively Bedouin.[75] Although the army had only 6,000 men in 1948, it came to have between 17,000 and 20,000 men in 1953 and close to 25,000 men in 1956.[76] In addition, there were 30,000 men in the newly constituted National Guard, which recruited from rural areas, especially West Bank border villages.[77]

As a result of this sudden and immense expansion in the army, new needs and trends emerged. Glubb's hostility to educated Arabs persisted and manifested itself in his refusal to promote the young educated officers in favor of the existing officers (many of whom were not necessarily of Transjordanian origins) and Bedouin officers with little, if any, education. This led to much resentment by the young cadres, who were not only refused promotions (as in the case of Abu-Shahut, for example) but were even dismissed from the army when news of their political views became known to Glubb. These young officers, as a result, were influenced both by the raging societal

upheaval surrounding them and by their own direct experience in the army, including with Glubb himself.

The first sign that military opposition was forming manifested itself through a number of pamphlets that were distributed to army units in 1952, signed by the Free Officers. The pamphlets were directed against Glubb, who claims that they were prepared by an officer in the Supply and Transport Corps who had been dismissed "for financial dishonesty" and was then residing in Beirut. Glubb claims that he obtained information about the officer through the Lebanese police and then sent him a warning, which he appeared to heed, as no more pamphlets appeared for a while.[78] When the pamphlets appeared again in 1955 and 1956 with the same signature, Glubb attributed them to the Egyptian authorities, as according to him, they included Egyptian military terms that were not in use by the Jordanian army.[79] He continued to deny the possibility that such a group as the Free Officers was real, even after his dismissal. His opinion, however, was not shared by another British officer, Peter Young. Young claims to have known of the Young Officer's Movement since the summer of 1954. In his estimation, it recruited more "among the intelligentsia—the artillery and the engineers."[80]

Clash of the Titans: Glubb Pasha and the Uneasy King

Contrary to most historical accounts of the period, the nationalist officers were not a unified group. Whereas most historians lump the Free Officers with other nationalist officers, such as Abu-Nuwwar and al-Hiyari, it is clear from memoirs written by officers in both camps that this was not the case. The memoirs, as we shall see, reveal much less unity of purpose and much more divergent interests, not to mention personal antagonisms between officers of both camps (especially Abu-Shahut and Abu-Nuwwar, and within the same camp especially between Abu-Nuwwar and al-Hiyari), than was thought before.[81] For now, however, the nationalist officers had a similar agenda: the expulsion of Glubb and Arabizing the army.

The resentment of the army officers was shared by the young nationalist king. In a meeting on April 9, 1955, with his cabinet, which included Glubb, the king outlined his demand for reforms in the army and the promotion of Arab officers who graduated from British military schools as opposed to uneducated officers (who were mostly Bedouin) with seniority. He also called for the establishment of an air force.[82] Reflecting his nationalist ideology, the king, in a speech he delivered on May 25, 1955, on Independence and

Army Day, identified the army as "the heart that pulsates within the homeland's being." He also identified army soldiers as "the grandchildren of the Conquering Arabs [al-'Arab al-Fatihin]" in reference to early Muslim conquests.[83] King Husayn speaks in his autobiography of the period of wanting to involve the people of Jordan in running its affairs, including the army, a goal that contradicted Glubb's plans. The king affirms that despite Glubb's "love for Jordan and his loyalty to my country, [he] was essentially an outsider, and his attitude did not fit at all into the picture I visualized. . . . Consequently, to be blunt about it, he was serving as my commander-in-chief yet could not relinquish his loyalty to Britain."[84] The king articulated his position as follows:

> Throughout the Army this led to a fantastic situation in which the British dominated our military affairs to a great degree. Around me I saw junior Arab officers who would obviously never become leaders. Some of them were men lacking in ability and force, men prepared to bow to Whitehall's commands (transmitted by senior British officers), men who had no spark, men without initiative and who could be trusted not to cause any problems. These were "officer material." . . . Those with nationalist aspirations, who hoped for a Jordanian Arab Legion, never had an opportunity for promotion, and when they did they were assigned to unimportant positions with no promise of advancement. It was bitterly frustrating to young men. Time after time I demanded that the British should prepare more Jordanian officers and train them for the higher echelons of the armed forces. Time after time my requests were ignored. The highest active post a man could hold was regimental commander.[85]

After months of "patient negotiations," the British agreed to submit a plan for the Arabization of the military "in due course."[86] In Glubb's own projections at the time (1955), he foresaw that Arab officers would not be qualified enough to take over from British officers before 1965 (later modified to 1961):

> [A]lthough we unwillingly decided that, for the present, the British officers were necessary to ensure efficiency, we prepared extremely detailed plans for their replacement. As a result of my personal intervention, we secured two entries a year at the British Staff College, Camberley. Calculating in considerable detail the ages of all officers,

> their qualifications and the output of the Staff College, we produced a plan according to which the last British officer would leave in 1965. The senior Jordanian officer, who would assume command as a lieutenant-general, would then be forty-five years old. . . . This plan was submitted to the King, who accepted it and proclaimed himself satisfied. Later on we produced a modified plan for a period of six years for the take-over. This proposal would have entailed a considerable drop in efficiency, as it would not have been possible in that time to produce officers qualified for all the posts which would be vacant. . . . The King accepted our proposals without comment or criticism. Had he or the government asked for a shorter period, we should have revised the scheme in any way they desired, while pointing out the possible dangers.[87]

King Husayn reports the story differently. Told that an Arabization plan was underway, he perceived a "victory." "Imagine the excitement when I told my Cabinet. All that remained was to discover what 'in due course' meant. But my elation was short-lived when I was gravely informed that the Royal Engineers would have an Arab Commander by 1985!"[88]

For the nationalist king and the nationalist officers, the army had to be nationalized hand in hand with the nationalization of the state and society more generally. The army was of particular importance, in that, as King Husayn stresses, it stood for the defense of the nation as well as for Jordanianness itself: "we had to give our own men a chance, especially in a country like Jordan where the Army is not only an instrument for defense against foreign incursions but is part of everything Jordanian. To Jordanians, with their martial history, it is and has always been an honor and a privilege to be a soldier. No man in the Arab world held this higher than did the troops of the Arab Legion. But for the officers it was very different, for they saw in a profession to which they were devoted no hope of rightful progress."[89] Note, how the king's nationalist views (like those of other Jordanian nationalists) are in tandem with Glubb's Orientalist views of Jordanians as Bedouins, and that Bedouins, unlike other Arabs, have a uniquely admirable "martial history," the latter being part of Glubb's (and subsequently successive Jordanian governments) de-Bedouinization and re-Bedouinization campaigns in the country (as we saw in chapter 3).

The king's problems with Glubb were all coded in the language of national self-determination and nationalist defense. Like the army officers, the king argued with Glubb over the necessity of having not only a defensive strategy (exemplified by the formation of the National Guard) but also an

offensive one. The king wanted Jordan to have the ability to retaliate against the routine Israeli cross-border attacks and massacres targeting Jordanian border villages and towns. In this regard, the king states, "I argued that every time such an outrage occurred we should select a target on the other side and do the same to them. It would soon have stopped the Israelis. As it was, we accepted these outrages meekly. . . . Our soldiers were ridiculed, a great gulf grew between the Army and the people. . . . In vain I pointed all this out to Glubb. To all my pleas he advised cautious patience."[90] Glubb also advocated a strategy of withdrawal to the East Bank, effectively allowing Israeli occupation of the West Bank, a solution that outraged the king. "I argued with Glubb on this principle of defense. There were other arguments when I learned that we were short of ammunition. I realized that he had some justification for his theory. But this was not a matter of theory; this was the margin that separates the honor and the shame of a nation."[91] Recognizing that Glubb took his orders from Whitehall,[92] the king asserted that "though it was not Glubb's fault, his very presence in our country was without doubt an important factor in the trouble. We were in the hands of foreigners."[93] Glubb's lectures to officers about abandoning the West Bank in case of attack angered Husayn "extremely."[94] As a result of all these problems, "I was determined to build up strong, well-balanced armed forces, including an Air-Force, and since this was not possible with Glubb, our self-respect demanded that we fight our battles alone."[95]

The king also stressed that there were also "personal problems":

> Glubb, who was now only a month away from sixty, had been with us so long, it was hard to imagine what life in Jordan without him might have been. He had been part of the Arab World since 1920, when, at twenty-three, he served in Iraq. He first came to Transjordan (as it then was) in 1930 to command the Desert Force and had been in command of al-Jeish al-Arabi—to give the Legion its Arabic name—since 1939. . . . His cherubic face beneath its silver hair and his brisk figure jumping in and out of his Land Rover were as much a part of the landscape as the great Mosque of Amman. Politicians held sway and slid into oblivion. Ambassadors came and departed. But Glubb went on forever—efficient, energetic, good-mannered, unchanging. But one thing had changed. The times.[96]

Note how Glubb's Orientalist images of a noble and unchanging Orient (discussed in chapter 3) are now used by the nationalist king against Glubb himself. The nationalist discourse of which the king was a product did not

question the epistemological underpinnings of Orientalism and the colonial discourse of modernity; it simply sought to complement them by assuming (contra both) its own agency. The problem with Glubb was not his colonial modernist project as such, but rather his failure at taking it to its logical conclusion by accepting the agency of the colonized as a response to colonialism. He also had become static, dragging a modernizing Jordan (which "modernized" thanks to Glubb and his colonial government's efforts) down with him. The king's use of Glubb's own imagery against Glubb himself, whether conscious or not, is indeed ingenious. Note his following statement:

> Twenty-six years is more than a third of man's allotted span, and in this period General Glubb had been largely isolated from the outside world. To be quite frank, it was my impression that he smacked too much of the Victorian era. He said that I was young and impetuous, while maintaining that he himself was older and more cautious. That is true. But Jordan is a young and impetuous country, and we were, and still are, in more hurry than Glubb was to achieve our national aims. And because of this very vitality, the last thing I wanted was a cautious army. Although a fine soldier, Glubb at fifty-nine was old-fashioned in many ways.[97]

Husayn's description of Glubb as a Victorian is fully in line with the king's nationalist and modernist commitments. Identifying Glubb as "old-fashioned" was certainly an indictment of Glubb's commitment to Arab "traditions" (with which the king and the nationalists concurred), at the expense of modernization (with which they did not). For the king and for the nationalists, as we will see, tradition and modernity combined in a way that was quite different from what Glubb had envisioned.

As for the king's continuing frustrations with Glubb, he had discussed matters with the British Foreign Office as early as 1955, when he informed British officials of his disagreement with Glubb, but nothing changed. Although, the king does not specifically mention meetings with nationalist officers, their influence on him was becoming more apparent. He states, "Although I felt Glubb must go, I had not yet fixed the exact time. Then two events occurred."[98] These were the matter of the list of officers that Glubb wanted dismissed, and the matter of the separation of the police force from army leadership (i.e., from Glubb's control), as the two were under the same administration. The king attempted to disentangle the two in a meeting with the prime minister two days before Glubb's dismissal, but the prime

minister warned of serious repercussions. Glubb's submission of the list of officers slated for dismissal on the last day of February was construed as the straw that broke the camel's back. The king, as already mentioned, refused to approve the order: "I remained obdurate, for what really made me angry was the realization that even my own ministers, however loyal, felt helpless to act within their rights."[99] Appalled, the king described Glubb's powers frankly: "Glubb operated from a position of such strength our political leaders tended to turn to him or to the British Embassy before making the slightest decisions."[100] That same day, the prime minister responded to the king, informing him that the separation of the police from the army was not possible at that time. The king was livid: "That night, I decided Glubb Pasha would have to go immediately. I have told General Glubb since then that the last thing I desired was to hurt his feelings, nor was it a pleasant task to dismiss a man who had served our country so faithfully for twenty-six years. . . . Though I knew that General Glubb would be upset at the brusqueness and suddenness with which this painful episode took place, it had to be done the way I did it."[101]

On the morning of March 1, 1956, the twenty-one-year-old King Husayn drove up to the prime minister's office in military uniform, "preceded and followed by Land Rovers containing my escort of armed soldiers." He told an aide, "This is one of the most important days of my life. I don't know what its end will be, but one can only live once and only with honor."[102] Husayn had written the dismissal order on a piece of paper that he presented to the prime minister (the king denies Glubb's later allegations that he threw the paper on the prime minister's desk). "Those few lines ordered the immediate dismissal of Glubb Pasha. . . . 'These are my wishes,' I told him. 'I want them executed at once.' . . . I then told the members of the Cabinet: 'I believe what I am doing is for the good of the country.'"[103]

The Prime Minister met with Glubb at two in the afternoon and gave him two hours to leave the country. Glubb, outraged, responded: "No, sir! . . . I cannot! I have lived in this country for twenty-six years. Almost all my worldly possessions are here, to say nothing of my wife and children."[104] An agreement was reached. Glubb and his family would leave at seven o'clock the next morning.

The king was harassed all night with unexpected visits from the British ambassador cautioning and then threatening him in an attempt to convince him to reverse his decision. According to Abu-Nuwwar, Glubb, who was confined to his house all night, attempted to leave his home at five the next morning to contact the British ambassador and loyalist army officers but was

prevented from doing so by a nationalist Bedouin officer, who had initially been recruited by Glubb himself.[105] Meanwhile, the king remained steadfast. He points out that "though he was dismissed, [Glubb] was dismissed with full honors. He was driven to the airport in my own royal car. My Defense Minister represented the Cabinet and my Chief of Diwan represented me. They both bade him good-by [*sic*]."[106] Before boarding the plane, Glubb was presented with a portrait of King Husayn in a silver frame. The King wrote on it, "With our acknowledgment of the good services and untiring exertions and with our best wishes for His Excellency General Glubb Pasha. 1/3/1956. Husain Tellal."[107]

Glubb claims that the king dismissed him because of a misunderstanding and the intrigues of nationalist officers and politicians:

> [A]nother immediate irritant had been an article which appeared in an English periodical . . . [implying] . . . that I was the real ruler of the country, while the king had little power. This of course was what the intriguers had been telling the King. He was incensed at seeing the same idea reproduced in an English newspaper. . . . The King had been enthusiastically determined to enter the Baghdad Pact, and had thereby incurred the hostility of Egypt and of the Jordan extremists. The policy had failed. It was pointed out to him that he could regain his popularity with these extremely vocal enemies at one stroke. To perform some act of defiance towards Britain and to dismiss me would immediately re-establish his popularity with the noisy politicians at home, and would quieten the active hostility of Egypt. At the same time, however, the King's mind and imagination had been genuinely fired up by Arab nationalism.[108]

In Glubb's estimation, King Husayn "was the originator of the order [of dismissal]. Ali Abu Nuwar and two other young A.D.C.s, were the King's advisers. Three other young officers, friends of the A.D.C.s were also aware of what was afoot. The names of all six officers were known to us as being intriguers. But they were friends of the king."[109] Although the king concurred with part of Glubb's analysis, he insisted that dismissing the latter was the ultimate act of saving Jordan from national annihilation: "Let it not be thought that I dismissed an old and trusted friend in a fit of emotional pique. Glubb Pasha is a great man and knows as well as I that this is far from the truth. . . . It was a surgical operation which had to be done brutally. I knew I was right; indeed, I would say that if Glubb had been in command of the

Army a year longer, it would have been the end of Jordan. The country would have been carved up among the other Arab states seeking aggrandizement."[110] The British and Glubb, who were seen by ʿAbdullah as instrumental in creating Transjordan and in unifying much of its disparate Bedouin population, came to be seen by King Husayn as the main reasons why the country would no longer exist.

On March 3, 1956, the Jordanian government issued a manifesto explaining the reasons for the dismissal of Glubb, which included the disaffection felt by Jordanian officers, disagreement on military strategy, the inaccurate information that he transmitted to the king, and "Glubb's role in the 1948 defeat."[111] The order that dismissed Glubb also dismissed two British officers and three Jordanian officers. The king took pains to communicate to the British government that "[w]ith regards to British officers serving in the Arab Legion, kindly note that Jordan will honour her obligations towards them according to their contracts and to the [Anglo-Jordanian] treaty."[112]

The king's decision to dismiss Glubb from his job did not signal a change in British-Jordanian relations. The king (and Glubb) took pains to stress that dismissing Glubb was an internal Jordanian affair, as Glubb was officially a Jordanian government employee. He assured the British that the dismissal of Glubb "had no bearing on my admiration of his country."[113] He wrote a long letter to Britain's prime minister, Anthony Eden, explaining that the disagreement with Glubb was of a personal nature and that it did not affect existing relations with Britain.[114]

This aside, Glubb's dismissal became a national day of celebration to be commemorated every year with speeches by the king and other government and army officials. After Glubb had been dismissed, a number of songs were composed for army soldiers, extolling the nationalist king for rendering "the hearts restful after the expulsion of Glubb."[115]

"Arabizing" the Jordanian Arab Army

The goal of nationalizing the Jordanian Arab Army, long sought by nationalists in society and in the army itself, was finally going to be realized. Immediately prior to Glubb's dismissal, the army was busy with training programs and reorganization following the Baghdad Pact events. As a result, many of the Free Officers who were on the Founding Committee were unable to meet. Abu-Shahut states that on a visit to Zarqaʿ, he was told by a fellow Free Officer that a number of colleagues had recently met with the

king and with Abu-Nuwwar, who informed them that the "operation" that would Arabize the army was imminent. Abu-Nuwwar, on his part, reports that the king asked him in the last week of February if the "[Free] Officers" were ready to take over the army. The king received an affirmative answer.[116] On the last day of February, the king met again with Abu-Nuwwar and reviewed the plans of Arabizing the army.[117] On the same day, Abu-Shahut (who was hospitalized in an army hospital in the West Bank for a strong case of influenza) was informed of the impending dismissal and of the new appointments in the army, including his own.[118] Major General Radi ʿInnab (who held only police functions before his new promotion) took over the army from Glubb. ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar was promoted (from major to major general) and appointed second-in-command, and soon after, on May 24, 1956, he replaced ʿInnab as head of the army. Massive purges, courts martial, desertions, transfers, and new promotions and appointments followed to effect the Arabization of the army.[119] Most of the sixty-four British officers were retired or dismissed, with the few remaining lacking any command functions.[120] Karim Uhan, of Maryamite army fame (he was one of the leaders of a small group of armed Christians composed of Palestinians and Transjordanians, organized by the state),[121] was transferred as military attaché to London. The British, however, by virtue of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, still had an army garrison in ʿAqaba, an armored car regiment stationed at Maʿan, a number of ordnance depots, and Royal Air Force bases at Amman and Mafraq.[122]

Peter Young claims (as does Glubb) that some Bedouin officers were prepared to restore Glubb by force but were stopped from doing so by the British commanding officers.[123] Still, by the end of May 1956, over 1,000 Bedouins left the army, including a hundred each from the two armored car regiments and the First Infantry Regiment. Young reports that they "have been told that there is no difference between haderi and bedu. This they may not believe. Many of their senior officers . . . have been sent to the National Guard [composed of Hadaris from both Banks], which, however unfairly, is despised by the bedouin. It is no wonder that they are trickling away."[124] In reorganizing the army, Abu-Nuwwar reports that, when he addressed Bedouin soldiers and officers, he stressed the new leadership's appreciation for their courage and sacrifices, clarifying to them the importance of educating their children in schools at the army's expense to qualify for army careers. Abu-Nuwwar frankly told the Bedouin regiments, which were being integrated, that there is a promotion ceiling to uneducated officers. As a result, many Bedouin senior officers were either retired or reappointed

to noncommand positions. Abu-Nuwwar acknowledges that this led to some unfairness to many officers who were bypassed for promotions despite their seniority privileges, as they did not have the proper qualifications that a "modern" army required.[125]

The new nationalized army had little use for the British colonial notion of "tradition." Like nationalists everywhere, they were committed to a modernization project that redefined tradition, and not to a Glubb-like traditionalization project that defined modernization. On May 26, 1956, Jordan's defense minister, Muhammad ʿAli al-ʿAjluni, issued a decision abolishing the red-and-white shmagh/hatta of the army, which he said was not practical and was "not a military head-dress."[126] The soldiers will now wear khaki berets. Peter Young defends the "military-appropriate" shmagh. Appalled by the decision, he states that the "imagination boggles at the thought of the bedouin in those hideous and unromantic pancakes." He proceeds to state that the "present régime in Jordan welcomes change for its own sake, and in twenty years time little will be remembered of the uniforms we knew."[127] His prediction was only partly true. Although most of the armed forces in Jordan today do not uphold the erstwhile uniforms, the Bedouin security forces (Quwwat al-Badiyah) that continue to exist in the Jordanian armed forces today continue to uphold Glubb's "traditional" clothing designs. As for the *shmagh*, it was to infiltrate society at large as a symbol of Jordanianness (see chapter 5).

The new nationalist leadership saw the army as an instrument of national unification. Upon assuming office, the nationalists embarked on achieving just that. The Arabized leadership integrated the National Guard into the army, which was going to achieve the integration of East Bankers and West Bankers as well as Hadari and Bedouin soldiers. This brought the total number of men in the army to 55,000.[128] The long-sought-after separation of the police and the army was also effected in July 1956. Bahjat Tabbarah (of Lebanese origin and Turkish trained) was appointed head of police. On his part, ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar, reorganized the entire army in the summer of 1956. He abolished division headquarters under which infantry brigade groups had been organized and reorganized them into separate brigade group headquarters. P. J. Vatikiotis states that, presumably, "independent Brigade headquarters afforded the new Chief of Staff the opportunity of dealings with each Brigade commander without the intermediary of a division headquarters."[129] Also, to avoid the fraudulence that accompanied the previous elections (in 1952 and 1954) in which the army was involved, by virtue of its members' votes, it was decided, in a joint meeting between the officers and

the king, that army soldiers no longer be accorded voting privileges. A law was drawn up to that effect (see chapter 2). ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar, who was late to the meeting, seemed unhappy with that decision.[130] As a result, army soldiers did not participate in the October 1956 elections, which brought to parliamentary power (for the first time in Jordan's legislative history) a wide spectrum of Jordan's nationalist opposition.

The Arabization campaign did not go unopposed. Several disaffected elements in the army began to make trouble. An assassination attempt on the life of Mahmud al-Maʿaytah, a Free Officer, was made by Majid al-Rusan, but it did not succeed. Other conspiracies began to unfold. One such conspiracy aimed to topple the king and the Free Officers. It is alleged to have been an alliance between East Bank Transjordanian nationalists and Bedouins. The Hadari officers involved hailed from northern Jordan (especially Irbid), whereas the Bedouin officers were mostly from the East Bank (especially members of the Bani Sakhr). Members of the conspiracy included Mahmud al-Rusan (Majid's brother), Radi al-ʿAbdullah, Muhammad Ahmad Salim, Salih al-Sharʿ, ʿAbdullah Mjalli, Sulayman Rutaymah, and many others. It was alleged that the conspirators were plotting with Nuri al-Saʿid, Iraq's strongman and the British Empire's most loyal subject in the Arab East.[131] Regionalism was also a motive, as the Irbidis involved felt that the army was being controlled by Saltis.[132] This attested to the incomplete unification and nationalization of the country under one supreme national identity. One of the conspirators, ʿAbdullah al-ʿAyid Mayyas, confessed and details were revealed at the trial. Others followed suit. A court martial took place and all the conspirators were indicted and sentenced to prison terms. They were all expelled from the army. ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar intervened on their behalf with the king, who issued an amnesty in their favor.[133] Around the same time, Jordan's long-time politician and prime minister of many terms, Tawfiq Abu al-Huda (of Palestinian origin), who was also Britain's main man in the country, committed suicide by hanging himself.

Whereas ʿAbdullah al-Tall's nationalism in the late 1940s centered on ridding the country of the British, the anticolonial nationalism of the Free Officers was more complex. Although, like al-Tall before them, they were committed to the monarch and to ending British control, increasingly they began to articulate a social agenda, one of democratization of society and the state. These were ideas already elaborated by the civilian opposition, which have by now infiltrated the army.

This situation manifested itself in the left–right split among nationalist officers themselves. The Free Officers were increasingly becoming disaf-

fected by ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar, who was never effectively a member of their group. His new appointments and transfers were all done without any consultation with them. Many of them felt that he was trying to co-opt officers to be loyal to him personally and not to the Free Officers as a group.[134] Many among the Free Officers were resentful, as many were being bypassed for important appointments by officers of lesser ranks including Abu-Nuwwar himself, who before his recent promotion was a junior officer in comparison with a few of them. The founding committee of the Free Officers met, and after a heated debate it was decided that they meet with Abu-Nuwwar and offer him the position of head of the Free-Officer's group, so that they would be able to work more closely with him, thus avoiding divisions. Abu-Nuwwar rejected the offer, stating that the main goal of the group was the Arabization of the army, which was underway, so there was nothing left for their group to do. The Free Officers insisted that their goals also included democratizing the country as well as military unity with Syria and Egypt. Abu-Nuwwar assured them that he would pursue their goals on their behalf and that it was time that they rested.[135] By late 1956, the Free Officers were becoming very uncomfortable with Abu-Nuwwar's personal style and his marginalization of their group. They began meeting regularly with members of the newly formed nationalist cabinet (following the October 1956 elections), who were also disaffected with Abu-Nuwwar's arrogance in dealing with them. They explained to the ministers that they did not approve of Abu-Nuwwar's actions and that he was not one of them. These meetings continued until the palace coup in 1957.[136]

The Palace Coup: The End of an Era

The dismissal of Glubb by King Husayn, although reflective of the king's nationalism and his rivalry with Glubb, was also a political maneuver aimed at silencing the opposition while maintaining the traditional influence that Britain had on the country, as Glubb, contrary to many of his detractors, was not the only conduit for that influence, although he was a central one. His removal did indeed neutralize domestic opponents of government policy as well as criticism from Arab nationalist circles abroad. This aside, the British annual subsidy continued and relations between the two countries did not seem to suffer much. The British foreign office and the war office announced respectively the continuation of the economic aid and the seconding of British officers to the Jordanian army.[137]

On the first anniversary of the expulsion of Glubb and the Arabization of the army, the king spoke of his happiness that a year had passed since "the liberation and Arabization" of the army whose leadership, responsibilities, and commitments were "Arabized as we and the Arab nation desired it to be."[138] The new nationalist prime minister, Sulayman al-Nabulsi, stated in a speech commemorating the event, "this army which [Glubb] had wanted to render loyal to himself and to his country, to execute his will, to obey his orders, smiting with his sword this army, the army of the people, the army of Palestine, the army of a liberated Arab nationalism, the army of the one Arab nation, is celebrating today the day of its Arabization, the day of its salvation, the day of its victory, the day of the expulsion of the tyrant. . . . Glubb was removed, and this Arab army became Arab in flesh and blood, Arab in thought and spirit, Arab in its hopes and ambitions."[139]

Al-Nabulsi's confidence and expectations for the army, however, were not justified by the events unfolding in the country. The general situation did not bode well for anticolonial nationalists in the country or for anti-British Arab governments, including Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. The leaders of the three countries made offers to King Husayn to replace the British subsidy. The king welcomed the offer of aid without connecting it to the British subsidy or the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. He later declared that he would welcome Arab aid provided it had no "ulterior motive."[140] The situation soon changed, following the 1956 tripartite invasion of Egypt and the new elections in Jordan. In light of these events, Jordan's new nationalist Parliament, through its foreign relations committee, recommended in November 1956 the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.[141] A new Arab Solidarity Agreement was signed in January between Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. It stipulated aid to Jordan and informally terminated the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. A formal termination finally came in March 1957 after negotiations with the British that lasted more than one month. British forces still stationed in the country would be withdrawn within six months (the British force in Aqaba numbered 1,500 men), and the Jordanian government pledged to compensate the British for the evacuated facilities and *matériel*.[142]

Following the expulsion of Glubb and the rise of the anticolonial Jordanian Arab nationalist tide in the country, the king's men were increasingly nervous about their situation. Whereas the king's nationalism shared the nationalist officers' desire to oust Glubb from the army, his nationalism was not anti-Western, let alone republican, in the way Nasirism was. For the king's men, the increasing popularity of Nasirist and Ba'thist Arab nation-

alism in the neighboring Arab countries, combined with its local popular support, signaled the end of their power, if not the end of the monarchy. The British invasion of Egypt in 1956 left little room for them and for the king to appeal to the British as friends of the Arabs. This situation, however, was to change quickly and drastically. The entry of the United States on the scene as a supporter of ʿAbd al-Nasir's efforts against the tripartite invasion was seen as a welcome maneuver. Events in Jordan in the coming months, if not the coming decades, were to be altered in accordance with these developments. The rise of the influence of the United States stands out in this regard, as does its impact on elites throughout the recently decolonized and the still colonized countries in Asia and Africa. Elites in these countries, who had a Western-friendly nationalism, could simultaneously condemn European colonial powers while befriending the United States, which did not yet have a colonial record in these continents (the Philippines and Korea excepted).

As the Jordanian government was still looking to end the treaty in January, the Americans declared their new formula for the cold war on January 5, 1957. It was called the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Saudis, increasingly nervous about the rising tide of Arab nationalism and its increasing republicanism, immediately endorsed the doctrine. In Jordan, reaction was mixed. Whereas nationalists preached neutrality, the king welcomed the doctrine and U.S. aid if the latter was offered "without political strings." The government protested the king's positive reaction. Incensed at what he perceived as their communist leanings, the king sent a now infamous letter to the government in which he condemned communism, warning the nationalist prime minister to be on guard against this "new kind of imperialism."[143] The letter, coming on the eve of treaty negotiations with the British and the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, signaled the increasing gulf separating the king from his cabinet as well as from nationalists in the army and in society.[144]

Earlier, when the October 1956 elections were approaching, members of the king's coterie were already advising him to suspend the constitution and to cancel the elections, as they expressed concern over ʿAbd al-Nasir's recent nationalization of the Suez Canal. Prominent among those advocating such solutions were old ʿAbdullah associates Bahjat al-Talhuni, current chief of the Royal Diwan, and Bahjat Tabbarah (who was present with ʿAbdullah at the Jerusalem talks with Churchill in 1921 leading to the foundation of Transjordan, and who had been recently appointed as head of public security, or police). When the king sought the advice of Abu-

Nuwwar, the latter cautioned against such measures and advised the king to proceed with the elections.[145]

Soon, more rumors began circulating in the country that a coup d'état was being planned against the recently formed nationalist government of Sulayman al-Nabulsi and the popularly elected Parliament as well as against the Free Officers. It was alleged that Bedouin units in the army would spearhead the coup.[146] Moreover, the involvement of major regime personalities was being reported, especially that of Husayn's uncle (Queen Zayn's brother) the Sharif Nasir Bin Jamil, who arrived from Iraq a few years earlier. Rumors had it that the sharif and a number of officers were distributing money and weapons to Bedouin tribes and to the Muslim Brotherhood. The king himself reports that he had become increasingly worried after he received a report from "an army officer from Beirut on a special mission . . . who must remain nameless" informing him that he was "very worried about the way our army officers are behaving in Beirut and Damascus . . . spending fortunes in the night clubs—money they couldn't possibly earn. They always seem to be with Russians or the Egyptian clique."[147] Upon more investigation, the king claims to have learned that a number of nationalist politicians and Abu-Nuwwar, who is identified as having been "once a close friend of mine," were "traitors" dealing with the Soviets and the Egyptians. The king reports that his chief of Diwan, Bahjat al-Talhuni, informed him that they brought over $300,000 into the country from their foreign masters to bribe Jordanians in preparation for their alleged coup.[148]

The king's alienation from the Free Officers was complete. He began making plans to replace them. Muhammad al-Ma'aytah (brother of the Free Officer Mahmud), an army officer who until recently served as military attaché in Syria, was called back to the country by Bahjat al-Talhuni and appointed senior aide-de-camp to the king. Ma'ayta is said to have been contacted by the king who proposed to him that he take over the army as soon as he (the king) removes Abu-Nuwwar from his position, and that Ma'ayta would then liquidate the Free Officers by retiring them, exiling them as military attachés outside the country, or dismissing them from the army altogether.

On hearing of this, the Free Officers met and discussed their options. They decided to approach the king and ask that the anti-nationalist conspirators be arrested. The list of conspirators included Bahjat Tabbarah, the Sharif Nasir, Samir al-Rifa'i (former prime minister for many terms and a 'Abdullah and Glubb confidant), Sadiq al-Shar' (army officer), Radi al-'Abdullah (future head of Jordanian intelligence—Mukhabarat), and

Talab Fahd. The list was submitted to Abu-Nuwwar and ʿAli al-Hiyari, who were not present at the meeting. The committee then went to Zarqaʾ to meet with the rest of the senior officers about the plan. There, officers shared with each other the direct threats communicated to different officers by al-Rifaʿi, Tabbarah, and the sharif, who did not mince words in informing them that their "days are numbered."[149] Abu-Nuwwar submitted the list to the nationalist prime minister and then met with king. The king informed Abu-Nuwwar that he had information that Abu-Nuwwar and other officers were scheming to assassinate him, allegations that Abu-Nuwwar denied categorically, claiming that this was false information propagated by the anti-nationalist conspirators and requesting that they all be dismissed from their jobs—the request was also submitted by the cabinet on April 7, 1957. The cabinet order included at least twenty-two officials to be retired.[150] The king refused to dismiss his uncle (who was a senior advisor) or al-Talhuni (who was chief of the Royal Diwan), but he relented on dismissing Tabbarah from his position as head of police, replacing him with Muhammad al-Maʿayta. The storm seemed to have been weathered, or so thought the Free Officers.[151]

Meanwhile, it was decided that the Free Officers would schedule routine military maneuvers to flex their muscles against the anti-nationalist conspirators. The maneuver, which involved the first armored regiment (led by Nadhir Rashid), was coded "Hashim," a tribute to the royal family and the nationalist king. It took place on April 8 and 9, 1957, and was supposed to take a census of cars coming in and out of Amman in preparation for a contingency plan to move troops from the East Bank to the West Bank in case of an Israeli invasion.[152] The old regime men, including Bahjat al-Talhuni, Bahjat Tabbarah, and the Sharif Nasir, used the maneuver to warn the king of an impending coup against him. Glubb, in his book, concocts an incredible propagandistic conspiracy theory involving the Soviets, Egypt, and the Free Officers, wherein the army maneuvers are said to have had the aim of forcing the king to abdicate and to declare a republic.[153] Abu-Nuwwar, in his memoirs, which were written after his rehabilitation, claims that these were routine maneuvers, although they involved certain troop movements of which he was not informed, implying that others (a veiled reference to ʿAli al-Hiyari, who, according to Abu-Nuwwar, was al-Nabulsi's choice to replace the difficult Abu-Nuwwar as head of the army[154]), and not he, may have been preparing for a coup.[155] He met with the king and assured him that no coup was in the making and ordered the cancellation of the Hashim maneuvers. The young king, torn between his recent nationalist allies and

his trusted family and old regime friends and allies, began to waver. The United States, with its Eisenhower Doctrine in full gear, was also becoming nervous about nationalist rule in Jordan.[156] In light of all this, the king chose his long-time advisors against the nationalists. Following the cancellation of the Hashim maneuvers, he states, "The time for action had come."[157] According to the king, his uncle, the Sharif Nasir, and other family members told him that "everything seems to be lost and the rumors and reports indicate that you are alone. Are you going to stand and fight or should we all pack our bags?" Responding to them, the king proudly stated, "I am going to stand and fight, whatever the consequences."[158]

Soon after, on April 10, and after the failure of the prime minister to provide the king with an explanation of why the maneuvers were ordered—a situation that was compounded by the cabinet's new order of April 9 dismissing trusted regime friends, including Bahjat al-Talhuni—the king dismissed the nationalist cabinet of Sulayman al-Nabulsi, calling for a new one. Al-Nabulsi duly resigned. Public pressure was mounting with opposition rallies and meetings calling for al-Nabulsi's restoration. The king did not waver. He appointed Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi (a Palestinian) as the new prime minister, but he resigned after twenty-four hours. The Hashim maneuvers seem to have backfired. Instead of weakening the anti-nationalists, they strengthened them.

Amidst public protests, the situation was becoming more complicated. The king was still attempting to appoint a new prime minister. He finally chose regime confidant Sa'id al-Mufti (a Circassian) to head the government. Army officers were concerned that unless a nationalist prime minister is chosen (they advised the king to choose the more "moderate" 'Abd al-Halim al-Nimr), the country would be engulfed in demonstrations and chaos. If that were to occur, they were not prepared to shoot at civilians. They were supported in their decision by the new chief of public security, Muhammad Ma'aytah.[159] In light of this situation, rumors were spread that the king was assassinated, eliciting a battle in Zarqa' in a regiment headed by Abu-Nuwwar's cousin Ma'n Abu-Nuwwar. The battle raged between Bedouin soldiers and those loyal to 'Ali Abu-Nuwwar. Moreover, armed Muslim Brotherhood members joined the fight on the side of the Bedouin troops against the "Communists."[160] Two soldiers were killed and twenty-five injured. Other Bedouin units (whose members were Bedouins from neighboring countries) also mutinied against the nationalist officers, especially in the first armored brigade.[161] On hearing of the situation, the king sent for

ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar and both went to Zarqaʾ. The king, in army uniform, showed himself to the soldiers as alive and well, putting an end to the fighting.[162] The soldiers were chanting death to Abu-Nuwwar, who was rushed back to Amman. The king's intervention became a mythologized event describing his courage and bravery. He addressed the soldiers, thanking them for their "noble patriotic feelings and for rallying around the throne."[163]

ʿAbbas Murad, a historian of the Jordanian army, claims that the palace spread the rumors in the army to rouse loyal troops. He relied, for example, on Glubb's account that the king's brother, prince Muhammad, and a cousin visited a Bedouin regiment in Zarqaʾ on April 13, prior to the alleged coup, warning them of the impending "coup" against the palace. The troops went into the streets of Zarqaʾ burning cars and chanting "long live the king."[164]

That same night, the king submitted to Abu-Nuwwar a list of officers in the army to be dismissed. He refused, as he did not think that they were to blame. The king gave it to ʿAli al-Hiyari, who, according to Abu-Nuwwar, duly issued the dismissal orders. Abu-Nuwwar felt that the king's action of bypassing him meant that he no longer held his job. Abu-Nuwwar is said to have collapsed crying and asked the king to save him. The king decided not to kill him for "[i]f I had put him to death, his name might have been much more revered than it is today."[165] He decided to let him go. Abu-Nuwwar met the king on April 14 and asked for a two-week vacation, which he planned to spend in Rome.[166] He left to Syria on his way to Beirut to board a plane to Rome. When he arrived in Syria, he was told that a number of Free Officers had fled to Syria the night before, including Nadhir Rashid. On April 15, Radio Amman reported that Abu-Nuwwar had in fact fled to Syria after having led a failed coup against the king. Abu-Nuwwar called the palace to speak to the king but was unable to get through. On his part, the king dispatched Muhammad al-Maʿaytah to Damascus, promising that the Radio Amman broadcast would not be repeated and asked for Abu-Nuwwar's resignation for the sake of "national necessity and the preservation of army unity."[167] ʿAli al-Hiyari was appointed new head of the army.

On April 15, the king successfully asked Dr. Khalidi to form a government. This time, he succeeded. It included members of the deposed nationalist cabinet, including Sulayman al-Nabulsi himself. The remaining Free Officers, including Abu-Shahut, were shocked, as they were not informed of any of the events that had transpired, and they had to deal with the new facts of fleeing army officers and those arrested and accused of conspiracy. They discussed their options, following the events precipitated

by the palace coup, including fleeing to Syria before they fell victims to the expected persecution. They opted to remain in the country and in their jobs as if nothing had happened.

On April 16, ʿAli-al-Hiyari informed the officers of his appointment as a replacement for Abu-Nuwwar and asked for their support. The officers gave it to him, as they did not know why Abu-Nuwwar had left to Syria in the first place. The king met with army officers on the evening of April 16 to check on the army. That same day, a Bedouin army officer, ʿAkkash al-Zabn, who commanded army tanks, and a group of 200 Bedouin shaykhs went to the royal palace to pledge allegiance to the king.[168] The *New York Times* reported that a Saudi airplane brought gold to Amman to be distributed as a reward to loyal troops and Bedouin shaykhs.[169] The next day, ʿAli al-Hiyari informed the Free Officers that there were orders to rid the army of them and that certain politicians and officers, including Sadiq al-Shar' and Habis al-Majali, were urging the king to do so. On April 18, the Free Officers were invited to a meeting where they were informed by an officer, Radi al-Hindawi, that the king had ordered an investigation and that they were from that moment under house arrest. The officers present included Abu-Shahut, Mahmud al-Ma'ayta, Nayif al-Hadid, Ma'n Abu-Nuwwar, Dafi Jam'ani, Ahmad Za'rur, Ja'far al-Shami, Turki al-Hindawi, and Tawfiq al-Hiyari. On April 19, ʿAli al-Hiyari left for Syria for talks about Syrian troops posted at the border with Jordan and opted to remain there, essentially defecting. He proclaimed at a press conference that a great plot was launched against Jordan by palace officials and "foreign military attachés"—in reference to the United States.[170]

Habis al-Majali, a friend of King ʿAbdullah, was appointed new head of the army. On April 22, a military court was set up and the Free Officers remaining in the country were all accused of conspiracy. Twenty-two people in total were accused of the plot. The court found five officers innocent, including chief of police Muhammad Ma'ayta, Nayif al-Hadid, and Ma'n Abu-Nuwwar. The remaining fifteen officers, including Abu-Shahut, Hindawi, Jam'ani, and Shami, faced prison terms ranging from ten to fifteen years. As for those who defected, including ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar, ʿAli al-Hiyari, and Nadhir Rashid, they were sentenced in absentia to fifteen years. ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar, in a press conference he held in Syria, denied all the accusations and stated that "the alleged plot was planned and designed by the American embassy in Jordan and by collaborators with colonialism in order to reach their goals."[171] A Free Officers' pamphlet, which circulated later in August 1957, accused "supporters of the Baghdad Pact and palace men" of the plot and stressed that "there was no plot against the throne."[172] The trials

effectively ended a chapter in Jordan's anticolonial nationalist movement.[173] The purges of the army proceeded in earnest, restoring the status quo ante, which had prevailed under Lieutenant General Glubb Pasha. Bedouin officers who were dismissed by Abu-Nuwwar were reinstated, and the predominantly Palestinian Fourth Infantry Brigade was split, with many of its officers dismissed.[174]

On April 23, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles spoke of the U.S. government's "great confidence in and regard for King Hussein," offering assistance "to the extent that he [Husayn] thinks that it can be helpful."[175] On April 24, al-Khalidi's cabinet resigned in the midst of massive public protests against the palace coup. The king appointed Ibrahim Hashim (of Palestinian origin, and one of 'Abdullah's confidants) to head the new government and declared martial law later that night.[176] Curfews were imposed in Amman and other cities, politicians were arrested, Parliament dismissed, parties banned, and unions and associations dissolved. Five newspapers were closed down, and the constitution was suspended. A thorough purge of the civil service was in full gear, and a number of politicians fled the country in fear of persecution.[177] Moreover, the long-sought-after separation between the police and the army was revoked placing the security forces under army command, as was the case under Glubb.[178] They were to be separated again in 1958 after the crackdown on the opposition was successfully completed.[179]

The king, for his part, informed the Americans earlier on the night of April 24 of his planned martial law and asked for their help in case of foreign intervention. The White House immediately expressed its support with a public commitment to "the independence and integrity of Jordan," which it deemed "vital" to the United States. The U.S. Sixth Fleet was on its way to Lebanon's shores, technically at the request of Lebanese president Kamil Sham'un, while U.S. military planners considered airlifting troops to Mafraq and Amman. This, however, proved unnecessary, as the king informed them that same night, "I think we can handle the situation ourselves."[180] In May, the United States provided Jordan with $10 million worth of arms and military equipment, and this was followed in June by the signing of an agreement for economic and technical cooperation with Jordan.[181]

The five-year history of an ascendant unionist Arab nationalism in Jordan came to an end. Following the palace coup, the new regime strongly resembled that which existed under King 'Abdullah and Glubb Pasha. The same men who helped 'Abdullah and Glubb run the country were back in power helping 'Abdullah's grandson remain on the same course. Like similar regimes in Africa and Asia that could not openly support European colonial

powers, the Jordanian regime's Western-friendly nationalism found in the United States a sponsor.

Army resistance to colonial discipline manifested after the Palestine War was crushed. Although the Free Officers' nationalism reflected that of society, it also reflected the internal dynamics of the military as a colonial institution. Colonial repressive and productive techniques had elicited nationalist resistance. The Arab identity that the officers and society assumed in opposition to colonialism was, however, reformulated by the state. Although the regime, and the state more generally, did not question the country's Arab identity, they questioned its supremacy over a more local Jordanian Bedouin identity that was linked to the monarchy. It was by reasserting this identity whose *other* was not colonialism but internal subversives that the state and the regime were able to reequilibrate. As we will see, the regime's triumph inaugurated a new exclusivist Jordanian national identity.

Palace Repression and the Forgiving King

Jordanian anticolonial nationalists saw themselves as part of a general Arab anticolonial nationalist movement and believed that Jordan could not survive outside of a future federation among Arab states. The palace espoused a different kind of Arab nationalism, one inspired by the anti-Turkish revolt during World War I, spearheaded by the Hashemites. Therefore, both parties spoke the language of Arab nationalism, although each accused the other of being an agent for foreign powers. For the anticolonial nationalists, palace men and their allies were collaborators with British and U.S. imperialism, whereas for the palace, the anticolonial nationalists were instruments of ʿAbd al-Nasir's hegemonic plans and Soviet communism, which King Husayn had called a "new kind of imperialism."[182] For King Husayn, "Nasser's Arab nationalism was taking the place of pure Arab nationalism,"[183] and those who supported ʿAbd al-Nasir's version in Jordan constituted, for him, a national threat to the homeland. He called on "ostracizing the party which almost blew away [our] independence and destroyed [our] being."[184]

Following the palace coup, which rid the country of internal threats to the prevailing order, the situation in the Arab world was changing so rapidly that the king and his triumphant advisors were becoming more worried about external threats. The unification of Egypt and Syria in what became known as the United Arab Republic was declared on February 1, 1958, to the consternation of the anti-ʿAbd al-Nasir rulers in Amman. The regime

opted for an immediate federal union with Hashemite Iraq (one that had been long sought by Iraqi strongman Nuri al-Sa'id) dubbed the Arab Federation (al-Ittihad al-'Arabi) and signed on February 14, 1958.[185] According to the bylaws of the federation, the Jordanian Arab Army was to be united with its Iraqi counterpart. The unified armies were to be called the Arab Army, although each would keep its separate identity in its respective state.[186] On March 29, 1958, the two countries issued a federal constitution called the Constitution of the Arab Federation.[187] The federal constitution was open to other Arab countries wishing to join. King Faysal of Iraq (Husayn's cousin) was appointed the president of the federation, and during his absence, King Husayn would be the president.[188] The Arab Federation, which was more of a confederation, had a short life. The Iraqi revolution in July 1958 (led by Iraqi army officers) violently eliminated the royal family (and the visiting Jordanian prime minister, Ibrahim Hashim, who had declared martial law the year before in the country) and declared a republic. The rulers of Jordan panicked. The king asked for immediate British and U.S. help to maintain his throne. Four thousand British troops landed in Jordan while U.S. soldiers landed in Beirut. U.S. planes also helped transport oil to Jordan, after it was surrounded on all sides by enemies (the rapprochement with the Saudis, the Hashemites' historic enemies, who had been allied with 'Abd al-Nasir against the Baghdad Pact, had not yet fully taken place). The British soldiers remained in the country until November 2, 1958. They left only after the Americans pledged to support the throne and to provide the country with $40 to $50 million as an annual subsidy, replacing the British subsidy.[189]

In the meantime, pamphlets began circulating in the Jordanian army calling on soldiers to "become part of the people to save the homeland from unjust rule and to stand up in the face of attempts to render the army a group of guards to the traitors and the corrupt [al-khawanah wa al-ma'jurin] and an instrument to beat the people and to repress patriotic sentiments [al-shu'ur al-watani] in the country." The pamphlet revealed that there were "more than 250 officers, who constitute the best military and nationalist personnel, under arrest."[190]

On July 16, the Jordanian authorities uncovered an alleged coup attempt led by retired officer Mahmud al-Rusan. The coup was supposed to have taken place on the same day as the Iraqi coup, July 14, later postponed to July 17.[191] Al-Rusan, a Camberley-educated Jordanian officer from Irbid, had been exiled by Glubb to the Washington embassy between 1953 and 1956. When he returned to Jordan in 1956, he was accused of the "Irbidi" coup

against the Saltis and, after receiving amnesty, was forcibly retired from the army.[192] A major new purge of the army was conducted and arrests of recently retired senior and serving junior officers followed.[193] This time, the arrests included friends of the palace (such as Radi al-ʿAbdullah, whose brother was accused of conspiring with the coup leaders). The entire army structure was reorganized immediately. Al-Rusan was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.[194]

Another alleged coup attempt was discovered in March 1959 upon King Husayn's return from a trip to the United States and Taiwan. This time the alleged coup leader was Sadiq al-Sharʿ along with sixteen others, including civilians. Al-Sharʿ, a Jordanian officer from Irbid,[195] was alleged to have been plotting his coup since the resignation of Abu-Nuwwar. He and two others were sentenced to death, a sentence that was later commuted.[196] Finally, the government claimed to have uncovered another coup attempt in August 1960, this time allegedly led by Musa Nasir, who was immediately arrested. Although the army was increasingly emptied of nationalist elements, there still remained officers who sympathized with the nationalist cause. In November 1962, three Jordanian air force pilots defected to Egypt with their planes and revealed Jordan's military involvement in Yemen on the side of the Imam. More officers defected to Syria in 1966.[197]

Regional divisions in Jordan were unraveling among Transjordanian-regime allies. The king sought to remedy the situation by asserting a unified Jordanian identity. In a radio-delivered speech he gave on April 15, 1961, the king spoke of his conversations with soldiers, asserting that among them "was the Bedouin and the Hadari, those who came from the west of the country and its east, from its north and its south, and those among them who were Muslims or Christians, Arabs or Circassians," all of whom asserted to the king that "we are all in our armed forces, the soldiers of this country, and the servants of this nation, and our value stems from our giving it our souls, blood, and spirit altogether, as sacrifices to it and to its future."[198] Through the accession of the youthful government of Wasfi al-Tall to power in 1962, the king sought to satisfy northerners with positions of power to counter the southerners' control of the army, as Habis al-Majali, head of the army, is a Karaki from the south. The king was also ensuring that no regionally based coup would take place in the army, such as the Irbidi one that was staged against Abu-Nuwwar. Soon, al-Tall's government set up an office it called the military secretariat (daʾirat al-sikritaryat al-ʿaskariyyah), which limited the power of the army chief. It also ordered the retirement of a number of army officers who were allies of al-Majali. When al-Tall's govern-

ment resigned the following year, al-Majali undertook the retirement of northern officers and returned his allies to army service.[199]

In the wake of the palace coup against the nationalists, a number of assassination plans were also uncovered by the regime. For example, a number of officers were arrested and accused of attempting to assassinate the king's notorious uncle, the Sharif Nasir. The king himself speaks of being the target of such attempts, once in 1961 with acid, and once in Tangiers, in Morocco, in August 1962.[200] Even police officers were the target of the purges. Two of them were accused of another attempt on the life of the Sharif Nasir. The one assassination attempt that did succeed was the one targeting prime minister Hazzaʿ al-Majali (of Baghdad Pact fame). Al-Majali was killed on August 29, 1960, when a big explosion destroyed the building housing his office and the prime ministry. A number of others were also killed in the explosion. Sixteen people were arrested, among them a number of army and police officers. Hisham ʿAbd al-Fattah Bakhit al-Dabbas, an officer in army engineering, was sentenced to death by a firing squad. This time, the sentence was carried out.[201]

The situation calmed down briefly, only to be roused again by the victory of the Baʿth party in both Syria and Iraq in 1963, leading to talk of unity between these two countries and Egypt. The Arab nationalist tide was reinvigorated in Jordan, which saw massive popular demonstrations for the first time since the imposition of martial law. The regime reacted swiftly, with mass arrests of civilians and military personnel, especially police officers and officers in the National Guard for refusing to shoot at demonstrators. On March 21, 1963, a long list of officers was issued announcing their forced retirement; it included many regime supporters, leading to much resentment on the part of many in the army. The situation became so grave that the king himself met with senior officers, promising them that a committee would be set up to look into the cases of the forcibly retired officers. It was revealed then that less than five out of 2,000 officers had a clean Mukhabarat (secret police) record.[202]

After the 1958 Iraqi revolution, the income of army soldiers and officers was increased as part of the government's strategy to ensure army loyalty, a measure that would continue to be used through the present.[203] In February, 1962, on the occasion of the birth of the king's second child and first son, prince ʿAbdullah (whom the king designated immediately as his successor to the throne), the king offered amnesty to the imprisoned officers (including Abu-Shahut and others who had been in jail since 1957, and Sadiq al-Sharʿ and his alleged group of co-conspirators).[204] Soon after the assumption of

the Ba'th to power in Syria and Iraq, all the released officers were rounded up again.[205] They were imprisoned for a year and were finally released in 1964 after staging a hunger strike.[206]

In the meantime, following the first Arab League summit in 1963, King Husayn met with over 100 nationalist officers (who had been purged over the last few years) at the palace. He chastised them for having worked against the regime and told them that their future is linked to their loyalty to the regime.[207] Wasfi al-Tall, who was prime minister at the time, feared that the newly declared Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Ahmad Shuqayri might obtain the support of Jordan's exiled military personnel. In April 1965, his government enacted a law of general amnesty to preempt the PLO.[208] Pursuant to the law, the king ordered all jails emptied of political prisoners. Two thousand were released.[209] He also issued an amnesty to all fugitives living in exile, including the three pilots who had defected to Egypt. The amnesty included 'Abdullah al-Tall, 'Ali al-Hiyari, and the Free Officers living in Syria and Egypt. 'Ali Abu-Nuwwar was pardoned by the king after the 1964 Arab summit.[210] This was part of a new policy that sought to co-opt enemies of the regime. Spearheading the co-optation campaign was Muhammad Rasul al-Kilani, who had been a low-level officer when he interrogated the Free Officers back in 1957 following the palace coup. He also came to prominence in 1959 during the interrogation and torture of Sadiq al-Shar'. He was later sent to the United States for Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) training. On returning to Jordan, al-Kilani, on the CIA's recommendation, was appointed head of the General Directorate of Intelligence (al-Mukhabarat al-'Ammah).[211]

Al-Kilani was instrumental in the co-optation process, as many ex-officers were offered jobs as intelligence agents. Eighty percent of ex-officers were given jobs in the police or the Mukhabarat.[212] Others were given more prominent political appointments. Few were returned to army service. 'Abdullah al-Tall, for example, was granted amnesty by King Husayn, whereupon he returned with his family to Jordan in 1965 after sixteen years of exile.[213] He was received at the airport by none other than Muhammad Rasul al-Kilani, head of the Mukhabarat, who was representing King Husayn. After he left the airport and before proceeding to his family home in Irbid, 'Abdullah stopped by his cousin's, Wasfi al-Tall's, home to greet him.[214] Al-Tall was quickly rehabilitated through his seeking forgiveness from the throne.[215] He also sent a letter to King Husayn in June 1966, condemning the PLO's Ahmad Shuqayri for his attacks on the late King 'Abdullah.[216] Two years after his arrival in the country and in the context of increasing

propaganda attacks on King Husayn by the Egyptian government, al-Tall made further amends with the king by sending a letter to Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir in January 1967, chastising him for using his memoirs against the Jordanian regime and for defaming the late King ʿAbdullah, "whose positions [on the Palestine question] . . . were shown to be far-sighted leading to the preservation of Jerusalem."[217] In his memoirs, al-Tall had called King ʿAbdullah a traitor.[218] Al-Tall's new-found love for the late king, however, did not stop there. In August 1967, he wrote a forward to Taysir Zibyan's book about King ʿAbdullah, in which he exonerated the king of all wrongdoing during the former's 1948 to 1949 negotiations with the Israelis—adopting the official Jordanian line on these events. He further added, "I consider that justice, fairness, and national duty dictate to the Arab nation that King ʿAbdullah be considered a nationalist hero. If erecting statues in order to immortalize heroes was part of our religion and traditions, it would have been imperative that a statue of King ʿAbdullah be erected in every capital of every Arab country."[219]

Al-Tall worked briefly as a governor in the Ministry of Interior (November 1970 to January 1971) and was then appointed by the king as a member of the senate (Majlis al-Aʿyan), a position he occupied until his death in 1972. He also became a prominent member of the General Islamic Conference.[220] As for other former opponents of the regime, ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar, ʿAli al-Hiyari, and Radi al-Hindawi were all appointed ambassadors. Abu-Nuwwar later became the king's special envoy. Ahmad Khasawnah and Mahmud al-Rusan were nominated to and became members of Parliament, although al-Rusan's membership was dropped after his support of the Palestinians in the 1970 Civil War and his escape to Syria.[221] Nadhir Rashid was appointed a high-ranking intelligence officer and allegedly received 18,000 Jordanian dinars as compensation.[222] He recently (spring 1998) served as Jordanian minister of the interior. Sadiq al-Sharʿ was appointed head of the passport department, then a governor of the Northern Governorate, and he was later appointed cabinet minister twice.[223] Those who remained outside the regime's co-optation efforts were few. Prominent among those was Shahir Abu-Shahut.

The new honeymoon lasted for one year. After the Israeli raid (and massacre) of the Jordanian West Bank village of Samuʿ in November 1966, massive demonstrations erupted throughout the country, leading to a new civilian–army confrontation in which a number of civilians were killed, especially in the West Bank city of Nablus. This was the period when army confrontations with the newly formed Palestinian guerrillas became com-

monplace (see chapter 5). Concomitant with these events, a fresh campaign of arrests of a new crop of nationalist army officers was launched. Tens of officers were arrested.[224] New pamphlets appeared in army units signed by the Revolutionary Committee of Free Jordanian Officers, calling for the overthrow of the monarchy and the declaration of a republic in both banks, and renaming the country Palestine.[225] It would seem that Jordanian officers of Palestinian origin who supported the Palestinian guerrillas were responsible. This was the first and last open call to overthrow the king by nationalist officers. On the eve of the 1967 June War, a large number of Jordanian army officers lay in jail.

Palestinians and the Military

Even before the annexation of central Palestine to Jordan, it was decided that Palestinians be involved in the defense of their country. In January 1950, the government issued the Law of the National Guard, inaugurating the foundation of a new military force in the country.[226] The National Guard was Glubb's idea. Immediately, after sending a memorandum to the government on June 25 proposing to set up the force, Glubb began recruiting for the National Guard.[227] A few months later, he was able to "persuade the government to prepare a Bill making National Guard Training compulsory for every *male* Jordanian of military age [emphasis added]."[228] He felt that it was necessary to set it up for two reasons:

> Firstly, it was obvious that we could neither rely on the other Arab governments if Israel should attack, nor could we long resist an enemy about seven times as strong as ourselves. . . . Obviously, we must get more troops. The men were available, and anxious to enlist, but we had no money or equipment for them. . . . Secondly, the other Arab countries had never recognized the union of Palestine and Trans-Jordan [which interestingly enough was not to be made completely official for at least four more months]. Some did not hesitate to sow dissension between West Bank and East Bank. One of the major points they used to stir up resentment was that the Jordan government did not trust the Palestinians. The Arab Legion was depicted as a purely East Bank army. The Communists went farther. They labeled the Arab Legion—"The Anglo-Hashemite Army of Occupation in Palestine."[229]

He added that the Palestinians "could not be half-citizens. We must make them feel trusted, and the first sign of trust was to arm them."[230] King Husayn himself asserted that the purpose of the National Guard was to "defend the border in order to allow the better trained and equipped army, in the event of [Israeli] aggression, to direct its strikes at specific targets."[231]

The National Guard was to be an unpaid army. Its first recruits, who were from frontier villages, were armed and trained to resist Israeli raids. Whereas, by law, serving was compulsory, "for lack of money, we could only arm, clothe, feed and equip a very much smaller number. It seemed, therefore, unnecessary and inadvisable to use compulsion—there were always more volunteers than we could train."[232] Most of the volunteers came from the West Bank frontier villages. Initially, opposition to the National Guard was ubiquitous. It was opposed by the Jordanian government because it feared that the National Guardsmen would use their weapons against the Jordanian regime and/or for crime, while West Bank Palestinian notables opposed it because they were not yet reconciled to the "unification" project still being finalized.[233]

The National Guard, as Avi Plascov remarks, "was neither equipped, trained nor designed to carry out its assigned tasks. With twenty bullets, a few rifles, little training and hardly any co-ordination or transport, very little could be done in the face of an attack. This was because the regime feared mobile troops of this type."[234] He affirms that the National Guard's "real task, in fact, was to control border infiltration [into Israel] by its members' own brothers."[235] Public pressure forced the government to expand recruitment and training and to stipulate that National Guardsmen would be used for army purposes in certain periods, at which time they would have to abide by Arab Legion regulations. Plascov states that this was a preliminary step toward the integration of the two forces, which was not to take place until May 1956 in the wake of Glubb's dismissal.[236]

Popular pressure increased further after continuing Israeli raids culminated in the Israeli massacre of sixty-six civilians including children in the West Bank town of Qibya in October 1953. Demonstrators and newspaper columnists blamed the civilian and military authorities and demanded better arming and training and larger recruitment of the Palestinian refugees. Few had any remaining respect for the National Guard, which was viewed by many as the protector of Israel from Palestinian infiltrators.[237] In addition, Arab governments were increasingly insisting that the National Guard be placed under joint Arab direction and leadership (an Egyptian officer was suggested as its possible commander), as opposed to the Arab Legion led by

Glubb and other British officers, and they pledged to support the force financially, something the British government had refused to undertake until 1955. Realizing the dangers of such an eventuality, the king did not object to the ultimate integration of the Guard with the Arab Legion, which took place in May 1956, two months after the expulsion of Glubb.[238] Moreover, integrating the two forces was part of the process of Jordanizing the Palestinians, which the National Guard failed to do, as it consisted mostly of Palestinian villagers.[239] Vatikiotis insists that the integration of the two forces had been part of Glubb's plan all along. The act of integration merged "an essentially élite regular force of beduin, tribesmen and Transjordanian peasants with a territorial frontier force wholly consisting of settled Palestinian agricultural peasants and a few townsmen."[240] Still, the actual merging took place under army commander ʿAli Abu-Nuwwar and under the direction of Defense Minister Muhammad ʿAli al-ʿAjluni.[241] The National Guard was finally abolished in 1966 in light of the November 13 Israeli raid on the West Bank village of Samuʿ (which killed fifteen Jordanian soldiers and three civilians and wounded fifty-four people), and it was replaced with compulsory national military service (al-Khidmah al-Wataniyyah al-Ijbariyyah), applying to "all Jordanians" between the ages of eighteen and forty.[242]

In the meantime, the Jordanian Arab Army remained mostly Transjordanian in composition and exclusively Transjordanian in leadership. Although many Palestinians joined the military, especially in its technical services divisions (signals and engineers in particular), their military ranks remained low on the hierarchy. Vatikiotis states that Palestinians "soon came to man almost exclusively the [Arab] Legion's maintenance workshops, for example."[243] He adds that "until 1956 General Glubb believed that he could maintain the Legion as a *corps d'élite* and resisted the inevitable influx into the technical branches of personnel that had perforce of needed skills to be recruited from among Palestinians."[244] Also, by expanding the political establishment to include a large number of Palestinians, King Husayn is said to have minimized "the infiltration of disruptive ideas held by the discontented and alienated among them into the army officer corps, particularly now that the *Jeish* [Army] comprises so many more administrative and technical personnel who are Palestinians."[245] Vatikiotis concludes, "the monarch has been careful to retain the traditional tribal element as the preponderant one in the operational ground force units, namely, infantry and armoured car regiments. In doing this, the monarch has managed to continue to identify himself with the traditional forces in the Legion, while at the same time he had led the process of a viable integration of the various elements in the

country that is so essential to political stability."[246] Palestinians recruited in the army were from among those refugees who did not have previous experience in war. They were heavily scrutinized to ascertain that they had not had any political involvement.[247]

Threatening the Nation's Masculinity and Religious "Tradition"

As discussed in previous chapters, the nation-state undertakes the nationalization of masculinity according to a traditionalized view that it identifies as "traditional" and "national." The masculinity of soldiers is of particular interest to the nation-state. As a male homosocial institution predicated on a specific identity and a specific set of practices, the military's *raison d'être* is the assertion of that nationalized masculinity (as identity and practices) as the *only* possible masculinity within the modality of the nation-state. Conventional masculine values of strength, victory, and loyalty are opposed to a sexist convention defining femininity as weakness, defeat, and treachery. The military institution was able to co-opt existing conventions of gender norms and endow them with nationalist signification.[248] As we saw in the last chapter, certain gendered practices, especially those of the Bedouins, were repressed while new ones were produced. We will see how these strategies affected the constitution of the new exclusivist Jordanian national identity and its *internal* others.

Following the defeat of the Jordanian army in the 1967 June War and the loss of the West Bank to the invading Israeli forces, rumors were rampant among the populace that the Jordanian army handed the West Bank to the Israelis and retreated to the East Bank, which they defended diligently. The accusations were leveled by Palestinians who felt that the Jordanian army did not *really* consider the West Bank Jordanian territory and therefore saw it as expendable, something that did not apply to Transjordan proper.[249] Sa'id al-Tall, a former minister and brother of the late prime minister Wasfi al-Tall, rebuts many of the arguments questioning the Jordanian army's commitment to defend the West Bank and the army's military abilities, and he labels such arguments as *Iqlimiyyah* or anti-Jordanian "regionalist chauvinism."[250]

In 1968, the Jordanian army and the increasingly powerful Palestinian guerrillas stationed in the country were able to erase part of the 1967 defeat through a partial victory over invading Israeli forces at al-Karamah, a small

village on the East Bank (see chapter 5 for details). Al-Karamah, which led to the unprecedented popularity of the guerrillas, however, also signaled the beginning of the countdown to the 1970 Civil War between the army and the guerrillas. During and after the civil war, 5,000 members of the Jordanian army defected to the guerrillas' side. The army's triumph in the war, however, inaugurated an important step toward a new national demarcation in the country. Transjordanians of Hadari (Arab and Circassian), and Bedouin backgrounds were now united in a Transjordanian East Bank national identity against Palestinian Jordanians, who, as we will see in the next chapter, were increasingly perceived as a grave national threat to the identity of Jordan. The civil war, in fact, solidified and intensified the formation of a stable Jordanian national identity, which, unlike its Arab nationalist predecessors, was *not directed at colonialism but at the Palestinians*. This process was augmented by a shift in the regime's powerful constituencies in civil society. Whereas since the 1940s, the regime's societal support (outside of the tribes and the military) came from the pro-regime Palestinian- and Syrian-dominated merchant class, by the late 1960s, the Transjordanian-dominated state bureaucracy (mostly staffed by settled Transjordanians) was ascendant, especially following the civil war, when its power was solidified, curtailing the power of the once powerful merchant class.[251]

Another dimension to these new developments was an explicit gendered ideology of mobilization used in the army against the guerrillas. For example, the Jordanian army saw al-Karamah as an important event in restoring the masculinity of its soldiers "lost" in the 1967 War. Its efforts after that war were directed, according the department of spiritual guidance (Mudiriyyat al-Tawjih al-Ma'nawi) of the Jordanian Armed Forces toward the restoration of its dignity and the "taking of women's dresses [fasatin al-Nisa'] off its body."[252] Identifying military defeat as a defeat of masculinity, not maleness, and its transformation into femininity, symbolized by the image of the soldiers dressed in drag, became one of the dominant themes in mobilizing soldiers for battle. Moreover, feminizing the enemy became a correlate strategy for mobilizing the army. King Husayn himself participated in this discourse after one of the confrontations between the army and guerrillas in 1968. In a speech he delivered after one such confrontation in November, he stated that these guerrillas were not serving the Palestinian cause and were in fact paid agents against it. He added that "they don the attire of manhood when manhood is innocent of [being implicated in] them."[253] This was not new for the king, as he had identified the nationalist threat of the 1950s as "conspiracies directed at [this country's] Arabism, at its manhood, its sovereignty, and its dignity."[254]

The Jordanian military began to mobilize its soldiers against the guerrillas' national "threat" by portraying it as a threat to the soldiers' masculinity. The guerrillas, who were portrayed as godless communists, were also portrayed as castrated men whose femininity was going to be imposed on a nation of manly men as a paradigm to be emulated. In the military newspaper *Al-Aqsa* (in reference to al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem), a story was printed portraying an "elegant" young guerrilla attempting to proselytize a Jordanian soldier by speaking to him about nationalism or "wataniyyah."

THE SOLDIER PRAYING: Praise belongs to God the Lord of all Being, the All-Merciful, the All-Compassionate. . . . [255]

THE YOUNG MAN INTERRUPTED HIM: Didn't you hear that Marx said . . .

THE SOLDIER RAISED HIS VOICE: It is You whom we worship and it is You whom we implore for help.

THE YOUNG MAN SAID: As for Engels, he said . . .

THE SOLDIER CHANTED HIS [QUR'ANIC] RECITATION: Say, I take refuge with the Lord of men . . . [256]

THE YOUNG MAN SAID: What do you care about this kind of talk? Religion is the opium of the masses.

THE SOLDIER RAISED HIS VOICE IN PRAYER: . . . from the evil of the slinking whisperer.

THE YOUNG MAN SAID: It is [political] reaction which has . . .

The soldier continues his prayers and then turns and threatens the young man that he will use force. "The young man got up, dusted off his tight pants, lifting his long bangs off his foppish forehead and withdrew shaking his posterior as he vanished delicately and coquettishly." As for the soldier, he "remained sitting and lifted his arms to Heaven and said . . . Lord, render al-Husayn [the king] and his soldiers victorious, . . . the soldiers of Muhammad, over Zionism and the atheist and Godless Zionists."[257] Note that not only is the guerrilla feminized according to Western perceptions of what it means to wear "tight" pants, and to strut around "shaking his posterior," but also according to a purely Western criterion that until recently contradicted Arab Bedouin notions of masculinity. Whereas, as we saw in the last chapter, Bedouin soldiers until the 1940s had long hair, which many among them wore in plaits, the Westernization of the Bedouin soldiers' notions of masculinity and femininity had been thorough. Long hair is now coded according to modern Western criteria as "feminine," and it is then passed on as an "authentic" Arab Bedouin judgment that is part of Bedouin "heritage" and "traditional" Bedouin notions of masculinity. Furthermore, consonant with

prevailing Western notions at the time about communists and subversives, army propaganda spoke of how guerrillas "grew their hair and beards and assumed the names of revolutionaries, which they took as models, like Castro, Che Guevara, and others."[258] Male and female "comrades" were said to be living in the style of "collective kibbutzes," thus portraying the guerrillas as both communist and as emulating the Zionist enemy in one stroke.[259]

Other accusations included explicit references to the male guerrillas' engaging in sexual relations with other male guerrillas, *liwat*,[260] in addition to sexual relations with guerrilla women outside the sanctity of marriage. Leftist guerrilla men (fida'iyyin), of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) especially, were accused of paying nocturnal visits to guerrilla women (fida'iyyat) in their tents (in training camps) for sexual purposes, which allegedly outraged the Bedouin soldiers.[261] In fact, similar accusations were made against enemies of the regime back in the 1950s. In his propagandistic book against the nationalist opposition in Jordan, Musa 'Adil Bakmirza Shirdan accused 'Ali Abu-Nuwwar and Sulayman al-Nabulsi of being alcoholic womanizers: al-Nabulsi is portrayed as a chaser of Egyptian dancers[262] and Abu-Nuwwar as simply "woman-hungry."[263] Shirdan is further horrified by al-Nabulsi for beginning one of his public political speeches by addressing his audience "women citizens and men citizens" (*ayyuha al-muwatinat wa al-muwatinun*), changing the "traditional" hierarchy of "men citizens and women citizens."[264] Moreover, Shirdan accuses Fu'ad al-Halabi, the general secretary of the Syrian republican palace, and other Syrian Arab nationalists, of being homosexuals who are attracted to handsome Russian and Lebanese men.[265]

Between the military propaganda and actual offenses committed by the guerrillas themselves, the soldiers internalized the gender dichotomy between themselves and their enemy. However, the gender identity attributed to the guerrillas and to army soldiers by Jordanian army propaganda was not always stable. On the one hand, the guerrillas, as we saw, were feminized as being not "real" men, and on the other, the Jordanian army's allowing the guerrillas' "femininity" to exist unchallenged feminized the Jordanian army soldiers themselves. This sense of being "feminized" manifested itself when the guerrillas were seen to be roaming the country and challenging the authority of the Jordanian state and its military. This was not only implicit but manifested itself explicitly upon an inspection conducted by King Husayn of an army tank regiment in early September 1970. The regiment was determined to enter Amman to attack the guerrillas. When the king arrived, he spotted, from a distance, an unseemly object hanging from a radio an-

tenna. It was a woman's brassiere. The Bedouin troops who hung it were said to be communicating to the king that they would not stand by "like women" while the guerrillas ruled the streets.[266] Note how, concomitant with army notions of male soldiers in drag, it is women's clothing for men, or simply drag, that constitutes the clearest mark of femininity for these soldiers. In addition, the soldiers were questioning the king's masculinity, if not his maleness, as he permitted this guerrilla penetration to take place. When he asked about the brassiere, the king was told that "it was because their king was a woman who was afraid to take action against their country's enemies."[267] The king spent three hours with the soldiers trying to convince them to turn back, which they reluctantly did.[268]

On the issue of religion, the government campaign against the guerrillas continued to identify them as "atheists" and as "the forces of darkness."[269] The army newspaper *Al-Aqsa* lamented the loss of al-Aqsa Mosque because of those atheists who "have sold their conscience to the devil."[270] Habis al-Majali, the army chief, congratulated his victorious army by saluting, "your faith in your creed and in your transcendental Message [of Islam] which you carry and which remains and shall remain planted in your souls challenging all the campaigns of hatred and atheism which seek to put it in doubt."[271] In fact, the army leadership distributed 60,000 copies of the Qur'an to soldiers before the fighting began in September 1970.[272] Plans were under way to distribute the bible to Christian soldiers.[273] This religious campaign of de-legitimation was more believable as the more radical elements of the Palestinian guerrillas committed certain irreligious acts horrifying many people. One such reported act was the hoisting of red flags and Lenin's portraits from the minaret of an Amman mosque on the occasion of Lenin's birthday. This drew the ire of many Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians alike.[274]

The use of religion during the civil war was not in fact new. As we saw in the last chapter, Glubb was very interested in the level of religiosity of soldiers. In fact, he had set up a Da'irat al-Ifta' al-Dini (the department of religious counseling) in the army, consisting of a number of Muslim clergy men led by Shaykh 'Abdullah al-'Izb. The clergy would undertake delivering religious sermons to army units. These sermons were to include mention of the Hashemite heritage of 'Abdullah, which links him to the progeny of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Glubb used the shaykhs as informants for his infamous reports on the soldiers. This was quite known to the soldiers, who dubbed one of the shaykhs (Shaykh Dawud) as Dawud the Guard (Dawud al-Natur).[275] Moreover, palace and army propaganda against the

nationalists in the 1950s also identified them as atheists and communists. King Husayn himself articulated these positions. In the context of increased attacks on his regime after the palace coup, the king stressed that "we shall remain on the same course . . . until the Arabs become clear on who are the pretenders of heroism and who are the parties of trickery and atheism, [who are also] the partisans of defeat and of deceiving the people."[276] Moreover, the new educational system, whether through army schools or civilian government schools, served to centralize religion and religious traditions among the population in accordance with the views of state-appointed shaykhs. Folk religious traditions among the Bedouins and Circassians, and to a lesser extent among villagers and urbanites, that did not follow state-sanctioned notions of Islamic practice were slowly eliminated. For example, whereas the Circassians had been partially Islamicized by the Ottomans (who ensured that all their males were circumcised by 1878 and that their secular Circassian names were changed to Turkish names), on the eve of their immigration to what became Transjordan, many Circassians arrived in the country carrying with them salted pork and their traditional alcoholic drink *bakhsima* (made of fermented barley).[277] Salted pork fell out of use due to unavailability and local peer pressure, but *bakhsima* remains available, albeit among the few. Attacks on Circassian traditions also came from within the community. Religious members began attacking Circassian customs including wedding celebrations, dancing, and of course alcohol.[278] The predominance of Syrian merchants among the Amman elite added Damascene "religious" traditions and practices, namely in terms of the veiling of urban women. Circassian women of Amman, like most Arab women of nonurban backgrounds, duly followed the Damascene example by veiling, a practice unknown among them before.[279] Similar transformations occurred in the Bedouin communities whose Islam was considered "lacking" in practice and belief and was slowly replaced with state Islam.

To make the Hashemite link to the Prophet more direct, the palace decided as early as 1954, during the heyday of massive secular opposition to government domestic and international policies, to add the article *al*, or *the*, to the name of King Husayn rendering it al-Husayn.[280] In 1969, on the eve of the civil war, the *al* was added to the name of the crown prince in *Al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyyah* (the country's official gazette). However, he continued to be referred to as Prince Hasan by the nongovernment press, until 1986 when a similar *al* was added to his name rendering it al-Hasan in all newspaper, radio, and television coverage.[281] Al-Husayn and al-Hasan are actually the names of the grandsons of the Prophet Muhammad, sons of his daughter

Fatimah and his cousin ʿAli Bin Abi-Talib, the two being the first (al-Hasan) and second (al-Husayn) Imams of Shiʿah Islam and important figures in Sunni Islam. By adding the *al* to their names, the Sunni king and his brother have surrounded themselves with a halo of religious legitimacy and with a direct line to the Prophet, bypassing tens of generations in between. Moreover, in 1981, the government set up a new military university called Muʾtah. The university was built south of Amman near the site of the Battle of Muʾtah that took place during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, further linking religion and the army.[282] This strategy continues to be espoused by the department of spiritual guidance in the army today. One of its more recent books for soldiers considers religion as central to any sense of national belonging.[283]

Outside the military domain, the government established in 1981 Muʾassassat Al al-Bayt (the Family of the Prophet Foundation), also known as the Royal Academy for Islamic Civilization Research, further linking Islam and the Hashemites in an academic setting. The king and the crown prince as well as government officials would also include references to the Qurʾan in their speeches, if not outright Qurʾanic verses. This went side by side with the king's and the government's sponsorship of mosque construction throughout the country. Television also would show the king attending Friday payers at local mosques and attending as well as hosting Ramadan breakfast banquets during the holy month.[284] One the more ostentatious achievements in this regard was the early 1980s construction of the King ʿAbdullah Mosque in the ʿAbdali neighborhood of Amman (itself named after ʿAbdullah) with its overarching blue dome dominating the Amman skyline.

The Military and the New Jordan

Following the upheaval of the civil war, the Jordanian army was able to recuperate as a unified force with an unwavering commitment to defending the monarchy, a commitment that prevailed even under the nationalist officers in the mid 1950s, government propaganda notwithstanding.

The government launched a major campaign of army recruitment after the civil war that targeted Transjordanians and excluded Palestinian Jordanians. This included all branches of the military. For example, in 1972, the Cadet School had twenty Palestinians out of 273 candidates. Moreover, Palestinians in the army were retired early along with nationalist Transjordanian officers.[285]

As a result of the new confidence the army acquired after its civil war victory, tribalist Bedouin chauvinism increased within its ranks (as the different tribes were jockeying for power positions), leading to few internal skirmishes between members of different tribes as soon as October 1971 in the First Regiment, leading the chief of staff and the king to intervene. The king had attempted to resolve similar matters earlier when he had appointed members of most Jordanian tribes in the military government set up during the civil war.[286] Moreover, in 1973, members of the royal family, including the king's brother and designated successor Prince Hasan and his uncle the Sharif Nasir, sought to encourage a group of chauvinist officers to apply pressure on the king to refuse adamantly the return of the Fida'iyyin to Jordan, which was under discussion at the time. The king, in fact, began involving high-ranking army officers in palace politics as he began to pay frequent regular visits to army units and to spend a portion of his working day in army headquarters.[287] As we saw in chapter 2, this is the period when the palace convened a series of tribal conferences, aiming to unify the country's tribes, which culminated in *Mahdar al-Qasr*, a document of palace–tribal understanding on the role of the tribes in the country.

Army presence in people's lives and in national culture skyrocketed after the early 1970s. The culture the army invented for its members was now overflowing into society, generating concomitant cultural productions by other state institutions, especially the state-controlled media. In fact, ever since the campaign against the guerrillas began, Jordanian television began airing special programs about the army. The army's department of spiritual guidance, in cooperation with Jordanian television, produced sixteen special programs about the Jordanian Arab Army in 1970 alone. There was also a daily radio program especially directed to soldiers.[288] Moreover, army songs had been playing since 1970 on Jordanian television with background pictures of excited soldiers surrounding King Husayn, who was seen in military garb, at some times aboard a tank, at others pointing a gun as if in a military drill, with the soldiers embracing him and kissing him. The army musical bands were also shown on television, regularly playing their bagpipes. This also led to the formation of a state-sponsored civilian bagpipe band (set up by Jordan television) performing for television viewers regularly, thus exporting military culture to society at large. This television campaign continues through the present.

The regime felt secure with the post-civil war army, as it had been emptied of all nationalist elements through defection to the Palestinian resistance or through forced resignations. Unexpectedly, however, in October 1972,

the government uncovered a plot by Jordanian army officer Rafi' al-Hindawi, who allegedly colluded with six people, all civilians. Al-Hindawi was allegedly planning to murder the king and his brother, Prince Hasan, after which he would receive diplomatic support from Palestinian guerrilla groups and Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. The government panicked upon its discovery of the plot and launched a witch-hunt in the army that resulted in the arrest of 500 officers, all of whom were subsequently released for lack of evidence. This resulted in many complaints leveled against the government by the army.[289] The al-Hindawi coup attempt came a few months after the regime's amnesty for all Jordanian civilians and military personnel who had left Jordan during and after the civil war fearing government persecution, allowing them to return to the country without repercussions. This was in line with the U.S.-inspired policies that the regime had followed since the 1962 amnesty. More amnesties followed, one of which included that of al-Hindawi himself.[290] Few internal upheavals occurred in the army after that. The government felt so strong that it reinstituted compulsory national military service in 1976 for men over eighteen years of age.[291]

As women's issues entered the civilian public sphere, they did so also in the military and the police. An important development that took place in the wake of the civil war was the establishment of a women's police force, al-Shurtah al-Nisa'iyyah, in December 1971. As women were increasingly entering the urban public sector through employment and education, the police force was going to provide for them more choices of employment and careers. The public security directorate also set up a school to train future policewomen. At first, the role of women was limited to prison and rehabilitation centers' inspectors. In 1972, only six women joined, a number that increased to seventy-two by 1975.[292] Moreover, policewomen set up their own handball team in 1975.[293] This upward trend has continued through the present. Women's duties expanded rapidly, including technical positions in the Criminal Investigation Administration, public relations, the Administration of Residency and Foreigners Affairs, as well as in the security apparatus in airports and aboard Jordanian airline flights. The most visible aspect of policewomen, however, was in their role as traffic officers in the streets of Jordanian cities, especially in Amman.[294] Then, by the mid 1980s, policewomen were seen less and less in this role as they more frequently filled administrative positions,[295] but more recently (by the summer of 2000), female traffic officers have again become conspicuous in Amman's streets.

As far as the military was concerned, women began joining the army in 1962 in technical capacities, mostly as nurses and midwives. Later, as edu-

cation spread, women joined the army as physicians, computer scientists, and technicians, and also as social workers, librarians, and secretaries. Women also became teachers in army schools.[296] Most women who join the army are well educated and have military ranks, although none of them has ever joined or been allowed to join fighting units.

Moreover, some of ʿAbdullah's early Westernizing projects were pursued in the army in the same spirit. This was especially true in the area of the Massed Bands founded under Peake. The 1950s had already seen an expansion of the Massed Bands. In 1951, King ʿAbdullah ordered the establishment of a Musical Band associated directly with the Royal Palace (al-Qusur al-Malakiyyah). It was called the Hashemite Band and was subsequently attached to the Hashemite regiment. Three more bands were also formed soon after.[297] Also in the early 1950s, Muhammad Sidqi, an officer in the Jordanian Arab Army, was sent to Britain for four years for musical training, while four more officers were dispatched to a music college in Pakistan.[298] The expansion continued throughout the 1960s.[299] In 1966, a music conservatory was established in the army, led by Jamal ʿAbd al-Karim ʿAtiyyah, who had also studied in Britain. The conservatory trained not only Jordanian members of the bands but also members of neighboring Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. In fact, through the seconding of officers, the Jordanian Musical Massed Bands played a central role in the training of the Massed Bands of Arab Gulf countries.[300]

The Massed Bands' participation in international concerts earned them a great reputation. Ever since their first performance in Britain in 1955, they performed throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds,[301] and the in the Western world.[302] In 1981, on the occasion of the establishment of an army symphony orchestra, twenty-three musicians were dispatched to Austria on a scholarship, where they studied from three to seven years. They were joined soon after by fifty-four more musicians. By the late 1980s, all of them returned to staff the first *army* symphony orchestra in the entire Arab world. The orchestra performs classical and "international" music. It has given concerts in Austria and Jordan. The orchestra also began to train students in Jordan.[303]

The Bands used to wear a yellow hatta (or kufiyyah); this was subsequently changed into Glubb's red and white shmagh, which they continue to wear today, except that some of the bands wear helmets. As for the orchestra, its members wear Western clothes with no Jordanian cultural markers.[304]

Although the first bagpipes were introduced to the Massed Bands in the period from 1929 to 1931, it was done on a small scale. In the early 1950s,

bagpipes were imported into the army's bands in large numbers, making them the hallmark of the Jordanian Massed Bands. In 1981, following the establishment of the symphony orchestra, piano and string instruments were introduced. In 1994, the bands claimed that they anticipated the introduction of "Eastern string instruments like the 'Ud and the Qanun soon."[305] This is yet to happen. The bagpipes, however, remain the quintessential instruments distinguishing the Massed Bands. Their importance to Jordan's international image was further confirmed during the internationally televised funeral of King Husayn in February 1999.

Colonial or National Legacy?

Ever since its inception, the Arab Legion, played an important role in imparting to its members, and through them to the rest of society, the rules of the game of the nation-state. The military was a central vehicle for the advancement of a new culture that is nationally defined and governed by the laws of the nation-state. From music to clothes to food to the very "tribalist" culture that Jordanian national culture came to represent, the Jordanian army was a central instrument in its formation. This army served both to unify and to divide the people, commensurate with different strategies used by those who controlled it. Peake set out to exclude the Bedouins from the military during the first decade of the state, serving to exacerbate existing divisions between the Bedouins and the Hadaris. Glubb sought to exclude the Hadaris from the army and to unify the various Bedouin tribes inside the country and Bedouins from outside it by integrating them into a military *corps d'élite* with specific Glubb-designed cultural attributes identified as "Bedouin." Glubb then attempted to make this culture the basis of Jordanian nationality.

When nationalist officers took over the army, they sought to modernize it by ridding it of Glubb's "traditions," which they did not recognize as Glubb's but fell into Glubb's trap by identifying them as Bedouin. Anticolonial nationalists are clearly not immune to colonial epistemology. As Timothy Mitchell put it, "in abandoning the image of colonial power as simply a coercive central authority, one should also question the traditional figure of resistance as a subject who stands outside this power and refuses its demands. Colonial subjects in their modes of resistance are formed *within* the organisational terrain of the colonial state, rather than some wholly exterior social space."[306] Since the anticolonial nationalist officers were committed

modernizers, there was no place in their schema for "Bedouin" traditions. Having a colonial epistemology that denigrated the Bedouins (Glubb's idiosyncratic and unique colonial views notwithstanding), they sought to nationalize the Bedouins by integrating their separate units into the rest of the army. Being nationalists, they sought to unify the army with the National Guard for the purpose of nationalizing Transjordanians and Palestinians into a nationally representative army. Another attempt at integration was tried by the king himself, when compulsory national military service was reinstituted in 1976. This, however, did not result in a thorough integration of Palestinian Jordanians in the officer corps of the army, but it did help to integrate settled Transjordanians with the Bedouins.

Following the palace coup, old Glubb patterns were replicated in the army, stressing its Bedouin character as its most "traditional." These were further extolled by the king and the army leadership in preparation for the civil war confrontation. These trends have continued also in society through the present, as we saw in chapter 2. Throughout the 1970s, senior army officers remained mostly of Bedouin origins, especially in armor. Circassians also remained prominent in the military, although by the 1970s and 1980s, they began to occupy mostly advisory positions or were placed in the special forces (al-Quwwat al-Khassah).[307]

Change was occurring in the army. Army personnel are much better educated today, and conscription has transformed the composition of the younger officer corps. Whereas older officers remain Bedouin, the younger officers are urbanites. Although older Palestinian officers continue to be in the army, they are never allowed to command strike units at the battalion level or above.[308] According to Jureidini and McLaurin, numbers aside, "Key positions at senior levels—more important than numbers of personnel—have been and continue to be held by bedouin of specific tribes . . . such as the Bani Sakhr, the Huwaytat, the Sirhan and the Shammar,"[309] the same tribes that Glubb had courted since 1930. The 1976 conscription was mandated by the need for manpower as the expanding economy was attracting potential recruits, and by the "changing nature of warfare," which came to require more technical know-how. By the mid 1970s and beyond, however, the value system of the army was changing. Although King Husayn's "religious legitimacy is still accepted . . . [it] is less germane to the concerns of army personnel, even of the bedouin."[310] Also, the 1976 conscription coincided with the normalization of the Bedouins in the realm of national citizenship through the cancellation of tribal laws.

Indeed, legitimacy was no longer sought through a Bedouin identity but rather by a nationalist Transjordanian one. By the time of the civil war—

that is, fifty years after the state was founded, and twenty years after its expansion and the incorporation of the Palestinians—the political, juridical, and military strategies employed by the state succeeded in rendering the new national identity as the main unifying identity for those whose Transjordanian geographical origins can be traced back to the founding of the state.

With the increasing professionalization of the army, however, it began to lose its exclusively tribalist character. As Jureidini and McLaurin conclude, King Husayn's "political legitimacy is accepted increasingly [in the military] for East Bank interests—the safeguarding of the interests of historical Transjordan and the Transjordanians. Economic issues are more important to tribesmen, including those in the army, while the role of the Hashemite kingdom is of less importance."[311] These trends increased with the onset of the 1980s and the 1990s. In 1980, for example, the king granted reserved seats at Jordan's universities (which are much sought after by ordinary students who cannot get in because of limited seats) and full scholarships to the children of army officers and servicemen whose fathers served for more than ten years in the Jordanian armed forces.[312] Moreover, the economic role of the military became more important with the establishment of discount, customs-exempt military stores and commissaries for the exclusive use of military personnel. Indeed, as in the 1930s, the military's economic role is primary in maintaining the loyalty of its members.

The integration of all Bedouin and settled Transjordanians into one national identity led many Jordanian nationalists to feel unburdened by the Palestinian West Bank element after the 1988 disengagement. They turned their attention to East Bank Palestinians as the main threat to their recently asserted identity. In fact, and as we will see in the next chapter, Palestinian Jordanians came to constitute the *other* against whom Jordanian national identity would define itself.

Concomitant with the many changes and developments in the country's political life, the very name of the army underwent corresponding transformations. Whereas, as already mentioned *al-Jaysh al-ʿArabi* or the Arab Army (known in English as the Arab Legion) was renamed in 1944 the Jordanian Arab Army;[313] the name of its head, the Chief of the Jordanian Arab Army, was changed in 1947 to the chief of general staff of the Jordanian Arab Army, or Raʾis Arkan Harb al-Jaysh al-ʿArabi al-Urduni.[314] Following the palace coup and the dissolution of the union with Iraq, the head of the army experienced another name change: he was now to be called general commander of the armed forces.[315] During the short-lived union with Iraq, the Jordanian Arab Army merged with its Iraqi counterpart, and the two com-

bined armies were called the Arab Army, while each retained its independent name locally.[316] The Jordanian Arab Army itself was renamed in 1964 the Jordanian armed forces,[317] only to be renamed again in 1966 the Arab Army.[318] On the eve of the civil war, it was renamed again the Jordanian armed forces,[319] a name that it has retained through the present.

Although the first change in 1944 was justified by the Amir ʿAbdullah as necessary to distinguish the Jordanian Arab Army from neighboring armies, especially as it came to play an international role in conflicts, except for the change under the union with Iraq, no justifications were provided for changing the name of the military on other occasions. Perhaps the most perplexing of all is the change of 1966 to Arab Army, as the Jordanian armed forces would be a logical change since it came to refer to all military branches in the country including the air force, the navy, and the National Guard. The 1966 change was done in the regional context of Jordan's increased isolation, with the Egyptians intensifying their campaign in the summer against King Husayn as a "reactionary." Moreover, it preceded the November signing of a defense treaty between Syria and Egypt and the November 13 Israeli raid and massacre at Samuʿ and the ensuing call for compulsory national military service. Within this context, it remains unclear why such a change was made.

By the mid 1980s, many events and figures were being rehabilitated by the new particularist Jordanian nationalism, including Glubb Pasha himself. After Glubb's dismissal, the king made a point to make amends with him. They met a number of times "including one evening when, with genuine pleasure, we had a long talk at a reception in London." They also corresponded and sent each other cards. The king admired Glubb's lack of bitterness after his dismissal despite how "hurt" he was "at what happened": "Another man, less wise, would have become so emotionally aroused that he might have damaged the work he had undertaken for so long and all the success he had brought about. Glubb Pasha acted with restraint and dignity in a great crisis of his life. . . . I hope he will return to visit us one day. He will always be most welcome."[320]

Glubb never did. After he died in 1986 at the age of 88, King Husayn eulogized him at a memorial service held in Westminster Abbey on April 17, 1986. The king spoke on his own behalf and on behalf of the people of Jordan:

> Rarely has a man left such a profound imprint upon a people as has General Glubb, better known in Jordan as Glubb Pasha, in recognition of the singularly meritorious services which he rendered devot-

> edly, and with the greatest integrity and fullest dedication, in the service of my country. . . . Sir John Bagot Glubb became so immersed in the innermost lives and concerns of my people, the humble and the exalted alike, that I wondered, often times and without any reflection, on his ultimate love and loyalty to his own mother country, where his life and heart dwelt and identified after so many years of service and association with Jordan. . . . He contributed immeasurably to the enhancement of the disciplined, martial, and professional traditions of the Jordanian Arab Army in its early formative years. . . . His memory will live in our hearts.[321]

The king was not alone in his praise of Glubb. Shahir Abu-Shahut, who as a Free Officer fought against Glubb's presence in the country and served as his aide-de-camp, also admired the colonial general. Abu-Shahut, like the king, admired Glubb's ability to praise Jordan after his dismissal without showing resentment, but unlike the king, he did not forget his colonial role in the history of Jordan.[322] Following the king's example, Jordanian newspapers eulogized Glubb lavishly. Like the king, they forgot his history as a colonial official, not to mention the reasons for which the king had expelled him in the first place.

Glubb's legacy has outlived him in ways he never anticipated. The Jordanian armed forces, as we saw in this chapter, continued to fulfill their prescribed domestic role of defining the new Jordanian national identity, but they also continued to fulfill their international role, as practiced under Glubb. Aside from the 1970s training of the militaries of a number of Gulf countries, the Jordanian armed forces played a central role alongside the shah's army in quelling the Omani Zufar revolution in the early and mid 1970s.[323] Today, the Jordanian armed forces are a privileged sector of Jordanian society. They live in exclusive suburbs, in villas built for them by the government. They shop at special military stores with low, controlled prices, which are exempted from customs and taxes. They have the best health care system in the country. They are highly paid compared to the rest of the population, and their children have reserved seats in Jordan's most prestigious universities, which they attend at government expense (this, however, contrasts sharply with the situation of many older army retirees, who live in poverty relying on relatively low pensions). Their central role in defining the national boundaries of Jordanianness continues afoot. Commensurate with Glubb's assiduous efforts, his colonial legacy has been effectively transformed into national culture.