3 Cultural Syncretism or Colonial Mimic Men

Jordan's Bedouins and the Military Basis of National Identity

The military is the most important homosocial nationalist institution within the confines of the nation-state. Its very *raison d'être* is the defense of that nation-state. Its symbols and its ideology are so suffused with nationalism that they cannot be conceived without it. Its flag, its anthem, its holidays, its songs, and its sense of cohesion are all nationally defined. As an institution, it is dedicated to the production of a certain species of nationalized beings, nationalists of a different variety from those outside the military institution. Their national existence is predicated not only on a being that is nationally constituted but also on acting in defense of that being. This nationalist agency is defined by that defense of the nation, of its physical and imaginary frontiers. But the military as an institution produces a gendered set of nationalist agents—namely, those of the masculine variety. It is a violent institution by definition (a "repressive state apparatus," as Althusser calls it) and relies on conventional masculine attributes of physical strength, endurance, and stamina. Its self-definition banishes from its ranks physical frailty, weakness, and fragility as feminine attributes. Although the military can accommodate women within its ranks, it is only women who uphold its masculine attributes that can become members.

Masculine behavior in a colonial context is always racialized. Establishing a new model of nationalized masculinity in the colonies proved to be a more complicated endeavor than its European counterpart. In European nationalist discourses, as Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues, it was always European white masculinity that defined nationalist agency at home. In the colonies, it was that same white colonial masculinity, made normative through

European colonialism, that reigned supreme in dealing with the natives.[1] In the process of European colonization of the Third World, the intersection of racial and sexual discourses is symptomatic of imperial rule. The institutions of colonial rule, the military, the judiciary, and the administrative service, have always been overwhelmingly masculine. "White men in colonial service *embodied* rule by literally and symbolically representing the power of the Empire."[2]

This chapter will look at the military's productive role. Although the military is generally viewed as a repressive and a coercive institution, its productive role has not been adequately studied. Following Michel Foucault's important contribution in this regard, I will show how, in addition to being a repressive apparatus, the military is also a productive institution, producing national identity as well as central aspects of what becomes national culture itself. Its coercive capacities aside, the military is characterized by its disciplinary role. As Timothy Mitchell puts it, "a restrictive, exterior power gives way to an internal productive power." Echoing Foucault, Mitchell, who is examining the workings of modern technologies of power in general and in the colonial context of Egypt in particular, states, "Disciplines work within local domains and institutions, entering into particular social processes, breaking them down into separate functions, rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and precision, and reassembling them into more productive and powerful combinations. These powers produce the organized power of armies, schools, and factories, and other distinctive institutions of modern nation-states. They also produce, within such institutions, the modern individual, constructed as an isolated, disciplined, receptive, and industrious political subject."[3]

This chapter will also look at how white colonial masculinity is institutionalized in a colonized domain as an *ambivalent* model for nationalist agency, later conceived as "anticolonial." We will look at the figure of John Bagot Glubb, who was second in command of the Arab Legion, Transjordan's army, from 1930 until 1939, and its chief from 1939 until his deportation from Jordan on March 2, 1956. Glubb will be shown to usher in a specific figuration of a syncretic nationalist agency imbricated in the culture of Empire while dressed up as authentically national. His syncretic cross-dressing will be shown to be of a substantially different variety than the culturally appropriative cross-dressing of T. E. Lawrence, who himself played a founding role in the establishment of Transjordan.[4] The study will focus on Glubb's own numerous autobiographical writings in relation to the history of the Jordanian armed forces. Glubb's investment in a certain Bedou-

inization of what became Jordan will be shown to have played a crucial role in *identifying* the country nationally, literally of conjuring up national cultural borders and a national personality, which is always already gendered and always already imbricated in racialized and classed imperial notions of comportment and aesthetics. (Although Glubb's personality marked his entire project, he was not a one-man show. Glubb, like all colonial officers, was part of a chain of command that went back to London. He was an executor of imperial plans and policies, although he would always stamp them with his personal imprints. The British Empire had several such officers, not only in its Arab territories, but also in other areas of the Empire.)

Although Glubb's project began as a military project, wherein the stated goal was the integration of the Bedouins into the nation-state through its most illustrious institution, thereby ensuring that the new militarized Bedouin would no longer threaten the nation-state and its laws, this process spilled over beyond the perimeter of the military and into the national life of civilians. The result was the invention of a specifically Jordanian national cultural product, ranging from mannerisms and comportment to national dishes (produced by British Mandatory trade relations), national dress and music (emulating the examples of Glubb and British cultural forms, respectively)—which the recently released and eruptive exclusivist Jordanian nationalism identifies as part of its very essence (see chapter 5).[5] Since nationalism lives through rituals, practices, and performances, it is through them that the nation is constituted. As Althusser has explained, "the existence of the ideas of [a subject's] belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject."[6] What one eats, what sports and music one plays, what one wears, how one speaks, and how one moves became all-important rituals suffused with specific significations. Introducing these rituals and giving content to their signification was a central part of Glubb's transformative policies. The creation of new national icons, ranging from a flag to military dress, became part of this process of nationalizing not only the Bedouins but also everyone living in Jordan.

It is argued often that the military apparatus of Transjordan preexisted its establishment as a nation-state in March 1921.[7] Such a claim relies on the existence of military outfits trained by the British in that area since 1920. However, it should be emphasized that administrative and government apparatuses had also existed in much of what became Transjordan prior to its nationalization in the form of a state by the British and the Hijazi Amir ʿAbdullah. After the Ottoman defeat at the conclusion of World War I, the

area of what became Transjordan came under the rule of the newly established Syrian kingdom headed by King Faysal. This situation lasted only until the defeat of Faysal's forces by the French imperial forces at Maysalun on July 24, 1920, which resulted in his expulsion from the country altogether. According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between the British and the French colonial powers, the southern part of Syria lying east of Palestine and the Jordan River was to be under British rule. British presence in the area, however, was minimal if not altogether lacking (as the British had withdrawn from the area in December 1919, relinquishing it to Faysal's government), leading to the establishment of a number of regional governments in the area, with their own administrative apparatuses. This was done with the help of the British high commissioner for Palestine, Herbert Samuel, who convened a meeting of the notables of the area east of the Jordan in Salt on August 21, 1920, for that purpose and dispatched several British representatives to the area to "advise" the populations and governments on political, military, and administrative matters. These local regional governments existed from August 1920 until April 1921, when ʿAbdullah and Winston Churchill concluded a deal giving birth to a Transjordanian state, with ʿAbdullah as its ruling amir, who, in turn, answered to the British Mandatory authorities. These advisors and officers included among them Lieutenant Colonel Frederick G. Peake (then seconded to the Egyptian army as commander of its camel corps) and Captain Alec S. Kirkbride, who were to play very powerful roles in Transjordan in the coming decades. Peake was dispatched to reorganize the disorganized gendarmerie left after the fall of Faysal's Syrian kingdom.

Captain C. Dunbar Brunton (who was stationed in Salt but later moved to Amman as the British representative there) set up the military Reserve Force in the area following the fall of Faysal to prop up the gendarmerie. Soon, however, events overtook the British. ʿAbdullah, son of the Sharif Husayn and brother of Faysal, marched toward Syria, declaring his purpose to be the restoration of the Sharifian throne. He neared Maʿan, the northernmost Hijazi city closest to Amman, accompanied by several hundred fighters. The British then invited him to a meeting with Churchill in Jerusalem, which resulted in his appointment as amir over the new state. ʿAbdullah contributed 750 men to the Reserve Force of the country, which Peake had already expanded to 750 men; thus the combined force, excluding the police, totaled 1,500 men. The police and military forces were finally unified in October 1923 and named the Arab Legion.[8] Peake and the British Resident H. St. John Philby were responsible for the name change: Peake

states that "when I suggested to him that the name of the New Force, that I was raising, should be changed from 'Reserve Force' to Arab Legion, Phibly agreed at once, and the strange thing is, that nobody noticed the change."[9] The Arabic name for the new force was actually the Arab Army, or al-Jaysh al-'Arabi, because many of its members were veterans of the anti-Ottoman Arab revolt fought by the Hijazi-organized Arab Army. Peake thought that al-Jaysh al-'Arabi was too ostentatious a name for such a small force and thus translated its name into English as the Arab Legion.[10]

The Arab Legion, headed by Peake, consisted of Brunton's Reserve Force, the gendarmerie, and 'Abdullah's troops, as well as some of Faysal's retreating troops who had remained in the area. The force was commanded and funded by the British while simultaneously being at 'Abdullah's service insofar as his interests coincided with those of the British. Soon, however, the Arab Legion was converted into a mere police force because of its poor showing in 1922 in battle against invading pro-Saudi Wahhabi raiders. The Wahhabis were defeated after the intervention of the British Royal Air Force, and the Arab Legion became mainly a police force involved in crime prevention, tax collection, and arresting offenders, as well as responsibilities over immigration and passport control, motor licensing, and traffic control. The Legion was helped in its efforts by the Royal Air Force (controlled solely by the British) who held the responsibility of defending the regime—a task that it was called upon to carry out on several occasions in the 1920s. On April 1, 1926, the British high commissioner for Palestine established the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF) under the command of the Royal Air Force. The TJFF's main task was the military defense of Transjordan's borders against tribal raids, especially in the east and the south. It was also to help the Arab Legion when called upon. This force was mostly recruited from the Palestine gendarmerie and was deliberately staffed largely by non-Transjordanians.[11] By 1927, the number of men in the Arab Legion had been reduced from 1,472 men to 1,000, and the issuance of the Arab Legion Law had formalized the new arrangement whereby the Arab Legion was confined to police duties. 'Abdullah and his administrative staff of Arab nationalists did not look favorably on the establishment of the TJFF, as it constituted a threat to the power of the Transjordanian government, who had no authority over this force, and concentrated more power in the hands of the British. The 1928 agreement between the British and the Transjordanian government effectively regulated security arrangements. Article 10 stipulated that Britain "may maintain armed forces in Trans-Jordan, and may raise, organize and control in Trans-Jordan such armed forces . . . necessary

for the defence of the country . . . [and that] His Highness the Amir agrees that he will not raise or maintain in Trans-Jordan or allow to be raised or maintained any military forces without the consent of His Britannic Majesty."[12] Other stipulations included that the Amir accept that certain parts of the country be placed under martial law (article 14).

It was through such legal mechanisms that the Mandatory-Hashemite state established its monopoly on the use of force and armed coercion. Still, however, the matter of the armed Bedouin tribes had to be resolved for such a monopoly to be effected. It was in this context that a British officer by the name of John Bagot Glubb was recruited from neighboring Iraq, where he had been engaged in "pacifying" the Bedouins of that other Mandatory-Hashemite state headed by King Faysal. Having acquired a regional reputation as the Bedouin expert par excellence, his services were in much need in Transjordan. On his arrival in Amman in 1930, Glubb set out to establish a new force within the Arab Legion. He called it the Desert Patrol or Quwwat al-Badiyah, and he recruited its members solely from among the Bedouins. The task for this new force was to guard the borders with the Saudis, who had recently occupied the Hashemite kingdom of the Hijaz and annexed it. (This role was later expanded to include guarding the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline, which passed through Transjordan.) In response to the anticolonial revolt raging in neighboring Palestine, the Desert Patrol was enlarged in 1936 to become the Desert Mechanized Force, acting as a mercenary army under British control. Its major contributions to British imperial policy in the region included subduing Palestinian rebels and their Transjordanian supporters within Transjordan in the late 1930s, intervening in Iraq against the nationalist anti-British coup leaders in 1941, and later the same year intervening in Syria against the Vichy French. The Desert Mechanized Force was to become the nucleus for the postindependence Jordanian Armed Forces. It was due to its new international character that in 1944 the Arab Legion was renamed the Jordanian Arab Army (al-Jaysh al-'Arabi al-Urduni) to distinguish it from other Arab military forces.[13] As we shall see in the next chapter, it was to be named and renamed several times in the coming decades.

The Bedouin Choice

On arriving in Transjordan, Peake launched his policy of defending the villagers against Bedouin raids, and he rallied the support of his government's

resources. His biographer insists that Peake, unlike other British administrators in the Arab East, did not possess "a streak of poetry and romance." Such a typical administrator "sympathizes in every way with the nomad's eleventh-century outlook and regards any interference with his old Arabian rights and customs as the worst form of vandalism. . . . This point of view, needless to say, is shared by the traveller who visits Arab lands and afterwards writes a book on his experiences. He is not in the country long enough to appreciate both sides of the case, and as his guides and caravans are supplied by the Beduin, he is led to see only the nomad point of view."[14] The attraction to the Bedouin is also motivated by the British sense that Bedouins embody primitivism and modernity simultaneously, a sort of evolutionary enigma. Sir Mark Sykes (of Sykes-Picot Agreement fame), sums this up: "The Beduin is, indeed, the strangest of all mankind. His material civilization is about on a par with that of a Bushman, yet his brain is as elaborately and subtly developed as that of any Englishman with a liberal education. There is no reasonable argument he cannot follow, no situation which he cannot immediately grasp, no man whom he cannot comprehend; yet there is no manual act he can perform."[15]

Peake would have none of it. Through his influence, the British forced ʿAbdullah to accept the abolition of the semi-independent Tribal Administration Department (Niyabat al-ʿAsha'ir) headed by Sharif Shakir Bin Zayd in the summer of 1924, forcing the enactment of new laws to control the Bedouins as early as October 1924.[16] The positions of Tribal Administration representative and deputy representative had in fact been established since the first Transjordan ministerial administration was set up on April 4, 1921; the position of deputy (occupied by Ahmad Maryud) was abolished on February 1, 1923, and the position of representative (occupied by Shakir) was completely done away with on June 26, 1926, two years after the abolition of the Tribal Administration itself.[17] In this vein, Peake proudly insists that "had not the British stepped into Trans-Jordan and the French into Syria there is little doubt that both countries . . . would soon have reverted to tribal rule and poverty." To achieve this important task, Peake set to work: "My policy was to raise a Force from the sedentary, or village, Arabs, which would gradually be able to check the Beduin and allow an Arab Government to rule the country without fear of interference from tribal chiefs. . . . It would have been easy to establish British rule and control enforced by British troops, but it would have caused much trouble and expense. Besides which I was always convinced that the old days of direct British rule were passing, or indeed had passed. Nationalism imported from the West with modern

mass education had come to stay and was a force with which one had to reckon."[18]

With the increase in Ibn Saʿud's territorial gains, which by the later twenties had reached the southern and eastern borders of Transjordan, cross-border tribal raids acquired an international character. It was in this context that John Bagot Glubb was called on to control the Transjordanian tribes.[19] Peake remarks that this new policy "was excellent, and the officer selected to run it under my direction could not have been better chosen." Yet, Peake seemed uneasy about how the strategy of policing the tribes was being pursued:

> Unfortunately, however, this new desert force was brought into being after the regular Arab Legion had completed its task of establishing public security in the settled part of the country. Consequently we soon saw the British government providing money with which to subsidize the tribes—the old evil of the *surra* [a money-pouch given to the Bedouins by Lawrence to aid the British effort during the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans, which Lawrence had learned about from the Ottomans who themselves used it to pay the tribes to prevent the latter from attacking the pilgrimage caravans] under another name; giving them armed cars with machine-guns, wireless sets, forts and other adjuncts to militarism, which had been denied to the old Arab Legion, who had had to carry on its task without them. . . . gradually we saw the desert nomads being turned into soldiers with modern arms and transport, while the old Arab Legion formed from the dwellers in the towns and villages remained for the most part mere police.[20]

Peake felt that such a transformation was tolerable as long as the British remained in control of the country, but he worried about the outcome of this policy, "should, in the future, a growing demand for independence be met by the withdrawal of British officers then we shall have given the tribal shaykhs an arm with which they can once again dominate the settled people. . . . My policy was always to prevent power from getting into the hands of the tribal chiefs as the country could not prosper if this occurred."[21] Peake's policy was endorsed by T. E. Lawrence who was in Transjordan as an advisor for a few months. Jarvis reports that Lawrence "agreed entirely with Peake's point of view that the future of the small State depended upon the cultivator, who must be protected from his desert neighbour."[22]

As a result of Peake's policy, there were very few Bedouins in the Arab Legion, which included Palestinians, Transjordanian Circassians, Chechens, and Turcomens—settled by the Ottomans a few years (in some cases decades) earlier. Initially, Peake had also recruited hundreds of Sudanese and Egyptians. This had had an impact on Transjordan's population, who until then had refused to be recruited in the Legion, seeing it as a new oppressive tax-collecting force. However, as Jarvis reports, fear of being policed by "foreigners" led many among them to join the Legion. The Legion officers included Arab Iraqis and Syrians who were ex-Ottoman officers. Recruitment from among educated town and village Transjordanians was to take place later, although Peake had difficulty finding men who combined the intellectual and physical qualities he required: "in the East these two essential qualifications are seldom found in company because education in some mysterious fashion has a deteriorating effect on physique."[23]

This was not the only problem faced by Peake. His Legion officers, most of whom were Arab nationalists, who had retreated to Jordan to regroup, making common cause with ʿAbdullah's intention to evict the French from Syria, were now undercutting his plans to establish control in Transjordan. The debacle ended in 1924 with his purging the Legion's officer corps and expelling the nationalists, a decision ultimately supported by ʿAbdullah whose excessive pragmatism toward the British was infuriating the nationalists.[24]

By the time Glubb arrived in the country, "[m]ore than half the officers and men were not in fact [Trans-]Jordanians, but came from Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Syria."[25] By the late forties, however, the Desert Mechanized Force had established an international reputation as an effective British mercenary force. The mystique of the Bedouins, however, had still not disappeared. Peter Young, who joined the Arab Legion after the Palestine war, remarks, "The bedouin are the most delightful people to serve with and to meet in the ordinary way. They are not unlike the Highlanders in the days of the '15 and '45; with their tails up and with leaders they trust they will fight admirably for short periods. . . . At the worst the bedouin can be stupid, sullen and fit for nothing, but there are few of this type. At the best, they are cheerful, willing and hardy soldiers, ready to go anywhere and try anything."[26]

On arrival, Glubb established a working relationship with Alec Kirkbride, the British resident in the country, as well as with the Amir ʿAbdullah. All three agreed on the new policy of recruiting the Bedouins to join the Arab Legion. James Lunt states that this was "a deliberate policy based on a shared

philosophy of all three men. According to Kirkbride the Arab Legion was intended to be a purely professional force, not a national institution."[27]

Glubb's dislike for town Arabs stemmed mostly from racial as well as cultural considerations. He considered them racial hybrids compared with the racially pure and martial Bedouins and villagers. This, for him, accounted for his contention that "the townsmen are rarely martial."[28] Lunt, in his biography of Glubb, defends the latter's preference for Bedouins stating that Glubb's intention of recruiting Bedouins was only to keep politics out of the army. He quotes a letter that was sent to P. J. Vatikiotis in which Glubb says nothing about Bedouins being better fighters than Hadaris. In his rush to defend Glubb, Lunt misses the many occasions on which Glubb did mention the martial superiority of the Bedouins in his writings.[29] The official historian of the Jordanian Armed Forces had the following to say about this matter:

> [T]he eventual pacification and the successful recruitment of the Bedouin of Transjordan into the ranks of the Legion was due solely to the personal efforts, leadership and diplomatic skills of Major (later General) J. B. Glubb. The dash, offensive spirit and élan displayed by the all-Bedouin Desert Mechanized Force in the subsequent campaigns in Iraq and in Syria in 1941, was a tribute to Glubb Pasha's prowess as a leader and commander of Bedouin troops. His later attempts to distinguish between Bedouin and non-Bedouin (*Hadari*) personnel were, however, less than successful. In the opinion of Arab officers they were quite unjustifiable and, like Lord Plumer's motives in grafting a TJFF on an unwilling Transjordan government, suspect. On the eve of the pullout of the British military presence from Jordan in 1956, five out of ten infantry regiments and two out of three armoured regiments were Bedouin. One can fully appreciate and sympathize with Glubb's genuine and sincere loyalty towards the Bedouin, who like the tribal Pathan [in India], has many manly and admirable qualities—including a delightful sense of humour. But, the cold hard fact remains, that the Turkish Army recruited Arabs from all over the empire and employed them in all theatres of war with considerable success.[30]

Glubb's policies in the Arab East were indeed not unique. They were part of a generalized British imperial policy of *divide et impera* practiced elsewhere within the Empire. As Syed Ali El-Edroos explains,

> There is little doubt that Glubb Pasha and the British officers who served with the Arab Legion, like their compatriots who served in the Indian Army, overplayed their hand on the subject of the so-called "martial" and "non-martial" races. At the same time, they exaggerated the so-called professional reliability of the *Fellahin* and the *Hadari* when compared with the Bedouin. Glubb Pasha's attitude towards the educated *effendi* (officer) class is also hard to understand. Like his compatriots in the British Indian Army, he appeared most uncomfortable when called upon to serve alongside educated, critical, and not overly obsequious Indian (in his case Arab) officers. The outstanding officers of the Arab Revolt were all from the so-called *effendi* class and included Arab regulars such as Aziz Ali el-Masri, Jafar Pasha el Askari, Nuri as-Said and Maulud Mukhlis, and no one can question their professional competence or courage. The ingrained British antipathy towards the educated class of officers and officials and a preference for the simple, illiterate, and naive peasant, farmer or bedouin, reflects a weakness in the British character.[31]

Still, Glubb insisted that no discrimination in the Legion should take place. Ignoring the real power imbalance manifested most clearly in the dearth of high-ranking Arab officers in the Legion in favor of British colonial officers, he states: "In the Arab Legion, we tolerated no racial, religious, or class distinctions. The British officers were not a class apart. On any given occasion, the senior officer present commanded irrespective of race. British officers saluted Arab officers senior to them in rank. The division between British and Arab was not the only potential source of dissension in the army. In Jordan, itself, there were Arabs and Circassians, Christians and Muslims, townsmen, countrymen and tribesmen, and different tribes unfriendly to one another. Latterly, there were East and West Jordanians—or, as we used to say, Palestinians and Transjordanians."[32]

Discrimination or not, the goal of Glubb's policy to have an all-Bedouin army was reached successfully: "The first Desert Mechanized Regiment was the genesis of the Jordanian Army as it exists today and it is important to note that it was chiefly bedouin in composition. There were technicians and clerks who came from the settled areas but the officers and the rank and file were all tribesmen, still wearing the uniform of the Desert Patrol, their hair long and in many cases worn in ringlets as was the bedouin fashion.[33]

By incorporating the Bedouins into the repressive state apparatus par excellence, Glubb ensured that not only would their internecine and inter-

national raiding be stopped, but also their group loyalty would be transferred to the nation-state, guaranteeing that the Bedouins would protect that state against all threats, especially so due to their contempt for city-folk from which anti-state threats might arise. Also, due to their kinship ties across the new national borders and their tribal affiliation, the Bedouins were seen as a threat to the nation-state. Nationalizing them, therefore, through territorialization, was part of nation-building. In fact, in addition to the military, the British government also dabbled with economic incentives, through transforming the Bedouins into agriculturalists: "The objects of the encouragement of bedouin cultivation are briefly (a) to broaden the basis of their economy and to prevent the whole of their livelihood depending upon one somewhat fickle form of capital, and (b) to give them a fixed stake in immovable property in the country, which will be not only an economic insurance but also a social anchorage."[34] As is obvious from this policy, the centrality of bourgeois forms of property to the national project could not have been more emphasized by the British. This policy was being enacted as the rest of Transjordan's communal property, as we saw in chapter 1, was being transformed into private property.

Cultural Imperialism and Discipline

The importance of studying the Jordanian military stems from its disciplinary function in the Foucaultian sense. Foucault views disciplinary regimes as supplanting juridical ones, or at least infiltrating them. In the case of Jordan, we will see how the law and the military are actually instruments employed simultaneously as complementary strategies by the juridical disciplinary state. Following Nicos Poulantzas, "law organizes the conditions for physical repression, designating its modalities and structuring the devices by means of which it is exercised. In this sense, law is *the code of organized public violence*."[35] The imbrication of the disciplinary operation in colonial models of rule is just as thorough as the juridical aspect of governmentalization. In this case, the figure of Glubb, as a metonym for Empire, will be examined, insofar as the imperial institution of disciplinarian rule was effected via the establishment of the Arab Legion. It is, after all, Glubb par excellence who personified Empire in Transjordan/Jordan for almost three decades.

On arrival in Iraq in October 1920, his first station in the Arab world, Glubb knew very little about Arabs. To rectify this situation, he embarked

on studying what other Europeans had written about the Arabs, so that such works would mediate his first-hand experience with them: "The impression [of seeing the Arabs] left on my mind was profound, but would doubtless have worn off in a few months if fortune had not placed in my hands a number of books. . . . As I bought books and more books, and read and reread them, a new and fascinating world was opened to my eyes."[36] He was fascinated not only with the Arabs but more so with the European explorers and Orientalists who wrote about them. His ferocious appetite for European knowledge of the Arabs was always in evidence. He informs us, "I devoured the works of the explorers of Arabia—Burkhardt, Doughty, Blunt and Palgrave—and determined to imitate them."[37] In this Glubb was not unique. As Edward Said demonstrated, "the transition from a merely textual apprehension, formulation, or definition of the Orient to the putting of all this into practice in the Orient did take place, and . . . Orientalism had much to do with that."[38] Glubb's imitation of Orientalist explorers and colonial officers did not pass unnoticed by anticolonial Arab nationalists. Glubb, in fact, was seen as nothing less than part of the chain of colonial officers. The newspaper *al-Istiqlal* had this to say about him: "Mr. Glubb is a modern Leachman, but the difference is that while Leachman was loud and violent, Glubb is soft and gentle. Their ends are however the same. There is another difference too. Leachman served the English cause with English money while Glubb serves it with the money of Iraq."[39]

Glubb was actually following in the footsteps of Colonel Sir Robert Groves Sandeman, the architect of the policy of Humane Imperialism. Sandeman had an impressive career pacifying the tribes in Baluchistan (where he worked as chief commissioner) and Afghanistan in the late nineteenth century. Sandeman's strategy was parsimoniously truncated to three words: "sympathy, subsidies and tribal law." He died in 1892 on the Sind border of a short illness. His biography, published in 1895, was widely read among colonial officers.[40] While in Iraq, Glubb had read the biography and Sandeman's reports. In 1935, Glubb commented in his monthly reports on an article that appeared in the magazine *The Near East and India* on the 100th anniversary of Sandeman's birthday. Underscoring the similarities between Bedouin and Baluchi tribes, Glubb articulated his own tribal policy: "Indeed, I would have the following principles painted in golden letters on the wall of the office of every administrator of warlike tribes: (1) humanity and sympathy; (2) light taxation and lucrative employment; (3) subsidies to shaykhs; (4) stick to tribal law."[41]

Glubb also had other models to draw on. Although he had been the first recipient of the Lawrence Memorial Medal, conferred upon him in 1936

by the Royal Asian Society in London, Glubb was quite a different man from T. E. Lawrence.[42] Unlike the latter, with whom he is often compared, Glubb's political philosophy in relation to "Arabs" was less culturally appropriative, although just as ostentatiously exhibitionist. Glubb was more interested in Arabs inhabiting a social formation suffused with a culturally syncretic "modernity." A mature Arabophile with little time for uneducated Eurocentric statements of slight dismissal (although Eurocentrism pervaded all his evaluative faculties), Glubb was a cultural relativist with views not so unlike those of some contemporary Western social scientists.

In commenting about the relation between Arab culture and foreign civilizations, Glubb insists that he has "not advised [the Arabs] to imitate the English, but rather the reverse."[43] He was clear on the European meaning of modernism. Under the title, "The Conflict Between Tradition and Modernism in the Role of Muslim Armies," he wrote, "I cannot avoid the impression that when we use the word modernism, we are in fact visualizing the things that characterize ourselves. . . . In other words, modernism means 'like us' and our title seems to imply that Muslims should endeavour to become more like us and that this process will inevitably involve a conflict."[44] In Glubb's view, the "present preëminence enjoyed by the West lies principally in the material field: in mechanics, technology, manufacturing, and similar activities. Other nations, however, are anxious to adopt these things, with the result that modernization in this sense necessitates little if any conflict. . . . The West, on the other hand does not enjoy any generally admitted preëminence in morals; consequently attempts to introduce Western standards of morality into other countries is likely to provoke opposition. Western democracy . . . is also by no means universally accepted as the best method of conducting the affairs of every nation."[45]

Glubb characterized the rule of law in Western countries as producing a "mechanical" sort of government, which worked well for Europeans and was in tune with their "temperament." This, however, he felt, was quite loathsome to Arabs, as they "do greatly prefer to follow men and not machines."[46] He explained how juridical rule, in his view, is unacceptable to Arabs: "I believe that Arabs like to be ruled by men, not by laws or committees; but at the same time they are the most outspoken and democratic of races."[47] Lest his comment come to be interpreted as opposing colonial rule, Glubb, always a committed imperialist, explains that what he is opposing here is "cultural and not . . . direct political influence, such as European colonization or the mandate system."[48] He, in fact, continued to sing the praises of the nineteenth century British Empire until the end of his life.[49] Still, he opposed the extension of the liberal democratic model to the colonies and

felt that the political party system is unsuited for non-European cultures. He even appreciated the dilemma with which anticolonial nationalists were faced: "By identifying 'modern' with the system of party politics now in vogue in the West, we compel other nations to forego their traditions of personal loyalties or to accept the stigma of being 'backward.' "[50] Unlike most Orientalists, whose writings were suffused with the theme of "Europe teaching the Orient the meaning of liberty,"[51] Glubb was careful to remind his compatriots, "Britain may well have introduced the Arabs to democracy—but not to freedom."[52] In fact, he was eager to demonstrate that the Arabs' individual freedom did not have to derive from political freedom: "In happy England we have come, for centuries past, to identify our personal liberties with the political independence of our country. Few people in Britain have realized to what an extent personal and national freedom may be divorced. . . . In Turkish days, the Arabs had no political existence, but as individuals they were as free as any men in the world. Their freedom admittedly owed nothing to Turkish generosity. It was due solely to the inability of the Government to control them."[53] In emphasizing this, Glubb is asserting that Arabs and specifically Bedouins need never be freed from colonial rule to achieve freedom, as the two are mutually inclusive.

This type of thinking, however, did not prevent Glubb from falling in the trap of evolutionary and modernizationist thinking. If cultural-relativist arguments did not work in favor of abetting dictatorship in the Arab world, he had no qualms using modernizationist language: "No word in human speech has aroused more enthusiasm or commanded more profound devotion than the word 'freedom.' But it is always risky to transfer the customs of one nation bodily to another, without regard to local conditions. In a country where the masses are entirely ignorant of the world at large, and where everybody (even the rulers) are lacking in experience, unexpected results may ensue from the application of what, in England, would be regarded as the most elementary human rights."[54]

One would think that Glubb is being a full-fledged modernizationist here, in the sense that democracy will be suitable in the future to the Arabs, once their rulers are more "experienced" and their masses less "ignorant." This is, however, only partly the case. For Glubb, these ignorant masses did not necessarily need Western education *tout court*. As we shall see later, Glubb had an entirely different pedagogical program designed for them. For him, if democracy should ever come to the Arabs, it will happen after a number of centuries have elapsed. In light of the mid-1950s anti-imperialist demonstrations against Jordan's joining the pro-Western Baghdad Pact, Glubb

writes, "the Arabs had for centuries been accustomed to autocratic rule. Suddenly autocracy had vanished, and they had slid into anarchy and mob rule, scarcely even passing at the intermediate stage of democracy. For democracy needs generations—perhaps centuries—to build up."[55] For Glubb, this is as much based on historical tradition as on cultural ones. In this case, Glubb identifies Islam as the culprit: "But I was also of the opinion that Arabs in general were more at home with a government which had a personal ruler on its head. This was partly due to ancient if unconscious tradition and partly to the religion of Islam. No Muslim country had ever been successfully governed by elected parliaments, assemblies or committees. The principle followed had always been the appointment of one man for every responsible task."[56]

Glubb ridiculed Jordan's brief experience with a partial-parliamentary system in the 1950s as an "imitation-British democracy . . . a system strange to the traditions of the country."[57] He preferred a "traditional" dictatorship not only for Jordan but also for Iraq: "Indeed if Britain is open to any blame in her relations with Iraq, it is probably due to the fact the she used her influence to install a system of democracy and party politics in that country. But this was due to a mistaken philanthropy, not to wicked imperialism. I have not the slightest doubt in my own mind that different races, owing to their differing temperaments and to thousands of years of varying culture and tradition, need different systems of government. To think that any one form of government is the ideal for the whole human race is dangerous illusion."[58]

Evidently, Glubb's recommendations in the sphere of governance insisted on supporting local dictatorial rule, defined by him as "traditional." He insistently concludes that "there need be no conflict between traditionalism and modernism in Muslim countries if one-man rule or some other form of authoritarian constitution be retained. . . . If some such system of government, broadly based on local traditions, were adopted, no conflict need arise between traditional and modern military methods."[59] However, careful not to leave anything to contingency, Glubb has particular strategies up his sleeve that non-Western countries, choosing the route of party politics, can pursue to ensure that the army stay out of politics. Such strategies do not involve laws; rather, in line with his antipathy to colonial legal structures in the colonies, he advocates more disciplinarian measures: "Our immediate object can best be achieved not by formulating laws or rules prohibiting military interference but by *producing* a spirit opposed to such intervention [emphasis added]." This shall be done by the production of a new tradition,

by "mak[ing] abstention from politics a *military tradition* [emphasis added]."[60] Glubb is not conscious of the oxymoronic notion that tradition can be produced by modernity, although he seems unconsciously aware that tradition *tout court* is indeed the outcome of modernity and does not precede it—a notion he had to rely on, albeit unconsciously, for the logic of his strategy to work.

A disciplinarian by trade, Glubb was better able to understand the imposition of European laws on the Arab world than most other colonial officials. He explains, "Not only . . . does the imposition of European law courts on the Arabs destroy the initiative of judges, but it has also imposed on the people a complete system of laws which they are often unable to understand."[61] He lamented the change in Bedouin behavior upon the introduction of these laws: The Bedouins who live "under a régime of physical violence . . . [have] qualities of simple truthfulness and frank open manners, qualities so attractive, yet which seem to be lost when violence is replaced by justice and law."[62] He is even able to discern class differences as correlates to levels of Westernization among Arabs: "The educated classes have often gained European law degrees, and are doubtless expert lawyers and judges. But they are thereby separated by a wide gulf from their fellow countrymen. Perhaps four fellaheen or bedouins out of five who come before a law court of this type are unable even to understand what the whole procedure is about."[63] In answering the question of "[w]hy . . . have laws so unsuited to the population been introduced?" Glubb states, "Owing, as it seems to me, to a failure to differentiate clearly between what is suitable and what is unsuitable when borrowing ideas from Europe. I would remind you once more of Mr. Gandhi's phrase: 'I should make use of indigenous institutions and serve them by curing them of their proved defects.'"[64] Examples of existing legal traditions in the Arab world are cited by Glubb:

> [T]wo elaborate codes of law already exist in Arabia (without adding a third)—namely, the Sheria, or religious law, and Arab [Bedouin] customary law. Let us try, if we can, to take Mr. Gandhi's advice and make use of these, at the same time gradually curing them of their proved defects. If we introduce an entirely new and already-made set of laws, they will probably be entirely unsuitable, will certainly cause injustice for a long time owing to being imperfectly understood, and may well be rendered ineffective by the non-co-operation of the inhabitants. But even if these new laws were the best, I would sooner start with the indigenous institutions and approximate them gradually to the new form by a process of building up on existing foundations.[65]

Glubb is exasperated with the lack of attention to local conditions. Following one of his recommendations to hold improvised courts in the countryside, and to abandon formality to give the "inhabitants" access to the courts, he states, "I know of no case where this is done, either in Iraq, Syria, Palestine, or Transjordan. The reason is that all eyes are fixed on the European law courts. There is not enough adaptability, it seems to me, nor accommodation to local conditions."[66]

Glubb's antipathy to juridical rule blinded him to the fact that without such rule, he could not have authority over the Bedouins. Aside from creating Bedouin courts and an apparatus imposing and reviewing Bedouin laws in relation to the Bedouin population as early as 1924, the Mandatory-Hashemite state had also enacted the Law of Supervising the Bedouins in 1929, just before Glubb's arrival in the country. This law effectively put all power in relation to the Bedouin population in the hands of the head of the army, or his deputy (in this case Glubb), thus relegating all Transjordanian Bedouins to living under martial law. It is the law that authorized Glubb throughout his career, a fact that, like the asymmetry between his colonial authority and the colonized status of his subjects, he conveniently forgets.

Glubb's apparent antipathy to imposing things European on the Arab world, however, extended beyond legal codes, military arrangements, and political ideologies, encompassing everyday practices. His attentiveness and sensitivity to detail, as the following will demonstrate, was central to the success of his transformative and productive project.

Cultural Cross-dressing as Epistemology

Glubb was a voyeuristic aesthete with equal commitment to colorful exhibitionism, albeit an exhibitionism projected onto his Bedouin subjects *qua* spectacle. He was meticulous in his plans for the production of a new species of Bedouins, nay, a new species of Arabs, albeit a species that came to be known as Jordanian. He knew exactly what the new Arab soldier should look like, what he (and it was invariably a "he") should wear, how he should move, what he should know, what he should view as tradition and culture, what he should accept as suitable modernity, and above all whom he should consider a friend and whom he should regard as foe; and herein lies the essence of the new Arab soldier, not so much whom to fight and how to fight, but just as importantly whom and what to protect and how. In that, Glubb's project entailed molding the Bedouin's body and mind into something new. The new Bedouin came to possess a new epistemology. But

equally important was his possession of a new body, which Glubb trained, fed, treated, educated, and dressed. This new military man was to become the icon and the symbol of the emergent Jordanian nation. His body was to become the national body.

Glubb was attentive to all the intricacies of the colonial cultural and institutional project in the Arab world. He vehemently opposed the creation of an officer class in Arab and Muslim armies because "it does not represent any division of social classes in civil life, but is merely an imitation of European institutions. And I have found no weakening of discipline to result from abandoning these restrictions. This is because Arabs are not 'class conscious.' Surely, to introduce these distinctions amongst them would be a mistake."[67] Explaining that this European military division is rooted in the European premodern past, Glubb's indignation leads him to conclude that the "irony lies in the fact that this system has been adopted by Muslim armies in recent years on the supposition that it is Western and therefore 'modern' and efficient. There are no Muslim traditions to justify such a division; in fact Muslim tradition is here much more 'democratic.' This example illustrates the anomalies which may arise from the slavish imitation of our methods by Muslim armies."[68] Note Glubb's consistency in being suspicious of unchecked mimicry. The "Gandhian" formula was to remain always his guiding principle.

The matter of military clothing was of paramount importance for Glubb: "This sometimes seems at first sight to be merely a superficial matter, but it does not, on mature consideration, prove to be so. A change of clothing signifies that the wearer has abandoned his sentimental attachment to the past. It is an open confession of faith; he seeks to be Europeanized."[69] Glubb describes how the soldiers were clothed under Peake: "The Staff officers of the Arab Legion wore at the time a blue patrol jacket, blue overalls and Wellingtons. The other officers had a single wide red stripe down their overalls, but the Pasha had a triple stripe. Thus clad, and with a high black lambskin cap and a stout malacca stick, he could be seen daily striding through the town of Amman to his office."[70] Glubb's description is precise and measured, leaving out no detail as insignificant. As Foucault has explained: "Discipline is a political anatomy of detail."[71] Sounding like a modern fashion-show host, Glubb proceeds to describe Bedouin clothing:

> From a practical point of view, Arab clothing seems to me much more suited to Arabia than is European clothing. Being largely white, voluminous, and loose, it is ideal for a hot, dry climate. The kerchief or

> keffiya worn on the head gives excellent protection from the sun. Tight coats and trousers and hats are supremely unsuitable. Again, a change of clothing necessitates a change of life, because in tight European clothes it is impossible to sit on the ground. Chairs, tables, and beds become a necessity to people wearing European clothes. There is no great advantage in furniture, that I can see. A room well carpeted, with low diwans and cushions, is more comfortable than most European drawing rooms.[72]

Glubb clearly understands the implication for the production of new bodies through cultural cross-dressing. Cultural cross-dressing results in a "change of life," a new corporeal culture wherein the very movement of the body is transformed, as are one's domestic surroundings, how one sits, how one eats, and so forth. This is not simply a matter of aesthetic sensibility. Glubb's defense of local traditions at times makes him sound like an ardent nationalist fighting cultural imperialism:

> In the military sphere the wearing of European clothes become even more ridiculous. The rank and file of the army are of poorer classes, who wear Arab clothing and live in homes without European furniture. When they become soldiers they are made to wear tight breeches in which they cannot sit down. People who all their lives go barefoot, or wear sandals are made to wear boots. Again Arab clothing, being loose and voluminous, if supplemented by an Arab sheepskin cloak, is ideal for sleeping out on the ground in any weather. Tight European clothes are very uncomfortable to sleep in and cannot be wrapped around the wearer like a cloak. As a result, Arab troops dressed in European clothes suffer considerably when they sleep out, and, moreover, have to carry blankets, waterproof sheets, tents, and all the paraphernalia necessitated by the unsuitability of their garments for campaigning.[73]

Glubb vividly describes his new clothing designs for the Bedouin Desert Patrol, which he created in the early 1930s: "The uniform was cut in the same manner as their ordinary dress, long robes reaching almost to the ground and long white sleeves, but the outer garment was khaki in colour. With a red sash, a red revolver lanyard, a belt and bandolier full of ammunition, and a silver dagger in the belt, the effect was impressive. Soon the

tribesmen were complaining that the prettiest girls would accept none but our soldiers for their lovers."[74]

It would seem that not only were pay and shooting good incentives for the Bedouins to join the service but sexual appeal to women as well. An added benefit was the Bedouins becoming a tourist attraction: "They are certainly the most picturesque body of men in the Middle East, and when the tourists are on the Petra run during the winter the Beduin patrol are photographed from daybreak to dusk."[75] The Bedouins come to form part of the exhibition into which modern European epistemology has transformed the world. Like the great nineteenth-century world exhibitions that formed part of the European colonial project, the world itself, as Timothy Mitchell demonstrates, is turned into an exhibition. Mitchell states that "the exhibition appears not just to mimic the real world outside but to superimpose a framework of meaning over its innumerable races, territories and commodities."[76] He proceeds to explain that the "Orient refused to present itself like an exhibit, and so appeared orderless and without meaning. The colonising process was to introduce the kind of order now found lacking—the effect of structure that was to provide not only a new disciplinary power but also the novel ontology of representation."[77] It is thus that the Bedouin becomes a fetishized commodity. The way he is produced by Glubb and colonial policies renders him a spectacle "where the perceptible world is replaced by a set of images that are superior to that world yet at the same time impose themselves as *eminently* perceptible."[78] The Bedouin becomes an image of what he should be by the new specular economy of Empire. Following Marx's insight about fetishized commodities, the Bedouin as a fetishized commodity is transformed into an exchange value *tout court*.[79] His use value *is* his exchange value as far as the imperial project is concerned. Insofar as he will secure imperial interests with little risk for Empire (white British boys won't need to endanger themselves to secure imperial gains; the Bedouins will do that for them[80]), provide entertainment for visiting tourists, and be paraded as a product of British civilizing efforts, the Bedouin as fetishized commodity becomes central to the imperial project in Jordan, as he will become later for the national project.

Glubb's fascination with his clothing designs provided him with a constant exhibitionist impulse. In his autobiography, he still finds the time to redescribe the Desert Patrol uniforms and the lasting impact they had had: "We dressed our patrol in their own natural clothing: white cotton trousers and a long white 'nightgown' or thob. Above this was a long Khaki gown, a wide, red, woolen belt, a mass of ammunition belts and bandoliers, a revolver

with a red lanyard and a silver dagger. *The headgear was a red-and-white-checkered headcloth, which has since then (and from us) become a kind of Arab nationalist symbol. Previously, only white headcloths had been worn in Trans-Jordan or Palestine* [emphasis added]."[81] The rest of the Arab Legion wore Khaki hattas. When in 1933 the Arab Legion replaced the headcloth with a pith helmet; an exception was made for the Desert Patrol.[82] The importance of the male headgear is not to be underestimated. As we will see in chapter 5, Jordanian palace and popular nationalisms were to adopt the red-and-white *shmagh* or *hatta* as defining of Jordanianness. The red-and-white hatta was to act as a marker, marking out "real" Transjordanians from Palestinian Jordanians, who in turn adopted the black-and-white hatta as nationally defining of their Palestinianness in the national context of Jordan. What is ironic is that prior to Glubb's innovation, which was introduced in 1931, most Transjordanians wore the white or the black-and-white hatta, as many older Jordanians still do today. As for the Palestinians, it was in the early 1930s that the peasants among them adopted the Bedouin white hatta, and later the black-and-white and the red-and-white hattas.[83] The arbitrary choice made by Glubb, however, was to define one of the most visible and provocative gendered symbols of Jordanian and Palestinian nationalisms in Jordan.

This type of clothing, however, was not worn all the time. When it came time for battle, as it did during the Syrian campaign in 1941, battlegear was issued:

> The men still wore the long khaki ankle-length dress, with a red cummerbund, a dagger and crossed and highly decorated bandoliers—the traditional uniform of the Desert Patrol. It was some while before we were issued with standard battledress and webbing equipment; and when they were first obliged to make the change from their tribal dress, the men found this European type of uniform irritatingly uncomfortable. They were used to wearing open sandals which meant that their feet were unusually wide. British army boots were often an agony to them. So with their daggers they cut off the toe caps and made holes in the sides to let in the air. They found it difficult to understand why this was frowned on. It took weeks to get them to turn out in this new kit with their equipment properly and neatly in place.[84]

One wonders about the disciplinary methods used during those weeks to secure Bedouin submission to the clothing routine. Musa Bakmirza Shirdan

claims that many Bedouins insisted on wearing their Glubb-designed "zubun" under the Western pants which made them look "funny," and "wherein the soldier among them would look inflated in his lower half"—a practice that did not last very long.[85] Following the period from 1941 to 1943, the dress of all fighting units was changed to European clothing, as this was seen as more appropriate for battle conditions. This coincided with the transformation of the Arab Legion from a police force into a full-fledged army. Moreover, the change of clothing was effected for economic reasons, as Glubb's elaborate (and Victorian) designs were quite costly. However, Bedouin military police units continued to wear Glubb's original designs, as they still do today, along with the rest of the Desert Patrol.[86]

Glubb's interest in identifying all that he was introducing as compatible with and complementary to Bedouin culture was paramount. This goal extended to his very person. Glubb believed strongly that even he himself was seen by the Bedouins as internal to their culture and way of life. He fancied himself a cultural passer. To illustrate the believability of his passing, he recounts a story of how captured Vichy-French soldiers reacted to him during the Syrian campaign at Sukhna in the early 1940s: "As I scrambled from my car, three French officers got out of an armoured scout car in front of me. I was wearing an Arab kerchief on my head. They looked at me in alarm. 'Je suis Englais, messieurs,' I said, but their distaste seemed by no means lessened by the information."[87] Indeed, even if the Frenchmen had believed him, for them, his going native was no less a cause for horror.

His identification with Bedouin Arabs in general, and with Jordanians in particular, was consciously clear for Glubb. He reveled in his knowledge of Bedouin culture so much that he claimed to be a mediator between the Bedouins and city Arabs. For example, he speaks of his resentment of the Syrian (which, for him, include Palestinians) and Egyptian lawyers who were surrounding Ibn Sa'ud in the early thirties, because they attempted to advise him—and, according to Glubb, they knew nothing of Bedouin life: "More than once I found myself obliged to explain bedouin customs and expressions to them."[88] Unlike Glubb, Westernized city-Jordanians also shied away from anything Bedouin: "officials and ministers in Jordan almost took a pride in not understanding bedu language or the customs of the tribes (of whom eighty per cent of the population consisted)."[89] Glubb was careful to exclude King 'Abdullah from this criticism, pointing out that his early years in the Hijaz had given him an instinctive sympathy for the tribes. Moreover, Glubb asserts that as a member of the Ottoman Parliament before World War I,

ʿAbdullah had acquired a much more comprehensive grasp of world affairs than any of his ministers.[90] It is unclear why such worldly knowledge would be important at all for ʿAbdullah to understand the Bedouins.

In his writings about himself and the Bedouins, Glubb is acting like a classic Orientalist. As Edward Said asserts: "The Orientalist can imitate the Orient without the opposite being true. What he says about the Orient is therefore to be understood as description obtained in a one-way exchange: as *they* spoke and behaved, *he* observed and wrote down. His power was to have existed amongst them as a native speaker, as it were, and also as a secret writer. And what he wrote was intended as useful knowledge, not for them, but for Europe and its various disseminative institutions."[91] Applying Said's reading of Edward W. Lane to Glubb, we reach the same conclusion as Said: "that ego, the first-person pronoun moving through Egyptian [in our case Bedouin] customs, rituals, festivals, infancy, adulthood, and burial rites, is in reality both an Oriental masquerade and an Orientalist device for capturing and conveying valuable, otherwise inaccessible information. As narrator, Lane [and also Glubb] is both exhibit and exhibitor, winning two confidences at once, displaying two appetites for experience: the Oriental one for engaging companionship (or so it seems) and the Western one for authoritative, useful knowledge."[92]

Glubb's identification with Bedouin Arabs, as the basis for Jordanianness, was ultimately ratified through a formal declaration before ʿAbdullah when the latter demanded it in 1939: " 'You are English . . . and this is an Arab country, and an Arab army. Before you take over command, I want you to pledge me your word, that as long as you remain in my appointment, you will *act* always as if you had been born a Trans-Jordanian.' . . . 'Sir,' I answered, 'I give you my word of honour. From now onwards I *am* a Transjordanian, except under the conditions you mentioned [the condition of fighting breaking out between the British and Jordan], and which I pray God may never come' [emphases added]."[93] Note that ʿAbdullah is aware that Transjordanianness is actually an "act" not a "being," whereas Glubb responds that this "act" constitutes for him a "being"—albeit one that is *consciously and conditionally* constitutive of his self. It is crucial to point out here that the importance of national identity, as one that is performatively (not ontologically) constituted, was central to Glubb's project of nationalizing the Bedouins through a certain set of practices imparted to them under the rubric of military training.[94] Also, it is important to note the slippage, in Glubb's writings, of Bedouins into Arabs and vice versa. In the context of Transjordan, Glubb's conflation of Bedouin, Arab, and Transjordanian as

one and the same is not at all unconscious but a reflection of his projected goal of Bedouinizing the country as a basis for its new national identity.

This act of being was so successful an act of passing that even "The East- or Transjordanians regarded me as one of themselves—not as a British general. Many Palestinians were my friends, even if they did not regard me quite as one of themselves, as the Easterners did."[95] In fact, Transjordanians, according to Glubb, were shocked at anyone's suggestion that Glubb's passing was just that. Glubb tells a story affirming that for Transjordanians, he *was*—rather than passed as—one of them:[96] The family of a distinguished Arab politician took refuge at a police station during a visit to Petra in 1947.

> In the corse of the conversation one of them asked the police:
>
> "How do you like having a British officer to command you?"
>
> "How do you mean?" answered the police sergeant, puzzled.
>
> "Why, Glubb Pasha, of course," was the answer.
>
> "Glubb Pasha isn't a British officer, cried the men indignantly. "He is one of us."
>
> It was what I had promised King Abdulla.

Ghalib Halasa, Jordan's most illustrious novelist, counters this version of Bedouin attitudes toward Glubb. In his novella *Zunuj, Badu wa Fallahun*, Halasah depicts Glubb on one of his visits to a Bedouin household. "On being served coffee," writes Halasa, "Glubb complains, saying, 'It needs fire, boy! Your coffee is cold.' "

> He [Glubb] was acting under the naive impression that he was gaining the loyalty of those Bedouins by claiming to uphold their traditions and by his exaggerated care in adhering to them. He is fooled by the acclaim that remarks like the one he made about the coffee elicit. In his presence, the Bedouins would pretend to be extremely attached to these traditions. . . . He would speak in an accent with strange pronunciation. A smile was drawn on the faces of the [Bedouin] shaykhs, one that they would conceal by knitting their eye-brows. . . . The British officer began speaking quickly, thinking that [by doing so] he could hide his funny accent.[97]

Glubb had even been renamed by Iraqi Bedouins as Abu Hunayk, or Father of Little-Jaw, in reference to a World War I wound that he had received.[98] This name was to stick with him after his arrival in Transjordan,

only to be changed again upon the birth of his son, who was named Faris by Amir ʿAbdullah. Glubb's new title was Abu-Faris, or Father of Faris.[99] His most famous title, however, was that of Pasha. "Glubb Pasha" is the way he was addressed and referred to by his contemporaries, and it is how he continues to live in the memory of Jordanians as well as in their history books.[100]

Glubb even followed Arab "tradition" by meeting with refugees, tribesmen, orphans, the poor, the ignorant, and others to solve their problems, rather than relegating them to an impersonal bureaucratic procedure. In doing so, he felt that he was passing as an Arab ruler: "Under the traditional forms of Arab rule, every post of authority is occupied by one man . . . [who] is accessible to everybody without exception . . . [but the] imitation of Europe . . . by the Turks . . . then . . . by the mandatory powers, destroyed this system." To remedy this situation, which "deprived the poor and illiterate of the traditional forms of justice which they understood, I tried to make myself accessible after office hours to the poor and the ignorant."[101] He explains: "This procedure may sound chaotic to Europeans. Perhaps it was. But it was much more congenial to Arabs than cold regulations of government departments."[102] Glubb did not completely appropriate Bedouin lifestyle. He felt the need for marking himself as different in appearance as well as manner. As his biographer remarks,

> Glubb was probably one of the few genuine Arabists who did not consider it necessary to adopt Arab dress. Unlike T. E. Lawrence, who attended the Peace Conference in Paris wearing Arab robes, or Harold Ingrams in the Hadhramaut who wore the *Futa* of South Arabia, Glubb's uniform was patterned on that of the British army. He wore, of course, the red and white checkered headcloth of the Arab Legion, known as shamagh; or the red and blue forage cap, called sidara; but otherwise he wore a khaki tunic and trousers, always with a black Sam Browne belt and sword frog. He wore khaki serge in winter and khaki drill in summer. He was not very impressive in uniform until one noticed his five rows of medal ribbons and realized that he had no need to draw attention to himself by the cut of his tunic. Off duty he always wore English clothes.[103]

Glubb's syncretic dress code, which combined European and Arab "tradition," was similar to that of the non-Bedouin units of the Arab Legion. In that sense, he was the equivalent of a city or village Arab in appearance, and Bedouin-like in manner. Unlike T. E. Lawrence, who presented him-

self as spectacle, Glubb was not necessarily part of the military spectacle that the Bedouins constituted. He remained outside that spectacle, too busy directing it.

Aside from dress and manner, he also observed Muslim religious rites, such as the Ramadan fast: "I fasted with them for the complete month. I did not do this from directly religious motives, but on the principle which constrains an officer to limit his kit to the same weight as that of men under his command."[104] Ironically, on one occasion, Glubb ridiculed the alleged difficulty with which Muslims had to establish prayer time. He also hated Muslim feasts because they involved official ceremonies requiring Glubb and the soldiers to report to work.[105] Despite his understanding of Islam, however, Glubb assures his readers that he was never tempted to convert: "I had had some experience of Muslim saints and religious men, and had observed in them many of the qualities which we associated with Christian saints. I had never been tempted to become a Muslim—Christianity laid more emphasis on love—but I found it easy to cooperate with Muslims in our common capacity of God Fearers."[106]

One of his fellow officers remarked on how Glubb had been transformed inside the Orient into a sort of chameleon man: "You never knew what was going on with Glubb. His mind had begun to work like an Arab's. He was all subtleties. He had the kind of mind that could understand the illogic of the Arabs and anticipate it. He knew they would act from their emotions, and he knew what those emotions were. He dealt as an Arab with the King's palace, as a Bedouin with the tribes, as a British officer with London. No one except Glubb knew everything that was going on."[107]

Although Glubb understood national identity to be performatively produced, he conceived of Bedouin identity in strongly essentialist terms—one is born, and does not become, a Bedouin. Although the etymological root of Bedouin (or *Badawiyy/a* in the singular or *Badu* in the plural) in Arabic derives from *bada* as in "to reside in the *badiya*" meaning the desert, hence a Bedouin is an inhabitant of the desert who leads a nomadic lifestyle, Glubb has a stricter criterion for such a definition. This is how he defines a Bedouin:

> The first requisite is that the bedouin must be a nomad who breeds and keeps camels. Any non-nomad is automatically ruled out. But there are tens of thousands of nomadic tribesmen in Syria and Iraq who live in tents and are continually on the move, but who are not bedouins for they do not primarily breed camels, but sheep and donkeys. Having decided that a bedouin must be a nomadic breeder of

> camels, however, we have not completed our definition; for he must also be able to trace his descent from certain recognized pure-bred bedouin tribes. *You and I could never become bedouins. A pure-bred Arab, an agriculturalist in Iraq or Transjordan, could never become a bedouin unless he could prove pure bedouin descent.* We find therefore that a bedouin, in the strictest sense, is a camel-breeding nomad of certain specified tribes [emphasis added].[108]

Although Glubb saw himself, and was seen by other Europeans, as a sort of father figure for the Bedouins, his real function was more maternal, since his reproductive project involved the creation of a new species of Arab—one that is endowed with ancient noble traditions that are combined with modern soldiering. His biographer (or hagiographer) states, "Most of the Arab officers liked and admired Cooke Pasha [a Glubb associate]. He was in their eyes much more 'the very image of a modern major-general' than Glubb Pasha, whom they regarded more as a father-figure."[109] Peter Young observes, "It was customary for a bedouin soldier, who felt 'wronged' or otherwise 'obliged,' to seek an interview with his commanding officer, or even with 'Abuna el-Kebir' [our old/great father]."[110]

At times, Glubb saw the Bedouins, as a result of their encounter with modernity, as sick patients: "A bedouin unit needs as much care on the part of an officer as a hospital full of patients needs from a doctor. . . . Every man must be studied separately."[111] Glubb spent his life doing just that. In this, he was following the footsteps of T. E. Lawrence, who had recommended such a course of action to Arabophiles:

> The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs, is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unconsidered thing; watch yourself and your companions all the time; hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses, and keep everything you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the work in hand so that your brain shall be saturated with one thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would undo the work of weeks. Your success will be just proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it.[112]

Gawain Bell, a British officer who served in the Legion, states approvingly, "We would all have done well had we too been able to follow these

precepts and impress them on those British officers who joined us with no previous experience of work in the Arab world. Some, but by no means all, had an instinct for this sort of approach to the problem of making modern soldiers out of illiterate but proud tribesmen."[113] Glubb lamented the few openly racist British officers (dispatched from Britain to assist him) who referred to Arabs as "Wogs."[114]

Glubb's biographer insisted, "Bedouins had little thought for the future and often behaved like children, furiously angry at one moment, in tears the next."[115] Glubb was at times disconcerted that Bedouins saw him as a sort of surrogate father. He states that a "serious and apparently increasing nuisance in the desert is the fashion spreading amongst bedouin fathers of dying and appointing me solemnly as guardian of the child."[116] Glubb's wife was to take up this responsibility:

> Immediately after we were married in 1938, my wife had taken a great interest in the barefooted little boys. . . . She rescued many of these boys, and we took an empty house for them, looked after them and engaged a schoolmaster to teach them. . . . One or two eventually became officers in the Arab Legion, one even going to Sandhusrt. Others became N.C.O.s or soldiers. A lame boy who had suffered from polio was set up as a shopkeeper in Kerak. We enabled another cripple, whom my wife found begging, to open a shop in Amman. When we had several children of our own, my wife was obliged to give up this work, but we maintained affectionate relations with most of these boys when they were established in the world.[117]

In addition to their biological son, the Glubbs did in fact adopt three children.[118] Naomi, whom they adopted in 1944, was a Jordanian Bedouin girl.[119] In 1948 they adopted two Palestinian refugee children whom they named Mary and John.[120] As for the boys they took care of, unfortunately, Glubb was disappointed to learn of the ingratitude of one of them:

> It was at the end of 1955 that one of these boys was sitting with a group of civilians in Amman. They were discussing the riots and one of those present made a derogatory remark about me. The boy whom we had brought up agreed with the denunciation of me. Another man present, however protested . . . "You ought not to say anything against the Pasha," he said. "After all, you owe everything to him." . . . "I used to think that myself," our boy replied. "But now the whole matter has

been explained to me. I realize how they did not care for me at all—it was all clever politics. That was why they helped me. We don't want any foreigners in this country."[121]

Glubb's relationship to this boy is obviously invoking a parallel between Britain and Jordanians (if not the colonized) more generally. The boy's rejection of his loving caretaker, and his imputing to him less than honorable motives, are quite similar to how Jordanian nationalists were soon to reject British tutelage through massive anti-British opposition in the country, which was to lead soon to the expulsion of Glubb himself and the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. Comparing the situation in 1978 to that in 1916, Glubb later commented in a different context: "Nowadays, in1978, the memory of the benefits conferred by British rule on backward countries has been largely forgotten. . . . The poor and primitive countries have so far advanced that they are now in a position to govern themselves. When the children are grown up, they rarely remember with gratitude the old nurse who directed their infant footsteps. In 1916, however, these benefits were still generally appreciated."[122]

Glubb, in fact, had become very distressed by the changes wrought by the arrival of the Palestinian refugees after 1948 and the impact they were to have on the Jordanians: "The people dwelling east of the Jordan were my people. I had grown old amongst them, and my home was in their midst. . . . Gradually [after the arrival of the Palestinians], the Trans-Jordanians were partially submerged, and the rock of Jordan, with its wise moderation and its broadminded comprehension of East and West, disintegrated in the flood of hate."[123]

The arrival of the Palestinians had in fact exposed Glubb as a passer, which marked the beginning of his alienation from Jordanians. He laments this unforeseen outcome, which was to end in his ultimate expulsion from Jordan in 1956: "Perhaps my principal handicap was the fact that I was British. Before 1948, the Jordanians had forgotten this and I had become one of them."[124] His sadness was of course real as, for him, "Jordan has been my country, *almost* as much as Britain [emphasis added]."[125] His worry about his place in Arab history books led him to predict and lament that "Perhaps for generations to come, the history books in most Arab countries will teach that Glubb Pasha betrayed the Arabs and gave Lydda and Ramle to the Jews, in accordance with orders received from Mr. Bevin in London."[126]

His prediction came true.[127] This was all the more sad for Glubb as he had seen his role and that of the British as somewhat of a corrective for what

had gone wrong the last time Europe had visited the Orient—that is, before the modern era of imperialism. Glubb was fascinated by that last instance, when the Europeans had been in the Orient as Crusaders. This fascination influenced his political thinking as well as his personal life, including his self-conception in relation to the Orient. References to the Crusaders abound in his books and articles, as well as in his private life. Politically, he saw the role Transjordan was to play in British policy as one similar to the one that "the first Transjordan," or "la terre d'outre Jourdain," had played in the Crusades.[128] He explains this parallel:

> Just as the Arab League is regarded by the Palestine Zionists today as a menace to their continued existence, so the nightmare of the crusaders of the twelfth century in Palestine was the union of Syria and Egypt. As long as these two Muslim states remained isolated, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was able to survive. To prevent their union, the Crusaders established the principality of Outre-Jourdain, or Trans-Jordan, with its capital at Kerak. . . . The last Crusader Prince of Kerak was Renault de Chatillion, an unscrupulous adventurer, but a man of immense courage and initiative. He was not contented passively to bar the way between Arabia and Egypt, but resolved to carry the war into the enemy's country. . . . When the Crusader kingdom collapsed at the battle of Hattin [*sic*], Renault was taken prisoner by Saladin. He was put to death for his raids on the Muslim pilgrims during a period of truce.[129]

The parallels between the British establishment of Transjordan and the Crusaders' establishment of Outre-Jourdain are quite obvious to Glubb and to his readers. The function of modern Jordan to the British and to the Americans and the Israelis remains the same as it was for the Crusaders. The fate of Renault might be an ominous allusion to the possible fate of the rulers of modern Jordan, a fate perhaps unconsciously postulated by Glubb.[130]

As for the impact of the Crusaders on his private life, it is illustrated by the following story: "In . . . 1939, five weeks after war was declared, a son was born to us in Jerusalem. We were advised to christen him David, because he was born in the city of King David. We decided to call him Godfrey, after Godfrey de Bouillon, the first Crusader King of Jerusalem. But when we brought him back to Amman, His highness declared that he must have an Arab name. He called him Faris, which means knight or cavalier, a name

which accorded well enough with Godfrey de Boullion. . . . Arabs are very proud of parentage, and often call themselves fathers of their children. Henceforward I was known as the 'Father of Faris.'"[131]

His being referred to as Abu Faris notwithstanding, Glubb continued to refer to his son as Godfrey in all of his subsequent writings (although today his son writes under the name of Faris). According to Edward Gibbon, Godfrey de Bouillon was proclaimed by the Crusader army as "the first and most worthy of the champions of Christendom. His magnanimity accepted a trust as full of danger as of glory; but in a city where his Saviour had been crowned with thorns the devout pilgrim rejected the name and ensigns of royalty; and the founder of the kingdom of Jerusalem contented himself with the modest title of Defender and Baron of the Holy Sepulcher,"[132] a role Glubb seemed to identify with, and one he wanted his son to mimic. De Bouillon, however, ruled only for one year, Glubb for twenty-six. Unlike De Bouillion, Glubb did not seek necessarily to fight the Arabs, but rather to control them through teaching them in the way of Empire—a task, he felt, for which the military institution was best suited. As for Glubb's son, he appeared to have political differences with his father as an adult. He lived in Beirut in the early 1970s and became a "resistance poet" allied with the Palestinian guerrillas. As a child, Godfrey/Faris "was often found in his father's company wearing a specially made copy of the Arab Legion's uniform, complete with *shamagh*."[133]

Imperialism as Educator

Glubb is not an essentialist nationalist. He is eclectic in what he draws on for philosophical inspiration. He understands all to well what his role as a representative of Empire means, and he is keen to carry out his task to the best of his knowledge. Consequently, he is not a rejectionist of all things Western in an Arab context but rather is partial to careful selectivity, and a proponent of cultural syncretism. Lest his European readers take him to mean that Europe has nothing to teach the natives, he is quick to explain: "What, now, are the essential lessons which Eastern soldiers can learn from Europe? The first is detailed organization, method, and discipline. This is ensured by mental and moral training, and does not necessitate the introduction either of foreign social distinctions or of foreign dress. The second lesson they require is the use of scientific weapons—motor transport, machine-guns, artillery, wireless and aircraft. I believe that it is possible for

Arab troops to learn the lessons which Europe can teach in organization, discipline, and scientific weapons, without departing from their hereditary customs, manners and dress."[134]

Glubb is committed to interpreting the other as different without *necessarily* assigning a hierarchy to the notion of difference (although on many occasions he does). He explains that another nation that differs materially from "ourselves" might do so for two reasons: "It may be less civilized and educated than ourselves . . . due to [its] 'backwardness,' " or the differences "between us arise from differences between our national characters, traditions, climate, or other factors, as a result of which our customs or institutions will *never* be suitable for the other community. . . . It will certainly never be possible, or even desirable, for them to become just like us."[135] His commitment to a serious understanding of the Orient led him to perceive himself as a chameleon man passing across cultures while being inhabited by them. He asserts, "I strenuously opposed any idea that East was East and West was West and that the two could never agree. I had experienced in myself, as I thought, the feasibility of living simultaneously as an Arab among Arabs and as an Englishman amongst Europeans. Why should not the two work hand in hand? There were, of course, many differences in outlook and temperament. But differences do not necessarily mean rivalry; on the contrary, they can be a means of harmony, for one becomes the complement of the other."[136]

Ultimately, this course of selective Westernization is what Glubb set out to accomplish. Teaching the Bedouins how to mimic certain, but not all, things Western was central to his transformative project. As Homi Bhabha asserts, "colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as *a subject of a difference that is almost the same but not quite*. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an *ambivalence*; in order to be effective, mimicry must always produce its slippage, its excess, its difference."[137]

Glubb, who fancied himself a race genealogist, never shied away from racialist descriptions and generalizations. Unaware of the many occasions in which *Bedouins* slip into *Arabs* in his text, he insists on the variability of the origins of those calling themselves Arabs (views which were later elaborated in his lecture on "The Mixture of Races in the Eastern Arab Countries"[138]), with a particular racist venom against Egyptians—whom he calls "lethargical," "tending to obesity," and "expert at intrigue," although "in many ways attractive" and having a "sense of humour."[139] These descriptions coincided with the Suez Crisis, as the book in which they appear was published in 1957.

Racial and cultural explanations were also deployed by Glubb to account for the difference between ʿAbdullah's attitude toward Zionism and that of other Arabs. The "Western Arabs—the Egyptians, Palestinians and the Syrians—have that logical mentality which deals only in purely intellectual conceptions. Such people are incapable of compromise."[140] This, of course, is unlike the more practical Bedouins. Although ʿAbdullah and his family hail from the oldest city in Arabia, Mecca, Glubb assimilates them into Bedouin culture as the latter is defined by Glubb: "King Abdulla never could see eye to eye with the Egyptians. Perhaps their differences were not solely due to a clash of interests, but also to some organic difference in their mental make-up. For King Abdulla was a practical man, always ready to make a bargain or consider a compromise."[141]

Glubb proceeds to tell us how Jordan's prime minister, Tawfiq Pasha, who is from the Palestinian city of Acre, is like the rest of the Western Arabs and therefore unlike the practical ʿAbdullah. He concludes on the same page by stating, "There is no doubt therefore that this peculiarity existed in the mentality of the Levantine Arabs; a kind of 'justice though the heavens fall.' " In fact, one of the only possible explanations that Glubb could give for the outrageous claim made by Palestinians that he, as a representative of the Empire, does not work for the benefit of the Arabs, is a cultural one: "The Palestinian Arabs are extremely intelligent. But their subtlety makes them unwilling to accept the obvious. They tend instinctively to seek a complicated and involved explanation for every event. . . . The plot was obvious, and I had sacrificed tens of thousands of Arabs in order to further Britain's wicked intrigues."[142]

Such claims were lies and fabrications, as far as Glubb was concerned, and characteristic of the Arab: "the Levantine Arabs and Egyptians . . . held [the] opinion . . . that morale must be kept up by telling lies. . . . This unwillingness to say anything unpleasant seemed, indeed, to be deeply engrained in the Arab character."[143] This should be contrasted with the honesty of the British Empire:

> In Britain, people believe that honesty is the best policy. . . . I have not found in the Middle East that truth can be relied upon to emerge. . . . Perhaps, in the West lies are more liable to exposure than in the Middle East, because people are more sophisticated and have more varied sources of information. But in the Middle East, the gullibility of the masses is unending. . . . The explanation of the unending credulity of Middle East crowds lies perhaps chiefly in their emotions. For Arab politics are more guided by passion than by reason. . . . I

> trust that Britain will never tell lies, because to do so is wrong and undermines the moral character of the liar. But I have not found that, in Middle Eastern politics, honesty is the best policy.[144]

Add European ideas like nationalism and communism to the Arab traits of dishonesty and lying and the situation becomes truly explosive and detrimental to Western interests: "Our second difficulty arose from the intense propaganda which was circulating, to the effect that the Western Powers were unscrupulous and deceitful. The East tends naturally to consider that politics are a competition in duplicity, but this normal opinion had been intensified by Communist and Nationalist propaganda."[145]

This aside, other explanations about the Palestinians' cunning intelligence can be found in biological hybridity: "This faculty for attributing Machiavellian motives to their rulers seemed to be a particular characteristic of the Palestinians. Every action one performed was analyzed with a view to discovering the tortuous motive which actuated one. I do not know whether this quality is to be attributed to the considerable amount of Greek blood which flowed in their veins and gave them this intellectual subtlety."[146]

Of course, Arabs could not have acquired such intelligence unless they had been genetically altered by a superior race. Glubb states, "This intellectual subtlety, which attributes to every action a tortuous ulterior motive, is not to be found among the original natives of central Arabia, whose minds seem to work openly and in a straightforward manner. Their tendency was to speak the truth and to accept what they were told at its face value."[147] Glubb also explains the racial hybridity of Jordanians: "The Jordanians were of mixed origins . . . [Alexander and the Greeks having settled the Northern part of Jordan] with the result that the people of northern Jordan retain their subtlety of intellect today. The remainder of Jordan, however, was largely peopled by central Arabians, whose minds were more frank and straightforward."[148] Not only can the intelligence or stupidity of Arabs be genetically based, but so can their lack of political stability. Glubb quotes a French officer explaining to Glubb the reason why Syria, after World War II, had been unstable with many coups, and why Jordan was stable: "He replied that the Syrians were too intelligent. 'A certain amount of stupidity is necessary to political stability,' he added. 'The British, for example, are famous for their stability!' There may well have been some foundation for his opinion, for historically, Syria and, even more, Lebanon and the 'Arabs' of Palestine have been heavily interbred with Greeks—a nation famous for acuteness of intellect but not for political stability."[149]

The Frenchman's likening the stupidity of the "Arabs" to the British notwithstanding, Glubb buys the argument. Explaining his race theory of Arabs and what propels them to disobedience of authority, Glubb states,

> Although, however, the "Arabs" are not by any means one race, it is possible to trace one or two characteristics, which most of them share, and which differentiate them from Europeans. . . . The Arabs in general are hot-headed, hasty and volatile. They are proud and touchy, ready to suspect an insult and hasty to avenge it. To hate their enemies is to them not only a natural emotion but a duty. Should any man claim to forgive an enemy, they find it difficult to believe in his sincerity and suspect a trap. *Politically, they tend, like the proverbial Irishman, to be against the government.* Of whatever form or *complexion* it may be, they are usually ready to change it, *though they may later on regret their action* and wish to return to their former state. It is easy to conquer any Arab country, but their *natural inclination to rebellion* makes it difficult and expensive for the invader to maintain his control. Their mutual jealousies, however, provide their rulers with the means of playing them off against one another, an art which they themselves consider to be of the very essence of politics. . . . But while their hot-bloodedness makes the Arabs good haters, it makes them also cordial friends. No race can be more pleasant or charming. They are delightful company, with a ready sense of humour. . . . In one quality, the Arabs lead the world—it is the virtue of hospitality, which some of them carry to a degree which becomes almost fantastic [all emphases added].[150]

The parallel with the "natural inclination" of the Irish and the Arabs to rebel leads one to conclude that Arabs, like the Irish, are sociopaths, albeit with the possibility of a conscience to mitigate their otherwise anarchic behavior ("though they may later on regret their action"). The mention of complexion here is not at all figurative, rather one that sees epidermal markers as justifying colonial rule, as is the case in the paragraph about maintaining such rule. The point is that Arabs do not resist invaders as anticolonial resistance; rather, it is part of their "natural inclination" to rebel against any form of government regardless of "complexion" or form. As for the Arabs' analysis of Western politics, Arab dishonesty combined with nationalism and communism are all that can account for the Arabs' skewed

antipathy to the West, and certainly not the historical and actual policies of the West itself.

In one of his periodic reports during World War II, Glubb predicted, "Whatever may be the result of this war in other directions, one thing is certain—'coloured' races are no longer going to accept with resignation a racial status inferior to that of the white races."[151] Glubb became increasingly concerned with possible anti-British revolts in the colonies. He worried that if the British continued to insist on not properly understanding the Arabs, as previous conquerors had not, revolution might ensue: "With the Arabs in particular, it is vital to remember the existence of a capacity for passionate and heroic courage concealed beneath their everyday venality. The Byzantines made the mistake of forgetting this no less than the Turks and the British. All of a sudden appears a cause or a leader possessing the flaming quality which can inspire the exalted courage that lies hidden deep in the Arab character. Suddenly they throw away money in disgust or exaltation, and develop a courage which staggers, if it does not sweep away, their astonished opponents. This is, indeed, yet one more quality in which the Arabs resemble the British."[152]

The Arabs, for Glubb, it would seem, are an unchanging lot of people, who across the centuries, since Byzantium and the Ottomans to the British, have been governed by the same eternal and essential spirit. He confirms such views in the context of his desiring British and Arab troops to fight together in Europe as equals during World War II. He states "I believe the Arab tribesman to be first-class military material. . . . I am convinced that they are the same men who conquered half the world 1,300 years ago."[153] This eternal Arab, for Glubb, never changes; *he* lives outside history. The passage of time signals no change at all, except when the British interfere and introduce the Arab to history and time, from which the Arab benefits by reconnecting with his eternal sense of "honour." In fact, British enlightenment has also been able to end abominable practices. Indeed, the march of history and progress cannot be stopped: "The days of the 'true light of God' are doubtless numbered, and in the full glare of modern democracy and (doubtless) enlightenment, the little red-hot spoon [a sort of Bedouin polygraph test wherein a red-hot spoon is placed momentarily on the tongue of someone suspected of lying. If the tongue blisters, due to dryness resulting from nervousness, then the person is a liar, otherwise, due to the presence of saliva whose evaporation protects the skin, she or he is not] will soon vanish."[154]

Empire's emotional commitment to its subjects is all too easily forgotten, laments Glubb. He quotes a Palestinian's testimony to the virtues of Empire

and then proceeds to mourn the British Empire's historical fate: "Direct British rule is disappearing. History will record that we sailed the seas, that we conquered, that we ruled. But will she remember also that we *loved*—and especially that we loved the poor?"[155]

Masculinity, Culture, and Women

Glubb's views of the Bedouins in particular and of Arabs in general were underlain by interrelated discourses on gender, race, and culture, especially when explicit comparisons with the West were made. His views reflect the dominant Orientalist feminization of the Oriental other as well as the supermasculinization of that other. Thus, the Arab seems to inhabit a hermaphroditic existence of femininity and supermasculinity, as does the West, which is characterized as masculine in relation to the feminine Arab, and feminine in contrast to the supermasculine Arab. The following will explore the points at which Arabs and Westerners are marked as masculine and feminine, to clarify the gendering discourse underlying these claims.

Describing a procession of Bedouin Arabs soon after his arrival in Iraq in 1920, Glubb expresses curious amazement at the feminine appearance of Bedouin men in contrast to European men: "before my eyes passed in review a complete pageant of that nomad life which had not changed in essentials since the days of Abraham, but which was soon to pass away. An almost unending procession of tanned men's faces, framed by long ringlets like those worn by the young ladies of the Victorian age."[156] The Victorian comparison was to crop up on other occasions decades later. In the context of the Palmyra battle during the Syrian military campaign in the early forties, Glubb describes an old Bedouin soldier, Zaʿal, who had gone up a hilltop and loaded his rifle and began shooting at the Vichy-French fighter-bombers flying up ahead. Glubb reports, "The old man [a veteran of the "Faysal-Lawrence war"] himself was warming to the work. His headgear had fallen off. His thin grey hair was done up in tight little plaits, like a Victorian landlady in curling pins. He was shouting now, calling the name of his sister, and fighting right and left as the huge winged monsters tore over his head."[157] Glubb's fascination with the long hair and plaits of the Bedouin was always in evidence. Describing the process by which tribesmen in the service were taught to read and write, he states: "Each evening the circle by the fire would be wrapt in a tense silence, *while bearded faces bent forward, their long hair hanging in plaits over their shoulders*, and horny hands laboriously traced the letters of the Arabic alphabet in their copy-books."[158] As a result of their

long hair, Glubb's Desert Patrol Bedouins were dubbed "Glubb's Girls" by British officers in the Middle East.[159] Although most Bedouin men had long hair, many did not have hair long enough to be in plaits, and this varied with the tribe. Long hair was characteristic of Bani-Sakhr and the Huwaytat tribes, in addition to some Iraqi tribes but not all.

The Arab Legion had no regulations for its soldiers' hair-length or whether they could or could not have facial hair. According to Ma'n Abu Nuwwar (a Jordanian army officer and a former head of the army's spiritual guidance division, or "al-Tawjih al-Ma'nawi"), these were considered matters of personal choice.[160] Things, however, changed in the early forties. On the occasion of the Arab Legion's involvement in battle, the men were issued battle dress and were ordered to shave their heads. Most of the Bedouin soldiers refused as they valued their long hair. To convince them, a Circassian officer named Musa Bakmirza Shirdan intervened. According to his elitist and derisive account, he claims to have told the Bedouins a story about nutrition, alleging that Bedouins have frail and skinny bodies because much of what they eat is used up by their bodies for hair growth, and that were they to shave their heads, they would have more plump healthy bodies. The soldiers, allegedly, bought this anti-Samson story and were convinced and subjected themselves to the head-shaving procedure.[161] By the late forties, long hair had disappeared completely from the Jordanian army, as British standards for masculine soldiery prevailed.

Comparisons with English women of yesteryear by Glubb were made not only with Bedouin men but also with Bedouin women. Narrating an incident in which he was disciplining Transjordanian Bedouins by confiscating their cattle, Glubb describes the scene as follows: "But within a couple of days, we had collected two hundred and fifty camels [belonging to tribal members who were away on a raiding mission against Glubb's orders] without firing a shot, although we had to run the gauntlet of the tongues of some terrible old women, shriveled and bent old hags like mediæval witches."[162]

The Bedouins' inability to understand the ways gendered appearance works in the West led them to commit many a faux pas, and one such was witnessed by Glubb during his trip across the Syrian desert with his Bedouin companion. As a result of cold weather, "I was obliged to accept some warm gloves [from the Bedouin companion], then a magnificent pair of Black French boots with pointed toes and buttoning half-way up the calf. I was doubtful for which sex they were originally intended."[163]

Noting the feminine behavior of a Bedouin lad, Glubb cannot help but make comparisons between the wider spectrum of male gender performance

among the Bedouins and its much narrower parallel in England: "Standing demurely a few yards away, I saw a slender youth of perhaps fifteen years old [ibn Hamdan], *with those refined, almost girlish, features which are sometimes to be seen amongst desert dwellers.*"[164] Two years later,

> I was sitting in one of our new desert forts in Trans-Jordan, when a tall, slender youth presented himself. "I am Nehhab, the son of Hamdan," he explained. . . . "I want to be with you." I thought him at first too young to be enlisted, but two months later I gave way. After a year's service, he became my orderly. His whole manner breathed gentleness. His beardless face was frank and open, with delicate features. He spoke softly and with a gentle kindness."[165]
>
> With this quiet and mild disposition, he combined absence of fear in battle and a clear brain which enabled him at all times to grasp the essentials of a situation. Arab courage and hardihood are to some extent appreciated in Europe. Their code of chivalry has not passed completely unnoticed by travellers and historians. *But this streak of gentleness, which here and there runs through the Arab character*, has rarely been remarked by Western writers.[166]

Glubb chides his compatriots for their much more rigid criteria of gender performance and is confident that Nehhab would have led a miserable life had he been an English lad:

> In England a boy so gentle as Nehhab would have been tormented and mocked. We seem at times to think much of toughness, and to mistake loudness and bad manners for courage. Amongst the bedouins, who lived in a world of violence, bloodshed and war, gentleness was not mistaken for cowardice. Intimacy with Arab tribesmen enabled me to visualize more clearly the age of chivalry in Europe. . . . I have seen among the Arabs depths of hatred, reckless bloodshed and lust of plunder of which our lukewarm natures seem no longer capable. I have seen deeds of generosity worthy of fairy-tales and acts of treachery of extraordinary baseness. Unscrupulous men of violence, and others so gentle that they could scarcely have lived in modern England . . . The Arabs, like all other races, are neither all saints nor all sinners. But the contrasts between them are more striking and dramatic than those which are outwardly perceptible between the inhabitants of Western Europe.[167]

Note how Glubb depicts the Arabs as living in a different time and as reflecting the childhood of Europe ("the age of chivalry in Europe"). Although, on the one hand, the Arabs' feminine gentleness can no longer be found in modern supermasculine Europeans, on the other hand, the violent acts of the supermasculine Arabs are acts "of which our lukewarm natures seem no longer capable." These extreme hermaphroditic characteristics of the Arabs, their being simultaneously "unscrupulous men of violence" and yet "so gentle" prevent them from living, or even existing, in "modern England." The emphasis here is, of course, on *moderation* and a lack of passion characteristic of England as a different space, and of modernity as a different time. Note how the modern gender criteria of Britain and the British, who are characterized as both feminine, in the sense of the civilized being too refined and feminine to appreciate excessive masculine violence, and masculine, wherein Europeans are too rational and thus masculine to appreciate homosocial gentleness characteristic of Arabs and of European childhood ("the age of chivalry"), are based on interrelated discourses of gender, race, development, modernization, and culture. It is the site of European urban modernity, and the different space and time that the Arabs inhabit, that can explain these gender variations. Although, on other occasions, Glubb attempts to locate such differences in geography, climate, and temperament, here there is no room for such explanations. Europeans used to be like the Arabs but not any more; the differences are more related to an immanent temporal schema ending with the telos of modernity, not some material considerations. In fact, Glubb's encounter with the Bedouins is, for him, a journey through time: "My intimacy with the bedouins seemed to take me back in time. Knowing them well, I felt that I could feel with the ancient Britons, with Arthur or King Alfred or perhaps with the American Red Indians."[168]

In this narrative, modernity proves to endow Europeans with phallic technology that the Bedouins still lack. In describing the southern terrain of Transjordan, Glubb states: "it was as though we were, indeed, in a new world. . . . The whole place had a silent and virgin feeling about it, as though it were the mountains of the moon. The clean white sand seemed never to have been trodden by the foot of man. This was, of course, not the case, for the tribes periodically passed this way, but it was quite possible that this valley had not been visited by man for two or three years. Nor is it likely that it had ever been seen by a European, and it is absolutely certain that it had never before been crossed by wheels."[169]

Here, what is of paramount importance is that it must be a European armed with European technology ("wheels") who is capable of violating the

virgin land, which is not quite so virginal except to Europeans, as no other defloration is really a defloration—for "the tribes" who have been there before are not real men with the deflowering phallus of Western technology. What a European has not seen, for Glubb, looks not like another part of the planet that "he" had not seen before, but like a part of a different world, indeed a different planet.

Glubb is also interested in contrasting gender relations among Bedouins with those in England, especially with regards to men's views of women: "Their attitude toward women reveals a number of contradictions. . . . On the one hand, free and romantic courtship remains the ideal, and there are still remnants of the old custom under which widows and divorced women had their own tents and themselves received suitors. Bedouin poetry and legend are full of tales of romantic love worthy of Arthur and the Round Table. Simultaneously, however, there are constant traces of the feeling that women are servants and inferior to man."[170]

Although the age of chivalry is no longer part of the European present, it remains part of Glubb himself, so much so that the Bedouins end up being less chivalrous than he. When in Iraq in the 1920s, a party of gypsies camped by Glubb and his Iraqi Bedouin workers labor camp: "the gypsy girls danced before the workmen. Some of the latter had no hesitation in kissing and indulging in physical familiarities with the girls, who were doubtless accustomed to such treatment and, indeed, earned their living by it." Such behavior was horrifying to Glubb: "But my innocent and chivalrous attitude to women filled me with disgust at such conduct. I collected all my labourers and made them all remove their *agals*, the little circles of rope by which they kept their kerchiefs on their heads. The *agal* was the mark of manhood—women did not wear it. I then had all their *agals* burned. My gesture was intended to express my opinion th[at] they were not men. The labourers, who saw no harm in their handling the gypsy girls, were mystified by my action and merely thought me a little mad."[171]

Glubb's disappointment in the men stems from his projective fantasy of them as "chivalrous" by tradition. The fact that they failed to live up to his fantasy of who they should be filled him with horror. For "[h]is Orient is not the Orient as it is, but the Orient as it has been Orientalized."[172] As Said notes in *Orientalism*, "the Orient is thus Orientalized, a process that not only marks the Orient as the province of the Orientalist but also forces the uninitiated Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications . . . as the true Orient. Truth, in short, becomes a function of learned judgment, not of the material itself, which in time seems to owe even its existence to the Orientalist.[173]

Despite all the cultural differences between Europeans and Bedouin Arabs, Glubb asserts that "[w]hen we have studied all the history, the folk-lore and the religious precepts of the Arabs, we find to our surprise that, inside the bedouin tent, the relations of man and wife are more like those of Mr. and Mrs. Smith of Tooting than we had visualized."[174] It is noteworthy that the only occasion that Glubb shows any interest in Arab women is during the 1948 War:

> Glubb: "I really cannot rattle through Jerusalem in a huge armoured car with the vizors closed, while the streets are full of women wandering about unconcerned. . . . "
>
> The young soldier [who was "very young. A new moustache was just beginning to pencil his upper lip"] surveyed with distaste two remarkably pretty girls in brightly coloured summer frocks, and with high heels, who walked past arm in arm. . . . "It does not matter much if the Jews kill a few girls," he remarked, "but [referring to Glubb] an army is no good without its general."[175]

Note the difference in opinion about the Palestinian "girls" between the young Jordanian Bedouin soldier and Glubb. Of course, the young man's opinion is attributed to him by Glubb, who shares his alleged distaste but not the idea that "girls" are dispensable compared to colonial army generals. The military as the institution with which the Bedouin was to affiliate has indeed succeeded. This was just another instance in which the project of shifting the male Bedouin's filiative loyalties to his tribe and clan to an affiliative loyalty with his military comrades showed much success.[176] This was the first step for the subsequent affiliation of the Bedouin with the nation.

In his autobiography, Glubb speaks of his personal sexual history and how completely asexual he had always been, marrying at the late age of forty-one only because he wanted a family. His Protestant anti-sex attitude is so pronounced that he is appalled at ideas of divorce, or of women's liberation from parental authority. He states, "I have devoted a great deal of time to the study of the rise and fall of past civilizations, and was intensely interested to discover that most national periods of decadence have been marked by increasing ease of divorce and sexual laxity." Tragic examples include the Roman Empire.[177] He also writes glowingly and homoerotically of his father, emphasizing the latter's "virility"[178] and crediting him with imparting to him his sexual mores.[179] Such mores led him to assert, "I have not the slightest

doubt that young girls do need protection. They constitute the greatest treasures of our race and it is on them that the whole future of our people depends, for it is mothers who form the characters of their children."[180] Glubb held these views until the last days of his life, reflecting his increasing concern that the British race was in jeopardy.

Transforming the Bedouins

With the advent of the British, the lifestyle of all the population (Bedouins, villagers, and city dwellers) was to undergo immense changes. Glubb, as usual, fully absorbed in his Bedouin obsession, commented that before British authority was established, "the Governments concerned had not yet attempted to bring the desert under control, and the bedouins still migrated, raided and fought unmolested."[181] This situation was to be radically transformed, so much so that the desert that Glubb crossed in 1924 from Baghdad to Amman, with its attendant risks of heat, water shortage, and Bedouin raids, was no more: "Ten years later the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline passed this way, a pumping station had been built in this waste, and English ladies were taking their tea out for a picnic in these stony valleys. That ten years [1924 to 1934] was to see the passing of an era."[182]

In describing the territories east of the Jordan river before the arrival of ʿAbdullah, Glubb explains how this "wild and unwanted [by whom?] territory east of the Jordan was out of hand and without a government. Negotiations were opened, and the Amir Abdulla was persuaded to accept the sovereignty of the unwanted territory. Trans-Jordan was born." Glubb elaborates:

> The task facing His Highness was by no means a simple one. Trans-Jordan was four-fifths desert, inhabited by nomadic bedouins who had not been subjected to any government for many centuries, if, indeed, they had been so subjected even by the first Muslim Empire in the eighth and ninth centuries. In the cultivated area society was almost entirely tribally organized, under paramount shaiks rarely powerful enough to maintain order but always able and often willing to destroy it. In the extreme north the villagers had been accustomed for a generation or more to the efficient control of the Ottoman Government. Throughout the remainder of the country the Turks had been in occupation for only a few years, and almost the whole population rec-

> ollected perfectly the great days before the Turks came. . . . The task was, therefore, to create rather than to take over the Government. . . . One of the first problems to be faced was obviously the organization of armed forces to commence the task of establishing public security and bringing the independent tribes to order.[183]

Whereas Peake recruited only from rural and urban areas having an overall boycott of Bedouins as potential recruits, Glubb was to transform military recruitment and ultimately the military identity of the Arab Legion. This was to also form the very national identity being fashioned in Transjordan. However, the process of recruitment of Bedouins was not done easily. Godfrey Lias, a chronicler of the Arab Legion, states that "the ice which had constrained the nomad mind for 1,000 years is just beginning to crack. Local Beduins, as well as those from other parts of Arabia, have begun to enlist in the ice-breaker, Desert Patrol, and the next leap forward is about to start."[184] Actually, several disciplinarian strategies had to be enacted to effect the desired result—the transformation of Bedouin culture and lifestyle, in short, the de-Bedouinization of the Bedouins as a precursor to the Bedouinization of Jordanian national identity. Glubb cites some of the difficulties he faced in 1931 upon launching his new project for the Bedouins: "But enlist as soldiers they would not. The idea that the Government was their bitterest enemy was too deeply *engrained in their minds* to admit such a *novel* idea."[185] In fact, the idea was not really novel as the Huwaytat and the other tribes had been subject, albeit intermittently, to governmental rule and they simply did not like the oppressive policies of governments. Their enmity for governments was not "engrained in their minds" but based on historical and present experience. Although Glubb recruited at first Iraqi and Hijazi Bedouins, slowly Transjordan's Bedouins were joining.[186] This was for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the ending of Bedouin raiding as an activity made the military the only sanctioned place for warfare that the Bedouins could engage in. On the other hand, the deteriorating economic situation of the Bedouins, with the drought and ensuing famine from 1932 to 1933, drove more of them into the Arab Legion where they could earn a living. In addition, Glubb paid many tribal shaykhs money to control the raiding and earn their favor.[187] The Legion's incorporation of the Bedouins was so successful that soon civilian firms began to employ them as watchmen. The British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company financed the expansion of the Desert Patrol by seventy men, almost double its original size, so that the new recruits could be used to protect its stores and camps along the pipeline that

crosses into Transjordan.[188] Only a couple of years earlier, the Bedouins had been feared as the main threat to the safety of the pipeline.[189] In the meantime, since Glubb still had to rely on non-Transjordanian Bedouins, the Desert Patrol was exempted from recruiting citizens exclusively, thus waiving the condition that had been asserted by the Travel-Documents law of 1927 (the precursor law to the 1928 Nationality Law). At one point, Transjordanian Bedouins protested the recruitment of Saudi/Hijazi Bedouins into the Arab Legion. Although as George Dragnich explains, "it would be hasty to conclude that the former were developing a national awareness—other evidence does not support that conclusion for this time frame, and they may have only wanted other members of their tribe to be enlisted."[190]

For all his ostensible dislike of European laws, Glubb would not have been able to carry out his task without relying on them. In addition to the military having authority over its Bedouin recruits, the law was marshaled to increase the power of the military over the civilian Bedouin population. As mentioned earlier, in 1936 the Law of Tribal Courts bestowed on the head of the Arab Legion (who at the time was Peake, with Glubb replacing him in 1939) not only the duty to execute the rulings of the tribal courts but also the complete authority of a *mutasarrif*, or governor, over the Bedouins throughout the country.[191] As the following clarifies, Glubb was aware of the productive quality of laws, of their ability not only to repress, restrict, constrain, or simply erase certain practices, but as importantly to produce new identities, new classifications, a new taxonomy by which the population was to be segmented in relation to the law. In a statement presaging Foucault's conclusion about the modern prison's role in producing criminals, Glubb states, "In the past everybody raided, and raiding was a custom not a crime. From now onwards, we developed in a mild way a criminal class."[192] Glubb happily explains how raiding was ended in Transjordan without "violence," in contrast to neighboring Arab countries, and how credit should go to the Desert Patrol men who "by their wisdom, their devotion to the cause in which they were engaged and their brotherly love for one another, so impressed the tribes by their example that they gave to tens of thousands of wild nomads a vision of a new kind of life."[193]

Glubb insisted on following the Gandhian formula of which he was so fond, namely, that "we should start with local institutions and then modify them as is found necessary to suit *modern* conditions. This was the system we adopted with the nomadic tribes which had never been administered by a Government."[194] Despite Glubb's reticence to transform Bedouins into "moderns" due to his understanding that *modern* meant *like us*, he still pro-

ceeded in that direction, hoping that sublating existing laws rather than simply replacing them would eschew that pitfall. We shall see how such a course of action achieved no such thing. The Christian patriarch that he fancied himself to be, Glubb describes the transformation of the Bedouins—from nomads into settled soldiers and farmers, from illiterates into literates, and from people beyond the reach of European state laws to ones subjected to and produced (subjectified) by them—under the heading "Labour of Love."[195] He concludes that the "limits of cultivation in Trans-Jordan have been extended, the standard of cultivation has been improved, tribesmen have been digging new wells, building storehouse, enclosing gardens. Why? Because, for the last few years, they have acquired confidence in the permanence of law and order. . . . If a breakdown of public security were to take place, this constructive work by tribesmen would cease."[196] Indeed, the Bedouins understood the logic of capital, bourgeois property, and the laws protecting both so well that limits had to be placed on their enterprising attempts. According to Glubb, "The usual [Bedouin] tactics were to go some fifteen miles out into the desert, plough up about fifty acres and sow it with barley. The idea was that if a man owned a village on the edge of the desert and a microscopic piece of cultivation fifteen miles out, he automatically owned all the desert in between. This hasty rush to stake out claims to land far out of the desert naturally produces some sharp disputes between rival stakers of claims."[197]

To alleviate the optimism of this Bedouin view of capitalist relations, Glubb suggested that the "only solution would appear [to be] to limit the cultivation in the desert to a strip lying along the east of the Hejaz railway and to forbid the staking of claims in isolated valleys far out in the desert." He is, however, conscious of the irony of the situation: "the necessity for preventing Bedouins in Transjordan from cultivating is amusing in view of the fact that it is generally considered necessary to adopt every possible means to compel then to cultivate. A second irony is the high state of public security in the desert which has emboldened all and sundry to race to stake out land claims in an area where formerly only raiders armed to the teeth could travel."[198]

Glubb's task was successfully accomplished through a strategic juridico-disciplinary dyad. He explains how Bedouin life-style was transfigured in tune with British imperial policy. Due to government penalties, "raiding was no longer worthwhile, and soon ceased."

> This we were able to do only because the Desert Patrol was in itself entirely composed of bedouins, including men of all the tribes con-

> cerned in these feuds. These men felt no scruples in this degree of efficiency by the high moral standard which we had inculcated in our own men. Their numbers were so few and the desire of the tribesman to enlist was so great, that we were able to pick and test each man individually. We spent much time in explaining to every individual man exactly what we were trying to do, how the age of raiding was past, and how much better it was for the tribes to learn to accommodate themselves voluntarily to the conditions of the modern world. Every soldier had ocular proof of the benevolent intentions of the Government, when he saw new medical clinics and hospitals opened, the sick and the old receiving free treatment, and the children admitted to school. Finally, the penalties we inflicted were not vicious or ruinous, so that the tribal soldier did not hesitate to arrest his own fellow tribesmen. He knew that they would meet not only with justice but with mercy, and just enough of a penalty to deter them from repeating the offence. . . . The men of the Desert Patrol were the most ardent missionaries of reform. They acted with all their power to put an end to raiding by their own fellow tribesmen, because they believed the latter to be mistaken and deluded, and they longed to convert them to the gospel of the new age.[199]

The result of this process of selective modernization was civilizing the "wild" Bedouins, thus rendering them of much value for British imperial policy in the area. The transformation was dramatic:

> These men who never committed crimes and never even accosted women, were not graduates of Eton and Oxford. Many were half-wild tribesmen who, a few years ago, would have thought little of cutting the throat of an enemy. But they were filled with an immense pride in the race from which they sprung, in the Arab Army to which they belonged, and in the martial traditions of their ancestors. Leaving for the first time their remote mountain villages or wandering desert tribes, they found themselves suddenly the cynosure of every eye, and the comrades of the soldiers of strange nations of some of whom they had never heard. They were not the men to disgrace their ancestors and their companions before foreigners.[200]

This transformation of the Bedouins through a new juridico-disciplinary regime was accomplished not only through overall generalized policies but through individual attention to whomever Glubb encountered. He, the self-

designated father, was going to teach each and every one of them a lesson. He narrates an incident in which a Bedouin of the Khushman tribe, assigned guard duty, failed to carry out the task: "Perhaps I was tired with long nights and days in the desert. . . . I lost my temper, and walking up to the man, I struck his sneering face with my fist. I then went back to my car and drove away."[201] On hearing of this injury, the brother of the accosted man confronted Glubb.

> "Did you strike my brother?" he screamed.
>
> I was standing alone and unarmed on a flat piece of desert. Near by my driver, also alarmed, sat in the car. I saw for an instant a dark bearded face, with wild matted hair hanging over the eyes."Yes I hit your brother," I said, "and I'll teach you a lesson too."[202]

As punishment, Glubb confiscated the camel herds of the Khushman. Other tribal leaders intervened on their behalf, pleading with Glubb for forgiveness. Having a big heart, Glubb relented telling the delegation "to tell the Khushman not to be naughty again, and gave them back the camels."[203] A similar punishment was meted out to the Huwaytat tribe for also being "naughty."[204]

Another dimension of "caring" for the Bedouins was the creation of the Desert Medical Unit in 1937. It consisted of one doctor, four nurses, and a driver. This unit would roam the desert providing free medical care to the Bedouin population at the "mobile clinics" installed outside the posts of the Desert Patrol. These clinics treated 10,000 patients in 1937, 15,000 in 1938, and 22,000 in 1939. Patients were treated for a variety of ailments, including eye diseases, malaria, syphilis, and bilharzia (or schistosomiasis).[205] This was not the first effort to provide medical care to the army. Peake had already enlisted the services of a British missionary physician, Dr. Charlotte Purnell, to oversee the army's medical care as early as 1923. Indeed, the Jordanian physician Hanna al-Qusus wrote a number of articles in 1924 in *Al-Sharq al-'Arabi* (the precursor to *Al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyyah*) to raise the soldiers' consciousness on matters of health and hygiene.[206]

Education, Surveillance, and the Production of Bedouin Culture

Glubb's commitment to a certain version of tribal Bedouin culture led him, through the different arms of the state at his disposal, to completely

redefine what is Bedouin and what is not, adopting new ways of thinking and acting and recoding them as traditional, while simultaneously banishing whatever he considered harmful to the interests the new Arab was to protect and recoding them as foreign. He was able to do that not only as the head of the Arab Legion since 1939, but also with his juridical authority as mutassarif, or governor of all Bedouins, a status bestowed on him by the Tribal Courts Law of 1936. Glubb's ingenuity lies in his putting in motion a whole cultural production that came to de-Bedouinize Jordan's Bedouins while redefining all that he introduced as "Bedouin." This was carried out through a Bedouinization policy that all Jordanians, Bedouins or not, were to undergo, wherein the entire country, with its different populations, was Bedouinized at the same moment that the Bedouins themselves were being properly (de)Bedouinized à la Glubb through a selective process of mimicry.

Glubb's initial contradictory project of segregating Bedouins from non-Bedouins was instrumental in achieving his goal of rendering them the core of Transjordan's new identity. The integration of the Bedouins into the state structure, the process by which they were and are still disciplined, had to be done with an absence of contamination from city and village Arabs. Only Glubb could be the Bedouins' window to the outside world. Disciplining the Bedouins of course required repressing them not only through killing them, beating them, expelling them, imprisoning them, confiscating their property, and exiling them, but also through educating them (in the way of Empire), providing for them (financially), protecting them, even "loving" them. As Althusser has explained, "There is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus. . . . For example, the Army and the Police also function by ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the 'values' they propound externally."[207] Although one of Glubb's first colonial activities was a bombing raid on Iraqi Bedouins, killing, according to him, "[o]nly one old woman,"[208] he was later to follow more peaceful means: "The basis of our desert control was not force but persuasion and love. In the office of every desert fort, a notice was fixed on the wall: 'Example is stronger than precept, so guide the people by your noble deeds.' I visited all the desert posts at frequent intervals and spoke to them of our duty to the people. These were rough men, brought up to raiding and robbery, but they were simple. I have often seen the tears run down their faces as I spoke to them of our duty to the nation."[209]

A new nationalist pedagogy was born. The concept of the nation was so strong that even rough men were driven to tears. The use of persuasion as the preferred method was so successful that Glubb summarizes it as follows: "I had arrived alone in Jordan, and had succeeded in ending desert raiding

(and even stealing) without firing a shot or sending a man to prison. The tribes, previously the bitterest enemies of the government, had become its most loyal adherents."[210] James Lunt, Glubb's biographer and a former officer of the Arab Legion, recaps how the "persuasion" strategy had led to the establishment of state authority: "If 1931 had been the year of persuasion, 1932 was the year for showing the flag throughout the Transjordan desert. 1933 was the year of consolidation when the forts were built."[211]

Glubb's stress on education and his personal enjoyment of it are important in this regard.[212] He explains that "[e]ver since I had been commander of the desert area before 1939, I had taken an interest in teaching boys."[213] This task was carried institutionally through the introduction of homosocial military schools: "Within a few years, we built up an Army Education Branch, which eventually provided for several thousand children. . . . all the boys joined the Arab Legion on discharge from school—not compulsorily but voluntarily. . . . All officer cadets in 1955 came from Arab Legion schools likewise."[214]

The school system became instrumental in the production of the British-imagined "Transjordanian." It is in those schools, or what Althusser calls the ideological state apparatus, that a gendered Transjordanian nationalist agency was first conceived. The responsibility of the military school system was to teach the boys a new ideology, nay a new epistemology, through which they were to apprehend their identity as well as the function it was to have: "The need for the production of Arab officers cadets, apprentice tradesmen and future NCO's from Arab Legion schools was to become more pressing as time went on. The government schools were saturated with politics, and many school-teachers were Communists. In Arab Legion schools, every effort was made to teach the boys a straightforward open creed—*service to king and country, duty, sacrifice and religion* [emphasis added].[215]

Glubb reduces this formulaic creed to its bare essentials. In the "military preface" to 'Abdullah's memoirs, written for the benefit of the troops in a special edition released to them, he says, "All that we soldiers have to do is to do our duty to *God, the King and the nation* [emphasis added]."[216] In a slight but crucial variation of the British original, this parsimonious truncation of the creed into a proper hierarchy was to guide the definition of Jordanian nationalist agency to this very day. In accordance with nationalism, the creed was to be rearranged as such: "God, Homeland, King" or "Allah, al-Watan, al-Malik." Glubb's gradual project was one of transforming the Bedouins' loyalty from tribal to military and finally to nationalist loyalty. The final stage was to come to fruition long after Glubb had left Jordan. As

for military loyalty, it manifested itself strongly during the first international intervention it was to carry out against Iraqi anti-British nationalists in 1941. Glubb states that the Bedouins of the Arab Legion abetted the British in their policy "from a feeling of military loyalty. Having served with us when things were easy, they were too honorable to desert when things went wrong."[217]

Glubb dismissed nonmilitary education as inappropriate for the Arabs. He always denigrated it as causing instability and mayhem. He affirms that "[i]n the Arab countries, where education is so new and so rare, intellectual pride is a common and unattractive quality of the young secondary school graduate. It is a form of snobbery which never inspires loyalty in fighting men."[218] This statement was made by Glubb in response to Jordanian nationalists' complaints against him that he did not promote educated men to be officers and in fact had a number of illiterates reach that status.[219] In this light, it is instructive to note his terror at these arrogant young graduates who thought they could actually become equal to him rather than obey his British majestic self. He explains, "In the Arab countries, where knowledge is still a novelty, it commands even more reverence than in Europe. . . . Indeed, in the Arab countries, shepherds may more likely possess it [knowledge] than university graduates. For knowledge is still rare in the Middle East, and its possession is therefore liable to give rise to intellectual pride, whereas, in the pursuit of wisdom, no quality is more necessary than humility."[220]

The result of the introduction of political intrigue in the country by educated men was nothing less than the retardation of Jordan's development, including in the realm of education. Glubb here waxes modernizationist: "There was still so much to be done in Trans-Jordan. With the universal concentration on Politics alone, there was no longer any time to give to the activities of the years of construction, the schools for the illiterate, the medical clinics for the poor, the importation of tractor ploughs, the education of the nomads in agriculture. There were still those children who were backward, those Roman masonry cisterns choked with earth—so much building up to be done."[221]

In fact, nonmilitary education, according to Glubb, had destroyed the once noble Bedouin personality. He laments such loss while identifying the educational system as the culprit: "In the early days bedouins rarely lied. Their faces were frank and open. In their commercial transactions or their relations with the older generations of merchants, receipts were never asked nor given. All parties trusted one another. Then we began to teach them to write, and they gradually learned to lie and deceive. What is there at fault

in a system of education which, while teaching men to read and write, seems simultaneously to introduce them to forgery and deceit?"[222]

Glubb's schools were designed to impart a special kind of education. According to the British government, these schools followed "a special curriculum designed to suit the needs of the Beduin."[223] Glubb concurred, asserting that for Bedouin men "suitability may be defined as an education which will not destroy their traditional moral background, and which will on the material side fit the pupils for the type of life which they will lead."[224]

In addition to education, surveillance was of the essence. This had started before Glubb's arrival in the country. Whereas the Arab Legion had established a criminal investigation branch as early as 1926 and a passport office in 1927, by 1928 the British boasted that the Legion's new fingerprint bureau was "proving of considerable benefit."[225] In addition, several laws were enacted in 1927 to enhance the state's control of the population. Such laws included the Prison Law, the Trailing of Persons and Search of Premises Law, the Crime Prevention Law, the Exile and Deportation Law, and the Extradition Law. As discipline is a regime of detail, Glubb in turn pursued a meticulous surveillance strategy, amassing intricate details about every angle of a soldier's life. James Lunt states,

> Memories of these days recall to mind the Confidential Report system in use in the Arab Legion. These had to be compiled on every officer and soldier and comprised a five or six page booklet which listed every known military virtue and failing. On every page were columns marked Excellent, Good, Fair, Bad and Nil. The reporting officer was required to put an X against such abstruse questions as "Give the extent of this man's belief in God," or even more difficult to answer, the extent of a man's interest in sex. In the case of the latter it was hard to know in which column the X should best be written, an "Excellent" signifying either too great an indulgence or monastic abstinence. One never knew."[226]

These surveillance reports were crucial to a soldier's chances of promotion, a procedure almost fully controlled by Glubb. In fact, Dragnich explains that the educational efforts on the part of the Legion "were conceived as more than a remedial step until a better educated generation could take over. The need was partly administrative: files and records had to be kept at the desert forts."[227] This is how another British officer of the Legion describes it: "Promotion examinations were a great feature of life in the Arab Legion and occupied quite a lot of one's time. . . . The promotion examinations for

junior N.C.O.'s were organized by brigade headquarters, and for senior N.C.O.'s and officers by Division. Successful candidates were promoted if they were recommended by their commanding officers, and if their annual confidential reports held at Qiada [Army headquarters], were deemed satisfactory. This elaborate system was no doubt intended to check the nepotism, which is a feature of Arab life."[228]

The reports themselves are described by Young, who seemed less confused than Lunt as to their evaluative system, especially as regards sexual activity:

> Annual confidential reports were written for every officer, N.C.O. and man, and were secret. Officers were not required to initial their reports, but even so Arab C.O.s whether because they are too kind-hearted, or because they are afraid that their remarks will come to light and be held against them, are extremely reluctant to describe the failings of their followers. For this reason a five- or six-page document, in both languages, was devised, which listed every known military virtue and defect. At the top of each page were written: Excellent, Good, Fair, Bad, and Nil. All the C.O. had to do was to put an X in the appropriate column. If you thought that a man's belief in the Value of prayer was Nil you merely put an X in the space provided. It was made perfectly clear by elaborate notes that if a man was notoriously keen on sexual offences the X was not meant to go under Excellent."[229]

Part of the training of the Bedouins was introducing them to European sports—team loyalty being ostensibly a complementary feature of strengthening tribal and national loyalty (Althusser had identified the role of sports, which is part of the cultural apparatus, as central to imparting chauvinism and nationalism[230]). To achieve this task, one of Glubb's associates, Sam Cooke (known as Cooke Pasha), translated the British Army's Manual *Games and Sports in the Army* into Arabic. Lunt remarks, "If by this he had intended to teach Jordanians cricket, or to discourage the bedouins from cheating when taking part in a tug-of-war, he was to be disappointed. When two bedouin teams were pulling against each other it was necessary to surround the arena with barbed wire to discourage spectators from joining in."[231] Still, some British officers began training the Bedouins in sports. Some of the problems they encountered were reported by Peter Young:

> James Watson, who had long held the British Army record for putting the weight, was very keen on all kinds of athletics, and had built up a

> strong [9th] regimental team. The star turn was Hassan Atallah, known as "Abu Sibil," "Father of the Pipe." Unfortunately, his fame has spread to 7 Regiment's team, and when they saw a lean and bearded bedouin loping along with a pipe in his mouth they ran up to him and cried, "Are you Abu Sibil?" He replied that he was, whereupon they threw him to the ground and ran over his prostrate body! This horrible story was related to me afterwards by the outraged members of our team, anxious to explain why they only got second place. 7 Regiment were first.[232]

Sports activity in which the Arab Legion participated included cross-country running.[233] One British officer, John Adair, a cultural cross-dresser who was renamed Sweilem, "took our athletics team in hand, and they won the brigade sports. . . . Of these the most important was the winning of the Lash Cup. This is a great silver trophy presented annually to the Regiment whose rifle team gets the highest score in the Legion. Our team had won it in Watson's day, but had lost it in 1953."[234]

One sporting activity that disturbed the sensibility of the Bedouins is described by Gawain Bell, another British officer:

> Every morning we began with forty minutes' physical training. This was an activity which the Bedu found difficult to appreciate. They were hard fit men in any case, their lives had been spent in open air, they were used to active existence; why then was it necessary to subject them to the absurdities of jumping up and down, bending and twisting their arms around? There were two exercises in particular of which they found the propriety doubtful to say the least. Press-ups they were prepared to do under some protest and with a good deal of embarrassment. Was it necessary, with all its apparently male associations, to do something quite so crude? As for the companion exercise that involved lying on one's back and making circular movements with one's legs in the air, no: this was an utterly unseemly activity for men. We abandoned it. But when it came to things like going through an assault course which called for the sort of muscles and the agility we had hoped to develop through these PT parades, they were all enthusiasm.[235]

Clearly, sports here not only are intended to foster a team spirit commensurate with nationalism but also act as masculinizing rituals. Insofar as

British corporeal movements conflicted with Bedouin gender epistemology, they were resisted, insofar as they did not, they were assimilated into the Bedouin's own masculine rituals. In the context of the military, all masculinizing rituals are always already nationalist rituals. The function of sports in the military, therefore, is to couple masculinity and a militarized sense of nationality, of nationalizing masculinity itself. This new nationalized masculinity becomes the model for the nation.

The Arab Legion also introduced European musical instruments and European music to its soldiers through setting up musical bands. In 1921, the first Massed Bands were formed consisting of eighteen musicians, ten from Egypt and eight from Syria. It was led by the Egyptian Muhammad Khatir.[236] Peake tells the story of the genesis of the Massed Bands:

> The government decided that His Highness should leave his capital with all possible pomp and glory. I was therefore asked to line the streets with the Reserve Force and to allow the band, the instruments for which had arrived about fourteen days before, to march in front of the Amir's car. At the last moment the big drum fell off the lorry bringing the band back to Amman and was crushed under the wheels. It was therefore necessary to hire the town crier, who had a drum. The procession started after the usual delays, when suddenly the band burst into activity, emitting an incredible amount of tuneless noise. . . . Then came the final guard of honour, on the right of which I saw with trepidation the two buglers sounded, not the usual Royal Salute, but "Come to the cook-house doors." The culprits explained later that it was all they knew. Abdullah, who had been a soldier, undoubtedly recognized the call but, after his experiences with the band, was probably beyond caring what happened and so said "good-bye" to me politely. On his return things were better. I had asked the bandmaster of the Palestine police Band to come over for a day or two, and he had impressed upon the Arab Legion Band that noise was not all that was required, the audience had a right to expect some tune.[237]

The bands' repertoire had expanded measurably, including the tune to Transjordan's princely (later royal) anthem "'Asha al-Amir" or "Long live the Prince," which was later updated to "'Asha al-Malik" or "Long live the young king," following the self-appointment of 'Abdullah as king upon independence in 1946. The anthem's lyrics were written by the Syrio-Palestinian 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Rifa'i, with the music composed by the Lebanese

ʿAbd al-Qadir al Tannir.[238] By the mid thirties, the bands had become such a big hit in Transjordan that they were invited to play at private parties and celebrations. The demand became so high that the government was compelled to issue a statute listing the fees to be paid to the Massed Bands for being contracted out for private events.[239] In September 1940, for example, the bands, along with the Amir ʿAbdullah, were invited to play at the inauguration of the new building housing the Circassian Charity Association in Amman.[240] Moreover, on the occasion of King Husayn's coronation in 1953, the Massed Bands were also a major hit. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Young reports how that "evening . . . the Massed Bands beat their retreat in [the new king's] honour on the parade ground in Zerqa Camp and gave us a fine selection of 'British' martial music, including 'Les Huguenots' and the slow march from 'Scipio.' "[241] There were actually three bands in the Arab Legion: the blue, the red, and the green. "In winter they wear khaki battle-dress, and in the summer white service dress. They can be distinguished one from the other by the colour of their lanyards, epaulettes and pipes. All musicians wear a lyre badge on the right arm above the elbow."[242]

The most important musical instruments to be introduced to the Legion were the bagpipes.[243] This was done in 1929 by the order of the Amir ʿAbdullah himself. Six members of the bands were selected and sent to Jerusalem, where a British Mandatory Bagpipe Band existed. A British officer named Patterson who was fluent in Arabic took on the training of the six musicians for two years, after which the musicians returned to Transjordan to form the first Bagpipe Band in the country. They would march in front of the amir on his way to the mosque on Fridays.[244] It is also said that the Black Watch trained the Legionnaires to play them.[245] The bagpipes have remained to this very day the most distinguishing hallmark of the Massed Bands of the Jordanian Armed Forces [al-Jawqat al-Musiqiyyah]. The bands, in fact, had made so much progress that in 1955 they went on a tour of Britain. Glubb proudly describes this achievement as one of the last over which he was to preside: "People who imagined Arabs to be wild desert camel riders were surprised to see the massed bands beating retreat on the Horse Guard's Parade, or the Arab Legion pipes and drums marching down Princes Street, Edinburgh. It was our swan song—within eight months the Arab Legion had ceased to exist."[246]

It would seem that for Glubb, playing Western musical instruments and Western music has transformed the Bedouin Arabs from "wild desert camel riders" into modern men. The success of this civilizing mission has actually borne much fruit. Today, the Massed Bands of the Jordanian Armed Forces

have acquired an international reputation. They perform worldwide and are the recipients of a number of international awards and prizes. Their music and their bagpipes are nationalist icons, which, as Theodor Adorno stresses, "appear . . . as a representative of the nation, and everywhere confirm . . . the nationalist principle."[247]

Other activities including use of the camp latrine proved equally problematic. As Gawain Bell reports, "Camp hygiene was a constant headache. The Bedu just hated using the latrine. Being extremely modest in these things they wanted privacy, the privacy of a fold in the ground or the shelter of a bush. Once we had moved from the wide spaces of the desert where all three regiments did all their initial training, first to Jericho in the Jordan valley, and then to the hutted camps along the coast of Palestine south of Gaza, this became a real problem involving constant and at times self-defeating disciplinary action."[248]

Other problems included diet. Bedouins had to deal now with British Army rations, which included food items to which they were not used:

> The Bedu had come to accept and indeed to like bully beef, but for fresh meat we could no longer buy sheep once we had moved away from Azraq. We had therefore to rely on British Army supplies, which meant accepting frozen mutton from Australia and New Zealand. There was no knowing whether it had been slaughtered in accordance with Muslim practice, but this was not the real worry to the men, which was whether it was sheep at all. It might, they suggested, be dog. There was that little tail on the carcass that looked more than suspiciously like a dog's tail. And then the head was missing from the carcass. Why? A lot of the men refused to eat it until we took a party of Squadron Commanders and NCOs to the RASC cold stores in Jerusalem to examine the carcasses in detail, to talk to the British officer in charge who, with Indian and other non-Christian units to serve, had a wide and sympathetic experience of these problems. He reassured us. The regimental *Imam* added his own conviction that the meat was genuinely sheep and nothing sinister, and finally all was well.[249]

Still, rations-related problems remained. One such case was reported by Young: "Eid Hweimel, who was really a very passable N.C.O., got it into his head that the ration meat was not properly killed as an orthodox Moslem was entitled to expect. He therefore refused to eat his rations, and lived on

his pay—that is to say on what remained after his relations had visited him. This I only discovered because I noticed that his face had become covered in blemishes. He steadfastly refused to eat the rations and, as I was equally determined not to support him from the canteen fund, we reached an impasse. Fortunately, he was dispatched to the Cadet School and his apparently insoluble problem went with him."[250]

Between the military rations and the opening up of Transjordan to the world economy through British colonialism, the way Transjordanian Bedouins ate was to change substantially. Glubb states that "the effects of the opening up of the country to trade" on the inhabitants included their "learn[ing] to drink tea," as they were formerly coffee-drinkers.[251] The types of meat and grains used in cooking also changed. Camel meat, once the hallmark of Bedouin food, has but completely disappeared from their menu. Although drought and raiding had reduced the size of the Bedouin flocks, the colonial state's sedentarization campaigns transforming the Bedouins from nomadic camel herders into agriculturalists were the major factor. The introduction of guns and military hunting obliterated in turn the ostrich and gazelle population of the country—the meat of both animals had been part of the Bedouin diet.[252] As for burghul (cracked wheat) and farikah (roasted green wheat) which were used in most dishes, by villagers and urbanites alike (Bedouins mostly used bread as their main accompaniment to meat), they were to be substituted with white rice, which, because of its high price, was used by the Bedouins and the peasants previously only on festive occasions. Colonial trade relations had made the once expensive rice more affordable and available, thus competing with local grains.[253] This has been such an important transformation that *mansaf*,[254] which came to be coded by the architects of Jordan's "Bedouin" identity as the Bedouin dish *par excellence*, and which the Bedouins used to cook with meat (lamb or camel), meat broth, and bread *only* (what is also known as *tharid*), is now mostly made with white rice.[255] It is said that merchants introduced rice to the Balqaʾ region in 1925. An invitation was extended to many people in Ghawr Nimrayn to come and eat rice-based mansaf, "and people saw how rice is cooked and is incorporated in the mansaf and immediately copied this method."[256] The transition was in fact gradual. At first, mansaf would be made with burghul and covered with a thin layer of rice on top. Slowly, rice became more fully incorporated replacing burghul completely. In addition, the main contemporary characteristic of mansaf is *jamid*, or *laban jamid*, sour dried yogurt made from goat milk, which is used as a sauce (*sharab*) over the meat and rice (or burghul or farikah), and which most Bedouins did

not use in cooking mansaf before their sedentarization by the nation-state. Only village folks used jamid with mansaf, whereas most Bedouins used meat broth or Samn Baladi (ghee) instead.[257] Although jamid was made by Bedouins and eaten dry during bad years as a last resort when no other food was available, it was never used as the base of any type of sauce, and never in association with mansaf. [258] Today, the new white-rice mansaf with jamid is ironically considered "traditionally" Bedouin as well as being Jordan's exclusive "national dish"—although the peasants and Bedouins of southern Palestine and Syria also ate (and eat) it.[259] These claims are made not only by lay Jordanian nationalists but even by Jordanian and foreign social scientists. In a study of Jordan's Bedouins, some such social scientists go so far as to claim that the fact that Bedouins would "*often* [emphasis added] eat . . . balls of dried yoghurt called *jamid*," constitutes evidence that they used it in cooking mansaf![260] After describing the jamid mansaf, which they identify as Bedouin, the authors tell us in a matter-of-fact way that "mansaf has become the national dish of Jordan."[261] Moreover, they ahistorically inform us that among Bedouins, "Tea is the most common household beverage."[262]

The change in the Jordanian population's habits of consumption was registered by Glubb himself. Responding to Eliahu Epstein, who claimed that the economic situation of the Trans-Jordanian tribes was worsening,[263] Glubb retorts by asserting that it "is true that their economy has changed a good deal since the Armistice [at the end of World War I]. They have acquired a taste for many luxuries formerly unknown to them, and they live in greater physical comfort. . . . Their desire to buy imported luxuries and manufactured articles has caused them to spend more freely."[264]

Through the disciplinary mechanisms of surveillance and education, Glubb's policies not only *repressed* and erased much in the Bedouins' way of life that conflicted with imperial interests but also *produced* much that was new and combined it with what was "inoffensive" and "beneficial" in their "tradition" in a new amalgam of what was packaged as *real* Bedouin culture. The new Bedouin culture in fact sublated much of pre-imperial Bedouin culture foreclosing certain venues while opening a myriad others, erasing practices while preserving and transforming others. Even Jordan's own flag was designed by the British. Sir Mark Sykes had been the one who designed the flag under which the Arab Army under Faysal and Lawrence marched on Damascus during World War I, which later became the basis for Jordan's flag.[265] Just like the new uniforms that the Bedouin members of the Desert Patrol wore, the new culture of the Bedouins looked on the surface to be of Bedouin make, but on closer scrutiny, neither its color nor

its texture, much less its style and cloth material, resembled anything that the Bedouins would call theirs before the colonial encounter. In fact, many of them were at first ashamed of being seen in them. Those who were sent by Glubb as missionaries to recruit others "were ashamed of being seen in uniform. The metal badges in their ageyls, or headbands, were especially unpopular, and the men often took them off before entering an encampment, and always when going on leave. In those days the badge seemed to the desert Beduin to be a mark of servitude—the mark of the beast which was how they regarded the Government. They think differently today."[266] As Edward Said remarks, "since one cannot ontologically obliterate the Orient . . . one does have the means to capture it, treat it, describe it, improve it, radically alter it."[267] Indeed, for the Bedouin produced by Glubb is but a faint simulacrum of an original that does not exist. Glubb's Bedouin is nothing less than a catachresis designating a wrong referent,[268] a spectacle to himself and others, albeit one that is nationally constitutive. "The spectacle's externality with respect to the acting subject is demonstrated by the fact that the individual's own gestures are no longer his own, but rather those of someone else who represents them to him."[269] Glubb's white colonial masculinity masquerading as "Bedouinism" becomes the occasion of a double mimesis,[270] wherein the Bedouin of the Desert Patrol is supposed to imitate Glubb's white colonial masculinity's imitation of a phantasmatic "Bedouin." The image of what a Bedouin should be is, actually, Glubb's social fetish. If we approximate Freud's psychoanalytic finding, that the fetish is a substitute for a loss,[271] to this situation, Glubb's Bedouin becomes a substitute for the "real" Bedouin whom he had read about in Orientalist books and could not find in real life. Glubb's realization that the real Bedouin is not the same one he had read about, causes him a sense of loss that he overcomes by substituting a simulacrum of the Bedouin for the real one. Thus, he was able to avert the crisis of false representation on which his entire epistemology of the Orient had been based. The Glubb-created Bedouin is the fetish with which Glubb cathected throughout his entire life.

By the time Transjordan obtained its independence in 1946, declaring itself as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the lives of its inhabitants had been radically altered: "Where formerly nomadic tribes had terrorized the villages, a modern State had been built up—a State which had gained the respect of the world."[272] Glubb recaps Jordan's history, extolling its achievements: "In 1921, the Amir Abdulla had arrived in a wild tribal land, never before regularly administered. He was without a government, without an army, without police or any of the attributes of a modern State. On this day

[May 1946], twenty five years later, he was proclaimed king of a loyal, happy, proud and contented country. A simple people, united behind the throne, had stood like a rock while rebellion followed rebellion in Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia."[273]

For Glubb, Jordan was truly exceptional in the Middle East, as far as its openness to the West. Thanks to "her" acceptance of British help, "[u]nder the King's wise guidance, she developed a broad and statesmanlike attitude to the world, a genial welcome to foreigners and a stalwart common sense, qualities so often conspicuous by their absence in the narrow and embittered politics of the Middle East today."[274] Other "unwise" Arab leaders "reacted by refusing the help [from Europe]—and remaining backward and chaotic."[275] Glubb, of course, personified that "British help" of which he was so proud. In fact, thanks to Glubb's efforts, Jordan's Bedouins had been successfully transformed from "wild" albeit "noble" "primitives," into modern soldiers. His biographer summarizes Glubb's outstanding achievements in the following words: "Glubb had succeeded in preserving the bedouins' traditions while at the same time turning them into modern soldiers. . . . But the credit was not his alone; he would have been the first to acknowledge the support he received from his Arab deputy, Abdul Qadir Pasha al Jundi [of Libyan origin], Norman Lash, Ronnie Broadhurst, Gawain Bell and many other Arab and British officers."[276]

Proof of Bedouin loyalty to their surrogate father became evident to Glubb in his last days in Jordan. After learning of the expulsion orders issued by King Husayn, Glubb reports how his Arab officers bid him farewell tearfully and how one of them drew out his revolver to avenge him.[277] According to him, one or two units of the Arab Legion had contemplated action to redress him against the king, but in "every case it was the British officers who prevented incidents."[278] In fact, Glubb owed his very life to a Bedouin who had saved him from drowning in 1920 in the Diyala River in Iraq.[279] As he is departing Amman, he cites how a former Jordanian prime minister had told him once that he had been "a founder member of this kingdom." He summarizes his history in relation to Jordan, likening it to a child that he reared: "I had first seen Amman in 1924. . . . Then it was a little village. Now it is a city of a quarter of a million inhabitants. For twenty-six years I had watched the country grow up. From a handful of policemen, I had seen the Arab Legion grow to an army of 23,000 men and a National Guard of 30,000. When reservists were called out, they could put nearly 60,000 men in the field. . . . Now, in a few hours, twenty-six years of work had been destroyed."[280]

On the departing plane flying over Amman, Glubb states, "Fascinated, I watched the Arab coast fade into the blue mist. . . . I turned away and laughed."[281] Glubb's laughter was not so much cynical as it was a conclusive acknowledgment of his surviving legacy. His twenty-six years in Jordan, a country that he never visited again (he died in 1986), had been a success. The next thirty years of his life were spent writing books and lecturing about Jordan and the Arabs. Disraeli's dictum "The East is a Career" still rings true. Glubb had indeed left an indelible mark on every aspect of life in Jordan. His policies channeled through the institution of the army were central to the production of a Jordanian national identity that pervades every aspect of Jordanian life today and will for many years to come. But not only did Glubb's army produce the Bedouins as national subjects who were juridically defined within the framework of the nation-state, the army produced them as holders of a specific national culture that itself was also produced by the army. As Timothy Mitchell notes, the modern army appears "to consist on the one hand of individual soldiers and on the other of the machine they inhabited . . . this apparatus has no independent existence. It is an effect produced by the organized distribution of men, the coordination of their movement, the partitioning of space, and the hierarchical ordering of units, all of which are particular practices. . . . But the order and precision of such processes created the effect of an apparatus apart from the men themselves, whose structure orders, contains and controls them."[282] This juridical-military dyad introduced by British colonialism was both a repressive and a productive success. Today's Jordanian national identity and Jordanian national culture are living testament to that achievement.