Notes

Preface

1. Christian Parenti, "Making Prison Pay: Business Finds the Cheapest Labor of All" *Nation* 262(4) (January 29, 1996): 11–15
2. Cf., Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1991; Geoffery Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973).
3. Thus studies are constantly "refining" the definition of which states are (or are perceived to be—which is a different argument altogether!), liberal and democratic and what constitutes the dependent variable. My review of the literature (discussed at length in chapter 4), found five operationalizations of the dependent variable and 13 variations on what constitutes a "democracy" for the purposes of the democratic peace argument.
4. There has been much attention to the need to create "conflict management systems" to deal with militarized conflict after the end of the Cold War. But most of this focus excludes interstate conflict in Latin America, as well as the use of military force by the U.S. See Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson, eds., *Managing Contemporary Conflict* (Boulder: Westview, 1996); Edward J. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, eds., *Coping with Conflict after the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
5. Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Arthur Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
6. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, 2nd ed.), pp. 187–201.

7. David A. Lake, "Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach" in David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 45–67.
8. Frank D. McCann, Jr. "The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945" *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 25(3) (August 1983): 299–324.

1. The Origins of Violent Peace

1. Cf. Arie Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); Mike Desch, "Why Latin America May Miss the Cold War: The United States and the Future of Inter-American Security Relations" in Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *International Security and Democracy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), pp. 245–65.
2. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 185–189; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War" *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990): 5–56.
3. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics" *American Political Science Review* 80(4) (December 1986): 1151–69; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace" *International Security* 19(2) (Fall 1994): 87–125.
4. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Etel Solingen, "Economic Liberalization, Political Coalitions, and Emerging Regional Orders" in David Lake and Patrick J. Morgan, eds. *Regional Orders* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 68–100.
5. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72(3) (Summer 1993): 22–49.
6. John E. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
7. Cf. Robert Paarlberg, "Domesticating Global Management" *Foreign Affairs* 54(3) (1976): 563–576; Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
8. Definitions of democracy vary dramatically, even among democratic peace advocates. See my discussion in chapter 4.
9. Analysts who extrapolate international behavior from citizens' willingness in a democracy to resolve even fundamental disagreements via the ballot box cannot

be comfortable with the empirical reality of democracies threatening and shooting at each other, even when they produce fewer than 1,000 battlefield deaths. Consequently, a number of democratic peace advocates have turned to the issue of violence below war levels. Cf. Michael A. Doyle, "To the Editors " *International Security* 19(4) (Spring 1995): 180–94; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace" *American Political Science Review* 87(3) (September 1993): 624–38. Russet has even felt it necessary to try to explain why a democracy would use covert action against another democracy, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, pp. 120–24. For my critique, see chapter 4.

10. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was preceded by years of diplomatic bargaining and economic sanctioning by the U.S. James B. Crowley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Iraq's invasion of Kuwait came not only after months of tense negotiations, but after a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador as well. "Kuwait: How the West Blundered" *The Economist* September 29, 1990, reprinted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., *The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* (New York: Times Books, 1991), pp. 99–106.
11. The U.S. is the only democratic country in which a minor can be given a death sentence. Amnesty International, *United States of America: "A Macabre Assembly Line of Death" Death Penalty Developments in 1997*. April 1998 AMR 51/20/98, p. 14.
12. Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
13. Hanson, *Western Way of War*, pp. 219–27; for a general treatment, see Raphael Sealey, *A History of the Greek City States, 700–338 B.C.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
14. David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace" *International Security* 19(2) (Fall 1994): 50–86.
15. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System" *International Security* 10(4) (Spring 1986).
16. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 43–46; James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes" *American Political Science Review* 88(3) (September 1994): 577–92.
17. I. William Zartmann, "Prenegotiations: Phases and Functions" in Janet Gross Stein, ed., *Getting to the Table: The Process of International Prenegotiation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 1–17, focuses on costs, but Stein (p. x) suggests that increasing benefits falls into the realm of prenegotiations as well.

18. Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In* (New York: Penguin, 1991), 2nd edition, p. 141.
19. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, pp. 35–43.
20. These distinctions are categorized in great detail in the Militarized Interstate Disputes data base. Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976: Procedures, Patterns and Insights" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28(4) (December 1984): 585–615; an updated version is discussed in Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15(2) (Fall 1996): 163–213.
21. On the issue of binding commitments, see Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*, pp. 21–52 and Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences."
22. On bargaining over the characteristics of the bargain once both parties see an agreement is in their interest, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier" *World Politics* (April 1991): 336–66; P. Terrance Hopmann, *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 87–96.
23. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, pp. 21–52.
24. See the discussion in Hopmann, *The Negotiation Process*, pp. 53–75.
25. Waltz notes that explaining national foreign policies, as compared to systemic outcomes, requires unit level factors. The idea of "two level games" tries to incorporate domestic and international factors. Cf., Evans, et. al., *Double-Edged Diplomacy*. For review articles concerning the state of the literature in successfully incorporating such factors, see Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics" *International Organization* 49(4) (Autumn 1995): 751–74 and Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay" *International Security* 17(1) (Summer 1992).
26. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits to Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
27. John D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia* (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger, c. 1962); Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies" *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1969): 161–82; and T.V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
28. W. Robert Reed, "A Retrospective Voting Model with Heterogeneous Politicians" *Economics and Politics* 6(1) (March 1994): 39–57; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Gary Woller, "War and the

Fate of Regimes" *American Political Science Review* 86(3) (September 1992): 638–46; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *Reason and War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow and Ethan R. Zorick, "Capabilities, Perceptions and Escalation" *American Political Science Review* March 1997 91(1) 15–27. See also Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences.

29. In the international arena, this logic underlies the dynamics of the security dilemma, offense-defense explanations of war, and even the stability of the bipolar Cold War. Cf., Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma" and James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War" *International Organization* 49(3) (Summer 1995): 379–414. Waltz himself has argued that nuclear weapons, a unit level attribute, is a fundamental determinant of the absence of war between the U.S. and Soviet Union, even taking into account the expected stability of a bipolar world. "The Origins of War in NeoRealist Theory" *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 28(4) (Spring 1988): 615–28. In the domestic arena, see the literature on retrospective voting, including Reed, "A Retrospective Voting Model with Heterogeneous Politicians."
30. A wide range of international relations analysts agrees on this approach to studying international politics. Cf. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 95–96 and one of his archnemises, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in *War and Reason*, pp. 16–19.
31. This is the traditional realist approach, which began with Thucydides' *The Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972 revised edition), passed through Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* 5th ed. (New York: Knopf; distributed by Random House, 1973) and is present in John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security* 19(3) (Winter 1994): 5–49.
32. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power" *passim*; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*, p. 19.
33. Cf. The discussion in Holsti, *Peace and War*. This approach is similar to the argument that the stakes in question matter for the use of military force. On this point see Paul F. Diehl, "What Are They Fighting For? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research" *Journal of Peace Research* 29(3) (August 1992): 333–44; Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, *Territorial Changes and International Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1992); For an analysis distinguishing territorial from nonterritorial issues in Latin American MIDs, see Paul R. Hensel, "One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816–1986" *Journal of Peace Research* 31(3) 1994): 281–97.
34. Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

35. Here I follow Peter A. Gourevitch's definition of the ruling coalition, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); see also Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
36. Cf., Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, pp. 31–37; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*, pp. 45–52; Doyle limits this preference ordering to relations among liberal states and worries that liberal states have a tendency to provoke violence with non-liberal states. See Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I" pp. 230–32 and "Part 2" pp. 323–53, in *Philosophy and World Affairs*, Summer 1983 12(3) and Fall 1983, 12(4), respectively ; Kapstein, "Is realism dead?" also objects to this assumption, pp. 761–62.
37. On Fashoda, see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: the Myth of the Democratic Peace" *International Security* 19(2) (Fall 1994): 28–33; on Venezuela, see Leandro Area, Elke Nieschulz de Stockhausen, *El Golfo de Venezuela: Documentación y cronología. Vol. II (1981–1989)* (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1991).
38. There is a large body of work demonstrating that the military requires support from key sectors in civil society in order to govern, and by extension, to threaten to govern if their policy preferences are not met. Cf., Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Alain Rouquie, *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans., Paul E. Sigmund (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
39. It had long been assumed that foreign policy had little impact on U.S. Presidential elections, but recent work is calling this into question. John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Brogida "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates 'Waltz Before a Blind Audience'?" *American Political Science Review* 83(1) (March 1989): 123–42. A historical case is made in Charles P. Korr, *Cromwell and the New Model Foreign Policy: England's Policy Toward France, 1649–1658* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
40. Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller, "War and the Fate of Regimes."
41. Arno J. Mayer, "Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870–1956: A Research Assignment" *Journal of Modern History* (September 1969): 291–303 ; Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993, reprint of 1989 Unwin Hyman edition), pp. 259–88.
42. Caesar D. Sereseres, "The Interplay of Internal War and Democratization in Guatemala since 1982" in David R. Mares, ed., *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia and Central Europe* (Boulder: Westview, 1998), pp. 206–22. Serrano shortly there-

after overstepped his bounds, however. When he attempted to suspend the constitution and rule by emergency degree, the military opted to support the constitution instead and Serrano fell from office.

43. Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick, "Capabilities, Perception and Escalation"; Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," p. 381.
44. Keisuke Iida attempts to model this possibility formally, but makes too many simplifying assumptions and imposes too many restrictions on players' moves (e.g., voting is sincere, rather than strategic), for the model to be empirically useful. "When and How do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(3) (September 1993): 403–26. One could use bureaucratic politics, legislative-executive bargaining, or principal-agent arguments to explain how these incomplete costs arise in domestic politics.
45. Examples include the U.S. mobilization of the Navy and ultimatum to Chile in 1891 after police arrested U.S. sailors involved in a barroom brawl. Peru also mobilized in 1977 after Chile began discussing Bolivian sovereign access to the sea via territory that Chile seized from Peru in the War of the Pacific 1879–1884. Joyce S. Goldberg *The Baltimore Affair* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986) and José de la Puente Radbill, "La mediterraneidad de Bolivia" in Eduardo Ferrero Costa, ed., *Relaciones del Perú con Chile y Bolivia*. (Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1989), pp. 399–58, Daniel M. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sánchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1991), p. 265 respectively.
46. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts*; Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
47. George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*; John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Alan Alexandroff and Richard Rosecrance "Deterrence in 1939" *World Politics* (April 1977): 404–24; Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts*.
48. David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); I.M. Destler and John Odell, assisted by Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics* (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987); Lisa L. Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Exploring Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
49. Thomas P. Anderson, *The War of the Dispossessed: Honduras and El Salvador, 1969* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981); Mark Rosenberg, et. al., *Honduras : Pieza clave de la política de Estados Unidos en Centro América*. (Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentacion de Honduras (CEDOH), 1990).
50. Elliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers: the Dilemmas of Military Service* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive:*

Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

51. Cf. studies on mobilization in World War I, especially Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914" in Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds. *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) revised and expanded edition; and analyses of nonoffensive defense, including Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma" *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167–214.
52. For a similar focus on partisan votes, see T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1992) 36: 25–52. Since the median voter theorem has specific requirements that clearly do not exist in all countries, I don't use this approach. On the median voter and its requirements, see Dennis C. Mueller, *Public Choice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 97–124.
53. For corroborating evidence, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "Nasty or Nice? Political Systems, Endogenous Norms, and the Treatment of Adversaries" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1) (February 1997): 175–99.
54. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); Arendt Lipjhart, *Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Scott Palmer, "Peru's 1995 Elections: A Second Look" *LASA Forum* 26(2) (Summer 1995): 17–20. The literature on international political economy has long recognized that variations in the characteristics of democratic states have important implications for their international behavior; cf. Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1978) and Peter F. Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States" *International Organization* 47(2) (Spring 1993): 299–326.
55. D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 22–38.
56. Cf. the debate over the War Powers Act in Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). See also Patrick James and John R. Oneal, "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(2) (June 1991): 307–32.
57. Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33(1) (March 1989): 23. For argu-

ments that governments led by professional militaries should be peaceful, see Stanislav Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 3 (December 1980) and David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military Political Types" in Samuel P. Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 71–101.

58. Analysts of the international political economy recognize the importance of this factor in explaining the success of leaders who initially impose severe economic adjustment costs on voters and are reelected (e.g., U.S. president Ronald Reagan in 1980–84; Argentine president Carlos Saul Menem 1990–1994). Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy" in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 319–50 and Barbara Geddes, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Economic Reform and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 66–72. But security analysts have ignored this aspect of domestic constraints.
59. Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKowen, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making" in Lee S. Sproul and Patrick D. Larkey, eds., *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1985), pp. 221–58.
60. Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, "The Strategic Structure of Enduring International Rivalries," Paper presented at the Workshop on Processes of Enduring Rivalries (Indiana University, Bloomington, May 1993), pp. 3–4. I want to thank Elli Lieberman for providing me with this information.
61. Not all democratic peace advocates would accept this claim. Since Huntington ("Clash of Civilizations?") does not believe that any Latin American democracies are members of Western Civilization (in contrast to Doyle ["Liberalism and World Politics"] who classifies many as Liberal Republics), their experience is irrelevant to his claims about the democratic peace.

2. *Latin America's Violent Peace*

1. Cf. Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 5; Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace*; Desch, "Why Latin America May Miss the Cold War"; one exception is Paul R. Hensel, "One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816–1986" *Journal of Peace Research* 31(3) (1994): 281–97.
2. Cf., Dirk Kruijt and Edelberto Torres Rivas, eds., *América Latina: Militares y Sociedad I* (San José, Costa Rica: FLACSO, 1991), pp. 8–9.

3. Large sections of Guyana are claimed by Venezuela; Guatemala, which only recognized Belize in 1992, continues to dispute the territorial and maritime borders; Guyana and Brazil contest Suriname's borders.
4. On the Monroe Doctrine see Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823–26* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927) and on the Venezuela dispute see Owen, "How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace," pp. 114–19.
5. Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954); J. Lloyd Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962).
6. See the response by the U.S. to the Colombian Minister in Washington in Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823–26*, p. 192. Britain intervened actively in the region: in the 1828 Argentine-Brazilian war, Britain forced the combatants to create Uruguay as a buffer state; in 1833 it seized the Malvinas Islands and in 1843 a Honduran island; in 1841 it occupied a Nicaraguan port. The French were also active, occupying a Mexican port and an Argentine island in 1838 and participating with the British in a blockage of the Rio Plata in 1845. In none of these cases was the U.S. willing to aid the Latin Americans. Aid would come only when the U.S. itself perceived a threat, and not when a Latin American country defined the threat. Gordon Connell-Smith, *The United States and Latin America* (New York: Wiley 1974), p. 69; Mecham *The United States and Inter-American Security*, pp. 37–38.
7. Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security*, p. 40; Guido DiTella and D. Cameron Watt, eds., *Argentina Between the Great Powers, 1939–46* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990); Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, *Historia da Política Exterior do Brasil* (Sao Paulo: Editora Atica, 1992); Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976).
8. *Diario* (August 7, 1993):32; *Hoy* April 4, 1995; see also United States, Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, Office of International Security Affairs 1995), pp. 12–14; Victor Millan and Michael A. Morris, *Conflicts in Latin America: Democratic Alternatives in the 1990s* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990), pp. 8–16; David R. Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining in the Ecuador-Peru Enduring Rivalry: Designing Strategies Around Military Weakness" *Security Studies* 6(2) (Winter 1996/97): 91–123.
9. For the ideas of a security complex and security externalities, see Lake, "Regional Security Complexes."
10. Dana G.Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Foster Rhea Dulles, *Prelude to World Power* (New York: Macmillan, 1971, 2nd edition).

11. Even Brazil, an extremely large country located at the southern end of the hemisphere, worried about the implications of U.S. intervention in the Caribbean for its own security. McCann, Jr. "The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945."
12. Cf., the State Department White Paper on El Salvador. "Flaws in El Salvador White Paper Raise Questions About Its Analysis" *The Washington Post* (June 9, 1991): A1, A114.
13. U.S. government officials and security analysts often point to such participation as evidence of "external" security threats. But they conveniently forget that the U.S. War of Independence itself attracted idealists from outside its territorial boundaries, as well as money and troops from a pre-Revolutionary France that could hardly have held the same ideals as those of the "Founding Fathers."
14. Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge 1917–1947* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991); Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security*; Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Charles D. Ameringer, *The Caribbean Legion: Patriots, Politicians, Soldiers of Fortune, 1946–1950* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).
15. Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1995); Buzan, *People, States and Fear*.
16. I want to thank Leon Zamosc for pointing this out, and Jennifer Collins for providing me with supporting materials. Cf. the package distributed for a march on the Ecuadorian national capital by the Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza, March 10, 1992 #0129-OPIP-92; also the pamphlet produced in support of a continent-wide campaign "Campaña Nacional: 500 anos de resistencia indígena y popular" Folleto 1, Secretaría Operativa, Guatemala November 1, 1990.
17. David R. Mares, "Middle Powers Under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement," *International Studies Quarterly*, December 1988) 32: 453–71.
18. Michael J. Francis, *The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile During World War II* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); Stanley E. Hilton, *Hitler's Secret War in South America, 1939–1945: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). Argentina paid a high price for betting that the U.S. would be unwilling to pressure the British to help rein in Argentina's independent foreign policy. See the discussion in Guido DiTella and Cameron Watt, eds., *Argentina Between the Great Powers, 1939–46* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990).

19. Ecuador was abandoned to the Peruvians in the 1939–41 war and Chile felt isolated in 1977–78 as it confronted war scares with first Peru, then Argentina (see chapters 6 and 7 below). The landed oligarchy throughout Latin America believed that the U.S. push for land reform after the Cuban Revolution meant that they were being abandoned by the U.S., while anti-Communist military regimes in the 1970s also perceived U.S. human rights policies in a similar light. Federico G. Gil, "The Kennedy-Johnson Years" in John D. Martz, ed., *United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961–1986* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), pp. 3–25; Frederick M. Nunn, *The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), esp. pp. 240–61.
20. E.g., the Acre War (1906) between Bolivia and Brazil, and the Cenepa War of 1981 between Ecuador and Peru.
21. Peruvian losses in Adrian J. English, *Armed Forces of Latin America: Their Histories, Development, Present Strength, and Military Potential* (London; New York: Jane's, 1984), p. 169; population estimates from James L. Wilkie and Enrique Ochoal, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* v. 27 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publication, University of California, 1989), pp. 112–13.
22. Bryce Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
23. *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, various issues.
24. This threshold is akin to those used in the general analysis of international politics, such as "post 1816" (Napoleonic Wars settlement), "post WWII" and now "post Cold War."
25. Joseph Grunwald, Miguel S. Wionczek, and Martin Carnoy, *Latin American Economic Integration and U.S. Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1972).
26. MIDS defined in chapter 1.
27. Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992," pp. 183–85.
28. Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28(4) (December 1984): 606–9.
29. Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (1992): 309–41; D. Scott Bennett, "Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816–1992" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(2) (April 1997): 236.
30. Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes," pp. 585–615.
31. For purposes of tractability, the relatively few MIDs with non-Western hemisphere states (mainly Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan) are omitted

from the analysis, except for the Falklands War between Argentina and Great Britain.

32. Gochman and Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes," pp. 600–02; see also Jorge I. Domínguez, "Los conflictos internacionales en América Latina y la amenaza de guerra" *Foro Internacional* 97 25 (1) (July–September 1984): 1–13.
33. Data obtained by Steven A. Bernstein from Keith Jaggers' update of Polity II, compiled by Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore. *Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800–1986* (Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1990).
34. William Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict" *American Political Science Review* 88(1) (March 1994): 22 also uses 6 as the determinant for his dichotomous democracy variable in a study of 264 interstate conflicts after WWII.
35. "País no ampliará la Amnistía" *La Nación* (San José, Costa Rica) July 17, 1999, p. 5A.
36. Gabriel Marcella, "Epilogue: The Peace of October 1998" in Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes, eds., *Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, North-South Center Press, 1999), pp. 231–35.
37. Edgar Camacho Omiste, "El Enclaustramiento Marítimo de Bolivia" (La Paz: FLACSO-Bolivia, July 1988) Documento de Trabajo #22; Juan Ignacio Siles, ed., *La Política Exterior de Bolivia, 1989–1993* (La Paz: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Government of Bolivia, 1993); Despite a 1997 agreement to remove them, as of 1999 Chile had not de-mined the area. "Border Mines Not Being Removed" *Santiago Times* June 30, 1999.
38. For a discussion of early plans see Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea*; Native American political units had already been incorporated *de jure* into Latin American states during colonial days but many still resisted *de facto* integration. Latin American states advanced their internal security interests by militarily defeating independence minded indigenous populations.
39. Ronald Bruce St. John, *The Foreign Policy of Peru* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 34–38.
40. English, *Armed Forces of Latin America*; Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., *Central America: A Nation Divided* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
41. For example, Brazil (largely because it saw itself as a Latin American great power that would soon be recognized as such by the Europeans—see discussion in Chapter 5), opposed these efforts in the early twentieth century.
42. David Sheinin, *Argentina and the United States at the Sixth Pan American Conference (Havana 1928)* (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1991) Research Papers 25. As late as 1945 the U.S. was still

using this policy against Argentina for its neutrality in the war, even though Argentine beef and grains contributed to the British war effort. For a discussion of the differences between the manner in which Britain and the U.S. dealt with Argentine neutrality, see Di Tella and Watt, eds., *Argentina Between the Great Powers*.

43. Mecham *The United States and Inter-American Security*, p. 46.
44. Hector Gros Espiell, *Conflictos Territoriales en Iberoamérica y Solución Pacífica de Controversias* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1986), p. 16; Binding arbitration of inter-American disputes met with the disapproval of the U.S., Chile, and others at the 1902 Pan American Meetings. Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security*, pp. 59–61; *Segunda Conferencia Internacional Americana* (Mexico: Tipografía de la Oficina Impresora de Estampillas, 1901), pp. 310–84.
45. Latin America Data Base, "El Salvador & Honduras Sign Treaties to End Border Conflicts" *EcoCentral: Central American Economy & Sustainable Development* ISSN 1089–1560 3(4) (January 29, 1998).
46. Latin America Data Base, "Chile and Argentina Resolve Last Border Dispute" *NotiSur—Latin American Affairs* Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, ISSN 1060–41889 9(1) (January 8, 1999).
47. Carlos Portales, "Seguridad regional en Sudamérica: escenarios prospectivos" in Augusto Varas, ed., *Paz, Desarme y Desarrollo en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano 1987); Augusto Varas, "Zonas de Paz en América Latina: Una propuesta factible?" in *Seguridad, paz y desarme: Propuestas de concertación pacífica en América Latina y el Caribe* (Santiago: FLACSO-CLADDE 1992). On Contadora, see Alicia Frohmann, "De contadora al grupo de los ocho: El reaprendizaje de la concertación política regional" *Estudios Internacionales* 22(87) (July–September 1989): 365–427.
48. Both undertook this step in 1994. Paz V. Milet, "La desmilitarización en Haití" and Ebrahim Asvat, "La desmilitarización Panameña y sus desafíos futuros," both in *Paz y Seguridad en las Américas* No. 12, July 1997, pp. 14–15 and 15–18, respectively.
49. John R. Redick, "The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America" *International Organization* 35(1) (Winter 1981): 103–34.
50. St. John, *The Foreign Policy of Peru*, pp. 204, 210.
51. E.g., the OAS organized the Seminario Regional Sobre la Aplicación Nacional de la Convención Sobre Armas Químicas in Lima in September 1994; during the XXIV Assembly the member countries also approved a resolution against arms proliferation; and at the IX Plenary Session the Commission for Hemispheric Security approved a resolution calling on members to redouble their efforts on disarmament and arms control. Since 1987 the Latin American Center for Defense and Disarmament (CLADDE) and the Joint Study Program of

Latin American International Relations (RIAL) have edited an annual study of progress in the area of arms control and disarmament, *Estudio Estratégico de América Latina* (Santiago, Chile).

52. Timothy J. Dunn, *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexican Border, 1978–1992: Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home* (Austin: The Center for Mexican American Studies, The University of Texas Press, 1997, 2nd ed.).

3. *The Myth of Hegemonic Management*

1. The list of scholars who casually assert that the U.S. has been able to control interstate conflicts in Latin America is long; cf. Phillipe C. Schmitter, "Introduction" in Phillipe C. Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences, and Perspectives* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), p.xi; Carlos Portales, "Seguridad regional en Sudamérica"; Heraldo Munoz, "Beyond the Malvinas Crisis" *Latin American Research Review* 19(1) (1984); Richard Millett "The Limits of Influence: The United States and the Military in Central America and the Caribbean" in Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S. R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial, eds. , *The Military and Democracy: the Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 123–40. More developed discussions of the positive impact of the U.S. for Latin American security are found in Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942*; Domínguez, "Los conflictos internacionales en América Latina y la amenaza de guerra"; and Clifford E. Griffin, "Power Relations and Conflict Neutralization in Latin America" International Studies Working Paper, Hoover Institute, March 1992.
2. Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962).
3. Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (New York: Macmillan, 1974); Scott C. James and David A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846" *International Organization* 43(1) (Winter 1989): 3–9.
4. This description holds even if one would claim that the rules of the international market, rather than those of a particular state, structure international incentives. My point is that the market is emphatically not "free," but rather that the leading states in a system allow certain markets to function more or less freely while others are not. This argument is developed at length in my book *Penetrating the International Market* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 3–38 and examined in the case of the illegal drug trade in the Americas in my "The Logic of Inter-American Cooperation on Drugs: Insights from Models of Strategic Interaction" in Peter S. Smith, ed., *Drug Policy in the Americas* (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 329–42.

5. An excellent analysis of this struggle in Mexico is Charles Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora: 1821–1853* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968); see also Woodward, *Central America*; the Liberal-Conservative struggle also reflected the battle between the forces of national centralization and decentralization. A fascinating account of this complex situation can be found in Domingo F. Sarmiento, *Facundo, or Civilization and Barbarism* trans. Mary Mann, introduction by Ilan Stevens (New York: Penguin Books, 1998).
6. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea*.
7. The list of Latin American Liberal dictators is long and includes Porfirio Díaz (1885–1911) in Mexico, the Liberal Oligarchy of the Monagas brothers (1847–1857) in Venezuela, Tomás Guardia (1870–1882) in Costa Rica, José Santos Zelaya (1894–1909) in Nicaragua, Justo Rufino Barrios (1873–1885) and Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1989–1920) in Guatemala. See also, Frederick B. Pike, *The United States and the Andean Republics: Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 143–53.
8. Thomas F. McGann, *Argentina, The United States, and the Inter-American System 1880–1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 130–64.
9. Ernest R. May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975). Most analysts, especially those who perceive the Doctrine as legitimate and in effect up through the Cold War, ignore the U.S. promise to stay out of European security affairs. The issue came up at the time because Greece was seeking its independence from the Ottoman Empire. European great powers were concerned about the impact of a weakening of the Ottoman Empire upon the balance of power.
10. In a dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain over the boundary with British Guiana in 1895 the U.S. took a forceful position favoring Venezuelan suggestions to arbitrate the controversy, with Secretary of State Richard Olney's claiming that the U.S. was "practically sovereign in the continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition . . ." The British initially rejected this position, noting that the Monroe Doctrine had no standing in international law. But when President Grover Cleveland told Congress that he was willing to go to war to defend the U.S. position, the British realized the seriousness of the situation and negotiated a compromise. Dulles, *Prelude to World Power*, pp. 134–48; Lester D. Langley, *Struggle for the American Mediterranean: United States - European Rivalry in the Gulf-Caribbean 1776–1904* (Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 1976), pp. 152–60. After this episode the British paid deference to U.S. security interests in the Caribbean region. Warren G. Kneer, *Great Britain and the Caribbean 1901–1913: A Study in Anglo-American Relations* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1975).

11. Langley, *Struggle for the American Mediterranean*, p. 160; U.S. naval forces at the time were still no match for the British. David Healy, *Drive to Hegemony* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 32–35. Britain steadily gave way to the U.S. on control of a trans-isthmusian canal, according it equal responsibility in the Clayton Bulwer treaty of 1850 and ultimately ceding co-defense in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901.
12. Compare Kneer's discussion of German Foreign Office preoccupation with U.S. positions on joint German and British military coercion of Guatemala and Venezuela in 1901 with the naval arms competition discussed in Holger H. Herwig, *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889–1941* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), pp. 67–109. Herwig also notes that U.S. naval planners did not adequately update their perceptions of German intentions in the region.
13. An extensive discussion and analysis of U.S.-Cuban relations is found in Jorge I. Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978).
14. General discussions of U.S.-Caribbean/Central American relations in this period can be found in two books by Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900–1921* and *The United States and the Caribbean Area* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934).
15. Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México* (México: Editorial Hermes, 1955) Vol. 7: 23, 174–83; and passim.
16. Ibid., pp. 424–26.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 565.
19. Ibid., pp. 473–81.
20. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea*, pp. 74–81; Gordon Connell-Smith, *The Inter-American System*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 39–42.
21. Robert John Deger, Jr., "Porfirian Foreign Policy and Mexican Nationalism: A Study of Cooperation and Conflict in Mexican-American Relations, 1884–1904," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1979, p. 220–21.
22. For U.S. interests, see Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, p. 147.
23. Woodward, *Central America*, p. 187; for U.S. interests in this episode, see Walter LaFaber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860–1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, 7th Printing), pp. 218–29.
24. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, p. 41.
25. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*.
26. Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México*, pp. 648–79; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, p. 151.

27. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*., pp. 152–55; Munro, *The United States and the Caribbean Area*, pp. 195–202; Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, p. 23.
28. Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México*, pp. 687–97.
29. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 165–66.
30. Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México*, pp. 699–703.
31. The consul was most likely acting on his own, and not under orders from the State Department, see Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, pp. 25–26; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 174–75. Nevertheless, the incentives from Washington encouraged this type of behavior. If independent action failed to produce benefits for the U.S., the consul rarely seems to have paid a price, while if such actions brought benefits Washington was very happy to accept them.
32. Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México*, pp. 705–7; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 175–77; Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*, p. 26.
33. Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México*, pp. 699–723; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, p. 179.
34. Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México*, pp. 708–23; Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 182–83.
35. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, p. 181.
36. Joyce S. Goldberg, *The Baltimore Affair* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986). Chile's Navy had new British-built ironclads which were superior to U.S. ships in 1879. See p. 116 and *passim*.
37. Joseph Tulchin, *The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (New York: New York University Press, 1971), p. 35.
38. Frederick M. Nunn, *Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890–1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).
39. William F. Sater, *Chile and the United States* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), p. 91.
40. Michael L. Krenn, *U.S. Policy toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1917–1929* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1990), chapter 1.
41. Tulchin focuses on these aspects in his analysis, *The Aftermath of War*.
42. Krenn, *U.S. Policy toward Economic Nationalism*, p. 8.
43. Michael Grow, *The Good Neighbor Policy and Authoritarianism in Paraguay: United States Economic Expansion and Great-Power Rivalry in Latin America during World War II* (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1981), pp. 25–42.
44. For U.S.-Brazilian relations at the time, see E. Bradford Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodomiro Bueno, *Historia da Política Exterior do Brasil* (Sao Paulo: Ed. Atica, 1992).

45. Tulchin, *The Aftermath of War*, pp. 63–64; Richard V. Salisbury, *Anti-Imperialism and International Competition in Central America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1989) and Chapter 3 below.
46. At the San Francisco conference to set up the United Nations in 1945, the Soviet Union had insulted the Latin American governments by referring to them as "client states." Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security*, p. 269.
47. Wood does not use the 1,000 battlefield deaths cutoff, therefore he includes the Leticia Dispute between Peru and Colombia. On the other hand, he does not include the attack by the Dominican Republic's army against Haitians, in which estimates run up to 12,000 dead. Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security*, pp. 175–76.
48. Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942*, pp. 8–15.
49. For Wood the Good Neighbor Policy weakened in 1943–44 when the U.S. pressured Argentina to break relations with the Axis powers and ended with the U.S. covert intervention against Guatemala in 1954. He also does not see either the OAS or the Rio Treaty as providing effective mechanisms for conflict resolution. *The Unmaking of the Good Neighbor Policy*.
50. Wood, *The United States and Latin America Wars*, p. 8 gives the U.S. the major credit, but see the detailed discussions in Lawrence A. Clayton, *Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999), pp. 137–41 and St. John, *The Foreign Policy of Peru*, pp. 160–64.
51. Joseph S. Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship* (Boston: Twayne, 1990), pp. 46–47; Arthur P. Whitaker, *The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 368–72; Sater, *Chile and the United States*, pp. 94–104.
52. Sater, Ibid., p. 88–91.
53. Sater, Ibid., p. 95; Pike *The United States and the Andean Republics*, p. 237.
54. Sater, *Chile and the United States*, pp. 94–97; St. John, *The Foreign Policy of Peru*, pp. 160–64; Frederick B. Pike, *The Modern History of Peru* (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 232; Daniel M. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso* (Westhaven, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 33.
55. Oscar Espinosa Mora, *Bolivia y el mar, 1810–1964* (Santiago: Editorial Nascimiento, 1964), pp. 350–57; Pike, *The United States and the Andean Republics*, p. 202. In 1977–78 Peru and Chile were on the brink of war as a result of Chile's discussions with Bolivia concerning an exchange of territory in the area. José de la Puente Radbill, "La mediterraneidad de Bolivia" in Eduardo Ferrero Costa, ed., *Las Relaciones del Perú con Chile y Bolivia* (Lima: Centro

Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1989), pp. 39–58 Chile has kept the border zone mined for years.

56. Sater, *Chile and the United States*, p. 100. Sater notes that Britain did not make the trade when it discovered that doing so would violate the Washington Naval Armament Limitation Treaty of 1922, but is silent on Japanese reasoning.
57. Pike, *The United States and the Andean Republics*, p. 203.
58. Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 169–72; St. John, *Foreign Policy of Peru*, pp. 165–66; Pike *Modern History of Peru*, p. 230; and *The United States and the Andean Republics*, pp. 203–4.
59. In 1932 the U.S. Ambassador in Peru, upon reviewing Embassy records, asked the State Department why it had pressured Leguia and his Foreign Minister into accepting a treaty "against their will." Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, p. 172.
60. Wood, Ibid., p. 171. Citation from Francisco Andrade S., "Límites entre Colombia y Ecuador" *Boletín de Historia y Antiguedades* (Bogotá) 47 (March–April, 1961): 201–29 at p. 217.
61. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p. 33.
62. Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, p. 21.
63. Leslie B. Rout, Jr., *The Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935–39* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), pp. 8–27.
64. Ibid.; Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security*, pp. 154–59; Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 19–166.
65. Wood, Ibid., pp. 169–251; St. John, *Foreign Policy of Peru*, pp. 173–77.
66. Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 255–344.
67. In Chapter 2 I extended the democratic rankings and MID occurrences to 1998. I am not, however, extending the quantitative studies past the Polity III and MID II periods. This decision avoids introducing problems of disagreements among coders into the analyses.
68. According to Waltz' structural realism theory, under conditions of bipolarity a great power should not be concerned with external balancing, but instead focus on internal resources. *Theory of International Relations*, p. 163. But the argument about regional hegemonic management by definition does not accept this claim and so we need to ask how systemic polarity might affect the hegemon's management, *assuming the hegemon wanted to manage regional conflict*. Note that this situation is not necessarily opposed to Waltz. If the management of regional conflict can be accomplished without impinging upon the great power's ability to internally balance against the other great power, Waltz has nothing to say concerning hegemonic management. For him, this lies more in the realm of foreign policy, rather than systemic outcome. Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World" *Daedalus* 93 (Summer 1964): 881–909.
69. Cf., Schmitter, "Introduction"; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*.

70. Eg., Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace*, pp. 67–81 sees the impact of hegemony as greater in Central America, while Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 1–15, makes no such distinction.
71. Cf., Salisbury, *Anti-Imperialism and International Competition*; Krenn, *U.S. Policy toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1917–1929*; Richard E. Feinberg, *The Intemperate Zone: the Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Norton, 1983) makes this argument for all of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.
72. Mexican workers in 1915 were organized into Red Brigades to fight in the Mexican Revolution. In 1925 the U.S. President warned Congress that war might have to be declared against the Mexican "Bolshevik" government which was spreading revolution in Central America.
73. The military government carried out a "Dirty War" internally in which tens of thousands of people were killed and "disappeared," and the generals believed that they were in the good graces of the Reagan administration because they were helping the U.S.-supported Contras in Nicaragua. See my discussion of the regime in Chapter 6.

4. Democracy, Restrained Leadership

1. Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the Americas*, pp. 1–5.
2. Levy had proclaimed it to be perhaps the only lawlike statement in the study of international relations. Jack S. Levy, "Democratic Politics and War" *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4) (Spring 1988): 653–73. The claim for absolute peace among democracies is clearly incorrect: The clearest cases include the U.S. against Spain in 1898, Great Britain against Finland during World War II, and Ecuador-Peru in 1995. If we want to go back in history, ancient Athens attacked Syracuse, among other democratic city-states.
3. My reading of the literature turns up five different versions of the dependent variable, two variations on normative and four on institutional constraints, four different claims concerning how long a state needed to be democratic and finally, three different ways of measuring whether a state was democratic or not (without including differences on what to measure in determining democraticness, where the variations are too numerous to mention). Among the better critiques are Joanne Gowa, "Democratic states and international disputes" *International Organization* 49(3) (Summer 1995): 511–22 and William R. Thompson and Richard Tucker, "A tale of two democratic peace critiques" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(3) (June 1997): 428–54.
4. David A. Lake, "Powerful pacifists: democratic states and war" *American Political Science Review* 86(1) (March 1992): 24–37 focuses on institutional con-

straints. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics" and Maoz and Russett "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946–1986," pp. 624–38 emphasize norms and institutional constraints. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future" credits international power relations and alliance structure. David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace" *International Security* argues that the findings are statistically insignificant.

5. Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976," pp. 3–35, argue that the findings vary by level of analysis, time period and measures used. Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946–86," claim that post-1945 democratic states also use force short of war against other democracies and nondemocracies less often than would be expected. Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28(4) (1984): 617–48 found that democratic states were most likely to be involved in extra-systemic wars and implies that if one included violence against anti-colonial movements, democracies would also score high in this category. Morgan, and Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force," while not a comparative analysis, present data demonstrating that the U.S. engages in the overt use of force internationally quite often. Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace" *International Security* 20(2) (Fall 1995): 123–46 found that, before 1914, democracies were more likely to engage in low-level military violence against each other than any other pairing of states. Russett and Antholis' analysis of the data demonstrates that democratic city states in ancient Greece were more likely to fight each other than were any other type of dyad, although the authors misinterpret their evidence in discussing their own table. Bruce Russett with William Antholis, "The Imperfect Democratic Peace of Ancient Greece" in Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 53.
6. An introduction to the historical sociological strain is found in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); for the public choice view, see Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
7. Although Kant and Doyle make the argument that the liberal peace requires both normative and institutional constraints, most of the analyses have focused on the latter.
8. Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists & Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 99–100.
9. For discussions of how the cost of a political act influences its use, see Charles S. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978)

and Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

10. If one assumes these other interests, the people may push leaders into war or willingly respond to the call to arms whenever and against whomever it is made. Thus Machiavelli, who assumed the people wanted glory, saw republics as the most efficient fighting institution and expected them to fight each other for greater glory. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," pp. 1154–55. Thucydides reports similiar advantages and aspirations for democracies. *Peloponnesian War* Book I.
11. Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes," p. 625; Lake "Powerful Pacifists" discusses the conditions under which democratic states will themselves be the aggressors: "when the initial cost of conquest and the ongoing costs of rule are less than the discounted present value of future economic profits," p. 29.
12. Lake's article is unfortunately mistitled ("Powerful Pacifists") In the text he makes it clear that democracies will *not* turn the other cheek.
13. Russet and Maoz, "Normative and Structural Causes," p. 625.
14. Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations?" and Doyle "Liberalism and World Politics" have similar arguments on this point, except that they ignore the subjective elements in the evaluations of other polities, even by Western or Liberal nations. For further discussion, see below.
15. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace," pp. 93–94; but for an interesting argument that post World War II liberals have overemphasized the distinction between nationalism and liberal individualism, see Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). In addition, John Stuart Mill believed that Liberals could treat "savages" in authoritarian ways. *Considerations On Representative Government* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1958), pp. 59, 256; *On Liberty* reprinted in Mary Warnock, ed., *John Stuart Mill* (New York: The New American Library, Meridian Books, 1962), p. 136 and *Civilization*, p. 60; see also, Gerald Sirkin and Natalie Robinson Sirkin, "John Stuart Mill and Disutilitarianism in Indian Education" *Journal of General Education* 34(4) (January 1973).
16. Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America: Still a Distinct Tradition?* 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1992); Brian Loveman, *The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
17. V. R. Berghahn, *Militarism: the History of an International Debate, 1861–1979* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
18. Note that not all militaries are more willing to utilize military force than civilians. In a study of the U.S. behavior during Cold War crises, Richard Betts found that, in all but one of the cases (Cuban Missile Crisis), military officers

were generally no more likely than civilians to advocate the use of military force. *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 4, 215–16.

19. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; Owen, "How Liberalism," pp. 108–15; Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England" in *Working Papers Series, Domestic Studies Program* Hoover Institute, Stanford University, pp. 8–11, November 1988; quote is on p. 33.
20. Ida Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany" *International Security* 20(2) (Fall 1995): 147–84.
21. Leandro Area and Elke Nieschulz de Stockhausen, *El Golfo de Venezuela: Documentación y Cronologia* Vol. 2 (1981–1989) (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1991), pp. 64–87; for Ecuador, see the discussion in chapter 7 below.
22. These are analyses which claim that both normative and institutional constraints matter, and then procede to classify "democracy" by a certain time threshold on the institutional side. Doyle "Liberalism and World Politics" uses three years, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War" *International Security* 20(1) (Summer 1995): 5–38 go up to ten years and Russet and Maoz, "Normative and Structural Causes," pp. 625 and 636 claim "new" democracies must develop the norms but do not provide any time period in which those norms can be expected to develop.
23. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*; Russett (with a chapter co-author William Antholis), *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (pp. 55–56, 61) argues that perhaps Athens did not know that Syracuse was democratic or perceived it as less democratic because of the great distance between them and difficulty of communications at the time. Yet the Athenian leader Nicias himself was the official representative of Syracuse's interests in Athens and told the Assembly that Syracuseans had freedom and power so the war would be difficult and expensive. The people believed him enough to vote to increase their forces for the war. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* Book VI: 20–26; Adcock, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 60.
24. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"and Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," respectively. Despite their agreement on this point, Doyle believes most Latin America republics have been Liberal (see his appendix in "Liberalism and World Politics," whereas Huntington does not, and thus classifies the region as a non-Western civilization. See also, Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy" *Foreign Affairs* 76(6) (November/December 1997): 36–38 who also seems to exclude Latin America from the group of Liberal republics.

25. Oren, "The Subjectivity of the 'Democratic' Peace"; Owen, "How Liberalism Produces the Democratic Peace."
26. The U.S. and Great Britain are liberal societies, and the rational choice analyses of voting behavior mainly draw on these two electorates for their empirical referents.
27. Owen recognizes that liberal societies may elect illiberal leaders, but expects the other constraints to keep the country from using force against another liberal state. "How Liberalism," p. 120. For a critique, see below.
28. Dennis C. Mueller, *Public Choice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 41–42 discusses the dimensionality of issues. An excellent discussion of this phenomenon applied to the use of force is Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad" *World Politics* 47 (July 1995): 534–54.
29. Mueller, *Public Choice*, pp. 43–49.
30. Ronald Hinckley, "Public Attitudes toward Key Foreign Policy Events" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32 (June 1988). Hinckley labels the variations within each group differently, but for our purposes "hard" and "soft" suffice.
31. In 1996 eight countries of Latin America were participating in UN peacekeeping missions. Antonio L. Pala, "Peacekeeping and Its Effects on Civil-Military Relations: The Argentine Experience" in Domínguez, ed., *International Security and Democracy*, p. 135. While most of these missions were outside the hemisphere, during the 1990s Venezuelan troops participated in the Central American missions and Argentine ships helped patrol Haiti. The U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and Chile also contributed troops to the peacekeeping force on the Ecuador-Peruvian border after the 1995 war.
32. On the Andean Pact, see Lynn Krieger Mytelka, *Regional Development in a Global Economy: The Multinational Corporation, Technology, and Andean Integration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). For a discussion of regionally competitive and collaborative geopolitics see Phillip Kelly and Jack Child, "An Overview: Geopolitics, Integration, and Conflict in the Southern Cone and Antartica," pp. 1–12 in Kelly and Child, eds., *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antartica* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988).
33. This section is guided by the analysis of U.S. public opinion on participation in the 1990 Gulf War in Gaubatz, "Intervention and Intransitivity," pp. 542–49.
34. Juan Rial and Daniel Zovatto G., "La Política, los Partidos y las Elecciones en América Latina," pp. xxxvii-xlvi and Juan E. Mendez and Luis Alberto Cordero, "Presentación," p. xi, both in Juan Rial and Daniel Zovatto G., eds., *Elecciones y democracia en* América Latina, *1992–1996: Urnas y Desencanto Político* (San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 1998).
35. Mueller, *Public Choice* p. 102, including fn. 3.

36. Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, *Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 10, 1994), pp. 1–2.
37. Latin America Data Base, "Honduran, Salvadoran, & Nicaraguan Naval Forces Agree to Reduce Tensions in Gulf of Fonseca" *EcoCentral: Central American Economy & Sustainable Development* ISSN 1089–1560 2(32) (September 4, 1997).
38. Interview, Luis Alberto Huerta Guerrero, Comisión Andina de Juristas, Lima, Peru March 25, 1999.
39. Cf., the discussion in Part I of Peter F. Cowhey and Matthew D. McCubbins, eds., *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
40. Winner take all elections discourage the formation of third parties and a two party system pushes the electorate toward the center. Thus it is theoretically erroneous to argue that U.S. citizens are represented by the median voter. Instead one needs to clarify that the median voter represents the citizens who actually vote, which in turn is affected by the institutional structure of elections.
41. Arendt Lipjhart "Presidential address" Western Political Science Association, Annual Meetings, March 1995, published in *American Political Science Review* 91(1) (March 1997): 1–14.
42. Palmer, Peru's 1995 Elections," p. 18.
43. Mathew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 31–32; Oscar Godoy Arcaya, ed., *Hacia Una Democracia Moderna: La Opción Parlamentaria* (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1990).
44. Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, pp. 87–91.
45. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 1. The fourth category is implicit, although they explicitly discuss only the three categories in which party systems exist. Currently, Venezuela may be moving toward an inchoate and Mexico towards an institutionalized competitive party system.
46. Cf., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Holly Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua* (Boston: South End Press, 1988).
47. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*; Lake, "Powerful Pacifists."
48. An excellent comparative analysis of this relationship as it concerns domestic issues is Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, pp. 106–66.
49. Framers of presidentialist constitutions recognize that legislatures may not be able to act quickly or may not be in session when a crisis occurs, therefore they provide the chief executive with the tools to act quickly. In addition, some

aspects of foreign policy may be the exclusive domain of the executive, including the use of force. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress control over budgets (including that of the military and the intelligence services) and the sole right to declare war. It also gives the executive the right to make foreign policy and defend the national interests of the U.S. See Franck and Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*; on Latin America, Loveman, *Constitution of Tyranny*.

50. Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, p. 141.
51. Franck and Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*, pp. 14–19.
52. William H. Freivogel, "Gulf Debate May Decide War Powers, President could Gain Authority" *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, January 10, 1991, p. 1C.
53. Franck and Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*, pp. 61–82; Sklar, *Washington's War on Nicaragua*, pp. 321–49; for Venezuela, Latin American Data Base, *NotiSur* ISSN 1060–4189 6(23) (June 7, 1996); "Venezuela: Former President Carlos Andres Pérez Sentenced to 28 Months for Misappropriation of Funds"; the exact Chilean share has changed over time, Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Chile y el gasto militar: un criterio histórico y jurídico de asignación" in Francisco Rojas Aravena, ed., *Gasto Militar en América Latina* (Santiago: CINDE & FLACSO, 1994), pp. 255–56; Brenes, Arnoldo and Kevin Casas, *Soldados como empresarios* (San José: Fundación Arias Para la Paz y el Progreso Humano, 1998).
54. Brian Loveman, *The Constitution of Tyranny* examines the colonial and 19th century origins of these provisions, which continue in today's democratic constitutions.
55. Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, pp. 141–42; Loveman, *The Constitution of Tyranny*, for Colombia, pp. 179–80; Peru, 232–33; Venezuela, p. 159.
56. Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies* chapter 6.
57. Ibid., pp. 126–29.
58. Rhoda Rabkin, "The Aylwin Government and Tutelary Democracy: A Concept in Search of a Case?" *Journal of InterAmerican Economic and World Affairs* 34(4) (Winter 1992/93): 119–94; Francisco Rojas and Claudio Fuentes, " Civil-Military Relations in Chile's Geopolitical Transition" in Mares, ed., *Civil-Military Relations*, pp. 165–86.
59. Charles Sellers, "Hard War Averted—Easy War Gained" in Archie P. McDonald, ed., *The Mexican War: Crisis for American Diplomacy* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1969), pp. 13–22; COW also codes the U.S. as initiator.
60. Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining."
61. Morgan and Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force."
62. The authors did not test for this relationship.
63. *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, pp. 36–38, 120–24. In Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Sources," however, the theoretical framework for the normative argument did not contemplate such a possibility; cf., p. 625.

64. From 1891 to 1973 Chile was governed by elected governments except for the brief period 1924–31 and the Socialists had participated in National Front governments from 1938–41 without provoking domestic disorder. For a discussion, see Paul Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile 1*932–52 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978).
65. Paul E. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
66. I want to thank Steven Bernstein for running the statistical analyses.
67. Analysts familiar with Latin American politics might find another type of constraint on leaders particularly useful given the historical role of the military in Latin American politics; cf., Stepan, *The Military in Politics*. Categorizing civil-military relations would enable us to test whether the degree of military domination of government affects a state's militarized dispute behavior. Although Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive* argue that militaries prefer offensive doctrines, in *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises* Betts finds that military leaders are not quicker than civilians to advocate the use of force in a crisis. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types" and Andreski, "On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships," claim that militaries involved in combating domestic civilian disturbances and paramilitary threats will be unable to successfully fight another army, consequently, military governments are peaceful internationally. (Of course, this claim of reticence based on a weak military would only hold if the potential targeted country did not use its military force in the same way, otherwise both militaries are weak and the determinants of the use of force have to be found elsewhere.) Banks' index of military domination of a polity looked promising for these purposes. Unfortunately, the large number of missing values precludes its use in this analysis. (For South America's 130 MIDs in this time period, 24 disputes cannot be coded because of missing values; for Central America 50 of 124 MIDs are missing.) He also develops a *constraint on the executive* variable. These constraints can be imposed by any political groups (legislatures, nobles, parties, the military); all that is required is that they be a recognized part of the decisionmaking process. But again, the time period covered by this variable does extend into the recent redemocratization wave in the region.
68. Gurr, *Polity II*, pp. 38–39. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability" *American Political Science Review* 98(4) (December 1995): 841–55 also use this indicator for regime type, labeling it a "relatively rigorous measure."

69. *Polity III* was constructed by one of the authors of *Polity II* and is less complete. Some of the revisions of the prior data seem problematic. Mexico is reclassified as a 0 on the 0–10 scale up through 1978, giving it the same score as Castro's Cuba and the first 14 years of Pinochet's Chile! Since 1978 Mexico is a 2, which is the same score merited by the last two years of Pinochet's military dictatorship. Chile from 1955 to 1962, a period in which the Socialist candidate narrowly lost the 1958 Presidential election, is given the same score that the Imperial Japan of World War II earned in *Polity II*! The downgrading of El Salvador from a 8 to a 3 in 1969 (despite the fact that the President's party had a bare majority in the Legislature and that he had to negotiate with the non-Communist opposition groups before engaging in the Soccer War [Anderson, *War of the Dispossessed*, pp. 107–08]), puts it at the same level as Peru in 1992–93 when President Fujimori dissolved Congress and ruled by decree and military force. In the face of these problems, two points are worth emphasizing. First, the bias seems to be to lower democracy scores, which should strengthen the support for an argument that democracies are inherently peaceful by eliminating many of the cases in which countries otherwise thought to be democracies engaged in MIDs. Secondly, if we utilize just *Polity II* the analysis must end in 1982, just when redemocratization begins in Latin America. Consequently, I use *Polity III* and note its limitations.
70. Doyle's "Pacific Union" listing also includes many of these Latin American countries as pacific liberal republics. "Liberalism and World Politics" Appendix.
71. R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27(1) 1983 and "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations: A Test Against Published Research Results" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29(3) 1985; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes," p. 635; Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . ." p. 621; but see Erich Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28(4) (December 1984): 660; Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976," pp. 18, 20; T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(2) (1991): 195.
72. Except for Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence" and "Libertarian Propositions" and Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Sources."

5. The Distribution of Power and Military Conflict

1. Cf. the diplomatic correspondence from the British Ministers in Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro in the Foreign Office files, Public Records Office, London, 1906–14.

2. John Child, *The Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938–1978* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).
3. For example, the Colombian legislature approved a large arms buildup after the 1987 war scare with Venezuela. Area and Nieschulz de Stockhausen, *El Golfo de Venezuela*, pp. 64–87. In 1958 Chile's Congress adopted legislation guaranteeing its military a percentage of copper export revenue for weapons purchases; there have been subsequent modifications in both the percentages and the manner in which they are calculated. Rojas Aravena, "Chile y el gasto militar," pp. 254–59. See also, Miguel Navarro, Equilibrios estratégicos en el Cono Sur: una aproximación chilena" in Francisco Rojas Aravena, ed., *Balance Estratégico y Medidas de Confianza Mutua* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1996), pp. 271–302.
4. Thomaz Guedes da Costa critiques recent U.S. policymakers' suggestions for the future role of the Latin American military in "Post-Cold War Military Relations between the United States and Latin America," in Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas, eds., *Security, Democracy, and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Miami: North-South Center, University of Miami, 1994), esp. pp. 143–44.
5. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*; Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, edited and translated by David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., c. 1995); Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*; Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of Institutions."
6. Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics*; Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"; Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* Winter 1994/95 19(3): 50–90.
7. Some analysts wish to make the heroic assumption that anarchy does not necessarily imply a concern for security. Cf. Wendt "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of State Politics," *International Organization* 46(2) (Spring 1992): 391–425. But this argument requires two difficult and related situations in order to succeed. States must be able to confide completely in the signals they are sending each other, and they must be perfectly pacific. The argument that states fear for their security, on the other hand, simply requires that communication not be perfect and that some states, even a minority of one whose identity is unknown, be willing to act first and ask questions later.
8. Cf. Mearsheimer, "False Promise."
9. Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma;" Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, pp. 24–27; Jack Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis" *International Studies Quarterly* 28(2) (June 1984): 219–38.
10. Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance" *International Security* 9(3) (Winter 1984–85): 47–88. Even when Realists look to eco-

nomic and political variables, it is because they affect how many resources and for how long a country can commit to the battlefield.

11. Lebow argues that the existence of nonmilitary proximate causes refutes Realism. *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 334–37.
12. See the discussion in Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads," pp. 313–14; A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler go so far as to argue that no distribution of power model can explain war in the "periphery." *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 29, 32, 45, and 51–53.
13. Organski and Kugler, *War Ledger*, p. 49 favor 80% while Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads" uses 3/1 and 10/1.
14. Organski and Kugler, *The War Ledger*; Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993 reprint of Unwin Hyman 1989), pp. 173–74.
15. Organski and Kugler, *War Ledger*, pp. 19–22; 206.
16. A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1968, 2nd ed), p. 373.
17. Organski and Kugler, *The War Ledger*, p. 45.
18. Joseph E. Loftus, *Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1938–1965* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1968) RM-5310-PR/ISA.
19. Martin C. Needler, "United States Government Figures on Latin American Military Expenditures" *Latin American Research Review* 1973 8(2): 101–3.
20. See the dispatches from the British Ministers in South America during the arms buildup in South America at the beginning of the twentieth century. Foreign Office, Public Records Office, London.
21. Discussed in J. David Singer, ed., *The Correlates of War* (New York: Free Press, 1979).
22. I want to thank Steven A. Bernstein for undertaking this statistical analysis. An earlier version was published in David R. Mares and Steven A. Bernstein, "Explaining the Use of Force in Latin America" in Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *International Security and Democracy*, pp. 29–47. Although in chapter 2 I updated MID and Democracy data to 1998, I did not have the opportunity to confirm or calibrate my calculations across the relevant categories and components of the data bases with those done by the other research teams. In particular, I refrained from distinguishing between democracy levels 6–10. Consequently, I have not incorporated these extra years into the statistical analysis.
23. David Spiro, "On the statistical insignificance of the Democratic Peace."
24. U.S. Department of Defense figures. *Keesings* 36(1) (January 1990) #37181.
25. Max G. Manwaring, "Monitoring Latin American Arms Control Agreements" in Morris and Millan, *Controlling Latin American Conflicts* Table 9.3, p. 182.

26. For a discussion of the National Period see chapter 2.
27. The impression for the first four and last wars is based on total population, GNP and my reading of the secondary literature on the status of the military in each country at the time. See especially Rout, *Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference*, pp. 41–45 and Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*. I use Manwaring's analysis of Relative Military Capability for the 1969 and 1982 wars,.
28. Gary W. Wynia, *Argentina Illusions and Realities* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), p. 21. Michael Brzoska and Frederic S. Pearson, *Arms and Warfare: Escalation, De-escalation and Negotiation* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1994), p. 80.
29. Augusto Varas, *Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 55.
30. See the annual volumes edited by the Centro Latinoamericano de Defensa y Desarme *Estudio Estratégico de América Latina* Santiago, Chile and the monthly newsletter of the UN Centro Regional Para la Paz, El Desarme y el Desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe, based in Lima, Peru. The case for unilateral arms reduction is made in Bennett Ramberg, ed., *Arms Control Without Negotiation: From the Cold War to the New World Order* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993). Costa Rica (1949), Haiti (1994) and Panama (1994) disbanded their militaries.
31. Graham T. Allison. "Questions About the Arms Race: Who's Racing Whom? A Bureaucratic Perspective" in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., ed. *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974); Robert E. Looney, *The Political Economy of Latin American Defense Expenditures* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1986) examines the impact of macroeconomic conditions on defense expenditures. Jose O. Maldifassi and Pier A. Abetti, *Defense Industries in Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile* (Westport CT: Praeger 1984) argue that an inability to procure arms in the quantity and quality desired stimulated the development of defense industries in these South American countries.
32. Luiz Cervo and Bueno, *Historia da Política Exterior do Brasil*, pp. 98–104.
33. By some estimates up to 80% of Paraguayan males perished in the six year war. For a discussion of the aftermath, see Harris Gaylord Warren, *Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The Postwar Decade, 1869–1978* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974).
34. Luiz Cervo and Bueno, *Historia da Política Exterior do Brasil*, pp. 107–14.
35. Nunn, *Yesterday's Soldiers*.
36. Bello, *A History of Modern Brazil*, p. 189; D.R. O'Sullivan to Sir Earl Grey, November 10, 1906, Haggard to Grey, 30 September 1906, and Barclay to Grey, October 5, 1906, all Public Records Office, Foreign Office, London; Nunn,

Yesterday's Soldiers, pp. 56–61; Joseph Smith, *Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), pp. 62–67.

37. Burns, *By Reason or Force*, pp. 183–84.
38. Hanford to Grey, July 30, 1906, Public Records Office, Foreign Office, London 1906, Folio 371.5 f28811, p. 157.
39. Burns, *By Reason or Force*, p. 182.
40. Nunn, *Yesterday's Soldiers*, p. 124; Public Records Office, Foreign Office, London for years 1906–1910. Cable traffic between the British Minister in Buenos Aires and London at this time contains many Argentine admonitions for Her Majesty's Government to pressure Brazil to moderate its naval program.
41. Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance*, pp. 185–191; Haggard to Grey, November 28, 1910, Public Record Office, Foreign Office FO 371/833. XC16815.
42. Javier Villanueva, "Economic Development" in Mark Falcoff and Ronald H. Dolkart, eds., *Prologue to Peron: Argentina in Depression and War, 1930–1943* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 65–78; Wynia, *Argentina*, pp. 37–38.
43. Robert A. Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 5–17; Glen Barclay, *Struggle for a Continent* (New York: SUNY Press, 1972), pp. 34, 36, 44–45; 68–76.
44. McCann, Jr. "The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945," p. 307.
45. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917–1947*, pp. 34, 47–48, 61, 99–101, 163, and 180.
46. Barclay, *Struggle for a Continent*, p. 96.
47. U.S. State Department Press Releases, August 21, 1937, p. 162, as cited in Graham H. Stuart, *Latin America and the United States* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955, 5th edition).
48. David R. Mares, "Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement" *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1988): pp. 453–71; McCann, Jr., "The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945," p. 314.
49. The U.S. claimed that the Argentine military was pro-fascist. But their fascist tendencies were not very different from those of Getulio Vargas' Estado Novo in Brazil. For an examination of the U.S.-Argentine relationship see Francis, *The Limits of Hegemony* and Di Tella and Watt, eds., *Argentina Between the Great Powers, 1939–46*.
50. Potash, *Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945*, pp. 168–74. The quote is from German documents cited on p. 172, fn. 103.
51. Brazilian combat experience in Italy is detailed in Frank D. McCann, Jr., *The Brazilian-American Alliance 1937–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 403–42.

52. Loftus, *Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1938–1965*. The author cautions that the figures are not entirely reliable, but they are the best we have and confirm impressionistic conclusions. McCann also sees a shift in the trend after World War II "The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945," p. 317; Nunn says manpower decreased between 1955 and 1965 *The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations, 1810–1973* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 251.
53. In an analysis of military expenditures from 1950–1970 Schmitter claims that Brazilian expenditures were not stimulated by Argentine expenditures, but that Argentina's did react to Brazil's. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Foreign Military Assistance, National Military Spending and Military Rule in Latin America" in Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America* (Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1973), p. 169.
54. Wayne A. Selcher, "Brasilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: From Wary Rivalry to Friendly Competition" *Journal of InterAmerican and World Affairs* 27(2) (Summer 1985): 25–54.
55. Manwaring, "Monitoring Latin American Arms Control," pp. 172–73; 182–83. Indicative of the problems of estimating the military balance in Latin America at this time, the sources cited in footnote 49 would have a difficult time believing that Argentina had a 4 to 1 advantage in 1970.
56. McCann, Jr., "The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945," p. 299.
57. Thomaz Guedes da Costa, "La percepción de amenazas desde el punto de vista de los militares brasileros en las décadas del 70 y 80" in VA Rigoberto Cruz Johnson and Augusto Varas Fernández, eds., *Percepciones de Amenaza y Políticas de Defensa en América Latina* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1993), pp. 193–210; Selcher, "Brasilian-Argentine Relations," p. 30.
58. Wayne A. Selcher, *Brazil's Multilateral Relations: Between First and Third Worlds* (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp. 264–66; Paul L. Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer, eds., *Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race: New Prospects and Challenges for Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992); Riordan Roett, ed., *Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
59. Camilión at the Argentine-American Forum, October 31–November 2, 1993 and Domínguez in "Chile comprará más mísiles: equilibrio militar en el Cono Sur" *Clarín* (Buenos Aires) January 23, 1998. Argentina has significantly increased its radar capabilities in the recent purchases of 53 U.S. Skyhawk A4s equipped with the same radar found in the F-16. Luis Garasino, "Aviones para la Fuerza Aerea" *Clarín* December 15, 1997. Though old, the Skyhawks had been responsible for destroying some of the British ships during the Malvinas

War. Adrian J. English, *Battle for the Falklands (2) Naval Forces* (London: Osprey, 1982), pp. 27–29.

60. "La OTAN rechazó el pedido de incorporación de la Argentina," *Clarín* July 29, 1999.
61. "Chile comprará más mísiles" *Clarín*. "Old Latin American Rivalries Reemerge, Generating Concerns About U.S. Diplomacy in the Region" *Eco-Central* ISSN 1060–4189 7(31) (August 29, 1997). The Brazilians worried about the political and military effects on the South American security environment of having Argentina join a military alliance outside the region. "OTAN: ya se quejó Brasil" *Clarín* July 10, 1999.
62. Tomaz Guedes da Costa, "Democratization and International Integration: The Role of the Armed Forces in Brazil's Grand Strategy" in Mares, ed., *Civil-Military Relations*, pp. 223–37.
63. For a review of actions and the accusations traded by important politicians and policymakers in both countries during the crisis, see Area and Nieschulz de Stockhausen, *El Golfo de Venezuela*, pp. 64–87 and Liliana Obregón T. and Carlo Nasi L., *Colombia Venezuela: Conflicto o Integracíon* (Bogotá: FESCOL, 1990).
64. "Uslar Pietri: puede estallar un gran conflicto" *El Nacional* (Caracas) March 17, 1995, pp. A1, 8.
65. "Chile Acquires Mirage Jets" CHIPnews March 20, 1995; for a discussion of the Chilean Mirages see *América Vuela* (No. 25, 1995): 22–27. On Peruvian threat perceptions, see St. John, *Foreign Policy of Peru*, pp. 203–5; Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p. 265. Citing Pentagon sources, CLADDE-RIAL reports that the Soviet Union provided Peru with 115 military advisers in the Army and Air Force, and trained 200 commissioned and non-commissioned officers, *Limitación de Armamentos y Confianza Mutua en América Latina* Santiago: Ediciones ChileAmerica, 1988, p. 348. Military expenditures can be found in ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* various issues.

6. Military Leadership and the Use of Force

1. Andreski; "On the Peaceful Disposition"; Kurt Dassel, "Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife: Domestic Sources of International Aggression" *International Security* 23(1) (Summer 1998): 107–40, focuses on the trade-offs for militaries whose institutions are "contested."
2. Cf. Arturo Valenzuela, "The Military in Power: The Consolidation of One-Man Rule" in Paul Drake and Ivan Jaskic, eds., *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), revised edition. But Gen-

aro Arriagada Herrera, "The Legal and Institutional Framework of the Armed Forces in Chile" in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 117–43, sees some negative impact on Chilean professionalism.

3. Antonio Cavalla, *El conflicto del Beagle* (Mexico: Casa del Chile, 1979), pp. 19–23; Burr, *By Reason or Force*, pp. 247–56.
4. Stephen M. Gorman, "Geopolitics and Peruvian Foreign Policy" *Journal of Inter-American Economic Affairs* 36(2) (Autumn 1982): 81 and "The High Stakes of Geopolitics in Tierra del Fuego" *Parameters* 8(2) (1978): 45–46.
5. Juan Archibaldo Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle* (Buenos Aires: Emece, 1984), pp. 510–12; James L. Garrett, "The Beagle Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone" *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 27(3) (Fall 1985): 90.
6. Thomas Princen, *Beagle Channel Negotiations*. Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Case 401. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1988, p. 2. Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 134.
7. Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, p. 517.
8. Ibid. On the 1976 coup, see David G. Erro, *Resolving the Argentine Paradox: Politics and Development, 1966–1992* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 73–98.
9. Princen, *Beagle Channel Negotiations*, p. 3; Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, p. 517.
10. Garrett, "The Beagle Dispute," p. 93; Roberto Russell, "El Proceso de toma de decisiones en la política exterior argentina" in Roberto Russell, ed., *Política Exterior y El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1990), p. 36.
11. Cf. The proposal by the Argentine Junta to Chile that it not use the Award to extend its sovereign claims to new Antarctic territories. Roberto Russell, "El Proceso de toma de decisiones," p. 38.
12. Italics are those of the author. Russell, "El Proceso de toma de decisiones," p. 36 citing *La Opinión* of May 4 , 1977.
13. Garrett, "Beagle Channel," p. 93.
14. Russell, "El proceso de toma de decisiones," pp. 38–39.
15. Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, p. 519.
16. If Argentina had merely rejected the Arbitral Award Chile would have had legal standing to appeal to the ICJ. Russell, "El proceso de toma de decisiones," pp. 41–42.
17. Andreas Keller Sarmiento, "The Dynamics of Decision-Making in the Argentine Military Government, 1976–82: The Beagle Crisis" BA Thesis, Depart-

ment of Government, Harvard College March 1984, p. 89, citing his interview with Admiral Allara on January 4, 1984.

18. There is some speculation that Argentina planned to seize the still disputed Beagle Channel islands in 1982 if the seizure of the Malvinas/Falklands Islands had been successful. Cf. Martin Middlebrook, *Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982* (London: Penguin, 1987, revised edition), p. 36.
19. Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, pp. 144–50.
20. Russell, "El Proceso de Toma," pp. 54–58.
21. General Pinochet, now Senator-for-life, was arrested in 1998 in London for possible extradition to Spain on charges of genocide stemming from his military government. During his defense, both his attorneys and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher highlighted Pinochet's aid to Britain during the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War. *ChipNews* "Foreign Office Ends Immunity Dispute: Thatcher Calls for Immediate Release" October 22, 1998. In retaliation for Pinochet's arrest Chile suspended its transportation links to the islands and joined Mercosur in calling for recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the islands. Foreign Minister Jose Miguel Insulza even said that Chile "should never have supported Great Britain" in the 1982 war! *Noti-Sur* "Chile & Argentina Resolve Last Border Dispute" ISSN 1060–4189 9(1) (January 8, 1999).
22. Note that the General and his military cohorts were willing to violate international laws and treaties that would constrain them in violating the human and political rights of anyone they believed posed a threat to their ability to restructure Chilean society, economy and politics. Thus this was not a stance on the legitimacy of international law *per se*.
23. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p. 265.
24. Burr, *By Reason or Force*, pp. 245–63; Emilio Meneses, *Ayuda Económica, Política Exterior y Política de Defensa en Chile, 1943–1973* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Políticos, 1989) Documento de Trabajo 117.
25. See discussion in chapter 5.
26. Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, p. 528; Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, pp. 142–43.
27. Kurt Dassel, "Domestic Instability, the Military, and War," PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, Department of Political Science, 1996.
28. English, *Armed Forces of Latin America*; figures are based on 1980 and 1981.
29. Gorman, "The High Stakes," pp. 9–10.
30. English, *Armed Forces of Latin America*, p. 134; In August 1999 there were unconfirmed rumors that Chile might agree to de-mine the border area. Atilio Bleta, "Tras los incidentes en Jujuy, Ménem se despidió de Frei" *Clarín* August 20, 1999.
31. Peru did provide fighter aircraft to Argentina during the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982. But that aid was largely symbolic and there was little reason for Peru to fear retaliation by the British.

32. Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, p. 518–23; Russell, "El proceso de toma de decisiones," p. 46. Chile did not accept the possibility of joint sovereignty over the islands. Pinochet also rejected the idea of continuing with direct negotiations after November 2, 1978.
33. See the declaration by Alfonsín's Minister of the Interior, Antonio Troccoli, in Russell, "El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones," p. 55.
34. Andres Miguel Fontana, "Political Decision-Making By a Military Corporation: Argentina, 1976–1983" (PhD Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1987), pp. 57–59.
35. Russell, "El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones," p. 18; Keller Sarmiento, "The Dynamics of Decision-Making in the Argentine Military Government," p. 53, citing *La Prensa* April 15, 1978.
36. Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, p. 521.
37. Fontana, "Political Decision-Making By a Military Corporation," p. 74. Videla requested the resignations of numerous military cabinet ministers and governors and reassigned ministerial responsibilities. The navy perceived all of this to the detriment of their influence. Russell, "El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones," p. 19.
38. Russell, "El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones," p. 50; fn. 111, 112, citing investigative report in the newspaper *Somos* (February 17, 1984): 31–32.
39. Russell, "El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones," pp. 50–51.
40. Russell, Ibid., p. 52; Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, does not refer to the meeting of the 22nd in his discussion. P. 144, nor does Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, p. 529.
41. Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, p. 148–49.
42. Keller Sarmiento, "The Dynamics of Decision-Making in the Argentine Military Government," p. 110.
43. Russell, "El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones," p. 53.
44. A Chilean reserve officer told me in confidence that Argentine troops had indeed crossed the border in the north on the day that the islands were to be seized but retreated quickly once the order to occupy the islands had been postponed. I could not, however, corroborate this claim and it seems unlikely that Chilean troops would have been caught unawares of an Argentine crossing.
45. *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), October 4, 1977 as cited in Russell, "El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones," p. 42.
46. Russell "El Proceso de toma de decisiones," p. 47 fn. 100 and p. 49, fn. 107, respectively.
47. *Tiempo Argentino* June 8, 1994 and *Clarín*, July 22, 1984, respectively, and as cited in Russell, "El Proceso de Toma," pp. 54–55.
48. Russell, "El Proceso de Toma," pp. 54–58.
49. Cf., Cavalla, *El conflicto del Beagle*.

50. On Videla's efforts to liberalize politically, see Fontana, "Political Decision-Making by a Military Corporation," pp. 72–90; Keller Sarmiento, "The Dynamics of Decision-Making in the Argentine Military Government," pp. 56–60.
51. Russell, "El Proceso de Toma de Decisiones," p. 46.
52. Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, pp. 523–25; Princen, *International Intermediaries* reports on the collapse of negotiations but focuses only on whether the Pope would be the mediator, not on the disagreement over the grounds for mediation, pp. 138–43.
53. Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle*, pp. 526–28; Princen, *International Intermediaries*, pp. 142–43.
54. Fontana, "Political Decision-Making By a Military Corporation," pp. 66–72.
55. Mónica Peralta Ramos, "Toward an Analysis of the Structural Basis of Coercion in Argentina: The Behavior of the Major Factions of the Bourgeoisie, 1976–1983" in Mónica Peralta Ramos and Carlos H. Waisman, eds., *From Military Rule to Liberal Democracy in Argentina* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 55–56; Erro, *Resolving the Argentine Paradox*, pp. 124–25.
56. Fontana, "Political Decision-Making By a Military Corporation," pp. 121–22.
57. Erro, *Resolving the Argentine Paradox*, pp. 123–26.
58. Fontana, "Political Decision-Making By a Military Corporation," pp. 126–31.
59. Middlebrook, *Task Force*, p. 36; Fontana, "Political Decision-Making By a Military Corporation," pp. 140–41, but Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) see the Malvinas issue as secondary to those concerning economic policies, pp. 3–4.
60. Latin American Bureau, *Falklands/Malvinas: Whose Crisis?* (London: Latin American Bureau Ltd, 1982), p. 80.
61. Carlos J. Moneta, "The Malvinas Conflict: Some Elements for an Analysis of the Argentine Military Regime's Decision-Making Process" in Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., *Latin American Nations in World Politics* (Boulder: Westview, 1984), pp. 128–29, also reprinted in *Millenium* 13(3): 198ff.
62. The plebiscite was in response to United Nations condemnation of the Chilean government for massive human rights violations. Under the repressive conditions of the times, the vote was hardly "free and unfettered" but it did allow Pinochet to claim a popular basis for his government. To a military who saw themselves acting in the name of the nation, it would be difficult to discard the results entirely. Valenzuela, "The Military in Power," p. 38.
63. Valenzuela, "The Military in Power," p. 61; Eduardo Silva, "The Political Economy of Chile's Regime Transition: From Radical to 'Pragmatic' Neo-Liberal Policies" in Drake and Jaskic, *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile*, pp.

98–127 discusses the economic concessions Pinochet made to his constituencies between 1983–1985.

64. In 1988 Pinochet lost his bid for re-election, garnering "only" 43 percent of the vote against a combined opposition. Probably to his detriment, Pinochet had structured the vote to be either "yes or no" on whether he should continue in office. As it became clear that Pinochet was losing the 1988 plebiscite on whether he should remain in power for another ten years, he looked for a way to continue his regime but the other members of the Junta refused to support such a move. Chile held democratic elections the following year. Sigmund, *The United States and Democracy in Chile*, pp. 167–78.
65. Nora Femenia, *National Identity in Times of Crises: The Scripts of the Falklands-Malvinas War* (Commack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 1996), *passim*.
66. See the analysis of decisionmaking in the Malvinas case undertaken by the military government that assumed office after the defeat: Rattenbach Commission, *Informe Rattenbach: El Drama de Malvinas* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Espártaco, 1988), pp. 25–42; also, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War*, pp. 7–11; Guillermo A. Makin, "Argentine approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas: Was the Resort to Violence Foreseeable?" *International Affairs* (1983): 403.
67. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War*, pp. 10–11, 78–81.
68. Rattenbach Commission, *Informe Rattenbach* is highly critical of the Junta's military planning, pp. 45–61.
69. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War*, pp. 4–13; Femenia, *National Identity in Times of Crises*, pp. 84–102.
70. *Informe Rettenbach*, pp. 63–87.
71. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's decision to respond with military force cannot be analyzed in the limited space available here. But the five factors determining costs and cost acceptability for the use of force in the militarized bargaining model also explain her decision. The costs produced by (S) recover islands before negotiating + (SB) overwhelming in favor of Britain in the diplomatic, economic and military arenas + (F) large naval task force, aided by U.S. material and intelligence support were less than those willing to be paid by her constituency (CC) and she was very constrained by her constituency, given the British parliamentary system (A). Cf., Walter Little, "Public Opinion in Britain" in Wayne S. Smith, ed., *Toward Resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 63–80; Latin American Bureau, *Falklands/Malvinas*, pp. 101–26; Femenia, *National Identity in Time of Crisis*, pp. 121–204; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War*, *passim*.
72. Rettenbach Commission, *Informe Rettenbach*, p. 56.

7. *Democracies and the Use of Force*

1. According to the MID data base all the Ecuador-Peru disputes in this period included displays or actual use of force by one of the participants, and not merely verbal threats. Other sources include Loftus, *Latin American Defense Expenditures*, pp. 27–29; *Hoy* December 29, 1995 and "Peru and Ecuador Hold Fresh Talks" *Financial Times* September 8, 1998, p. 9; 1998; Carlos E. Scheggia Flores, *Orígen del Pueblo Ecuatoriano y Sus Infundadas Pretensiones Amazónicas* (Lima: Talleres de Linea, 1992), p. 61; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Hacia la Solución del Problema Territorial con el Perú: Libro Blanco* (Quito: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992), pp. 194–95.
2. This brief historical summary is based largely upon Julio Tóbar Donoso and Alfredo Luna Tóbar, *Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano* (Quito: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994, 4th edition); Gustavo Pons Muzzo, *Estudio Histórico sobre el Protocolo de Rio de Janeiro* (Lima: n.p., 1994); Scheggia Flores, *Orígen del Pueblo Ecuatoriano;* Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Hacia la Solución;* Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–42.*
3. Burr, *By Reason or Force*, pp. 44–45; 80–88; 146–47.
4. Peru was fearful of renewed Chilean attacks, since they remained in possession of Peruvian territory in Tacna and Arica. For a discussion, see chapter 3.
5. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS) (1910): 439.
6. Chile had also made explict offers of alliance to Ecuador in the nineteenth century: St. John, *Foreign Policy of Peru*, pp. 153–54, 34, and 111. U.S. and Argentine diplomats also believed that Chile had significant influence in Quito. FRUS 1910, pp. 492–93.
7. Ironically, the contemplated settlement in 1910, while depriving Ecuador of vast territory, provided for Ecuadorian access to the Maranon River and the treaty following the 1941 war would not.
8. FRUS (1910): 171–83.
9. See the discussion in chapter 3.
10. Perkins, *Constraint of Empire*.
11. The payoff to Colombia was settled borders with Ecuador and Peru (although they had to fight a war in 1932 to ensure it), leaving the country with only disputes with Nicaragua and Venezuela (both of which continue to flare up). Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 169–72; Bruce St. John, *The Boundary Between Ecuador and Peru*, Vol 1. No. 4 of *Boundary & Territory Briefing* (Durham, UK: International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 1994), p. 12; Pike *The United States and the Andean Republics*, pp. 203–4.
12. Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 69–251; Pike, *The Modern History of Peru*, pp. 266–69.

13. Anita Isaacs, *Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972–92* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 1–3; Victor Villanueva, *100 años del ejército peruano: frustraciones y cambios* (Lima: Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1971), pp. 100–107; The U.S. military attaché in Lima rated Peru's combat efficiency as significantly better than Ecuador's. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics*, pp. 65–70; Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 268–69.
14. Although Peruvian President Manuel Prado was opposed to a war with Ecuador, the commander of the northern army insisted upon attacking the Ecuadorian forces. Geoffrey Bertram, "Peru 1930–60" in Leslie Bethel, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 8 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 423; Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 255–331.
15. See the comments by the Ecuadorian negotiator in Tóbar Donoso and Luna Tóbar, *Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano*, pp. 212–22 and by General José W. Gallardo R., Commander-in-Chief of the Army, "Comentario Militar" in Hernán Alonso Altamirano Escobar, *EL POR QUE del ávido expansionismo del PERU [Peru's Avid Expansionism Explained]* (Quito: Instituto Geográfico Militar, 1991), pp. 34–35 (Gallardo was Defense Minister during the 1995 war). Captain Altamirano Escobar's book begins with a discussion of Incan expansionism. Also, Lt. General Frank Vargas Pazzos (ret.), *Tiwintza: Toda La Verdad* (Quito: Color Gráfica, 1995) [Vargas Pazzos was leader of one of the political parties in Congress upon which President Bucaram depended.] and Wood, *The United States and Latin American Wars*, pp. 326–30.
16. Tóbar Donoso and Luna Tóbar, *Derecho Territorial Ecuatoriano*, pp. 212–26; 234–35. With hindsight the authors claim that Ecuador expected the guarantors to find some way to compensate Ecuador, but since the Protocol did not foresee anything at issue other than border demarcation this appears to be post hoc justification for the position taken by Ecuador after the Zamora-Santiago problem arose.
17. *Análisis Semanal* (Quito) 25(6) (February 10, 1995): 11–12 noted that Ecuadorian leaders never specified where access to the Amazon would occur, but that access via the Maranon River in the Zamora-Santiago region would provide the country with only the appearance of an Amazonian country since the Maranon is not navigable to the Amazon in that sector.
18. Pons Muzzo, *Estudio Histórico*, pp. 277–78.
19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Hacia la Solución*, pp. 78–79; Fernando Bustamante, "Ecuador: Putting an End to Ghosts of the Past?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34 (4) (Winter) 1992/93): 205–13.
20. William P. Avery, "Origins and Consequences of the Border Dispute between Ecuador and Peru" *Journal of Inter-American Economic Affairs* 38 (1) (Summer 1984): 74.

21. Avery, "Origins and Consequences," p. 69.
22. Gorman, "Geopolitics and Peruvian Foreign Policy," pp. 83–84.
23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Hacia la Solución*, p. 182.
24. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *1982 World Armaments and Disarmament*, p. 412; Pons Muzzo, *Estudio Histórico*, pp. 310–54; *Análisis Semanal*, p. 46 reports the payment, but Ecuadorian political leaders denied it. *Hoy*, March 2, 1995 "No se Pagó Indemnización a Perú."
25. *El Universo* (Quito) special supplement "Ni Un Paso Atrás" c. March 22, 1995, p. 2.
26. Scheggia Flores, *Orígen del Pueblo Ecuatoriano*, pp. 71–73.
27. Gabriel Marcella, "War and Peace in the Amazon: Strategic Implications for the United States and Latin America of the Ecuador-Peru War of 1995" (MS US Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy. September 1, 1995), pp. 2–3.
28. At the time there was speculation that by appealing to the guarantors Ecuador had retreated from its nullification thesis and accepted the Protocol. But the President's wording on the appeal was ambiguous and never clarified. The majority of people polled in Ecuador's two major cities believed that he did not accept the Protocol. Among respondents with graduate school level of education, the figure is even higher. Poll of January 6, 1996 in Quito and Quayaquil by Informe Confidencial, archives in Quito offices.
29. *Hoy* (Quito) December 29, 1995, February 12, 13 14, 23, and 26, 1996; the planes have U.S. built engines and therefore their sale to third parties requires U.S. approval.
30. Latin American Data Base, "Peru: Foreign Minister Resigns in Midst of Negotiations with Ecuador" *NotiSur—Latin American Affairs*, ISSN 1060–4189 8(37) (October 9, 1998) and a confidential interview with a former high ranking Peruvian diplomat. Lima, March 26 1999.
31. St. John, *The Boundary*, p. 16.
32. Pons Muzzo, *Estudio Histórico*, p. 362.
33. Confidential interviews August 1995; in addition, Dr. Luis Proaño, Political Advisor, Ministry of Defense, Quito, August 14, 1995; Col. Hernández, Personal Secretary to the Minister of Defense (and commander of the Tiwintza defense during the war), August 14, 1995.
34. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Hacia La Solución*, p. 145.
35. Luis Carrera de la Torre, *El proyecto binacional Puyango Tumbes* Quito: AFESE, 1990; Scheggia Flores, *Orígen del Pueblo Ecuatoriano*, pp. 71–73.
36. Between 1983–1993 Ecuador increased its number of soldiers dramatically (by 50%), while Peru decreased its own (by almost 1/3). Yet Peru's armed forces still outnumbered their rival by 2–1. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993–1994*, pp. 61 and 78.

37. J. Samuel Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Poltical Process: Ecuador 1948–1966* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Isaacs, *Military Rule and Transition*, pp. 2–3 also does not reference the question of border in her summary of why the military grew disenchanted with democracy in the 1960s.
38. St. John, *The Boundary*, p. 16.
39. Confidential interviews August 1995; in addition, interviews with Proaño and Hernández; see also, Gen. Vargas Pazzos, *Tiwintza*, 45–62.
40. ACDA does not record China having delivered or made any agreements to deliver arms to Ecuador from 1979 to 1993. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993–94* Vols. 1985 and 1993–94 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 133 and 140, respectively.
41. Confidential interviews with Ecuadorian, Peruvian and U.S. military and civilian analysts August and September 1995. The Navy had been bottled up in port in 1981.
42. Gorman, "Geopolitics and Peruvian Foreign Policy," p. 80; Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p. 265. During the 1995 conflict Peruvian President Fujimori maintained that Peru could escalate the conflict despite initial loses because the military government of the 1970s had stockpiled weapons in preparation for a war with Chile. *CHIP News* "Peru was preparing for War with Chile, Reveals President Fujimori" March 3, 1995.
43. The poll is discussed in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Hacia la Solución*, pp. 192–93; diplomatic sentiment is discussed in *Latin American Regional Reports* November 14, 1991, p. 6 and confirmed in my confidential interviews of 1995.
44. Pons Muzzo, *Estudio Histórico*, p. 358.
45. Jaime Durán Barga, "Actitud de los Ecuatorianos Frente al Perú: Estudio de Opinión Pública" in *Ecuador y Perú: vecinos distantes* (Quito: Corporación de Estudios para el Desarrollo, 1993), 171–202.
46. *Informe Confidencial* February 25, 1995 and January 6, 1996. Archives.
47. *Informe Confidencial* January 6, 1995. Archives.
48. Pedro Saad Herrería, *La Caída de Abdalá* (Quito: El Conejo, 1997), pp. 137–38.
49. ACDA's estimates of Ecuadorian military expenditures as a percent of GNP indicate that they were never large. A slight increase developed after the military government had been in power for a few years (from 2.1 percent to 2.4 percent, except for 1978 when it reached 2.9 percent), followed by a slight decline with the return of democracy to the level of the early years of military government, an important increase after the 1981 mini-war (reaching 3.3 percent in 1983), and declining dramatically after 1987, reaching 1.1 percent in 1993. *World Military Expenditures* Vols. 1985 and 1993–94, pp. 60 and 61, respectively.
50. For a detailed analysis, see Mares, "Deterrence Bargaining."

51. Based on responses by Army and Air Force officers to my presentation "La Disuasión y el Conflicto Ecuador-Perú" at the Air Force War College, Quito, August 1995; interviews with Army Chief General Paco Moncayo and Adrian Bonilla and public opinion data analyzed in this chapter.
52. Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, *Perú Político en Cifras* (Lima: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1994, 2nd edition), p. 71; Raul P. Saba, *Political Development and Democracy in Peru: Continuity in Change and Crisis* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), pp. 72–76; Philip Mauceri, *State Under Siege: Development and Policy-Making in Peru* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1966), pp. 46–58; Julio Cotler, "Political Parties and the Problems of Democratic Consolidation in Peru" in Mainwaring and Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions*, pp. 337–43.
53. Saba, *Political Development and Democracy in Peru*, p. 137; none of the other authors in the previous footnote even mentions the 1981 mini-war in their discussions of political protests against Belaunde. Edward Schumacher, "Behind Ecuador War, Long-Smoldering Resentment" *New York Times*, February 10, 1981, p. A2.
54. Tuesta Soldevilla, *Perú Político en Cifras*, p. 68.
55. Mauceri, *State Under Siege*, pp. 59–77; John Crabtree, *Peru Under Garcia: An Opportunity Lost* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), pp. 69–93,121–83.
56. Tuesta Soldevilla, *Perú Político en Cifras*, p. 64 for 1990 and Palmer, "Peru's 1995 Elections," pp. 17–20 for 1995.
57. Tuesta Soldevilla, *Perú Político en Cifras*, pp. 23, Table 2 and 149.
58. In March 1999, nine years after assuming office, which include two years of authoritarian government, Fujimori's approval ratings were still 64.5%. "En popularidad, Fujimori cede terreno a Andrade" *El Comercio* March 21, 1999, p. a5.
59. Polling data from Apoyo, S.A. (Lima) via Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT. January 1994 #62001 questions 9.1 and 9.2 and April 94 #62004 questions 6.1 and 6.2.
60. Apoyo, S.A. (Lima) via Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, February 1995 "Elections" #63004 question 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7; February 1995 "Political and Economic Situation" #62002, question 2.1, 2.2, and 2.5; and March 1995 #62003 questions 4.1a, 4.1c, and 4.1e, 4.1f,.
61. Apoyo, S.A. (Lima) via Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, February 1995 "Elections" #63004 question 5; February 1995 "Political and Economic Situation" #62002, question 2.4; and March 1995 #62003 questions 4.2 and 4.3.
62. Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, pp. 149–55.
63. Catherine M. Conaghan, "Politicians Against Parties: Discord and Disconnection in Ecuador's Party System" in Mainwaring and Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions*, pp. 434–58.

64. Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, pp. 114–15.
65. *Hoy* (Quito) February 19, 1997 "Reforma contra Bucaram;" *Hoy* February 24, 1977 Francisco Rosales Ramos "Dilema." *NotiSur* April 11, 1997 "Ecaudor: Interim Government Calls Referendum as Supreme Court Orders Arrest of Former President."
66. *Hoy* "Jueces Unen a Políticos" October 4, 1996 and "Como despolitizar la justicia?" April 18, 1997.
67. Latin American Data Base, *NotiSur* "Ecuador: Compromise Between President Jamil Mahuad & Congress on Economic Measures Ends Crisis" ISSN 1060–4189 9(11) (March 19, 1999).
68. *NotiSur* "Ecuador: Institutional Crisis Continues with Investigation of President Sixto Durán Ballen" November 10, 1995; Adrian Bonilla, "Las Imágenes nacionales y la guerra: Una lectura crítica del conflicto entre Ecuador y Perú," paper presented at the XXI Annual Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, April 17–19, 1997 Guadalajara, Mexico.
69. For a discussion of the varieties of civil-military relations, see Mares, "Civil-Military Relations, Democracy and the Regional Neighborhood."
70. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Misión en Washington*, p. 61.
71. Two confidential Ecuadorian interviews, Quito, August 1995.
72. Confidential interview with a former high ranking diplomat. My 1995 interviews, Gen. Vargas Pazzos (*Tiwintza*) and Minister of Defense General Gallardo ("Comentario Militar"), suggest that some military officers have reinterpreted the events of 1981 to suggest that they were holding their own and civilians capitulated. On the other hand, Army Chief General Moncayo claimed that, as a result of having focused on governing the country between 1973 and 1979, the armed forces were not ready to defend themselves against a broad Peruvian attack in 1981. Interview, August 16, 1995.
73. Isaacs, *Military Rule and Transition*, pp. 137–40.
74. Confidential Ecuadorian interview, Quito, August 1995.
75. For example, in the controversy over Bucaram's demise, Congress and the Vice President disputed who would succeed him. Thus for a few days Ecuador had three Presidents, since Bucaram rejected his ouster. The military initially remained aloof despite the President's efforts to garner their political support. When they finally decided to publicly withdraw support from Bucaram they refused to name his successor, insisting that Congress and the Vice President resolve the issue themselves. Although they, along with the U.S. Embassy, favored naming the Vice President, everyone accepted the maneuvering by Congress which placed its leader in the presidency. *Hoy* January 29–February 13, 1997 for discussions of the crisis, in particular "Los militares tras Rosalía" and "EEUU no ha intervenido en la crisis," both in *Hoy* February 11, 1997; *Notisur* "Ecuador: Congress Votes to Oust President Abdala Bucaram" February 7, 1997; interview with Adrian Bonilla, April 1997 Guadalajara, Mexico.

76. Cf. The discussion in NotiSur.
77. In May 1990 52% of respondents believed the legislature had performed either "badly" or "very badly" during the García presidency of 1985–90 and 54% wanted the Senate and House to fuse into one chamber. APOYO S.A., Lima, as cited in Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, *Parlamento y democracia* (Lima: Constitución y Sociedad, 1990), pp. 239, 260.
78. Carol Graham, "Government and Politics" in Rex A. Hudson, ed., *Peru: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993, 4th edition), pp. 212–17; an excellent overview is Cynthia McClintock, "Presidents, Messiahs, and Constitutional Breakdowns in Peru" in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 286–321.
79. 1979 Constitution, Articles 227–30.
80. 1993 Constitution, Articles 134–36.
81. 1979 Constitution, a majority of both houses Article 193; 1993 Constitution Article 108.
82. McClintock, "Presidents, Messiahs, and Constitutional Breakdowns," p. 309; the number of decrees is from Samuel B. Abad Yupanqui and Carolina Garces Peralta, "El gobierno de Fujimori: antes y después del golpe" in Comisión Andina de Juristas, ed., *Del Golpe de Estado a la Nueva Constitución*. Series: *Lecturas sobre Temas Constitucionales* 9(Lima: Comision Andina de Juristas, 1993), p. 103.
83. 1993 Constitution Article 118, XIX.
84. 1979 Constitution, Article 188, 211 and 1993 Constitution, Articles 104 and 137.
85. Polls by Apoyo and CPI as cited in Federico Prieto Celi, *El golpe* (Lima: B&C Editores, 1992), p. 41; see also, Carlos Ivan Degregori and Carlos Rivera, "Perú 1980–1993: Fuerzas Armadas, Subversión y Democracia" *Documento de Trabajo No.* 53 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1994), pp. 8–14.
86. *Hoy*, March 22, April 3, 1995; Abraham Lamas, "Ecuador–Perú: Quién Ganó y Quién Perdió en la Guerra Empatada" *InterPress Service*, March 10, 1995.
87. Latin America Data Base, *NotiSur—Latin American Political Affairs*, March 10, 1995.
88. See footnote 68.
89. Crabtree, *Peru Under Garcia*, pp. 108–12; Interview, César Azabache, Defensoria del Pueblo, Lima, April 5, 1999.
90. Interview, Azabache.
91. Susan Stokes, "Peru: The Rupture of Democratic Rule" in Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., *Constructing Democratic Governance: South America in the 1990s* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 66–71.

92. David Pion-Berlin, "From Confrontation to Cooperation: Democratic Governance and Argentine Foreign Relations" in Mares, ed., *Civil-Military Relations*, pp. 79–100; Carlos Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).
93. He failed because the military juntas were accused in 1998 of kidnapping and selling the babies of political prisoners, a crime which had not been considered under the 1990 amnesty. The Junta leaders are currently back in jail, awaiting new trials.
94. Teodoro Hidalgo Morey, *Las Ganancias de Ecuador* (Lima: Producciones Gráficas "Borjas," 1997).
95. Interview with Luis Huerta, Comisión Andina de Juristas, Lima, March 25, 1999.
96. see the discussion in chapter 5, footnote 100.
97. Pons Muzzo, *Estudio Histórico*, p. 364.
98. In a little over a year, a Constituent Assembly was elected, a new constitution increasing executive powers adopted, and the country returned to democracy.

8. Militarized Bargaining

1. Cf., the declarations by opposition politicians as the war began to wind down. Femenia, *National Identity in Times of Crises*, pp. 108–19.
2. Latin American Bureau, *Falklands/Malvinas*, pp. 101–26.
3. For example, the Organization of American States created a committee to examine the relationship between the social-political-economic components of the organization and their military counterpart. Academic institutions in the U.S., Canada and Latin America (e.g., The North-South Center at the University of Miami; the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution; The Queens University, University of Montreal, and FLACSO-Chile) have organized conferences and research on this topic.
4. In 1991 the OAS adopted the Santiago Resolution, which stipulates that the defense of democracy is vital to the security of the region. The United States Southern Command now has among its priorities to aid the countries of the region in sustaining democracy. See also the newsletter edited jointly by FLACSO-Chile and the Latin America Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center, *Paz y Seguridad en las Américas* and the various committee reports for the Organization of American States: Working Group on Hemispheric Security, Working Group on Cooperation for Hemispheric Security and the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security.
5. Riordan Roett, "Introduction" in Roett, *Mercosur*, pp. 1–5; Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina*; Pion-Berlin, "From Confrontation to Cooperation."

6. Cf., Carlos Escudé and Andrés Fontana, "Argentina's Security Policies: Their Rationale and Regional Context" in Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *International Security and Democracy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), pp. 51–79.
7. Roett, ed., *Mercosur*; Martin Bywater, *Andean Integration: A New Lease on Life?* London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. 2018, March 1990; Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Centroamérica: Nueva Agenda de Seguridad" in *Paz y Seguridad en las Américas* No. 9 (December 1996): 3–7.
8. David R. Mares, "Latin American Economic Integration and Democratic Control of the Military: Is There a Symbiotic Relationship?" Forthcoming in David Pion-Berlin, ed., *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).
9. Even in Central America, which has the example of Costa Rica and in which many U.S. and Central American analysts had hoped that the end of the Central American civil wars would demilitarize the region, the hope now seems lost. LADB (Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico) June 9, 1995.
10. Israel's strategy that the "best defense is a strong offense" is a prime example. Many Chilean military analysts find important parallels between Israel and Chile's strategic predicament. On the general subject of the relationship between capability and doctrine, see Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* .
11. Venezuela had already been reinforcing border defenses after Colombian guerrillas crossed. But the appearance of a Colombian navy vessel in Venezuelan claimed waters provoked a major interstate dispute. For a review of actions and the accusations traded by important politicians and policymakers in both countries during the crisis, see Area and Nieschulz de Stockhausen, *El Golfo de Venezuela*, pp. 64–87.
12. E.g., the comments by Argentine Defense Minister Jorge Domínguez in "Chile comprará más mísiles."
13. See the discussions concerning the recent purchases of Skyhawk A4s with top-down radar from the U.S. Though old, the Skyhawks had been responsible for destroying some of the British ships during the Malvinas War. Adrian J. English, *Battle for the Falklands (2) Naval Forces* (London: Osprey), 1982, pp. 27–29.
14. "Chile Acquires Mirage Jets" CHIPnews March 20, 1995; for a discussion of the Chilean Mirages see *América Vuela* (No. 25, 1995): 22–27.
15. For Ecuador, data from an interview with the Director of *Informe Confidencial*. Polls were taken in Quito and Guayaquil, January 1996; for Chile, Rojas Aravena, "Chile y el gasto militar," p. 244, citing a survey by FLACSO, "Percepciones y Opiniones sobre las Fuerzas Armadas en Chile" June 1992 in Santiago.