6 Military Leadership and the Use of Force: Illustrations from the Beagle Channel Dispute

The model of militarized bargaining developed in chapter 1 provides a fourth framework by which to analyze the use of force in interstate relations. Five factors related to the costs inherent to the use of force, the costs acceptable to the public, and the public's ability to hold its leaders accountable are hypothesized to determine whether the use of military force is a rational policy option. This chapter examines a military dyad to explore the utility of the militarized bargaining model.

Military governments are often seen as quick to utilize military force to resolve conflicts. Not only is the application of force their profession, but also, the very fact of controlling government means that force has been utilized against opponents at home. Military governments are thus seen as predisposed to address problems with the use of military force.

A few analysts see a tradeoff for the military between using military force at home and abroad because they conceptualize the use of force as "war" and therefore requiring a diversion of resources from domestic control to external aggression.[1] Yet some military governments are able to use the police and a special intelligence bureaucracy to maintain domestic control without affecting the military's fighting capacity; in Latin America, Chile is the best example.[2]

The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile that produced a full mobilization on both sides, a declaration of war, yet no actual combat. We then turn to examining the factors hypothesized to affect the costs associated with the potential use

of force: the politico-military strategy chosen (S), the strategic balance (SB), and the characteristics of the force used (CF). A third section examines the costs acceptable to the leader's constituency (CC) minus the slippage in accountability produced by the domestic means of selecting leaders (A). A subsequent section includes a brief discussion of the Argentine decision to use force in the Malvinas crisis to demonstrate the ability of my analytic framework to show how the same actor (the Argentine military government) can choose to use force in one crisis (Malvinas) but not in another (Beagle).

Brief History of the Dispute

The boundary treaty of 1881, in which Chile recognized Argentine sovereignty over Patagonia in return for Argentine neutrality during the War of the Pacific, provided some guidelines for future delimitation of the waterways south of the mainland. A specific reference to the Beagle Channel provided that the islands south of the Beagle Channel would belong to Chile. The treaty also sought to provide the basis for peaceful co-existence by establishing the principle of "Chile in the Pacific, Argentina in the Atlantic." This bi-oceanic principle was reaffirmed in the 1902 Pactos de Mayo, which also provided the mechanism for resolving border disputes: arbitration by the British monarch.[3]

Unfortunately, what appeared clear at the turn of the century became controversial. Over time the strategic importance of the islands increased dramatically. Latin American countries laid claim to, first, a 200 mile maritime conservation zone in 1952, then a 200 mile territorial sea in 1970. The discovery of petroleum and organic resources in the area, and the competition over future rights to the Antarctic, further increased the value of controlling the south Atlantic.[4] In 1952 the pair had their first MID since 1905, and seven more followed up to the crisis in 1978.

The controversy revolved initially around two issues: did Argentine sovereignty stop at the water's edge in the channel? And which path did the Beagle Channel follow in its eastern mouth? The importance of the former question lay in whether the Argentine military base of Ushuaia (inside the Channel but on the Patagonia mainland) would be accessible to the Navy via Argentine waters. The route of the channel in the east would determine the sovereignty of the islands of Picton, Nueva, and Lennox, thereby affecting territorial seas and claims on Antarctica. There were multiple attempts

between 1902 and 1970 to resolve the issue, but the two countries could not agree on the bases for negotiations on this or any of the other 23 disputes on their borders. In 1960 Argentina had gone so far as to propose recognizing Lennox as Chilean in return for navigation rights along all of the southern waters and the submission of the question of the other two islands to arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague. Chile's Congress, however, rejected the proposal because it considered the navigation issue too generous to Argentina.

In 1964 Argentina dropped its insistence on a navigation treaty, but bilateral talks failed to produce a proposal for the ICJ. The following year the Argentine Foreign Minister commissioned French and Italian jurists to prepare studies on the likely outcome of international arbitration. Both studies were optimistic about the likelihood of gaining a dividing line down the middle of the Channel and pessimistic concerning gaining any of the three islands. Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Zavalla Ortíz subsequently publicly rejected arbitration and called for direct bilateral talks to find a political solution to the Beagle dispute.

Chile took matters into its own hands in 1967, deciding under the treaty of 1902 to unilaterally submit the dispute to the British Monarch for arbitration. But Argentina, now with a military government, continued to reject arbitration and the British Foreign Office refused to act in the absence of a consensus of the two parties. The Argentine National Security Council (NSC) attempted to revive bilateral negotiations in 1969, but to no avail. The following year the NSC decided that, in light of the importance of resolving all of the border disputes between the two countries and Chile's refusal to negotiate the Beagle issue directly, Argentina would accept arbitration. The service branches were consulted, and gave their approval. This position was maintained during the next two military governments in 1970 and 1971. In July 1971 arbitration by the British Monarch and an international court was formally requested in London by the two nations.[5]

General Alejandro A. Lanusse, president of a government in transition to democracy, expected to lose one or two islands. The General wanted to promote regional integration with Chile and saw navigation rights as an obstacle. The question of Atlantic projection by Chile was not an issue for Argentina at this time, apparently for two reasons: Lanusse expected to retain at least one island,[6] which presumably would be the easternmost, and the bi-oceanic principle itself was a well-established part of the bilateral relationship.

Argentina re-democratized in 1973, just as Chile succumbed to a military coup. From 1973 to 1976 the two countries submitted their oral and written arguments to the court. But at the same time the new democratic government moved to stop the arbitration. The Foreign Minister queried Argentina's two representatives before the Court of Arbitration on the advisability of retiring from the proceedings, but was counseled against such action, apparently because they had no legitimate reason to withdraw. In January 1976, an MID occurred between Argentina and Great Britain in the Shackleton affair. One of the Argentine representatives suggested that either Argentina could withdraw from the proceedings on the grounds that the arbiter was no longer on friendly terms with one of the parties, or that the British could be privately convinced to withdraw in light of the deteriorating relations. In addition, Argentina's two houses of Congress voted unanimously for the process to be suspended while it reviewed the case and decided whether to continue or not. In March 1976, the President of the Senate scheduled a meeting with President María Estela Martínez de Perón to discuss the matter.[7]

The utter collapse of the government in the face of economic crisis and dramatic political violence, however, provoked a coup and the meeting never took place.[8] The new military government appointed a Rear Admiral to examine the proceedings and he consulted with the prior Foreign Minister as well as with the international jurists who had prepared the earlier studies on arbitration. The government decided to continue with the arbitration.[9]

On May 2, 1977 the Court rejected the bi-oceanic principle as a basis for delimitation in favor of an interpretation based closely on specific geographic details in the texts of the 1881 treaty. All three islands were found to lie south of the Beagle Channel and consequently awarded to Chile. The judges found that the issue of maritime boundaries was outside of their competency and should be negotiated between the parties. The award provided for a nine-month period to execute the treaty.

The Argentine government, stunned by the decision,[10] realized that the Court's refusal to recognize the bi-oceanic principle had potentially dire implications. If negotiations on maritime limits broke down, Chile had the internationally recognized right to draw its lines of sovereign extension from the islands into the sea. Not only could these lines project Chile into the Atlantic, but they could also dramatically reduce Argentine claims in the Antarctic because much of Chile's new limits would block Argentine projection south to Antarctica.[11] Therefore, under the new context of no bi-

oceanic principle, Argentina needed at least one island to safeguard its interests in the region. On May 3 they issued a communiqué claiming that no nation was bound to accept decisions by an arbiter affecting national interests or those violating national sovereignty *when those issues had not been expressly part of the arbitration.*[12] The following day Argentina proposed to Chile that bilateral negotiations be undertaken to solve all 24 outstanding controversies, including the Beagle Channel and associated matters.[13]

The Chilean government recognized its windfall and quickly accepted the Arbitrator's decision. They agreed to discuss all issues not resolved by the Arbitral Award and on July 14, 1977 promulgated Supreme Decree 416, implementing its right to a territorial sea based on lineal projection from its newly conferred possessions. With this move, Chile effectively made a return to the status quo before the arbitration impossible. Thus Argentine inaction would mean *de facto* acceptance of the arbitration.

Seven possible points on which the parties could potentially agree characterized the structure of the bilateral bargaining situation between the two countries. These ranged from recognition of the bi-oceanic principle with 0–3 islands, through shared sovereignty in the territorial sea, to elimination of the bi-oceanic principle, with Chile gaining a broad or narrow projection into the Atlantic. In 1977 Chile's actions communicated that its preference curves extended out only to a limited projection into the Atlantic and had a steep slope (i.e., it would view anything less as a significant loss). Argentina's minimally acceptable outcome was a bi-oceanic principle without any islands, but accepting the *laudo* meant that Chile would have international legitimacy in unilaterally implementing its preferred outcome in the face of no agreement.

Figure 6.1 illustrates the bargaining situation. We can easily see that, under the conditions prevailing in 1977–84 there was no basis for a negotiated agreement. Argentina thus had only two options: capitulate to Chile's position or move Chile's preference curve outward, to at least include the bi-oceanic principle and all three islands as Chilean.

The challenge for Argentina became to broaden Chile's bargaining range to include discussions of the islands. Argentina might settle without the islands, but it needed the islands to be a topic of discussion to keep Chile from walking away from negotiations on the territorial sea corresponding to the islands. Having already lost on legal grounds, Argentina needed a political settlement that could appreciate the importance of the bi-oceanic principle for stability in the region; thus staying away from the International



FIGURE 6.1 Bargaining Scenario Argentina-Chile 1977

1 = Bi-Oceanic Principle, 0 Islands to Chile
2 = Bi-Oceanic Principle, 1 Island to Chile
3 = Bi-Oceanic Principle, 2 Islands to Chile
4 = Bi-Oceanic Principle, 3 Islands to Chile
5 = Shared Sea, 1, 2, or 3 Islands to Chile
6 = No Bi-Oceanic Principle, 3 Islands to Chile

Court of Justice was paramount. For Chile, however, failed bilateral negotiations still left it with an internationally recognized new status quo that gave it the benefits of a South Atlantic power.

Informal discussions during the nine months provided for the Award to be executed failed to resolve the issue.[14] During these discussions Chile proposed territorial exchanges between the Beagle Channel and the Straits of Magellan. For the Argentine government such a proposal reinforced their view that Chile would protect its newly allocated projection into the Atlantic.[15]

On January 25, 1978 Argentina formally declared the arbitration award "null" because of "serious, repeated, and varied errors, omissions and excesses." Chile publicly rejected the Argentine action the next day, claiming that the arbitrators had acted correctly and Argentina was bound by treaty to accept it.[16] Formal bilateral negotiations began and continued until October 1978. Both sides demonstrated some interest in possible mediation, but failed to agree on neither who could mediate nor the basis for mediation.

In light of Argentina's overall weak bargaining position, it turned to military force as a signal of its commitment on the issue in hopes that it would

broaden Chile's bargaining range. While Argentina did not prefer war, it was prepared to fight to keep Chile out of the Atlantic. Negotiations broke down in November and troops were deployed to strategic points. Argentina decided on December 12 to seize the islands, drafted a declaration of war on December 21, and gave the order to attack on December 22, 1978. The naval squadrons came as close to each other as 20 nautical miles.[17]

It is commonly believed that Papal mediation solved the issue, but this is a misleading oversimplification. Unfavorable weather led to the postponement of the seizure of the islands, and the next day the Pope notified both countries that he was sending a personal representative to sow the ground for a possible mediation effort. Argentina grasped at this new effort to find a negotiated settlement and put seizure of the islands on hold.[18] Chile, which would have fought only if attacked, accepted Papal intervention without prejudice to its position on the non-negotiability of the islands.[19]

Yet even as the Pope's mediation developed, militarized bargaining continued. Argentina remained steadfast in insisting that the bi-oceanic principle was the key to the deal and Chile continued to seek to preserve its gains in the Atlantic. Consequently, Argentina rejected a papal suggestion in 1980 that sought to make the waters in the area a common patrimony. Neither the Argentine defeat in the Malvinas War in 1982 nor redemocratization in 1984 led to changes in the Argentine position on the bi-oceanic principle (see Appendix). Resolution came only in 1984–85. In 1984, as part of a comprehensive agreement to resolve all 24 points in dispute, Chile desisted from contesting the bi-oceanic principle and Argentina recognized Chilean sovereignty over the Beagle Channel Islands. (Figure 6.2 illustrates the shift in bargaining positions.) Even then, the final agreement was opposed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy and passed the Argentine Senate by only one vote.[20]

Explaining the Use of Military Force

Foreign Policy Goods

Each leader seeks to deliver a foreign policy good to his constituency. The ability of each leader to deliver these goods depends on the evolution of the bilateral bargaining situation. Our interest lies in illuminating the



FIGURE 6.2 Bargaining Scenario Argentina-Chile 1977, 1984

1 = Bi-Oceanic Principle, 0 Islands to Chile
2 = Bi-Oceanic Principle, 1 Island to Chile
3 = Bi-Oceanic Principle, 2 Islands to Chile
4 = Bi-Oceanic Principle, 3 Islands to Chile
5 = Shared Sea, 1, 2, or 3 Islands to Chile
6 = No Bi-Oceanic Principle, 3 Islands to Chile

reasoning which made incorporating the use of force as a bargaining tactic rational for each side in its quest to deliver these foreign policy goods.

Argentine Presidents in the 1960s and 1970s, whether military or civilian, wanted to settle a long conflict with Chile, but not at the expense of the bi-oceanic principle, which had helped define the country relative to its neighbor Chile. As a result, the bi-oceanic principle was a public good. In addition, by 1976 Argentine relations with Great Britain were souring over the Malvinas dispute. Chile historically had good relations with Great Britain. Argentina's bargaining power with Great Britain over the sovereignty of these islands would be seriously diminished if Chile were to project itself into the south Atlantic.[21] Consequently, Argentina was in a bind in 1977. Accepting the Arbitral Award as handed down had potentially serious consequences.

Some Argentine leaders, especially in the Navy, were interested in a private good: sovereignty over one or all of the islands in the Beagle Channel. While Videla was willing to use the islands as a bargaining chip to gain

acceptance of the bi-oceanic principle, these minority political voices wanted more.

The goods President General Pinochet wished to deliver were twofold. The Court had presented him with the opportunity to demand Chile get the full benefits of the *laudo*, which included unforeseen Chilean benefits in the Atlantic. The public good consisted of the sanctity of international treaties and laws concerning territorial sovereignty.[22] Chile had reasons to fear the implications of renegotiating treaties recognized by international law. As noted in chapter 3, Chile's current dispute with Bolivia over a sovereign outlet to the sea was rekindled at this time. Tensions produced a war scare, with Peru potentially joining Bolivia.[23]

The Award did not explicitly reject the bi-oceanic principle, but it did make it possible for Chile to project itself into the Atlantic. This projection would be a private good for ultranationalists. Since the turn of the century Chileans had largely accepted that they were a Pacific rather than Atlantic power. Maritime projection does not seem to have had the same support as defending sovereignty over the islands.

Expected Costs

Political-military Strategy

Argentina sought to break the link between possession of the islands and the right to project into the territorial sea via bilateral negotiations. Argentina could not accept Chile's offer to submit the arbitration award to the World Court. The only solution Argentina could countenance required either bilateral negotiations from scratch or mediation by someone who could not only recognize the strategic necessity of the bi-oceanic principle, but also convince the Chileans to accept these terms for mediation. In the absence of either solution Argentina was prepared to defend its Atlantic interests by force of arms.

Argentina needed to convince Chile that Chile's own interests would be better served by reopening negotiations on both islands and territorial seas and resurrecting the bi-oceanic principle. Given Chilean intransigence, Argentina's bargaining was essentially limited to raising the specter of a costly military confrontation with Chile.

Chile's international security had been based on maintaining the status quo after its conquests of the nineteenth century.[24] The credibility of Chile's

refusal to be coerced into making concessions would be severely diminished if it accepted Argentina's proposal to ignore the results of an international arbitration. Chile thus offered in 1978 to discuss issues not addressed by the Arbitration and to take the dispute over the arbitration to the International Court of Justice. But it could not agree to renegotiate that which it had already been granted, unless the costs of not renegotiating increased dramatically beyond Argentine irritation.

Past MID experiences with unhappy neighbors suggested that Chile could expect some saber rattling by Argentina. In the Beagle case, Chile would need to demonstrate that it had the military capacity to make an Argentine seizure of the islands extremely costly. This would entail either thwarting an Argentina attack in the Channel or convincing them that a successful attack in the south would mean full-scale war. This strategy was complicated by three factors. First was the possibility of an Argentine-Bolivian-Peruvian alliance against Chile. Chilean military strategists believed they could easily defeat Bolivia and inflict heavy damage upon one of the other two adversaries. The task was to make one hesitate long enough before joining the other that Chile could defeat the first invader before the second joined in.[25] Second, Chile needed to maintain a strong military presence in both the north and south. Finally, Chile needed to avoid provoking Argentina by overreacting to its use of force as a signaling device.

Strategic Balance

Both governments were international pariahs because of their human rights records. Ideally, Chile could count on diplomatic support from all countries that opposed the use of force in settling disputes. Even the U.S. administration of Jimmy Carter, which had extremely poor relations with both countries, told Argentine representatives in no uncertain terms that the use of force to regain the islands was unacceptable.[26] Chile and Argentina were both confident of Chile's ability to win in the diplomatic and legal halls around the world if war broke out.

The military situation was complex. An analyst might be tempted to simplify by counting numbers of weapons and people, even including Peruvian forces in the balance, and geography.[27] Argentina's population is more than 2.5 times that of Chile's, with Peru adding another 1.5 times Chile's population. Argentine GNP was a little over four times Chile's, although Peru's was only roughly two-thirds that of Chile's.[28] The difference in troop strength

is not as overwhelming, but still large: in 1976 estimated figures were Chile 83,000 troops total (50,000 Army, 23,000 Navy and 10,000 Air Force); Argentina 137,000 total (83,000 Army, 33,000 Navy and 21,000 Air Force); and Peru 69,000 total (46,000 Army, 14,000 Navy, and 9,000 Air Force). Chile also fell behind in terms of naval and air equipment at the time.[29] The geographic disadvantages for Chile are little strategic depth east to west and vast distances between north and south (roughly 4,000 miles). By this reckoning, a war with Chile would have produced a quick and cheap Argentine victory.

Chile, however, had very important advantages that rendered war with it costly and risky for Argentina as well. As a status quo power, Chile would be fighting a defensive war on its own territory rather than invading someone else's. The northern deserts were heavily mined, making invasion here costly and difficult. The Chilean armed forces had extensive supply and transport equipment, ensuring that their lines of communication would hold up well. The quality of the Chilean soldier was generally recognized as excellent.[30] The qualitative differences relative to Peru mean that Chile could count on a defensive advantage far greater than the traditional 3–1 force ratio generally perceived necessary for an attacker to count on success. And even if one were to grant Argentina equal quality on the ground, it only had a 1.6–1 advantage. Finally, there is no history of Argentine-Peruvian military cooperation. During the War of the Pacific, Argentina preferred to negotiate its own deal with Chile rather than aid Peru. In the tense negotiations leading up to the 1929 treaty there is no evidence of Argentine pledges of aid to Peru. And when the 1976–78 period of tension between Peru and Chile began, the Argentines were again silent even as the Peruvians mobilized their forces. Since Argentina had never been a credible ally for the Peruvians, they could hardly have a high degree of confidence in Peru's willingness to become involved in a war with Chile when it was advantageous for Argentina.[31] There is no record of discussions between Argentina and Peru concerning joint military action, and none of the interviews provided by Argentine military and diplomatic actors of the day mention such discussions.

These Chilean advantages do not imply that it could have won a war against Argentina, but that is not the relevant point. To deter their neighbors the Chileans do not have to demonstrate a capability to win. They need, instead, to make a credible case that a military adventure against Chile would not be cheap. In 1978, the Argentine Junta could not be very confident that war would produce a low-cost victory against Chile.

Characteristics of Force Used

Chile's desire to demonstrate resolve but not escalate unnecessarily meant that it was unlikely to use force early in a dispute. Instead, its actions would be geared toward credibly communicating their determination and capability to defend via declarations of resolve, mobilizations of units, and deployments in defensive positions. Because Chile's military was already mobilized to run the country and its internal security missions had already demobilized the democratic opposition, the domestic costs of signaling military resolve to Argentina were low. Chile's politico-military strategy required force to be actively used only to repel an Argentine invasion of the country or seizure of an island. Full-scale war would entail use of the Army and Air Force in the center and north and the Navy and Air Force in the south. Thwarting an Argentine military operation against the islands required naval and air actions in the south. In either case, the costs could be expected to be high for Chile.

Argentina's politico-military strategy provided for the use of force in three ways: to coerce Chile into broadening its negotiating stance before violence escalated; to seize an island and negotiate from a position of strength; and to fight a war if necessary. If Argentina were successful in coercing Chilean negotiators via demonstrations of Argentine military capabilities and will, the costs of such use of force would be minor. Argentina thus engaged in domestic mobilizations, overflights of Chilean airspace, and naval bombardment of uninhabited islands. Seizing and holding an island for negotiating purposes would be cheap only if done by surprise and without provoking a Chilean escalation. Surprise however, would be difficult since the preferred strategy was to initially use force to communicate the seriousness with which Argentina perceived the Beagle dispute. Chile's Navy would consequently be on the alert in the region lest the signaling escalate into an attempt to seize territory. Thus, if the islands were not seized at the beginning of the militarized bargaining strategy, seizure later likely meant war, at least in the south.

A military stalemate in the south would bring Argentina international condemnation for using force and provide Chileans with little incentive to broaden their negotiating range. In fact, it would probably narrow it, since Chile had international law on its side as well, and would presumably result in Chile's refusal to negotiate on the other 23 outstanding disputes. Taking the islands in the south would thus mean having to pursue victory if Chile

resisted. Victory required moving into Chile in the north at the same time, and hence full-scale war. And again, high costs.

To summarize the total expected costs associated with the use of force: Militarized bargaining costs were low for Argentina, since Chile was not likely to attack; and it was low for Chile as long as Argentina did not decide to escalate from threats and demonstrations to seize the islands by force. As for the cost of war, it was likely to be high on both sides since Chile was on the alert in the south.

Restraints on Costs

Constituencies' Cost Acceptance/Aversion

Argentina

Generals Videla, Viola, and Galtieri had three constituencies to whom each had to deliver goods at acceptable costs if he were to remain in office for his specified term and choose his successor. These were the Junta, the Army's high command, and those in civil society whose support was necessary for a leader's political project to advance. Alfonsín, the first president in the transition to democracy, had a constituency consisting of the traditional Radical Party voters, voters who had abandoned the traditionally majority Peronist Party in 1984, and those officers in the military who had supported democratization.

Within the Junta during 1977 Videla represented only 1 out of 3 votes and was in danger of being outvoted. This appears to have occurred early in the dispute. Videla had accepted the recommendations of an Inter-ministerial Commission concerning maximum and minimum negotiating positions, including the possibility of "joint sovereignty" over water and land. but the Junta rejected any consideration of Chilean sovereign access to the Atlantic.[32] On this point the 1977 Junta did not waiver, even when it was renewed with a new cast in 1978, and neither Junta differed from the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín in 1984.[33] Videla, Viola, Galtieri, and Alfonsín all confronted this limit to the Argentine position.

The Junta preferred a negotiated solution to fighting, but also preferred fighting to losing on the bi-oceanic principle. It thus paid close

attention to the informal negotiating sessions carried on by the Foreign Ministries in July and October 1977. When those failed, the Junta turned to direct military contacts. After rejecting the Award in January 1978, the Junta sent a military mission to Chile to confirm that Argentina wished to commence formal bilateral negotiations.

In the Junta, only Admiral Emilio Massera was anxious for a military resolution. Admiral Massera sought to use military successes in restoring the economy, combating subversion, and reaffirming Argentine sovereignty in the South Atlantic (Beagle and Malvinas) to win a Presidential election.[34] His constituency comprised nationalist forces within the military and he courted the Peronists, even talking to the remnants of the urban guerrilla Montoneros living in exile as well as with Estela Perón, whom the Junta had overthrown in 1976.[35] After the second meeting of Presidents on February 20, 1978 and in response to Pinochet's declaration that Chile respected international law and would defend the Arbitral Award, Admiral Massera ended a speech in Buenos Aires with "the time for words has ended!"[36] But Massera's opposition to Videla and his own political project lost him support within the Navy. He retired in September 1978 and his successor in the Junta became more cautious.[37]

The Junta's caution did not mean that it was unwilling to decide upon war if necessary. They authorized the Foreign Minister to meet the Chilean Foreign Minister on December 12, 1978 and agree to the Pope as mediator, as long as the issue included items covered by the Arbitral Award, i.e., land from which Chile could project into the Atlantic. After this effort failed to persuade Chile, Army Chief Viola, under stiff pressure from the service's High Command, pressed for a quick resolution of the issue. While the Navy and Air Force believed the moment was not ripe for a military solution, they acceded to the Army's position.[38] The decision was thus made in the Junta on December 14 to seize the islands in order to force Chile to negotiate on Argentine terms.

The Junta still held out for a modification in the Chilean bargaining range right up to the perceived last moment. Although the U.S. government proposed on the 12th that the disagreement be submitted to the Organization of American States dispute resolution mechanisms, Argentina insisted on pursuing the bilateral route (as did Chile).[39] The Junta dispatched a high-level military mission on December 17 to meet with their counterparts in Chile, but to no avail. When informed of the Pope's mediation offer on the 22nd the Junta grabbed this last opportunity to avoid war, and immediately

suspended their plan for seizing the islands, withdrew their fleet, and reopened the borders.[40]

Cardinal Samore met multiple times with the Junta. The sticking point was Chile's refusal to accept a wording of the mediation process that did not foreclose the possibility of discussing issues seemingly settled in the Arbitral Award. Chile finally acquiesced and on January 5, 1979 the Argentine Junta agreed to have the Pope mediate the dispute. Presidents Videla, Viola, and Galtieri were now able to proceed with the negotiations with little day-to-day interference from the Junta.[41]

Although it had backed down from war, the Junta never gave up on the use of military force to pressure Chile. There were MIDs in 1980, 1981, and 1983 with the last military government embarking on a transition to democracy in the wake of the defeat in the Malvinas. The Junta also rejected the Pope's suggestion of a shared sea with Chile in 1980 and supported Galtieri's decision in 1982 not to renew the bilateral treaty with Chile which called for the juridical resolution of disputes.

Videla had initially been able to contain the hardliners in the Army while he was both President and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. After Videla lost control of the Army in the middle of 1978 the High Command wanted to seize the islands as a negotiating ploy. Army Chief Viola was unable to assert his control over the institution either and it was the Army which pushed through seizure of the islands in December 1978. While Viola was President, Army Chief Galtieri appears to have acted upon his own authority and closed border crossings between the two countries.[42] The military was too divided to accept the Pope's proposal of joint sovereignty over the seas, preferring to risk military escalation once again.[43] They were focused enough on fighting Chile that even during the Malvinas War against Great Britain in 1982 the Army left its best troops on the borders with Chile, rather than shift them to the Malvinas.

The Army thus emerges as quite belligerent after mid 1978. The officer corps was willing to assume the military costs of confronting Chile. It is not clear, however, that they expected to face the full costs of any engagement. If the war remained limited to the islands, the Army would bear little of the direct costs since seizure would be largely in the hands of the Navy and Air Force. Since a land war would escalate only if Chile provoked it in the north, and Chile was well known to have a defensive posture, the chances of a major land engagement must have seemed minimal.[44]

Although Argentina lived under a military government during the Beagle dispute, the major political issues of the day, including the Beagle, were discussed in the newspapers. In addition, newspapers were often linked to one or another military faction, and would report on intra-military government discussions and feuds. There was evidence that major political forces wanted to retain the islands and to keep Chile out of the Atlantic. In October 1977 high-profile writers, businessmen, retired military officers, and politicians (including the leader of the Radical Party and the man who would become President after the collapse of the military regime in 1984, Raúl Alfonsín) published a declaration in the major Buenos Aires daily. This diverse group demanded that "not one meter of our air, sea or territorial space could be negotiated away without a manifestation of the national will, whether that be via the reestablishment of constitutional government or by a national referendum."[45] The latter clause indicates that defending Argentine sovereignty took precedence over redemocratization.

The public at large was not in the dark on the issues at stake, or on the alternatives to the use of force. Pinochet's telegram of November 3, 1978 suggesting that a friendly government be asked to mediate the dispute, rather than renew bilateral negotiations that had already proven fruitless, was published in a major Buenos Aires daily. In addition, the text of the Pope's telegram to both Videla and Pinochet encouraging a peaceful settlement was also published the day it was received, December 12, 1978.[46]

The return of democracy in 1984 made the public more important in policy decisions. The nationalist fervor that had produced massive demonstrations in support of the Junta's military seizure of the Malvinas Islands in 1982 had been dampened by the defeat at the hands of the British. The public clearly demanded no wars, but it was not clear how much nationalism in the country's foreign policy they were willing to give up to avoid war.

The Peronist Party perceived that negotiations with Chile were a platform on which they could regain the loyalty of those voters that had supported Alfonsín in 1984. Alfonsín sought to mitigate this attack by publicly defending the bi-oceanic principle and Argentine claims to the Antarctic. In a telling pronouncement, Interior Minister Antonio Troccoli noted that good relations with Chile were a priority that needed to be addressed immediately, "defending, of course, the bi-oceanic principle."[47] Although the Peronists attempted to strike at Alfonsín by opposing the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship in the plebiscite, the electorate supported it overwhelmingly. The Treaty passed the Senate by a narrow 23–22 margin, with one abstention.[48]

Chile

General Pinochet's constituencies in the relevant years of 1977–84 were the Army and right wing political forces and individuals, many of whom assumed positions in his government. Although even leftist political forces in exile believed that Chile should not renegotiate what it had won in international arbitration,[49] Pinochet was certainly not paying attention to their desires.

There seemed to be unanimous agreement among Pinochet's constituencies on two points. First, that Chile had international law on its side (the irony of being an international pariah on human rights issues escaped them). Second, that Chile could not succumb to intimidation by the Argentine military government. Because Argentina was demanding that Chile give up what it had gained through a legal process or face war, the idea that Chile should defend itself against military aggression even if war ensued seems not to have been disputed within these military and political forces.

To summarize constituency cost acceptance/aversion: In Argentina from 1977 to the outbreak of the Malvinas War of 1982 using military force *if necessary to defend the bi-oceanic principle* appeared acceptable not only to the military Junta, but also to the reemerging political forces. In the absence of a specific discussion of those costs it would have been extremely risky for an Argentine leader to assume that the public would have accepted high costs. Pinochet's constituency also supported the use of military force if necessary. Because they would have been responding to an Argentine attack and were right wing nationalists, Pinochet likely assumed they would offer all to defend the country.

As for the accountability of the leader to constituencies, Argentina and Chile in 1977–78 both had military governments. Yet because the structure of the military governments and the events leading up to the coups which brought them to power differed dramatically, the Argentine and Chilean Presidents had distinct vulnerabilities to their key constituencies in the armed forces and society.

Argentina

Argentina had significantly greater internal armed conflict than Chile in the period leading up to the coup in 1976. The Argentine military coup was

welcomed by virtually everyone and, since the scale of the Dirty War within Argentina was unknown at the time, the government faced little domestic opposition from traditional political forces in 1977–78. In Chile, the 1973 coup had been a traumatic experience and there was a large, though cowed opposition. Still, the Chilean military government retained the allegiance of the center and right who feared a return to the polarized politics of the Allende years if the military relinquished power. Although the economies of the two countries were in states of collapse at the beginning of the MID, both began short-lived recoveries at the height of the crisis, and saw their economies collapse again beginning in 1981, with the Chilean economy recovering in 1984.

In Argentina, the military coup of 1976 was designed to restructure Argentine politics, society, and the economy. The military leadership recognized the enormity of the task and designed an institutional form of government to maintain unity within the armed forces during the process. The supreme organ of the state was the Military Junta, in which each of the three services' Commanders in Chief would have equal standing. While the Commanders represented their services, they were not autonomous of their officer corps. The high commands of each branch met separately to discuss and assess the issues of the day. In this fashion power was intended to reside only in the military and would be exercised only jointly.

The Presidency was an executive office, officially subordinate to the Junta, and to be occupied by a retired officer so as not to disrupt the division of power within the Junta. General Videla had been named President although he was not retired because the military believed that the fight against domestic enemies required the leader to be an active duty officer. A formal document recognized this situation as temporary, to be remedied once domestic order had been secured. In August 1978 the period of exception was ended and the Presidency separated from the Junta, with General Videla retiring and General Roberto Viola taking his place on the Junta as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Junta could veto presidential decisions by a two-thirds vote, except that deposing the President required unanimity.

The functions of government were initially divided into thirds, and military officers dominated the cabinet. The Navy received responsibility for foreign affairs, among other assignments. In 1976, a rear admiral carried out the evaluation for the Navy-supported Foreign Minister which approved continuing the arbitration. Upon retiring as Army chief in August 1978, Videla

convinced the Junta to allow half the cabinet to be composed of civilians and the other half of retired officers.

General Videla was a moderate within the military. Unlike hardliners, he sought to maintain a dialogue with forces within civil society, particularly political parties. At the end of November 1978, just as the Beagle Channel dispute was entering its most dangerous phase, the General attended two significant civilian events along with half of the leadership of one of the leading parties, the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). This action signaled the beginning of a serious political opening, which picked up steam in 1979.[50] Army Chief and soon to be successor to Videla, General Viola had always advocated a dialogue with the political parties. Videla and Viola, however, would have to deal with forces within the military that sought either no transition at all or to drag out the transition.

The limitations on Videla's policy choices were in evidence as the end date of the formal negotiations with Chile neared. Videla and his Foreign Minister, Air Force General Carlos Washington Pastor (who was also Videla's brother-in-law), discussed possible mediators. With the collapse of formal negotiations on November 2, 1978 the Military Committee went into permanent session to plan Argentina's next move. This committee was composed of the President, the Junta, and the secretaries of the three service branches; in mid-November two generals from the Army General Staff joined.[51] In December 1978, Chile was willing to accept the Pope as mediator, but insisted on the Award being one of the issues to be mediated. Videla decided to expand his bargaining range in light of Chilean intransigence, but the Junta intervened and forced him to retract such modifications.[52]

Videla and Pastor attempted to pursue a diplomatic route without the Junta's knowledge. They sent representatives to the U.S., the USSR, France, Germany, and the Vatican, as well as to the UN in an attempt to bring international pressure to bear on Chile to modify its stance. But the Argentines found no allies because no one was willing to back the use of force and Chile was defending the Arbitral Award. On December 15 and 16, during meetings at the U.S. State Department, the White House and Congress made it clear that any use of force would be condemned by the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. government did offer, however, to ask the Vatican to act quickly to try and defuse the crisis.[53]

Videla tried another maneuver to get around the Junta's tight rein. He met with the Papal Nuncio on December 14 and informed him that he had

given the orders to seize the islands the following week. Videla reportedly expressed his personal desire to avoid the use of force, but feared that the Junta would remove him if he backed down now. This surprising revelation of Argentine war plans must have been designed to spur the Vatican into immediate action to persuade Chile to make the necessary concessions to get negotiations back on track. Videla seemed to understand that the Junta would allow him to negotiate only if Chile modified its negotiating stance.

Viola found himself with even less freedom of action upon assuming the Presidency. The debate over terminating Videla's dual role as President and member of the Junta thrust the high command into playing increasingly active roles in determining major policy. The Army high command was able to extract a commitment from Videla's ally and heir apparent, General Viola, that he would retire after serving only half a term as Commander-in-Chief and not modify the high command while Army leader.[54] The latter would prove a severe constraint. His successor as Army chief, General Leopoldo Galtieri, proved to be a rival rather than ally, ultimately toppling and replacing him as President.

As long as the Junta wanted to govern the country itself and was willing to use repression to guarantee its rule, the number of domestic allies it would need would be small. But as soon as they contemplated opening up the political process, even short of holding elections, and ruling through a civil-military alliance, their need for allies increased. Such needs would provide these civilian allies with informal and weak, but very real, abilities to constrain policy choices.

By 1978 the liberal economic program was providing fruits and urban guerrillas were defeated (both had enormous costs for the losers, but many of these were still unknown to society). The liberal economic program would serve to ally policy technocrats and internationally competitive business with the military. In 1979 business groups began to anticipate the change in the presidency set for 1981 and pressured different "candidates" to pay more attention to their needs.[55]

The Junta publicly declared that the new president would be its "legal representative," thereby warning potential candidates and political parties that it was not willing to share power.[56] Intense discussion and politicking within the armed forces eventually led to General Viola's selection in October 1980 and he became President in March 1981. But Viola could not count on the support of his successor as Army Chief. General Galtieri represented the hardline faction within the Army and wanted to become Pres-

ident himself. Within the Junta Galtieri allied himself with the Navy's representative, Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, a supporter of Admiral Massera's willingness to use force quickly to resolve disputes.

Viola's short reign in 1981 was characterized by increasing tension from walking the tightrope between the moderates and hardliners.[57] Viola changed the orientation of economic policy, made overtures to the Argentine Industrial Association, and selected leaders of the agricultural and mining sectors to head the respective ministries. The new Minister of Labor was a general who opened a dialogue with the unions, while the new Interior Minister announced the priority of the "political dialogue." On July 14, 1981 the political parties formed the Multipartidaria and entered into discussions with the Minister.[58]

General Galtieri forced Viola out in December 1981. He became President yet retained his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, thereby altering the relationship between the Presidency and the Junta in his favor. Galtieri had to promise Navy Chief Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya that he would support an invasion of the Falklands Islands in order to get his support for the Presidency.[59] Three factors suggest that Anaya's influence over Galtieri would have diminished upon his becoming President. First, Galtieri's own political program gave him personal reasons for wanting to seize the Falklands (see below). Second, Anaya could not topple Galtieri on his own. The third member of the Junta, Air Force General Basilio Lami Dozo, not an enthusiastic supporter of the Falklands invasion, would have been unlikely to support toppling Galtieri over this issue. Finally, Galtieri was firmly in control of the Army and the Navy had less political weight, as demonstrated previously in the disputes between General Videla and Admiral Massera.

While Galtieri had significantly diminished the Junta's ability to constrain him, he began developing new constraints on his freedom of action. Although a hardliner, Galtieri realized that the Junta's days were numbered. The economy was slipping into chaos and the political parties were increasingly active. His political project, consequently, was to create a new civil-military alliance that would guide the transition back to democracy and lead him to victory in the elections. He publicized his net worth to demonstrate that he was not corrupt, promised to return his presidential salary to the Treasury, and began making public appearances "shaking hands with the elderly and kissing babies."[60] The Multipartidaria demand in February 1982 for "the immediate restitution of the Malvinas"[61] made defending sovereignty of Argentine territory an important issue in any upcoming electoral

campaign. Compromising on the bi-oceanic principle would have been a poor political move in 1982.

Once Raúl Alfonsín became President the constraints upon the Executive shifted to the Congressional and electoral arena. Alfonsín was the first presidential candidate to defeat the Peronist party in free elections since 1948, but the Peronists claimed control of the Congress. Alfonsín perceived that no politician could concede the bi-oceanic principle to Chile. When Alfonsín lobbied politicians at home to support the Pope's suggestions for a solution, he insisted that any agreement would defend both the bi-oceanic principle as well as Argentine claims in the Antarctic. This formula paid off, as the plebiscite on the Treaty was a major success. Although the Peronist-controlled Senate passed the Treaty by only one vote, Alfonsín had already made his point with the electorate.

Chile

In Chile, the military coup of 1973 was carried out as a collegial affair, but Army Commander-in-Chief General Augusto Pinochet soon consolidated control over the Junta. During the early years the Junta came to believe that the country needed to undergo radical changes in the social, political, and economic spheres and that these changes would be possible only under their "guidance." Unlike their Argentine counterparts, Chile's military feared that the politicization of the military that was inevitable under direct rule would undermine its professional capabilities. The ruling Junta was, therefore, made up of the commanders of the four service branches (Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Police) who were directly accountable only to themselves.

Pinochet retained his position as both a member of the Junta and President. This combination gave him enormous policymaking leeway because Junta decisions had to be unanimous. In January 1978 Pinochet increased his independence from the Junta by overwhelmingly winning a symbolic referendum endorsing his government. The Air Force and Navy Commanders in the Junta attempted to prevent the referendum because they understood that it would give the President an additional basis of legitimacy, but Pinochet held it under executive order.[62]

Pinochet developed a secret police that were directly answerable to him as President and they instilled fear even within the military. He also promulgated a decree that allowed him to purge the ranks of the Army officer

corps of any potential competitors, including virtually everyone from his generation. There was thus little opposition to Pinochet within the government or the Army.

General Pinochet had a rival in the Junta, Air Force General Gustavo Leigh. But Leigh's political project sought to create a civil-military alliance to run the country and this prospect clashed with the general desire of the armed forces and police to "stay out of politics." Leigh and his top generals became isolated within the military and could not build important alliances in civil society. When Pinochet mobilized paratroopers, the other members of the Junta, and his cabinet to depose General Leigh and 18 high ranking Air Force officers in July 1978, Leigh had little alternative but to back down from a confrontation.

In 1979–80 Pinochet moved further to legitimize his government outside of the Junta. A new constitution was written and passed overwhelmingly in another plebiscite. Although opponents of the regime denounced the voting process, he now had a "popularly legitimated" mandate to remain as President for another ten years, with a possibility for "reelection." The perception of the business elite and right wing political forces that only Pinochet stood in the way of a resurgence of the Socialist-Communist alliance gave him great autonomy on policy matters. The support of most of this sector even survived the short-lived but dramatic economic collapse of 1982–83.[63]

Pinochet had more independence from the Junta than his Argentine counterpart because Chile's Junta saw his continuity as fundamental to their legitimacy and the institutional structure of the authoritarian government provided no justifiable way for the Junta to constrain him. If the Junta were to depose General Pinochet it would have to confront the government (staffed largely by Pinochet loyalists) and the Army (under direct control of Pinochet and a handpicked group of Generals), and to call into question their own legitimacy. It was not until the Junta decided that a transition to democracy was desirable that they were willing to risk a major confrontation with Pinochet.[64]

General Pinochet thus had great political leeway in structuring a package to resolve the Beagle dispute, *as long as he did not give up islands*. The arbiters had found in Chile's favor on the question of islands and had left maritime projection to be negotiated between the two countries. Once Pinochet decided that a deal with Argentina was in Chile's best interests, he was willing to give up the private good of maritime projection for the public good of the sanctity of international treaties regarding territorial sovereignty.

Although the Navy Commander-in-Chief wanted to hold out for the private good, Pinochet seems to have paid no costs in overruling him.

In sum, regarding restraints on costs, Chile's leader confronted an ideal situation. Chilean society, even those in exile, perceived the Argentines as the aggressors and supported defending Chilean sovereignty, as defined by the arbiters. Since war would result only if Argentina attacked, Pinochet could count on his constituencies' support of Chile's defense. Not only did he have their support, he had great leeway on the specifics of policy because of the polarized political environment within Chile. Argentina's military and democratic leaders were greatly constrained by their military and civilian constituencies. Although the identities of the constituencies varied by leader, all were defenders of the bi-oceanic principle. The challenge for Argentine leaders was to deliver the foreign policy good, but avoid large-scale war.

If Not Beagle, Why Malvinas?

In the Beagle Channel dispute the Argentine Junta demonstrated a willingness to use the threat of force to bargain and an eagerness to grasp at an exit strategy when it was offered. Why did the same Junta fail to draw back from the confrontation with Britain over the Malvinas? Exploration of Galtieri's decision to seize the disputed Malvinas Islands provides further suggestive evidence for my model of militarized bargaining.

Although I argued above that Galtieri was more secure within the Junta than other analysts claim, everyone agrees that he was seeking public support for a run for the presidency in a transition government. Thus *Galtieri's political future was very accountable to Argentine political forces*. So why did he embark on a foreign policy which turned into such a disaster for him?

The answer lies in the high benefits and low costs that he expected to pay for bringing home this foreign policy good. Restitution of the Malvinas was clearly a public good in Argentina. The political parties themselves recognized the drawing power of the Malvinas issue. In February 1982, as part of their program for a transition to democracy, through the Multipartidaria they had demanded "the immediate restitution of the Malvinas." The massive street demonstrations in support of seizing the islands and the lack of such demonstrations against war when it became clear that Britain would fight demonstrate that Galtieri's potential public constituencies favored the effort and were willing to pay an unspecified price of war to achieve it.[65]

The political-military strategy was clearly to seize the islands and then negotiate, not fight. Argentina had previously taken the issue to the UN and in 1964 the General Assembly included the islands on a list of territories to be decolonized. Following a UN resolution the British and Argentines initiated negotiations in 1966. After initial progress, talks stalled in 1968 when the 1,200 inhabitants of the islands were given effective veto power over any agreement. Originally hailing from Great Britain, the islanders preferred the status of British subjects to becoming Argentine citizens.

Negotiations took on a new life after 1977, when the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher began cutting state expenditures. Funds for supplying and defending islands located 8,000 miles away and with little economic or strategic value, seemed like a good item to strike from the budget. Galtieri and his advisers also believed that Britain's government would calculate the international cost of fighting for the islands to be greater than the domestic costs of standing up to the islanders and Parliament. The Argentines believed that world opinion and the U.S. government would see this as a decolonization issue and support Argentine claims.[66]

The strategic balance seemed to favor Argentina. The Argentine leadership studied previous episodes in which military force was used to develop scenarios about likely responses to an Argentine seizure. From the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Argentines noticed that the U.S. had sanctioned British, French, and Israeli use of military force to regain control over the Suez Canal after Egypt had nationalized it. Egypt's attack on Israel in 1973 demonstrated not only that militarizing a dispute could draw international attention, but also confirmed the willingness of the U.S. to pressure a close ally (Israel) to make concessions in order to gain a peaceful solution. The Argentine decisionmakers also noticed that India's seizure of Portuguese Goa in 1961 was initially condemned by the international community, and then accepted as a *fait accompli*. Finally, the British decision to come to terms with their renegade former colony Rhodesia in 1981 was seen as a harbinger of likely British response to a "peaceful" Argentina occupation of the Malvinas.[67]

Although the Junta did not believe Britain would fight, they also assumed that if Britain did react militarily Argentina could defend the islands. The British were 8,000 miles away, with a weak capability to project military power into the south Atlantic. The Junta certainly overestimated Argentine capabilities, but even more important were calculations about the weather and U.S. behavior. The seizure of the islands had been planned for May 15

when winter would make naval operations to expel the Argentines extremely treacherous. And the U.S. was expected to remain neutral.[68]

The characteristics of force used (a surprise landing with an overwhelming number of troops) were designed to permit seizing the islands while avoiding British casualties. A bloodless takeover was expected to dampen the emotional response of British nationalism, thereby making it less likely that a military response would be forthcoming. Peaceful occupation was also designed to mitigate the Junta's poor international reputation on human rights. In addition, the Junta expected that the international community would see the "peaceful" occupation as a restrained response to British intransigence in negotiations over an issue that the UN had already declared ripe for decolonization.[69]

Argentine calculations were thus that likely costs associated with seizure of the Malvinas Islands were very acceptable: $S + SB + CF < CC - A$.

The problems began when the seizures had to be carried out earlier in the year because the British were becoming suspicious. Since the idea was to carry out a bloodless seizure, a British alert would require a change to more costly action, both militarily and diplomatically.[70] The British, who had decided to fight rather than commit to negotiating sovereignty,[71] now had ample time to put a task force in place before winter *if they had the aid of the U.S.*

The U.S. government, despite U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's efforts and communications to the Argentine government, opted to see this issue as one of international aggression rather than decolonization. The U.S. provided the British task force with access to a naval base along the route, as well as fuel, munitions, and satellite intelligence that tracked Argentine military moves. By the time Galtieri realized that the military costs of keeping the islands would be far greater than he had calculated, his domestic political costs of backing down were clearly high enough to oust him from office and, if the Junta fell with him, to threaten prosecution for human rights violations. Thus pressed, he gambled on winning the war.[72]

Militarizing the Malvinas dispute can thus be understood as a rational policy decision by the Argentine leadership, not simply an attempt to divert attention from problems at home. Winning the Malvinas would have provided a policy good to a constituency that held tremendous influence over General Galtieri's political future. The miscalculations of the Argentine Junta were not the result of irrational military bravado, but largely due to

British and U.S. failures to take the Argentines seriously and signal deterrence credibly. In the Beagle Channel Dispute with Chile, the Argentine Junta had demonstrated their rationality, as well as prudence, when Chile signaled deterrence credibly. In this case the Argentines understood that the costs of a war would be high and grasped at the last straw offered, even when it was not clear that the Pope's mediation would work.

Conclusion

Exploration of the Argentina/Chile dyad demonstrates the utility of the militarized bargaining model for understanding a military government's decision to use force. Viewing the Beagle Channel dispute through the lens of costs of force, constituencies' tolerance of costs, and their ability to punish decisionmakers makes the Argentine and Chilean decisions to bargain militarily, yet stay away from war, understandable, rational, and even prudent within their contexts.

Ultimately, Chile had a great advantage in being able to keep the military from governing as an institution. This meant that political decisions were subject to less pressure from the officer corps and that the fighting ability of the institution was never seriously undermined. General Pinochet could make decisions and expect them to stick and have a high degree of confidence in his military's ability to defend the country. Hence, in the model's terms, the constituencies' inability to punish Pinochet increased his freedom to bargain. Further, the strategic situation in which Argentina was necessarily the aggressor if war occurred virtually guaranteed popular support for fighting a war.

Argentina's military governments were vehicles by which the officer corps of the three service branches became intimately involved in policy choices. Videla, Viola, and Galtieri (though less so the latter) were severely constrained by the politicization of the officer corps. At the same time, these leaders were also limited by the need for civilian support for their political projects. Hence, consistent with the model, the greater constraints on the Argentine president limited his bargaining options. Faced with intransigent adversaries and constituencies eager for foreign policy goods, Argentine policymakers chose the political-military strategy of rattling sabers. In the Beagle dispute, the President's constituency preferred a costly war to the new status quo; in the Malvinas, where Argentina had intended to present the British

with a fait accompli and move directly to negotiation, war was preferable to capitulation for both the Junta and the public.

Given the common assumption that military governments are more willing than other regime types to consider the use of force, explaining a military government's use of force does not necessarily demonstrate a model's power for understanding the behavior of other regime types. The following chapter explores the usefulness of the militarized bargaining model for understanding decisions around the use of force in a democratic dyad composed of unequal partners.