Part 1

The Issue

1 The Origins of Violent Peace: Explaining the Use of Force in Foreign Policy

Latin America represents a theoretical puzzle for the study of international relations. International relations analysts are usually attracted to the region because of its purported "long peace.[1]" They are intrigued that this pacific outcome occurs despite the absence of what have been identified in the literature as possible determinants of a "long peace": nuclear weapons,[2] democracy,[3] economic interdependence,[4] western culture,[5] or an advanced level of economic development.[6]

A detailed examination of the empirical record in chapter 2, however, indicates that there has not been a long peace in the region, whether one defines peace as the absence of "war" (defined by at least 1,000 battlefield-related deaths), or the absence of serious military confrontations. The empirical record raises three puzzles for analysts and policymakers concerned with understanding and possibly decreasing violent conflict. Why are these states using military force against each other? Given the prevalence of the use of force in relations between states in the region, why haven't there been more major wars? And, in the context of the current spread of democracy, why are so many democracies using force against each other?

These questions are best answered through the development of a general explanatory model of the use of force in foreign policy. In this model I conceptualize the decision to use force as an optimization problem in which decisionmakers weigh the costs of militarized conflict against their constituents' willingness to accept those costs. The decisionmaker cannot

fully control either of these two factors. In addition, her balancing of these factors occurs within a context in which constituencies affect the decision-maker's ability to retain her position of power.

This argument assumes the rationality of behavior, but is not a rational unitary actor model of foreign policy. At defining moments, when a state's existence or international position is at play, we can assume that virtually all citizens want their leaders to defend the country, with military force if necessary. In those cases, it is analytically useful to collapse domestic politics and think about rational unitary actors conducting international politics. But this approach only means that we expect domestic actors to have homogeneous preferences about survival, not that they do not exist or act. When we focus on issues other than survival and international position, however, domestic actors' policy preferences become heterogeneous and the rational unitary actor approach becomes less useful.[7] Military force may still be used, but we have to break into the black box of domestic politics to understand it.

In brief, my argument is that leaders use foreign policy to provide collective and private goods to their domestic constituencies. The key question for the leader is whether the use of military force will benefit her constituencies at a cost that they are willing to pay and whether she can survive their displeasure if the costs are high. This is not, however, another "democratic peace" argument. As Doyle has pointed out, even those who accept the argument that democratic states (however one defines democracy)[8] are less likely to use force against each other still have to explain why force is used at all in these relationships.[9]

In my argument, the willingness of constituencies to pay costs varies with the value that they attach to the good in question. Their ability to constrain the leader varies with the institutional structure of accountability. The costs of using military force are influenced by the political-military strategy for the use of force, the strategic balance with the rival nation, and the characteristics of the military force used. A leader may choose to use force only when the costs produced by the combination of political-military strategy chosen (S) + the strategic balance (SB) + the characteristics of the force used (CF) are equal to or lower than the costs acceptable to the leader's constituency (CC) minus the slippage in accountability produced by the domestic means of selecting leaders (A). Force will not always be used when these conditions are met, but force will not be used in their absence.

$S + SB + CF \leq CC - A$ may lead to the decision to use force
$S + SB + CF > CC - A$ no force will be used

The answers to the second and third puzzles (why so "few" wars and why democracies use force against each other), build upon this model of the use of force. Wars are few relative to militarized clashes because the use of military force is a bargaining strategy, not an ideal option. Wars do not occur without any advance warning.[10] War is preceded by some degree of informal or formal bargaining in which the international and domestic costs of escalating to war are evaluated by both sides. Major war requires mobilization strategies that affect all citizens and depends upon the opponent's ability to resist. Few issues are likely to produce the domestic incentives for citizens to pay such high costs. Escalation to war should occur only when decisionmakers perceive that the costs of escalating do not outweigh the willingness of constituencies to pay, considering their ability to depose the leadership. Thus even large-scale use of military force by one side does not always produce "war"—for example, the Peruvian attacks on Ecuadorian outposts in 1981, or the U.S. invasions of the Dominican Republic (1965) and Panama (1989), or its mobilizations against Haiti (1994). The militarized bargaining model tells us where to look to understand both the attacks and non-responses.

Three of the model's variables are particularly helpful in understanding violence among democracies. First, citizen preferences concerning negotiation and the use of force vary, just as only a few democracies choose the death penalty over life imprisonment, and only one subjects minors to death.[11] Second, some uses of force entail very few domestic costs, hence democratic constituencies may be confronted with minor costs. Finally, even within democracies there are significant differences in the vulnerability of a leader on any one particular issue. Democratic leaders will, therefore, at times find the use of force to constitute an "appropriate" policy option even against another democracy.

This opening chapter elaborates on the conceptual and theoretical origins of the militarized bargaining model. The core of the approach is that the use of military force is best thought of in a bargaining context. I draw on historical data from Ancient Greece as well as modern international politics to support this view. The concept of "militarized bargaining" is developed and illustrated. Selection of the five key variables is theoretically justified and they are operationalized for use in the text.

Conceptualizing the Decision to Use Force

For roughly three centuries before their conquest by Macedonia, Greek city-states consistently engaged in battles against each other. As Victor Davis Hanson describes it, *polei* would organize their hoplites, meet in a clearing, and attack. Attack meant pushing against each other in organized formations, and when one side pushed through, the battle was over, as there could be no regrouping of the broken ranks. Few died in the process. If a battle were expected another day, a truce allowed the exchange of dead and wounded and the victor erected a trophy. In addition, when invading armies were not engaging other hoplites, they would cut and burn the orchards, vineyards, and grainfields of their adversaries. Given the horticultural characteristics of grape vines, olive trees, wheat, and barley, however, this activity did little long-term damage, as the hoplites, farmers themselves, fought after the harvests, and the vines and trees would grow back after their "pruning." Hanson argues convincingly that these battles made sense in a context in which the Greeks wished to avoid long wars, but had important disagreements with each other.[12]

Greek use of organized military violence in this period was thus ritualized, ubiquitous, and largely inconclusive. City-states generally neither perished nor lost their autonomy. The destruction of a city was a very costly affair, requiring hoplites to spend much time away from homes and fields. If we were to define "war" as a large-scale enterprise (as we moderns do with our definition of a minimum of 1,000 battlefield related deaths), and "peace" as the absence of war (as do those who speak of the "long peace" between the U.S. and Soviet Union), we would have to say that the Greeks in this period experienced a "violent peace." Military force was used frequently in their inter-*polei* relations, but major war among Greeks was avoided for almost 300 years, until the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

The termination of this type of warfare was largely the result of changes in strategies and the characteristics of force, which lowered the costs of using force and raised the stakes of conflict. After repeated contact with Persian armies in the fifth century B.C. the Greeks began to engage in varied operations, so that military organization turned away from an overwhelming reliance on hoplites. Athens' social-economic structure and wealth enabled it to field armies over the long period of time required to besiege cities. In addition, Athenian naval supremacy allowed it to maintain

the constant vigilance necessary to subjugate its former allies in the Delian League and create an empire. Technological developments subsequently made siege warfare a less costly affair. As a result of making long-term war more feasible there was no inherent limit to the damage war could inflict. The stakes of warfare among the Greeks were raised, provoking the Peloponnesian War and subsequently enabling the Macedonian conquest of Greece.[13]

Is the concept of a "violent peace" relevant to the modern world? Perhaps more so than a focus on the occurrence of war. Not only is warring a rare event in the 19th and 20th centuries,[14] it has become even rarer after WWII in most of the world (see chapter 2). Yet, during the Cold War the U.S. and Soviets engaged in multiple threats of military violence, including nuclear war, as well as funding and supplying proxy wars. We cannot understand the foreign policy dynamics of the Cold War if we conceptualize it primarily as a long period of war avoidance between the U.S. and Soviet Union.[15] And, as the next chapter illustrates, for over a century Latin America has also experienced a "violent peace."

The concept of a "violent peace" forces us to consider the use of officially sanctioned military violence across national boundaries when war is not the intended result. War might occur, but as a result of escalation dynamics unknowable, unforeseen, or miscalculated by those who made the initial decision to use military force. In short, the decision to use military force should be thought of as a bargaining tactic rather than a decision to settle an interstate dispute through war. This book focuses on discovering the conditions under which states bargain with military force, as well as when those bargaining tactics are likely to lead to war.

A Model of Militarized Bargaining

International politics is largely a bargaining situation: two or more actors, with common and competing interests, interact with each other in addressing, directly or tacitly, the terms of their relationship. Because the international system is anarchic and actors are primarily self-interested, any interactions dealing with high-value issues carry the risk that one side will renege on the cooperative aspects of the relationship. These risks may be mitigated through a variety of mechanisms, but they do not disappear even when states enter into formal negotiations and agreements.[16]

Policymakers usually negotiate without any recourse to military force. Under some circumstances, however, state leaders draw upon their military capabilities to influence the terms of their international relationships. The uses of those military capabilities range from mere verbal threats to an application of military force that produces large-scale violence. These uses of a state's military capabilities represent *militarized bargaining*.

Militarized bargaining is used in a variety of situations. These can be fruitfully typologized as "pre-negotiations" (activities undertaken before the actors decide to formally begin a process leading to a cooperative solution to their problem), "distributional bargaining" (in which the outcome is conceptualized as zero-sum), and "problem-solving negotiations" (in which the parties focus on solving common problems).

Pre-negotiations may lead to formal negotiations or be oriented to produce some political benefits independently of whether or not negotiations begin. For our purposes, the relevant point is that the contending parties are not addressing their issue because one side finds the status quo of no agreement to be an outcome superior to that it perceives as likely from negotiations. The purpose of pre-negotiation, therefore, may be to convince the reticent party either that the costs of the status quo are becoming higher or that the benefits of a possible agreement are increasing.[17] It can suggest that war is a possible result and that, even short of war, the overall relationship will suffer and the reticent party will need to divert resources into preparing for armed clashes. Introducing military considerations into the relationship is not what Fisher, Ury, and Patton have in mind when they counsel a party confronting another who refuses to negotiate to create "objective conditions that can be used to establish deadlines."[18] But it may be the only option available to the state seeking change, short of capitulating on the issue.

When negotiations are absent, the government of the revisionist state may also seek to communicate credibly to its domestic constituency, as well as to other governments, that the issue is still alive. These are not "diversionary conflicts," in which a policymaker under pressure at home provokes an international crisis in order to rally domestic support around a new issue. Low-level militarized signaling could be a way for a policymaker to satisfy some of his nationalist constituency cheaply. Militarized bargaining can thus help a decisionmaker to defuse pressure for resolution when such efforts might have little possibility of success or cost his core constituencies more than they would be willing to pay.

Using military force as a threat has many attractions as a tool in *distributional bargaining*. Given the commitment problems inherent in any bargaining situation, an action which can be decomposed into steps allows a player to build a reputation for following through on threats.[19] Military force can be disaggregated into public pronouncements, mobilization or display, use of force causing minor damage or few deaths, and use of force resulting in great damage or many deaths.[20] In addition, because the use of military force has the potential to escalate to war, its use even at low levels makes it more difficult for the initiator to back down without some concessions; thus it serves to bind the initiator to his position.[21]

Even if one side seeks to engage in *problem-solving negotiations* it may be advantageous to use military signaling to either expand the other's bargaining range or to credibly communicate that one will not expand its own. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the bargaining situation in a problem solving negotiation. The two vertical axes represent the payoffs to the two parties. The horizontal line divides the payoffs into positive or negative and consequently represents a zero payoff. Any point on the line is an actor's Best Alternative to No Agreement (BATNA). Each party's preference curves begin high on their payoff axis and move outward toward the other party, crossing



FIGURE 1.1 Bargaining Scenario: No Cooperative Solution Possible



FIGURE 1.2 Bargaining Scenario: Cooperative Solution Possible

the horizontal line along the way. If the two parties' preference curves cross at or above the horizontal line, agreement is possible.

There are two situations in which militarized bargaining might be appropriate in problem-solving negotiations. If the preference curves do not intersect above the horizontal line, militarizing the dispute at low levels might extend the other party's curve outward, as a result either of fearing a worsened bilateral relationship or because a third party might influence it to make a settlement possible. The other case could arise when there is disagreement about where within the cooperative space the agreement will be.[22] The point of militarized bargaining in this situation is not to bully the other party into an agreement, but to influence the other party's costs slightly. Bullying tactics would destroy a problem-solving relationship and push the parties into distributional bargaining.

Theoretical Foundations

Although Schelling's seminal work on strategic interaction in international politics recognized the potential importance of linking issues in dis-

pute,[23] the traditional model of interstate bargaining perceives issues as largely one dimensional.[24] This approach fits reasonably well with the assumption of a rational unitary actor because preferences can be assumed and held constant. But the work of negotiation analysts using a problem-solving bargaining model forces us to open up the black box of decision-making to discover which issues can and cannot be linked, as well as the extent of the bargaining range. In other words, the bargaining scenario in which states find themselves depends upon domestic demands in both countries. If a decisionmaker cannot convince his constituency to accept extra dimensions, he will of necessity identify the issue as one-dimensional. In addition, if a support coalition does not form within the defender's domestic selectorate for opening discussions with a dissatisfied party, no bargaining range will exist. We need, therefore, to incorporate domestic politics to explain foreign policy decisions.[25]

My model builds on the work of numerous scholars. From Alexander George and the "second wave" of deterrence theorists, I take the insight that a focus on the simple overall military balance is not sufficient to explain the use of force in interstate relations.[26] My aim is to make more systematic the argument that certain nonmilitary variables, under specifiable conditions, will determine whether a state can deter a challenge to the status quo.

I have also incorporated insights from analysts who study the foreign policies of small states in alliances, whether those be formal or informal. These studies have shown convincingly that often the "tail wags the dog" and that the problems of "moral hazard" provide important latitude for small states to engage in violent behavior at times.[27] I put these findings in the context of a general model of the decision to use violence internationally. In my general model, small states differ from larger states only in their capabilities, not in their reasoning or desires. Hence, an argument about when weak or strong states choose to utilize military force should be deducible from the general model once we make adjustments for the appropriate distribution of capabilities, military and otherwise.

Another school of analysts which will find their work reflected here is the retrospective voting/expected utility school which links the policy behavior of leaders to their particular requirements for remaining in office. I found Reed's analysis of heterogeneous politicians particularly fruitful for modifying the approach used by the group of analysts which has flourished around Bruce Bueno de Mesquita.[28] I conceptualize decisionmaking in many of the same ways, but differ in both the core interests that drive policymaking and

the preference orderings of citizens. They define core interests simply as "physical security," which I find too limiting. What drives my model is the notion (and the empirical reality) that the use of force in international politics does not disappear when the survival of the state is no longer in serious question. We need to ask and answer the question, "Why?" rather than assume it away. Another difference in our approaches is that I do not assume that citizens always prefer to negotiate rather than fight. Because of these two major differences the utility calculations of decisionmakers will thus differ dramatically in my model as compared to theirs.

This model of the decision to use force internationally is based upon six theoretical assumptions that define the general context in which foreign policy is made. These assumptions are

- international anarchy
- rational, forward looking and self-interested behavior by the actors
- the existence of a hierarchy of national goals
- heterogeneous constituencies in domestic politics
- decisionmakers who try to use foreign policy to remain in power
- incomplete information, both domestically and internationally.

I begin with the assumptions of anarchy and rational, forward looking and self-interested behavior by the relevant actors. Anarchy is simply the absence of an overarching authority that can make agreements among states binding and punish those who violate such agreements. Actor rationality is instrumental, meaning that actors choose to behave in ways they expect will help them get what they want. They are also self-interested and forward looking, by which I mean that they put their own needs first and think about whether the agreements made today will hold up tomorrow. Competing states in an anarchic realm and actors in the domestic arena who are forward looking confront a commitment problem in their relationships with those who promise to behave in certain ways. The severity of this commitment problem varies depending upon the costs actors pay for breaking their commitments.[29]

Anarchy sets the context within which the actors compete, but it does not determine all of their goals. I find the assumption that states seek to secure their sovereignty (understood as the ability to decide oneself how to respond to challenges and opportunities at the international level[30]) more useful than the assumption that they seek power.[31] In any strategic interac-

tion situation, the options players have are affected by the relative distribution of resources relevant to the matter at hand; this is true even when cooperative interactions are possible.[32] Consequently, states will care about their relative standing, also known as international position.

Historically, there have been instances in which states, even great powers, did not confront credible threats to either their survival or the maintenance of their position, or when it was not possible to move up in position. This experience is as true for great powers as for smaller powers.[33] At these times military force may still be used in international politics, but in order to advance other interests of states, not to defend their core interests. Krasner argued that at such a moment the U.S. followed its ideological interests in Vietnam.[34] Ideology, however, is an ambiguous concept, and in any case one would really be speaking about the ideology of the social forces dominating the state apparatus, since a state cannot have an ideology. For purposes of social scientific analysis, material rather than ideological interests are more useful. Thus, under international conditions of significantly reduced immediate threat, we are most likely to find goals that are defined by the material interests of the governing coalition in the state.[35]

I assume, therefore, that a *hierarchy of goals* exists for a state under conditions of international anarchy: survival, position and the advancement of national interests defined domestically. Once we introduce domestic politics into the argument, we move beyond the rational unitary actor model. I make two assumptions about domestic politics, one focusing on the domestic constituencies which select the government's leadership (the electorate in a democracy, and in nondemocratic polities the groups without whom a leadership could not survive) and the other concerning the foreign policymaker(s).

The *selectorate* is assumed to have both *homogenous and heterogeneous characteristics*, depending upon the foreign policy issue. In the foreign policy arena, the selectorate is assumed, first and foremost, to want its leadership to provide for the security and position of the nation. Even in a dictatorship, the selectorate will want to determine the decisions concerning how the country will respond to international challenges and opportunities, as well as to continue to exploit the disenfranchised at home. Security and position are collective goods for the selectorate. All members of the selectorate will benefit from their provision, whether they contribute the taxes, blood or skills required to supply security and position (if they don't benefit because

the leadership excludes them, they have already ceased being part of the selectorate).

As the threats to the security and position of the nation decline, the selectorate will demand that its leadership provide them with private goods. Private goods in foreign affairs are those whose benefits are consumed by specific groups. Examples would be the acquisition of nonstrategic territory (that which is not necessary for defense or lacks the natural or human resources which generate national wealth) for cattle ranchers, fishing rights for a particular group of fishermen, or the protection of citizens migrating illegally to other countries. Hence, the selectorate displays heterogeneous characteristics when it comes to the demand for private goods.

The selectorate is also heterogeneous in its preferences concerning how to behave internationally with respect to the use of force. Advocates of a Liberal Peace paradigm assume that citizens will always prefer to negotiate than use military force, though they would prefer to use military force than capitulate to demands made via military threats.[36] The reality of citizens capitulating rather than fighting (British public opinion at Munich) or supporting the use of military force against another democracy rather than negotiating (the British vis-à-vis Fashoda, and Venezuela against Colombia[37]), are too important to be ignored. I leave the selectorate's preference orderings to be determined empirically.

We can now turn to the *decisionmakers*. The relevant decisionmaker is not a bureaucrat or simply an appointed administrator. In foreign policy matters, the head of government (whether president, prime minister, or dictator) must authorize decisions that involve the use of official military force (including standing orders to respond with force if borders are violated). Even in a military dictatorship, policy decisions are made with the expectation that civilian supporters will either benefit from that use of force or not pay costs beyond what they are willing to accept. To ignore these questions would cost the military the support of their civilian allies, thereby threatening the government's ability to remain in power.[38]

The goal of the decisionmaker is to remain in power, either individually or as a group if a leadership period is of fixed duration (e.g., the election to the Presidency of a member of the same party). Policy choices are best understood from this perspective. While domestic policy choices probably matter more for selection,[39] in cases where foreign policy is disputatious it must matter to important actors domestically (or else there

would have been a settlement). Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson have demonstrated the negative costs which losing a war can have on a leader's ability to remain in power.[40] But there is no reason why the foreign policy arena cannot also provide positive benefits. In short, I assume that policymakers perceive a positive payoff with the selectorate for delivering goods from whichever sphere, domestic or foreign.

Analysts of international relations are used to thinking about the possibility of domestic political gain in terms of diversionary fights.[41] There is no reason to limit the possibilities of domestic payoffs to those derived from in-group–out-group dynamics. A leader who takes a major step toward resolving a contentious issue can benefit at these times, because he will be able to demonstrate his ability to rise above "partisan" politics and act for the good of the nation. For example, faced with a Congress which would not pass his proposed legislation and hounded by charges of corruption, Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano reversed a century-long policy and recognized the existence of Belize. The military, important supporters of the President, were pleased with this move as it made their internal and external security tasks more manageable by reducing the threat of war with the British guarantors of Belizean sovereignty.[42]

Incomplete information. Decisionmakers have to make decisions without knowing everything about their own costs and benefits, nor about their rival's. Incomplete information gives added value to private information and provides incentives for parties to mislead rivals. In addition, what decisionmakers "know" may be erroneous. Rather than treat this as a cognitive problem of misperception, I follow Bueno de Mesquita and company in viewing this as a problem of incomplete information.[43] Nevertheless, I go beyond their treatment of the topic by incorporating the possibility that one's knowledge of one's own costs may itself be incomplete.[44]

If information were complete, rival states would know each other's bargaining range and whether cooperation was possible. If their bargaining ranges overlapped, they would also know the commitment of each to a specific point in the cooperative space. With incomplete information rivals are not sure where they stand or whether third parties might be enticed to become involved. Decisionmakers may thus pursue militarized bargaining with only an estimated guess as to whether this tactic will either get negotiations started or influence those already under way. In addition, incorrect information about one's ability to influence a rival's

policy can also produce an overly optimistic decision to challenge. The information a decisionmaker has about his country's own capabilities to effectively carry out the chosen policy may also be erroneous.

Because of the strategic interaction among rival leaders and the problem of incomplete information internationally and domestically, one cannot simply examine the outcome of the militarized foreign policy and deduce initial policy preferences of the leadership. Rather, analysis must begin by setting out the general context of foreign policy making, examining its particular manifestation for the issue and countries in question, and tracing the politics and updating of information along the decision path.

Explaining Militarized Bargaining

Militarized bargaining is simply the use of military force by one state to influence the behavior of another. The specific context in which militarized bargaining may occur has two characteristics. First, a disagreement exists between two or more nations. Second, at least one of the actors has a military capability. Anytime these two situations occur, there is a potential for a state to use military force to influence the behavior of another.

Policymakers contemplating force are hypothesized to consider the interaction among five factors that bridge the international and domestic spheres. Policymakers evaluate each factor in accordance with the theoretical assumptions of the model. The five factors are:

- the *political-military strategy* within which force would be used
- the *strategic balance* among the parties involved
- the *characteristics of the force* to be used
- the *willingness of constituencies to absorb costs* associated with the use of force
- the *degree of accountability of the policymakers* to their constituencies

Political-Military Strategy. The utility of force as a policy instrument has to be evaluated in the first instance in terms of its contribution to the policymaker's ability to advance her constituencies' interests. Only after ascertaining its potential usefulness does it make sense for policymakers to weigh the costs and benefits of using force.

There are different ways in which to advance those interests, depending upon the state of the relationship between the contending parties. These alternatives can be usefully summarized in five political-military strategies.

- keep the issue alive
- affect bilateral negotiations
- defend the status quo
- attract the support of third parties
- impose a solution

If the leader perceives the costs of any likely resolution of the dispute to be greater than those which his constituency is likely to accept, he will not pursue a solution today. But since the constituency wants a solution favorable to its interests at some point, the leader can score points at home by *keeping the issue alive* internationally. If the country is in possession of the resources in dispute, keeping it alive means simply continuing to control the asset *de facto*. But if the country does not control the asset, keeping the issue alive can be done by any combination of diplomatic protest, economic obstructions, or low-level military signals. The combination selected will depend upon the extent of the leader's credibility problems with the rival or third parties and the acceptability of associated costs to his domestic constituency. Low credibility will bias actions toward more severe acts, whether diplomatic, economic, or military. A constituency with great aversion to costs will bias policymakers toward less severe diplomatic, economic, or military actions, e.g., a verbal threat to send forces to disputed territory, "if necessary."

If the leader believes that negotiations could produce an outcome acceptable to his constituency, there will be an incentive to *negotiate bilaterally*. But the rival may believe any likely outcome of negotiations to be unacceptable to her constituency, and therefore avoid negotiations or negotiate with a very narrow bargaining range, in essence, *defending the status quo*. In these circumstances each state wants to communicate its resolve and its high valuation of the asset in dispute. A low-level use of military force could be an attractive option for signaling. In addition, since each state's position on the issue is a function of the costs domestic constituencies are willing to pay, low-level use of military force by one party may be directed at raising those costs to the other. The rival's domestic constituencies are expected to induce their leaders to broaden the government's bargaining range. If the negotiating process includes, or could potentially include, *third*

parties, the use of military force against a rival may be a signal directed toward the third parties in order to get them to pressure one's rival to negotiate or widen its bargaining range.

Finally, leaders could choose to attempt to resolve the issue unilaterally by *imposing a solution* and thereby provide their domestic constituencies with the largest possible good. Low-level military force is unlikely to produce such an outcome, except in the case where one state can credibly communicate that it is willing to follow up such low-level use with large-scale attacks.[45] Consequently, we should see this strategy accompanied by the large-scale active use of military force.

None of these strategies is inherently appropriate for a leader to pursue. Discerning which strategy, if any, a leader is likely to pursue requires examining the specific case. Case details will illuminate where the disagreement stands, the determinants of the costs associated with each strategy, and the constraints on the costs a leader can impose on his constituency. The actual costs for using military force are determined by the strategic balance and the characteristics of the force to be used.

Strategic Balance. The strategic balance is a relative measure. I use it here to refer to the factors which influence the likely costs produced by the strategies each actor can use in particular disputes, rather than in its more narrow military sense, as in "strategic nuclear weapons." As numerous studies of small-state conflict behavior have demonstrated, a focus on the *absolute* capability of a nation, even incorporating nonmilitary factors, is inadequate for analyzing interstate conflict dynamics.[46]

The appropriateness of a measure of the strategic balance depends upon the particular political-military strategy one is utilizing and the political-military strategy one is confronting. The strategic balance is defined by the resources that are relevant to those strategies and thus helps us understand the bargaining situation between the actors. While others have made this point using variations in military strategy, risk assessments, and time frames,[47] I add diplomatic and economic factors to the range of relevant resources. Because of incomplete information, however, the strategic balance is never entirely clear to either party.

Three broad categories of resources are useful in considering the strategic balance: diplomatic, economic, and military. The relevant *diplomatic resources* revolve around the ability to garner external support for, and blunt external criticism of, one's strategy in the dispute. This is affected not just by the skill of the diplomatic corps, but also by the standing which one's

position on the disputed issue has in the international political order of the era. Great powers may claim that their interests and values are universal, use force in the defense of those interests, and face little international sanction. Smaller powers, however, must couch the defense of their interests within the context set by the reigning great power political order or be willing to face international sanctions. When smaller states can link their actions to the interests of great powers, new opportunities for advancing their interests arise. It may be possible to gain support for their own use of force, or aid in defending against a rival's use of force, or perhaps even to increase international pressure on the rival to negotiate the previously nonnegotiable. Alternatively, when a small state has interests that are of minor consequence to the great powers, its rival's diplomacy might serve to convince the great powers that any benefits they might garner from becoming involved in the dispute would be outweighed by the associated costs.

Economic resources include both those that can be used in a nonmilitary way to influence behavior by a rival and those for building up national capacity to use military force. In evaluating whether to use military force, policymakers will consider both aspects of economic power. When economic leverage is sufficient to gain one's goals at acceptable costs, force is unlikely to be used.[48] But when that economic leverage is deemed insufficient, how economic resources affect a state's ability to mobilize, use, and resupply military forces becomes paramount.

A state's economic infrastructure (railroads, highways, and airports) can dramatically affect the logistical costs of using force. The ability to raise revenue for defense can be an important consideration because it highlights the domestic opportunity costs involved in using force, thereby making it more likely that opposition to its use will form. For example, the inability of a poor state to tax the wealthy imposes a severe constraint on state expenditures. Military expenditures thus come more openly, while economic and social welfare spending decreases. When the domestic elite are focused on moderating the polarization of society they are unlikely to support a leader who wishes to spend the government's meager resources in militarized bargaining with a neighbor.

Honduras in the 1960s and 1970s provides a good example of this economic constraint on the use of force and helps explain why El Salvador believed it could quickly defeat Honduras with a blitz in 1969. Honduras also illustrates how diplomacy might overcome this constraint: after the 1979 victory by the communist-oriented Sandinistas in neighboring Nicaragua,

the U.S. flooded Honduras with both economic and military aid. Economic constraints on Honduras' military capabilities were thus obliterated, until the U.S. perceived that the Sandinistas were defeated and lost interest.[49]

Military resources include the quality and quantity of personnel, type and quantity of armaments, and doctrines for utilizing those resources. Studies of great power foreign policy tend to emphasize the quantitative aspect of such resources because the social and economic disparities that underlie qualitative differences among great powers are not large. But the experiences of Iraq in the Gulf War, Israel in the Middle East, and Chile in South America demonstrate the importance of quality differentials where they exist.

Characteristics of Force. Two characteristics of the military force contemplated also affect the costs of using force: mobilization requirements and force alternatives. The attributes of the *domestic mobilization* process affect the time domestic and international opposition has to organize, as well as the personal disruption experienced by the relevant publics. A society's decision to have a military defense establishment with certain characteristics reflects its perception of vulnerability in the international system as well as the domestic politics of the civil-military relationship,[50] and is not simply an outcome of the desire to use military force in any particular foreign policy dispute. Nevertheless, the defense establishment's characteristics will affect the way in which a leader chooses to use force. Most studies that examine this aspect of the use of force are concerned with its impact on escalating a crisis with an international rival.[51] Yet the cost implications for the domestic constituencies of the decisionmaker should also be of concern. The use of force which relies on a reserve-based military produces the highest domestic economic costs as workers are taken away from their jobs and employers have to scramble to replace them temporarily. The use of a standing military force produces the lowest mobilization costs.

Force alternatives also influence the likely level of political costs to the leader. Political costs will primarily be the result of the level of casualties and the budgetary costs of the operation. Given similar training and equipment, the relative vulnerability of ground forces is highest, with air and naval forces generally much lower. The cheapest use of force from the perspective of casualties would be a naval bombardment from offshore or a drone-piloted airstrike, followed by manned aircraft, and the costliest is the use of the army to penetrate territory. However, decisionmakers must also consider the economic costs generated by using these different means. For some countries, the consumption of jet fuel, rockets, etc. in even a small military action may

exhaust the defense budget. The leader would then be forced to confront the political costs of raising more money for the defense establishment.

While knowing the costs of using military force is a necessary component of any decision to use it, policymakers must also assess how their constituencies value these costs and what they are willing to pay for the foreign policy good. In addition, we need to consider the ability of the constituency to hold the policymakers accountable for their action.

Constituency Acceptance of Costs. In this model, constituents are defined narrowly as those whose support is required for a leader to remain in office. In a democracy voters in general are not constituents; rather, it is those voters who voted for the policymaker[52] as well as those voters whose support might be necessary for re-election. In a dictatorship, constituents include military officers and economic elites, but they do not include the large segments of the urban poor who are supportive of strong authority. The identification of constituents cannot be done in any general way, but must be analyzed in the specific cases.

Constituencies are heterogeneous with respect to what they want their foreign policy leaders to provide beyond the collective goods of national survival and international position. Their private demands will be related to their social-political and economic characteristics. Hence, fishermen will want access to rich fisheries, while migrant workers will desire freedom to cross borders and humane treatment once across.

Constituents are also heterogeneous in the costs they are willing to pay to receive those goods. The amount of money, blood, and inconvenience a constituency is willing to pay for a collective or private good is another empirical question to be answered in case analysis. But we can make a few general suggestions about payment schemes constituencies will likely find attractive. Collective goods have to be couched in nationalist rhetoric in order for the vast majority of society to contribute to their provision. The low level of draft dodging and tax evasion during modern wars demonstrates the success of nationalist sentiment for overcoming collective action problems. Constituencies seeking private goods will prefer to have costs distributed entirely away from them or at least broadly with other groups, including nonconstituents. In general, private goods delivered to a constituency at costs below actual costs will be received with greater enthusiasm by the constituency. This distribution of costs is made easier if the constituency and policymaker describe the private good in ways that imbue them with nationalist sentiments (e.g., fisheries as part of the national patrimony).

Degree of Accountability. The sensitivity of the leadership to its constituency's cost evaluations is determined by the institutional structure of leadership accountability, which includes selection intervals and the leadership's ability to perpetuate itself in office via selection of colleagues. The democracy-nondemocracy distinction is not sufficient for this variable.[53] The literature clearly demonstrates that the institutional rules governing who votes and when, as well as how votes are counted, vary across democracies and make a significant difference in who wins and policy outcomes.[54] There is also an inherent problem in any principal's control of her agent; consequently, "slippage" will inevitably occur between what the majority of citizens want and what their legislators, presidents, and government bureaucrats actually do.[55] The experience of the United States demonstrates that even within well institutionalized democracies, leaders may have the means and willingness to use force in a dispute without getting explicit authorization from the legislature or the public.[56] Finally, studies have shown that nondemocracies are also less likely to go to engage in violence against other nondemocracies than against democracies.[57] The "nondemocratic peace" therefore bears analysis as well. My model, since it does not privilege democratic institutions per se, sheds light on the decision to use force in all types of political regimes.

The earlier assumption that the leader desires to stay in office makes the determinants of retaining office central in our discussion of constraints on the leader. Three factors are crucial in determining the degree of accountability of policymakers to their constituencies: selection intervals, reselection possibilities, and legacy possibilities.

Selection intervals for the leader affect the swiftness with which the use of military force can be sanctioned at home. The time it takes to call the policymaker to account is important because a leader may be able to deliver other goods after using military force which will dilute the anger felt by a constituency that paid costs at the prior moment.[58] Five gradations distinguish the vulnerability of a decisionmaker on this factor, and vulnerability makes for accountability. The least vulnerable leader is a personalist dictator. He faces an unlimited time period in office; removing him at any particular point in time requires a major upheaval in domestic politics. Next in vulnerability is a leader who faces a fixed time period in office, and can be removed beforehand only through an impeachment process for criminal behavior. Leaders in presidentialist systems are in this situation. Prime Ministers of a majority government have fixed terms, but can be deposed be-

forehand through a vote of no confidence. Since they lead a majority government, such votes should be rare. Leaders of authoritarian governments that depend upon the support of a small group (e.g., a military junta) may have irregular terms but are subject to swift replacement. They are, consequently, quite vulnerable to their constituency. The most vulnerable leader is the Prime Minister in a coalition government. The coalition is likely to be constituted by parties who have major differences (otherwise they would be in the same party); as a result, votes of no confidence are an ever-present danger for the decisionmaker.

Re-selection possibilities constrain leaders by giving them an opportunity to remain in office if they continue to please their constituencies. Four possibilities are analytically useful for our discussion. A leader who has no possibility for reselection can only be controlled by the possibility of ouster before her term expires. The decisionmaker who can be reselected for a consecutive term will be more controllable in his first term. In the case where a fixed number of terms is specified, he reverts to the situation of no reselection in the final term. The leader who can be reselected only after a specified period has passed (usually one term) is likely to be more adventuresome on policies that she expects to have a medium-term payoff, even if short-term costs might be high during her first term. The leader who is most controllable by his constituencies will be the one who confronts unlimited possibilities for reselection.

Leaders can be constrained in the absence of reselection if they can influence the selection of their successor. These *legacy possibilities* are fundamentally determined by the strength of the political groupings to which the leader belongs. In democracies these groups take the form of political parties which compete for the selectorate's votes. Although parties exist in authoritarian polities, it is the party elite who determines both who the party's candidates are and whether they will win. Strong political groups or parties make it more likely that a leader who delivers to his constituency but cannot be re-selected will be succeeded by a colleague from his group or party.

We now have three elements to consider in this causal factor of accountability. Selection intervals have five variations, reselection possibilities have four, and legacy possibilities are two. That makes 11 variations, with 132 possible combinations. These are far too many to list, but Table 1.1 presents some of the most interesting combinations, in ascending order of accountability, along with some examples.

TABLE 1.1 Illustrations of Variations of Leadership Accountability (in ascending order)

Type	Examples
1. Personal dictatorship	Iraq under Hussein, Nicaragua under Somoza
2. Fixed term, authoritarian dominant party state with unlimited reelection	Indonesia under Suharto, Communist Cuba
3. Fixed term, no reelection, weak parties, and presidential	Ecuador, 1979–94
4. Fixed term, authoritarian dominant party state with no reelection	Mexico, Islamic Iran
5. Fixed term, limited reelection, strong parties and presidential	U.S., Venezuela, Chile, Argentina
6. Fixed term, parliamentary, majority party government	UK
7. Irregular term, swift replacement	Argentine military junta, 1976–83
8. Fixed term, parliamentary, with coalition government	Israel, 1997

Hypotheses

The argument of this book is that whether a state will engage in militarized bargaining depends in part upon its ability to provide benefits to a leader's domestic constituencies at a cost that they are willing to pay. It is an argument about the necessary, though not sufficient conditions for force to be used in international politics.

The model generates the following hypotheses about the likelihood of a state using military force in its foreign policy. A leader may choose to use force only when the costs produced by the combination of the political-military strategy chosen (S), the strategic balance (SB) and the characteristics of the force used (CF) are equal to or lower than the costs acceptable to the leader's constituency (CC) minus the slippage in accountability produced by domestic means of selecting leaders (A).

When $S + SB + CF \leq CC - A$, a leader may decide to use force
When $S + SB + CF > CC - A$, a leader will decide not to use force

Once a dispute has become militarized the decision to further escalate follows the same logic. Policymakers update their information on the status of each variable, but the calculations yield the same predictions: force may only be used in each instance if $S + SB + CF \leq CC - A$.

Evaluating the Argument

My analytic framework for explaining the determinants of militarized bargaining is most appropriately tested by structured and focused comparative case studies that employ a process-tracing methodology.[59] While the case studies will be focused on the dynamics of decisionmaking when considering whether or not to use force, I have also provided brief historical backgrounds to the conflict for readers unfamiliar with the specific cases. Structured comparisons are carried out by addressing the following questions in each case analysis:

- What political-military strategy did the leader have in mind when he chose whether or not to use force?
- What was the strategic balance between the rival states at the time of the decision to use force and how did the leaders perceive the balance?
- What were the domestic costs produced by the characteristics of the decision to use force and were those costs anticipated by the decisionmakers?
- What groups made up the constituency of the leader at the time of the decision and what did they perceive the costs of the use of force to be?
- Did the leader attempt to evaluate his constituencies' views on the use of force and did he feel constrained by them?
- Was the behavior consistent with the hypotheses produced by my model of militarized bargaining?

The Argentina-Chile and Ecuador-Peru enduring rivalries are used to demonstrate the plausibility of the model. Enduring rivalries are particularly

appropriate conflict groupings with which to study force initiation dynamics. These rivalries consist of disputes which are repetitive, severe, durable, and continuous (at least five militarized disputes within a 25-year period with no more than 10 years between incidents, unless the issue in dispute remained the same).[60] The problem of selecting on the dependent variable (the occurrence of a MID) is mitigated when one examines an enduring rivalry in which, as occurs in these cases, years may pass between instances of force although the issue continues to be contentious.

Examining leaders' decisions concerning the use of force in an enduring rivalry allows us to more clearly examine how variations in the five variables affect leaders' calculations. Latin America provides a rich empirical history for anyone investigating violent conflict. There are periodic arms races, governments fall in and out of international favor, nationalist fervor ebbs and flows, and polities move away from and toward democracy. Even within democratic structures there have been significant constitutional reforms over time which affect the separation of powers as well as the sensitivity of leaders to the electorate. Because of these shifts, the Latin American experience should be particularly ideal for evaluating arguments about the effect of democracy per se on the use of force internationally.[61]

Quantitative tests of my argument are not yet possible, as the existing data sets do not include at least four of my five variables (the accountability variable can be extrapolated from existing data). Given the paucity of information concerning Latin American militarized interstate disputes one needs to virtually reconstruct each of the hundreds of MIDs to develop the relevant data set. Hopefully, the analysis in this book will stimulate such efforts.

Testing this framework requires examining the relationship between leaders and their key constituencies. If the model is correct, we should not see militarized behavior occurring out of the blue. Instead, we should find leaders attempting to calculate the costs to key supporters of the decision to use force, as well as their ability to devise and implement a strategy to gain their policy goals within a relevant strategic balance. If national survival or international position is at stake, the calculations should be straightforward, both in terms of which resources matter in the strategic balance as well as what costs domestic constituencies will be willing to pay. On issues other than national survival or international position, however, leaders should pay particular attention to the variety of signals by key groups hoping to influence the decision: polls, public demonstrations, editorials, statements by acknowledged spokespeople for particular interests, etc.

The model gains support to the extent that we see leaders strategically calculating both domestic and international costs before undertaking military actions. If leaders consistently take these factors into consideration this framework will be useful. The Conclusion to the book addresses how to incorporate this framework into a more complete argument about the sufficiency factors for militarized bargaining to occur.