The Price of Dominance

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The New Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership

Jan Lodal

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Contents

List of Acronyms

ABM	Antiballistic Missile
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
EKV	Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
GPALS	Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IFF	Identification Friend-or-Foe
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
LECO	Law Enforcement Cooperation Officer
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MEADS	Medium Extended Air Defense System
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime

NMD	National Missile Defense
NPT	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
NRRC	Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
NSA	National Security Agency
OPCW	Office for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons
PAC	Patriot Advanced Capability
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SIOP	Single Integrated Operations Plan
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SSBM	Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile
SSBN	Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (Trident)
SSP	Stockpile Stewardship Program
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STRANSS	Strategic Transparency, Safety, and Stability Treaty
TBM	Theater Ballistic Missiles
THAAD	Theater High-Altitude Area Defense System
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
WMD	Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction

Foreword

The nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States is over, but weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remain the most serious threat to the security of the United States. The Information Revolution has spread the knowledge needed to develop these weapons and driven the globalization of commerce that makes export controls on them harder to enforce each year. As a result, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are increasingly the means by which rogue states and terrorist organizations may choose to oppose the United States. At the same time, China and Russia, even though they are no longer America's enemies, retain large nuclear forces that pose a potential threat.

In this book, Jan Lodal, a former senior official responsible for arms control and defense policy in both Republican and Democratic administrations, makes an intriguing case that the new WMD challenge is an inevitable result of America's military, political, cultural, and economic dominance. Throughout history, nation-states have coalesced to oppose hegemonic powers, even those with apparently benign intentions. Lodal identifies important changes that can be made in U.S. strategic policy to ameliorate the opposition of other powers to American-led efforts against WMD proliferation. In particular, he strongly urges abandoning the Cold War nuclear doctrine of "damage limiting" and its resulting "prompt retaliatory" nuclear attack plans. Dropping these plans would permit reducing U.S. nuclear forces to 1,200 weapons from today's total of almost 10,000, without abandon-

ing any important aspects of nuclear doctrine. If the United States eventually deploys "light" antiballistic missile defenses (which Lodal favors and both political parties now seem to support), failing to abandon the "prompt retaliatory" war plans would give the United States a de facto first-strike capability and absolute military dominance over all other nations combined. In such circumstances, it would be impossible to organize the tight cooperation of other states, particularly of Russia, China, and France, that is so absolutely necessary to stop the new WMD threats.

The Price of Dominance offers an integrated program for moving away from the Cold War approach that still dominates U.S. WMD policy to one aimed at achieving multinational cooperation against WMD threats while retaining nuclear deterrence as the bedrock of America's security policy. The Lodal program begins with a new nuclear strategy that reaffirms deterrence of Russia and the "nuclear umbrella" over friends and allies, along with four very limited "first-use" nuclear missions. But it explicitly renounces any first-strike capability against Russia and the forces and war plans supporting a first-strike capability. The new strategy would include limited missions for ballistic missile defenses. America would use its unilateral changes in nuclear strategy and forces to forge an international consensus accepting limited national ballistic missile defenses as enhancements rather than threats to strategic stability. Nuclear arms control would continue to play an important role but would be restructured from the Cold War Strategic Arms Reduction and Antiballistic Missile treaties to a new Strategic Transparency, Safety, and Stability treaty (STRANSS).

In the context of these changes, it should be possible to greatly enhance the acceptance and enforcement of the three treaties that prohibit the proliferation of WMD—the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. Lodal argues that the role of law enforcement, both domestic and multinational, will have to be increased at the expense of reliance on multilateral enforcement organizations such as the Office for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The dis-

mal experience of the United States Special Commission in enforcing arms control in Saddam Hussein's Iraq illustrates the severe limits to the effectiveness of U.N.-based enforcement organizations. In the end, Lodal argues that the traditional tools of diplomacy, sanctions, and military force will have to be used to enforce nonproliferation.

The Price of Dominance proposes a strategic vision of strong deterrence coupled with open international cooperation around which the new president could organize a U.S. policy toward WMD that could develop wide support domestically and internationally. Without a new vision, the gridlock that has characterized arms control, antiballistic missile defense policy, and strategic relations with Russia, China, and France will continue. What intrigues me about Jan Lodal's book is its bold moves and coherent vision, so essential in any effort to combat the extremism, terrorism, and anarchy that drive the new WMD threats.

Leslie H. Gelb
President
Council on Foreign Relations

Preface

This book grew out of the work of a Council on Foreign Relations study group formed in 1999 to assess the future of arms control. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been rejected by the U.S. Senate, and Russia had refused to ratify the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). It seemed that arms control efforts had come to a halt; a completely new approach would be needed to break the gridlock.

In the summer of 1999, the Clinton administration acquiesced to long-standing pressure from Republicans in the U.S. Senate to announce a tentative deployment date for a national missile defense. The proximate cause of the new policy was North Korea's test of a long-range rocket. The Antiballistic Missile (ABM) decision added greatly to the sense that the arms control approach built up since the Eisenhower administration had come to an end. The United States insisted on modifying the ABM Treaty to permit deploying the defense against North Korea, and Russia insisted on keeping the treaty intact. Both sides threatened to withdraw from the arms control regime if the other refused to budge.

As I compiled the results of our study group discussions in the fall of 1999, I came to conclude that the gridlock in arms control could not simply be blamed on bad negotiating tactics, turbulence in Russian politics, opposition from Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.), or America's refusal to ratify the CTBT. All of these were factors to be dealt with, to be sure. But the problems in arms control were symptoms of a more fundamental challenge to American foreign policy. The United States had not completed the shift

from a policy based on the bipolar balance of the Cold War to one based on America's growing dominance in world affairs.

Most nations accept the benign nature of American intentions and the moral strength of our political system and culture. But in the end, they will assess their positions based on our capabilities, not our intentions. They know that an America with absolute military dominance over all other powers could all too easily fall under the control of political forces that would insist on using that dominance to impose America's political, economic, and cultural system on the rest of the world. They will thus oppose American power, even if it means taking serious risks to their own societies by permitting the proliferation of new weapons of mass destruction and maintaining larger nuclear and other military forces than they can afford or need for their immediate defense.

The U.S. failure to complete the transition away from the bipolar Cold War world led me to conclude that only a new, integrated, comprehensive approach to the challenge of new weapons of mass destruction could be effective. It would have to encompass not only arms control, but a new nuclear strategy and force posture, a new approach to antiballistic missile defenses, better enforcement of the existing chemical, biological, and nuclear nonproliferation regimes, and a major enhancement of law enforcement and intelligence capabilities (including dramatically increased international cooperation). Most significantly, the new president would have to articulate a strategic vision consistent with the strong international cooperation absolutely necessary to meet the challenge of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, a book that started out to focus on arms control ended up focusing on these broader issues, but with arms control, including both its history and its future, being the major sub-theme. The book is short by design; I avoided the temptation to elaborate many important details in order to give the main strategic themes more prominence. The details of a new program and policy will in any case have to emerge out of negotiations within the leadership of the next administration, between the executive and congressional branches, and with other nations.

I would like to thank first and foremost Les Gelb, president, and Larry Korb, vice president and director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, for their support and encouragement, from the very first ideas for this project to its final words. I would also like to thank Jessica Stern, who was a senior fellow at the Council during the early days of the study group and made invaluable contributions to its organization and to the definition of the issues that the book would have to cover. Paula Dobriansky, vice president and Washington program director, and the staff of the Washington office provided key administrative and substantive support. Patricia Dorff, director of publishing at the Council, under the leadership of David Kellogg, vice president and publisher, provided superb assistance with editing and production. I have been a member of the Council for 26 years and am particularly appreciative of the strong leadership of recent years that has enhanced the Council's role in bringing informed outside input to our nation's foreign affairs.

Susan Koch, a member of the study group and deputy assistant secretary of defense, was a source of both expertise and wisdom on these subjects second to none within the U.S government. She read the manuscript and saved me from many embarrassing mistakes—all without ever getting anywhere near the necessary line between her role on this project and her government responsibilities for ongoing negotiations and policy development.

This book would simply not have been possible without the extraordinary support of Jessica Tuchman Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her friendship and encouragement were essential to getting through the ups and downs of writing on a policy subject whose foundations seemed to change as each chapter was drafted. She provided invaluable tangible support, including office space, the impressive Carnegie Endowment library, and access to Carnegie's magnificent team of experts on Russia, China, and proliferation. She offered important detailed comments on the manuscript and, most important, she challenged many sections where the analysis was either incomplete or just downright wrong. I cannot thank her enough.

I would also like to thank Dean Michael Rothchild and my graduate seminar at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. The semester I spent there not only forced me to organize this complex subject into a form that nonexpert readers can grasp, but gave me invaluable feedback from an extraordinary group of young scholars. Finally, my wife Elizabeth, son Eric, and daughter Kirsten never failed to offer the encouragement and help that have characterized our wonderful family for 34 years.

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