
Notes

Chapter 1

1. Paul H. Nitze, *Tension Between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), p. 15.
2. Quoted in David D. Newsom, *The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 121, 138.
3. Christopher Hill, "Academic International Relations: The Siren Song of Policy Relevance," in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, eds. *Two Worlds of International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 16–17.
4. Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," *Political Science Quarterly* 108(2) (Summer 1993): 242–243.
5. Newsom, *The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy*, p. 138.
6. John Vasquez, "World Politics Theory," in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds. *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics* 2 (New York: Routledge: 1992), p. 839.
7. This definition is adapted from the one used in James N. Rosenau, "International Relations," in Joel Krieger, ed. *The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 455.
8. For a good discussion of these issues, see Philip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering," *International Security* 18(4) (Spring 1994): 155–171.
9. William Wallace, "Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 22 (1996): 301.
10. John Madge, *The Tools of Social Science* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), p. 2.
11. Karl Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 3.

12. Kjell Goldmann, "International Relations: An Overview," in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds. *A New Handbook of Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 410.
13. Peter Ordeshook, "Engineering or Science: What is the Study of Politics?," *Critical Review* 9(1-2) (Winter-Spring 1995): 180-181. See Joseph Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 150-151, for a discussion of how the field of statistics grew out of a need to relate statistical work done in applied fields with one another and with academic work in mathematics.
14. Mark V. Kauppi and Paul R. Viotti, *The Global Philosophers* (New York: Lexington Books, 1992), pp. 21-22. Although Postmodernists reject this objective, their work cannot be considered "traditional."
15. Goldmann, "International Relations: An Overview," p. 410.
16. Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory," in Michael Banks, ed. *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's 1984), pp. 5-7.
17. Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory," p. 5.
18. John A. Hobson, *Towards International Government* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1915), p. 8.
19. Banks, "The Evolution of International Relations Theory," pp. 7-8.
20. Robert S. Boynton, "The New Intellectuals," *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 1995), p. 53.
21. Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 36.
22. Jack Snyder, "Science and Sovietology," *World Politics* 40(2) (January 1988): 173.
23. Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," *World Politics* 17(3) (April 1966): 366-376.
24. Philip Everts, "Academic Experts as Foreign Policy Advisers: The Functions of Government Advisory Councils in the Netherlands," in Michel Girard, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, and Keith Webb, *Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy-Making* (London: Pinter, 1994), p. 68. For specific examples, see Gregg Herken, *Counsels of War* expanded edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 205-210 and Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Touchstone, 1983), pp. 89-110, 117-124, 330-335. See also James Kurth, "Inside the Cave: The Banality of I.R. Studies," *The National Interest* No. 53 (Fall 1998), p. 34.
25. John G. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 68.
26. Joseph Kruzel, "More a Chasm Than a Gap, But Do Scholars Want to Bridge It?," *Mershon International Studies Review* 38, Supplement 1 (April 1994), p. 179.

27. Gunnell, *The Descent of Political Theory*, p. 224.
28. David Easton, "Political Science," in David L. Sills, ed. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 12 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 296.
29. Easton, "Political Science," p. 297.
30. The quote is from J. David Singer, "Theorists and Empiricists: The Two-Culture Problem in International Politics," in James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis, and Maurice A. East, eds. *The Analysis of International Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 84.
31. Michel Girard, "Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy: Epistemological Problems and Political Realities," in Girard et al. *Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy-Making*, p. 5.
32. Warren O. Hagstrom, *The Scientific Community* (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. 33–35.
33. See Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," and Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–128, 129–156; Hagstrom, *The Scientific Community*; Jerome R. Ravetz, *Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Joseph Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society*; Joseph Ben-David, *Scientific Growth: Essays on the Social Organization and Ethos of Science* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Bernard Barber, *Social Studies of Science* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990); Robert K. Merton, *The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973); Michael Mulkay, *Science and the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979). For a critique of the political-science profession from this perspective, see David M. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 209–248.
34. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science*, p. 222. On the incentives for scientific originality, see Robert K. Merton, "Priorities in Scientific Discovery," in Merton, *The Sociology of Science*, pp. 293–296.
35. See Fenton Martion and Robert Goehlert, *Getting Published in Political Science Journals* (Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association, 1997).
36. See David Lalman and David Newman, "Alliance Formation and National Security," *International Interactions* 16(4) (1991): 251.
37. Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills, eds. *From Max Weber*, p. 143, emphasis in original.
38. Ben-David, "Science and the University System" in Ben-David, *Scientific Growth*, pp. 164–166; Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society*, p. 156; Ravetz, *Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems*, p. 15.

39. Ordeshook, "Engineering or Science?," p. 178.
40. Michael M. Weinstein, "Economics Students Seek a Bit of Reality," *The New York Times* September 18, 1999, pp. A17, A19.
41. Ordeshook, "Engineering or Science?," pp. 181–182. See also Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106(3) (Summer 1977), p. 46.
42. Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society*, p. 158.
43. Kurth, "Inside the Cave," p. 33. This problem seems especially pervasive in international relations where, as K. J. Holsti notes, research agendas appear, disappear, and reappear, often with a changed vocabulary. See K. J. Holsti, "Rooms and Views: Perspectives on the Study of International Relations," in Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau, eds. *Journey Through World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 35. One reason seems to be the prevalence in this field of large "isms" as the main theoretical frameworks—Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism—all of which seem to draw inspiration from a few prominent cases or scenarios to the exclusion of others. When real-world events force a factor that had been ignored by the dominant "ism" onto people's attention, that framework suddenly comes into favor again. From the perspective of policy relevance, such cyclical rather than linear intellectual progress can only make IR theory seem particularly lacking in credibility and authoritativeness.
44. Wallace, "Truth and Power," p. 305.
45. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Studying World Politics," in Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau, eds. *Journeys Through World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989) p. 206.
46. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20(1) (Summer 1995): 5–38; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74(3) (May/June 1995): 79–97.
47. Kruzel, "More a Chasm than a Gap," p. 180.
48. General John C. Galvin (Ret.), "Breaking Through and Being Heard," *Mershon International Studies Review* 38, Supplement 1 (April 1994): 173.
49. Alexander L. George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), pp. 117–125. George also mentions "actor-specific behavioral models of adversaries" as a useful kind of knowledge, a point echoed by former NATO Commander Galvin (endnote 48). We do not discuss these in detail, as they do not constitute "theory" (general causal propositions) in the strict sense.
50. Kruzel, "More a Chasm than a Gap," p. 179.
51. Newsom, *The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy*, pp. 135–136.

52. For a fuller discussion, see Joseph Lepgold, "Is Anyone Listening? International Relation Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance," *Political Science Quarterly* 113(1) (Spring 1998): 43–62.
53. See the remarks by Peter Katzenstein in Atul Kohli et al., "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium," *World Politics* 48(1) (October 1995): 14–15.
54. Kruzel, "More a Chasm than a Gap," p. 180.
55. Norwood Russell Hanson, *Perception and Discovery* (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper, and Company, 1969), pp. 149, 302–303; Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20(3) (April 1968): 455–457.
56. Alexander L. George, and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 536–547.

Chapter 2

1. This section draws upon Miroslav Nincic, "Policy Relevance and Theoretical Development: The Terms of the Tradeoff," in Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold, eds. *Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), chapter 2.
2. One dictionary, in fact, defines "instrumental" in part as "helpful" or "useful." See *The Random House College Dictionary* rev. ed. (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 691. Most discussions of policy relevance in international relations similarly identify instrumental knowledge as the most practical kind of knowledge. See, for example, Oran R. Young, "The Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories of International Relations," *World Politics* 24 (Supplement) (Spring 1972): 183.
3. Richard N. Haass, "Sanctioning Madness," *Foreign Affairs* 76(6) (November/December 1997): 74.
4. Ibid.
5. Quoted in Haass, "Sanctioning Madness," p. 75.
6. The literature on this issue has become quite large. See, for example, Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chapter 6, pp. 134–165; David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), chapters 7–10, pp. 115–335; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22(2) (Fall 1997): 90–136; Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, assisted by Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics); Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Half Empty," *International Security* 23(1) (Summer 1998): 50–65; Robert A.

- Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions *Still* Do Not Work," *International Security* 23(1) (Summer 1998): 66–77.
7. George E. Shambaugh IV, "Dominance, Dependence, and Political Power: Tethering Technology in the 1980s and Today," *International Studies Quarterly* 40(4) (December 1996): 559–588.
 8. Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 74(3) (May/June 1995): 109–122.
 9. Edward D. Mansfield, "International Institutions and Economic Sanctions," *World Politics* 47(4) (July 1995): 588–598.
 10. Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War," *International Organization* 48(1) (Winter 1994): 39–75.
 11. William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24(1) (Summer 1999): 14.
 12. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," *International Security* 17(4) (Spring 1993): 5–51; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70(1) (Winter 1990/91): 23–33.
 13. Charles F. Doran, "Why Forecasts Fail," *International Studies Review* 1(2) (Summer 1999).
 14. The quote is from Joseph Ben David, *Scientific Growth: Essays in the Social Organization and Ethos of Science* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 402.
 15. Haass, "Sanctioning Madness," p. 81.
 16. The quoted phrase is from Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, p. 339. For a more detailed discussion, see Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 49–54.
 17. Mario Bunge, *Finding Philosophy in the Social Sciences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 124.
 18. Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 18.
 19. Philip E. Tetlock, "Psychological Advice on Foreign Policy: What Do We Have to Contribute?," in Neil J. Kessel, ed. *Political Psychology: Classic and Contemporary Readings* (New York: Paragon House, 1993), p. 327; James G. March, *A Primer on Decisionmaking* (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. 38.
 20. Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, p. 555. See also Jack Snyder, "Science and Sovietology," *World Politics* 40(2) (January 1988): 174–175.
 21. Paul H. Nitze, *Tension Between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics* (New York: Scribner's, 1993).
 22. "Truth" itself is associated with more than one meaning. Here, the meaning referred to is that implied by the "correspondence theory" of truth which claims that a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to empirical reality. Other theories make different claims about truth. For example, the coherence theory contends that a statement is true if and only if it coheres with all true statements.

23. One of the best examinations of the nature of the scientific enterprise is Ernest Nagel's *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979). See chapter 13 for a discussion of the special case of the social sciences. See also, A. F. Chalmers, *What is This Thing Called Science?* (Indianapolis, Hackett, 1976).
24. For a further discussion of these issues, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
25. Discussions of cognitive dissonance are Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: Row, Peterson), 1957; and J. W. Brene and A. R. Cohen, *Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: Wiley, 1962).
26. Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," in James N. Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1969): 543–550.
27. For subsequent research that compares the thinking of Dulles to that of John F. Kennedy and Henry Kissinger, see Douglas Stuart and Harvey Starr, "Inherent Bad Faith Reconsidered: Dulles, Kennedy, and Kissinger," *Political Psychology* (Fall-Winter 1981–82): 1–33.
28. The classic work on attribution theory is Richard E. Nisbett and L. D. Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1983).
29. Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).
30. See, for example, Robert Jervis, "The Drunkard's Search," in Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire eds. *Explorations in Political Psychology*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 338–360. Also Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica* 47 (1979): 263–291.
31. See, in particular, Ernest P. May, *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). Also David H. Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). Chapter 9.
32. These heuristics are described in the following two pieces by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman: "Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability," *Cognitive Psychology* (5) 1973: 207–32, and "Judgments Of and By Representativeness," in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky eds., *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
33. Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. 61.
34. Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 717
35. *Ibid* p. 719.

36. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), pp. 277–278.
37. Arthur A. Stein, “The Politics of Linkage,” *World Politics* 33 (October 1980): 62–81.
38. For further developments of such thinking, see S. Lohman, “Linkage Politics,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (February 1977): 36–67.
39. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), p. 176.
40. William Kaufmann, “Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt and Kennedy,” in Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 658–659.
41. Steve Smith, “Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission,” in Eugene R. Wittkopf ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, 2nd. ed. (New York: St. Martins, 1994), p. 308.
42. We are indebted to Emily Goldman for the Churchill and Weinberger examples.
43. Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 445.
44. Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, *Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), chapter 4.
45. Thorstein Veblen, *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), p. 33.
46. See also, Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *The Knowledge Elite and the Failure of Prophecy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), Chapter 3.
47. See, for example, David M. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science: Scholarship and Democracy*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), and Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
48. Stephen M. Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” *International Security* 23(4) (Spring 1999): 5–48.
49. Dale R. Herspring, “Practitioners and Political Scientists,” *PS* September 1992, p. 159.

Chapter 3

1. For an exceptional example of relevant knowledge that is supply-driven and linked by a *singular* path to the decision-making process, see the discussion of the impact of Homer-Dixon's work, below.
2. Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, *Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution* (New York: Routledge: 1990).
3. Steven J. Brams and Jeffrey M. Togman, “Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 3 (1996): 99–112. An expanded

- and updated version of this piece appears in Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, *The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares for Everybody* (New York: Norton, 1999).
4. Of course, the reason that organized interest do not press for a solution may be because they, like policymakers, do not see how it could be attained given the current state of knowledge.
 5. See, for example, Bruce W. Jentleson, *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
 6. See, for example, J. P. Hardt, "Soviet and East European Energy Supplies," in H. Franssen et al., *World Energy Supplies and International Security* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1983), and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Challenges for US National Security: A Preliminary Report*, Part 2 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981): 165–196.
 7. For example, John Mueller, "A Quick Victory? It Better Be," *New York Times*, January 19, 1991, p. 31.
 8. See especially Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), Erik Albaek, "Between Knowledge and Power: Utilization of Social Science in Public Policy Making," in *Policy Sciences* 28 (1995): 79–100; Douglas Torgerson, "Between Knowledge and Politics: Three Faces of Policy Analysis," *Policy Sciences* 19 (1986): 33–59.
 9. Relevant scholars include Marshall Shulman, Adam Ulam, and Alex Inkeles.
 10. Good histories of the development of U.S. nuclear doctrine are provided in Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martins, 1981), and Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).
 11. For example, see Yehezkel Dhor, *Crazy States: A Counterconventional Strategic Problem* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1971).
 12. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).
 13. Bernard Brodie is an early example.
 14. Lindblom, *Intelligence of Democracy*.
 15. Erik Albaek, "Between Knowledge and Power: Utilization of Social Science in Public Policy Making," *Policy Sciences* 28 (1995): 85.
 16. Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, (March 1972): 294–334.
 17. Homer-Dixon's impact on official thinking in Washington DC is described in Ross Laver, "Looking for Trouble: Tad Homer-Dixon's Prophecies for a

- Crowded Planet Have Created a Stir in Washington," *Macleans* (September 5, 1994): 18–22.
18. See, for example, Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz eds, *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986).
 19. Carol Weiss, "Research for Policy's Sake: the Enlightenment Function of Social Research," in *Policy Analysis* 3 (4) (Fall 1977).
 20. Of course, it is the scholar's responsibility to indicate to policymakers where the setting in which the knowledge is to be applied differs materially from that from which the knowledge was produced.
 21. A partial exception is provided by political psychologists whose research is often of an experimental nature.
 22. Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, *Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 76
 23. This section draws on Joseph Lepgold, "Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance," *Political Science Quarterly* 113(1) (Spring 1998): 48–60, and Lepgold, "Scholars and Statesmen: Framework for a Productive Dialogue," in Nincic and Lepgold, eds. *Being Useful*.
 24. See also Ernest J. Wilson, "How Social Science Can Help Policymakers: The Relevance of Theory," in Nincic and Lepgold eds., *Being Useful*, pp. 109–128.
 25. James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, *Thinking Theory Thoroughly* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), p. 2.
 26. For a somewhat different manner of establishing such taxonomies, see Wilson, "How Social Science Can Help Policymakers."
 27. Norman Robert Campbell, *What is Science?* (New York: Dover, 1952), p. 79.
 28. See, for example, Kenneth A. Oye, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate* (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 1990); Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," *World Politics* 40(3) (April 1988): 317–349.
 29. For representative statements of the Constructivist position, which argues that preferences result from the groups of which actors are a part, see Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly* 37(3): 271–296. For recent statements of the choice-theoretic position, which argues that preferences are largely exogenous to choice and interaction, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), and Robert Powell, *In The Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

30. See, for example, Alan C. Lamborn, *The Price of Power*, and Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 42(3) (Summer 1988): 427–460.
31. See the debate between Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), and Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 67–85.
32. James N. Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," *International Organization* 40(4) (Autumn 1986): 852, 871.
33. Tetlock, "Psychological Advice on Foreign Policy," p. 322.
34. George, *Bridging the Gap*, pp. 117–120.
35. George, *Bridging the Gap*, pp. 120–125.
36. Davis Bobrow, "The Relevance Potential of Different Products," *World Politics* 24, Supplement (Spring 1972), pp. 223.
37. Richard N. Haas, *Intervention* rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999).
38. Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, *Beyond the Water's Edge: An Introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 239.
39. William Wallace, "Between Two Worlds: Think Tanks and Foreign Policy," in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, *Two Worlds of International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 146.
40. See George, *Bridging the Gap*, pp. 125–131, for some good examples of this type of knowledge.
41. Bobrow, "The Relevance Potential of Different Products," p. 221.
42. Bobrow, "The Relevance Potential of Different Products," p. 223; Young, "The Perils of Odysseus," p. 200.
43. Bobrow, "The Relevance Potential of Different Products," p. 223.
44. This section draws on Lepgold, "Is Anyone Listening?," and Lepgold, "Scholars and Statesmen."
45. See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis: Rational Choice and Security Studies," *International Security* 23(4) (Spring 1999): 5–48, and Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
46. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "The Benefits of a Social-Science Approach to Studying International Affairs," in Ngaire Woods, ed. *Explaining International Relations Since 1945* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 67.
47. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, *Forecasting Political Events* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 7.
48. Daniel W. Drezner, "Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion," *International Studies Quarterly* 42(4) (December 1998): 709–731.

49. Mark H. Moore, "Social Science and Policy Analysis," in Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings, eds. *Ethics, the Social Sciences, and Policy Analysis* (New York: Plenum Press, 1983), p. 290.
50. Young, "The Perils of Odysseus," pp. 200–201.
51. Steven Erlanger, "Policy Centers Rethink Their Images," *New York Times* July 20, 1997, p. A10.
52. George, *Bridging the Gap*, p. 4, and chapter 1, note 2, pp. 147–148.
53. Erlanger, "Policy Centers Rethink Their Images."
54. Robert Jervis, "Models and Cases in the Study of International Conflict," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed. *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 64, 67.
55. Dean G. Pruitt, "Stability and Sudden Change in Interpersonal and International Affairs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13(1) (March 1969): 35.
56. Arthur Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 44, 47.
57. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," *World Politics* 16(2) (January 1989).
58. John C. McKinney, *Constructive Typology and Social Theory* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1966), p. 36; Paul Diesing, *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1971), p. 189.
59. "Introduction," in Carol H. Weiss ed., *Using Social Research in Public Policy Making* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1977), p. 18.

Chapter 4

1. For a critique of this position, see Michael Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), especially chapter 2.
2. Michael Root, *Philosophy of Social Science The Methods, Ideals, and Politics of Social Inquiry* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Especially chapter 1.
3. For a different view, see Peter deLeon, *Advice and Consent: The Development of the Policy Sciences* (New York: Russel Sage, 1988).
4. Root, *Philosophy of Social Science*, p. 16.
5. George Herbert Meade, "Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences," *Selected Writings* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
6. John F. A. Taylor, *The Public Commission of the University* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), Chapter 6.
7. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, "Theory for Policy in International Relations," in *Policy Sciences* (December 1973): 388.
8. For an examination of the concept of national interest, see Miroslav Nincic, "The National Interest and Its Interpretation," *Review of Politics* (January 1999): 29–55.

9. George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, p. 619.
10. Joseph Ben David, "Innovations and their Recognition in Social Science," *History of Political Economy* 7(4) (1975): 434–455.
11. Scott Greer, *The Logic of Social Inquiry* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).
12. Except, of course, where importance refers to the actual or assumed ethical or social implications of discoveries in the natural sciences.
13. Knowledge designed as an end in itself is variously referred to as "basic," "pure," or "disinterested" knowledge. Here, we will use the third term.
14. A good and somewhat related conception is provided by Abraham Kaplan, who defines theory as "more than a synopsis of the moves that have been played on the game of nature; it also sets forth some idea of the rules of the game by which the moves become intelligible." Abraham Kaplan, (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 302.
15. For discussions of the components of good theory, see Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), chapters 5 and 6; Johan Galtung, *Theory and Methods of Social Research* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), chapter 6; Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Harper, 1968), chapter 3.
16. For a discussion of the relation between explanation and prediction see Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, chapter 40. Also, Michael Nicholson, *The Scientific Analysis of Social Behavior* (London: Pinter, 1983), chapter 9.
17. For a good discussion, see Nazli Choucri and Thomas Robinson eds., *Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1965), part IV.
18. As Stephen Toulmin point out: "Scientists are interested in 'forecasting techniques' only incidentally, and any more satisfactory sense of prediction takes for granted the idea of explanation, rather than defining it." *Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry into the Aims of Science* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 99. See also, Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," *American Political Science Review* (December 1997): 913–917.
19. Realism in this sense has nothing to do with political realism (*realpolitik*).
20. The distinction is discussed in A. F. Chalmers, *What Is This Thing Called Science?* (Stratford: Open University Press, 1978), chapter 13, and Ernst Nagel, *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1961), pp. 129–152. For a particularly well-argued statement of the realist position, see Richard W. Miller, *Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and Social Sciences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), Chapters 8–11.
21. See Richard L. Kikham, *Theories of Truth A Critical Introduction*: (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), and Laurence Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

22. See, for example, William H. Brenner, *Logic and Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), chapter 4, and Milton Hobbs, *The Objectives of Political Science* (New York: University Press of America, 1993), chapter 1.
23. In Milton Friedman ed., *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3–43.
24. Imre Lakatos, “The Methodology of Scientific Research programs,” in Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave, *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)
25. Vladimir I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1939). First published in 1917.
26. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
27. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948).
28. Milton Hobbs, *The Objectives of Political Science* (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 10–13.
29. For example, the concept of “transaction costs” as the basis for the establishment of *economic* organizations has been extensively studied by professional economists. When the same notion was uncritically imported into political science in an attempt to account for the creation of *military* alliances, the significance of the venture was undermined by the fact that it could not be demonstrated that transaction costs had similar meaning to those involved in establishing in military organizations. In other words, the concept was now bereft of real empirical meaning. See Katja Weber, “Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Cost Approach to International Security Cooperation,” *International Studies Quarterly* (June 1997): 321–340.
30. John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of a University* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1947 [1852]), p. 101. For a provocative discussion of this issue, see Bertrand Russell, “Useless Knowledge,” in Bertrand Russell ed., *In Praise of Idleness and Other Essays* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1935), pp. 9–29.
31. This is discussed in Nicholson *The Scientific Analysis of Social Behavior*, pp. 95–100.
32. Philip H. Melanson, *Political Science and Political Knowledge* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1975), p. 130.
33. For a discussion of this concern and an examination of its foundations, see Nico Stehr, *Practical Knowledge: Applying the Social Sciences* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992), pp. 147–149.
34. A discussion of some of the empirical issue involved in the debate on the Democratic Peace can be found in Michael E. Brown et al., eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

35. David Morris, *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index* (New York: Pergamon, 1979).
36. Richard Miller defines a "bias toward the superficial" characteristic of much deductive work in the social sciences. This bias is reflected in "an unjustified preference for theories denying the operation of causal factors which are relatively hard to observe . . . [arising from] at least three aspects of deductivism: the rejection of the hedges and defense on which deeper theories usually depend; the neglect of causal depth in assessing explanations; and the neglect of the actual context of scientific development in the choice among hypotheses." *Fact and Method*, p. 262.
37. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 39.
38. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1979, especially chapter 6.
39. Waltz's major contribution to policy-relevant thinking is found in his work on nuclear proliferation. Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: Norton, 1995).
40. David M. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship and Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984)
41. Abraham Flexner, "The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge," *Harper's Magazine* 179 (1939): 535.
42. Hill, "Academic International Relations," pp. 7–9.
43. For some recent discussion in the area of political philosophy, see Jeremy Waldron "What Plato Would Allow," in Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCew eds., *Theory and Practice* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 138–177, and, Jeffrey C. Isaac, "The Strange Silence of Political Theory," *Political Theory* (November 1995): 636–688.
44. Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, p. 399
45. As in note 31, above.
46. In this regard, it is worth noting that the professional journal that has, in recent years, provided the best *theoretical* articles in the area of international relations, *International Security*, is also a journal that has produced some of the best work on matters of applied foreign policy.

Chapter 5

1. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 1.
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948)
3. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

4. Mercier de la Riviere, "L'Order Naturel et Essentiel des Systemes Politiques," in Edgar Depitre ed., *Collection des Economistes et des Reformateurs Sociaux de la France* (Paris, 1910), pp. 242–252).
5. See Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1988). Especially chapter 6.
6. See, for example, the discussion of Kant, below. Of course, a federation would represent the ultimate achievement of the institutional approach to world politics discussed in chapter 6.
7. Condorcet, Marquis de, *Oeuvres*, Volume 9.(Paris: Firmin Didot Freres, 1847), p. 41.
8. Ibid.
9. Most democracies now have that requirement. In the United States, despite the constitutional requirement that wars be declared by Congress, the war-making prerogatives of the executive continue to be fiercely defended by U.S. presidents, a matter at the heart of the executive-legislative struggle over war powers.
10. Condorcet, *Oeuvres*, pp. 45–46.
11. Immanuel Kant, *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (Indianapolis: Hackett. 1983 [1795]). Translated by Ted Humphrey.
12. The other principles are an international federation of states (broadly consistent with the retention of national sovereignty) and the guarantee of international hospitality, so that the citizens of one nation would not be ill-treated in other countries.
13. Kant, *To Perpetual Peace*, p. 113.
14. An interesting possibility is that democracies need stronger (or at least different) reasons for fighting than non-democracies do. In turn, this could imply that, once they mobilize to fight, democracies may be more uncompromising with regard to the terms by which they cease hostilities.
15. Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
16. Quoted in Thomas J. Knock, *To End All wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 6.
17. Ibid., p. 121.
18. It must be observed that some of these studies focused on international conflict more generally, some forms of which fall short of war.
19. Michael Haas, "Societal Approaches to the Study of War," *Journal of Peace Research* 2(4) (1965): 304–323.
20. See, for example, Maurice East and Philip M. Gregg, "Factors Influencing Cooperation and Conflict in the International System," *International Studies Quarterly* (September 1967): 244–269; Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F.

- Hermann. "The Effect of Size, Development, and Accountability on Foreign Policy," *Peace Science Society Papers* 14 (1969): 16–30; Dina Zinnes and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. "An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," in Wolfram F. Hanreider ed., *Comparative Foreign Policy* (New York: McKay, 1971), pp. 200–216.
21. Rudolph J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War: Volume 4* (New York: Sage, 1979), p. 292.
 22. Stephen Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December 1984): 617–648.
 23. Zeev Maoz and Nasrine Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1817–1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (March 1989): 3–35.
 24. Zeev Maoz and Bruce M. Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" *International Interactions* 17(3) (1992): 245–267.
 25. Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988): 653–677.
 26. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, pp. 31–38.
 27. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996).
 28. Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," Address delivered at the School of Advanced International Study, Johns Hopkins University. September 21, 1993.
 29. Bill Clinton, "Address by the President to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly." The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. September 27, 1993.
 30. White House, *A National Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement*. February 1996, p. 7 (our emphasis).
 31. Ibid.
 32. Strobe Talbott, "Remarks Before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace," March 1, 1996.
 33. White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. February 1997, and White House. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. October 1998.
 34. Joseph Bouchard, "National Security Strategy and U.S. Foreign Policy," Talk given at the Institute on Government Affairs, University of California, Davis. February 11, 1999.
 35. David E. Spiro, "The Democratic Peace: And Yet It Squirms," *International Security* (Spring 1995): 177–180.
 36. Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jagers, and Will H. Moore, *Polity II Codebook* (Boulder, CO: Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, 1989).

37. Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (Spring 1990): 25–50.
38. Alex Inkeles, "Introduction: On Measuring Democracy," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25 (Spring 1990): 3–6.
39. Erich Weede, "Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement," *Journal of Peace Research* 29 (November 1992): 649–664.
40. However, Weede's study covers a considerably shorter period (1962–1980) than most others within this area.
41. James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
42. Stuart A. Bremer. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 36 (June 1992): 309–341.
43. Arvid Raknerud and Havard Hegre, "The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence for the Democratic Peace," *Journal of Peace Research*. 34 (4) (1997): 385–404.
44. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order*. (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), p. 194.
45. Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," Remarks to the Denver Summit of the Eight Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights. October 1, 1997
46. Lewis A. Coser. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1956).
47. John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett. "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985," *International Studies Quarterly* 41(2) (1997): 267–294.
48. In this regard, it is worth noting the finding by Beck and Tucker (1998) that the democratic peace appears to be a recent (post–World War I) phenomenon. In other words, it is only evident during a period that includes the Cold War.
49. Oneal and Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right." See also by the same authors, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992," *World Politics* 52(1) (October 1999): 1–37.
50. Blainey, *The Causes of War*, chapter 5.
51. Zeev Maoz and Bruce M. Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" *International Interactions*. 17(3) (1992): 245–267.
52. See, for example, Ted R. Gurr, "Persistence and Change in Political Systems: 1800–1971," *American Political Science Review* 48 (December 1974): 1482–1504.

53. Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy*. 2 (Spring 1991): 12–34.
54. For example, Robert A. Dahl. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Samuel Huntington. "Will Countries Become More Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99(2) 1984): 193–218; Seymour Martin Lipset. *Political man: The Social Bases of Politics* 2d edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1981); Alex Hadenius. *Democracy and Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
55. See James S. Coleman, "Conclusion," in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), and Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics* 16 (1964): 442–54.
56. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 55
57. Richard Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).
58. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theory and Facts," *World Politics* 49 (January 1997): 155–183.
59. Hadenius, *Democracy and Development*, p. 84.
60. Przeworski and Limongi, "Modernization," p. 159.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 161–167.
62. Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 418.
63. Hadenius, *Democracy and Development*, p. 91.
64. Samuel Huntington, "Will Countries Become More Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (2) (1984): 207–209.
65. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 398.
66. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).
67. Hadenius, *Democracy and Development*, pp. 134–136.
68. See, for example, Michiel de Vries, "Democracy and the Neutrality of Public Bureaucracy," in Haile K. Asmeron and Elisa P. Reis, *Democratization and the Bureaucratic Neutrality* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996): 107–126. Also, Malcolm Wallis, *Bureaucracy: Its Role in Third World Development* (London: Macmillan, 1989).
69. See Constantine P. Danopoulos, *From Military to Civilian Rule* (New York: Routledge, 1992), and Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).
70. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968) 4: 3–5.
71. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset eds. *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

72. See, for example, Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman eds. *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
73. For example, Devesh Kapur, "The IMF: A Cure or a Curse," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1998): 114–131.
74. A partial exception is Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
75. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "Albright Debates Rights and Trade With Chinese," *New York Times*. March 2, 1999.
76. See Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74(3) (1995): 79–97, and, by the same authors, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 5–38.
77. "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 5.
78. Ibid p. 12.
79. Ibid p. 38.
80. Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch. "Democratizing for Peace," *American Political Science Review* 92 (March): 51–61.
81. See also, Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "War and Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization," *International Studies Quarterly* 44(1) (March 2000): 1–30.
82. Oneal and Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right."
83. Ibid., p. 287.

Chapter 6

1. Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?," *Foreign Policy* no. 110 (Spring 1998): 83.
2. Barbara Crossette, "Americans of Two Minds on Sanctions, A Poll Finds," *The New York Times* April 23, 2000, p. A10; Joseph Kahn, "Seattle Protestors are Back, With a New Target," *The New York Times* April 9, 2000, p. A4.
3. Ronald B. Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance," *International Organization* 48(3) (Summer 1994): 431.
4. For these definitions, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Two Cheers for Multilateralism," in *Power and Interdependence* 2nd ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989, p. 271, and Mark W. Zacher, "International Organizations," in Joel Krieger, ed. *The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 451. Broadly defined, international institutions also comprise international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and enduring, if nonformal, patterns of trans-state relationships. But

national officials are less able to directly manipulate NGOs than interstate institutions, so knowledge about NGOs would tend to be less useful to them instrumentally. We thus exclude non-state international institutions from detailed consideration in this chapter. NGOs may, however, be a key part of the context in which international policy is made, a point discussed in section III.

5. Zacher, "International Organizations," p. 451.
6. Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 35.
7. Robert O. Keohane and Craig Murphy, "International Institutions," in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds. *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, II (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 872.
8. Keohane, "International Institutions," p. 84.
9. Keohane and Murphy, "International Institutions," p. 878.
10. M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919* (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 211–221.
11. Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 16.
12. Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 51–54.
13. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, pp. 233, 227.
14. Kenneth Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 28, quoted in Clark, *The Hierarchy of States*, p. 58.
15. Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 21(2) (1984): 113.
16. Keohane and Murphy, "International Institutions," p. 878.
17. There was also a French Functionalist tradition, represented during the 19th century by Saint-Simon and August Comte. Because its intellectual and political roots were idiosyncratic to French conditions, it resonated less widely than the British tradition. See F. Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 101–106.
18. Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations*, p. 100. For an interpretation of the post-World War II economic regimes from this perspective, see John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 26(2) (Spring 1982): 379–415.
19. David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), p. 70.
20. William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now* (London: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 191.
21. Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, p. 382.

22. Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*, p. 63.
23. Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 47–50.
24. Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 85–88. In this argument, international institutions are seen as an efficient response to a form of market failure. In international politics, this type of situation is evident when policymakers avoid agreements with other states they might otherwise prefer because participation involves high uncertainties about others' future behavior. The reasoning in this argument is guardedly optimistic, even though it rejects the assumption, held by Orthodox Functionalists, that cooperation on socioeconomic issues is virtually costless and risk-free. Like other arguments within the broad Liberal tradition, it assumes that unrealized possibilities for cooperation are likely to exist. But it carries a key caveat: it applies only when actors' objectives are compatible enough for them to prefer joint action in the first place.
25. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 88–100; Keohane, "International Institutions," p. 86; Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization* 36(2) (Spring 1982): 191–192.
26. For an example of Liberal approach that tries to explain interests, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51(4) (Autumn 1997): 513–553.
27. Clark, *The Hierarchy of States*, pp. 68–73; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978), p. 299.
28. Keohane, "International Institutions," pp. 87–88.
29. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 105. For a more extended version of this argument, see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization* 42(3) (Summer 1988): 485–507.
30. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19(3) (Winter 1994–95): 47.
31. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28(3) (April 1976): 317–347; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
32. Joseph M. Grieco, "Realism and Regionalism: American Power and German and Japanese Institutional Strategies During and After the Cold War," in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds. *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 338–340.
33. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, chapters 3 and 9.

34. Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 2, 128.
35. Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, pp. 144–147; Alan C. Lamborn, “Theory and the Politics in World Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 41(2) (June 1997): 193–194.
36. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” in Frierich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds. *International Organization: A Reader* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1994), p. 11; Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Force of Prescriptions,” *International Organization* 38(4) (Autumn 1984): 705; Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 145. As U.S. representatives to the UN noted in the 1970s and 1980s, a failure to respond to the prevailing rhetoric in institutional forums can, by default, legitimize it more broadly in world politics. See Keohane and Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism,” p. 269.
37. Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, chapters 2–4.
38. An exception is Keohane and Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism.”
39. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1) (February 1998): 15.
40. Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” *International Journal* 40(4) (Autumn 1985): 615–620.
41. Peter van Ham, *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 41–42.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
45. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 92–96.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 103–106.
47. Keohane and Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism,” p. 272.
48. Oran Young, “The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables,” in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 177–178.
49. Mitchell, “Regime Design Matters,” pp. 430–458.
50. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 53–65; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 234–238.

51. The basic distinction noted here is between what Arthur Stein calls a dilemma of common aversions and a dilemma of common interests. See Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 32–44. See also James D. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” *International Organization* 52(2) (Spring 1998): 274–275, and Keohane and Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism,” pp. 273–274.
52. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” p. 279.
53. While Neoliberal Institutionalists belong in this broad group, a wide range of other scholars has contributed to this discussion. The school that has focused on these issues is sometimes referred to as the “New Institutionalism.” See, for example, Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Karol Soltan, Eric M. Uslaner, and Virginia Haufler, eds. *Institutions and Social Order* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For international relations applications, see James D. Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information,” *International Organization* 48(3) (Summer 1994), and Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” as well as the citations therein.
54. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 89–92; Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” in Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 111–113.
55. Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” p. 298.
56. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp. 64–65, 87–90.
57. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” pp. 112–113; Keohane and Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism,” pp. 272.
58. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 91.
59. In many cases, observed compliance with international accords may result from an absence of any deep commitments. See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation,”? *International Organization* 50(3) (Summer 1996): 382–397.
60. Keohane and Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism,” p. 275.
61. Joseph Kahn, “From Minks to Mules, U.S. Issues China Trade Details,” *The New York Times* March 15, 2000, p. A10.
62. James K. Sebenius, “Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case of Global Warming,” *International Security* 15(4) (Spring 1991). We are not suggesting here that Sebenius is a Neoliberal, but simply that his assumptions and conclusions are consistent with that school.
63. Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” *World Politics* 43(3) (April 1991): 342–360.

64. Among others on these points, see Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security"; Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations: A Critique," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 68–81; Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 274–283.
65. Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," *International Organization* 48(2) (Spring 1994).
66. Lamborn, "Theory and the Politics in World Politics," pp. 191–194.
67. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," p. 276.
68. George Yeo, "China in the WTO? A Leap Forward," *Washington Post* February 29, 2000, p. A 19.
69. Edward C. Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 45.
70. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 100–103; Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50(3) (Summer 1996): 461–469.
71. G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," *International Organization* 23(3) (Winter 1998/99).
72. Luck, *Mixed Messages*, pp. 2, 4–5; Barbara Crossette and Eric Schmitt, "U.N. Ambassadors in Helms Land: Smiles On, Gloves Off," *The New York Times* March 31, 2000, p. A8.
73. James Traub, "Holbrooke's Campaign," *The New York Times Magazine* March 26, 2000, p. 42.
74. James Traub, "Holbrooke's Campaign," p. 43.
75. For further discussion of these issues, see Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," *International Security* 23(2) (Fall 1998), and Joseph Lepgold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem," *International Security* 23(1) (Summer 1998).
76. For this point and the next, see Steven Weber, "Institutions and Change," in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds. *New Thinking in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), pp. 243–244.
77. Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model," in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 119–123.
78. Peter M. Haas, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," in Peter M. Haas, ed. *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*

- dination (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1997, pp. 1–7; Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” in Haas, ed. *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*, pp. 372–385. For a related though somewhat broader discussion, see Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 20–49.
79. See essays by Emanuel Adler, Peter M. Haas, and Ethan B. Kapstein, all in Haas, ed. *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination*.
 80. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power*, p. 12; Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, pp. 28–29.
 81. Abbott and Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” pp. 24–26.
 82. Stephen Haggard, “Structuralism and Its Critics,” in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 415.
 83. On this point, see Zacher, “International Organizations,” p. 452.
 84. Luck, *Mixed Messages*, p. 45.
 85. Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, p. 39.
 86. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 89.
 87. Immanuel Kant, “Second Supplement: Secret Article for Perpetual Peace,” in *Perpetual Peace* (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), p. 33.
 88. George W. Ball, “Introduction,” in Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, eds. *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. xiii. Monnet said as much in his memoirs, arguing that “[I]f the victors and vanquished agreed to exercise joint sovereignty over part of their joint resources . . . a solid link would be forged between them, the way would be wide open for further collective action, and a great example would be given to the other nations of Europe.” See Jean Monnet, *Memoirs* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), p. 293.
 89. See Van Ham, *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s*, chapter 3, pp. 33–50; Glenn E. Schweitzer, “A Multilateral Approach to Curbing Proliferation of Weapons Know-How.”

Chapter 7

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3. Christopher Hill, "Academic International Relations: The Siren Song of Policy Relevance," in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, *Two Worlds of International Relations* (London: Routledge: 1994), p. 17.
4. George, "Some Guides to Bridging the Gap," p. 172.
5. Arthur Stinchcombe, *Constructing Social Theories* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 44, 47.
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