5 The Inter-Democratic Peace—Theoretical Foundations and Policy Implications

In this chapter and the next, we discuss the practical policy implications of some recent international relations scholarship: namely, the literature surrounding the democratic peace and that associated with institutions and international cooperation. Our aim is to determine what guidance, if any, this knowledge might provide to practitioners, and to examine its strengths and weaknesses in this regard. An obvious question at this point is why we selected these two bodies of scholarship rather than others. Three considerations drove the decision. First, we wanted issue-areas that would be broad enough to encompass a variety of specific problems and relationships American decisionmakers face. Many foreign-policy problems turn on when and under what conditions the United States should collaborate with others, as opposed to going it alone, while many others turn on how to prevent conflicts from erupting in the first place. The literature on institutionalized cooperation should help address the first set of questions; work linking democratization with pacific international behavior should illuminate the second. Second, we looked for topical areas in which there was enough scholarly literature to provide a basis for an extended discussion, including exchanges across competing points of view. Third, we sought a body of scholarship sufficiently mature in terms of the solidity of its empirical and theoretical foundations, i.e, one that has been thoroughly vetted by the profession over a substantial period of time.

In this chapter, we analyze the implications of the proposition that democracies are much less likely than autocracies to engage in international

hostilities, at least against other democracies. This assertion has achieved widespread (though not universal) acceptance, and has generated a virtual cottage industry of empirical research by international relations scholars.

The proposition can also be embraced on ethical grounds. Many policies connected with peace and security have implied tools with unpleasant connotations that could be justified only, and reluctantly, by the end they were supposed to promote. For example, alliance politics and nuclear deterrence were regarded as unavoidable evils required by an exalted objective. In the present case, however, the clash between the ethical content of means and ends disappears, as the instrument (democracy) is intrinsically as desirable as the objective (peace).

The notion that democracies behave differently on the world stage is especially consequential at a time when the cold war's termination, along with an extensive spread of democracy, presage a new era in international relations, requiring that long-accepted policy assumptions be substantially revised. As Bruce Russett asks: "Does the post–Cold War era represent merely the passing of a particular adversarial relationship, or does it offer a chance for fundamentally changed relations among nations?"[1] The possibility that the second answer is correct leads us to inquire what, if anything, the United States can do to promote this transformation, and what contribution scholarship can make to understanding the link between democracy and peace and the ways of ensuring that it is realized. We will begin by placing the proposition in its broader theoretical context.

The Intellectual Context

Traditionally, the notion that a nation's form of government shapes its attitude toward military force has not been the dominant academic belief. More often, it was been thought that either properties common to all states, or else compelling attributes of the international system, lead nations to behave uniformly in most important respects—irrespective of their internal political differences. This position has characterized scholars identified as political "realists," for whom foreign policy reflects a primary concern with security and power in a threatening world, a concern unaffected by domestic political proclivities.

Hans J. Morgenthau, a founder of modern realist thinking, observed that statesmen "think and act in terms of interest defined as power. The aspiration

for power being the distinguishing element of international politics."[2] For Morgenthau, this is natural, since the drive to "dominate" has the status of an "elemental biosocial drive" that is "common to all men."[3] International politics reflects the imperatives of power, and war is avoided only by adhering to realist tenets of international behavior (e.g., by respect for an international balance of power).

In more recent, "neorealist," variants of this doctrine, the need for power does not appear as an inherent drive, but as a response to *anarchy*: the defining property of the international system. Anarchy implies insecurity and the need for self-help, from which it follows that national security and sovereignty must rest on power. If peace is to prevail, power must be acquired and managed internationally in such a way that aggression is discouraged. Domestic politics are neither here nor there: foreign and security policies stem from international circumstances too compelling to allow much variation rooted in regime characteristics.

The opposite position has also had adherents. Some have questioned the notion that anarchy necessarily breeds a security dilemma among nations, requiring power-based responses. It has been argued, since the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, that insecurity could be mitigated by fostering economic interdependence among nations—a view held, inter alia, by theorists of the French enlightenment,[4] and the Manchester School in England.[5] Similarly, a number of scholars have argued that international organizations can foster cooperation among nations, substantially mitigating their sense of insecurity. In some views, political federations could even be created among nations, virtually removing the possibility of war among them.[6]

Most significantly for our concerns, it has been argued that war-proneness does vary from nation to nation, depending on the political system—in particular, that nations with governments subject to popular control are less inclined to resort to force in their external dealings. The French *philosophes* disapproved of political cultures that glorified military conquest and balance of power—cultures viewed as pathologies of despotic governments—and they felt that freely expressed public sentiment would not countenance such values. This feeling was most influentially expressed by the Marquis de Condorcet. Best known by political scientists for his "jury theorem" and "Condorcet equilibrium," he also argued that international peace required a profound restructuring of domestic politics.[7] People (unlike monarchs) were peace-loving; the challenge was to ensure that their preferences prevailed.

International treaties (especially involving military alliances) should require legislative ratification at the level of electoral districts—to ensure that they contain no nefarious designs.[8] War should require a declaration by the legislature (and even this would be permitted only if the other side had instigated hostilities).[9] To further guarantee that the popular will would prevail, Condorcet urged that new elections be held as soon as feasible after war had been declared, allowing voters to ratify the legislature's decision, or to refuse to do so.[10] The effect would be a substantial reduction in the incidence of war.

In a similar and currently better-known view, Immanuel Kant[11] argued that peace required governments based on republican constitutions,[12] which would ensure three things: (1) the respect of individual freedom; (2) a common source of legislation, and the separation of executive and legislative authority, and, finally, (3) the political equality of citizens. In turn, a collectivity of free and equal citizens exercising control over executive decisions would not countenance executive wars.

> The republican constitution . . . provides for this desirable result, namely perpetual peace, and the reason for this as follows: If (as must inevitably be the case, given this form of constitution) the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be a war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game. (Among these are doing the fighting themselves, paying the costs of war from their own resources, having to repair at great sacrifice the war's devastation, and, finally the ultimate evil that would make peace itself better, never being able— because of new and constant wars—to expunge the burden of debt.) By contrast, under a nonrepublican constitution, where subjects are not citizens, the easiest thing in the world to do is to declare war.[13]

The implication of Condorcet's and Kant's views is that democracies are far less likely to opt for war than autocracies, and that domestic political arrangements may matter more than the character of the global system in accounting for war and peace.[14] These arguments impressed a number of statesmen, including many of the U.S. Founding Fathers, who agreed that popular control over major foreign policy decisions would promote the cause of peace.[15] More recently, Woodrow Wilson, whose ideas on foreign policy were deeply rooted in philosophical convictions acquired before entering

politics, claimed a link between peace and democracy. These convictions included the virtues of free debate and popular opinion, and a belief that democracy alone offered the promise of "the establishment of the most humane results of the world's peace and progress."[16] When a post–World War I international order was contemplated, he declared that "The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty," emphasizing that "A steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations."[17] More recently still, a number of U.S. statesmen of the cold war period have stressed the dependence of peace on democracy and the inherent aggressiveness of Communism—although the line between empirical observation and rhetorical flourish was often blurred during those decades.

While earlier thinking on the implication of democracy for peace was grounded in casual and impressionistic assessments of the popular and legislative impact on executive actions, modern research methods and extensive data have produced knowledge of a more rigorous sort.

During the 1960s, a series of related efforts, using for the most part large aggregates of data, explored the possibility that either the incidence or the intensity of international conflict may be predictable on the basis of the political systems of countries involved. The evidence indicated that this was the case.[18] A study by Michael Haas[19] found evidence that democratic states were less often party to conflicts than nondemocracies, a finding confirmed by several subsequent studies.[20] In the 1970s, Rudolph Rummel of the University of Hawaii, published an extensive, five volume, study of war, arguing that democracies, or libertarian states, are more peaceful than autocracies, because of:

> the responsiveness of elected leaders to domestic interest groups or public opinion, which ordinarily will oppose violence, tax increases and conscription . . . Domestic interests set limits and libertarian leaders lack the power or the will to take violent initiatives or make moves escalating violence, unlike their authoritarian or totalitarian counterparts.[21]

Most research during the 1960s and 1970s suggesting that democracies are more peaceful than autocracies took the *nation state* as the unit of analysis—computing the number of wars engaged in by various countries, then comparing those numbers on the basis of political systems. However, this said little about the political systems encountered in the warring *pairs*

of nations, which requires identification of the dyads involved (In order to find out which political systems fight most, but also what kind of political systems they tend to fight).

An early study of this kind by Stephen Chan[22] took as its unit of analysis the dyad-year (i.e., each possible pair of nations examined on a per-year basis). It found that nondemocratic dyad-years showed proportionately less war involvement than those including two democracies. In a subsequent, and much quoted study, Zeev Maoz and Nasrine Abdolali[23] provided what is now the most widely accepted statement of the democratic peace. Examining all pairs of states for the period 1816–1976, they found that although democratic states were no less war-prone than nondemocratic states, none of the 332 dyads engaged in war were *jointly* democratic. This yielded the conclusion that, while democracy does not guarantee peaceful behavior in general, democracies will not fight each other. These findings were confirmed by several subsequent studies, including one by Maoz and Bruce Russett that considered the war-democracy relation in the context of a number of possible intervening conditions.[24]

The finding about the disinclination of democracies to fight each other has since gained much academic support; by one reckoning "the absence of wars between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."[25] Two broad theoretical explanations for this finding have been proposed. The first, "normative" or "cultural" explanation, maintains that democratic political culture—based as it is as on bargaining, negotiation, and compromise in its domestic politics—will be extended by democracies to their external relations, especially when dealing with countries that subscribe to similar political norms.[26] A second, "structural," explanation finds the source of the democratic peace in legislative, public, and other constraints on the ability of government to initiate war. While it may not be immediately obvious why these constraints should account for less war *among democracies*, as opposed to more pacific policies in general by democracies, an explanation can be offered. As Michael Doyle points out, domestic constraints on war involvement are likely to be relaxed only if the war is to be fought for a popular reason, and wars against nondemocracies are far more likely to be popular than against nations which share one's democratic structures and values.[27] This is because they should be harder to legitimize domestically.

Although advocates for the supremacy of one or the other explanation can be found, it is nearly impossible to disentangle the respective effects of the cultural and structural attributes—since both simultaneously

characterize democracies. The most credible conclusion is that, while, individually, either could account for the democratic peace, their combination provides its strongest guarantee.

The Democratic Peace and the Policymaking Community

Given the empirical evidence, theoretical plausibility, and ethical appeal of the claim that democracies do not fight each other, it is not surprising that the proposition should have been embraced by policymakers. The policy theme drawn by the Clinton administration (the first fully post–cold war administration) was the need to move from a strategy of containment to one of *enlargement*, i.e., of expanding the community of nations adhering to political democracy and free market principles. In a public address in September 1993, Anthony Lake, the President's National Security Advisor, explained that:

> During the Cold War, even children understood America's security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob. Today . . . we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the "blue areas" of market democracies.[28]

The justification for enlargement was not only couched in terms of democracy's domestic virtues, but also of its international benefits—including the democratic peace, which was initially accounted for in terms of a largely cultural explanation. According to President Clinton, in his first major foreign policy address,

> Democracy is rooted in compromise, not conquest. It rewards tolerance, not hatred. Democracies rarely make war on one another. They make more reliable partners in trade, in diplomacy, and in the stewardship of our global environment.[29]

Soon, the foreign policy of the United States came to be defined by the coupled concepts of *engagement* and *enlargement*: the first involving active internationalism, the second encouraging democracy and market economies in those parts of the world in which they had not fully taken root. These two themes provided the title of the administration's 1996 national security report, stating that, "Our national security policy is . . . based on enlarging the

community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests."[30] Democracy was to be promoted because "Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more reliable trading partners *and are far less likely to wage war on one another.*"[31] (Our emphasis.) Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott further explained, enumerating the various objectives of U.S. foreign policy, that:

> We will advance all the objectives I have just enumerated, and others as well, if we also strengthen associations among established democracies and support the transition to democracy in states that are emerging from dictatorship or civil strife. Democracy, in short, is the one big thing that we must sustain and promote wherever possible, even as we deal with the many other tasks that face us.[32]

The commitment went well beyond rhetoric, and the administration could indeed point to numerous examples of its efforts at enlargement. These included vigorous support of the quasi-public National Endowment for Democracy, aid to a democratizing Russia and to several newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, and to a number of Eastern and Central European nations. Policies included support for South Africa's democratic transformation, and for similar (though much less successful) efforts in Cambodia. Enlargement ranged from the military intervention designed to restore democracy in Haiti, to such actions as hosting the Summit of the Americas, which reaffirmed the members' commitment to democracy.

Surprisingly in light of the above, the national security reports submitted in the following two years[33] no longer explicitly referred to the goal of enlargement, subsuming it under the more general heading of engagement. Moreover, references to the international benefits of democracy no longer mentioned the fact that they do not fight each other. The explanation for this shift is interesting from the perspective of policy-relevant knowledge. According to a National Security Council official with substantial responsibility in this area, there were two reasons for this change of emphasis.[34] The first was the finding that although democracies are unlikely to fight each other, they are not more pacific overall. The second was the more recent suggestion by a number of political scientists that, independently of what may apply to established democracies, nations going through the process of *transition* from autocracy to democracy may be quite war-prone.

Under the circumstances, the benefits of enlargement would have had to be presented in far more qualified and ambiguous terms, probably accounting for the decision to shift the focus of official statements of U.S. foreign policy.

Significantly, then, a large part of the original justification for the policy of enlargement, and the reason it was subsequently downplayed by U.S. foreign policy doctrine, appear grounded in academic findings. Thus, work on the democratic peace represents a vivid example of policy-relevant thinking (rooted, in this case, in supply-driven scholarship), and we must evaluate the extent to which the proposition that democracies do not fight each other is a reliable foundation for policy.

As we have seen, relevance may assume various forms, and appraisals must be specific about which is at issue. Since the most basic form is *instrumental* relevance, we will begin by evaluating the democratic peace proposition from that perspective (is it really true that democracies do not fight each other). Secondly, social science may help us understand how democracy itself can be promoted, adding *contextual* relevance to its contribution to our grasp of the range of the possible. Finally, it can shed light on the *costs*, if any, of pursuing global democratization, expanding our understanding of the consequences of the actions we take. We will examine each variant of relevant scholarship in turn.

Instrumental Relevance and the Democratic Peace Scholarship

Instrumental relevance concerns the association between policy and desired objective. Here, the objective is international peace, the instrument is democracy. The credibility of any proposition that claims instrumental relevance is proportional to the faith that can be placed in its truth—in this case, that democracies do not fight each other. Despite considerable academic support for this proposition, both the quality of the research and the theoretical assumptions that stand behind it have been questioned. With regard to the former, a number of methodological challenges have been directed at the correlation between joint democracy and dyadic peace. With regard to the theory, it has been suggested that the correlation may be an artifact masking other, more basic, influences on peace.

Methodological Challenges

Two complaints about the quality of the research are most often encountered. The first concerns the significance of the failure, by most scholars working in this area, to find any instance of a war between two democracies. The point is that war, among *any* two nations at any given time, is very unlikely. Even if these things were governed by chance alone, the proportion of wars between democracies, as well as those involving autocracies, would be very small. Therefore, it may be hard to assign much substantive significance to the absence of any instance of war between democracies. As one critic points out, the probability of winning the lottery is extremely small, so the fact that none of his immediate relatives ever won it cannot be imputed to anything specific about his family.[35]

Thus, Maoz and Abdolali, while finding no instances of wars in their democratic-dyad years, also found that only 0.10 percent of the nondemocratic dyad-years witnessed a war; and, if this were governed by chance only 0.12 percent of the democratic dyads would have experienced war. Obviously the difference between 0 percent, and either 0.10 percent and 0.12 percent is very small, as is the difference between those two figures. Thus, even a slight change in the way either democracy or war is measured could wipe out that difference.

A second problem with much of the democratic peace research is more technical. The issue is that the dyad-years used as the basic unit in most of these studies are not statistically independent—in the sense that the probability of war for one dyad is not unrelated to the probability of war for another—while the assumption of independence is required by the vast majority of statistical tests of association. The problem is evident both cross-sectionally and across time. Cross-sectionally, many of the war dyads are part of *multilateral* wars, meaning that individual dyadic wars are not independent events. For example, during World War I, the war between Russia and Germany was not independent of the war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, even though they are so considered for purposes of the statistical analysis. Across time, too, it is obvious that the war between Russia and Germany in 1916 is not independent of the war between the same two countries in 1917. When the assumption of independence is violated, the significance of any statistical relation found tends to be inflated—implying that the apparent relation between democracy and peace may be an artifact of the dependence of the dyad-years.

Thus there are two main criticisms of the quality of research under-pinning claims of a democratic peace: the sensitivity of the findings to measurement error and the statistical dependence of the units of analysis. How disabling are they?

Qualms regarding measurement procedures are hard to evaluate in a definitive manner. The variables directly involved are democracy and war. Measures of democracy typically are multivariate—as, for example in the frequently used Polity-II data set,[36] or in the data on freedom and democracy computed by Freedom House.[37] Generally, the measures encompass (a) the existence of free elections, (b) a meaningful measure of democratic account-ability, and, (c) constraints upon executive authority. These indicators are sometimes further weighted in the computation of the extent to which two nations are *jointly* democratic.

Although the exact threshold that divides democracies and nondemocra-cies is inevitably subjective, the conclusion that democracies do not fight each other has followed from studies using somewhat different operational definitions. In any case, as Alex Inkeles has observed: "indicators most com-monly selected to measure democratic systems generally form a notably coherent syndrome, achieving high reliability as measurement scales. . . . In the real world they are so intimately linked as to almost perfect substitutes for each other."[38] We recognize that there may be plausible ways of mea-suring democracy that could wipe out the finding that democracies do not fight each other, but we also feel that they would be no less plausible than those that confirm it.

As for war, it is generally measured by criteria established by the Corre-lates of War (COW) project, which assumes that the conflict is between two independent nation states (excluding civil, revolutionary, or colonial wars) and that the level of violence goes beyond the level of a minor skirmish. The threshold of violence required for a conflict to qualify as a war is a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths. While this comes close to a definition that most people would accept, the 1,000 figure is not inherent in any conceptual definition of war, such as would be found in a dictionary. Furthermore, different thresholds might yield different results. For example, a study by Erich Weede,[39] found that different conclusions on the democratic peace could be reached if the threshold were 1,000 battle deaths than if that thresh-old were 100.[40]

Obviously, variations in operational measurement of either democracy or war might yield exceptions to the proposition that democracies never fight

but, even so, plausible exceptions are few and far between.[41] Most funda-
mentally, this criticism reflects the fact that neither of these two terms has
a conceptual definition so precise in its ordinary meaning as to eliminate
all uncertainty at the level of operational measurement. From a policy per-
spective, the implications reach no further than this. Criticism regarding
chosen measures matters only to the extent that policymakers' understanding
of the meaning of either war or democracy are significantly at variance with
the meaning implied by those measures. It is unlikely that this would be the
case very often; thus, measurement issues should not affect the utility of
policies seeking to promote peace by encouraging the proliferation of de-
mocracies.

The more significant criticism concerns the lack of independence among
the dyad-years which most studies examine, and several solutions to this
problem have been suggested. Stuart Bremer[42] considered only the *original*
belligerents, and only the year in which the war began. While this obviously
limits the number of dependent dyad-years, it also leads to such implausible
anomalies as reducing World War II to the fighting between Germany and
Poland in 1939. A better solution is to treat the dependence as an expression
of conflict-*diffusion*, and to study it accordingly. This was done by Raknerud
and Hegre[43] who treat inter-dyad dependencies as diffusion of war effects.
In addition, they question the assumption of "stationarity" implicit in most
previous work—i.e., that the relation between dependent variables and pre-
dictor variables (in this case the probability of war and the presence or ab-
sence of democracy) does not change with time (e.g., that it is the same in
1830 as in 1980). In a sophisticated model incorporating these new assump-
tions, the authors confirm that, at the dyadic level, democracies are in fact
less likely to fight each other, but that they are no more pacific than autoc-
racies in terms of their overall war involvement (while politically mixed
dyads are especially conflict-prone). A large part of the explanation, they
reckon, is in the different war-*joining* behavior of autocracies and democ-
racies: while democracies do not go to war with each other, they are par-
ticularly likely to join other democracies in their wars with autocracies. This
information has obvious policy implications, since decisionmakers can ben-
efit from knowing that, when involved in conflict, a democracy is more likely
to get help from other democracies than an autocracy is from other autoc-
racies.

The finding that democracies do not fight each other implies that a world
with more and more democracies is likely to be a correspondingly peaceful

world; it establishes that regime type matters when it comes to foreign policy, and it casts substantial doubt on the claims of political realism, a doctrine that both scholars and policymakers are now increasingly questioning. Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, for example, argue that realist assertions must be challenged

> by the new reality of no war among the democratic great powers. . . . Relations among these countries will not be influenced by the need for military allies. Nor will they be concerned with the balance of military power among groups of democracies. . . . [D]emocracy is a basic long-term hope for achieving general peace.[44]

Within the policymaking community, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, criticized traditional thinking that, under the heading of realism, focused foreign policy on matters of raw power, drawing the policy implications of the evidence in support of a democratic peace: namely, "that there is a hard-headed, national-interest based rationale for the promotion of human rights and democracy into the fabric of our diplomacy as a whole. It is, precisely, an imperative of 'realpolitik,' not just of 'idealpolitik.' "[45]

What light scholarship sheds on the possibilities of actually promoting democracy is information of a contextual sort, and we will address the issue presently. But it will be useful to linger on the generalization that democracies do not fight each other, to see whether this bivariate relation holds when a variety of ceteris-paribus circumstances are controlled for. In other words, we ask whether the relation does not mask other, more basic relations which, when taken into account, would make regime-type appear less relevant to the incidence of war. By understanding the influences that intervene between democracy and peace, as well as those that may mask the link, scholars help policymakers understand the why's and wherefores of a theoretical relationship of great practical moment.

Theoretical Challenges: Intervening and Confounding Conditions

It has been pointed out that the democratic peace may simply be an artifact of the cold war. The point is that during the cold war's 45-year duration, democracies as a group were linked by their common conflict with the Soviet Union and its allies. Social scientists understand that social

entities faced with a common enemy are less likely to engage in conflictive behavior among themselves,[46] and it may be that many differences among Western industrialized democracies were muted during the period when they were linked by an overriding common cause. In other words, it is possible that that the Soviet threat, rather than anything intrinsic to democracy, accounts for much of the evidence in favor of the democratic peace.

One could argue that there were few, if any, wars among democracies at *any* time, not just during the cold war. Nevertheless, results such as those reported by Maoz and Abdolali would probably seem less persuasive if the cold war years, and thus the bulk of the democratic dyad-years, had not been part of the research. Moreover, research by Oneal and Russett, which covers only the 1950–1985 period (and which focuses on militarized disputes, not just wars),[47] finds that, while democracies are less likely to engage in such disputes, the existence of an *alliance* (several of which linked democracies during the cold war), also makes conflict less likely.[48]

A second issue is whether the lack of wars (or militarized disputes) among democracies is not a consequence of their economic interdependence—that trade and investment, not regime type, account for their disinclination to fight each other. A substantial body of theorists has argued that security dilemmas can be trumped by economic links among nations—rendering the opportunity costs of fighting too high. Again, the most valuable research is that of Oneal and Russett;[49] it reports that economic interdependence does indeed make a difference, without, however, wiping out the effect of regime type. Democracy continues to matter, but its pacific impact is amplified by economic openness and by trade interdependence. Of course, the exact nature of the causal relation may be debated—since democracies are also more likely to have open economies than are autocracies, and because they may be more inclined to trade with each other. Thus, even if regime-type makes a difference to the prospects for peace for cultural and/or structural reasons, it may do so *additionally* by the economic incentives it creates.

A final possible intervening variable, political stability, is also significant, because of its implications for policies to encourage the spread of democracy. It has been asserted that governments facing high levels of domestic disorder may seek to unify the society by involving it in a common struggle against an external enemy.[50] Moreover, if disorder is rooted in governmental performance, a foreign quarrel may deflect attention from its failures, and it might provide government with an excuse to tighten the reins of domestic

control (say, by censoring the press, introducing martial law, etc.). Accordingly, a stable government may be less likely to initiate war.

Not only may unstable polities be tempted to start wars, they may also be *victims* of aggression—because they could seem incapable of mobilizing society for a fully effective defense. There is some evidence that the impact of regime type on war involvement at the dyadic level is lessened when political stability is also brought into the equation. For example, in a study that introduces an explicit control for stability, Maoz and Russett conclude that "Stable states are far less likely to fight one another than expected, regardless of their regime type."[51]

If so, the correlation between political system and peace may be spurious. Since it is well-documented that established democracies are more stable than nondemocracies,[52] stability may account both for flourishing democracy and for a disinclination to fight (at least with other democracies). However, it is also possible (and somewhat more likely) that democracy promotes stability, and that stability in turn promotes peace. If so, the relation would not be spurious—stability is simply an intervening variable. Even so, policy implications are apparent, for this conclusion suggests that, if a way could be found to ensure stability even in the absence of democracy, and if peace were the ultimate imperative, the incentive to promote democracy could be reduced.

We see that social science has not only provided the generalization about the democratic peace, of which policymakers took careful note, but also the caveats and ancillary propositions on which thoughtful policies could be based. In this way, it has shown relevance of an instrumental sort— describing the link between democracy and peace and defining the faith that should be place on it—and, to some extent at least, it has shaped the policy debate accordingly. Of course, it is not enough to know that the spread of democracy may promote peace; it is also useful to know how this proliferation could be encouraged.

Contextual Relevance: Foreign Policy and the Promotion of Democracy

The benefits of scholarship to policymaking extend beyond establishing ends-means relationships. Social science may also shed light on the context of instrumental relations, most notably by explaining how the means of pol-

icy (and even the intervening variables) may, in turn, be affected, and how their values may be anticipated. No part of the context of the democratic peace appears more important, from a decisionmaker's perspective, than the issue of how democracy itself can be promoted.

An exception not long ago, democracy has become the world's dominant political system. Not all countries have fully embraced all of its attributes, but few governments do not feel compelled at least to pay lip-service to the democratic idea, and few can claim legitimacy on the basis of any other principle.

Despite the recent diffusion of democracy, it is not obvious that the process is one of linear progress. Samuel Huntington,[53] reckons that the spread of democracy moves in cycles, and that we are currently experiencing its third wave. The first was witnessed between 1820 and 1920, when democracy spread through much of the Western industrialized world (and parts of Latin America). A second wave crested in the decades immediately following World War II, when decolonization often was associated with the adoption of the colonial powers' political forms. The third wave appeared in the mid-1970s, gathering momentum in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and to an extent in Africa, in the 1990s. However, as the previous two waves demonstrated, the process is not irreversible, and one may ask what can be done to ensure the expansion and consolidation of democracy?

From the perspective of the scholarship, the task is logically twofold. It should illuminate the objective conditions in which democracy is most likely to take root and flourish. Having done so, it should indicate to what extent and how these conditions can be molded by U.S. activities.

The Conditions of Democratic Transition: Insights of the Social Sciences

Although disagreements appear at the margins, and while scholars may disagree on the respective causal weights to assign to each, a broad consensus attends the general foundations of democracy,[54] and these may be grouped into several categories.

Economic prerequisites: No correlates of democracy have been as extensively studied, or accorded a more basic role, as those of an economic character. In Seymour Martin Lipset's early and influential view (1960, revised 1981): "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will

sustain democracy" (p. 31 of 1981 edition), and numerous scholars agreed.[55] A large part of the reason for this view is that economic growth (presumably based on market principles) goes hand-in-hand with a growing and educated middle class, which generally eschews political extremism while embracing the fundamental tenets of the democratic process. As long, then, as dispar- ities of wealth are reduced along with growth, society avoids a "runaway cycle of ever-increasing inequalities" wherein:

> a small minority with superior resources develops and maintains a hegemonic political system (often headed by a single dominant ruler) through which it can also enforce its domination over the social order and hence strengthen the inequalities even more.[56]

The notion that the outlook for democracy improves with economic growth came to be referred to as the "all good things go together" perspec- tive,[57] it guided U.S. foreign assistance programs in the 1960s, and, in one view, it has "generated the largest body of research of any topic in compar- ative politics."[58] However, this research has produced a few caveats to the Lipset thesis, and these may provide useful contextual guidance to policy- makers.

One caveat is that the outlook for democratic transition does not increase linearly with growing affluence. Alex Hadenius observes that the degree of democracy rises from low to somewhat higher levels of development but flattens out thereafter.[59] Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes become more likely with increases in per capita income, but *only* to a level of about \$6,000. "Above that, dictatorships become more stable as countries become more affluent."[60] In other words, beyond a certain threshold, added affluence may be *counter- productive* to a democratic transition.

Just as importantly, Przeworski and Limongi have shown that Lipset's argument probably is misspecified. The point is that two models may be implied by the notion of a democratic transition. The first is that economic development itself creates the conditions for the demise of authoritarian regimes—the implication being that policies that encourage development accelerate their dissolution (Lipset's thesis). The second is that economic development holds no privileged position in accounting for the *collapse* of authoritarian regimes, which can be the result of a variety of economic or noneconomic circumstances (war, for example). The role of affluence is felt

after the collapse—in ensuring the survival of the democracy established at that point. Evidence amassed by these two authors supports the second model, suggesting that, whatever may cause the dissolution of authoritarian rule, the major function of affluence is to help ensure that it is not re-established.[61]

The policy implication is that encouraging economic development may not be enough to promote democracy, that increased wealth may actually strengthen authoritarian regimes after a point, and that other possible conditions for their demise should be addressed.

The Socio-Cultural Context: The structure of society and the character of the national culture may also shape the prospects for a country's democratization. To begin with, and related to the matter of economic development, a society not overly inegalitarian is a better candidate for democracy than one that is. According to many, this translates into the requirement for an educated middle class—a bourgeoisie. As Barrington-Moore put it: "No bourgeois, no democracy."[62] It is also considered desirable that the society should be functionally differentiated, with a strong service sector. In fact, Hadenius observes that the proportion of a society employed in the service sector is an even better predictor of democracy than are raw measures of economic development,[63] since a society with a developed service sector is also likely to be a well-educated society with a substantial middle class.

Political culture matters very much, as well, especially with regard to the value it places on civility in political discourse, its tolerance for a pluralism of beliefs, and its commitment to the primacy of process in collective decisionmaking. Samuel Huntington has further argued that not all religious cultures are equally conducive to democracy: Protestantism, in his opinion, is most so; Catholicism's case is more ambivalent, Islam, Confucianism, and Buddhism are hospitable to authoritarian rule. The crux of the matter is the extent to which a culture is "consummatory" in character—a matter determined by the degree to which intermediate and ultimate ends are connected, and how difficult it is to segregate politics from religion, and process from outcome.[64] Obviously too, the extent of a country's ethnic diversity, as well as the experience these ethnic groups have of each other, is a crucial facet of the socio-cultural context and predictor of the likelihood that democracy would prosper.

While a nation's socio-cultural attributes are not easily and directly malleable from without, understanding their nature may guide policy in two ways. First, by providing an appreciation of the limits of the possible, and

by implication, a better predictive grasp of the international environment within which U.S. national goals must be pursued. Second, by indicating what, if any, *indirect* levers may be available for the purpose of shaping the socio-cultural context. In this regard, scholarship's insights on the way in which such contexts are shaped by economic growth may be most relevant. Nevertheless, an understanding of socio-cultural context's hold on political life may serve a cautionary function for the policymaker, since a facilitating political culture is not likely to take root in a society characterized by extreme inequality, or by deep ethnic or religious cleavages.

Institutional Foundations: We know that institutions shape political outcomes, and social science has cast considerable light on those upon which democracy rests. The importance of political parties to democratic development has, in particular, been extensively documented. We understand that parties are the key institutions for organizing political participation,[65] and that they perform their democratic function when they are a stable reflection of the interests of a meaningful segment of society, rather than an instrument of the personal ambitions of restricted elites.

Scholars have also examined the ways in which democracy requires properly constituted bureaucracies. Since Max Weber's seminal work on the subject, bureaucracy is recognized as a component of modernization, as a basis for *rational legal authority*.[66] We appreciate the extent to which nonpartisan bureaucracies are essential to the implementation of democratic decisions, and for ensuring the political system's procedural integrity. We also recognize that they cannot occupy too strong and independent position within the political system but must be accountable to representative institutions,[67] nor can they be mainly a vehicle for political patronage. A bureaucratic culture rooted in the ideal of a civil service is required, and the manner of bringing this about has been addressed by academics.[68] Similarly, but more obviously, democracy cannot function unless its military and police service operate on the basis of a professional, nonpartisan culture. While the military have played a significant role in the politics of the developing nations in recent decades, the conditions of their withdrawal from politics also have been the object of academic scrutiny.[69]

Accidents or Patterns: Background, macro-structural circumstances of the sort discussed above affect the likelihood that authoritarian rule will be challenged, and they probably improve the outlook that the democracies by which they are displaced would endure. Still, it has been observed that democratic transitions rest on many events that cannot be anticipated and

on decisions whose implications cannot always be foreseen. As the editors of the most thorough current examination of the process observe, an adequate theory of transitions

> would have to include elements of accident and unpredictability, of crucial decisions taken in a hurry with very inadequate information, of actors facing irresolvable ethical dilemmas and ideological confusions, of democratic turning points reached and passed without an understanding of their future significance. . . . this is not to deny that the macrostructural factors are still there." . . . At some stages in the transition, in relation to certain issues and actors, those broad structures filter down to affect the behavior of groups and individuals. But even those mediations are looser, and their impact more indeterminate, than in normal circumstances.[70]

The important point, however, is that what appears accidental may not really be so, since systematic scrutiny often reveals structure where things initially seemed random. While the substance and consequences of human decisions appear less predictable than the impact of the sorts of macrostructural conditions discussed above, the task of the social sciences is to seek regularities where they are not immediately apparent, allowing them to provide policy guidance where none previously had appeared feasible.

Democratization and the Levers of Policy

Given an appreciation of the conditions that foster democracy, what guidance can scholarship provide U.S. policymakers concerning *specific* steps to promote such conditions? Focusing on the four classes of conditions surveyed above, the socio-cultural foundations of democracy are the least plausible candidates for external manipulation; the economic bases, on the other hand, are those about which most has been said. As one influential study notes, "at the current time . . . and no doubt in many previous decades, the most important international influences on prospects for democracy in developing countries appear to be economic ones."[71]

Because of its global economic sway, the United States is in a strong position to affect the course of democratic transformations. Here, scholarly contributions have generally kept in step with (but rarely preceded) the

dilemmas identified by policymakers; associated work has been driven by explicit or implicit demand rather than by an initially disinterested supply.

Much as academic discussions on the impact of growth on democracy shaped the justifications for U.S. economic assistance policies in the sixties, the more recent emphasis on multilateral economic assistance has placed the spotlight on the policies of major international lending agencies—the IMF in particular—and on their social and political consequences for developing nations. During the 1980s, much social- scientific commentary on IMF policies concerned its insistence, as part of its conditionality agreements, on tight monetary policies, and on the removal of "structural impediments" to growth: usually in the form of large government deficits, monopolies, and excessive governmental regulation of economic activity. Academics examined the socio-political consequences of these priorities, consequences flowing from reduced government subsidies and other transfer payments, high interest rates, bankruptcies of companies denied government assistance, and increased unemployment with fewer programs to mitigate its most immediate consequences.[72]

More recently, discussion of IMF policies has focused on the consequences of its insistence on unfettered globalization—particularly with regard to international capital flows. It has been observed that, while the IMF has sought to free these capital flows in the 1990s, the volatility implied for many developing economies has amplified capital flight during economic downturns, causing exchange rates to collapse, and leading to the bankruptcy of firms unable to pay their foreign debts. The direct consequences for democracy have been examined,[73] and these appear as disruptive as those of the earlier, and never entirely abandoned, IMF conditionality requirements. Since the United States' is the single most important voice within the IMF, and as the organization's priorities produce socio-political consequences within recipient countries, scholarly scrutiny of these matters consequences bears directly on the impact of U.S. policies on democratization in the developing world.

Beyond economics, the U.S. is also in a position to strengthen the *institutional* bases for democracy in many nations, through direct assistance and in the context of international organizations—the United Nations in particular. Programs at building or rebuilding administrative structures, legislative and judicial bodies, and internal police forces have encompassed nations as diverse as El Salvador, Cambodia, and Haiti. Nonetheless, academics have not extensively explored the conditions attending the success or failure of

such programs.[74] Yet, as with economic conditions, these are matters most competently examined by those whose expertise lends itself to the systematic study of regularities, and to rigorous inferential reasoning. This, then, is an area where scholarly contributions have not risen to meet policy needs, but where they are in a position to help shape national policy.

Earlier, we observed that part of what determines the success or failure of democratic transitions can appear as a series of apparently random events—usually in the form of choices that may or may not be taken and whose consequences, at the time, seemed almost impossible to foresee. Moreover, decisions by external actors, including the United States, are sometimes taken at these critical junctures, leaving a record of their impact for scholarly scrutiny, allowing a search for system where much had appeared random.

Thus, during the weeks and days in February 1986 when, following the fraudulent Philippine presidential elections, a variety of U.S. actions may have tipped the balance of power away from President Marcos and toward Corazon Aquino. A few days after the U.S. Senate and House condemned the electoral fraud, Philippine Defense Minister Enrile and Deputy Chief of Staff Ramos quit the Marcos government, took over defense headquarters, and called on Marcos to resign. The next day, the White House also called for Marcos to leave office, and offered to fly him to a safe haven in the United States (ultimately, spiriting him off to Hawaii). Three years later, when renegade troops sought to mount a coup against Aquino, President Bush declared that U.S. aid would be cut off in the event of its success, while U.S. warplanes based in the Philippines flew air cover for Government forces. The rebellion was quelled. In a related vein, in late April 1996, it appeared that Paraguay's first democratically elected president in half a century, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, was about to be overthrown by a coup led by his cashiered army commander General Lino Oviedo. A swift response by the Organization of American States, spearheaded by the United States, threatened Oviedo with economic and diplomatic isolation if he carried through his designs. This show of hemispheric clout, along with pro-Wasmosy demonstrations in Asuncion, may have made a decisive difference to the outcome.

We are unaware of much systematic examination of the link between critical events and critical U.S. decisions, but the need exists. The point is not only that what appear to be random critical junctures may yield a structure when subjected to scientific scrutiny, but also that there may be a

pattern to the types of outcomes that U.S. activities produce in different circumstances. Causal empiricism and ordinary knowledge may not be enough to discover the underlying structures, and the tools and resources of scholarship may be called for.

The Costs of Seeking Democracy

We argued, in chapter 3, that the policy-relevance of knowledge can extend beyond its assistance in charting, via expanded instrumental and contextual understanding, the possibilities for foreign policy: it can also improve our grasp of the costs and consequences of various policies. While the direct costs of trying to forge democracy abroad may not be particularly high, the secondary cost, in terms of present gains foregone, i.e., opportunity costs, may be more significant. Moreover, present benefits may involve future costs, which may also have to be included in the decisional calculus. What light, if any, can the social sciences shed on these costs.

Opportunity Costs and the Politics of Linkage

During the cold war, the United States was often deterred from pressing too diligently for democracy by a fear of the geostrategic costs this might entail. The promotion of freedom at Communism's expense was translated into military and geopolitical goals that, in many cases, displaced their own ultimate objective—promoting the global democratic interest. This displacement of the end by its means was evident in Latin America, much of Asia, and parts of Africa, where particularly vicious right-wing dictatorships frequently were embraced by the United States as allies in its anti-Communist crusade. The preference for right wing dictatorships over left-leaning democracies in the developing world reflected a conviction that the geopolitical struggle could be jeopardized by attempts to reform totalitarian or authoritarian allies. Pressing for their democratization was a risk that the stakes did not appear to justify.

In a post–cold war context, the issue no longer involves a tradeoff between the promotion of democracy and global political objectives. If a tradeoff exists, it seems to be between the former and the pursuit of U.S. *economic* gain. Clearly, the nation's willingness to encourage democracy in oil-rich Saudi Arabia falls short of its willingness to do so in, say, Haiti. Similarly,

the strength of U.S. dedication to democratic political rights in Cuba far exceeds its commitment to those rights in China. In both cases, fear of an *economic* cost accounts for the seemingly tepid interest in furthering democracy within certain countries.

Officials responsible for these policy choices usually deny that democracy is subordinated to a more tangible, but less lofty, concern. In their view, the best policy—the one they have chosen—is to *separate* the two pursuits, the nature of the link being such that attainments on either objective may suffer if made conditional on achievements on the other. Thus, according to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "We determined some time ago that it was not a good idea to link human rights and trade, and that we actually make better progress in both when they are not linked."[75]

In principle, there are three possible approaches to the democracy vs. economic benefit dilemma, and rigorous scholarship may help clarify the choices. The first is to neglect the promotion of democracy within economically important authoritarian regimes, while trying to extract the utmost economic benefit from the relationship with them. The second, is to place a similar priority on both economics and democracy, without linking the economic relationship (from which both sides presumably benefit) to improvements in the partner's domestic politics (benefiting the desires of the U.S. government, but not its partner's). The third possibility is to link the economic relationship to progress at democratizing the partner's domestic political arrangements.

The choice of strategy depends on two sorts of awareness, while scholarship's contribution concerns the second of the two. The first type of awareness concerns the values to be placed on the foreign policy objectives of democracy promotion and economic gain, respectively, and this includes the matter of determining the acceptable terms of tradeoff between the two (to the extent that they are at all incompatible). In terms of the three strategies discussed, the first assumes that fostering democracy is considerably less important than the pursuit of U.S. material gain; the third implies that these priorities are reversed (because of a declared U.S. willingness to sacrifice economic gain if democracy does not advance sufficiently); the second strategy gives them equal weight. These are normative, not empirical, matters; and decisions at this level are appropriately made by a democratic process of weighing and aggregating societal preferences. Here, it is not obvious that scholars have any particular comparative advantage over other segments of the polity.

The desirability of a strategy depends not only on the relative preferences of U.S. society but also on the actual tradeoffs it faces. These are determined by the economic partners' responses, which, in turn, depend substantially on their own acceptable tradeoffs. A grasp of these preferences and calculations is an *empirical* matter, involving our second level of awareness; here, scholarship can make a considerable contribution by establishing the empirical logic on which U.S. decisions would depend.

The first of the three strategies assumes not only that economics is more highly valued than democracy-promotion by the United States but also that the other side objects to its own democratization more intensely than it values the economic relationship, and that it would sacrifice the latter to avoid the former. Accordingly, a tradeoff implying an economic loss to the United States is assumed. The second strategy assumes that the other side can be encouraged to pursue democratization even in the absence of economic incentives. Finally, the third strategy implies that the other side values the economic gain from the relation more than it objects to the costs associated with democratization, that it will accept the latter to enjoy the former. Here, the presumption is that there are other tools that the United States can use to promote democracy that would not cause the other side to disrupt the economic relationship. Plainly, each strategy makes different assumptions about likely preferences and calculations by the other side.

Scholars can help policymakers navigate this sort of dilemma by pointing to the logical implications of certain linkages, but more importantly by assessing their empirical truth or falsity. We need rigorous, general propositions about what leads nondemocratic governments to accept certain tradeoffs between desired internal political arrangements and economic gain offered by partnerships with the United States. These propositions must identify the conditions that influence how tenaciously such governments will cling to established political structures, as well as those that determine how badly they may want the benefits of an economic relationship offered by the United States. Only competent social-scientific research can produce credible generalizations of this nature.

To provide policy guidance in concrete instances, these generalizations must be supplemented by information on applicable initial conditions (the I's of explanation), since such information determines whether the circumstances specified in the general propositions are indeed met in the particular case. While scholars may contribute to the fund of knowledge bearing on initial conditions, it may often be the case that a statesman's sources of

information may rival those of the social scientist. Although academia's comparative advantage lies with theoretical generalizations, it has not shed much light on economic and other costs implied by policies pressing for democratic reforms by major economic partners. This is an area of potential, not actual, scholarly contribution, and we present it as a gap that could profitably be filled.

Future Benefits and Present Costs:
The Issue of Inter-Temporal Tradeoffs

As we argued in chapter 3, costs can be assessed not just in terms of tradeoffs between objectives, but also across time. Future interests can be sacrificed for present benefits, or vice-versa, and policy-relevant scholarship should also cast light on costs thus conceived; here, the literature offers more than it did in the previous case. The issue is that, while the process of building stable democracy should decrease the likelihood that states would fight, the transitional period may actually yield an *increased* likelihood they would do so. In two journal articles, one widely read by top policymakers, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argued that, even if established democracies do not fight each other, countries in the process of democratization may be particularly war-prone.[76]

> It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. However, countries do not become mature democracies overnight. More typically, they go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democratization suffers reversals. In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states.[77]

Examples of transitional democracies engaged in war are not limited to parts of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, they include mid-Victorian England in the Crimean War, the wars engaged in by France at the time of Napoleon III, World War I and Wilhelmine Germany, and so forth. The explanation for the frequent readiness of transitional democracies to fight

must, according to the authors, be sought in the nature of domestic political competition following the collapse of autocracy. Elites associated with the old order compete among themselves and with the new political elites. Struggling for public support to further their rival interests, they appeal to popular, often nationalist symbols. The passions thus unleashed can drive the nation to war, even where this was not the initial intent.

The authors provide a quantitative analysis of the relation between war and regime transition (relying of COW data for the first, on Polity-II for the second), reporting that, "On average, democratizing states were about two-thirds more likely to go to war than were states that did not experience a regime change."[78] The policy implication follows naturally: "In the long run, the enlargement of the zone of stable democracy will probably enhance the prospects for peace. But in the short run, there is a lot of work to be done to minimize the dangers of the turbulent transition."[79]

While Mansfield and Snyder's research was cast at the monadic (not dyadic) level, examining the general propensity of a state to fight, the argument about the dangers of democratic transition created a stir both within the policymaking and the academic communities. It encouraged the Clinton Administration to downplay the role of democratic enlargement in public statements of U.S. foreign policy. It also led scholars to examine the proposition about democratization and war, yielding a number of qualifications to Mansfield and Snyder's conclusions, and, by extension, to the policy implications of their work.

A study by Ward and Gleditsch examined the impact of key properties of regime transition on the probability of war involvement.[80] The authors asked to what extent this probability is affected by: (a) the *direction* of the transition (from autocracy to democracy or the other way), (b) the *magnitude* of the political change implied by the transitions, and, (c) the *smoothness* of the change (the extent to which the change is linear, rather than characterized by oscillations and reversals). Their conclusions are more nuanced than Mansfield and Snyder's, agreeing that, if the sole focus is on whether a change toward democracy has occurred or not (a binary statement of the issue), it can indeed be said that democratic transitions may encourage fighting (as might, for that matter, autocratic transitions). But the magnitude of the change is also very important, since changes of large magnitude in the democratic direction are associated with significantly *smaller* probabilities of war than are more modest steps. At the same time, rocky changes toward democracy heighten the likelihood of bellicosity (bolstering the hypothesis

that stability may be as important as regime type in this respect).[81] The policy implications are that democratization need not be feared if peace is the ultimate objective—it all depends on whether the transition is substantial and smooth enough. Accordingly, changes of a large magnitude are to be encouraged, and all possible steps should be taken to discourage back-tracking.

Even these findings are not fully conclusive. Like Mansfield and Snyder, Ward and Gleditsch examine the general bellicosity of democratizing nations, but unlike most of the work in democratic peace literature, they do not ask against what sorts of states (democratic or autocratic) this is apt to be directed. Thus, we do not know whether, during the transition process, the war-prone democratizing states would fight other democratizing states and full democracies. Another necessary observation is that this work establishes only the bivariate relation between the onset of war and the transition characteristic; unlike much research of the dyadic sort, it does not consider the possibility of intervening variables that may modify the impact of regime transition on war involvement.

Oneal and Russett,[82] however, examine both dyadic relations and intervening variables. They focus on the dyadic level of analysis, they control for number of intervening influences in addition to economic interdependence (e.g., territorial contiguity), and they examine the direction of regime change (either from autocracy to democracy or vice-versa). Their conclusion: "We find no indication that a dramatic change in regime type, either from autocracy to democracy carries an added risk of dyadic conflict."[83] At the same time, the intervening condition of economic interdependence remains significant. Thus, the only study so far to examine the impact of regime transition on dyadic conflict casts further doubt on Mansfield and Snyder's finding, suggesting it does not provide firm grounds for retreating from an active policy of democratic enlargement.

The policy implication is that worries about the short-term consequences of democratization must be taken with a large grain of salt: the process may not encourage external conflict if certain conditions are controlled for (economic interdependence, in particular); at most, a concern with ensuring the smoothness of the transition may be called for. This research also highlights scholarship's role in discouraging a belief that the world is simple, and that certain, easily grasped, causes invariably lead to clear-cut consequences. Democracy and peace do appear related—*under certain circumstances*. Democratization, despite the administration's concerns, may not imply

war-proneness. The opportunity costs to the United States of insisting upon democracy on the part of economically valuable partners *depend on the assumptions* one makes. By insisting on causal complexity, social science's contribution may not always be what decisionmakers most desire, but it may provide what they frequently need.

Conclusions

There is little doubt that basic assumptions about world politics color the foreign policy strategies of U.S. decisionmakers. Much as the realism of the postwar period shaped (and legitimized) the cold war policies of containment and deterrence, so the democratic peace proposition influenced the Clinton administration's strategies of engagement and enlargement. Scholarship on the democratic peace influenced Clinton's formative foreign policy doctrines, and subsequent academic reservations about the proposition led to a recasting of the doctrine of enlargement.

Some of the academics associated with this body of work, while aware of its practical implications, have undertaken it for professional reasons largely unrelated to the pursuit of relevance. Others, (e.g., Bruce Russet, Rudolph Rummel) have been more explicit about the value of their research to policy-making. In any case, the impact of the democratic peace proposition is an instance of supply-driven relevance, demonstrating how concerns originating largely within the Ivory Tower can come to influence choices made in the corridors of power.

As theoretical propositions, the statements regarding the democratic peace and its various corollaries represent some of the best that social science has offered in recent years. From the standpoint of validity, conclusions follow from assumptions by logically compelling inference. From the standpoint of truth, the credibility of the propositions is buttressed by rigorous methods of empirical analysis and by explicitly operationalized variables. Generalizations about the cultural and structural characteristics of democracy provide a broader explanatory foundation for the democratic peace proposition. Moreover, the value of this body of work is evident—it is highly interesting from the perspective of knowledge per se, and it is of substantial practical value (proving that the two are not incompatible desiderata). Thus, work on the democratic peace, while policy-relevant, also rates very highly as theory (higher than much wholly disinterested international relations theory).

Not only has it helped mold statesmen's basic conceptions of the desirable and the possible, it also demonstrates to those willing to learn that a number of ceteris paribus conditions (e.g., economic interdependence) mediate the direct instrumental relation between democracy and peace. It alerts them to the particular dangers associated with democratic transitions, while indicating why such dangers must not be overstated (as the Administration may, implicitly, have done). In addition, and with a direct bearing on policy decisions, social science sheds light on the conditions that promote the transition to democracy. It has provided broad theoretical generalizations, but it also has helped qualify them in a manner relevant to the concerns of decisionmakers (as in the proposition about the threshold beyond which the link between wealth and democracy may no longer hold). Admittedly, it has not had enough to say on the manner in which specific U.S. policies can, in turn, affect these conditions; but it is well suited to address these issues and may well do so—perhaps in response to a specific demand originating from the policymaking community.

Most importantly, this body of work has demonstrated how knowledge and policy interact, and it has shown that both the quality and value of scholarship may benefit from tackling questions that are substantively meaningful.