

Notes

Introduction

1. A distinction made by Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel in their article, "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict," *International Organization*, vol. 50, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 683–700.

2. Dr. Yossi Beilin, "The Opportunity That Was Not Missed," in Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat, Moshe Maoz, eds., *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1973–1993* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994), p. 28.

3. Edward W. Said, *Peace and Its Discontents* (New York: Vintage, 1995), p. 31. So, too, is there merit in his insistence that "to speak in *grandiose* geopolitical terms, or to speak *mindlessly* about 'separating' them is nothing less than to provide prescriptions for more violence and degradation" (*italics mine*), p. 164.

1. Just Stability, or a Just Peace?

1. The literature on ripeness begins with the pioneering work of I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); also, I. William Zartman, ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995). For a critical review of current thinking on ripeness, the reader is referred to Michael E. Salla, "Creating the 'Ripe Moment' in the East Timor Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 34, no. 4 (November 1997), pp. 449–466.

2. By a "mutually hurting stalemate" Zartman and others mean that each of the parties perceive the costs and prospects of continued confrontation to be more burdensome than the costs and prospects of a settlement.

3. Because "many conflicts have a self-sustaining dynamic of their own" Fen Osler Hampson feels "the conflict has to reach a plateau" so that the parties "no longer think they can use force to gain a unilateral advantage and they become willing to consider other options." "Why Orphaned Peace Settlements Are More Prone to Failure," in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds., *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 538, 534. Hampson gives the problems of operationalizing ripeness, its tautological connotations, and preventing "unripening" further extensive consideration in her independent study, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press), also published in 1996.

4. Christopher W. Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996).

5. Richard N. Haass, *Conflicts Unending* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 27–29, as well as chapter 7, “Ripeness and its Implications.”

6. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 90, no. 4 (December 1996), p. 715.

7. Daniel Druckman and Christopher Mitchell, in their preface to the issue on “Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation,” *Annals of American Political and Social Science*, vol. 542 (November 1995), p. 9.

8. The terms were first coined by Arnold J. Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

9. “If Washington Wants Mideast Peace, It Will Have to Jump In,” *International Herald-Tribune*, October 22, 1996.

10. Recommended for its many accumulated insights into the mechanics and modalities of Middle East peacemaking is the fascinating and readable study by Kenneth W. Stein and Samuel W. Lewis, *Making Peace Among Arabs and Israelis: Lessons from Fifty Years of Negotiating Experience* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991). The thirty-nine-page paper deserves updating, to benefit from the Madrid and Oslo experiences as well as subsequent events.

11. Henry Siegman, “The Peace Process Is Dead, Unless Israelis Resolve to Save It,” *International-Herald Tribune*, October 17, 1996.

12. Alan Dowty, *The Jewish State: A Century Later* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 236.

2. *First Choice or Last Resort?*

1. See, Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); also see Daniel J. Elazar, *Exploring Federalism* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987).

2. Edward W. Said. *Peace and Its Discontents* (New York: Vintage, 1995), p. 31.

3. The term *prenational* or *potential* nations appears in the collection of essays by Walker Connor, *Ethnocentrism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 79.

4. This claim is made by John J. Mearsheimer in a *New York Time* op-ed piece entitled “The Only Exit From Bosnia” (October 7, 1997).

5. Aharon Klieman, “Territorially Based Ethnic Disputes: Does Democracy Offer a Diplomatic Solution?” in Yoram Dinstein, ed., *The Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, vol. 26 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997), pp. 219–237.

6. Mark Helprin, “For a New Concert of Europe,” *Commentary*, vol. 101, no. 1 (January 1996), p. 33.

7. Partition as applied by Great Britain in its “retreat from empire” is reconsidered by Robert Holland, Carl Bridge, and H. V. Brasted in their article, “Coun-

sels of Despair or Withdrawals with Honour?" subtitled "Partitioning in Ireland, India, Palestine and Cyprus, 1920–1960," appearing in the British journal *Round Table*, no. 342 (April 1997), pp. 257–268. Of exceptional quality and insight are the earlier reflections of Nicholas Mansergh in his 1976 Commonwealth lecture published as *The Prelude to Partition: Concepts and Aims in Ireland and India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

8. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), and his more recent important book on *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Reexamination of partition as a modern political-geographical attribute and process is evident in the work of Haifa University geographer Stanley Waterman. See his "Partitioned States," *Political Geography Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 2 (April 1987), pp. 151–170; and "Partition, Secession, and Peace in Our Time," *GeoJournal* vol. 39, no. 4 (August 1996), pp. 345–352. Another Israeli colleague, David Newman, at Ben-Gurion University's Department of Geography, has been doing interesting research that derives from a partitionist perspective. For example, see his study on the territorial discourse within Israel entitled "Creating the Fences of Territorial Separation: The Discourses of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Resolution," *Geopolitics and International Boundaries*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Autumn 1997), pp. 1–35.

9. William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 171, 175.

10. Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957); Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study in International Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); and Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

11. Michael J. Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1996).

12. I. William Zartman, *The 50 Percent Solution* (Garden City: Anchor, 1976).

13. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," *New York Times*, March 31, 1993.

14. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "When Peace Means War," *New Republic*, December 18, 1995, pp. 16–21.

15. Gregory Clark, "Divide Them and Leave Reunion for Calmer Times," *International Herald-Tribune*, May 14, 1993.

16. Graham E. Fuller, "Redrawing the World's Borders," *World Policy Journal* (Spring 1997), pp. 11–21.

17. Quoted in Robert Schaeffer, *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), p. xi. This same sentiment is echoed by T. G. Fraser

in his comparative study, *Partition in Ireland, India, and Palestine* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), where he concludes that partition "was agreed to by weary men desperate to see a way out of seemingly intractable bloody struggles" (p. 196).

18. Schaeffer, *Warpaths*, p. 253.

19. Huntington first presented his provocative thesis in the now classic article, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49, followed by Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal," also in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996), pp. 28–46. His arguments were then expanded into book form: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

20. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), p. 589. Two studies of note receptive to partition in principle are Clive J. Christie, "Partition, Separatism, and National Identity: A Reassessment," *Political Quarterly*, vol. 63, no. 1 (January–March 1992), pp. 68–78; and Chaim D. Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 120–156.

21. *Economist*, September 5, 1992.

22. Michael Walzer, "Modern Tribalism," *Dialogue*, no. 99 (1993), p. 15.

23. Indicative of partition's marginalization in international relations theory the literature on the subject is rather limited. Standard works include Thomas E. Hachey, *The Problem of Partition: Peril to World Peace* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972); Ray Edward Johnston, *The Politics of Division, Partition, and Unification* (New York: Praeger, 1976). These have been supplemented in more recent years by two studies, both unsympathetic to partition's utility, even in the narrower context of ethnic politics and independence movements: Robert Schaeffer's *Warpaths: The Politics of Partition* and Radha Kumar, *Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition* (London: Verso, 1997).

24. Schaeffer, *Warpaths*, p. 253.

25. Kumar, *Divide and Fall?* Her "obsession" with partition, proclaimed in a page of acknowledgments, can be forgiven. But not the kind of ideological tirade that sees "travesties" in the Camp David talks and employs shocking instances of historical inaccuracy on top of false analogies and inappropriate comparisons for the sake of a thesis objectively defensible on otherwise legitimate grounds.

26. *Ibid.*, p. xv.

27. Uri Savir, "Collage of Comment, *NPQ* [*New Perspectives Quarterly*] (Winter 1997), p. 62. Savir headed Israel's negotiating team at the secret Oslo talks.

28. Kumar, *Divide and Fall?* pp. 164–165.

29. Schaeffer, *Warpaths*, pp. 252–253.

30. Kumar, *Divide and Fall?* pp. 168, 139.

31. Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger imposed basic scientific distinctions like that between “divided nations” (Germany, Korea, China-Formosa, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and Mongolia) and “partitioned countries” (Ireland, India, India-Pakistan-Bangladesh, Ruanda-Urundi, Palestine-Eretz Israel) in their edited earlier book, *Divided Nations in a Divided World* (New York: David McKay, 1974).

3. *Partition and Palestine*

1. The poll, held in November-December 1997 and using an identical questionnaire, was conducted jointly by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) and the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies at Tel Aviv University. The findings courtesy of the Steinmetz Center.

2. A recent study has been published by the author of ambiguity’s role in diplomacy, with particular reference to its great explanatory power for understanding the failure of Middle East peace initiatives to terminate in Permanent Status agreement. See Aharon Klieman, *Constructive Ambiguity in Middle East Peacemaking*, Research Report Series no. 10 (Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 1999).

3. *International Herald-Tribune*, August 8, 1997.

4. Barry Rubin, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Is Over,” *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 3, no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 3–12.

5. Itzhak Galnoor, *The Partition of Palestine* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).

6. The text and wording of Articles 2 and 19 are taken from Y. Harkabi, *The Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning* (London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1979), pp. 33 and 76. Harkabi also provides a close analysis of each clause.

7. The text of the Palestinian declaration of independence at Algiers on November 15, 1988, is found in Yehuda Lukacs, ed., *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record, 1967–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 411–414. In addition to expressing belief in the settlement of regional and international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter and resolutions, the declaration also contains the following important statement: “Despite the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinian Arab people . . . following upon UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, *yet it is this Resolution that still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty*” (p. 412).

8. In his December 15, 1988 Geneva press statement, when pressed, the P.L.O. chairman publicly endorsed the UN’s original partition Resolution 181 as the basis for the Palestinian people’s rights to freedom and national independence, as well as the right of all parties to exist in peace and security. Text in Lukacs, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, p. 434.

9. An outsider’s plea for binationalism is made in Marc H. Ellis, “The Future

of Israel/Palestine: Embracing the Broken Middle,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 16, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 56–66.

Interestingly, several lonely voices have also been raised of late against separatism and in favor of the binationalist construct on both the Arab and the Israeli side. For example: Jenab Tutunji and Kamal Khaldi, “A binational state in Palestine: The Rational Choice for Palestinians and the Moral Choice for Israelis,” *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 31–58; see also Ghada Karmi, “Life with the Enemy: The One-State Solution,” *World Today* (August/September 1997), pp. 200–202), wherein the author makes clear her position: a single democratic state including Israelis and Palestinians. This is essentially the approach advocated by Assad Ghanem and Sara Ossatsky-Lezer in their November 16, 1996 op-ed piece that appeared in *Ha’aretz* under the caption “Two in One State.”

Probably the single most read Israeli commentator on the conflict who has consistently defended binationalism is the former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, Meron Benvenisti. His conceived formula for Jews and Arabs living in a shared—and undivided—land combining ethnic and cultural separation within a common geopolitical framework is spelled out in a series of articles published in the *Ha’aretz* daily, one of which appeared on September 15, 1993, with the title, “Where Did I Err?” His basic thesis of the logic and imperative for Arab-Jewish coexistence has since been updated: “Who’s Afraid of Binationalism?” August 16, 1996, and “The Evolution of a Concept,” December 5, 1996. English readers will find many of these ideas in Meron Benvenisti, *Intimate Enemies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

10. The virtues of federalism, taking the form of shared rule, and how they might be applied to Palestine are best represented consistently over the last twenty years in the writings of Professor Daniel Elazar, *The Camp David Framework for Peace: a Shift Toward Shared Rule* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), and his subsequent study, *Two Peoples—One Land: Federal Solutions for Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991).

11. Shimon Peres, with Arye Naor, *The New Middle East* (New York: Holt, 1993), pp. 72–73. Since then, Peres’s position has evolved further, to the point that by mid-1998 he openly favored outright Palestinian political independence and full statehood, with or without some form of political affiliation (federation or confederation) to neighboring Jordan.

12. Peres, *The New Middle East*, p. 173, in a chapter entitled “Confederation,” pp. 163–179.

13. Fouad Ajami, “The Arab Inheritance,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997), p. 134.

14. Benjamin A. Netanyahu, *A Place Among Nations: Israel and the World* (New York: Bantam, 1993). Even more outspoken in carrying the torch for Revisionist antipartitionism in a collection of his newspaper commentaries is

Binyamin Ze'ev Begin, son of the late premier Menachem Begin, *A Zionist Stand* (Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 1993).

15. One of the most recent, scholarly, and extensive studies on the limited self-rule construct is Ruth Lapidot, *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

16. Kenneth W. Stein and Samuel W. Lewis, *Making Peace Among Arabs and Israelis: Lessons from Fifty Years of Negotiating Experience* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, October 1991), pp. 25–26.

17. Larry L. Fabian, "The Red Light," *Foreign Policy*, no. 50 (Spring 1983), p. 53.

18. Any detailed historical analysis of the Palestine conflict through the partitionist prism by right ought to begin the partition chronicle with the end of the First World War. For Arab nationalists Anglo-French dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire arbitrarily divided the Arabs, thereby setting back the goal of Arab unity within a single patrimony. Whereas Zionists and Revisionist-Herut-Likud ideologists in particular regard the severing of Transjordan and the East Bank from the West Bank in 1921–1922 as the British cardinal sin and a betrayal of the Zionist enterprise by restricting settlement activity to western Palestine.

Those early interwar events certainly altered the salience and attractiveness of the land prize for both Arabs and Jews. Abdullah's Transjordanian kingdom represented 76 percent of the total land area at the outset of the Palestine mandate. The effect of divorcing it from the heartland of Palestine has been twofold: limiting territorial competition to the less restricted west bank of the Jordan, in addition to making the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan a third contender for who rules Palestine.

19. The reader will find a useful compendium of the major diplomatic initiatives and specific plans for Arab-Jewish reconciliation that have been tabled over the years, along with a close analysis of each, in Karen Feste, *Plans for Peace: Negotiation and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Greenwood, 1991). An additional source providing the outlines of twenty-nine different peace proposals extending from 1937 to 1991 is Lawrence Joffe, ed., *Keesing's Guide to the Mid-East Peace Process* (London: Cartermill, 1996).

20. Eban's essay, "Partition Revisited," appeared in the *Jerusalem Post*, November 27, 1987.

21. From the address by President Bush at the opening session of the Middle East Peace Conference, October 30, 1991.

22. One of the pioneering efforts at getting into the details of possible partition plans is Saul Cohen's monograph, *The Geopolitics of Israel's Border Question* (Boulder: Westview, 1986), under the auspices of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. While Cohen's primary interest was the future borders between Israel and neighboring Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, he did address the lands within those borders as well.

23. A frank, thorough exploration of four possible relationships between the

Hashemite monarchy and Palestinian nationalists—drift, a functional scenario, separation, or cooperation—can be found in Mustafa Hamarneh, Rosemary Hollis, and Khalil Shikaki, *Jordanian-Palestinian Relations: Where To?* (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1997).

24. Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, in their excellent textbook for surveying the Palestine conflict, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), at one point insightfully describe the protagonists as “coming full circle” back to the partition concept, and the concept itself as “the default option of their history” (p. 113).

4. *Within the Confines of Palestine*

1. Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 5.

2. Results of the first Palestinian census ever to have been conducted were published in early 1997. They showed 2,920,454 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Although the census provided no breakdown for the West Bank and for Gaza separately, of the total figure given, 210,209 were Palestinians resident in east Jerusalem. The *International Herald-Tribune*, February 28–March 1, 1997, which also quoted the Israeli Defense Ministry spokesman, who charged the census with inaccuracy, including the inclusion of Arabs living abroad.

3. *Ha'aretz*, September 7, 1998, using statistics compiled and released for publication by the Ministry of Interior's population registry at the request of the antissettler Peace Now movement.

4. Joseph Alpher. *Settlements and Borders*. Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians Study No. 3 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1995), p. 3.

5. *Ha'aretz*, August 17, 1998. Angrily rebutting the memo's insinuations, Israeli Arab spokesmen charged that “instead of parachuting commissars on us, the government should act to integrate Arabs in all walks of life” and that it was people like the authors of the document who threaten Israeli democracy “by working to make Jewish-Palestinian cooperation impossible.”

6. On the idea of “territorial reciprocity”—that the Palestinians be compensated for any territorial attrition within the West Bank by an equal or commensurate area taken from less sensitive regions of pre-1967 Israel—see David Newman, “This New Pragmatism Is Welcome,” *Jerusalem Post*, February 21, 1997; see also his more extensive discussion, “‘The Crisis of Jewish Settlement’—The Territorial Politics of Exurbanization: Reflections on Twenty-five Years of Jewish Settlement in the West Bank,” *Israel Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 61–85; especially p. 80, which pictures his map of possible territorial exchanges of Jewish and Arab settlement areas along the edges of the “green line.”

7. In 1997 the Palestine Authority's justice minister, Freih Abu Medin, tabled legislation forbidding Israeli Arabs from selling Arab property to Israelis even within the bounds of Israel. *Ha'aretz*, May 28, 1997, p. 3.

8. Juval Portugali, *Implicate Relations* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1993), chapter 8: "Adjami: The Arab Neighbourhood of Tel-Aviv," pp. 142–155. An engaging ethnographic account of specific situations of friction, conflict, and co-operation in Upper Nazareth among Jewish and Arab residents is Dan Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

5. Borders and Security

1. At the time of King Hussein's extended hospitalization in the United States for chemotherapy treatment in 1998, military expert Ze'ev Schiff openly voiced these concerns. In one column he wrote, "We must not forget that a substantial change for the worse in Jordan and the Hashemite rule may shake up the region and cause a 180-degree change in Israel's strategic position." "After Hussein and Arafat," *Ha'aretz*, July 31, 1998.

2. Worth exploring is Arye Shalev's extensive work, *The West Bank: Line of Defense* (New York and Tel Aviv: Praeger and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1985). Notwithstanding that some of the viewpoints expressed there, such as the need for "a protracted period of transition," are no longer operative in the current stage of negotiations positing a direct move to permanent status, the book retains much of its value as an indispensable starting point for a broader understanding of the military, security, and even psychological-perceptual implications of geographic and topographic considerations like height and distance.

3. In an act of self-criticism, Yoel Marcus, veteran *Ha'aretz* columnist and outspoken proponent of Israel's withdrawal from the 1967 territories, was quick to pounce on India and Pakistan going nuclear to reinforce his argument. On June 2, 1998, he reasoned: "Now that we are faced with the prospect that Iraq and Iran might, in the very near future, join the nuclear club, our stubborn quibbling over one tiny percentage point of West Bank land with the argument that we are trying to protect Israeli citizens from shoulder-held rocket and Katyusha attacks seems more than just ridiculous—it is, in effect, playing Russian roulette with this country's future."

Fellow columnist Akiva Eldar took the same "inside/outside" tack in "Security Is in the Eye of the Beholder" (*Ha'aretz*, May 27, 1998), faulting the government for claiming a withdrawal of two percentage points might jeopardize Israel's security and insisting this acreage is in no way comparable to the security, diplomatic, and economic damage were the Oslo process suspended. He argued that Israel's failure to withdraw promptly from all the territories, excluding, for the time being, settlements and security zones, "would make the streets of our cities infinitely more dangerous."

One only doubts whether Palestinian Authority decision makers came in for comparable criticism for "quibbling" over the same one to two percentage points.

4. This and the following quotes are taken from Ahmad S. Khalidi, "Security in a Final Middle East Settlement: Some Components of Palestinian National Security," *International Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 1–18.

5. Ze'ev Schiff, *Security for Peace: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with the Palestinians*, Policy Papers no. 15 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989).

6. Joseph Alpher, *Settlements and Borders*, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians Study no. 3 (Tel-Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994).

7. Joseph Alpher, "Israel's Security Concerns in the Peace Process," *International Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 2 (April 1994), pp. 229–241.

8. A good example of the expansive, regionwide security perspective can be found in Efraim Inbar, "Israeli National Security, 1973–96" (pp. 62–81), in the vol. 555 (January 1998) issue of *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science devoted to "Israel in Transition."

9. Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan, *Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), provide useful essays on Israel's security perceptions and its larger security environment and on Arab perceptions and security policies. One may assume it is not entirely coincidental that the Palestinian security plight is hardly mentioned, let alone seriously addressed by Toukan, a Jordanian with close ties to the royal Hashemite court.

10. *Ha'aretz*, on May 11, 1997, quoted Prime Minister Netanyahu as not being inplacably opposed to a Palestinian entity with many of the attributes of statehood on the condition, however, that it may not be militarized and that it waive any claim to a "strong" army or heavy weaponry. He added one further stipulation: Israel would resist creating a shared border between the Palestinian entity and the Jordanian kingdom that in the future might otherwise ease the way for suddenly shifting troops from the one to the other.

11. The IDF Central Command has been reported as drawing up detailed plans for various eventualities, including an order to reenter and retake the West Bank and its cities, prompted by widespread turmoil or threats to Jewish settlers and military installations and bases. *Ha'aretz*, May 22, 1997.

12. Mordechai Bar-On, *Past Lessons and Future Logic: National Security Considerations for Peace Making in the Middle East—The Israeli Perspective*, Center for International Development and Conflict Management Monograph Series Paper no. 1–94 (College Park: University of Maryland, 1994), p. 5.

13. Micha Bar-On, *Red Lines in Israeli Deterrent Strategy* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1990), chapter 5. The Jordanian connection is also discussed in Aharon Klieman, "The Israel-Jordan Tacit Security Regime," in Efraim Inbar, ed., *Regional Security Regimes* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), chapter 6, pp. 127–149.

14. Annex I: Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements, *The Interim Agreement on Palestinian Autonomy* (Jerusalem: Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry, 1994), Article 14.

15. Primakov's formulation is reported in the *International Herald-Tribune*, December 19, 1997.

16. In the “spirit of Madrid” one finds an entire shelf of published conference proceedings generated by any number of private, academic and “track two” seminars devoted to Middle East security-related issues. At these meetings Egyptians, Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians and other Arab delegates have exchanged views and tabled concrete proposals for mutual security enhancement ranging from crisis prevention centers to regional arms control. The joint publication, cited above, by Feldman and Toukan is merely one example of the potential for security collaboration; another is Efraim Karsh and Yezid Sayigh, “A Cooperative Approach to Arab-Israeli Security,” *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 114–125. Still another, more recent blueprint circulated by the Swedish-based SIPRI Institute is Peter Jonas’s *Toward a Regional Security Regime for the Middle East: Issues and Options* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 1998).

17. Barak made this point emphatically when speaking at a symposium on “The State of the Nation 1998,” held by Tel Aviv University’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies on January 13, 1998. Also quoted in *Ha’aretz*, January 14, 1998.

6. *Fair Share: The Economics of Partition*

1. *Ha’aretz*, August 18, 1998.

2. Addressing himself to this problem of thousands of new and expensive cars being transferred, totally unimpeded, to Palestinian areas, Ze’ev Schiff, in an editorial column entitled “Robbing the Country Blind,” nevertheless put vehicle theft into larger perspective. Writing in *Ha’aretz* on August 21, 1998, he insisted this had much broader security implications. “The border between Israel and the PA is porous, and Israel is not having much success in sealing it.” “The Palestinian vehicle thieves have proved and are continuing to prove each day,” he explained, “that individuals who have an expert knowledge of roads and paths can penetrate Israel, can reach targets deep inside Israeli territory, and can do whatever they damn well please, safely returning at night to the Palestinian territories.”

3. The Palestinian West Bank official responsible for security, Jibril Rajoub, laughingly welcomed the idea of Israel constructing a wall along the green line. Pronouncing himself all in favor of separation “between them and us,” he said, “Let them take the settlers inside their area and put up a barrier 200 meters high if they want.” Reuters, reprinted in *Ha’aretz*, August 18, 1998.

4. The four areas: north of Jenin, the southern Sharon, the Jerusalem corridor, southwest of Hebron. Details of this Interior Security Ministry antitheft initiative were reported in *Ha’aretz*, August 18, 1998.

5. *Maariv*, August 21, 1998.

6. Figures compiled by the Mass Research Institute on Palestinian Economic Policies in its semiannual Economic Monitor survey and cited in *Ha’aretz*, November 14, 1997.

7. State of Israel, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Department of Inter-

national Relations, *Labor and Employment in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District* (Jerusalem: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, March 1996), pp. 17–18.

8. Osama A. Hamed and Radwan A. Shaban, “One-Sided Customs and Monetary Union: The Case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Under Israeli Occupation,” in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., *The Economics of Middle East Peace: Views from the Region* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p. 124. Simcha Bahiri and Samir Huleileh, with Daniel Gavron, *Peace Pays: Palestinians, Israelis, and the Regional Economy* (Jerusalem: Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, 1993), pp. 39–40. Also see Ephraim Kleiman, “Some Basic Problems of the Economic Relationships Between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza,” in Fischer, Rodrik, and Tuma, *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, pp. 307–8.

9. Bahiri and Huleileh, *Peace Pays*, p. 40.

10. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Palestinian External Trade Under Israeli Occupation* (New York: United Nations, 1989), p. 79.

11. Bahiri and Huleileh, *Peace Pays*, pp. 44–45.

12. Kleiman, “Some Basic Problems,” p. 312.

13. Bahiri and Huleileh, *Peace Pays*, pp. 45–46.

14. “Protocol on Economic Relations Between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, Representing the Palestinian People” (Jerusalem: Israel Foreign Ministry, Information Division, 1994), p. 1.

15. Ibid. See, in addition, “Israel-PLO Protocol on Economic Relations: Summary of Main Points,” communicated by the Finance Ministry spokesman (Jerusalem: Israel Foreign Ministry, Information Division, 1994).

16. Bahiri and Huleileh, *Peace Pays*, pp. 60–63.

17. Hisham Awartani, “Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations: Is Cooperation Possible?” in Fischer, Rodrik, and Tuma, *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, p. 301.

18. This upbeat, sky-is-the-limit economic philosophy is best mirrored in such works as Shimon Peres, with Arye Naor, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), especially chapter 6, “From an Economy of Strife to an Economy of Peace,” pp. 87–99.

19. See “Prospects for Sustained Development of the Palestinian Economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1990–2010: A Quantitative Framework,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ECDC/SEU/6 (1994), p. 34.

20. A useful place to begin for background reading is Alwyn R. Rouyer, “The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process,” *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 57–81.

21. Peter Gleick, ed., *Water in Crisis: A Guide to the World’s Fresh Water Resources* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 147.

22. Stephan Libiszewski, *Water Disputes in the Jordan Basin Region and Their Role in the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ENCOF Occasional

Paper no. 13 (Zurich: Center for Security Policy and Conflict Research, 1995), chapter 3.

23. Ibid., chapter 2.

24. Ibid., chapter 1.

25. See Joel Zinger, *The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Phase Two* (Jerusalem: Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry, 1995), p. 11.

26. See Joseph Alpher, *Settlements and Borders*, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians Study no. 3 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 37.

27. Sharon's enlightened view of water as a humanitarian need and seeming disavowal of hard partition nevertheless did not prevent him in the next breath from charging the Palestinians with using Arab water distress "as another excuse to suspend the process and the talks, and of sharing culpability with the heat wave, due to their, the Palestinians' own 'deficient methods.'" Amira Hess, "Sharon Says PA Excuses All Wet," *Ha'aretz*, August 19, 1998.

28. Elisha Kali, *Options for Solving the Water Shortage Problem in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip Under Conditions of a Regional Peace* [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Multidisciplinary Center for Technological Prediction and Analysis, Tel Aviv University, 1978).

29. An early exponent of regionalism applied to understanding the emerging salience of water is Joyce R. Starr, "Water Wars," *Foreign Policy*, no. 82 (Spring 1991), pp. 17–36. A similar regional perspective is applied in the collection of articles published in 1997 as a special issue of *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 20, no. 1, on "Water Conflict, Part One: The Middle East." Mary E. Morris's opening essay, "Water and Conflict in the Middle East: Threats and Opportunities," pp. 1–14, is particularly relevant in setting forth the severity of the water crisis from this regional point of view.

30. For Peres's analysis of the larger water problem and regional solutions for it, see his chapter 9 on "The Living Waters," in Peres, *The New Middle East*.

7. Jerusalem

1. The established pattern of contravening building codes and the techniques used by city hall in documenting these violations were reported by *Ha'aretz* on March 13, 1998.

2. Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment 11), in Ruth Lapidot, "Jerusalem and the Peace Process," *Israel Law Review*, vol. 28, nos. 2–3 (Spring-Summer 1994).

3. Basic Law: Jerusalem Capital of Israel (1980) (Jerusalem: Israel Foreign Ministry, Information Division, 1995).

4. Ira Sharkansky, *Governing Jerusalem: Again on the World's Agenda* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996), p. 80.

5. Maya Choshen and Naama Shahar, eds., *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: Municipality of Jerusalem and Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1997), p. 30.

6. Over the last thirty years Jerusalem has generated countless studies and even more blueprints. One of the more recent and down-to-earth plans for strategically and comprehensively dealing with the multilayered problems involved in implementing the formula of close-proximity coexistence is a paper drawn up by the influential Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. Widely circulated among senior officials, the paper called for a major reorganization of the city's municipal structure, for example. This would involve rezoning and dividing Jerusalem into twenty-nine communities (nine in the Arab sector, seven for the ultra-Orthodox, and thirteen in the remaining Jewish areas), each electing a council to represent it in dealing with the municipality, to establish policy guidelines on important citywide issues, and to provide community services. Outlines of the ambitious plan are provided in *Ha'aretz*, March 23, 1998.

7. Cecilia Albin, "Negotiating Intractable Conflicts: On the Future of Jerusalem," *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, no. 1 (March 1977), p. 64.

8. Chad F. Emmett, "The Status Quo Solution for Jerusalem," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Winter 1977), pp. 16–28.

9. King Hussein made his observation in an interview published in *NPQ*. He elaborated further: Jerusalem, he felt, "belongs to all the descendants of the children of Abraham—Muslims, Jews and Christians. It must become a symbol of peace. A point of light for the whole world." *NPQ* (Winter 1997), p. 59.

10. Faisal Husseini's remarks to the Arab daily *al-Quds al-Arabi* were then reported by *Ha'aretz* reporter Nadav Shragai, June 17, 1998, under the headline "Husseini Envisions Jerusalem as One City with Two Capitals."

11. The meaning of "functional," "joint," and "qualified" sovereignty, as set out by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies in its master plan, is discussed by Nadav Shragai in his report, "Think Tank Has New Ideas for Jerusalem Sovereignty," *Ha'aretz*, April 5, 1998.

8. *The Elusive Middle Ground*

1. Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Last Reminiscence," interview of January 14, 1994, *Israel Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 192.

2. The turnover of authority from Israeli to Palestinian hands has been multi-phased and contentious at every step of the way. In phase 1 self-rule was restricted to most of the Gaza Strip and to the city of Jericho. Subsequently, a plan was agreed upon for dividing the West Bank into three zones: A, B, and C. Zone A, while comparatively small in terms of territorial expanse, contains the major Arab cities with the largest concentration of Arab residents and is under exclusive PA civilian and security control. The second sector, Zone B, were those towns and villages where the Palestinians would be responsible for maintaining public order and Israel's authority limited to assuring overall security. Zone C consists of Israeli settlements, uninhabited land, and military areas where Israel retains exclusive control.

Only in September 1995, after more than eighty hours of intense bargaining that necessitated direct involvement by both Foreign Minister Peres and Chair-

man Yassir Arafat, was agreement reached at Taba for an Israeli army withdrawal from the main population areas of the West Bank—Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Kalkiliya, Ramallah, Bethlehem—with security entrusted to 12,500 Palestinian police. As part of the package deal, a compromise was also hammered out for the city of Hebron whereby it too would be subdivided into three zones: one patrolled by Israel, a second jointly, the third by Palestinians.

At Taba the Palestinians had expected Areas A and B to consist of about 40 percent of the West Bank. Israel, however, was unwilling so early in the interim phase of the peace negotiations to trade its remaining land assets. As a result, A and B together amounted to 27 percent, of which wholly Palestinian land came to only 3 percent. Nor was there any real contiguity between the Palestinian areas, leaving journalist Connie Bruck to portray a scene of “disconnected islands of brown and yellow in a sea of white.” “The Wounds of Peace,” *New Yorker*, October 14, 1996, p. 78.

The next step in the Israeli recession did not take place until March 1997, whereby the government of Benjamin Netanyahu, after prolonged debate, announced the transfer of an additional 9.1 percent of the West Bank to either partial or total PA control. Except that the announcement produced more rancor than reassurance.

In what can only be seen as a ringing testimony to the unconstructive effect of diplomatic ambiguity, it is true that in the follow-up to Oslo Israel had pledged itself to three further “redeployments” before reaching the final status phase. For their part the Palestinians interpreted this commitment by Israel as implying withdrawal each time from one-third of the occupied territories. But the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations had left the determination to Israel alone as to exactly how much land was to be yielded in each of the three stages. Consequently, while American officials expressed the hope Jerusalem would present a credible double-digit figure, Netanyahu’s disappointingly low figure of less than 10 percent was compounded by the fact that most of the designated areas were drawn from Area B rather than C. Which meant in effect that Area A only grew to 10.02 percent, leaving Israel at the end of 1997 still in effective control of 71 percent of the West Bank. Arafat charged the Netanyahu Government with “a big deceit operation.” *IHT*, March 8–9, 1997.

3. When Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, released after eight years in Israeli prisons, volunteered that were Israel to withdraw completely from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and remove all its settlements, he would consider a truce but not permanent reconciliation, his words were interpreted in the foreign press as seeming to chart “a cautious political course,” and the sheikh himself touted as a possible “force for moderation.” Joel Greenberg, “Freed Hamas Leader Suggests Terms for Truce with Israel,” *New York Times*, October 8, 1997.

4. Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, *Negotiating Arab-Israel Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 129.

5. As Moshe Dayan was forced to admit years ago: "I've never been able to draw a line through the West Bank that would be secure for Israel and politically acceptable to the Arabs." Harold H. Saunders, "Reconstituting The Arab-Israeli Peace Process," in William B. Quandt, ed., *The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988). p. 429.

6. Thomas L. Friedman, "To Get to Camp David, They Have to Earn the Costly Tickets." *IHT*, April 11, 1997.

7. *Ha'aretz*, February 21, 1997. An expanded Jordan Valley salient under direct Israeli control accounted for a considerable percentage. A comparable design—73 percent in Israel's possession, 27 percent in Palestinian hands—was tabled by Israeli geographer Chaim Gewirtzman in his study of redeployment possibilities, *Mapat Ha'interesim Ha'Yisraelim BeYehuda v'Shomron* [A Map of Israeli Interests in Judea and Samaria], published by the BESA Center for Strategic Studies (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, July 1997).

8. *Ma'ariv*, July 3, 1997. Sharon's Knesset speech followed his secret meeting with Palestinian negotiator Abu Mazin for the first time. His formulated territorial compromise is noteworthy in light of Ariel Sharon's traditionally hawkish and uncompromising stand on the future of the West Bank.

9. Even earlier, in November 1996, Netanyahu confided at a meeting with ambassadors resident in Israel that he personally could live with a political solution whereby the Palestinians lived in an entity modeled along the lines of Puerto Rico or Andorra. His ideas were reported in *Ha'aretz*, November 8, 1996.

10. For the unofficial map and analyses by Ze'ev Schiff, see *Ha'aretz*, May 29, 1997, and June 6, 1997. Almost immediately, Netanyahu and government spokesmen sought to draw attention away from the territorial concessions by underscoring instead the political side of the equation. Namely, by stressing what the Palestinian self-governing but nonstate entity would not be entitled to, such as treaty-making powers, any large standing army, or alliances with radical regimes like Iran and Iraq. Nevertheless, undeflected, people like Charles Krauthammer, commenting on "Netanyahu's Map" in the *Washington Post* edition of June 13, 1997, properly noted, "The battle lines have, literally, been drawn."

Among sections meant to pass from Israeli rule to outright Israeli sovereignty are the principal aquifers, columns of territory along the existing western and eastern boundaries with Israel and Jordan respectively, and a corridor from Jerusalem to the Jordan River. Whereas, should Netanyahu have his way, the Palestinians would obtain three or four enclaves amounting to a patchwork of roughly 40 percent of West Bank lands drawn in such a manner as to encompass nearly all of the Palestinian population.

As pictured by one analyst, this entity in effect would be sandwiched between Israel and Jordan, denied any shared border with Jordan, and sliced by four east-west roadways under Israeli army control. Barton Gellman, "Netanyahu Proposition: West Bank Partition," *Washington Post*, June 16, 1997. Or as Thomas

Friedman cites a nameless Israeli diplomat: "Bibi's map keeps virtually all the settlements, all security and water, all of Jerusalem, and chops up the Palestinian state into unconnected blocks, cut off from both Gaza and Jordan." *New York Times*, June 17, 1997. To which the diplomat added: "That's a territorial compromise the Likud can accept."

11. *New York Times*, June 17, 1997.

12. See Schiff's commentary, "Mapa l'Yisraelim Bilvad" [A Map for Israelis Alone], *Ha'aretz*, May 30, 1997.

13. Barton Gellman, "Netanyahu Proposition: West Bank Partition," *Washington Post*, June 16, 1997.

14. In this second, more expansive version, territorial compromise would keep 98 settlements (81 percent) inside Israel, and a settler population of nearly 110,000 (91 percent). The Efrat-Katz map was first detailed and given national coverage by Akiva Eldar, *Ha'aretz*, December 2, 1996. Efrat, a professional geographer at Haifa University, went public with his own revised plan shortly thereafter. *Ha'aretz*, January 7, 1997.

15. Joseph Alpher, *Settlements and Borders*, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians Study no. 3 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994). His Plan B for moderate territorial compromise is set forth on pp. 36–41. Deputy director at the time of the prestigious Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, and identifying politically with the left-of-center Meretz party then headed by Shulamit Aloni and Yossi Sarid, Alpher's monograph gained wide circulation within the policy establishment and has served since as the basis for other modified versions.

16. *New Republic*, "Toward True Peace," February 3, 1997.

17. That the widely reported sharp divergence between Sharon and Mordechai might be a serious misreading is pointed out by David Makovsky in his take on the Netanyahu government's line of reasoning. *Ha'aretz*, January 11 and 20, 1998.

In fact, the government debate over the amount of land to be either retained perpetuum or yielded to Palestinian control had a hidden subtext. Underlying the first tier of *how much* to cede through phased redeployment (single-digit versus double-digit pullbacks), and also the precise timetable, was the second tier of *which* areas to withdraw from—A, B, or C?

Yet a third-tier cause for Israeli-Palestinian and Israel-American differences of opinion took the areas question a step further in the controversy over whether lands turned over by Israel in Area C would immediately go from C to A status, meaning completely under Palestinian control, or only indefinitely from C to B, leaving Israel with security control and the Palestinians with nominal sovereignty. A further complication were fundamental three-sided differences with regard to whether Israel's pledge to redeploy could be honored through a single pullback followed by final status negotiations, two moves and final status, or a full three "pulses" as stipulated in the earlier accords and as demanded by the Palestinian side.

18. The idea behind the Area D and “10 + 3” formulas was to turn over 10 percent of Area B to Palestinian civil control. The further 3 percent needed to meet Palestinian and American definitions of a substantial pullback would have special interim status, marked by: a nature preserve drawn from arid land to the east of Hebron, the Palestinian police made responsible for maintaining public order, though construction, planning, zoning, and security restrictions would be levied on the PA. In other words, this new Area D would have many of the attributes of Area B though not explicit consent by Israel that these 3 percent would eventually be turned over to exclusive Palestinian control or sovereignty in the permanent status agreement. The Israeli offer is analyzed by *Ha’aretz* diplomatic correspondent David Makovsky in the newspaper’s August 20, 1998, edition.

19. Geoffrey Aronson, “Israelis Debate Plans Outlining Options for Final Status,” in *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories: A Bimonthly Publication of the Foundation for Middle East Peace*, vol. 8, no. 1 (January-February 1998), p. 4.

20. This controversy in late 1998 over highlands versus desert pitted the Yesha Council of Settlements against one of its otherwise pro-settlement, antitotal withdrawal allies, the Third Way party, with the former arguing for a minimal withdrawal even if this involved handing over parts of the Judean Desert and the Jordan Rift Valley in order to patch together a 13 percent redeployment. Third Way leaders, for their part, insisted the pullback not include any part of the Judean Desert, even were this to affect the settlers around Mount Hebron and elsewhere. Reflecting on what he saw as a “tragic dilemma” between two values, MK Alex Lubotzky insisted the Third Way sought to ensure the greatest amount possible of the Land of Israel be brought under Israeli sovereignty. *Ha’aretz*, July 28 and August 7, 1998.

21. The quote is from Walid Khalidi, “Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1 (Autumn 1997), p. 17.

22. Danny Rubenstein, “He Brought No Maps,” *Ha’aretz*, January 23, 1998.

23. Sha’ti is quoted in Heller, “Toward a Palestinian State,” p. 19.

24. Darwish’s comments appear in an interview with him that appeared in the *Ha’aretz* weekly magazine of June 5, 1998.

25. This extensive interview with Bishara as well was conducted by *Ha’aretz* and is published as a feature story, “Citizen Azmi,” in its weekend magazine of May 29, 1998.

26. Sheikh Yassin’s words were carried by the *New York Times* on October 24, 1997, “Frail Hamas Leader Vents Fury But Masks His Intent.”

27. This prophecy by the Sheikh was made in Damascus and reported by the *New York Times*, June 25, 1998.

28. The institute’s findings, based on a fairly large sampling of 1,152 interviewees, were printed by Dani Rubenstein, Palestinian affairs reporter for *Ha’aretz*, on December 1, 1996.

29. The Palestinian writer Anton Shammas has been described as mourning for a lost homeland, “a construct of nostalgia, a territory without a map.” Fouad

Ajami, "The Arab Inheritance," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997), p. 147.

30. Khalil Shikaki, "Peace Now or Hamas Later," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 77, no. 4 (July/August 1998), p. 36.

31. Israeli tolerance for imprecision during the entire course of the Oslo negotiations is matched on the part of Palestinian spokesmen, part of whose calculus might very well be the ability it affords them to defer their own most sensitive and potentially divisive question. Which is, whether—and at what optimal point—finally and genuinely to embrace the partitionist platform of dividing and sharing land, including the West Bank, with the Zionist foe.

32. Burhan Dajani, "An Alternative to Oslo?" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 25, no. 4 (Summer 1996), p. 12. Dajani, a Palestinian economist living in Jordan, answers his own question by eschewing partition in favor of a reunified Palestine with equal citizenship for all and a return of the Palestinians to their homeland, in effect dismissing any resolutions adopted by the Palestine National Council in recent years that even implicitly hint at territorial compromise.

33. Khouri's column appeared in Hebrew translation in *Ha'aretz*, April 10, 1997.

34. Khalil Shikaki, "Reflections on the Peace Process and a Durable Settlement," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1 (issue 101), (Autumn 1996), p. 25. Elaborating further, he offers a vision ostensibly based on soft separation—but separation nevertheless—allowing for porous borders, access of each side to its "historical" land, some mixed Jewish-Palestinian neighborhoods, joint economic ventures, and mutually acceptable security arrangements (p. 26). It immediately becomes apparent, however, that what Shikaki is really calling for is not partition, or even a two-state formula, but really a binational state granting equal political rights, "including the right to return," to all its citizens—an idea all too readily similar to the earlier PLO slogan of a single "secular, democratic state."

35. A. S. Khalidi, "On the Drawing Board, a Blueprint of Palestine," an op-ed piece appearing in *IHT*, February 12, 1997. Well-placed as editor of the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, the author also was an adviser to the Palestinian delegates at the 1991–1993 Mideast talks.

36. Shlomo Gazit, "Israel and the Palestinians: Fifty Years of Wars and Turning Points," *The Annals*, vol. 555 (January 1998), p. 84. Gazit's statement, incidentally, is no longer valid, since the opening of the final round of map negotiations finds the Palestine Authority and embryonic Palestinian state already possessing substantial and precedent-setting portions of land finally "liberated" from Israeli occupation and control.

37. Naomi Weinberger, "Role Reversal Over Partition: 1948 and 1998," an electronic essay appearing in *MERIA* [Middle East Review of International Affairs], vol. 2, no. 2 (May 1998), an Internet service of the Bar-Ilan University's BESA Center for Strategic Studies.

38. At one point in discussions over the next promised Israeli troop pullback, in December 1997, Prime Minister Netanyahu seemed ready to offer a further 6–8 percent of the West Bank, in contrast to Palestinian demands for up to 30 percent. U.S. officials were then said to be aiming at a double-digit figure of 14–16 percent, splitting the difference right down the middle. Reported in the *IHT*, “Albright Leans on Palestinians and Israelis,” December 9, 1997.

39. Yosef Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882–1948: A Study of Ideology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). p. 323.

9. *Safe Passages*

1. Parliamentary Debates (Lords), Fifth Session, 106 (July 20, 1937).

2. Findings by the State Comptroller’s Office are reported in *Ha’aretz*, May 6, 1998.

3. In disclosing secret discussions over several months between an Israeli interdepartmental team and Palestinian Authority representatives devoted largely if not solely to the safe passage sticking point (in itself an admission by both sides of how seriously they take it and how wide apart their respective interpretations), *Ha’aretz* military correspondent Eitan Rabin reported the Israeli position insisted upon all its laws being applicable while the Palestinians were prepared to accept only Israeli traffic law. *Ha’aretz*, May 6, 1997.

4. Items of contention revolving around the safe passages agenda item and cost estimates are reported by *Maariv* in its Friday weekend magazine supplement of June 12, 1998.

5. *Ha’aretz*, February 26, 1998.

6. The 90 percent figures are cited by Arie Caspi in his article, “Down and Out in the Territories,” *Ha’aretz*, July 10, 1998.

7. “Trucks from Gaza to Get Homing Devices,” *Ha’aretz*, January 4, 1998. In laying out its proposal, the Israel Ports Authority volunteered that in 1996 a total of 40,451 such trucks traversed the Karni passage alone.

8. The new measures and their attendant implications are reported in *Ha’aretz*, August 13, 1998.

9. The only in-depth study of what the failure to negotiate a comprehensive safe passage protocol has meant for Gazans and West Bankers was published by B’tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories in its fact sheet of May 1998. Entitled *Hafred u’mshol* (Divide and Rule), the twenty-nine-page pamphlet describes the human condition stemming from blocked passage between the two territorial extremities.

10. Details of the Gush Katif closure crisis in *Ha’aretz*, July 3 and 5, 1998.

11. “Doctors Protest Infant Deaths in Closure,” *Ha’aretz*, August 31, 1998.

12. Amira Hass, “It’s a Long Way to Bir Zeit,” *Ha’aretz*, August 19, 1998.

13. In 1996 PA minister of social affairs Intisar al-Wazir (“Uum Jihad”) was caught illegally giving a lift to the student brother of a Hamas activist, an act prohibited by the special *laissez passer* terms for special passage.

14. Dalia Shehor, "No Sure Proof Wanted Men Fly in PA's Copter," *Ha'aretz*, May 19, 1998.

15. *Yediot Achronot*, July 2, 1997.

16. Netanyahu's 9 percent second redeployment sketch was leaked to *Ha'aretz* on April 28, 1998, and is further commented upon in the Foundation for Middle East Peace's bimonthly *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* of May-June 1998. An excellent insight into what he calls "the pullback numbers game" is David Makovsky's "What Does It All Mean?" which appeared in *Ha'aretz* on May 21, 1998. Makovsky drew heavily upon the research of Hebrew University hydrologist Dr. Haim Gvirtzman.

17. Reconstructed from the April 8, 1998 *Maariv* report of the *Daily Telegraph* interview, which also cited Israeli engineering feasibility experts who pointed to comparably long bridges in New Orleans and in the Florida Keys, for example.

18. *Ha'aretz*, December 18, 1997.

19. *Ha'aretz*, July 16, 1998.

20. In seeking an arrangement other than annexation of the Jordan River salient by Israel or its permanent presence there, Joseph Alpher reasons that "an Israeli military force deployed in the Jordan Valley without a direct link to the border with Israel is liable in an emergency to be cut off and besieged, thereby generating more military problems than it could ever solve." *Settlements and Borders, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians Study no. 3* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 26.

21. As part of the outlines for his personalized peace map Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly was willing to accept the Oslo provision for safe passage and to sanction no more than three corridors linking Gazans to Tulkarem, Kalkiliya, and Jericho. But in return, and by way of reciprocity, he would demand four Israeli land routes splicing the West Bank from west to east and reaching as far as the Jordan Valley. An unauthorized and therefore unconfirmed sketch of the Netanyahu map was printed in *Ha'aretz's* edition of May 29, 1997, and is reproduced in the *Washington Post* (June 16, 1997). The sketch did not indicate, however, whether any of the Palestinian passages would then be permitted to continue uninterrupted westward across Israel, finally terminating in the Gaza Strip.

22. Professor Sofer's proposed map was published on January 7, 1997 by *Ha'aretz*.

23. The analogy with Bosnia was drawn by *Maariv*, December 18, 1997.

24. The tunnels "bridging" proposal was apparently conveyed to the United States by Israeli minister Ariel Sharon in talks with U.S. national security adviser Sandy Berger in early November 1997 and duly reported by David Makovsky, diplomatic correspondent for *Ha'aretz*, November 28, 1997.

25. The alternative Mordechai-Sharon map designs and conceptions of Israel's national and security interests, including the roads question, are outlined by *Ha'aretz* reporters David Makovsky and Nadav Shragai in *Ha'aretz*, December 15, 1997.

26. David Makovsky, "Israel Agrees the 3 Percent Can Be Contiguous," *Ha'aretz*, July 27, 1998.

27. Having both Israeli and Palestinian best interests at heart, in December 1997 the Peace Now movement demanded the Israeli government transfer 50 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians, even before the final status agreement, and turn Area B, divided at the time into no less than 190 separate "islands," into a contiguous Palestinian territory. The reasoning given for such a proposal was that "connecting Area B to a contiguous expanse will allow Israel to make logical and realistic claims regarding the Palestinian fight against violence and terror organizations." The proposal and the logic behind it are spelled out in *Ha'aretz*, December 3, 1997.

28. Moshe Arens, "Skipping a Beat," *Jerusalem Post*, December 5, 1997. His categorical statement was countered and offset by assurances from fellow Likud Party ministers Netanyahu, Mordechai, and Sharon that the cabinet was mindful of the contiguity dilemma and would draw Israel's territorial demands in such a way as to leave the Palestinians with extensive contiguous areas.

10. Toward a Negotiated Territorial Compromise

1. Thomas L. Friedman, "A Delicate Balance," *New York Times*, June 30, 1998.

2. Gwyn Rowley, for example, argues that any understanding of Zionist and Israeli settlement policy must be based on a deeper appreciation of "the fundamental Hebrew system of beliefs in which *land*, the Promised Land, plays a central and crucial role." "The Land in Israel," in A. D. Burnett and P. J. Taylor, eds., *Political Studies from Spatial Perspectives* (New York: Wiley, 1981), p. 443. The same thesis can be found in the literature on Palestinian Arab attachment to the land.

3. In *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 116–117, Karl W. Deutsch reasons that the safest, most prudent strategy for players in irreconcilable conflict game situations is to choose either "the best of the worst" or "the worst of the best" of all possible outcomes. As a result there will arise at least one "saddle point" at which "the minimum of one player's maxima and the maximum of his adversary's minima coincide," thus facilitating one or several stable solutions resembling in some ways "an automatic equivalent of compromise."

4. "Netanyahu Broadens Land Claim," *International Herald-Tribune*, December 23, 1997.

5. Mashaal's candid remarks derive from the October 9, 1997 transcript of his interview in *NPQ: The New Perspectives Quarterly* (Fall 1997), p. 44.

6. Mark A. Heller, "Toward a Palestinian State," *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 5–22. His "preferred option" is to leave a Palestinian state in "most of the West Bank" and "with limitations on the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty," p. 18.

An early supporter of Palestinian statehood, the evolution in his thinking can be traced through his earlier work: Mark A. Heller, *A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983); and Mark A. Heller and Sari Nusseibeh, *No Trumpets, No Drums: A Two-State Settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991). The reader will note that the differences are relatively minor between Alpher and Heller, former close colleagues for a number of years at the Jaffee Center think tank and both articulate members of a circle of Israeli political doves comprised of retired generals, former intelligence personnel, and security-oriented academics.

7. Heller, "Toward a Palestinian State," p. 17.

8. In Heller's version Israel would need to retain the Jordan Valley as a "forward-defense line" in anticipating plausible war contingencies and to maintain early warning as well as air- and missile-defense installations on the eastern side of the north-south mountain ridge running down the center of the West Bank.

9. An unauthorized Hebrew text of the "blueprint for a peace accord" was offered by Ze'ev Schiff in *Ha'aretz* on February 22, 1996. An English version of the main points of the understanding can be found in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1 (issue 101) (Autumn 1996), p. 149. Two interpretations of the document's larger importance are offered by Daniel Sobelman in *Ha'aretz*, May 29, 1997, and by Heller in his previously cited article, "Toward a Palestinian State," pp. 18–19. Fairly detailed boundary maps were apparently appended to the draft but not circulated. Beilin himself extensively covers the post-Oslo secret attempt at going beyond interim status to tackling the permanent status agenda in a recent book: Yossi Beilin, *Lagaat b'Shalom* (Touching Peace) (Tel-Aviv: Miskal-Yediot Ahronoth and Chemed, 1997).

10. Asfour's interpretation appears in an interview with *Ma'ariv*'s Oded Grannott, October 11, 1996.

11. Further amplifications later supplied on the record by a member of the Beilin discussion group, Dr. Yair Hirschfeld, suggest that the Israeli negotiators gave their consent to extraterritorial status for the Temple Mount, with a Palestinian flag and free access, as well as responsibility for the Church of the Sepulchre bestowed upon the Palestinian Authority. Hirschfeld's interpretation was first printed as an interview in the Israeli settler publication, *Nekuda* (July 1996), and then republished in English translation by the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1 (issue 101) (Autumn 1996), pp. 150–151.

12. Quoted in an interview, "From the Architect of Oslo: A Way Out of the Deadlock," *NPQ: The New Perspectives Quarterly* (Fall 1997), p. 43.

13. Support for the option of an Israeli pullback parallel with final peace talks came from a U.S. initiative, a copy of which was obtained by *Ha'aretz* and first published on June 4, 1998. One of its suggestions called for a tightened-up timetable, enabling talks on the opening of final status to begin at the start of a twelve-week, three-phased pullback.

14. French leaders, for example, noting France had always looked positively

upon the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, let it be known that France would recognize the Palestinian state as soon as it was declared. At least thirteen of the fifteen EU members were counted upon to follow suit. In 1988 dozens of third world countries recognized the Algiers declaration of independence. *Ha'aretz*, July 7, 1998.

15. Danny Rubenstein, "Arafat's Last Asset—Statehood," *Ha'aretz*, July 13, 1998.

16. Beilin continued to pursue his idea in discussions with American, Jordanian, and Palestinian officials. *Ha'aretz*, July 21, 1998.

17. Dan Margalit, "Sharon 1998 Is Dayan 1972," *Ha'aretz*, March 2, 1998.

18. An observation offered by Thomas Friedman, himself an avowed supporter of a brokered peace settlement, in his *New York Times* column on June 17, 1997.

19. In Shimon Peres, with Robert Little, *For the Future of Israel* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 124.