Chapter 5
Borders and Security

> *Many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others. In domestic society, there are several ways to increase the safety of one's person and property without endangering others. One can move to a safer neighborhood, put bars on the windows, avoid dark streets, and keep a distance from suspicious-looking characters.*
>
> —Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma" (1978)

Like modern-day international frontiers in general, the question of future Israeli-Palestinian borders is in itself paradoxical: narrow, confining, and yet also full of gaping holes. Narrow in peacemaking terms in that this single issue—the exact location and precise nature of the permanent borders between Israel and the neighboring Palestinian entity—is the absolute "bottom line" as to who gets what and therefore the very crux of final status territorial bargaining. Confining in the sense that there is very little to work with; as pointed out previously, conditions on the ground are highly inauspicious if the aim of partition is to achieve Arab-Jewish separation. Conversely, this same border question can be viewed as encyclopedic, since in one way or another it touches upon and envelops every one of the many other subsidiary issues forming the crowded Middle East peace agenda.

Defensible Borders

UN Resolution 242, which continues since 1967 to serve as anchor, inspiration, and operative guideline for all subsequent peacemaking efforts, expressly affirms the right of "every State" in the area to live in peace "within secure and recognized boundaries" free from "threats or acts of force."

Should separatist-partitionist solutions fail in the end to satisfy this security goal, then little of enduring importance will have been achieved.

Certainly not the "just" but also *lasting* peace so many Israelis and Palestinians profess to seek. Nor is the diplomat's task going to be made any easier by the difficulty in knowing scientifically what security means and when it prevails in other than subjective terms. Or how precious a commodity it is. Neither people yields to the other in its perceived insecurities. Once the PLO in the 1960s became disillusioned with pledges of assistance by Arab world leaders, both peoples never knew or entertained any other way than self-help, or zero-sum unilateralism, in coping with their respective security dilemmas.

Moreover, the level of individual and group security Israelis can anticipate from internationally recognized frontiers profoundly affects their psychological environment. This certainly will color their predisposition toward compromise; especially at the critical moment in the future when they may be asked to make additional, possibly far-reaching political and territorial concessions as the price for peace and normalcy. In the case of the Palestinians, too, the final lines of demarcation still to be drawn by 1999 for the emerging Palestinian entity to all intents will determine the character of that entity, its capacity for independent self-rule, chances for statehood, and economic viability.

The border question impacts much further afield. Together with its security component, it is certain to broadly affect Arab-Israeli relations, regional politics, and the Middle East military balance for years to come.

How the Middle East peace map looks at the end of the day—when the bargaining is over and the legal peace instrument ratified—is thus really the heart of the matter. What, for example, will then characterize the landscape of western Palestine? A hard or soft partition? Partition, or partition plus, implying any number of points of cross-border contact? Open roads, open borders, "open doors," and open skies, perhaps even leading in time to open minds and hearts? Or, instead, a terrain scarred by electronic fences, barbed wire, cement pylons, barricades, and exclusionary walls?

Borders thus become the integrative factor. They serve to tie together all the individual components into a peace package that makes a comprehensive settlement also comprehensible. Defendable militarily, but defensible politically and rationally, too.

Fitting Jordan Into the Israeli-Palestinian Security Equation

In a category all its own is the future military and geopolitical relationship of neighboring Jordan—to Israel and to Palestine separately, but also within the Israel-Jordan-Palestine strategic triangle. Will Jordan throw its

weight behind reinforcing the permanent status peace settlement? Is it likely to perceive its own interests, centering on regime survival and national security, as lying in closer alliance with Israel, based upon the past model, and against the threat of an all-Palestine takeover of the East Bank? Or, alternatively, in blunting any possible Palestinian thrust eastward by emphasizing East Bank/West Bank and Arab solidarity against Israel? Or, in yet another alternative, struggling to protect itself from both Israeli and Palestinian domination through studied neutrality and aloofness, leaving both stronger proximate neighbors to contend with each other?

Even these few comments are enough to underline Jordan's disproportionate importance for Israeli-Palestinian peace and security. So intimate and intricate is this trilateral relationship, and pivotal the balancing role of the Hashemite entity, that it prompts me to make a larger observation, tying Jordan to the permanent status peace process by way of its relevance for the security equation.

One of my only reservations about the wisdom of the Oslo initiative in 1993, aside from its overdose of evasiveness masquerading as constructive ambiguity, was not its strategic direction in finally, belatedly setting up a Palestinian option, but rather its timing. As a lifetime student of the larger conflict, I had come to see two broader parallel trends—really, historical processes—at work.

One is Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, the other, clarifying Jordan's internal composition as a Hashemite monarchy and its international status as a separate kingdom, or merged into a single Palestinian entity. For over four decades the latter questions heavily depended upon the strong leadership and clever statecraft of one individual, His Majesty King Hussein, whose reign, however, already gave indications, in 1993, of drawing to a close.

Strictly from the standpoint of Israeli and Middle East regional security, my personal preference, then and now, would be to wait for the longer-term succession process in Amman to first work itself out before negotiating any large-scale territorial withdrawal from the West Bank with the Palestinians. And not in order to procrastinate or to avoid ceding territory. Rather because, even in the best of times and in periods of relaxed tensions, Israel has constantly had to closely monitor East Bank economic, social, political, and military developments.

It is that much harder to know how Jordan, with its Palestinian majority and Palestinian refugee camps, will look or how it will function under Abdullah II, King Hussein's successor. And because the order and sequence by which both historical processes take place can make a profound

difference for Israeli security prospects as well as for the nature and durability of Israeli-Palestinian peace.[1]

I would not want Israel, for instance, to face a situation whereby, having left the West Bank and forward Jordan River positions, it might then awake to find an amalgamated East Bank–West Bank state under direct Palestinian rule, or indirectly intimidated by Palestinian threats of a violent takeover. A reconstituted state led, moreover, by militants pledged to liberate all of Palestine and not bound by either the Oslo or the permanent status terms of settlement. And one bent upon remilitarizing the West Bank as well as directly challenging Israel's casus belli "red lines" doctrine by inviting Iraqi, Iranian, or Pakistani forces to set up "defensive" missile bases on Jordanian soil within easy range, however, of Israeli military targets and population centers. Least of all would I feel comfortable with Israel's then having to confront any such altered strategic balance of power from a position of weakness and with the vulnerable "green line" as its revised political and security border.

For these reasons, in 1993 I would have preferred reversing the Oslo-induced strategy that, in effect, opted for transferring larger and larger increments of West Bank territory as part of the reconciliation with Palestinian nationalism ahead of, rather than after, the inevitable post-Hussein era. At the time this is being written, with King Hussein's passing, the two processes are now once again running parallel. In later retrospect this may yet prove to be one of the few benefits (and even if more unintended than premeditated!) to be derived from having put off the permanent status territorial and other negotiations for so long. Clearly, proximity talks; and what transpires on one side of the Jordan River will directly bear on the other.

Shifting Lines, Fixed Positions

The Oslo agreement is at heart a partition-based construct and, as such, implicitly makes redrawing borders obligatory. However, in keeping with Oslo's preference for opaqueness and phased negotiation, the 1993 accords did not go into the whole subject of the exact nature and location of the lines of partition. Deferred confrontation masked as constructive ambiguity made it possible, indeed advisable, to leave this supremely contentious issue for future clarification.

And yet, since 1993, despite a string of crises and political standoffs, the lines of disengagement and repartition have begun to shift significantly. Israel's sphere of territorial control has shrunk in direct propor-

tion to the expanding zones of direct Palestinian dominion, starting with the twinned cities of Gaza and Jericho, then most of the Gaza Strip and urban portions of the West Bank, followed by Hebron, with a standing pledge of three more interim subphases ("pulses," "redeployments," or "pullbacks") aiming at converting C-designated areas (under Israeli administration and security responsibility) to A status (Palestinian administration and security responsibility). Under the terms of Oslo 2 (the interim agreement signed in Washington on September 28, 1995) the West Bank was divided into three areas:

Area A major cities—Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem
Area B towns and villages (containing 68 percent of the Palestinians)
Area C unpopulated areas of "strategic importance" and Jewish settlement

As of mid-1998 Area A represented 3 percent of the West Bank, Area B . . . 24 percent, and Area C . . . 73 percent.

While the Israeli-Palestinian perimeter has been in flux, by contrast the respective core positions on (a) borders and (b) security remain unassailable.

On the matter of future borders Israeli defenses are four-tiered. The front-line position championed by Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, and claiming Jewish sovereignty over the disputed territories, has since been abandoned. Former Prime Minister Netanyahu and his supporters still cling to Israeli residency anywhere in Judea and Samaria as a historic right and dig in their heels on the need for the Jordan River to serve as Israel's abiding security border. Their fallback position, however, interprets the principle of "land for peace" liberally rather than literally and would settle for a West Bank repartition within the 50–50 to 60–40 range. So long as it might enable annexing settlement clusters immediately adjacent to pre-1967 Israel, control of water sources, and early warning outposts strung along the river.

Should neither position be tenable, however, then a third stand calls for the most minor border adjustments, limited to no more than some 8 percent of the West Bank. However, should even this symbolic single-digit territorial compromise be unacceptable to Palestinians sworn to retrieving all of the occupied West Bank, a final line of retreat has already been voiced by the Israeli peace camp: dismantling Jewish settlements, withdrawing completely, and returning to the 1967 armistice lines. Sweeping concessions in return for peace now. In which instance the principle



9. The Oslo II Map [Areas A, B, and C]

of territorial compromise is reduced to little more than tiny territorial and border adjustments; and even these conditional upon the mutual exchange of land by ceding portions of pre-1967 Israel to Palestinian rule.

The official Palestinian line of battle in preparing to fight diplomatically over future borders as drafted by Yasir Arafat is unambiguous by comparison and firmly entrenched. Palestine's final partitioning will only come about if conducted under the formula of "land for peace." This is strictly interpreted as meaning Israel's total evacuation of the West Bank, reactivating the 1967 green line, and creating an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

There is no fallback position, at least not one vetted publicly. At best there are a few scattered and unauthoritative Arab references to a "land for land" corollary, appearing to leave slightly open the possibility of symbolic territorial exchanges, but on condition of parity and reciprocity. One has the right to interpret the 1988 Algiers resolution by the Palestinian National Council on behalf of the state solution as acceptance of territorial compromise by virtue of relinquishing title to Ramle, Lod, Nazareth, etc. However, in effect, the Palestinian final status formula presently amounts to partition without territorial compromise—in the sense that there will not be any further concessions of West Bank land to the Israelis beyond the 1949 armistice lines.

Border Crossings and Controls

Wherever drawn, the final peace borders will still need to be guarded daily, and border transit regulated on an ongoing basis. Which comprises an entire peace agenda item in and of itself.

Israeli sensitivities toward the east-west passages into Israel both from Egypt and from across the Jordan River are aroused in the first instance by the danger of elements inimical to the state entering the territories unscreened, proceeding from there to civilian terrorist targets inside Israel proper. Economics are a second consideration, for once contraband goods are safely smuggled into the territories, similarly, it is difficult to prevent them from entering and then flooding the Israeli market. For a combination of reasons Israeli authorities have always assigned high priority to exercising direct influence over the border crossings from Egypt to Gaza and from Jordan onto the West Bank.

But the Oslo process did not expressly mandate establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, only an interim autonomy arrangement for the Palestinians. For this reason, directly following evacuation of Gaza and



10. Jordan River Crossings

Jericho, responsibility for the *outer* frontiers continued to be dealt with operationally, meaning on an ad hoc basis, thereby still dodging the twin political aspects of sovereignty and final borders.

Basing themselves upon those clauses of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement treating areas under Palestinian control as remaining inside an Israeli security sheath, leaders in Jerusalem confidently felt border supervision could be negotiated without prejudicing the final status. But only so long as it was clear to the PLO that Israel would "maintain security control and supervision over the entry of persons, vehicles and weapons at all points of entry."

In the negotiation dynamic, however, the Palestinians made incessant demands early on for some semblance of authority over the border crossings. This led in February 1994 to insertion into the Cairo Agreement of a unique plan for dual supervision. This arrangement, hammered out in marathon bargaining, in effect provides for two wings at each border terminal. The first services Arabs residing under the autonomous Palestinian Authority or living in other parts of the territories, plus visitors, while the second processes Israelis and others whose destination is Israel or areas under Israel's control.

The role of Israeli security personnel stationed behind tinted glass or two-way mirrors toward Arabs and non-Arabs entering the Palestinian wing is to be as unobtrusive as possible. Also, the Palestinians enjoy symbolic trappings of power, such as a raised national flag at the terminal and uniformed police officers. At the same time, the arrangement still meets Israel's conditions for having the final say over anyone entering or exiting the Palestine autonomy.

This solution to the problem of safe border passages is an example of creative problem solving in which the craving for attributes of sovereignty by the Palestinians and Israel's direct security needs are deftly balanced. This constructive approach encourages the belief that other security concerns can be addressed in a similarly businesslike and sensitive fashion. Yet past precedents are no guarantee of future behavior patterns, again, the closer we move toward confronting the sovereignty-security nexus. One should not expect the wary protagonists to be as forthcoming in the final round.

Insecurity Blankets

One underlying factor contributing to the uncompromising stances by both claimants on border adjustment, border policing, and land concessions certainly has to be the adverse conditions of physical geography discussed

above. Objectively, "Palestine" west of the Jordan and ending on the Mediterranean seacoast does not encourage magnanimity. Nor does it assure security in depth.[2] But, in addition to the spatial dimension, surely territorial intractability traces as well to basic attitudes; to feelings of insecurity/security that are essentially a matter of individual subjective perception.

In which case what stands out in the Middle East is the cognitive gap separating the respective sides. For there is a profound dissonance between how Arabs and Jews (and for that matter, Turks and Iranians) tend to see (a) themselves, (b) each other, and (c) the balance of threat. Indeed, Israelis and Palestinians best epitomize the classic security dilemma. In all these years of togetherness they have not lost their underlying mutual distrust. Indeed, the opposite is true, with each petrified of and by the other. Forced to coexist in such close and confining quarters, and living with such deep trepidation—the Israeli parent of the terrorist's bomb, the Palestinian child of midnight house searches—they all but vie for the dubious title of most threatened and least secure party.

Palestinians both fear and resent Israelis as the more dominant, powerful actor in their bilateral central zone of conflict. Israelis reciprocate by professing anxieties that they, in turn, are vastly outnumbered and completely surrounded by a circle of Arab and Islamic countries still unreconciled to the Jewish state's very existence. And who enjoy not only numerical and quantitative superiority but a growing arsenal of missiles, chemical warheads, and other modern offensive weapons systems. To which Arab world strategists promptly respond with their own expressions of deepening concern at Israel possessing an uncertified yet presumed nuclear monopoly.

Quick to impart the most sinister motives to their opponent, and prepossessed by their own distinctive vulnerabilities, all sides live within a deep protective shell. They have been programmed to think solely in terms of disfavorable imbalances of power and worst-case scenarios. In direct consequence, at the level of national psyches and security perceptions they may actually be too afraid to signal even the slightest trace of flexibility, out of fear (thus adding to the list!). Fear that such a step will be seized upon by the opposing side as a sign of weakness, or appeasement.

In this strained psychological climate the borders-and-security issue poses a formidable hurdle. Yet it is one that can no longer be sidestepped.

Extreme caution is therefore advised. Do not underestimate the profound dimensions of the security problem in the final status talks. Two, perhaps three preliminary clues suffice as warning. The first are the lay-

ers of sensitivity previously exposed during the tough negotiations conducted in 1993–94 over responsibility for supervising the exterior borders. The second are the official positions already staked out and part of the public record, making subsequent concessions—especially one-sided or asymmetrical ones—that much more difficult, both in terms of prestige (face saving) and outraged constituents. Certain to be a particular bone of contention, for example, is the north-south strip of the Jordan Valley. Military strategists in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv regard this as the eastern gate to the land of Israel, but which Palestinians lay claim to as their eastern access to the rest of the Arab world. Third, like everything else involved in repartitioning Palestine, security poses almost limitless complexities.

Any Israeli-Palestinian security dialogue, as we have already shown, immediately runs up against the bottomless nature of the problem. Indeed, listening to and following the discussion of security problems oftentimes seems surrealistic, sometimes futile and sterile, always circuitous. One reason is that each side's stand on security comprises a mixture of concerns that are entirely well-based, but also fears that are both genuine and exaggerated and worries that are fabricated or groundless.

Another reason for not being able to get beyond the security barrier in compromising on Palestine is the total absence of objective, professional criteria for defining, and for narrowing, the nature of what today constitutes a security danger to Israel and Palestine, Israelis and Palestinians. On the one hand, definitions of state security are widening to include environmental safety, control over resources, safety against sudden economic dislocation and the like. On a different plane, but in the same expanded direction, are a host of more distant, over-the-horizon threats, illustrated in the case of Israel by ballistic missiles launched at it from Iran. Risks of this sort magnify insecurity, while seeming, in the opposite direction, to trivialize the bitter arguments we have been witness to over the need for Israelis, or Palestinians, to yield a few percentages more, or less, of sovereign West Bank territory.[3]

On the other hand, longer-distant dangers and set-piece military confrontations between massive, heavily armed standing forces are offset in the Israeli-Palestinian context by such immediate and "low intensity" acts of hostility as throwing a grenade, setting off a bomb, blocking wells or roads, imposing curfews, or stabbing someone, Arab or Jew, indiscriminately. At the personal level, threats abound and strategic military balances lose their meaning. Under prevailing conditions of the closest physical proximity, porous borders, and perceived vulnerability to attack

against one's person, family, or property, what constitutes "protection" and what might qualify as "protective measures"? Not objectively. Not scientific, theoretical, or rigorous standards; but ones appropriate to Israel/Palestine.

Of what real value are fortified border positions, formal treaty alliances or solemn security guarantees, and esoteric doctrines for strategic extended nuclear deterrence in a situation on the ground where anywhere up to one hundred thousand Palestinians, with or without valid entry permits, are able to cross into Israel on a normal day? When border police using state-of-the-art detection equipment are unable to inspect each vehicle entering or leaving? Or for that matter, when an Arab student resident in Gaza is disqualified from study at a West Bank institution of higher learning because he or she has been denied permission to travel freely from one destination to the other?

Raise the subject of individual victims of terror or violence, however, and you are accused of lacking "strategic vision." Conversely, restrict yourself to the Middle East balance of power and sight is lost of the very human dimension of security. Is there any wonder that security seminars devoted to Israeli-Palestinian security strategies and scenarios so often assume an air of surrealism? Of going around in circles? Or else they end up being exercises in futility: my insecurity is greater than yours. You possess more power than I.

But then most discussions that have taken place thus far feature narrow presentations, one-sided perspectives, and unilateral prescriptions. They and their participants rarely get down to discussing each other's fears and anxieties, let alone empathizing with them or placing them on a par with their own security concerns. Whereas maximum assured security, certainly under present global conditions, let alone emerging Middle East threats and the single most salient fact of Israeli-Palestinian life—close proximity, is only approachable through joint effort, coordinated problem solving, and a shared security burden.

The wisdom of this caveat is strengthened by yet another intimation of things to come once the sensitive, thorny subject of permanent security in a repartitioned Palestine is pushed to the top of the permanent status agenda. The warning is found in unofficial and preliminary essays by Palestinian and Israeli security specialists known for close links to policy makers in the two respective camps. These formulations of the security issue more than amply clue us into the contradictory perceptions of what constitutes security and insecurity for each side as well as what remedial or compensatory steps might be taken to assuage both individual and reciprocal fears.

Although writing in their private and unofficial capacity, these authors are sufficiently representative to warrant mention. And what they have to say at the level of specific security components exposes a gaping hole where the middle ground on common security ought to be.

Palestinian Security Concerns

In an important 1995 article in the British journal *International Affairs*, Ahmad Khalidi, former adviser to the Palestinian delegation at the Washington and Cairo/Taba peace talks and currently an associate fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, offers a fairly comprehensive and unabashed Palestinian doctrine of national security. Among the main points he makes:

- Palestinians' security fears and concerns have been grossly undervalued in comparison with those of Israel, especially given the preponderance of power in the latter's favor;
- henceforth, Israeli and Palestinian security are to be treated on an equal footing;
- long-standing asymmetries have bred "a profound and pervasive Palestinian feeling of insecurity" that can only be relieved by "a complete and final end to Israel's military occupation and colonization of Palestinian land," establishment of a national entity on Palestinian soil, and firm assurances against threats of military occupation, external domination, and hostile encroachment.[4]

Full attainment of these goals, according to Khalidi, requires three central components: self-defense, external reinforcement, regional linkage.

He defines self-defense as the right of a Palestinian government to maintain "some element of a defence force" against (a) outside aggression and (b) internal subversion. As for residual Israeli concerns, he does not preclude bilateral verification and observation measures, establishment of a permanent military commission, and mutually binding commitments on nonbelligerency and the inviolability of borders. Only "total demilitarization," he writes, is thus not an acceptable option from a Palestinian point of view."

External reinforcement, Khalidi's second stipulation, calls for third-party enhancement of Palestinian security: first, through an external military presence under appropriate international supervision and, second, through "iron-clad" external guarantees of the postsettlement regime by the international community. These assurances would be issued to both

Israel and the Palestinians, although their primary aim is "a lock-in mechanism that precludes Israeli revisionism" without posing a challenge to Israeli basic security.

The essential third element, regional linkage, is presented as nothing less than "a Palestinian national security imperative." By regional linkage the author really has in mind a regional security regime. Which, in addition to deterring "future Israeli attempts to challenge or undo" the terms of the peace settlement "through direct military action or compulsion," would put limits on external arms transfers and indigenous production as well as enforcing "extensive and intrusive" observation and verification measures.

Khalidi's security package is offered as a test of Israel's good faith and of its readiness "to overcome its ideological addiction to territory as well as its territorial security fixation." A particular effrontery: "From the perspective of Palestinian national security, the maintenance of armed, organized, regular or semi-regular armed settlers in autonomous enclaves deep within Palestinian territory is patently unacceptable." Khalidi offers a rather original security spin on the refugee problem in adumbrating one final demand. The "right of return" for pre-1948 refugees has a significant psychological security dimension, insofar as "the perpetuation of their predicament could lead to their alienation from the peace process, and hence their emergence as a dangerous source of post-settlement instability."

Khalidi's treatise is brought here as fairly indicative of official Palestinian thinking on security. Also, his choice of wording notwithstanding, the author does make an attempt at evenhandedness, acknowledging some of Israel's major concerns as well. Finally, the Khalidi piece, for all its efforts at scholarly and pragmatic problem solving, highlights more points of divergence than convergence.

Since the article's publication, moreover, Palestinian fears have been heightened. Above all, that the Netanyahu government, in power since 1996 and determined to reinterpret the Oslo commitments, could freeze the interim lines of jurisdiction, making them permanent. Which would leave Chairman Arafat titular "sheriff of Gaza" and the Palestinians in charge of scattered Bantustan-like pockets of land and people. Hardly the foundations for a viable state. The official Palestinian stand, in turn, has not only crystallized but become more self-confident and demanding, and therefore less compromising. This hardening of positions is expressed, inter alia, by insistence on parity, across the board, with Israel and an enhanced self-defense force virtually indistinguishable from a standing

army, together with refusal to consider any kind of limitation infringing upon Palestinian sovereignty, neither partial demilitarization nor any form of Israeli military presence.

Israeli Security Requisites

A sense of mainstream Israeli thinking on the final status peace treaty's security provisions can be garnered likewise from the writings of Israeli security analysts. The two selected as both knowledgeable and well-connected to government and IDF sources are Ze'ev Schiff, respected senior commentator on military affairs for the Hebrew-language daily *Ha'aretz*, and Joseph Alpher, former deputy director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, the Tel-Aviv University think tank.

In a 1989 monograph Schiff gives a detailed list of Israel's *minimal* security requirements during a transition period—of undefined duration—but also possibly beyond. He begins with renunciation by the PLO of intentions for the step-by-step liquidation of the Jewish state, as well as of the Palestinian "right of return," with the refugees to be absorbed by the Palestinian entity and its sister Arab countries. Specific security-related desiderata include:

- precluding the Palestinian entity from entering into any military alliance or from permitting the "stationing, transit or training" of foreign military or police forces on its territory";
- reducing the likelihood of a surprise attack against Israel by complete demilitarization of the Palestinian entity—save for a "strong police force" numbering "several thousand" men—without any time limitation;
- the IDF to remain stationed "in several points" on the West Bank and Gaza;
- air and missile early warning stations to be manned by Israelis within the Palestinian areas but to be operated at the end of the transition by Americans or by a joint team of Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians under U.S. command;
- an outside monitoring regime to prevent violations of the agreement.

Although written before Oslo, Schiff's stipulations still largely reflect current thought in Israeli military and government circles.[5]

Joseph Alpher offers a further gloss on the Israeli security doctrine in two essays published during 1994 in the immediate wake of Oslo. Regarded as a political moderate supportive of Palestinian statehood, even

he makes a number of stringent claims unlikely to elicit PLO consent, principal among them being:

- a completely demilitarized Palestinian entity;
- Israel retaining "for years to come" the capacity to move defensive forces to the Jordan River "in real time";
- physical detachment of the Palestinian entity from Jordan and the Arab world, with or without annexing territory.

In effect, Israel is advised at the security negotiations to insist upon creation of a double security belt, based on the Jordan Valley as Israel's security border, together with "a thickening of the Green Line at the most sensitive points."[6]

Alpher makes his argument more explicit in a second, follow-up piece devoted to Israel's ultimate security concerns, which then appeared in *International Affairs*. Echoing Schiff and the military establishment, he too calls for the introduction of demilitarized zones as a buffer between the two sides, perhaps with an international trip wire or verification presence.[7]

From a comparison of the respective positions it is readily apparent the two security doctrines do not dovetail on at least four counts. First, *territorial adjustment*. Khalidi, to be sure, finds any territorial claims by Israel beyond the 1967 line objectionable, whereas Alpher as well as Schiff, while differing over the exact contours, stress the need—Schiff's term—for "corrections." Schiff estimates Israel will find it necessary to annex a strip 2 to 6 kilometers east of the green line, to demand border corrections in the Mount Gilboa area and near Lod (thus expanding the airspace near Ben-Gurion International Airport), to expand in the Etsion bloc south of Jerusalem, on both sides of the northern corridor connecting Jerusalem with Tel-Aviv and the coast, in the Jerusalem metropolitan area, and in the area linking Jerusalem with Ma'ale Adumim to the east.

In Alpher's version, too, Israel is advised to insist on modification of the 1948–1967 border: expanding the Jerusalem corridor to the north and south, attaching the Latrun salient overlooking the airport, assuring a "foothold" in the foothills of western Samaria, protecting Jerusalem from the east, at Ma'ale Adumim, and maintaining "a presence" in the Jordan Valley.

Second, *demilitarization*. The Palestinians adamantly oppose what Israel is holding out for: a neutralized, defanged Palestinian entity as the quid pro quo for consenting to evacuate most of the territories and possibly agreeing to an independent state. Third, the *outer limits* of the security sphere. Here, Khalidi's preoccupation, and, by inference, that of Pales-

tinian strategists in general, is with containing Israel, and within the narrow context of a two-sided Israeli-Palestinian equation. By contrast, the perspective adopted by Schiff, Alpher, and Israeli colleagues is broader, indeed, regionwide. Their calculus, and therefore rationale, for demanding Palestinian demilitarization and that Israel must have a forward security border at the Jordan River encompasses extra-Palestine threats—ranging from conventional through ballistic or chemical warfare to an Arab/Islamic nuclear option—whether from the direction of Syria, Iraq, or Iran.[8]

Fourth, *denuclearization*. Once again, the lines are sharply drawn. The thrust of Khalidi's argument, backed by the declared positions of Egypt's President Mubarak and other Arab leaders, is renunciation by Israel of its nuclear advantage as a contribution to regional stability. The official Israeli position endorses the principle of a nuclear-free Middle East. But such consent is conditional upon three frankly unrealistic preliminary safeguards. First, peace treaties with Israel contracted by all regional members, including renunciation of threats to Israel's existence. Second, consent of the other parties to forego manufacture, deployment, or use of biological or any other unconventional weapons. And third, for added measure, Arab democratization, on the premise that democratic regimes do not go to war with each other.

Yet a fifth indication of divergent if not antipodal Israeli versus Palestinian security perspectives is offered by their views toward the eventual role of the neighboring Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In Khalidi's extensive coverage of the Palestinian security calculus Jordan is conspicuous by its absence. He makes no reference to it as a factor.[9] This, in direct contrast to the two Israeli security formulations, wherein Jordan is presented as the centerpiece in any effective trilateral security regime.

For Schiff, Jordan "must be included" in the military section of any Middle East peace agreement, if only to ensure it "would cease to be a component of the 'eastern front.' " Whereas Alpher couches the motivation in more positive terms, and would have Hussein's desert kingdom perform multiple roles: regional buffer and collaborator with Israel in deterring Palestinian irredentism or any other provocative military adventurism through a classic geopolitical pincer. In either event, Israelis universally respect the monarchy, regard Jordan as pivotal, especially after the 1994 treaty of peace and cooperation, and assign it unique status. For the very same reasons one has to assume Khalidi's omission does not owe to mere oversight; on the contrary, it mirrors latent Palestinian suspicion of Hashemite motives and the fear that once drawn into a security regime King Hussein's successors might league with Israel against Palestine.

Mirror Image: Israeli-Palestinian Threat Perceptions

Security is, of course, closely related to the nature of the risk any international actor faces, with each type of danger posing different security implications and each requiring a distinct form of response. Taken as a whole, the territories present Israel with a range of threats, internal and external, with the West Bank separate from the Gaza Strip. Bordering Israel along 307 kilometers (184 miles), the West Bank straddles most of Israel's population and industrial centers, as compared with the Gaza Strip, fronting Israel along only 51 kilometers (31 miles) as well as lying further from Israel's urban industrial nerve centers. Indeed, any plan for linking the two areas by cutting across Israel from east to west through a network of air, rail, and land corridors gives birth to yet another potential threat (see chapter 9).

One kind of internal threat a Palestinian state poses are low-level terrorist activities carried out in Israel's heartland, but launched only a few kilometers away from the West Bank or Gaza. Conventional warfare, a second breed of threat, relates to the *strategic* importance of the territories, principally the West Bank, in terms of defending Israel from outside Arab attack.

Threat 1: Terrorism

The Palestinians in and of themselves do not present a strategic military threat to Israel in the foreseeable future. Especially if their prospective final status political entity, whether autonomous or sovereign, is neutralized through demilitarization and/or an Israeli-Jordanian military vise.

Few question that Israel will make limited or full demilitarization of the West Bank a prerequisite,[10] so there is no danger in the conventional sense of Palestinian tanks capturing Tel Aviv with Palestinian combat aircraft flying overhead. On the other hand, the street battles of September 1996 do raise the possibility of a guerrilla warfare capability on the part of armed Palestinian civilians and elements of the Palestinians security apparatus. Although serious, and a clear threat to the lives of Israeli civilians and soldiers, these are not existential threats to the State of Israel. Still, combating terrorism is difficult, and its obliteration, like international crime, all but impossible.

With the establishment of Palestinian autonomy a new reality has been created. Today, most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip no longer live under Israeli occupation. That the Palestinians could do a bet-

ter job of policing their own population and preventing terrorist activities than the Israeli Defense Forces or the General Security Services was one of the basic premises guiding the Israeli team in the Oslo 1 negotiations.

From Premier Rabin on down the feeling was that by lifting military occupation the mass support and legitimacy enjoyed by PLO extremists would be greatly weakened. Also, that self-interest would prompt the Palestine Authority to destroy the infrastructure built up during the years of the intifada by Islamic terrorists in order to (a) continue the process of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and (b) forestall any threats to the authority's own standing from extremist elements.

Subsequent events have exposed the flaw in this logic. It failed to take into account several important factors. That attitudes change slowly. That while Arafat has an interest in preventing terrorist attacks against Israel, he also wants legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab population, many of whom still view terrorist activities, even suicidal and indiscriminate bombings, as an act of patriotism. That he cannot afford to be perceived by Palestinians as a puppet of the Israelis. Also, that the controlled use of Hamas terrorists and armed violence can be an effective political tool and form of pressure in the diplomatic war of nerves with Jerusalem whenever encountering Israeli resistance toward further bargaining concessions. Conversely, Israel for the present still retains leverage of its own, pressuring the Palestinian Authority to combat terrorism through a mixture of threatened economic sanctions, like border closure, and incentives, above all withdrawal from additional West Bank territory.

Presumably, a final settlement resolving all problems outstanding between Israel and the Palestinians would nullify the rationale for terrorism. Still, there is a serious problem with this premise once the IDF does withdraw under the terms of the peace accord. Were anti-Zionist hostility to continue because of religious and ideological opposition to a Jewish state on any Arab and Islamic soil, in the future Israel would still be in a position to threaten nonmilitary economic sanctions and the like. But at that point "hot pursuit" by an elite IDF unit into Arab towns, larger armed incursion, or full-scale reoccupation of the West Bank becomes a virtual impossibility from every angle and standpoint.[11] Militarily, each would meet Palestinian armed resistance. Diplomatically, the United States and other international actors could not be expected to sit passively on the sidelines. And even domestically, in terms of an Israeli public wedded to peace and no longer prepared to endorse cross-border operations with the risk of an incalculable number of casualties, any one of the force

options involves political risk taking with grave repercussions inside Israel.

Threat 2: Invasion

The Middle East has long suffered the reputation for endemic instability. While future political and military constellations in the region are anyone's guess, Israel's basic geopolitical features, and those of the region, are not. They are, rather, a given.

For one thing, the West Bank shares a ninety-seven-kilometer (fifty-eight-mile) border with Jordan; the Gaza Strip, an eleven-kilometer (seven-



11. Close Proximities

mile) frontier with Egypt as well as a maritime boundary. For another, Tel Aviv on a good day is perhaps an hour's drive from Gaza and only twenty minutes from the West Bank, while west Jerusalem is but a few kilometers and a few minutes from the West Bank in three directions.

It is not beyond the realm of the possible for these short permeable boundaries to be exploited by one or more of the neighboring Arab countries in another Arab-Israeli war. In this scenario military forces, including tank units, jet fighter squadrons, and missile batteries, could be inserted into the Palestinian areas—with or without official Palestinian permission, or merely tacit consent—thus favorably positioning the attackers to strike against Israel's exposed heartland.

Considering that the Gaza Strip adjoins the vast and largely demilitarized Sinai buffer zone, there is one major difference between it and the West Bank. An Egyptian expeditionary tank force sent to attack Israel would have to travel the entire breadth of the northern Sinai, which is close to 220 kilometers (132 miles) from the Suez Canal to the border of the Gaza Strip. This ought to afford Israel precious time to call up military reserves and to deploy its forces. Besides, any future Egyptian-Israeli war in all likelihood would be fought deep within the Sinai and not on the Israeli-Gaza Strip frontier. Which makes the strip somewhat less problematic in relative terms from the standpoint of an external military threat.

The same cannot be said for the West Bank. First, the West Bank, as noted, lies astride Israel's most important industrial and population centers as well as its most critical arteries of transportation and communication. The distance between Tulkarem and the Netanya coastline is only some 11 kilometers (a mere 7 miles), making Israel extremely vulnerable to being cut in half by an Arab military force descending from the hills of western Samaria. The Tel-Aviv–Jerusalem road as well as Israel's international airport are also susceptible to attack from the nearby West Bank border, especially from the air.

Second, the West Bank fronts on Jordan. And while it is true Jordan is at peace with Israel and does not, in itself, constitute a direct military threat, nonetheless, it does share borders with stronger, possibly predatory neighbors: Syria to the north and Iraq to the east. Each of them possesses powerful, modern armed forces possessing medium- and long-range offensive capabilities. Either state might intimidate Jordan into serving as a staging area for preparing an attack on Israel, as happened in 1967. Syria in particular, still finding itself blocked by a fortified Israeli military presence concentrated on the Golan Heights and a forward Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon, has the option of a flank-

ing movement, moving through the Jordan salient in order to militarily threaten or possibly attack Israel in tandem with other Arab partners.

Under this scenario Palestinian cooperation in allowing Arab League units to then enter onto the West Bank via Jordan would mean that Israel would be forced back upon defending Jerusalem almost literally from the city ramparts, and the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area from its eastern suburbs of Kfar Saba-Raanana-Petach Tikva. Especially if denied any forward positions along the Jordan River. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a great many Israelis not necessarily identifying with the nationalist-religious ethos of settlements and forward expansion yet wishing to see a strong IDF presence and more direct form of military control of the West Bank, perceived by them as nothing short of critical for the defense of Israel.[12]

On the other hand, the counterargument against Israel holding onto the territories and against presenting it at the negotiating table as absolute and nonnegotiable rests heavily upon the availability of technological alternatives. Sophisticated RPV remotely controlled pilotless vehicles, in addition to advanced sensors, whether ground-based or mounted on aircraft or from balloons, now make over-the-horizon surveillance of the future battlefield possible, and from a considerable distance. These electronic and computerized early warning systems are widely touted as offering real-time information that would enable defending forces either to preempt or to prepare defensively to engage the invader.

The upshot of this thesis is that while the Jordan River should in fact be considered Israel's defense line in terms of a threat from the east, it may not be essential for the IDF physically to occupy the Jordan Valley or even to maintain a standing military presence there. Reinforcement comes from two additional lines of reasoning. First, that with the velocity of missiles and the speed of supersonic jet fighter planes, holding onto the West Bank and/or Jordan Valley provides no real protection. Second, that in the last analysis the Kingdom of Jordan is in reality Israel's first line of defense. Long-standing Israeli military doctrine corroborates this, in that any foreign military incursion into Jordan from any one of the neighboring Arab countries has always been defined as constituting a direct Arab violation of Israel's declaratory red lines policy and therefore a casus belli justifying appropriate military countermeasures.[13]

Again, IDF strategic planning underlines the determination—predicated upon early warning and detection—not to wait for Arab forces to reach the West Bank and to tighten the "noose" around Israel's neck in any repeat of the 1956 and 1967 experiences. Conceivably, new military tech-

nologies can be incorporated into a permanent status military doctrine, alerting Israeli intelligence officers to provocative Arab military activities at the moment Arab forces cross the border from Syria, Iraq, or possibly even Iran into eastern Jordan, thus facilitating Israeli countermeasures well east of the Jordan River.

For the moment, and for both reasons of antiterrorism and strategic defense in depth, Israel continues to insist upon exercising ultimate control over the Gazan-Egyptian frontier as well as the West Bank–Jordanian border.

Threat 3: Sea and Air

Yet a third security concern has to do with Israeli reservations about providing the Palestinians with extensive seaport and airport rights. Resting on the provisions of the Oslo accords as a legal base point, Israel retains complete control of the airspace above the autonomous areas in addition to policing waters off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

Although the Palestinian police are entitled to a naval arm, it is essentially confined to coastal patrol duties within what the Oslo 2 accords refer to as Zone L (up to a distance of six nautical miles from the coast).[14] The Israeli navy, on the other hand, bears exclusive responsibility for overall naval security, including the area between Egyptian territorial waters and Palestinian Authority territorial waters. On the air front, the Palestinians to date operate only several rotary-wing aircraft and must obtain clearance from Israeli aviation authorities in order to fly from one Palestinian province to the other. So that, in security terms, the Israeli air force has undisputed control of the skies, also extending to and above the two autonomous regions.

Nor is this situation likely to change under the terms of the final settlement, if Israel can help it. Air power is singularly important in the emerging Middle Eastern electronic battlefield, and therefore Jerusalem will not willingly allow the Palestinians to build an air force or in any other way restrict Israel's own ability to overfly the territories for purposes of training exercises, reconnaissance, and aerial defense.

However, the Palestinian Authority, for its part, gives early indication of demanding its right to build a seaport and air terminals of its own in the future on the grounds that such facilities are psychologically important for the Palestinians. Sovereignty becomes meaningful when one can enter the territories directly by sea and air rather than via Israeli ports such as Ashdod and Ben-Gurion Airport. Symbolism and distrust likewise explain resistance by Arafat and his representatives to Israel retain-



POINT	GEOGRAPHIC		U.T.M. (Zone 36)	
	LONG (EAST)	LAT (North)	EAST	NORTH
m1	34° 13'07.8"	31° 19'27.4"	615970	3466234
m2	34° 13'58.6"	31° 20'08.2"	617301	3467507
m3	33° 56'41.6"	31° 33'48"	589676	3492475
m4	33° 57'31.7"	31° 34'30.1"	590985	3493785
k1	34° 29'18.2"	31° 35'30.9"	641220	3496217
k2	34° 28'21.1"	31° 34'14.7"	639745	3493850
k3	34° 09'48.4"	31° 46'38.3"	610165	3516393
k4	34° 08'49.9"	31° 45'23.1"	608652	3514063

12. The Proposed Gaza Maritime Zone

ing any supervisory role whatsoever at these eventual port terminals comparable to the border crossings setup. Most ostensibly, because it would allow Israeli security personnel to "return" to Gaza and to operate inside territories formally under PA civil and internal security control.

Expanding the seaport at Gaza and opening the Dahaniya airfield near Rafiah were discussed on numerous occasions in the years 1994–1998. But, with the two sides clearly at a diplomatic impasse, the issue is far from resolved. In the meantime, the airfield, built despite Israeli protests and without authorization, reached completion by 1998. Even once inaugurated, though, it is difficult to picture international flights operating in unfriendly skies without clearance from Israel.

Threat 4: Transit Rights

Incursions from air and sea, Middle East terrorism, and the lingering debate as to whether land will still contribute to in-depth security against the threat of invasion in the twenty-first century are certainly three issues towering over the peace-with-security agenda. Yet arguably no other topic more directly impacts on the nature of Israeli-Palestinian intercourse than the tangible expression given to the accepted international legal norms of "innocent passage," "freedom of movement," and "peaceful commerce."

For members of the European Union or residents and travelers along the U.S.-Canadian-Alaska transcontinental highway the act of transporting people and moving goods through another country's existing state borders has become rather commonplace—an everyday experience to be taken for granted. Even permission for rapid deployment of security forces across frontiers in a situation of emergency, while more sensitive and complicated, is no longer regarded as out of the question.

This is anything but the norm, at least for now (and conceivably for years to come) in Israel/Palestine. Already now the emerging contours of a peace map clearly indicate the need for a complex labyrinth of "safe passages," "vital arteries," and interlocking corridors between the two respective domains (see chapter 9). In the success or failure of this network lies the answer to whether Israelis and Palestinians are destined to form a single spatial and economic unit while insisting, however anachronistic in the eyes of others, on going their separate political ways. Or whether the goal of peaceful daily coexistence is nothing more than wishful thinking, without any practical basis in day-to-day reality.

From an Israeli point of view open passages are of deep and abiding concern. If Palestinians should be permitted to traverse Israeli territory

unsupervised, what protection is there against a determined Islamic terrorist breaking his or her authorized journey, for example, and entering Tel-Aviv instead to carry out a suicidal bombing mission? Earmarking one and possibly multiple existing roads linking Gaza with the West Bank has been proposed; alternatively, building a major new east-west artery intended exclusively for use by the Palestinians. Nevertheless, in either case very real, and practical, questions arise. How can such highway facilities be fully secured? Who is to exercise policing authority? And who will hold legal sovereignty?

To be sure, the seemingly less objectionable option of constructing an elevated, extraterritorial superhighway connecting the territories has also been bandied about. In theory, at least, such a scheme has the obvious merit of allowing Palestinians free unhindered travel on their own *autobahn*-like roadway and yet assuring retention by Israel of full control over the ground beneath. However, not only are the costs considered prohibitive but the psychological effect is to laterally divide Israel. Moreover, it is now apparent that any final status settlement permitting Israeli residents and/or army outposts inside Palestinian-controlled territory creates a certain symmetry, or reciprocity, by making Israeli motorists and supply convoys themselves dependent on the Palestinian regime for assured safe passage. However, in the meantime no successful solution has been found to date for threats of interdiction, harassment, or simply abuse of the privilege of mobility.

Common Security

Being subjected to Israeli internal ("safe passage") as well as external border checks is merely one symptom of Palestinian insecurity. Their overriding fear is that in the face of Israel's local military preponderance the hoped-for Arab state will be entirely vulnerable: from brief "surgical" incursions by the IDF to reoccupation of the entire West Bank. Recognizing that Israel will strenuously oppose any substantial Palestinian militarization, certainly in the first stages of peace, they are therefore attempting to follow what appears to be a three-pronged strategy. Holding out for retrieving as much of the 1967 West Bank territories as possible is one thrust, soliciting outside security guarantees—whether from other Arab states, the UN, the Europeans, or the Americans, is another. While, at the same time, a third objective, modeled on the Shiite Amal and the Hizbollah in southern Lebanon, involves building up an arsenal of small arms, antitank weapons, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, and the like, so

as to be better able to mount an effective resistance against any new Israeli occupation force.

As confirmed by events in September 1996, low-intensity (but by no means low-casualty) urban guerrilla warfare can inflict losses and slow the progress of IDF units. It would also provide Palestinian leaders the hours or days needed to organize a concerted all-Arab or international diplomatic offensive against Israel aimed at forcing it to withdraw. At the same time, Arafat's own Palestinian administrators remain in a subtle interdependent relationship with Israel in defending themselves against such internal threats to their fragile authority as the Islamic Hamas extremist movement. Especially, one imagines, if dissident protest or an uprising should originate at one extremity of the Palestinian state and could only be put down by PA police forces dispatched from the other wing, but only with Jerusalem's sanction.

Israelis and Palestinians are thus each tormented by mirror-image threat perceptions. Extending the parallel, their declared bargaining positions on future border lines are also identical—which is another way of saying contradictory, by virtue of being mutually exclusive—and best summed up as "the more, the better." Both sides have set out to acquire high levels of perceived security through maximum territorial acquisition and minimal territorial concessions. In which instance the mix of inducements and disincentives, fears and expectations may be conspiring to provide the makings—if nothing else—for a mutual *insecurity* regime.

The great nineteenth-century English statesman Lord Castlereagh once remarked that the common purpose in Europe must be "security, and not revenge." The question for late twentieth-century Mideast peacemaking is whether the hard-core Israeli and Palestinian positions on security are at all bridgeable. In this context the words of advice to NATO sounded by Russian foreign minister Yevgeni Primakov that the aim of a security charter should be to create a "common space of security without dividing lines" is overly ambitious and woefully premature.[15] The poignancy of his observation is so much greater for our study. Unlike most countries bordering on each other, Israelis and Palestinians are not going to benefit from having miles of separation between them.

Here, on the eastern Mediterranean, the immediate challenge lies in testing whether a common security structure can yet be built upon even the weakest of foundations.[16] This, in order to begin reducing the disincentives, to alleviate the fears, and to achieve longer-term security through reconciliation.

In principle as well as in practice there are probably only two approaches or stages toward confidence building and security cooperation. One is to stress limitations, as in *dis*engagement, *de*mobilization, *dis*armament, and the like. The other strategy is to augment individual national security efforts, with supplements taking the form of mutual reassurances, joint nonaggression pacts and defense treaties, international guarantees, or a collective security framework. In either case, the essential precondition has got to be a basic willingness on the part of both sides to (a) accept tradeoffs and (b) impose self-restraint. Otherwise, neither limitations nor supplements will be effective in the long run.

Applied to the Israeli and Palestinian security predicament, "security for sovereignty" may be a more serviceable compass than "land for peace." Admittedly, exclusive control over one's borders, including the right to decide who may enter, pass through, and exit, is an important traditional facet of statehood and state security. Yet, as part of the price for peace this particular aspect of Palestinian as well as Israeli territorial independence may have to be waived. Or at least limited in the final settlement in order for them first to achieve in tandem both values: the national legitimacy that comes with formal sovereignty and a higher level of actual security. So, too, the Palestinians are probably going to have to learn to live with an Israeli West Bank security "shadow" over what Israel considers to be an integral part of its legitimate security sphere. Whereas Israelis, for their part, are called upon to gear their thinking toward integrating an Arab Palestinian entity into their security doctrine as no less a security partner than a security menace.

To make physical separation between the Palestinians and Israel a prerequisite for security, as Prime Minister Ehud Barak has done, is a sheer physical impossibility, and therefore a nonstarter, politically and militarily.[17] Rather, in addressing permanent status security-related concerns what becomes increasingly essential for both negotiating parties to bear in mind is that in today's world neither sovereignty nor security are absolutes, merely ratios reflecting degrees of reasonable safety. It is these ratios that must now be transcribed onto the peace map.