3   The Drift into Incivility

"Religion shelters us from violence just as violence seeks shelter in religion."
— René Gerard, *Violence and the Sacred* (1997)

"It is the group boundaries that determine the extent of human sympathy; within these boundaries, humanity prevails; outside them torture is inflicted without qualm."
— Randall Collins, *The Three Faces of Cruelty* (1974)

When, why, and under what circumstances does collective violence become uncivil or drift into incivility? More concretely, how is latent enmity released into open but limited conflict and what exacerbates this hostility to assume the pathological manifestations of random and guilt-free violence? Other than implying, as is conventionally done in defining civil violence (i.e., that civilians rather than regular armed forces are engaged in such civil disturbances), what is so civil about civil violence? Can civil violence, in the first place, ever be civil? Is it not a rhetorical conjunction of incongruous terms, bordering on the oxymoron?

This interest in the link between violence and civility is not, of course, of recent origin. The vision of the world as a battle ground, a blood-splattered arena fit for atavistic gladiators, enjoyed currency long before social Darwinism became salient. Thomas Hobbes's savage portrayal of life in the state of nature as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short, no matter how blunt and extreme, was not just a ringing metaphor. What it asserted, as every schoolboy came to believe, is that humans are one another's natural enemies. More pertinent perhaps to the concerns of this study, Hobbes went further to marvel how ordinary people would behave so atrociously during the English civil war of the 1640s. His answer has lost little of its poignancy. In the absence of government, he told us, the stage is set for a war of all against all, in which no holds are barred. Denied the protection of an able and just government, deprived and threatened groups would do anything to preserve themselves.

More than a century later, Adam Smith espoused competition and ruth-
less struggle to maintain one's self interest as an enabling and constructive
force in society. Freud, of course, went further in accounting for the dis-
quieting implications of man's psychological insecurities. Even when the
sense of physical security is not threatened, people are predisposed to protect
themselves psychologically by pushing their personal insecurities onto oth-
ers. It is always easier to get neighbors and kinsmen to vent their wrath and
pent up hostilities on each other. Outlets for such displaced aggression are
naturally more ravenous in an intimate and closely knit sociocultural setting.

Most nineteenth-century observers, early and late, had few doubts that
the human is fundamentally an aggressive animal. Peter Gay (1993), in his
insightful and probing analysis of the "cultivation of hatred" as a constructive
and destructive force in Victorian society provides persuasive evidence
through the views of some of the towering thinkers of the day to reinforce
the notion that this "sentiment" or "instinct" for destruction is innate in
man. To most nineteenth-century Christian believers, the conviction that
mankind is "inherently wicked — greedy, sensual, mendacious, aggressive —
came naturally" (Gay 1993: 4). To secular thinkers and unbelievers, par-
ticularly those influenced by the views of Herbert Spencer and social Dar-
winism, man's intrinsic combativeness was, of course, an irrefutable premise
on both philosophical and scientific grounds. Herbert Spencer, though not
strictly Darwinian, became the prophet for preaching the survival of the
fittest even if it entailed nasty combativeness and pugnacious rivalry.

Around the turn of the century, William James summed up the post-
Darwinism view when he asserted that "ancestral evolution has made us all
potential warriors" (James 1902: 366). A few years later, Georg Simmel, the
brilliant and enigmatic German sociologist, reiterated the same verdict: that
the human mind is endowed with a "fighting instinct. . . . an inborn need
to hate and fight" (As quoted by Gay 1993: 4).

By the time Ortega y Gasset (1932) warned of the "revolt of the masses,"
the polemics over the nature and consequence of violence took a sharper
turn. For Ortega, the revolt of the masses signaled a most pathological form
of barbarism. It marked a regression to a Hobbesian order and was sustained
by the sheer pleasure of destructiveness. It found expression in random vi-
olence, protracted disorder, the impoverishment and demoralization of pub-
lic life, and the erosion of civility and accepted standards of morality and
decency.

Others, particularly writers like André Gide (1950), J.P. Sartre (1964),
Albert Camus (1956), Paul Goodman (1964), R.D. Laing (1967), Frantz

Fanon (1966), and other spokesmen of Third World insurgency advanced, of course, a more "theraputic" and salutary view of violence. On some occasions, they argued, violence (even barbarism) arises as a necessary stage in the dialectic of self-discovery. In other words, there are times when barbarism can be understood and condoned as a return to sanity, an experience through which society seeks to recover its lost integrity and virtue. This can be witnessed in virtually all post-revolutionary epochs, which are marked by rapid and threatening socioeconomic and political change. In such instances acts of savagery and violence — even coarse, indecorous and boorish behavior — become legitimate moral responses to the rampant immorality and hypocrisy that pervade the social fabric and the body politic.

Such conceptions often border on the "romanticization" of violence and treat it as a rejuvenating and purging force — a sort of rebirth or regeneration through commitment to militancy. Sorel's (1961) assertion that a class can be resurrected through violence or other familiar refrains of insurgency (such as those articulated by Fanon, Debray and Mao), that individuals can become whole again by participating in violent politics, are frequently invoked as a rationalization for violence. In his attack on colonialism, Fanon (1961) goes further to assert that the powerless are entitled to kill their oppressors. By doing so, they are in effect killing two birds in one stone: the oppressor within and the oppressor without.

There has been renewed interest, in recent explorations of the changing incidence and character of armed conflict, in mapping out the interplay among globalization, reawakened communalism, and the "uncivil" character of so-called civil wars. The demise of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire and their tumultuous reverberations throughout the world have, among other things, brought about a perceptible decline in major wars between nation-states. These and associated global events — particularly reform and liberalizing movements in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the presumed homogenizing impact of Western consumerism and popular culture — have reawakened the polemics over the nature and consequences of such transformations.

Some, often in apocalyptic terms, see in these momentous events not just the end of the Cold War or a watershed of a fundamental historical movement, but "the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (Fukuyama 1989: 4). In a similar vein, others herald these epochal transformations as blissful signs of the "retreat from doomsday" or at least as manifestation of the longest stretch of

peace in recent history when the cruelties, "repulsiveness and futility of war" have now come to an end (see Mueller 1989; Melko 1990, among others).

To Singer and Wildavsky (1993), the world now may be divided into two distinct zones; one of peace and another of violent anarchy. The so-called "democratic zone of peace," comprising roughly one-seventh of the world's population, contains the comparatively prosperous and open democracies. This felicitous zone forms a "security community" where the rhetoric of war and militancy has ceased to be the main instrument of politics. Instead, civil peace, mediated and reinforced through nonbelligerent dialogue, voluntarism, competitive elections, and other venues of political participation in public spaces, prevail as the norm. The rest of the world constitutes the "zone of violent anarchy and turmoil." Here societies are entrapped in protracted war, poverty, and lawlessness. Civility, security, stability are longed for but never realized. Instead, people are embroiled in chronic "coups and revolution, civil and international wars and internal massacres and bloody repression."

These celebrated views have not, of course, gone unchallenged. Rebuttals abound. The world clearly cannot fall into such clearly demarcated zones. Even those who live within the so-called democratic zone of peace are "as much if not more troubled by violence than the majority of the world's population" (Keane 1996: 4–5). Some are berated for positing such a unilinear vision of the uninterrupted progression of capitalism into an idyllic facsimile of a conflict-free liberal democracy. They contend that while the world is moving away from bipolarity, it is being beleaguered by new fractious tensions and the reawakening of dormant primordial and primitive hostilities. For example, competition for world markets is likely to generate trade wars, marginalization of growing segments of itinerant labor, and other grievous dislocations. New forms of East/West, North/South, interstate conflict and those provoked by environmental degradations and human rights abuses are also bound to be exacerbated. Nor are the alleged allures of cultural modernity likely to be accepted without resistance. Sharp increases in reactionary movements, fundamentalist militancy, and so-called identity conflicts concerned with the preservation of cultural authenticity, ethnic, and tribal purity attest to this.

In a celebrated and polemical book, Benjamin Barber (1996), avoids such sharp dichotomies and polarization. Instead, he anticipates a world in which the forces of parochial ethnicity and tribalism, as epitomized in *Jihad*, and those of cosmopolitan globalism, as expressed in *McWorld*, are intertwined. Although the two sets of forces underlying each appear antithetical, the

dialectics between them are seen as the central paradox in human history in that both are tearing the world apart and bringing it together. "Jihad" is forged around "communities of blood, rooted in exclusion and hatred, communities that slight democracy in favor of tyrannical paternalism or consensual tribalism." "McWorld" forges global markets rooted in consumption and profit"(Barber 1996: 6–7). While the former are driven by parochial hatreds and thus re-create ancient ethnic borders from within; the latter, propelled by universalizing markets, are inclined to render national borders more porous from without. Both, however, Barber warns, are bound to undermine state sovereignty and democracy. Both harbor a strong "indifference to civil liberties."

Globalism and Uncivil Wars

Controversy over these and related issues notwithstanding, one can discern a convergence of views on a few issues.

First, while these changes are associated with the decline of major wars between nation states, they have left in their wake a trail of bewildering and destabilizing transformations. In some instances this has led to the consolidation of larger entities and the longing for "European Homeland" and the burgeoning interest in such global issues as the environment, human rights, labor migration, world terrorism, epidemics, drug, and trade wars. In others, we see unmistakable evidence of a sharp increase in the incidence of so-called low-intensity conflict (LIC), mostly internal and communal forms of strife fueled by ideological, ethnic, racial, sectarian, and tribal tensions and solidarities. In either case, as Hüppauf has urged recently, "the line dividing war and peace has been blurred beyond recognition and civil society does not lead to the eradication of but continues to co-exist with violence" (Hüppauf 1996:2).

More important, most of these internal wars are sustained with outside assistance and patronage, thereby reconfirming the complexities of the interplay among local, national, regional, and international rivalries. It is also then that they degenerate into "Dirty Wars"; i.e., the proxy battlegrounds for other peoples' wars and the surrogate victims of unresolved regional and global tensions. One prime characteristic of all such wars, of which Lebanon and Yugoslavia are often cited as poignant examples, is the deliberate targeting of innocent civilian groups and the pervasive mood of unrelenting terror and fear that blankets the entire population.

Second, these world-wide "uncivil wars" have the tendency to degenerate into conflagrations that depart from the old moral precepts of "just wars." In other words, the costs of these wars, in proportion to their ends, are both unjust and uncivil. They are unjust because they are much too costly. The magnitude of destruction — both to life and property — are too high in terms of the accomplishments of the wars. They violate what Michael Walzer calls "the maxim of proportionality" (Walzer 1992: xvi). They are uncivil because the violence and destruction are usually indiscriminate, random, reckless. Innocent civilians are disproportionately victimized.

It is not being suggested here that previous civil wars were bloodless. Rather that the bloodshed, as John Keane argues, had a structure and organized form. Many of today's wars by comparison seem to lack this coherent logic other than murder on an unlimited scale (Keane 1996: 137). Furthermore the wars are "uncivil" not only because they violate rational calculation strategies, but also because violence begins to take on a life of its own. Rather than being politics by some other means, violence becomes an end in itself. Its "perversely self-destructive dynamics" becomes, in the words of Keane, "self-propagating."

This "revolving-door" of relentless cycles of violence, quite often provoked by "unidentified assailants" became, as will be seen, the most striking feature of protracted strife in Lebanon. Each bloody episode was begetting its own avenging reactions. Curiously, the episodes appear to take place at moments preceded by inexplicable lulls in the intensity of fighting or, equally puzzling, when prospects for reconciliation seemed auspicious.

For example, on that infamous day Kata'ib Party leader Pierre Gemayyel made a reconciliatory visit to Damascus (December 6, 1976), the bodies of four slain Kata'ib activists were found on a hillside east of Beirut. Without waiting even for Gemayyel's return from Damascus, Kata'ib militiamen went on a rampage and rounded up and summarily killed more than seventy Muslims picked at random on the basis of their ID notification of their religious affiliation. This "Black Saturday," as the label that dark day acquired, became a grim threshold for ushering in other such mindless vendettas.

When in the fall of 1976 the Kata'ib and other Christian militias launched their "cleaning" up operations culminating in the siege and "liberation" of Tel al-Zaatar and other suburbs (such as Dbayyeh, Maslakh, Qarantina, Jisr al-Basha, Nabaa and other mixed neighborhood in areas under their control) the LNM and their Palestinian allies retaliated by besieging the Maronite town of Damour on the coast south of Beirut. More than 500

people, it is assumed, lost their lives in Damour, as was also the case in Quarantina.

When Kamal Jumblat was assassinated, along with two of his close associates, on March 16, 1977, on his way home in Mukhtara, his outraged Druze kinsmen sought revenge among their most likely surrogate enemies. Though the assassination was attributed to Syrian agents, his frenzied followers went on a rampage and slaughtered more than 170 Christians in adjacent villages. In a vengeful act of impassioned *quid-pro-quo*, the proverbial Christian–Druze coexistence in the Shuf was dealt a grievous and irretrievable blow.

Avenging the death of Bashir Gemayel was much more gruesome in substance and implications. When the youthful President-elect was killed in the massive explosions that ripped through the phalangist headquarters in East Beirut (September 14, 1982), it did not take long for his bereaved followers to retaliate for their stricken leader. The incident released a flush of contemptuous outrage. As in other such episodes, the fury was not, of course, directed against those who might have had a hand in the tragedy. Instead, it was discharged on the most vulnerable and accessible proxy targets: Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Shatila camps. Given the outrage and the protection the perpetrators of the massacre had received, the victimization was bound to be gruesome. It turned out to be more barbarous than all expectations. Though the area was monitored at the time by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Gemayel's own militia, reinforced by members of Major Haddad's South Lebanese Army (SLA), managed to get through and indulged in two days of utter bestiality. Indeed, they were deliberately let in by the Israelis. Close to 2,000 people, mostly children, women and elderly, were butchered. The IDF, clearly did nothing to stop or contain the pogrom.

Even state-sponsored invasions were not averse to such tit-for-tat strategies. When no legitimate grounds for retaliatory measures were available, alibis or "provocations" were willfully fabricated. The Israeli invasion of 1982 was one fully documented instance of such strategies. Menachem Begin, as Israeli Prime Minister, had promised President Reagan that Israel would not launch an attack on south Lebanon without a clear provocation from Palestinian or Syrian forces. For more than a year the Lebanese Southern borders were fairly quiet. The "Sinai Observers Agreement" between Egypt and Israel was signed. Saudi Arabia issued their bold declaration, the first to be made by an Arab regime, regarding Israel's right to exist. The U.S., Egypt and Israel were engaged in negotiations toward some kind of self-rule for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Yet, despite all these reassuring

signals, Israel sought to officially annex the Golan Heights, which had been captured from Syria in 1967. Shortly before the invasion (May 9, 1982), Israel shot down two Syrian MIGs during a routine reconnaissance over Lebanon. But the real pretext, the immediate "provocation" for the invasion, came when the Israeli Ambassador to Britain was shot down and seriously wounded in London.[1]

The incivility and futility of strife became more visible precisely because such atavistic forms of self-administered retributive justice were bereft of any redemptive or restorative value. The more merciless the scope and intensity of vengeful violence, the more remote the likelihood of reconciliation. It is also then that the vertical divisions started to assume a more fractious character. Communities became more cloistered and, hence, less inclined to entertain schemes for coexistence and cooperation.

Cruelty not only begets cruelty. It also becomes the breeding ground for bigots and hard-liners. In the wake of those early confrontations, the Damour Brigade of the Lebanese Forces vowed to avenge their fallen townsmen and relatives. They swore not to stop fighting until all Palestinians were driven out of Lebanon. Other Maronite leaders declared that if they fail to curb or restrain Palestinian presence in Lebanon, they would advocate a secessionist-separatist all-Maronite enclave. The LNM and their leftist allies retaliated by declaring that they would take measures to foreclose the political isolation of the Kata'ib.

Third, observers are not concerned simply about the increasing incidence of such local uncivil wars. In many places in the world, their form and content are undergoing such sharp transformations that they can no longer be understood, it is claimed, by the conventional analysis of ordinary civil wars, such as class struggle, national liberation, youth protest or ideological rifts and party rivalries. To a considerable extent they are akin to, or at least have much in common with, what Keane labels as a "late modern regression into 'primitive' or 'tribal' warfare" (Keane 1996: 136). Likewise Robert Kaplan speaks about the emergence of "re-primitivized man: a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalism in the grip of low intensity conflict" (Kaplan: 1994: 56).

Much of the internecine and intracommunal rivalries between the major combatants took the form of such "turf battles." These conflagrations had, naturally, more in common with tribal and factional feuds than with conventional warfare, revolutionary struggles, or class and ideological conflicts. They are also much bloodier than the benign label "low intensity conflict" suggests. Indeed, they are all the more baffling and painful because the

bloodletting is endogenous; as incredulous and abhorrent as the muted cru-elties of "intimate violence" or the futile victims of "friendly fire." All the malevolent and self-destructive inner logic of violence is manifest here: i.e., the corrosive proclivity of groups embroiled in conflict to eliminate potential competitors from within their own groups to enhance and consolidate their belligerency against their enemies without.

Here again the original sources which might have provoked the initial hostilities become irrelevant. Caught up in the frenzy of blood-letting, com-batants began to kill those they can; not those they want. Little wonder that such internecine violence turns out to be the most atrocious. Its ultimate pathos is not only inherent in the heavy toll of innocent victims it generates, but, more perfidious, it is often inflicted upon, and by, groups with known identities and histories. People were literally killing their neighbors and friends of yesterday. This is why in the early rounds of fighting, militias and fighters in close combat often resorted to wearing masks to conceal their identities.

Virtually all the militias have had their hands stained by the blood of their own brothers. Initially, this was most apparent in the infighting between and among Palestinian factions. Early in 1977, mainline Palestinians of the PLO were already engaged in pitched battles with those of the PFLP-General Command and the Arab Rejection and Liberation Fronts. At other times, the Syrian-sponsored Sa'iqa were fighting others, particularly those with leanings toward Iraq or Libya. Often rival factions within single camps (such as those between Arafat and Abu Musa loyalists within Fateh), were riven with fierce clashes.

Among Shi'ites, the infighting between Syrian-supported Amal and Iranian-supported Hizbullah was equally ferocious. These conflicts were ex-acerbated by their shifting global and regional sponsors. For example, when Iran became suspicious of Syria's rapprochement with Washington, after 1988, it gave Hizbullah a freer hand in undermining Syria's proxy powers within the Shi'ite community. More perplexing, sometimes Hizbullah would be at war with a Syrian-supported militia in the Beqa while fighting on the side of another Syrian-supported militia in south Lebanon.[2]

The most ruthless, however, were the turf wars among the Maronite mi-litias and their contentious warlords. Coalitions and alliances readily broke up into fragmented factions, each vying to extend and consolidate its powers. Bashir Gemayyel's swift political ascendancy was largely a byproduct of the ruthlessness he displayed in eliminating potential rivals (e.g. Tony Franjieh and Dany Chamoun, both presidential hopefuls) in his quest to claim the

leadership of the Maronite community and, ultimately, Lebanon. In May of 1978 he encountered little resistance when his Phalangist militias attacked the coveted and strategic region of Safra and destroyed the military infrastructure of Chamoun's Tigers, the militia of the National Liberal Party (NLP). The elimination of Tony Franjieh was far more gruesome. Masterminded and led by Elie Hobeika, Phalangist forces raided Ihden (June 13 1978) and massacred Franjieh, his wife and child, and twenty-five of his followers.

The rivalry and intermittent clashes between Samir Ja'ja and Elie Hobeika for the leadership of the Lebanese Forces and the final showdown in September of 1986, was costlier and much more divisive. Hobeika's militia, reinforced by Syrian-backed Muslims from West Beirut, crossed over to confront the Ja'ja-Gemayyel coalition. Though Hobeika's incursion into the Christian enclave was repelled, it was the first such fateful crossover. It left grievous repercussions other than the heavy toll of casualties and destruction.

By far the most destructive of the intra-Maronite turf wars was the final confrontation between Ja'ja and General Awn. This was more than just a turf war since it pitted two Maronite diehards who entertained two distinct visions for safeguarding and bolstering Christian sovereignty. Ja'ja was calling for a "Federal Lebanon" to be partitioned among its various sectarian communities. Awn, on the other hand, favored a broader more Lebanonist vision, reflecting a "Greater Lebanon" of the past, than the constricted Maronite nationalist view envisioned by Ja'ja and the Lebanese Forces. Much like the cryptic biblical story of Cain and Abel, the sibling rivalry between Ja'ja and Awn was equally enigmatic in the hidden meanings it evoked.[3] This morbid legacy was clearly alive in Lebanon and equally brutal. Given the urban density of the Christian enclave and the technologies of destruction available to both (thanks to Iraq's Saddam Hussein), the campaign was bound to be devastating in its terror and ferocity. Patriarch Nusrallah Sfeir, like other outraged Maronite leaders, bemoaned this round of bloodletting as "collective suicide." After six weeks of reckless fighting and abortive cease fires, more than 1,000 lives were lost. This was more, incidentally, than the toll of devastations spawned by six months of artillery bombardment by the Syrians in 1989 (Winslow 1996: 276–77).

Finally, Lebanon's encounters with collective violence reconfirm another compelling feature of the so-called "new uncivil wars," particularly in the manner with which such wars violate another fundamental attribute of just-war theory. As articulated by Walzer, civil wars are considered "just" if they are seen as efforts to restore the *status quo ante*. In this fundamental sense,

the wars of 1975–90, more so perhaps than their predecessors, were "unjust" because they rendered any prospects for secular reform all the more remote. They also eliminated the return or restoration of the modicum of civility, along with the liberal and plural coexistence of the pre-war period.

The Pathologies of Protracted Violence

All wars are atrocious. The horrors spawned by the Lebanese wars are particularly galling, I have been suggesting, because they were not anchored in any recognizable and coherent set of causes nor have they resolved the issues that might have sparked the initial hostilities. It is in this poignant sense that they have been wasteful, ugly, and unfinished. All they did is foment and regenerate a deepening legacy of enmity, suspicion, and implacable chasms and widening rifts within and among its communities. I wish to go further and suggest that they have bequeathed a maelstrom of unforeseen cruelties of their own, which have compounded this drift or descent into incivility.

Though each of the episodes has been subjected to extensive and repeated study, no synthetic or composite effort has been made thus far to reexamine the interludes together to extract and highlight their defining elements. Despite their varied historical contexts, they do evince recurrent features, which elucidate the intimate interplay between the magnitude of collective violence, reawakened communal solidarities, and foreign intrusion. Some of these features have become distinctive characteristics of Lebanon's political culture. Others share much with instances of collective violence in comparable historical settings. A few merit brief mention here as a preamble to the elaborate and more substantive documentation in subsequent chapters.

First and, perhaps, most striking is the distinction that needs to be borne in mind between the factors which *initiate* the conflict and those which *sustain* and compound its magnitude and consequences. Hopefully, it will be made apparent that the circumstances which impelled marginalized and oppressed groups to political violence were not necessarily those which sustained their mobilization and informed the direction, character, and outcome of conflict. This outstanding feature, which incidentally is overlooked by both theoretical and empirical studies of conflict, was to resurface time and again in all the interludes under study. For example, all the peasant uprisings in nineteenth-century Lebanon were initially sparked off by a sense

of collective conscience and a concern for public welfare. Yet, all were deflected, at one point or another, into confessional hostility. Likewise, episodes of communal conflict, originally provoked by socioeconomic disparities and legitimate grievances, were transformed (or deformed) into factional rivalry. The enthusiasm for "class" struggle and collective mobilization espoused by Christian peasants in the North during the peasant uprisings of 1820 found little appeal among their counterparts in the Druze districts. By arousing latent confessional enmity, traditional Druze leaders could easily manipulate such sentiments to ward off or caution against such involvement. The lapse of nearly forty years (from 1820 to 1860) had done little in other words, to transform the loyalties and attachments of peasants.

The brush with civil unrest in 1958, comparatively brief as it was, also displayed this dramatic turnaround from a socioeconomic and political rivalry over "divisible goods" into a belligerent and fierce struggle over "indivisible principles." As this happened the character and magnitude of strife became visibly more boisterous and bloody. Grievances, strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of collective protest were transformed into armed clashes and bitter sectarian warfare. The protracted hostilities of 1975–90 were replete with such instances where the fighting acquired a life of its own and was propelled into directions unrelated to the initial sources of the conflict.

Another defining element stands out, one that also will inform much of our composite portrait of protracted strife. Initially, the uprisings tended to employ nonbelligerent forms of collective protest such as rallies, mass gatherings, petitions, refusing payments of rent and other feudal impositions. On the whole, however, even when the confrontations became more contentious, the resort to violence involved little more than the ordinary rifles and hatchets common at the time in factional combat and local rivalries.

By the time regional and European powers were drawn into the conflict, violence, in most instances, had escalated into actual warfare with regular armies, reinforced by the technologies of mass destruction; e.g., massive troop movements, naval blockades, bombardment, heavy artillery and the like. It is also then the damage to life and property became inevitably more devastating (Smilianskaya 1972:81; al-Shidyaq 1954, II: 226).

Another related feature, one which prefigured most encounters with collective strife, became more manifest: Insurgents, peasants, rebels rarely acted alone. In all episodes of peasant uprisings, for example, organizational and ideological leadership was assumed by Maronite clerics. It was they who first articulated the peasants' revolutionary attitude toward the feudal system. They organized them into village communes and appointed *wakils* as spokesmen

for the 'ammiyyah. In addition to ecclesiastical intervention, the peasants almost always received either the direct or moral support of Ottoman officials and foreign consuls. As usual these were inclined to manipulate the uprisings for purposes unrelated to the grievances of the peasants as a protest movement. The Ottomans were always eager to undermine the privileged status of Mount Lebanon and the local authority of feudal chiefs. Indeed, playing one group against another became an apt euphemism for Ottoman repression.

Foreign powers, always eager to gain inroads into the Middle East and win protégés, also reverted to the same divisive strategies. This was particularly apparent in 1840. While European powers (France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia) were all acting in unison to release Syria from its Egyptian occupiers, each had their own diplomatic agendas. Sometimes discord within any of the countries, globally or regionally, would leave its reverberations on the course and outcome of the rebellion. Hence, as will be seen, many of the local uprisings would be deflected into a regional or global crisis. Indignant peasants, already violated by the adverse effects of European economic penetrations, were victimized further. Kisrwan, in the process, was assailed into a proxy battleground for other people's wars.

The internationalization of the conflict in 1958 also contributed to the protraction and escalation of hostility. Events outside Lebanon (i.e. the Suez Crisis of 1956, the formation of the UAR in February of 1958, and the Iraqi coup in July of 1958) raised the specter of growing Soviet influence in the region and undermined Western interests. Heated debates in the Arab league and the Security Council, riveting world attention and the ultimate landing of U.S. troops, did little to address or assuage the internal sources of discord. The intervention, as was the case on repeated occasions in 1975–90, served only to polarize the factions and deepen sources of confessional hostility and fear.

A third element was the way violence, both in the nineteenth century and 1958, acquired its own momentum and began to generate its own belligerent episodes. Embattled groups were entrapped in an escalating spiral of vengeance and retribution; a feature which became much more pronounced and devastating in 1975–90. In such highly charged settings, the most trivial slight or petty personal encounter can become, as was to happen time and time again, an occasion for the shedding of blood. Hypersensitivity to being insulted or violated, nurtured by unresolved hostility, almost always provokes a tendency to retaliate out of proportion to the initial offense.

This too became another indelible feature of Lebanon's entrapment in recurrent and escalating cycles of vindictive violence. One has only to read

war diaries and accounts of combatants, dispassionate observers, or neutral bystanders to highlight the belligerent implications inherent in such predispositions. In times of combat and periods of heightened hostility, communities are abuzz with pejorative inflections, insulting innuendoes, and the arrogant rhetoric of boastful muscle-flexing. Each maligns the other. They trade invectives, fabricate incriminating episodes only to reconfirm all the abusive epithets they had harbored about each other for so long. Even communities with no such visible history of violence or enmity between them were drawn into the vortex of combat. No sooner, for example, did the fighting break out in the early rounds of 1975–76, than permeable neighborhoods of "West" and "East" Beirut become transformed into barricaded and partitioned enclosures with their own warlords, militias, media, war system, and subcultural manifestations.

Residents of "East" Beirut, with its predominantly Christian and Right-wing leaning groups, would depict the "Western" suburbs as an insecure, chaotic, disorderly mass of "alien," "unattached," and "unanchored" groups aroused by "borrowed ideologies" and an insatiable appetite for lawlessness and boorish decadence. In turn, residents of "West" Beirut portrayed the Eastern quarters of the city and its sprawling suburbs to the north as a self-enclosed "isolationist" ghetto dominated by the overpowering control and hegemony of fascist-like organizations where strangers are suspect and treated with contempt.

Finally, the relentless suffering of the Lebanese epitomizes another curious anomaly, which departs from the experience of conventional civil wars. As John Keane (1995) reminds us, not only is the defining and crucial attribute of any civil war inherent in the use of direct violence by the protagonists against their enemies, but also that at some point, after the conflict or insurrection explodes into the open, the outcome of the conflict must be decided. To Keane, a civil war normally may be considered to have ceased when one of the following three conditions has transpired: (1) When one faction forcibly subjugates its opponent as in the American Civil War; (2) when the warring parties manage to establish their independence from each other, as in the case of the separation of Holland and Belgium; (3) or when the combatants are mutually exhausted and they opt, as in the War of Roses, to arrange a temporary truce.

None of these circumstances have ever transpired in Lebanon. It is in this fundamental sense that the country's "civil" wars have been "uncivil." Perhaps because of the overriding ethos of "no victor, no vanquished," which has long characterized its checkered political history, even bloody and often

decisive confrontations (as happened repeatedly in the nineteenth century), never ended, or were never permitted to end, by the unequivocal defeat or victory of one group over the other.

The role of foreign brokers, in earlier and more recent episodes of civil strife, in either mystifying or obstructing the decisive resolutions of such encounters, cannot and should not be overlooked. As we shall see, patrons (self-appointed or otherwise) often for considerations unrelated to the indigenous conflict, intercede on behalf of their respective client groups. Instances of such meddling are legion. So are the alibis. In the name of amity, equity, balance, stability, peace, geopolitical considerations; if not mercy or the empowerment of threatened communities, power-brokers have never shied away from such alibis to rationalize or disguise their intervention. In fact, at times, like the proverbial fearless fools rushing in, they too have been embroiled in the country's quagmire; thereby exacerbating the tension they were alleged to contain. Their embattled client groups are once again transformed, as in earlier such episodes, into passive, helpless pawns caught up in an inexorable process. Lebanon is perhaps unique among nation-states in that it has never fully or freely willed its entry or exit from war.

Virtually all the episodes of communal strife in the nineteenth century reconfirmed this anomalous ethos of "no victor and no vanquished." The events of 1958, as will be seen, were yet another costly repetition of this unheeded lesson of history.

The outbreak of fighting had hardly started in 1975 when the disruptive and escalating character of the inside-outside dialectic was already strikingly visible. Fuad Faris, a leading strategist of the left alliance, was plain and unambiguous in affirming this relationship. He was also revealing the belligerent underside of the egregious interplay and a basic premise of this study; namely that the forces which initiate strife are not necessary the same which sustain and heighten its brutality.

> It must be concluded that, while Lebanon contained the necessary ingredients for an armed confrontation between the internal opposing parties, the brutality and bloodiness of the Lebanese war, its prolongation and delayed outcome, are primarily due to the increased interference of external forces and the meddling of foreign governments (Faris 1976: 175).

Had any of the earlier episodes of political strife been more explicitly resolved, by designating a winner and a loser, and resolving, thereby, the

decisive issues associated with each, then perhaps Lebanon might have been spared many of the costly trials and tribulations of subsequent turmoil. If there is, after all, any logic inherent in the structure of war; any war, just or unjust, it is normally a derivative of some of the assumed benefits the victors come to enjoy. For only at the end of the war do the rewards of injuring occur, particularly the enactment of the winner's issues.

Once again, Bowyer Bell delivers another instructive message. "Every civil war," he tells us, "ends with the effect of a revolution: the construction of a society with institutions and values that create an intolerable life for a substantial portion of the defeated, whose very identities had been first transformed by the polarization and then shattered. The vicious, almost permanent psychic wounds of civil war are less a result of the cruelty of the contest, the extensive violence, battles of vengeance, and wanton destruction, than of the 'intolerable' terms of defeat, which must be 'tolerated' by one side and imposed, year after year, by the other" (Bowyer Bell 1987).

All the adversaries in Lebanon must, doubtless, realize that they are likewise caught in this double-binding predicament. They, too, have opted to suffer the more "tolerable" cruelties of protracted strife rather than the "intolerable" psychic wounds of defeat. Since, to many, sustaining the war meant at times no more than a discourse of belligerency, with its warring postures and rhetorical gestures, it is clearly more dignifying than the humiliation of defeat. And defeat in Lebanon will most certainly involve, at least to the major adversaries, exclusion from the reality of the old dreams and/or unwillful participation in a new and abhorrent world.

More perhaps than any other foreign broker, Syria has been quite adept at maneuvering its brinkmanship in Lebanon to reinforce the circumstances in favor of this attenuated myth of "no victor, no vanquished." Indeed, when it dispatched Syrian-based units of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) into Lebanon early in 1976, Syria made very explicit what its avowed objectives were; namely to ensure that neither side in the war emerged as victorious or upset the delicate equilibrium of forces. In January of 1976, they restrained the Maronite forces when they were gaining the upper hand. Six months later they turned to contain the Palestinian and Muslim left coalition when the logistics of fighting swung in their favor. This same oscillating and adept reflexivity has characterized Syria's strategies in maintaining its patronizing relationship with all its client groups in Lebanon. No groups were allowed to gain sufficient supremacy or hegemony over the others. Even prominent leaders who evinced such predilections were either cowed into political subservience or eliminated.

Syria's role in the Ta'if Accord of 1989, which was supposed to have heralded Lebanon's Second Republic, was also predicated on the premise that the "no victor, no vanquished" formula is still a desirable and workable arrangement. The Accord though, judging by its contentious birth, is still riddled with uncertainties. It clearly has not, as we shall see, reassured or appeased all communities that there are no real victors or vanquished. Nor has it safeguarded the country's sovereignty or achieved the desired political consensus and national integration.

Foremost, Ta'if embraced the principle of abolishing religious affiliation for filling all government positions, yet few practical steps have been taken thus far to accomplish it. More critical, the corrective constitutional changes stipulated by the Accord (i.e. more equitable system of power sharing by way of redressing the pro-Christian and pro-Maronite bias of the earlier system) were supposed to be implemented without undermining the political stand- ing of Christians or inviting their fears. Stipulations of Ta'if notwithstanding, large portions of the Christian community continue to harbor strong anti- pathies for what they term *al-ihbat al-Masihi* (Christian hopelessness and discontent). The de-facto balance of political power has visibly shifted toward Muslims. A whole generation of Maronite leaders—particularly those in- volved in the last phases of 1975–90 war—have either been jailed (Samir Ja'ja'), banished (Michael Awn) or were forced into exile (Raymond Edde and Amin Gemayyel). No alternate core of forceful leadership looms in the horizon. While all other communities appear to enjoy uncontested leaders or spokesmen, the Maronites seem leaderless, splintered and bereft of com- pelling voices apart perhaps from the Patriarch.

More disheartening Lebanon remains today virtually under Syria's he- gemony; almost akin to a subservient satellite state. Such transgression of Lebanon's sovereignty could not have been sustained without international acknowledgement and tacit approval or support. Ta'if, for example (in which Damascus incidentally was one of its major architects), calls for the rede- ployment of the 30,000 Syrian troops stationed in Lebanon two years after the implementation of constitutional changes. This stipulation has been arbitrarily overlooked. At least it has been reinterpreted by Syrian authorities to mean that no substantial redeployment or withdrawal of their troops from Lebanon can be expected before a final Israeli pullout from Southern Leb- anon. Incidentally, this is why the issue came to a head directly after the Israeli withdrawal.

Damascus is also allowed to meddle with the political life of the country; both the broader macro issues of destiny hinging on foreign policy and

external security along with the intricacies of petty local politics. Recent measures reflecting growing state authoritarianism, curtailment of media pluralism and permissive audiovisual networks (e.g. 100 radio and 50 TV stations), and postponement of municipal elections are all done largely with Syria's tutelage and prodding. Lebanon's economy, however, is not tinkered with. The country's proverbial laissez faire and free enterprise, with its aggressive freewheeling entrepreneurs and open-market credit facilities are perceived as Syria's Hong Kong. Beirut is today, doubtlessly, the largest construction site in the Middle East. The massive reconstruction efforts, let alone drug trafficking in the Beqá and the rampant kickbacks from public projects, provides lucrative outlets for Syria's economy and its superfluous manpower.

Within such a setting, Lebanon remains hostage to circumstances that render the inveterate inside-outside dialectics all the more vulnerable. It does not take much for Syria to maneuver any of its key proxies to destabilize the internal security and thereby justify its continued presence in Lebanon.

The Sanctification of Cruelty

One poignant inference may be inevitably deduced from our discussion thus far: that Lebanon's encounters with civil unrest have been largely unjust and uncivil. Despite the immensity of suffering and victimization, the country today is in a less enviable condition, while the prospects of restoring pre-war civility (always precarious at best) are much more remote and improbable.

In light of the above, the nagging question resurfaces and needs to be restated: How could this fairly peaceful and resourceful society, with a comparatively impressive history of viable pluralism, co-existence and republicanism, become brainwashed into so much barbarism and incivility?

We have thus far sought the answer, like most scholars seem to be doing recently, in the so-called inside-outside dialectics and, more concretely in the case of Lebanon, in some of the macro geopolitical forces of unresolved regional and global rivalries and the belligerency inherent in reawakened communalism. Part of the answer may still be sought, I have been suggesting, in the unfolding and escalating character of communal violence itself. Once unleashed, violence is hard to quell, while its perversely self-destructive dynamics acquire a life of their own. In more conceptual terms, violence in this case is no longer a dependent variable but becomes an independent variable propelling and reproducing its own consequences.

By shifting the focus of inquiry in this manner we can better understand not only the forces associated with the origin and antecedents of violence but also those circumstances which sustain, reproduce, and escalate its intensity. By doing so we can also make judicious use of some insightful theoretical contributions often overlooked in such explorations.

Foremost, the existential experience of Lebanon, particularly since it is entrapped in such an atrocious and unyielding cycle of vengeance and reprisal epitomize the three sociocultural elements Paul Ricoeur attributes to any form of human evil, namely: "defilement," "sin," and "guilt" (Ricoeur 1967). By defiling (debasing and demonizing) the "other," it is much easier to sanction his killing and, hence create conditions for guilt-free violence. Natalie Davis (1975) in her analysis of popular religious rioting in sixteenth-century France, also talks about the "rites of violence" to elucidate the strategies Protestants and Catholics engaged in to "defile," "pollute," "desecrate" the other. Here, as well, we are given vivid evidence of how victims were dehumanized, which generated conditions for "guilt-free massacres" (Davis 1975: 181).

One is struck, the lapse of four centuries notwithstanding, by how comparable the manifestations of communal violence are. The mutual vilification; how Protestants were viewed as "vessels of pollution," while Catholic priests were "lewd" and accused of converting churches into brothels and arsenal depots. Masses, on both sides, were considered "filthy," "vile," and "diabolic." Hence, combatants are made to feel more comfortable about the merciless suffering they inflict on their reinvented enemies. All other atrocities normally elicited by the cruelties of confessional bloodletting — the desecration of religious edifices and symbols, mutilation of corpses, dehumanization of victims, etc. — had their analogues in Lebanon (Davis 1975: 156–81).

The exploitation of religious symbolism by inciting sectarian bigotry and reawakening the predatory forces of confessional zealotry became, doubtless, the most atrocious feature of the prolonged hostilities of 1975–90. In a culture pregnant with religious consciousness and latent sectarian enmity, defamatory attributions become more volatile. Negative stereotypes, lodged in the collective memory of each community, are reawakened. Little wonder that conflict came to assume all the manifestations of a baleful and deadly contest. The ugly events of the war are strewn with such vengeful episodes. One sectarian massacre begetting another of more appalling proportions. Some "unidentified elements" or "undisciplined" assailants are always held accountable.

With or without such scapegoats to alleviate collective guilt and mask the true identity of assailants, the fighting descends into the abyss of a zero-sum

fierce rivalry, where the perceived victory of one group is achieved by the deprivation of the other. Again and again, the omnipresent binary categories of diabolic "them" and virtuous "us" resurface with sharper intensity. Hence it is either a victory for "us" or a victory for "them." The enemy is demonized further and the conflict is seen as a war between light and darkness, between the virtuous and the damned.

Much can be extracted from the massive propaganda literature and pamphleteering at various stages of the 1975–90 Lebanese war to substantiate the strategies employed by adversaries for manufacturing enmity and sanctioning violence. A cursory content analysis of two such prominent documents — the Kaslik, on behalf of the Christian Lebanese Front and the so-called "Aramoun Summit," on behalf of the predominantly Muslim National Movement (LNM) — reveals the depth of the polemics, mutual vilification, and consequent sanctification of violence against the "other." Considering the vile attributions they assign to each other, fighters involved in such purifying bloodbaths are not only purged of their guilt. They are also glorified into patriots and national heroes.

Bowyer Bell accounts for the legitimization of violence in Ireland in almost identical terms:

> In sum, all the actors feel legitimate, and all act within a tradition that authorizes their strategies and limits their tactics. Each is a patriot, none a murderer. All are rational, some even reasonable, their course, if single-minded, set from a partially understood past toward a specific if improbable goal. As with most other lethal political questions, the ground has been strewn with myths, special pleading, fine slogans, and elegant rationalizations. The distant observer may select from the lot, but the burden here is relatively simple. Even if the perceptions of those involved differ from those of the alien eye, the gunmen are not mindless, and their strategies and tactics are shaped by tradition and policy (Bowyer Bell: 1987: 169).

The implication here is that we should not dismiss or account for violence as though it is merely a byproduct of crazed or deprived groups or those driven by the frenzy of aroused religious passions. Gunmen, in other words, Bowyer Bell tells us, are not "mindless." Rather, they are shaped and socially constructed within a cultural tradition that authorizes and legitimates their violence.

Natalie Davis also reiterates this view. The Protestant-Catholic rioting she explored in sixteenth-century France is explained not in terms of how crazy,

frustrated, deprived, uprooted groups were (though they may sometimes have such characteristics), but in terms of the goals of their actions and in terms of the roles and patterns of behavior allowed by their culture. It is in this fundamental sense that religious violence is related here less to the pathological than to the normal (Davis 1975: 185–86).

By focusing on the "normalization" of communal and civil strife, one is able to avoid some of the pitfalls often underlying the conventional analysis of episodes of religious and ethnic conflict. Two approaches, in particular, stand out and continue to survive in accounting for the persistence of sectarian hostility. Occasionally they resurface and are extended to account for the pathologies of terrorism and radicalization of Islam.

One approach perceives religious violence as an extraordinary event, the product of frenzy or the frustrated and/or atavistic impulses of irrational and "primitive" minds. Such impulses are symptomatic of the reawakening of the deeply rooted hostility lodged in the "collective unconscious" of each of the communities. Another perspective is more likely to treat such violence as a more usual dimension of social behavior, but is prone to explain it as a somewhat pathological byproduct of certain kinds of economic deprivation, status loss, marginalization, or even child rearing practices.

Instead, by following the insights and suggestive hints one can extract from the seminal works of Girard, Davis, Collins, among others, one is able to emerge with a more sobering and realistic view of communal strife. At least the enabling and disabling attributes inherent in ardent religious and communal commitments become more plausible. Religion is not assigned only a pathological role in inciting violence but rather in providing moral venues for its sanctification. In other words, as long as those engaged in violence maintain a given religious commitment, they are less likely to display guilt or shame for their cruelties. This is, after all, what Girard has in mind when he argues that just as religion protects us from violence, it can also allow us to seek "higher" and "nobler" justifications for sanctioning it. Religion, he tells us, "shelters us from violence just as violence seeks shelter in religion." As this happens, communities are entrapped in that vicious circle of vengeance and reprisal. "The mimetic character of violence is so intense it cannot burn itself out. . . . Only violence can put an end to violence and that is why violence is self-propagating" (Girard 1986: 24–26).

Religion in such instances elicits strong emotions because it connects intimately with some of our noblest sentiments and aspirations, particularly those of self-definition, love, peace, compassion, benevolence, justice, and the like. But then precisely because religion connects intimately with such

fundamental values, violence is bound to be more brutal and ferocious. No quantum leap of imagination is required to account for the persistence of such seemingly inconsistent manifestations.

Robin Williams must have had this in mind when he spoke of the "sanctified cruelty" and "virtuous bigotry" inherent in all holy wars. "The annals of the past as well as the daily news of the present are filled," he tells us, "with the records of virtuous bigotry, justifiable homicide, sanctified cruelty, censorious and primitive piety, obligatory revenge and retributive justice" (Williams 1981: 35). The more recent work of Sudhir Kakar (1996) has vividly demonstrated that every religion, under certain circumstances, holds a vision of "divinely legitimized violence":

> In the Semitic religions, we have the Holy War of the Christians, the Just War of the Jews, and the Jehad of the Muslims where the believers are enjoined in battle and destroy evildoers. In other religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, with their greater reputation for tolerance and nonviolence, violence is elevated to the realm of the sacred as part of the created order. In Hinduism, for instance, there is a cycle of violence and peacefulness as the Kali Age is followed by the Golden Age. Buddhist myths talk of Seven Days of the Sword where men will look on and kill each other as beasts, after which peace returns and no life is taken. Although Islam (especially in its current phase) and medieval Christianity have had most violent reputations, the question as to which religions have unleashed the greatest amount of violence is ultimately an empirical one (Kakar 1996: 193–94).

Randall Collins (1974) carries this a step further by providing a comparative sociological framework for the analysis of cruelty. The essentially Durkheimian perspective he adopts takes us, I think, in a more appropriate direction for a fuller understanding of the form and magnitude violence has assumed in Lebanon. He seeks an understanding of cruelty not in purely religious passions or commitments, but in the interplay between morality and the boundaries of group inclusion and exclusion. "It is the group boundaries," he asserts, "that determine the extent of human sympathy; within these boundaries, humanity prevails; outside them, torture is inflicted without qualm" (Collins 1974: 417).

Since confessional and territorial identities are converging in Lebanon, the resulting sense of communalism, as a vector for group solidarity, has been reinforced and heightened. Hence, any threat to the group is bound,

as Durkheim would argue, to reunify it in its "righteous indignation." It is this set of moral boundaries which may place groups beyond the pale of moral obligations. Violence in such instances becomes "not just morally indifferent but morally motivated" (Collins 1975: 419). Here again the double-edged significance of such reinforced communalism becomes much more pronounced. As we shall see, in times of widespread fear, panic, and insecurity, displaced groups seek shelter in such spatially bounded communities. By doing so they become all the more distant and detached and, hence, more likely to be ferocious and callous in their combat strategies and tactics. At successive stages of the war, as adversaries became more anchored spatially, they lost contact with and empathy for their enemies. Such detachment, reinforced by reawakened enmity and political resocialization, eroded what little residue of human sympathy was left. Cruelty was guilt-free; it was celebrated often with the exuberance and hoopla of boisterous and joyful events. The annals of the war are etched with such gruesome episodes and icons of inhumanity, almost akin to a "danse macabre." The most sinister and grim were the post-kill celebrations amidst charred and devastated settings, with the mangled disfigured remains of slaughtered fighters and casualties displayed boastfully as trophies of the ephemeral victories of battle.

The reterritorialization of displaced groups in cloistered communities had another ominous byproduct. The sheltered communities themselves became more vulnerable and accessible targets. This is more so, incidentally, among the warring and traditionally more belligerent communities, namely; Maronite, Druze, and Shi'ites. Their enclaves, by virtue of their stronger and more integrative communal solidarities, became much easier to identity spatially. In other words, the indiscriminate and so-called random shelling which pounded civilian groups in enemy territory was not that indiscriminate anymore. Likewise, the casualties of car bombs detonated at congested marketplaces or intersections were destined, given the confessional rehomogenization of neighborhoods, to be from one exclusive community.

Here again, in other words, the enabling and disabling features of communalism became more pronounced. By seeking shelter in cloistered communities, displaced and terrorized groups found security, benevolence, relief, and psychic reinforcement. They also, however, ran the risk of becoming more accessible targets for collective violence and pogroms.

The form and magnitude of violence also became deadlier. The hand-to-hand fighting, street and neighborhood battles, gave way to random shelling, car bombs, full-scale manhunts, methodical "combing," and "clean-up"

operations, besieging and blockading sanitary and food relief, kidnapping, detention, and collective massacres.

Reinforced by the more sophisticated technologies of warfare, the magnitude of violence was bound to escalate. Automatic pistols and rifles, the emblematic AK47 (the Kalashnikov Russian assault rifle used by Palestinian militias and their allied groups), or the American M16 used by Christian forces, gave way to heavier artillery, mortars, mobile rocket launches, tanks, and ultimately to the even deadlier technologies of full-fledged conventional weaponry of state-sponsored armies. By the time of the Israeli invasion of 1982, fighter-bombers, heavy artillery, and naval gunfire were routinely employed against residential districts. Cluster bombs, incapacitating gas, and white phosphorous "smart" bombs were also used. In fact, epitomizing the ultimate in cruelty and incivility, there is evidence that Lebanon was used then to test the battlefield effectiveness of new weaponry.

In this poignant sense, not only had Lebanon become a proxy battlefield for relentless regional and global rivalries, but also it was further reduced pitilessly to a testing ground for the lethal technologies of future wars.