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Liberalization and Foreign Policy, by Miles Kahler, editor
Conclusion: Liberalization as Foreign Policy Determinant and Goal
Miles Kahler
Democratic triumphalism, encouraged by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, and challenges to authoritarianism in the developing world, has faded. For pessimists, the rise of authoritarian movements in Russia, China's resistance to political reform, the faltering of political opening in Africa, and the shift of Central Asia toward one-man despotisms all suggest that the latest wave of democratization may have begun to recede. Those convinced that the latest democratic gains will not be reversed see the current pause as merely a stage on the winding road to democratic consolidation. Economic liberalization has also suffered its own, less severe setbacks, as former communists in East Europe have returned to power promising to soften, but not reverse, market-oriented policies. Despite severe shocks, such as the Mexican financial crisis of late 1994, most governments have maintained their attachment to economic liberalization, even in the face of high economic and political risks.
Established liberal democracies have reduced their expectations for democratization and their commitment to the spread of democratic governance. The mood among policy makers and analysts was recently described as "less sanguine about democracy's prospects, more sober about the difficulty of promoting it and more skeptical about whether its triumph in several strategic countries would enhance American interests." 1 The new and more cautious attitude toward political and economic liberalization reflects doubts about the inevitability of democratic extension and consolidation (accepting the "wave" pattern of past democratization), the necessarily benign consequences of democratization and economic liberalization for foreign policy, and the ability of established market-oriented and liberal democratic societies to foster their institutional choices in other societies. This volume shares this reflective stance toward liberalization and foreign policy and extends understanding of both the international consequences of liberalization and those strategies most likely to consolidate economic reforms and liberal democracy.
Foreign Policy and Liberal Democracy: The Distinctiveness of Democratic Dyads
The foreign policies of democratic dyads have received rigorous scrutiny in recent international relations scholarship. Because of its potential importance if confirmed, that scrutiny is deserved. Nevertheless, investigation of democratic dyads has produced ambiguous findings, findings that are both extended and questioned in this volume. First, the scope of the distinctiveness of democracies in their foreign policies toward one another widens. Although most attention has been directed toward 3D findings on the absence of war and incidence of militarized disputes, Kurt Taylor Gaubatz argues in this volume for an additional range of international behavior--alliance commitments--in which democratic dyads display significant differences from other regime combinations. As Gaubatz suggests, a powerful tradition in international relations theorizing holds that democracies should be less capable of maintaining international commitments, given the volatility of public opinion (reflected in foreign policy choices) and the rotation of elites. Despite the methodological difficulties in testing propositions regarding alliance duration, Gaubatz offers strong evidence that democracies undertake international commitments toward other democracies that are more durable than those made between states with other types of regimes (including democracies and nondemocratic states). 2
As described in the introduction, many conventional theories of foreign policy fail to explain the distinctiveness of democratic dyads, since the foreign policies of democracies toward other regime types are not distinctive. This reflective quality has produced persistent undertheorizing of the 3D findings. One explanation--that democratic institutions impose constraints on executives--is examined carefully by Lisa Martin and Joanne Gowa. In her detailed treatment of legislative influence over foreign policy in two liberal democracies--the United States and Britain--Martin appears to offer strong support for the importance of these quintessentially liberal political institutions for foreign policy outcomes. Even in liberal democracies that are conventionally believed to display executive dominance, such as Britain, she discovers legislative influence exercised through carefully calibrated delegation regimes that do not display overt day-to-day oversight of policy. Broadly put, political liberalization, if it implies the introduction of elected legislatures, is likely to have more impact on foreign policy than is often recognized.
A second set of conclusions may also be drawn from Martin's arguments, however, conclusions that parallel Gowa's criticisms of simple checks-and-balances assumptions regarding liberal democracies. Martin's examination of the United States Congress and the British Parliament underlines the considerable variation that exists within the set of liberal democratic regimes. Different delegation models produce different policy outcomes: the gatekeeping power that the British executive exercises over the legislative agenda is key in this regard. But even that power is highly dependent on particular procedural rules that may be issue-specific. "Checks and balances" and the grosser measurements of liberal democracy may not capture the level of institutional detail that is required to explain variation in foreign policy outcomes. Although she does not address institutional equilibria in nondemocratic regimes, Martin's account raises another issue that Gowa emphasizes: whether authoritarian regimes, which may appear to have very simplified institutional outlines, contain institutional checks and balances that only closer analysis will reveal.
Gowa argues against democratic exceptionalism, not only on the grounds that the "selectorates" of authoritarian regimes can supply checks and balances but also because political-market failures may render democracies more "authoritarian" (responsive to narrowly based interests) than simplified images allow. 3 In the second case, "concentrated benefits and diffuse costs and variable barriers to collective action impede the effective operation of checks and balances." 4 Liberal democratic regimes may also be less "liberal" in the issue area of foreign policy than in other spheres of public policy. The electoral connection may not be stringent, and informational asymmetries may be highly significant, despite the greater transparency of democratic processes in general.
Gowa presents a strong case that many significant institutional constraints on foreign policy are not captured by the liberal-authoritarian distinction. Institutions characteristic of liberal democracies may parallel authoritarian regimes and produce similar effects in both types of regime. Even the competition of political parties in electoral settings may have analogues in the political tests that are periodically confronted by authoritarian regimes or in intra-elite rivalry. The arguments of Martin and Gowa suggest greater disaggregation in dealing with the consequences of regimes and their institutional design for foreign policy. Martin's institutional analysis offers one avenue for undertaking that disaggregation: undermining conventional views of legislative abdication and then exploring the subtle institutional distinctions that produce quite different foreign policy outcomes.
Calling into question one institutional commonplace associated with democracies--checks and balances--opens the way to considering other institutional attributes that are more characteristic of liberal democratic regimes (and less often authoritarian regimes) and that may have more direct attachments to the policy realms in which democratic dyads appear to be distinctive. Gaubatz draws attention to one crucial linkage: transparency in domestic politics and the ability to make commitments to domestic audiences. Although increased transparency is part of the definition of liberalization presented in the introduction, most explanations of liberal democratic foreign policies have not emphasized it. As Gaubatz points out, however, "in the international arena, the ability to link external commitments transparently with internal commitments will allow democratic states to draw on domestic audiences to aid their international credibility." 5 Peter Cowhey has suggested the avenues by which institutional differences among democracies can make it "harder or easier to make or reverse promises." 6 Several of these dimensions also divide most democratic from most authoritarian regimes, particularly the ability to monitor and influence political decisions, which is directly related to political transparency.
The link between commitments and transparency can in turn be linked to the distinctive conflict behavior of liberal democracies through James Fearon's explanatory model of rational state decisions for war over negotiated agreements. 7 The two crucial parts of Fearon's model are private information and commitment problems, each of which, arguably, will be diminished between two democratic states. Whatever the incentives of a state's elites to retain private information regarding resolve or capabilities, in a democracy their ability to do so will be eroded. At the same time, following Gaubatz and Cowhey, the commitment capabilities of liberal democracies toward each other may also be higher, because of the transparency of decision making and the importance of relatively wide domestic audiences. Although wars of misperception are not covered by Fearon's model, on his logic, several categories of military conflict are likely to be rare between democracies.
In addition to extending the scope of 3D results and disaggregating the explanations offered, the contributors to this volume have also enlarged understanding of the foreign policy of democratic dyads across time. Some claim that the "democracies rarely, if ever, make war on one another" finding extends to the nineteenth century (assuming a satisfactory definition of democracy can be agreed upon) but that it strengthens in the twentieth century, particularly after 1945. 8 Even skeptics who challenge this finding for earlier periods (pre-1914) concede that the rarity of war between democratic dyads does hold in the post-1945, Cold War era. 9
Whether the distinctiveness of democratic dyads holds across time is important: longer time spans and larger numbers of polities increase confidence in the findings and lend support to the importance of democracy as an explanation for this behavior. At the same time, the Cold War years suggest important alternative explanations, particularly those based on the international system. Structural realists, who argue for such external determinants of foreign policy, have dominated the ranks of critics of the 3D findings, even as their scope has expanded. Joanne Gowa suggests security interests (defined by alliances) as a more plausible explanation for the apparent behavior of democracies toward one another in this later period.
Claims that democracy is a less plausible explanation than alliance membership are, however, called into question by empirical results and alternative explanations. Russett and Maoz find that democracy has a significant and independent effect on the behavior of democratic dyads even when alliance relations are controlled. 10 Also, defining the interests reflected in alliances as solely those derived from external threats (rather than the character of regimes) is a neorealist assumption. A far more refined analysis of the content of alliances (and the threats that they were formed to meet) would be required to clarify which interests are dominant.
Two additional explanations for the strengthening of distinctive foreign policy behavior between democratic dyads in more recent decades are presented here. The first is democratic consolidation over time, in Lisa Martin's terms, the establishment of a stable institutional equilibrium. (Alternatively, one could argue that democratic norms become more embedded in both domestic political practices and foreign policy.) Stable democracies may behave differently from recently established or contested ones. The issue of transitional regimes and their foreign policies is discussed in the next section. A second explanation relies on the density of democratic regimes and the effects that their clustering has on reinforcing norms and creating expectations about "normal" democratic foreign policy. The regional differences that are apparent in the preceding case studies lend support to the importance of this effect.
Transitional Regimes or New Democracies?
The four cases of political liberalization examined here--Spain, East Europe, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa--offer mixed support for a coherent category of transitional regimes with its own foreign policy characteristics. For cases on the periphery of liberal democratic Europe, there is little evidence of a distinctly transitional phase in democratization that is the source of foreign policies more militarized or conflictual than either the preceding authoritarian or succeeding "consolidated" phase of democracy. Using the criterion of widespread support for the democratic rules of the game, Spain certainly and several East European countries probably have achieved consolidated democracy. Foreign policies between these regimes and other democracies resembled those of other democratic dyads, although Spain witnessed a vigorous national debate over alignment with other democracies in NATO.
The reasons for these relatively untroubled transitions and benign foreign policies are given in essays by Ronald Linden and by Victor Pérez-Díaz and Juan Carlos Rodríguez. A negotiated transition to democracy in Spain was imitated by other nascent democracies in Latin America and East Europe. When they were installed, democra tic institutions were accepted by most sectors of society. The institutions were seldom challenged, and they did not figure in conflict over foreign policy. Economic liberalization in Spain and, to a degree, in East Europe had produced a civil society whose foreign policy interests and orientations could be confirmed and clarified by democratic institutions. The underlying pattern of interests in Spanish society favored the European orientation of the Franco regime, begun as a necessary corollary of its program of economic liberalization. Continuity in economic policies, including external economic policies, eased the political transition and confirmed the broad foreign policy orientation of the new regime.
As Linden describes, foreign policy institutions in East Europe have demonstrated both rupture and continuity. 11 From a political system that was characteristically illiberal on all dimensions--opaque, monopolized by the Communist Party, penetrated by a key external constituent, the Soviet Union--the foreign policy process was rapidly opened to much wider participation and transparency. The end of Communist Party monopoly and the proliferation of new parties across East Europe was, in Linden's view, the most significant institutional change. In other respects formal institutions changed relatively little, but "existing structures began to be infused with genuine political power." Foreign policy bureaucracies, at least initially, displayed considerable continuity from the old regime to the new.
Electoral incentives in a newly competitive political setting also had significant effects on post-liberalization foreign policies. Change has been greatest when the old regime and its dominant ideology were closely linked to a particular set of external policies or an external orientation. In Spain, therefore, the introduction of liberal institutions produced less change in external orientation. The further integration of Spain into European institutions, permitted by democratization, produced change only at the margins of Spanish foreign policy by eliminating a nationalist and "Third World" strand employed by the previous regime to demonstrate its autonomy. 12 In East Europe, on the other hand, political liberalization was more likely to imply a wholesale change in foreign policy. Long-standing attachments to the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were rapidly discarded after democratization and alignment with Western institutions, such as the European Community and NATO, were eagerly sought. As Linden describes, activism directed toward new Western alignments has been under taken to extract resources, but it has also served to gain domestic popularity on the cheap for the new regimes. 13 The new dynamics of electoral competition reinforced foreign policy change that was already encouraged by the international environment.
In other regions as well, the introduction of liberal democracy demonstrated fewer international consequences when the preceding regime had not been closely identified with a particular external stance. Authoritarian regimes that had been Cold War allies of the United States were most likely to reflect significant shifts in public opinion after political liberalization. In South Korea, expressed anti-Americanism increased; in other cases, such as Greece and the Philippines, a similar reaction against the senior ally, widely voiced across the political spectrum, was intensified by a perceived dependent or colonial relationship with the United States and other industrialized countries. An "explicit connection between the political regime and its external links" had long been taken for granted in Greece. After democratization in the mid-1970s, the socialist opposition party, PASOK, had opposed membership in the European Community, which it regarded as confirmation of Greece's dependent status in the international system. As the possibility of attaining power grew closer, PASOK's line shifted. After becoming the governing party in 1981, PASOK dropped its opposition but demonstrated little ideological affinity for European institutions and took an "openly pecuniary approach" to retaining membership in the EC. 14
Despite a shift in the international strategic environment (the end of the Cold War) political liberalization in these cases produced foreign policy outcomes that were similar to those predicted by the literature on democratic dyads. There was little evidence of de-alignment of democracies or disruption of alliance ties between democracies. As Linden points out, there has been little increase in the use or threat of military force in East Europe since democratization, and none between states with firmly implanted democratic institutions. (As he points out, the wars in the former Yugoslavia are difficult to classify as either interstate or wars between consolidated democracies.) In general, the new regimes have demonstrated a tendency to align themselves with existing democracies, represented by the European Community and NATO. These negotiated transitions to liberal democracy suggest that the category of transition as a particular and uniformly conflict-prone category requires disaggregation. As the cases of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate, however, the contested and tentative character of certain democratic transitions may produce foreign policies that diverge substantially from the paradigm of democratic dyads.
Lisa Anderson's account of liberalizing Middle Eastern states calls into question predictions based on states with long-standing democratic institutions. 15 As she describes, the alignments of liberalizing regimes in the region following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 ran counter to both neorealist and liberal theorizing. Instead of bandwagoning toward the strongest coalition, Jordan, Yemen, and Algeria gravitated, for domestic political reasons, toward Iraq, which was clearly the weaker party to the conflict. Instead of aligning themselves with a coalition led by the Western democracies, these liberalizing regimes sided with a repressive, one-party dictatorship. Although these governments did not engage in military conflict with the United Nations forces, their newly installed liberal institutions and the absence of a history of liberal governance permitted political forces hostile to the West--nationalist, anti-imperialist, Islamic--to overwhelm either institutional or normative pressure for democratic alignment. Even transnational ties, which are often portrayed as reinforcing liberal foreign policy among societies with "multiple channels of contact," did not prevent distancing from the democratic coalition: knowledge of Kuwaiti society in Jordan produced hostility, not sympathy; Saudi and Persian Gulf subsidies of the Islamic Front (FIS) in Algeria were overwhelmed by domestic political imperatives.
Jeffrey Herbst's predictions of an end to the stable boundary regime in sub-Saharan Africa indicate that the internal dynamics of political liberalization may sometimes overwhelm normative or institutional predispositions to maintaining a cooperative regime. 16 The norm of respect for existing boundaries in Africa was itself the creation of a cartel of largely authoritarian rulers. In part for self-protective reasons (sketched by Joanne Gowa), they rarely threatened one another's territorial integrity. That cartel could be eroded by an opening of the political process. As Herbst describes, radical reversals of group status are possible as political participation widens; the need to mobilize the rural peasantry using ethnic symbols promises heightened conflict along cleavages that will put enormous pressure on the boundary regime. Instead of continued international cooperation among similar states, political liberalization in Africa threatens to overturn a long-standing cooperative arrangement.
The foreign policies of liberalizing regimes in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa stand in contrast to the foreign policies of transitional states in Europe. Several working hypotheses may link the politics of transition to illiberal foreign policies in these cases and others. As Lisa Martin argues in her account of the first liberalizing states--England and the Netherlands--the most important distinction among liberalizing regimes is success or failure to exclude foreign policy from transitional politics. This failure may take at least three forms. Lisa Anderson's account of Jordanian and Algerian foreign policy in the face of rising Islamist opposition illustrates one pattern. Liberalization in these two states was hardly consensual: elements of the opposition aimed at the destruction of the existing regime, not a brokered transition. Conflict had not reached a revolutionary stage, however. Both regimes and their oppositions could, therefore, use foreign policy as a convenient vehicle for their competition and conflict in a permissive international environment. 17 Herbst's predictions about the African boundary regime are based on a similar pattern of transition in that region: "winner take all" transitions that include little notion of pacts or power sharing between old political coalitions and new. 18
A negotiated transition may explicitly or implicitly exclude foreign policy from contests over future institutional design. It can also reduce the incentives to react against the previous foreign policy orientation (which might have included alignment with democratic states or a suppression of nationalist claims). As Huntington notes, this constellation is most likely when the liberalizing regime is a one-party state. In such transitions, the representatives of the old regime may search for a new ideological support for their position. Typically that ideology is nationalist or religious. In certain recent cases, such as the former Yugoslav republics, such an ideological shift on the part of members of the old regime had dire consequences for external aggressiveness and conflict. In the former Soviet republics, where a similar transformation has taken place, conflict has increased but has not in most cases resulted in military confrontation. 17
A transitional pact may also affect foreign policy by explicitly or implicitly including foreign policy in bargaining. The roles of particular institutions, such as the military or the existing national security bureaucracies, may be protected or these institutions may be offered new roles: each choice may have external implications. One of the reasons that the Spanish socialists embraced NATO, after years of opposition to membership, was its appeal as an alternative role for an interventionist military. Huntington notes that the nationalism of both Karamanlis and Papandreou during Greece's transition was designed to win favor with the military. The new political leadership was torn between its desire to resolve old quarrels with its neighbors and the need for a "traditional enemy" to occupy its military planners. 18 He goes so far as to suggest in his "guidelines for democratizers" the need to "balance gains from the removal of foreign threats against the potential costs in instability at home." 19
Both the former Yugoslavia and the tentatively democratizing states in Africa described by Herbst suggest a final source of transitional foreign policy uncertainties. Democratization in ethnically divided societies may mobilize conflicts over the shape of the political community itself. As Robert Dahl and others have noted, nothing in democratic theory or practice provides a sure guide to the boundaries of a democratic polity. Such conflict can easily blur the boundary between interstate and intrastate conflict as well, particularly if ethnic loyalties spill across national frontiers. In East Europe, as Linden notes, a democratic (or democratizing) peace has held against such ethnic politics; about Africa, Herbst is more pessimistic that the authoritarian cartel sustaining the current boundary regime will persist.
The recent experience of South and East Europe, as well as Latin America, belies any generalized and alarmist claims that transitional states are particularly prone to interstate conflict. Throughout a wave of political transitions that surpassed any of the previous periods of democratization there was little evidence of a persistent increase in interstate conflict linked to these political changes. In Europe the end of the Cold War brought some increase in violence (none strictly interstate), but by 1994 the violence had subsided to levels lower than those during most of the Cold War years. 20 Although the transition was hardly complete (according to the definition employed here) in all regions of democratization, the case for discriminating among transitional regimes and their foreign policy behavior is very strong.
The South and East European cases considered in this volume seem to differ from transitional regimes in other regions by the political dynamics of their transitions, the speed of their institutional consolidation, and their acceptance of liberal international norms. In short, they demonstrated most of the characteristics of established democratic dyads more rapidly than many would have predicted. The contrasts among the transitional regimes discussed here were also regional, however, pointing to another set of hypotheses that may explain the foreign policies of transitional regimes: their historical relationship to preceding waves of democratization and their spatial relationship to other, established liberal democracies.
Democratic Consolidation or the Ebbing of the Third Wave?
Although this volume has not dealt systematically with the historical and spatial distribution of political and economic liberalization, the clustering of these developments across time and space is important in explaining foreign policy outcomes. As Huntington has described, democratization (and, by extension, political liberalization) has occurred in waves over time, often followed by reverse waves that return some democratic regimes to authoritarianism. Participation in previous waves of democratization, however transient, seems to have significant effects on the consequences of contemporary democratization. The foreign policy behavior of liberalizing regimes in the Middle East and Africa, excluded from earlier waves of democratization, differed substantially from that in the states of South and East Europe.
Political liberalization has also occurred in spatial waves that overlap with these historical cycles and that have had even more significant foreign policy consequences. Spatial proximity, which reduces the costs of recognition, has been demonstrated as highly important in the emergence of cooperation in nature. 21 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz has suggested that democracies have tended to form clusters historically (apart from a brief period in the interwar years), even though he could find no resulting advantages in capabilities vis-á-vis nondemocracies. The latest wave of democratization seems to demonstrate the significance of geographical contiguity or proximity. Political liberalization has been most apparent in the European periphery (first Southern, then Eastern Europe) and in Latin America, two regions adjacent to the liberal heartland of Western Europe and North America. The third wave of democratization described by Huntington is limited to those regions with the addition of Pakistan and part of the East Asian periphery (South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines).
Two of the cases examined here (Spain and East Europe) are contiguous with the established liberal democratic "core." Their foreign policies were shaped by their aspirations to join the all-important European clubs, which shaped their external behavior, as described by Pérez-Díaz and Rodríguez and by Linden. The influence of Western Europe can be seen as anticipatory socialization, given electoral demands for an orientation toward Europe. The existing European democracies "defined" democratic behavior for these aspirants on their periphery. A more rationalist, state-centered account would include the implicit sanctions and rewards that European democracies wielded toward economies heavily dependent on their trade, investment, and foreign aid. European clubs were unique in having an explicitly democratic entry criterion; one, the Council of Europe, is the strongest regional human rights regime. Latin American democracies, despite their proximity to the largest democracy, could not aspire to the club benefits offered to democratizing Europeans. The norm of nonintervention and suspicions of American meddling have also made it difficult to construct an explicit democratic club. Even in the absence of formal institutionalization, however, democratic norms of foreign policy behavior became more widespread as the density of democracies in the Western Hemisphere approached that of Europe.
Only in the 1990s has political liberalization appeared in a less than tentative way in regions more distant from the liberal democratic core: in the Middle East (Jordan, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria) and in sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa). In these late-liberalizing regions political change has often been limited to tentative and formal steps toward democratization. 22 Lisa Anderson and Jeffrey Herbst suggest that the foreign policy consequences of liberalization are likely to be less predictable and more prone to conflict in these regions than in those states whose foreign policies are constrained by and identified with more powerful democratic neighbors in the liberal heartland. The same judgment may apply to the former Soviet Union, where democratic institutions remain contested, and neoauthoritarian solutions have found recent favor. Apart from the Baltic states, none of the countries in the former Soviet Union had more than ephemeral participation in preceding waves of democratization. Their distance from the liberal heartland of Europe and the rival core of Russia (which defines its "club" by ethnicity or history, not political regime) suggests a different liberalizing trajectory and possibly different foreign policy outcomes.
Asia provides a third and intermediate regional case. Democratic governments, growing in number, are found on the periphery of the region; at the core are large and resolute (if challenged) authoritarians. Although subregional groups for the peaceful management of conflict exist (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN) and a regionwide club devoted to economic liberalization has emerged (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC), no regional grouping is specifically dedicated to human rights or the promotion of democracy. Many governments in the region argue forcefully that those issues should not find their way onto the international agenda.
Economic Liberalization, International Institutions, and Foreign Policy
Globally, the latest wave of economic liberalization preceded the third wave of democratization. After gaining a foothold in the academic and policy worlds in the late 1960s, neoliberalism produced the orthodox experiments of the southern cone of South America (under political authoritarianism) in the l970s. 23 The success of the East Asian newly industrializing countries--which, apart from Hong Kong, were only partly liberalized political economies--was an important spur to other liberalizing experiments, particularly in China and Vietnam. International economic conditions, especially the end of easy bank credit for many developing countries and successive oil shocks (both the price inflation of the 1970s and the price deflation of the mid-1980s), also contributed to the growing pressure on elites in the developing countries to adopt market-oriented policies and to open their economies to foreign trade and investment. 24
By the mid-1990s, economic liberalization had spread widely, and few developing countries remained untouched. With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet market, and a sharp decline in Russian economic assistance, even the last holdouts--Cuba, North Korea, and India--were forced to reconsider their statist orthodoxy. One unprecedented feature of the latest wave of liberalization is clear: although several distinct variants of market economies may exist, no coherent alternative program exists after the near demise of unreformed (nonmarket) communism and the decline of statist options.
One feature of this latest wave of economic liberalization has been important in shaping the adoption of market-oriented policies and their foreign policy effects. Like political liberalization, economic liberalization has deepened unevenly across regions. As outward-oriented policies have taken hold and government commitment to more liberal policies has grown in importance for economic actors, regional groupings to sustain economic opening have proliferated. Regional free trade agreements have been the most prominent new "clubs" sustaining economically liberal policies. Their agendas have broadened beyond the lowering of impediments to exchange at the borders to include investment, standards, and other behind-the-border issues. They have also linked industrialized and developing countries for the first time. The consequences of this clustering of liberalizing countries have been similar to the regional clubs that sustained democratization. One of the most important has been the formation of new multilateral institutions and sharply increased interest in joining existing institutions.
Four national cases in which economic liberalization is prominent--China, Mexico, Spain, and the European Union--demonstrate the dependence of programs of economic liberalization on international institutions and the importance of those institutions in shaping the foreign policy consequences of such liberalization. These cases span the spectrum of political regimes from an unreformed authoritarianism (China) to established liberal democracies (the European Community). This range of political liberalization (from effectively zero to established liberal democracy) permits a quasi-experimental control for the effects of political regime. In each of these cases, economic liberalization appears to have had independent and significant effects in encouraging cooperative strategies in national foreign policies, independent of the effects of political liberalization.
China, which combined a program of economic liberalization that emphasized external opening with a resolutely authoritarian regime, illustrates the consequences of economic liberalization in the absence of any marked change in political regime. Dramatic growth in China's economic interdependence with the capitalist world during the 1980s (exports were close to 20% of GNP in 1990) has created new domestic institutions and interests that influence foreign policy. The new sphere of external activity is dominated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, founded in 1982, soon after the initiation of the economic reforms. MOFERT has become an "immense bureaucratic empire many times larger than the Foreign Ministry." 25 The highly centralized system of the Maoist era became much more decentralized, with much greater debate on foreign policy issues. Most significantly, provincial actors outside Beijing, empowered by rapid economic growth and attached to expanded international economic ties, have attempted to construct their own foreign economic policies when possible and have intervened in policy debates at the center when those ties were endangered by international conflict. 26
Although the Chinese government initiated external cooperative strategies and sought membership and participation in international economic institutions, its authoritarian political system served as a largely successful gatekeeper between domestic interests and international regimes. 27 Such institutions provided an increment of credibility to domestic reformers, but China, like other successful Asian economies, found it less necessary to purchase credibility through cooperation with international economic institutions. Although institutional membership provided a more efficient means of managing its proliferating international economic ties, China resisted any cross-issue linkage that could be exploited by its international economic partners.
Mexico, another single-party state that initiated a dramatic break in the 1980s with its statist past, also experienced a transformation of its foreign policy under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Persistent anti-Americanism disappeared as the logic of economic liberalization reinforced Mexico's economic dependence on its northern neighbor. As one of Salinas's critics has argued:
| Whatever the other implications this strategy had, its consequences for foreign affairs were perfectly clear. It made no sense, on one hand, to put all of Mexico's eggs in one basket (namely the one that held foreign financing, business confidence and U.S. support) and then proceed to kick and quarrel with the owners of the basket. The inconsistency of the former policy was eliminated: Mexico would no longer try to maintain its activist, assertive and frequently anti-American policy in Central America, the United Nations and elsewhere. 28 |
The decline of nationalist ideology also complemented Mexico's new strategy of engagement with international economic institutions: Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), whose liberal trading principles had previously been anathema, and relations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank became increasingly cordial. In another striking break with the past, the Salinas government enthusiastically completed negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
External liberalization has not always been a self-reinforcing and dominant strategy for Mexico's political elites. In an earlier discussion of capital account liberalization and closure, Sylvia Maxfield highlights a backlash effect in which the distributional effects of liberalization create an opposition that uses its political and institutional bases to counterattack. During the bank nationalization of 1982, the liberalizing coalition tied to international financial markets and opposition to external financial controls, suffered a temporary defeat at the hands of its national populist opponents. 29
Under Salinas, a strategy of international collaboration was employed to enhance the credibility of exchange rate policy in the eyes of both international creditors and investors and the domestic electorate. By aligning Mexican policy with that of the United States, the Mexican president (and presumably future presidents who endorsed the liberalization program) could raise the costs of another backlash by the opponents of liberalization. In addition, NAFTA, another key international reinforcement of the Salinas economic program, could be threatened by volatile Mexican exchange rates. Preserving valued cooperation in one sphere required movement toward greater exchange rate stability.
Liberal international economic policies do not always point toward greater institutional collaboration in managing exchange rates, however. In her contribution to this volume, Maxfield endorses an interest-based explanation for the gradual acceptance by Mexican policy makers of a bilateral or multilateral framework for exchange rate management. Internationally connected banks in Mexico have a strong interest in collaborative firebreaks to nationalist policy reversals. Nevertheless, the broad support of domestic and international investors for an exchange rate corollary to NAFTA contains a paradox, as Maxfield makes clear. By such solutions to Mexico's debilitating cycles of devaluation and overvaluation, mobile financial interests in Mexico seemed willing to forgo their oldest instrument of influence with the government: capital flight. In answer to the ques tion of which strategy was most effective and least costly for domestic capital, a target zone for exchange rates (backed multilaterally) and a futures market to hedge against unforeseen shocks seemed the favored choices. Growing economic integration in North America, symbolized by NAFTA, produced a redefinition of interests by key sectors of Mexican business. 30
The Spanish transition to democracy, described by Pérez-Díaz and Rodríguez, was deeply influenced by the program of economic liberalization that had been pursued by the Franco government. Decisions that followed from the 1959 stabilization program committed the Franco government to an external economic path that was not initially intended by either Franco or portions of the dominant political coalition. International institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, provided crucial external credibility for the original stabilization program, which was a sharp break with Spain's nationalist and isolationist past. Economic liberalization then created a powerful set of economic interests that argued for continuity in pursuing integration with Western Europe during a time of political transition. Overall, the consequences of economic liberalization--unforeseen when the program began in 1959--resulted in external and internal constraints on Spanish policy that virtually guaranteed foreign policy continuity across the democratic transition. Chief among those constraints was the deepening cooperative relationship with the European Community. 31
Like Maxfield, Jeffry Frieden explains growing collaboration in exchange rate management, but he does so in a different economic and political setting: the industrialized and stable democracies of the European Community. Frieden offers a final example of the power of economic liberalization and regional integration in advancing an agenda of deepening European monetary cooperation and building regional monetary institutions. Policy makers in Europe, like those in Mexico, sought a credible anchor for their turn toward anti-inflationary policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s: the EMS (with its clear link to the deutsche mark) was clearly the best available counterweight to the inflationary expectations of their own populations. 32 Both anti-inflationary turn and initiation of economic and monetary cooperation enhanced the role of the central banks in member countries: central bank predominance guaranteed that monetary cooperation would take a particular form, centered on foreign exchange management by a network of central bankers. In addition, instability in exchange rates could have called into question other more politically sensitive parts of the European Community, in particular the Common Agricultural Policy.
As Frieden notes, however, these motivations for intensified monetary cooperation can explain the persistence of plans for collaboration but cannot explain the variation in such interest among EC members over time. Frieden's model of European monetary integration is one in which the interests produced by economic liberalization ratchet up support for monetary cooperation in Europe. Swelling support for monetary cooperation in Europe is a consequence of increasing levels of intra-European trade and investment. Sectors most dependent on intra-European transactions supported closer monetary collaboration as a way of lowering the exchange rate risks implied by their exposure to other European economies. Monetary institutions and the cooperation that they embodied in turn made an outcome of expanded trade and investment more likely in the eyes of private investors. Although the process appeared to be self-reinforcing, Frieden notes that the EMS suffered a gravecrisis in 1992-1993, one that called into question a Europe-wide Economic and Monetary Union. Nevertheless, the cause of that exogenous shock was the German response to reunification, not economic nationalism. On the basis of a close, demonstrated link between economic liberalization, economic interests, and monetary collaboration, Frieden predicts that monetary union will proceed, whatever its temporary setbacks.
Liberal Democracy as a Foreign Policy Goal
Interest in the foreign policy consequences of democracy and other political regimes has been stimulated by the third wave of democratization, which reached its apogee after the end of the Cold War. Arguments that democracies rarely if ever make war on one another were useful for those who urged a positive policy of promoting democratization. As Tony Smith has shown, democracy promotion has been a central and bipartisan theme in American foreign policy throughout the twentieth century. 33 Although the pacific consequences of democratization have been part of its appeal, it seems likely that other goals, such as political stability, would have sustained its prominent place in the foreign policy of the United States.
Policy makers and publics must define the priority assigned to support for liberalization, in light of its international effects. Those who accept that democratic dyads have peaceful and otherwise beneficial foreign policies toward one another more often endorse democratization as a central foreign policy goal. For some enthusiasts of democratization, extending the third wave is sometimes portrayed as a virtual panacea for all international threats confronted by the industrialized democracies. 34
Despite the panoply of programs and actors promoting democracy, however, there is surprising lack of agreement on two crucial points: how effective outside actors can be in furthering democratization and which instruments are most effective in promoting the beneficial consequences of democratic governance. In part because he includes the latest cases of democratization in East Europe, Samuel P. Huntington assigns a greater weight to external influence, although conceding that previous waves of regime change were more deeply influenced from the outside. 35 With the exception of Huntington's work, the voluminous literature on democratic transitions offers conflicting estimates of the influence that external actors have had on recent episodes of liberalization. Most analysts have argued that the initiation, pace, and outcome of political transitions have been determined largely by internal political factors and that external actors have at best limited influence over the process. 36 Assessments of the positive effects of external influence on democratization also divide those examining the Latin American experience with democratic transitions and those who have concentrated on the European balance sheet. Abraham F. Lowenthal's evaluation is typical in its skepticism about American promotion of democracy in Latin America: efforts by the United States government "have rarely been successful, and then only in a narrow range of circumstances"; in the twentieth century the overall effect of American policy was "usually negligible, often counterproductive, and only occasionally positive." 37 At best, bilateral American efforts have had a discernible influence in those "highly unusual, very finely balanced circumstances when foreign influence can tip the scale--or else in the small nearby nations most penetrated by and vulnerable to the United States." 38 In general, however, external efforts to promote democracy often stimulate a nationalist backlash, create relations of dependence that thwart a democratic equlibrium, and shift with domestic political trends in the promoting (rather than target) country. Most American programs have simply been too small: the "magnitudes of the task and of the solution are vastly out of proportion with one another." 39
European democracy promotion is regarded in a far more positive and influential light. In both Mediterranean and East Europe, existing liberal democracies played a significant role in encouraging and consolidating democratic transitions. 40 In the case of Turkey, for example, European pressure produced important steps to align Turkish political and social practices with those of Europe. 41 As the case studies in this volume confirm, two crucial features distinguished the European record from that of Latin America: influence was exerted multilaterally (through the European Community or other European institutions) rather than bilaterally, and democracy was encouraged through the incentive of membership in a highly regarded club rather than through political conditionality, the wielding of carrots and sticks to induce compliance.
This contrast between Latin America and Europe illustrates an initial policy conclusion that can be drawn from these studies of the foreign policy consequences of liberalization. The use of clublike arrangements to encourage democratic politics and liberal foreign policy was effective in the European cases. The aspiration to join such clubs, particularly the European Community, was an important incentive to maintain and deepen democratic consolidation in Spain and more recently in East Europe. The apparent influence of such membership incentives was dependent on several features of the European setting that were not replicated in other regions. First, the key clubs had credible membership criteria that included democratic governance. The EC's criteria were credible since they were embedded in Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome and further specified in the 1962 Birkelbach Report. Despite assiduous efforts, the Franco regime was signaled firmly that it would not become a full member of the European Community while it remained under authoritarian rule. Greece's status as an associate of the EC was frozen after the colonels' coup in 1967; Turkey faced similar sanctions in the early 1980s. 42
The term "sanctions" is not entirely accurate, however: failure to progress toward full membership (or more desirable associate status) was not viewed in the same light as the inducements and sanctions that accompany political conditionality. Not only is membership in a club by its nature multilateral (the criteria are not set by a single country), it cannot be viewed as intrusive or as violating "sovereignty" in the same way as conditionality. Few nations question whether another group of nations can establish their own criteria for an association to which they belong; many nations question whether democratization and other "internal" political issues can be linked legitimately to economic concessions.
If a credible set of democratic admission requirements is one element in the success of such clubs in Europe, the desirability of membership--on economic grounds--is the second. The European Community has been far more influential than the Council of Europe in sustaining democratization because of the clearly defined economic benefits of membership. Even elites that are not imbued with democratic norms may choose to follow democratic rules of the game in order to win the economic benefits of membership. In contrast to the exercise of conditionality, however, linkage between democratic behavior and economic inducements is implicit in membership: the careful modulation and monitoring of compliance that absorbs conditionality is less necessary.
Clubs also serve as reference points for democratic norms in both domestic politics and foreign policy. Despite these advantages, however, few have been established during the third wave of democratization. Latin America might appear to be a candidate for such a club, but the region's strong norm of non-intervention (and suspicion of the United States) has hindered its creation. Although it has pursued a more active role in the 1990s, the OAS has not been very effective in promoting democracy. 43 Other groups have begun to multilateralize political conditionality and external pressure for democratization, but few have set stringent conditions for participation, and even fewer have membership benefits that would strengthen attachment to democratic norms. 44
If clubs have played a valuable role in confirming democratic consolidation and the characteristic foreign policies of democratic dyads, they have been equally important in economic liberalization. Economic liberalization and its positive effects (on economic growth and the development of civil society in particular) pose another dilemma for those managing institutional membership. Widening of membership must constantly be weighed against bending the rules of adherence (which are often less sharp by definition than democratic criteria are) in order to reward progress in economic liberalization. This dilemma has appeared in the case of China's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO): "engagement" and the benefits of further liberalization are set against maintaining the existing rules (and credibility) of international economic institutions. A different sort of risk is illustrated by Mexico's financial crisis in December 1994. International economic institutions may provide a valuable increment of credibility to national governments that are pursuing economic liberalization. Those governments may, however, rely too heavily on that borrowed credibility (as Mexico did in the case of NAFTA). The "joining" impulse that seems to accompany economic liberalization, as described in this volume, can exaggerate the benefits of institutional membership for elites under pressure.
A further set of conclusions with policy implications concerns transitional democracies. Latin America and Europe appear to engineer an acceleration of democratic consolidation. Liberal democracies must become "established" as quickly as possible (as they have in southern and central Europe) in order to avoid the often perverse foreign policy consequences of political liberalization (illustrated in the Middle East and possibly in sub-Saharan Africa). In regions without a critical density of existing established democracies, external support for consolidation is particularly important. Given the absence of one barrier to backsliding (the ratchet effect of a club), a crucial feature of support for democratization should be its long-term character: too often, a competitive election is held, democracy is declared, and then international interest and support decline rapidly. These conclusions support most other assessments of successful pro-democracy programming. Rapid consolidation is important to avoid a lag between new democratic institutions and the recognition and acceptance of those new institutions by democratic neighbors; such a lag can be curtailed by support and oversight from the outside.
The end of the Cold War and the absence of an overwhelming nondemocratic strategic threat have led some to argue that "sustained international support for the consolidation of democratic regimes would demand hitherto untapped sources of Western maturity and tenacity in such a context." 45 Paradoxically, the most recent wave of democratization may demonstrate the shortcomings of democracies in their failure to support democratic consolidation over the long haul. To win the rewards of a world of established lib eral democracies, existing democratic powers must sustain fledgling regimes beyond their often troubled (and internationally disturbing) early years. Any devices that can remove such programs from the vagaries of short-term perceptions and politics are likely to yield foreign policy benefits.
Another familiar nostrum of the literature of democratization--support for civil society--is called into question in its simplest form by contributors to this volume. Many endorsements of strengthening civil society are based on unexamined beliefs that civil society is a unique reservoir of democratic norms. Unfortunately, as the Middle Eastern and African cases illustrate, civil society can also be a source of ethnically charged or politically illiberal movements, whose influence on foreign policy will not confirm democratic norms. A narrower definition of support--framed as constructing transnational links between nongovernmental groups in established democracies and those in liberalizing societies--may produce more predictable benefits. For their counterparts in transitional societies, groups in established democracies could provide benchmarks for democratic action and modest incentives to observe those parameters.
Finally, transitional regimes are less likely to enjoy a smooth consolidation of democracy if foreign policy itself becomes part of the conflict over new institutions. That risk argues for two additional measures by existing democracies. Established liberal democracies can shape the immediate international environment by reducing insecurity: international threats will complicate democratic consolidation and provide an additional instrument of self-protection for the governors of the old regime (particularly the military). At the same time, external efforts to influence the process of democratization, particularly bilateral measures, should be undertaken with an eye to reducing nationalist reactions in the target state.
Overall, these prescriptions resemble those propounded by skeptical observers of international intervention in democratic transitions. Policy to promote democracy should be "both steadily funded and implemented over many years . . . overt, but quiet, carried out in a low-profile manner." 46 Even if established democracies can implement such policies, perpetual peace will not be guaranteed. New or established democracies may backslide into authoritarian rule. Democracies will also behave in a belligerent fashion toward nondemocracies. Nevertheless, given the positive foreign policy benefits that have flowed from the latest wave of democratization in at least some regions and the modest resources that are devoted to democracy promotion, the costs and risks of supporting the consolidation of democracy are certainly justified.
Note 1: Judith Miller, "At Hour of Triumph, Democracy Recedes as the Global Ideal," New York Times, 18 February 1996. Back.
Note 2: Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," ch. 1 in this volume. Back.
Note 3: Joanne Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes," ch. 3 in thisvolume. Back.
Note 5: Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," p. 41-42. Back.
Note 6: Peter F. Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States," International Organization 47, 2 (Spring 1993): 299-326. Back.
Note 7: James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, 3 (Summer 1995): 379-414. Back.
Note 8: Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 20, pp. 73-74 (for reasons that the 3D findings may have strengthened). Gaubatz notes that democratic and nondemocratic involvement in alliances tracked each other closely until the 1920s, when defense pacts (the most "committed" of alliances) between democracies demonstrated a significant increase ("Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations"). Back.
Note 9: Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security 20, 2 (Fall 1995): 123-146. Back.
Note 10: Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 84-86. Back.
Note 11: Ronald H. Linden, "Liberalization and Foreign Policy in East Europe," ch. 6 in this volume. Back.
Note 12: Victor Pérez-Díaz and Juan Carlos Rodríguez, "From Reluctant Choices to Credible Commitments: Foreign Policy and Economic and Political Liberalization--Spain, 1953-1986," ch. 7 in this volume. Back.
Note 13: Linden, "Liberalization and Foreign Policy." Back.
Note 14: Susannah Verney, "To Be or Not to Be Within the European Community," in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Securing Democracy (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 205, 215. Back.
Note 15: Lisa Anderson, "Democratization and Foreign Policy in the Arab World: The Domestic Origins of the Jordanian and Algerian Alliances in the 1991 Gulf War," ch. 4 in this volume. Back.
Note 16: Jeffrey Herbst, "Political Liberalization and the African State System," ch. 5 in this volume. Back.
Note 17: For two contrasting instrumental uses of nationalism, see V. P. Gagnon Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security 19, 3 (Winter 1994/95): 130-166; and Charles F. Furtado, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy: The Case of Ukraine" (paper prepared for the 1992 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 3-6 September 1992). Back.
Note 18: Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 247-248. Back.
Note 20: Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Democracy and the Future of European Peace," European Journal of International Relations 1, 4 (December 1995): 555. Back.
Note 21: Martin A. Nowak, Robert M. May, and Karl Sigmund, "The Arithmetics of Mutual Help," Scientific American 272, 6 (June 1995): 80-81. Back.
Note 22: Although parliamentary elections had been held in thirty-five of forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries by 1996, in thirteen of these cases the elections were "seriously flawed" or "marginally free and fair," and in another four the electoral results were later reversed by nondemocratic means (Michael Holman, "Fitful Africa Deepens Donors' Dilemma," Financial Times, 8 February 1996, p. 4). Back.
Note 23: For an account of the rise of the new orthodoxy, see Miles Kahler, "Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives," in Joan Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 33-61. Back.
Note 24: On the contribution of the international economic environment to the trend toward economic liberalization, see Barbara Stallings, "International Influence on Economic Policy," in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 49-52. Back.
Note 25: A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 93, 96. Back.
Note 26: See Lin Zhimin, " 'Walking on Two Legs': The Domestic Content of China's Policy Toward the Asia-Pacific Region," China Report 3, 2 (April 1992); and He Di, "China's Foreign Policy in Deng's Era" (paper prepared for the SSRC Conference on Foreign Policy Consequences of Economic and Political Liberalization, 9-11 July 1992). Back.
Note 27: Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990). Back.
Note 28: Jorge G. Castaneda, "Salinas's International Relations Gamble," Journal of International Affairs 43, 2 (Winter 1990): 410. Back.
Note 29: Sylvia Maxfield, Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). Back.
Note 30: Sylvia Maxfield, "Financial Liberalization and Regional Monetary Cooperation: The Mexican Case," ch. 9 in this volume. Back.
Note 31: Pérez-Díaz and Rodríguez, "From Reluctant Choices to Credible Commitments." Back.
Note 32: Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht," International Organization 47, 1 (Winter 1993): 1-39. Back.
Note 33: Tony Smith, America's Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Back.
Note 34: For example, Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1995), pp. 1-7. Back.
Note 35: Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 85-100. Back.
Note 36: See, for example, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 19; Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 188-189; Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 249. Back.
Note 37: Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Themes and Issues (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 243. Back.
Note 38: Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Case Studies. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 278. Back.
Note 39: Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 218. Back.
Note 40: See, in particular, Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1991); and Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, eds., Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994). Back.
Note 41: Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "The International Context of Democratic Transition in Turkey," in Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, p. 171. Back.
Note 42: Pridham, Encouraging Democracy, p. 215. Back.
Note 43: On the OAS, see Laurence Whitehead, "Fragile Democracies, International Support, and the Practice of Foreign Policy-Making" (paper prepared for the SSRC Conference on Foreign Policy Consequences of Economic and Political Liberalization, 9-11 July 1992), p. 5; and Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, pp. 36-37. Back.
Note 44: For example, the OAU (Diamond, Promoting Democracy, pp. 37-38) and several groups in Central America (Joan M. Nelson with Stephanie J. Eglinton, Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid? [Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1992], pp. 55-58). Back.
Note 45: Laurence Whitehead, "East-Central Europe in Comparative Perspective," in Pridham, Herring, and Sanford, Building Democracy?, p. 53. Back.
Note 46: Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, pp. 258-259.
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