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Liberalization and Foreign Policy, by Miles Kahler, editor
6. Liberalization and Foreign Policy in East Europe
Ronald H. Linden
A number of intriguing empirical and theoretical questions are raised by the changes in the international organizational structure and behavior of the East European states. East Europe represents an unusual case of an "experimental" situation occurring in the real world. Much has changed domestically and internationally, but much remains the same, e.g., state size, geographic location, recent history. This setting allows us to look in a preliminary way at possible explanations for changes in some forms of state behavior. In the case of foreign policy, we can begin to assess the relative impact of changes in domestic politics and process, the international milieu, and/or international institutions on the East European states' international behavior. Up to this point, relatively little work of this type has been done on East Europe.
1
While not assuming that we will find a neat monocausal chain or that we will be able to settle realist-versus-liberal controversies with so few "data points," we can nevertheless make a contribution by looking at changes in East Europe's international behavior that followed the revolutions of 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
This essay will offer a brief description of the political and economic changes that have taken place in and around East Europe since 1989. Then we will look for clues in both the domestic policy-making environment and the external milieu that seem to explain movement and differences in East European foreign policies.
Since the revolutions of 1989, the "transition" in East Europe has in general meant liberalization of both the political and the economic systems. The process is a differentiated one and is proceeding faster in some places and spheres and more slowly in others. In all cases the revolutions of 1989 swept away one-party rule of communist regimes. Even where reformed or renamed communist parties retained power, such as in Romania and Bulgaria, they did so in conjunction with multiparty parliaments, independent presidencies, and an open print media, and they continue to face the prospect of competitive elections. 2
In most of East Europe after 1989 political liberalization proceeded more rapidly and broadly than did economic liberalization. In all of the former one-party regimes except Poland, competitive national parliamentary elections were held by mid-1990. Over the next five years parliamentary and local elections were held at various intervals throughout the region, producing coalitions of varying stability and, in some states--Lithuania, Poland, Hungary--an electoral return of communist parties.
Since the transition began, political parties have sprung up by the hundreds, along with a variety of interest groups representing both political and economic positions. Associations of students, farmers, workers, writers, ethnic groups, nationalists, environmentalists, and so on have appeared to press their cases either through or alongside the newly elected governments and competing parties. Media pluralism has emerged, though print media typically reflect much broader viewpoints than electronic media, with the latter in many cases remaining close to or controlled by the government.
While personnel at the very top have changed--all the states had new presidents by the end of 1990--institutions usually were not formally changed. Instead, existing structures began to be infused with genuine political power, to be "authenticated," to use Jan Gross's term. 3 Institutions of public representation, such as national legislatures, as well as executive organs, including the office of prime minister and other ministries, became politically responsible to earned majorities instead of elite proclivities. The most significant institutional change was the elimination of the Communist Party's "leading role" in theory and in practice. This meant that for the first time, other actors have had a legitimate and public role in the policy process. 4 Other dramatic institutional changes in the region involved the elimination of one state entirely, the German Democratic Republic, and the splitting of two others, Czechoslovakia by peaceful partition and Yugoslavia by armed struggle.
Economic change after 1989 was slower in coming, but the region has made substantial progress in most respects. 5 Only Poland embarked on rapid "shock therapy" policies that freed prices, ended government subsidies, and made the Polish zloty convertible at arate that the government was prepared to defend. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania moved more slowly to free prices, and they accompanied their actions with campaigns to prepare the public. Privatization of small assets--e.g., shops, services, restaurants--proceeded more rapidly than for large state-owned assets, but in the East European states, on average, more than one-half of the gross domestic product had its origins in the private sector by mid-1995. 6 Outside investment has been drawn largely to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, with smaller amounts flowing to Southeast Europe. But overall investment levels have been lower than expected and still represent tiny shares of global foreign direct investment. 7 The overall performance of the East European economies, already weak before the revolutions, worsened through 1992, but recovery was clearly in evidence throughout the region by the end of 1994. 8
The New International Environmentof the East European States
Not only have the revolutions in East Europe produced liberalizing regimes that must formulate their foreign policies under new domestic conditions--e.g., multiple autonomous political actors and pluralistic media--but these policies cannot simply be extensions, or slight modifications, of what had been practiced before, even if the new domestic political scene would allow it. This is because the external environment, to which foreign policy is at least nominally directed, has itself changed. The hovering power of the regional hegemon, the restrictive embrace of the regional alliance systems, the powerful if distorting effects of the Soviet economy, the similarity and familiarity of fellow "fraternal allies," and the usually predictable nature of their interactions and policies all disappeared after 1989, and especially after 1991.
After 1989 the international institutions that the Soviet Union had utilized as one of the instruments for establishing the parameters of acceptable behavior--both domestically and internationally--were quickly dismantled. Both the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) immediately disappeared and, despite some talk to the contrary, were not replaced by regional military or economic alliances. Some regional initiatives have been pursued, most notably the Visegrad Three--then Four--but the ultimate aim of the group was and is full and rapid integration with the West. 9
Western alliances, meanwhile, offered only partial acceptance into the most important European communities that all of the new regimes declared to be their new referent group. The European Union offered first the Central European then the Southeast European states "associate membership" but no commitment or timetable to full membership. NATO established an ancillary "North Atlantic Cooperation Council" and in 1994 offered the states of the region a Partnership for Peace. But both NATO and the EU denied these states the alliances' most important benefits of membership: free trade and security guarantees. 10
The uncertainty engendered by the lack of commonly binding alliance structures has been compounded by a degree of differentiation among the states themselves that was not present during the Soviet period. Historically, East Europe has not been a region where democratic rule has been very robust, and the possibility of a historical replay of the interwar period is not forgotten. 11 As a result of developments during that period, World War II, and then communist rule, the different East European leaders brought different agendas to governance in 1989. For example, the post-communist governments in Budapest consider themselves responsible for the welfare of some three million Hungarians who live in neighboring countries. Romanians now inhabit two states, Romania and Moldova, but neither of these is ethnically pure, while Poland, for the first time in its history, is both free and almost completely Polish. Ethnic dispersal across international borders is less of an issue for Bulgarians, but ethnic diversity within the country is, with a population of approximately one million (out of eight million) Turks and eight hundred thousand Roma (Gypsies). In one case of state fragmentation in the region--Czechoslovakia--ethnicity was less significant than regionalism, while in Yugoslavia, ethnicity and memories of past intercommunal warfare (absent in the Czechoslovak case) offered political entrepreneurs a rich field. 12
After 1989 the new ruling coalitions in Central Europe were primarily center-right in political orientation. In Hungary, for example, a rapid arrangement between the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the main opposition party, the Free Democrats, allowed the former to gain the government and the latter the presidency. Hungary then moved quickly to open its economy to foreign participation and, compared with Poland, enjoyed remarkable government continuity through 1994. The coalition in Czechoslovakia, by contrast, was weakened by the widening split between the Czech lands and Slovakia and the growing inclination of leaders in both parts of the country to pursue special agendas. By the beginning of 1992 effective national policy on most issues was less the norm than the exception, and by the end of the year two states stood where one had been. In Poland fragmentation of the political landscape among Solidarity's successors and the hovering power of Lech Walesa, elected president in 1990, presented yet another variant of post-communist rule.
In Southeast Europe, communist parties, renamed as Socialists or Social-Democrats, did not have to endure long intervals out of power. In Romania the National Salvation Front won the country's first free elections in 1990 and, despite splitting, won again in 1992. In Bulgaria the Socialists and opposition Union of Democratic Forces traded ineffective years in office until, after a time with a technocratic government, the Socialists won a clear majority in the legislature in 1994. But while Ion Iliescu, a former high official in the Ceausescu era, retained the presidency in Romania, in Bulgaria a former dissident and head of the opposition, Zhelju Zhelev, was elected and reelected president. In these cases the political inclinations and electoral base of the governing parties meant slower progress on liberalizing the workings of the economy. In yet another variant, elections in each of the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia produced nationalist governments, and by 1991 political diversity gave way to full-scale civil war. This result and the ineffective response of external powers to these consequences represent only one path--the most disastrous one--that the East European movements toward domestic rule could take. But even absent warfare, the new democracies of East Europe, in making foreign policy, cannot be sure how long the new democracy next door will last or what alternative kinds of governments might emerge.
In several other respects as well, the international milieu changed after 1989. The putative military threat from West Germany, so long held up as the raison d'être of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet security "guarantee," disappeared, replaced by a new kind of German "threat," perceived by some, of economic domination. By mid-1991, for example, 70% of all investment in the Czech Republic--which itself received more than 90% of all foreign investment in Czechoslovakia--was of German origin. 13 In early 1992 the head of the Office for Foreign Contacts and Information of Czechoslovakia wrote to the government warning of an economic "offensive" on the part of Germany against the country. In response, the government called a special meeting to see if there was evidence to back up this claim. 14 In Poland similar concerns were expressed. 15
At the same time, danger from the East, in the form of Soviet pressure or even intervention, was significantly reduced, but it did not disappear altogether. Concerns of many of the East European governments that history could be reversed were informed by four decades of experience under Soviet hegemony. As Russia exerted pressure on its former republics to join in the Commonwealth of Independent States, to accept Russian troops as peacekeepers, or to blend economies, many in the East European states feared a return to an aggressive foreign policy stance in Moscow. The evident and strident Russian hostility to East European membership in NATO does not ease this fear.
Liberalization and Foreign Policy: Research Questions for East Europe
East Europe represents as close to a political science laboratory situation as we are likely to find in the real world. 16 The states of the region have all been subject to the same "experiment": the lifting of communist political and economic domination and the removal of Soviet hegemony. All have seen the emergence of multiparty, competitive elections and legislatures, elected chief executives, more or less pluralized media, removal of barriers to foreign influence, and a whittling away of state domination of the economy. In short, to use Miles Kahler's categories, all have seen an increase in political and economic competition, participation, and transparency.
But they bring to the situation quite different characteristics. These include differences in pre-communist history, religious orientation and institutions, level of industrialization of the economy, level of exposure to Western influence during the communist period, and ethnic heterogeneity, as well as differences in size, resources, and population. In this "experimental" situation we do not really have a communist "control" group--the remaining communist states of Cuba, North Korea, and China are too distant and too different to make comparison plausible--so we may want to think of these countries' own communist past as the "control" group.
The question then arises--and is reinforced by a key question that motivates this volume--as to which set of factors has been more important in determining the new foreign policies of the liberalizing states: the changing and liberalizing domestic structures or the dramatically changed international environment?
Activism and Reorientation in Foreign PolicyLet us consider first the overall level of activity and orientation of the East European states' foreign policies after 1989. What effect is liberalization having on these states' patterns of international relations? With the restrictive environment of the Soviet-dominated alliance system removed and economic ties to the East withered, it might be expected that the newly democratic states will display both a more vigorous pattern of foreign policy activism and one that is orientedmore toward other democracies. In the literature, the first result is suggested by Hagan 17 and the second by the work of Siverson and Emmons. 18 In the specific case of East Europe, given the stated policy objectives of the new regimes in East Europe, i.e., to return to Europe, we might expect these states not only to become more active but also to seek out other democracies in particular as alliance partners.
Preliminary evidence from East Europe on the question of activism is mixed. Enormous activism characterized the early foreign policies of post-communist Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As expected, most of this was directed toward a "return to Europe." But Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland were also active in pursuing ties in Latin America. Are these levels being sustained? Hagan indicates that the degree of foreign policy activism, as measured by specificity, commitment, and independence of activity, is affected in open states by the regime's level of vulnerability and fragmentation. 19 We might expect, then, that open but politically fragmented regimes such as Poland and Bulgaria will not be able to sustain the level of international involvement and commitment seen in the early stages of postrevolutionary activism, while open but less fragmented states such as the Czech Republic or Slovenia will be able to do so. Zhong offers data suggesting that a constriction of international interactions has occurred for all states of the region, especially with regard to their ties with non-European communist states and less-developed countries. 20
Other factors affecting activism were tested by Cowhey for the great powers. These results indicate that a state's electoral system, specifically the degree to which collective goods are emphasized as rewards, the division of power, and the transparency of the system, directly affect the ability of a state to sustain multilateral international commitments. States in which power is divided between the executive and the legislature, for example, seem more able to sustain commitments, though these are harder to achieve at first, than those in which a parliament dominates. 21 This would suggest that over time Poland will be more able to sustain its commitment to multilateralism than will Bulgaria, where the president is relatively weak, or even Hungary, where the president is elected by the parliament.
As for seeking other democracies, the evidence is strong that for East Europe, this is indeed the direction of foreign policy movement. The region witnessed a rapid changeover in orientation from East to West, as measured by trade flows, aid and investment orientation, public pronouncements, and organizational membership. 22 Was this primarily a function of domestic liberalization or of shifting forces in the international system? Obviously, the global opportunity structure had changed--i.e., Soviet hegemony had been withdrawn. But given this new milieu, why did all of the states choose to shift their orientations westward? The global distribution of power shifted radically toward the United States--especially in the economic sphere--and thus a certain amount of "bandwagoning" could be expected. But can we learn anything from the fact that some East European states moved in this direction more abruptly or more sharply than others? For example, the Central European states--Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia--were most eager to discard or rapidly transform the CMEA and the system of Soviet-East European economic exchanges. Romania and Bulgaria were less eager but supported some changes. And why did the East European states move so quickly to exit from the shelter of the restrictive but protected world of CMEA? Why did they move to shift Soviet-East European trade to world prices and hard currency at a time when such a move was expected to bring substantial economic disadvantages to them only months into their revolutions? 23
The answer is that despite the economic "advantage" of staying within the Soviet system a bit longer, politically it was not possible. These new, non-communist governments had come to power promising and determined to return their countries to "normal" and end "distortions" in their foreign relations. Whether the original impetus came from the former ruling parties themselves, as in Hungary and Poland, or from the streets, as in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the new governments were representations of the national desire to break with the past. At home, this meant relegating the communists to the margins; internationally, it meant "joining Europe."
Unlike the previous ruling (communist) parties, the new governments in East Europe could not afford to ignore this sentiment. The communist parties had sought to maintain a monopoly of political power, which they protected by enforcing a severely restricted political environment, dominating the information environment to the point of monopoly, and excluding the public from involvement in policy making except in the form distribution of power shifted radically toof mobilized support. Politics existed under the communist regimes, of course, but opposition, when it occurred, was primarily intra-elite, and public opposition activities and organizations were by definition illegitimate and repressed. 24 Foreign policy making and execution represented an even more restricted arena, since it always carried with it the need to be especially attentive to a powerful external constituent, the Soviet Union.
But after 1989 formulation and execution of foreign policy in East Europe became subject to public intervention. Foreign policy, as with other policies, lay within the newly created and newly legitimate realm of public discussion, debate, and criticism. Virtually all aspects of the process, from agenda setting to implementation, were, in principle, open to intervention by actors who were not creatures of the ruling regime. Though a common circumstance for Western democracies, it was a new dynamic for the East European political elites.
Thus all ruling parties, communist or not, faced political competition for the first time, and foreign policy was one of their assets. For the new ruling parties, breaking ties with CMEA and the Warsaw Pact confirmed the new regimes' democratic credentials at home and mirrored internationally their return to "normalcy." The new regimes found themselves in a situation where their legitimacy was high but they faced daunting tasks. In trying to liberalize their economies most were forced, sooner or later, to take several unpopular actions, such as ending price controls and subsidies, allowing for unemployment and bankruptcies. Foreign policy, on the other hand, provided an arena in which these regimes could earn popularity relatively cost-free. This was accomplished partly by aligning the regime most visibly with states popularly perceived to be democracies, i.e., the West. Joining the United States and other European countries in sanctions against Iraq and in the Gulf War, reducing ties with members of the Soviet-approved list of "revolutionary" states (e.g., Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam), and reestablishing relations with states that had long been on the taboo list (such as Israel, South Korea, and Chile). Of little impact internationally and hardly offering the net gain that a self-help-in-an-anarchic-world perspective might suggest, these actions were important symbolically to the new government's domestic constituencies. 25
While in general it is the domestic political and economic structure and policies that occupy the central attention of most East European parties, foreign policy issues are not absent and can be useful in competitive elections. In the first free Polish elections (1991), for example, one party, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, long considered a fringe party of the right, achieved significant success (finishing with the third-largest number of seats in parliament), partly because of its reputation as a historic and uncompromising defender of Poland's national independence, a position it steadily contrasted with that of the first post-communist government vis-á-vis external economic powers. 26 In Hungary opposition parties criticized the ruling coalition for "selling out" the country and failing to guard its prerogatives in the face of rapacious Western governments and companies. One such party, the Independent Smallholders and Civic Party, finished fourth in the voting in 1994. Further support for the importance of the battle of domestic forces on this aspect of foreign policy is provided by those cases where the dog did not bark--at least not as loudly. In Romania and Bulgaria, where elections in 1990 kept descendants of formerly ruling communist parties in power, the governments were less eager to break down the old alliances, more willing to settle for reform in the existing system, and more sluggish in shifting their trade.
It is clear, however, that the new democratic governments of East Europe were also being pushed toward increasing Western ties by the external environment. They were, in international relations terms, "regime takers." They needed the loans, trade, and investment of the Western democracies and their supranational organizations, especially after 1991, when the Eastern option collapsed. Thus, democracies or not, the states of East Europe would have had to look elsewhere for partners. But to understand why they turned west in the first place, one must look to domestic political changes. A domestic perspective is also necessary to understand what Kalypso Nicolaidis calls the "anticipatory adaptation" of East European economies to the expected demands of Western economic institutions. 27 Domestic politics also gives us an understanding of why these transition economies looked to the West instead of, for example, to more forgiving markets such as those in less-developed countries.
The question of how states respond to international pressure is in part a question of how the political processes define a country's future, its preferences, and its identity. According to the constructivists in international relations theory, national preferences are not given, as structural realists might suggest, but are formed as a product of intersubjective interactions with the outside world. 28 Therefore, how a state reacts to outside pressure, what views of itself or norms of behavior elites bring to the interface with the outside world, are formulated and shaped by that interaction and are neither static nor overdetermined by the external power structure. 29
For East Europe, a critical aspect of this battle involves economic choices, as indicated above. Another part of it--and an important one--involves national ethnic identity. Few of the East European states are homogeneous; all must in one way or another determine whether they are both a nation and a state. The return of sovereignty does not automatically presume a particular choice in the legitimation of that sovereignty. 30 The reemergence of nationalism as a powerful legitimating force in the region derives from several factors, including its long suppression and delegitimation under communist rule, the absence of a powerful competing ideology or value system, the search for identity among national communities now cut loose from the East but not fully accepted by the West, and the discrediting of internationalist alternatives by virtue of four decades of the Soviet-imposed "socialist commonwealth." 31
The impact of nationalism--as that of other factors--has varied across the region. But most of the post-communist governments in the East European states are obliged to respond to charges from nationalists that other national groups within the state have or seek too much power, that they seek secession, and that the government will be betraying the national heritage if it yields to the demands of such groups. In Romania and Bulgaria, for example, a critical issue facing the new governments has been their treatment of minority populations, Hungarians and Turks, respectively. In both of these cases ethnically based political parties act as powerful lobbying groups, pressing for the collective rights of their constituents. The governments in power, but also competing parties, must take positions on whether and when these minorities can achieve full expression of their cultural and civil rights and in what form, e.g., collective or individual. Both government and opposition actions have resonance outside the country, particularly if a referent country is involved--Hungary and Turkey in this case. At the same time, powerful groups in these referent countries push their governments to see to it that co-nationals in neighboring states are fairly treated or even, in some cases, to try to effect border changes. In Romania opposition parties essentially forced onto the agenda the issue of support for the independence of and then possible unification with the new state of Moldova (the former Soviet republic of Moldavia). They wanted the National Salvation Front government and President Ion Iliescu to do more than speak out in favor of the Moldovans. Opposition parties and political umbrella groups forced Iliescu to publicly defend his hesitancy on this issue and ultimately to declare himself opposed to union of the two independent Romanian states. After a referendum and elections in Moldova in 1994 demonstrated a popular rejection of union with Romania, nationalist forces in Romania--some of which were by now in coalition with the governing Social Democratic Party--nevertheless continued their agitation to keep the status of Moldova as an issue in Romanian politics.
The new Hungarian governments have viewed themselves as the protector of co-nationals in all of the neighboring countries. In 1990 Hungarian prime minister Jozsef Antall declared that he saw himself as prime minister of fifteen million Hungarians. As the population of the country at the time was ten million, this statement was widely taken as aggressive interference in neighboring sovereign states' prerogatives at best, as revealing irredentist tendencies at worst. The center-right government tirelessly pressed the issue of Romanian government policy toward its Hungarian minority in various European bodies, with the consequent slowing of that country's ability to "join Europe." The German minority in Poland, residing mostly in the region of Upper Silesia, transferred to Poland after World War II, has directly solicited German aid in improving its situation. During his visit to Poland in July 1992 German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel promised such aid and seemed assured that improvement would be forthcoming, because, as he put it, "Poland wants good relations with Germany." 32
While nationalism relates most obviously to a state's identity preferences, it also affects its ability to pursue its economic goals internationally. Numerous domestic actors now have an impact on foreign policy in East Europe through their involvement in the debate on the speed, direction, and nature of their country's domestic economic transition. Criticism of government policies, for moving too fast or too slowly, is frequently linked, explicitly or implicitly, to the government's willingness to do the bidding of foreign economic centers.
The most outspoken example of this phenomenon occurred in Hungary, where the vice chairman (at the time) of the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum, Istvan Csurka, unleashed a vicious broadside against the government of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall. Accusing the government of being under the control of various foreign economic powers, Csurka linked the transformation of Hungary with that which took place after World War II and compared the IMF to the Red Army. 33 Wrapping his criticism in the defense of national sovereignty and seeking as much as possible to link the current transformation with that overseen by the illegitimate communist regime, Csurka said:
| We do not need economic patrons prepared at the desks of the former planning office, but we need a Hungarian national economic policy. Our survival depends on this. There is nothing more sacred than the national interests. 34 |
His appeal to Hungarian nationalism was explicit in his rejection of foreign domination in the transition process:
| We must no longer wait for applause from abroad because, prompted by the old banking connections, some foreign countries today applaud precisely helplessness and half-heartedness and regard highway robbery as democratic and market economy orientation. 35 |
Throughout the region, other actors have weighed in on the economic transition issue, complicating the ability of East European governments to deal with Western institutions. In most of East Europe trade unions for the first time have begun to act like trade unions. They consider it their obligation to act on behalf of their memberships, or of workers in general, to protect them from the vicissitudes of economic change. Especially during a time of transition, the unions both new and old are faced with a full range of challenges to the welfare of their constituents (or potential constituents, as the unions too must also contest for support). As has happened elsewhere, the unions of East Europe often push their governments not to implement strict IMF guidelines, to move more slowly on ending subsidies to enterprises and allowing bankruptcies, and especially to keep some price controls. 37 No longer the "transmission belts" of economic directives that Lenin envisioned and successive Soviet and East European leaders fashioned, the unions today often form a powerful counterweight to governments eager to comply with international demands for painful economic reforms. In some cases the new governments have tried to co-opt the newly outspoken groups into policy making and thus into implementation of IMF-imposed guidelines. In Romania during 1991-1992 a joint government-union commission and a separate National Consultative Council made up of the three largest unions negotiated a national labor contract covering wage and pension levels. An even broader "social pact" was offered in Poland in 1992 by the government of Prime Minister Hanna Suchochka, after it faced down its own miners in order to try to keep its budget deficit within the IMF's stipulated limits.
Nor are unions the only interest group that the new governments must consider when seeking or making international connections. Farmers have become especially vocal in some East European states. In Poland they object to what they see as a flood of Western imports of foodstuffs that drives their products out of the market while the governments of these very same Western countries keep Polish goods off Western European markets. In August 1991 the National Council of the Polish Peasant Party Solidarity demanded that the Polish government provide "food security" for the country. 38 The next month a new peasant party, called the Feed and Defend Peasant Party, warned that the proposed association of the country with the European Community could cause a "sell-out of Polish land" and said it would oppose "the sale of national assets to foreign hands." 39 After the association agreements with the EU were signed, the Polish government promised its farmers that high import tariffs against foreign agricultural products would be maintained. 40
If the makers of foreign policy can no longer count on being able to automatically call into line key national interest groups, they must also deal with other actors whose intervention affects foreign policy and who operate at the subnational or even local level. Under communism, the governments of the East European states, with the exception of Yugoslavia, were highly centralized. Since the revolutions, regional--often ethnically based--interests have asserted themselves in several instances, with the most extreme and tragic consequences in Yugoslavia. Before the breakup of Czechoslovakia, one of that country's first foreign policy acts exacerbated a regional split. President Vaclav Havel, eager to regain for the country some of the goodwill it had lost through its enforced alliance with the Soviet Union, executed a number of policy reversals, aimed at reorienting the country's foreign policy along "nonideological" lines. One such action involved trying to reduce or end the country's arms sales, pursued as handmaiden to Soviet interests worldwide. But since the bulk of the arms factories, with thousands of workers, lay in Slovakia, this international issue had direct domestic regional consequences. Objections to halting arms sales were raised, and in fact the sales continued.
The question of Slovakia's role in Czechoslovakia's international policies played an important part in the ultimate breakup of the country. Slovak leaders complained that Prague's eagerness to please Western creditors and its concomitant desire to pursue economic liberalization rapidly hurt the poorer Slovak region more than the Czech lands. Less exposed to Western investment, more tied to Soviet-era state enterprises, such as arms factories, and less able to switch markets nimbly, Slovakia was suffering disproportionately as a result of the country's Westernizing economy. 41 Slovakia needed to develop its own policies and determine its own pace, nationalist leaders like Vladimir Meciar argued. In the end, eager to be rid of what he saw as obstacles to economic change and integration with the West, Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus not only acceded to Slovakia's separation but encouraged it.
Democracy and Conflict in East EuropeGiven the plethora of nationalists and nationalist issues, both "internal" and international, why has the region not seen more conflict? Contrary to the common willingness to generalize from Yugoslavia, in fact East Europe and even the states of the former Soviet Union have seen relatively little interstate conflict. Despite nationalist pressure, conflict has been avoided between Romania and Hungary, for example, and no violent conflict has emerged between Poland and Lithuania, or Hungary and Ukraine, where co-national communities and nationalist pressures exist, nor between Slovakia and Hungary, where this issue is complicated further by the conflict over water resources. Nor have Slovakia and the Czech Republic resorted to threats or armed action, despite differences serious enough to produce a division of their once common country.
Are such conflicts restrained by the international system or is their absence a further illustration of the "liberal peace" that exists between democracies--i.e., the notion that democracies do not fight each other even though they engage in conflict about as often as nondemocracies do? While we can hardly consider the five years or so since the end of communist rule in the region as constituting a full test, we can try to fit these states' behavior--in this case the relative absence of conflict--into the explanatory suggestions offered by the literature as to why the "liberal peace" might hold.
The case for external factors' restraining conflict, especially among small states, would seem to be strong. In Morgan and Campbell's findings, the relationship between political constraints (their operationalization of democracy) and war proneness held for major powers, but it did not hold for smaller powers, which the East European states clearly are. 42 Though Morgan and Campbell do not offer conclusions in this direction, one reason why the force of domestic factors did not hold up might be the differing nature of these states' relationship with the external environment, captured in Thucydides' famous dictum "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." Much other work on small states 43 suggests that whether they are democracies or not, the international environment will exercise a powerful influence on the direction of their foreign policies. Indeed, work on major powers 44 as well as the author's own investigations of the region itself 45 suggest the important though differentiated impact of international changes on states' polices, foreign policy not excepted.
In addition, institutionalists would expect that settling into a web of ties with other democracies would constrain conflictual behavior among the East European states. Thus a situation with conflict potential might be mediated by "honest brokers" whom the East European states not only trusted but wanted to please by accepting their solutions. EC mediation in the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Danube River dam controversy would be an example of such a situation. This huge barrage and hydroelectric generator project, originally planned in 1977, has been the subject of controversy since 1989, when Hungary stopped building its part and then ultimately canceled its participation in the project. Czechoslovakia and then Slovakia pushed ahead and in October 1992 diverted the river into the canals and reservoirs of the project. Defusing a potentially dangerous confrontation, EC intervention did succeed in getting both parties to agree to submit the main dispute to the International Court of Justice while continuing talks on the amount and consequences of the water diversion. 46 At the same time, institutionalists would argue that the existing international institutional environment has provided a key arena for the exercise of international influence and the achievement of national goals. In this view the existing powerful institutions of West Europe acted to mitigate the power struggle that might otherwise have ensued and exerted a powerful influence on the behavior of both the West and the East European states. 47
But the utter failure of the West European states or the United States to prevent conflict among the former Yugoslav states or halt its spread is a more dramatic example to the contrary. Neither the international power structure nor the international institutions prevented or mitigated conflict here. If in fact the United States, the European Community, and/or the United Nations had put into force some effective constraints on the behavior of Serbia or Croatia, for example, one could argue that the option of resorting to the use of force elsewhere in East Europe, and hence the presence of conflict, had been reduced by either the international system or the international institutions. But the Yugoslav case demonstrates the opposite. The change in the global power structure away from bipolarity probably facilitated the conflict in Yugoslavia, as realist thinking would sug gest. 48 And the external institutional environment applied only weak constraints. But since these conditions were also operative throughout the region, how do we explain the relative lack of conflict?
The liberal perspective argues that regime type, in this case democracy, is centrally involved in this relative lack of conflict. Despite presumptions that democracies are less warlike, aggregate research suggests that in fact democracies engage in wars about as much as nondemocracies do. As noted, Morgan and Campbell found that the inverse relationship between political constraints and war proneness held for major powers but not for smaller powers. But Maoz and Abdolali, among others, found that democracies tend not to clash with each other and do not fight each other at all. 49 In Bruce Russett's words, "This research result is extremely robust, in that by various criteria of war and militarized diplomatic disputes, and various measures of democracy, the relative rarity of violent conflict between democracies still holds up." 50 Further, Randall Schweller says the evidence is clear that even in situations of global power shift, which realism says predicts conflict, democracies do not engage in preventive wars against democratic challengers and prefer the use of alliances to handle nondemocratic challengers. 51
Why should this be so? Schweller argues that the inclination to war in democracies is blunted by "liberal complaisance" (concerns about the cost of war), the openness and division of power, and moral values of a democracy that militate against war. 52 But Morgan and Campbell argue that decisional constraints, at least, are very much "context dependent." As they put it, "Political constraints arising from domestic structure may not significantly affect the overall frequency of dispute or war involvement, but they may alternatively raise and lower the probabilities of these behaviors, depending on other conditions." 53 In his comprehensive review of the question of why democracies do not fight other democracies, Russett focuses on two variables: (1) the prevalence of democratic norms, which are externalized and operate to reduce the likelihood of resort to force between democracies (but not necessarily between democracies and autocracies) and (2) institutional constraints--the difficulty and protracted nature of debate and decision in democracies. In studying the data with Zeev Maoz, Russett concludes:
| Normative restraints help prevent both the occurrence of conflict and the occurrence of war. . . . Institutional constraints prevent escalation to war, but they do not by themselves prevent states from becoming involved in lower-level conflicts. 54 |
So what can be gleaned from the recent history of East Europe? A rough comparison of the region's nondemocratic period with its democratic phase suggests that conflict and resort to war have been reduced in the brief democratic period. During the period of Soviet and communist dominance, roughly 1945-1989, there were three incidents of military action: suppression of workers' revolts in East Germany in 1953; crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956; and the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Only the last involved East European states' (as opposed to only Russia) taking action against each other, and only the 1956 Hungary action involved enough deaths to qualify, in the aggregate literature, as a war. Other actions might be added, if the notion of conflict were broadened, to include, for example, Soviet pressure on Poland during 1980-1981 using military maneuvers or border incidents between Yugoslavia and some of its neighbors after its break with Stalin in 1948.
Even given such an expanded notion, and even extending the field to include possible clashes between the Soviet Union/Russia and East European states currently, the present democratic period has not seen such incidents. Of course the democratic period is as yet much shorter than the nondemocratic period, but the range of freedom available to each state (what Maoz and Abdolali call "interaction opportunities") is many times greater, and, as noted, powerful domestic forces, such as nationalist parties, that might tend toward conflict are not restrained, as they were during the autocratic period. Viewed in that light and recognizing that this does not constitute a full empirical test, the recent period in East Europe does seem to conform to the general findings.
But what about the fighting in former Yugoslavia? We could exclude this case from consideration as not involving true interstate war. Fighting there began, after all, as a war of secession between Serbia and first Slovenia, then Croatia, neither of which had been recognized as separate states. The fighting in Bosnia, which did begin after it was recognized, is in large part a civil war between communities struggling to control a piece of, and withdraw from, the new state. But in both the Serb-Croat and the Bosnian fighting there are interstate dimensions; both Croatia and Bosnia were recognized by the international community in 1992 and fighting, of course, continued in both places.
But for purposes of looking at the relationship between democracy and conflict, this is not a true test, in that none of the combatant states had been independent democracies for very long before fight ing began. Russett, for example, uses a cutoff point of three years of democratic governance. While highly arbitrary, such a distinction does draw attention to the fact that claiming to be a democracy does not make it so, especially for research purposes. True, elections had occurred in all the Yugoslav republics, but no genuine competitive opposition had emerged (the opposition seceded in Bosnia), nor has an independent press been allowed to function in either Serbia or Croatia. 55 Thus, if one were looking for the institutions of democracy to test in a situation of potential or real conflict, it would have been hard to find them at the time when the conflict began and would be even harder now.
Assuming that the rest of East Europe qualifies as democratic, it seems clear that the institutional constraints Russett refers to have indeed been developing. The most significant change institutionally has been the dilution of the power of the communist party from a dominating body that sanctioned no public competitors to a political party competing for influence and votes. Other changes that have followed involved not so much the creation of new institutions (though some of that has happened) as the instilling of real power into existing institutional shells. Examples of such changes include the presidency in Poland, the constitutional court in Hungary, and legislatures in most of the countries.
With regard to foreign policy, such actors have for the first time demonstrated an ability and willingness to influence foreign relations. While foreign ministries themselves have shown remarkable stability and independence from the domestic political fray, in contrast to most other governing elites, 56 one of the lessons the new democracies are learning is that no matter who runs it, the foreign ministry does not exercise a monopoly over the conduct of foreign affairs. Typically in East Europe there is now a vigorous ministry of international economic relations; a defense ministry eager to build bilateral and multilateral ties; and a ministry of economic reform, which must deal with powerful external economic actors. In some cases, such as Hungary, the prime minister has created his own foreign policy advisory group or council, usually designed to more directly and effectively represent his views and those of his party. Such a proliferation of foreign policy actors led Tamas Katona, a state secretary in Hungary, to complain in May 1991 that there were "too many players" in the foreign policy arena. 57
Among the other institutions that have taken newly significant roles in foreign relations are the countries' national banks. Responding to the cries of enterprises that they serve, leaders of national banks have often been reluctant to go along with IMF-imposed austerity, especially as it applies to credit restrictions. The central banks in Russia and East Europe, for example, typically report directly to the parliament rather than to the president or the government. This structure has allowed them to pressure politically sensitive leaders who fear the consequences of tight money policies, as happened in Bulgaria and Romania.
At the same time, the very nature of key institutions and their relationships have been in flux. Struggles to formulate and specify arenas of responsibility, rights, and prerogatives have taken place in the foreign policy sphere, along with others, as was evident in the contest between the president and the prime minister of Hungary, for example. 58 Such struggles for institutional influence, both for their own sake and in order to achieve the desired results in the policy area, have occurred before. But they are both more open now and more consequential, partly because the guiding and controlling hand of what had been the key institution, the communist party, has disappeared. But, as noted, domestic liberalization has also allowed all struggles, including those over foreign policy, to become part of the competitive political arena. There are now intrusive parliaments, independently elected presidents, vigorous media, and a broad array of social action groups and parties that have demonstrated an ability to slow, halt, or alter key decisions. And now there is a positive incentive for institutional actors to seek support in public politics, an option not previously available.
The picture is further complicated by the fact that the relative independence of institutional actors and the new permeability of the countries' borders mean that interest groups can seek and utilize external actors as allies in domestic policy struggles. Soon after Slovakia's independence in 1993, Hungarian political parties in Slovakia called on the Council of Europe not to admit the country until the new government dealt with the Hungarian minority's economic and political grievances. 59 And governments throughout the region have used the IMF and its rigorous guidelines to justify austerity policies at home.
Finally, both institutional actors and other interests and individuals have the ability to try to influence foreign policy through a pluralized media. Foreign policy, like other policy, is now considered and debated in a much different media environment than that which characterized the communist regimes. All actions are at least potentially subject to criticism and evaluation in the variety of print and, to a lesser extent, electronic media in the states of East Europe. Thus government preferences, whether more aggressive or more passive, are subject to a critical or opposition press and both institutional and public intervention.
As for liberal complaisance and/or the presence of moral values that might restrain resort to war, it is hard to establish a clear connection regionwide. Public opinion surveys in the region show continued evidence of interethnic hostility, and certainly nationalist groups are active and sometimes powerful in the region. In Romania nationalist candidates made a strong showing in the parliamentary elections of 1992, won many local offices precisely in the region of the country inhabited by Hungarians, and in 1994 joined the national government for a time. But there is no evidence that these events translated into a popular willingness to bear the cost of war with Hungary. And in Hungary, which has many nationalist groups of its own, the desire to become part of Europe, which means, inter alia, eschewing the use of force to settle disputes, seems dominant and part of the broad consensus on foreign policy. 60 Both there and in Poland the continuing power of popular sentiment for "joining Europe" was demonstrated by the fact that in these cases the communist and left parties that won elections in 1994 were quick to assert their vigorous interest in continued integration with Europe.
Thus democratic norms would seem also to be operating in the region to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict. Hungary and Romania, despite their clear and serious differences, for example, have been able to sign an "open skies" agreement between them, reducing the likelihood of conflict and even providing for military cooperation. Russett's conclusion that democratic stability and the stability of expectations between such states regarding the continued absence of conflict seem to be supported here and between other adversaries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
In these cases also, international institutional constraints clearly seem to be operating. Both Hungary and Romania signed on early to the Council of Europe and its strictures, the U.S.-sponsored Partnership for Peace, an EU-brokered multilateral treaty on minority rights, and--most problematical (and still unratified)--a comprehensive bilateral treaty. 61 Both have been eager to maintain a positive image to support their membership in the Western alliances.
Does this mean conflict would never occur among states in East Europe or with states outside the region? No one even vaguely familiar with this region would venture such a prediction. But it does indicate, as the aggregate literature does, that a complex mix of factors is involved in the resort to war by democracies. If the costs of war were at some point to be seen as lower relative to the costs of peace--for example, acquiescence in the loss of territory--then liberal complaisance could be replaced by jingoism. Or if instability in one part of the democratic dyad led the other to expect an escalation of conflict, or if the rewards offered by international institutions were to be significantly devalued or indefinitely put off, the likelihood of violent conflict could increase.
As with other countries, the question of the impact of liberalization on foreign policy in East Europe can only partly be answered in the aggregate and probably not at all satisfactorily by relying only on "internal" or "external" explanations. The likely paths and probable causes can be suggested and valuable guides created. The complex of factors that the literature suggests and the still fresh history of liberalizing East Europe should tell us that an unambiguous answer as to what causes nations to behave the way they do and, most important, what causes them to resort to war, is still probably a few months off.
I would like to gratefully acknowledge the careful reading and comments by Miles Kahler, Valerie Bunce, and Russell Leng and by the anonymous reviewers of Columbia University Press. I would also like to acknowledge the research assistance of Ben DeDominicis. Portions of this essay appeared in "Domestic Change and International Relations in the New Eastern Europe," in John R. Lampe and Daniel N. Nelson, eds., East European Security Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993).
Note 1: Studies with this focus include: Regina Karp, "Postcommunist Europe: Back from the Abyss?" in Daniel Nelson, ed., After Authoritarianism: Democracy or Disorder? (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995); Pal Dunay, Gabor Kardos, and Andrew J. Williams, eds., New Forms of Security: Views from Central, Eastern, and Western Europe (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995); Yang Zhong, "The Fallen Wall and Its Aftermath: Impact of Regime Change Upon Foreign Policy Behavior in Six East European Countries," East European Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 235-257; John Lampe and Daniel Nelson, eds., East European Security Reconsidered (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Sudosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1993); Joseph C. Kun, Hungarian Foreign Policy: The Experience of a New Democracy (London: Praeger Publishers with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993). Back.
Note 2: On the revolutions of 1989, see Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); J. F. Brown, Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991). Back.
Note 3: Jan T. Gross, "Poland: From Civil Society to Political Nation," in Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 56-71. Back.
Note 4: For a discussion of the party's role in communist states, see T. H. Rigby, "Politics in the Mono-Organizational Society," and Zygmunt Bauman, "The Party in the System-Management Phase: Change and Continuity," in Andrew C. Janos, ed., Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1976), pp. 31-80, 81-108. Back.
Note 5: Transition Report 1995 (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995). Back.
Note 7: "In 1994," writes the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), "the total FDI into eastern Europe, the Baltics and the CIS, a region with a population of 400 million, was similar to that into Malaysia with a population of 19 million" (ibid., p. 6). Back.
Note 8: Ben Slay, "East European Economies: Recovery Takes Hold," Transition 1, no. 1 (January 30, 1995): 68-72; Kevin Done and Anthony Robinson, "EBRD Praises Ô Fast-Track' Countries," Financial Times, November 2, 1995. Back.
Note 9: See, for example, the memorandum from the three Visegrad countries to the EC in October 1992 (Warsaw PAP, October 22, 1992 [Foreign Broadcast Information Service, hereafter FBIS], October 23, 1992, p. 3). In 1992 the EC agreed to treat the Visegrad Three as a unit for customs purposes but declined to grant the group full membership in the EC. At the same time, partly in response to EC economic pressure, a free-trade zone was created among the countries. See Karoly Okolicsanyi, "The Visegrad Triangle's Free-Trade Zone," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 3 (January 15, 1993): 19-22. In January 1993 Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus called the grouping "artificial" (RFE/RL News Briefs, January 12, 1993, p. 12). Back.
Note 10: See the discussion in Ronald H. Linden, "The Price of a Bleacher Seat: East Europe's Entry Into the World Political Economy," in Ronald Liebowitz and Michael Kraus, eds., Russia and Eastern Europe After Communism: The Search for New Political, Economic, and Security Systems (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 315-336. Back.
Note 11: On the interwar period, see Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974). Back.
Note 12: See the discussion in Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down, pp. 218-252, and V. P. Gagnon Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 130-166. Back.
Note 13: CTSK in English, February 21, 1992 (FBIS, February 26, 1992, p. 2). Back.
Note 14: Respekt, no. 7 (February 1992): 17-23 (FBIS, February 1992, pp. 8-10). Back.
Note 15: See Glos Szczecinski, June 17-18, 1992 (FBIS, June 30, 1992, pp. 26-28). See also Jan B. de Weydenthal, "German Plan for Border Region Stirs Interest in Poland," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 7 (February 14, 1992): 39-47. Back.
Note 16: For a similar point regarding Europe and the end of Cold War, see Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. v. Back.
Note 17: Joe D. Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 339-365. Back.
Note 18: Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 285-306. The data support this proposition more strongly in the post-World War II period than in the interwar period. Back.
Note 19: Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and Comparative Analysis," pp. 356361. Back.
Note 20: Zhong, "The Fallen Wall and Its Aftermath," pp. 240-248. Back.
Note 21: Peter F. Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States," International Organization 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 299-326. Back.
Note 22: Ronald H. Linden, "The New International Political Economy of East Europe," Studies in Comparative Communism 25, no. 1 (March 1992): 3-22; Linden, "The Price of a Bleacher Seat." Zhong, in "The Fallen Wall and Its Aftermath," supports this conclusion with a comparison of international interactions. Back.
Note 23: At the time of the revolutions of 1989 most of the East European states, able to sell overpriced manufactured goods to the USSR for underpriced fuel and raw materials, were running trade surpluses with the USSR. Though artificial because of the lack of a true common convertible currency, these surpluses were expected to turn into sharp and real deficits when trade moved to hard currency and world prices in 1991. Though initially estimated as a likely benefit to the USSR of $12 billion, the virtual collapse in Soviet-East European exports during 1991 in fact led to a small trade surplus for East Europe overall by the end of the year. See John Williamson, The Economic Opening of Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democrat1991), p. 13; PlanEcon Report 8, nos. 27-28-29 (July 21, 1992): 4, 7. Back.
Note 24: See the discussion of the "politics of notables" in Ellen Comisso, "State Structures, Political Processes, and Collective Choice in CMEA States," International Organization 40, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 195-238. Back.
Note 25: See the discussion "The Uses of Foreign Policy," in Linden, "The New International Political Economy," pp. 11-14. Back.
Note 26: Louisa Vinton, "From the Margins to the Mainstream: The Confederation for an Independent Poland," Report on Eastern Europe 2, no. 46 (November 15, 1991): 2024. See also an interview with Leszek Moczulski, head of the party, in Kurier (Vienna), November 3, 1991 (FBIS, November 4, 1991, p. 20). Back.
Note 27: Kalypso Nicolaidis, "East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?" in Keohane, Nye, and Hoffmann, After the Cold War, pp. 196-245. Back.
Note 28: Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-426. Back.
Note 29: For a constructivist discussion of the end of the Cold War in Europe, see Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 215-247. Back.
Note 30: For a discussion of the varying bases of legitimation of sovereignty, see J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 107-130. Back.
Note 31: Ronald H. Linden, "The Appeal of Nationalism," Report on Eastern Europe 2, no. 24 (June 14, 1991): 29-35. Back.
Note 32: Frankfurter Allgemeine, August 1, 1992 (FBIS, August 5, 1992, p. 17). Back.
Note 33: Nepszabadsag, August 27, 1992 (FBIS, September 3, 1992, p. 9). Csurka's article was originally published in Magyar Forum on August 20, 1992; Nepszabadsag then published long excerpts. Back.
Note 36: See, e.g., Uj Magyarorszag, November 13, 1995 (FBIS, November 17, 1995, p. 13). Back.
Note 37: In February 1991 the head of the former government-run trade unions in Poland, Alfred Miodowicz, led protests against the government's economic plan on the grounds that Poland was being run by the IMF, which had "dictated" its economic program (Ben DeDominicis, "Liberals in Poland" [Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1992], p. 271). Back.
Note 38: PAP in English, August 3, 1991 (FBIS, August 3, 1991, p. 30). Back.
Note 39: Rzeczpospolita, September 21-22, 1991 (FBIS, September 25, 1991, pp. 22-23). Back.
Note 40: PAP in English, February 24, 1992 (FBIS, February 26, 1992, p. 22). Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing N Back.
Note 41: At the end of 1992, unemployment in the Czech republic was 3%, while in Slovakia the figure was nearly 12%. Back.
Note 42: T. Clifton Morgan and Sally H. Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 187-211. Back.
Note 43: Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr, "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy," in Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, pp. 409-432. Back.
Note 44: Patrick James and John R. Oneal, "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 307-332. Back.
Note 45: Ronald H. Linden, Communist States and International Change: Romania and Yugoslavia in Comparative Perspective (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987). Back.
Note 46: CTK (Prague) in English, January 20, 1993 (FBIS, January 21, 1993, p. 28); Nepszabadsag, November 30, 1992 (FBIS, December 9, 1992, p. 1); for a review of the controversy, see Karoly Okolicsanyi, "Slovak-Hungarian Tension: Bratislava Diverts the Danube," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 49 (December 11, 1992): 49-54. Back.
Note 47: Stephan Haggard, Marc A. Levy, Andrew Moravcsik, and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining, and Institutions," in Keohane, Nye, and Hoffmann, After the Cold War, pp. 173-195. For a critical view of institutionalist approaches, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/
95): 5-49. Back.
Note 48: John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, expanded ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 141-192. For a critique of this view, see Richard N. Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," International Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 249-277. On the end of the Cold War and Yugoslavia, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), esp. pp. 148-157. Back.
Note 49: Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 1 (March 1989): 3-35. Back.
Note 50: Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 10. Back.
Note 51: Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" World Politics 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 235-269. Back.
Note 52: Ibid., pp. 240-246. Back.
Note 53: Morgan and Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War," p. 209. Back.
Note 54: Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 88, 90. For a critical view of democratic peace theory, see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 5-49. Back.
Note 55: For a discussion of press control in Croatia and Serbia, see Christian Science Monitor, January 26, 1993, pp. 2, 12, 13. Back.
Note 56: See Thomas A. Baylis, "Plus Ca Change? Transformation and Continuity Among East European Elites" (paper presented at national convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, Arizona, November 19-22, 1992). Back.
Note 57: Kun, Hungarian Foreign Policy, p. 119. Back.
Note 58: Judith Pataki and John W. Schiemann, "Constitutional Court Limits Presidential Powers," Report on Eastern Europe 2, no. 42 (October 18, 1991): 5-9. Back.
Note 59: RFE/RL Daily Report, February 5, 1993. Back.
Note 60: See Alfred A. Reisch, "Hungary Pursues Integration with the West," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 13 (March 26, 1993): 32-38. Back.
Note 61: Reuters, March 19, 1995. Back.
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