|
|
|
|
Liberalization and Foreign Policy, by Miles Kahler, editor
Democratic States and International Disputes
Joanne Gowa
As a replacement for the Cold War strategy of containment, the Clinton administration has adopted a foreign policy strategy of "enlargement." According to Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for national security affairs, the administration's strategy is designed to enlarge the world's "community of market democracies."
1
This strategy serves U.S. interests, President Clinton maintains, because "democracies rarely wage war on one another."
2
The Clinton administration strategy reflects the findings of the rapidly growing body of literature about the democratic peace. Perhaps the most striking conclusion to emerge from this largely empirical literature is the following: democratic states do not wage war against other democratic states. More generally, studies in this literature conclude that the incidence of serious disputes is much lower between democratic polities than between members of other pairs of polities. 3
In this essay, I examine the three arguments that contributors to this literature most commonly advance to explain their findings. One argument emphasizes the role of norms; the second focuses upon checks and balances; and the third assigns the principal explanatory role to trade. I conclude that none of the three arguments provides a compelling explanation of the peace that is said to prevail between democratic polities. Recent empirical analyses reinforce this conclusion. 4
The Existing Literature
There is a rapidly growing body of literature that examines whether the foreign policies of democratic states are unique. There is a strong consensus on two related issues. First, democracies do not engage each other in war. Second, and implied by the first, members of pairs of democratic states are much less likely to engage each other in serious disputes short of war than are members of other pairs of states.
Many contributors to the literature under review here examine whether the incidence of war between democracies differs from that of war between other states. 5 According to William Dixon, the democratic-peace literature has produced "very strong and consistent empirical evidence that wars between democracies are at most very rare events." 6 Indeed, on the basis of their analysis of data spanning 150 years, Zeev Maov and Nasrin Abdolali conclude that "democracies never fight one another." 7
Students of this issue have been very careful to make it clear that whether a state is democratic does not affect its overall propensity to wage war. They note that democracies are just as likely as are other states to engage in war. 8 In addition, there is no strong evidence that democracies are any less likely than are other polities to initiate war. Thus, the incidence of war between democracies is not an indicator of the war-proneness of democracies in general. Instead, the distinctive effect of democracy on war is limited to cases in which both members of a pair of states are democratic.
Another finding that emerges from this literature relates to the outbreak of "militarized interstate disputes" (MIDs). Several studies find that members of pairs of democratic states engage each other in MIDs at a significantly lower rate than do members of other dyads. A dispute is categorized as a MID if (1) it involves "threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of force" and (2) the threat or deployment of military forces is "explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned." 9 Examples of MIDs include the 1898 Fashoda crisis, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis. The finding about MIDs echoes that about wars: militarized disputes are much less likely to occur between democracies than between members of other pairs of states.
Using data in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set, contributors to this literature have also analyzed the relationship between democracies and the incidence of crises. The definition of a crisis, according to Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, is "a situational change characterized by an increase in the intensity of disruptive interaction between two or more adversaries, with a high probability of military hostilities." 10 As in the case of wars and MIDs, crises are less likely to occur between members of democratic dyads than between members of other dyads. 11
Thus there seems to be consensus that the behavior of democracies in the international arena is distinctive in some respects. War between democratic polities is nonexistent, and MIDs short of war or crises between these polities are relatively rare events. A series of empirical analyses has replicated these findings.
The issue that has been less intensively examined is why democracies behave differently. As I noted above, it has become conventional in the relevant literature to advance one or more of three explanations of the distinctive behavior of democracies. The first relies on norms, the second on checks and balances, and the third on trade. In the next three sections, I examine each in turn.
Norms
The findings of the democratic-peace literature imply that "Second Image" or domestic political factors are essential to an understanding of the outcomes of state interactions. That is, the latter cannot be explained exclusively in terms of the interests of abstract states, as defined by the logic of the situations in which these states find themselves. This, in turn, implies that a clear distinction should exist between the explanations that this literature invokes to support its findings and those familiar from "Third Image" or realist theory. Norm-based explanations of the democratic peace fail this test.
Norms are "rules for conduct that provide standards by which behavior is approved or disapproved." 12 Much of the democratic-peace literature assigns primary importance to the norm that defines appropriate methods of resolving conflicts within democratic polities. Proscribing recourse to force, the relevant norm legitimates as "proper" the use of either adjudication or bargaining as a method of conflict resolution. 13
This norm is adduced to explain peace not only within but also between democratic states. According to Zeev Maoz and Bruce M. Russett, domestic norms influence international outcomes because states "externalize . . . the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions." 14 Thus, if a norm mandates the peaceful resolution of disputes within two states, it will also mandate the peaceful resolution of disputes between them. Hence, the democratic peace.
Despite the nominal distinction between norms and interests, however, it is not at all clear that this explanation differs fundamentally from its conventional realist counterpart. The conclusion that the norm-based and the realist explanations are discrete follows from the interpretation of norms that dominates the democratic-peace literature. In this interpretation, norms have "independent motivating power." As such, they are "ex ante sources of action" rather than "merely ex post rationalizations of self interest." 15
The apparent distinction between norm-based and interest-based explanations would fade, however, if the democratic-peace literature adopted another interpretation of norms. For example, some contributors to the more general literature on norms believe that norms reflect interests, because it is the expectation of external sanctions rather than internalized values that explains adherence to norms. In this interpretation, as James Finley Scott notes, an individual " 'internalizes' or learns a norm to the extent that . . . he conforms to it at a spatial or temporal remove from sanctions." However, learning is the product of "sanctions applied by . . . the social environment." And, Scott adds,
| the learning of norms is never complete, and always involves expectations that sanctions will be applied. Thus even when norms are thoroughly learned, when moral commitment is strong and a sense of obligation is keenly felt, the maintenance of both conscience and conformity depends on the exercise of sanctions. 16 |
In this interpretation, it is interests that drive norms: little, if anything, distinguishes between them. If the democratic-peace literature adopted this interpretation, the prominent role it assigns to the norm of peaceful dispute resolution could be recast in terms of the interests of states and the logic of their situations. Then, the interests of states in a peaceful resolution of disputes, whether at home or abroad, would follow from the relative price of that option: bargaining is less costly than war, whether civil or international. 17 From this perspective, what seems problematic is not the interest of states in settling disputes short of war but their failure to do so. 18
This argument suggests that the norm-based explanation common in the democratic-peace literature is not distinct from explanations of war and disputes that realist theory advances. In the latter, interests are understood as responses to the logic of situations and as independent of the particular states involved. This implies, in turn, that the outcomes of armed disputes should not vary across states according to their regime types.
That just such a lack of variance obtains is the finding that emerges from recent empirical analyses. Its most powerful support derives from the existence of an inconsistent relationship between polities and peace across time: before World War I, no difference exists between the rates at which members of democratic dyads and members of other dyads engage each other in war; after World War II, democracies have a lower incidence of war between them than do other polities. 19
Variations in patterns of alliance formation across the two periods help explain this inconsistency: before World War I, democracies are significantly less likely to be allied with each other than are other states; after World War II, they ally at a significantly higher rate than do members of other pairs of polities. 20 Because alliances reflect the common and conflicting interests of states, this finding implies that the inconsistent relationship between democracies and war across time is a function of changing patterns of interests.
Checks and Balances
The premise of the checks-and-balances argument is that much more effective domestic political constraints on leaders exist in democratic polities than in other kinds of polities. 21 As such, the argument is the clear intellectual descendant of that which Immanuel Kant advanced long ago. In states that are not republics, Kant maintained, "a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court functions, and the like." As a result, Kant observed, an autocrat may "resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial reasons." 22
Even if this assumption about checks and balances were true, it is important to note that structural constraints will not always bind lead ers of democratic polities considering the option of war. Whether they will do so depends upon the net welfare consequences of war. In some cases, aggregate social welfare will be higher if states enter into war than if they decline to do so (e.g., allied and U.S. entry into World War II). In these cases, whether checks and balances exist will not make any difference: assuming that the gains from war are distributed across the population, a majority will favor entry into war. 23 The potential for checks and balances to bite, then, exists only in situations in which distributional rather than efficiency concerns motivate the prosecution of a war. It is these cases, however, that raise questions about whether it makes sense to assume that checks and balances operate as effectively in practice as in principle: by definition, if distributional issues drive decisions about war, political-market failures have led to the breakdown of a checks-and-balances system.
Incomplete information is a common cause of imperfect political markets. Other sources include asymmetries in the cost-benefit distributions associated with many government policies, as well as variations in the political efficacy of different groups. These political-market failures drive a wedge between the de jure and the de facto operation of checks-and-balances systems.
For example, political-market failures produce tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade (NTBs). These barriers exist in most democracies despite the fact that their effect on aggregate social welfare is negative. They do so, in part, because trade barriers produce concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: producers gain; consumers lose. This distributional asymmetry reinforces a skew in political participation: because of their relatively small number and high geographic concentration, producers tend to be more effective political actors than are consumers. Thus, democratic political processes do not constrain leaders to define trade policy so as to maximize social welfare. 24 As in the case of tariffs and NTBs, the prosecution of a war can also yield a pattern of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs that creates a political-market failure. Producers (e.g., defense contractors) are likely to be more effective political actors than is the population at large. The composition of the armed forces may create an even more skewed political process than exists in trade: whether under a draft or a volunteer system, evidence from the United States suggests that the costs of military service fall disproportionately on low-income con stituents--that is, on those whose rates of political participation are relatively low. 25 The net effect, again, is to create a wedge between the principle and practice of checks and balances.
These patterns of political resource endowments benefit heads of state, as well as special rather than general interests. As Adam Smith observed long ago, the voice that democratic regimes give to special interests can produce foreign policies that are inimical to the nation as a whole. Of imperialism, for example, Smith noted:
| To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers. 26 |
This discussion is not meant to imply that no differences exist between the policy processes that produce tariffs and those that produce wars. Large wars have the potential to precipitate a markedly different political process than do small wars, because their costs are spread more widely across the population than are those of small wars. Yet, because most wars are small wars, the trade analogue is useful for the argument here. In both cases, concentrated benefits and diffuse costs and variable barriers to collective action impede the effective operation of checks and balances.
Further diluting the power of the conventional checks-and-balances argument is the existence of informal substitutes for structural constraints in nondemocracies. The tenure in office of leaders of these polities depends upon a supporting coalition of interests. As a result, these leaders cannot take actions that jeopardize the cohesion of the coalition of forces that maintains them in office. Indeed, empirical analyses suggest that these coalitions and those that exist in democratic polities do not differ on average with respect to their propensity to engage in war: as noted earlier, there is no difference between the rates at which democracies and nondemocracies engage in war.
Leaders of nondemocracies also confront a constraint on their ability to wage war that is unique to them. 27 The construction of a strong military force can place their incumbencies at risk. If the armed forces are strong enough to defeat foreign adversaries, they may also be sufficiently strong to overthrow their nominal commander in chief. Maintaining only weak armed forces, however, is risky too. While this strategy makes a military coup d'état improbable, it facilitates a takeover by rivals to rule outside the state. Heads of state of nondemocratic polities, therefore, confront a dilemma that does not plague leaders of democracies.
This dilemma may make rulers of these states more interested in reducing the incidence of wars than in waging them. Indeed, this interest was one motivation for the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Its potential member states did not have large indigenous military units in place. If each agreed to respect the borders of all others, as Gordon Tullock notes, each would be able "to keep relatively small military units, and what is more important, military units that are weak." 28 As a result, the founding states agreed that a pledge to adhere to preexisting borders would be a prerequisite of membership in the OAU. To the extent that the organization confers excludable benefits, then, the OAU can facilitate collusion among incumbent African leaders to preserve their incumbency.
Thus, there are at least two reasons that the checks-and-balances argument is less compelling than it might at first glance appear: political-market failures decrease the efficacy of de jure constraints, and substitutes for them exist in nondemocratic polities. As in the case of the argument about norms, then, the discussion in this section suggests less variation in dispute rates across regimes than does the democratic-peace literature. Indeed, empirical analyses of the relationship between formal constraints and dispute involvement have not found any statistically significant effects. 29
Trade-based explanations of the relationship between polities and peace are less common than are either norm-based or structural-constraint explanations. Nonetheless, in some contributions to the literature under review here, trade plays an important explanatory role. Michael Doyle, for example, maintains that the "cosmopolitan right to hospitality" that democracies accord to each other allows "the 'spirit of commerce' sooner or later to take hold of every nation." 30 According to this argument, trade flows between democratic states will be higher than are those between other states. This implies that the trade disruption that would ensue from serious interstate conflict would be more costly for members of pairs of democratic states than for members of other pairs of states. Thus, all else being equal, the incidence of conflict should be lower between democracies than between other states.
There are two problems with this argument. First, it seems clear that the "spirit of commerce" does not infect all members of democratic polities. Import-competing industries that file petitions for protection do not discriminate between the exports of democracies and those of nondemocracies. Nor is there any evidence that elected officials discriminate in this way when they supply tariffs or NTBs in response to these petitions or to other demands for protection. 31 The "spirit of commerce" may exist, but it does not seem to be highly infectious.
Thus it is not surprising that empirical analyses do not find strong and consistent evidence that trade flows are higher between democracies than between other states. Edward D. Mansfield and I examined the impact of political factors on bilateral trade flows between major powers in a series of cross sections between 1905 and 1985. We found that whether the trading partners were both democracies mattered in only one case. 32 Extending the analysis to a larger sample of countries during the post-World War II period, Mansfield and Rachel Bronson found no consistent relationship across time: although trade flows between democracies are higher than are those between other states between 1950 and 1965, no difference exists thereafter. Mansfield and Bronson attribute the positive relationship they observe in the early postwar years to the influence of the Cold War. 33
Second, even if members of democratic pairs of states did trade consistently more with each other than their nondemocratic counterparts did, the conclusion that trade reduces the probability of conflict between them would not necessarily follow. 34 If competitive markets exist, any disruption of trade between two states will simply lead both to alternative markets. As a result, the costs incurred will be limited to the transaction costs that accompany market shifting. If both states incur roughly comparable costs, however, each would have an incentive to continue to trade with the other as long as it is feasible to do so.
Suppose, for example, that a serious diplomatic dispute breaks out between France and Germany. Suppose, in addition, that France imports its widgets from Germany and that Germany imports its goat cheese from France. Will this exchange of widgets and goat cheese exercise a strong influence on the probability that the Franco-German dispute will escalate to one that involves the threat or use of armed force?
It will do so if and only if France has no other source of widgets or Germany no other source of goat cheese or if one country cannot find alternative export markets. That is, the threat of a breakdown of bilateral trade can act as a powerful deterrent only if France or Germany possesses monopoly or monopsony power in widget or cheese markets. Otherwise, France can import widgets and Germany cheese from other countries, and each country can find a market for its exports in a third country.
Thus a disruption of trade between two countries incident upon an armed dispute between them can inflict large welfare costs only in cases in which alternative markets do not exist. Unless conflict makes trade infeasible, however, neither belligerent may have an incentive to disrupt trade. If both states have equivalent degrees of market power over the prevailing terms of trade, a decision to disrupt trade in the event of conflict would be self-defeating: it would leave both countries worse off. 35 The existence of asymmetric market power does not affect this decision calculus. Presumably, a state able to improve its terms of trade unilaterally would have done so ex ante. If it had waited to do so until the outbreak of conflict, it would in the interim have inflicted costs upon itself in the form of forgone increases in its real income. Similarly, if its trading partner had a more profitable alternative ex ante, it would have not been subject to the exercise of market power. As in the case of a symmetric distribution of trade, then, disrupting trade in goods and services in which asymmetric market power exists will impose costs on both sides.
The logic of this argument applies as well to cases in which monopoly or monopsony power originates in a relation-specific investment. The latter, as Beth and Robert Yarbrough note, is an investment "undertaken to be used in specific transactions with a specific partner." Because its value in other transactions is either negligible or nonexistent, a relation-specific investment can endow a would-be belligerent with the requisite market power to improve its terms of trade. 36
For example, Japanese investors might design a plant to build cars specifically to meet the demands of the U.S. market. In doing so, they become vulnerable to a U.S. holdup. Once the plant is built, the U.S. government can seek to renegotiate the terms of the agreement, because it is impossible for the owners of the plant to relocate it profitably. Other examples of relation-specific investments include cross-national upstream or downstream integration of a firm. 37
As in the case of market power more generally, relation-specific investments need not deter dispute escalation. Investors should be aware ex ante of the danger of reneging. Thus they will attempt to minimize the ex post danger of a holdup via contingent contracts and/or the establishment of a bilateral monopoly. If neither is possible, it will be difficult to deter attempts to renege. It is not clear, however, that the onset of a serious conflict will have any effect on these attempts. Absent an effective deterrent mechanism, holdups will occur as soon as they become feasible.
Suppose, however, that reputational concerns had deterred holdups before the initiation of a conflict. In this case, the actual outbreak of armed conflict may precipitate holdups that would not have otherwise occurred. This is so because a reputation for reneging during armed conflicts is unlikely to be very costly, given the infrequency with which such conflicts occur. Thus, in this case, the escalation of a dispute may inflict trade-related costs on its potential belligerents.
Whether it will do so depends, however, upon the distribution of relation-specific investments. Although no direct evidence is available about this distribution, it seems plausible that if all else is equal, these investments will take place in countries that are unlikely to engage in serious disputes with the home country. This suggests that, as in the case of trade, investments will be skewed toward countries allied with the home country. 38
Because armed disputes between allied countries are relatively rare, opportunism related to such disputes is also likely to be rare. 39 And, as in the cases discussed above, if each party to a dispute has made comparable relation-specific investments in the other, no holdups should occur in the event of a war or of serious disputes short of war: opportunism would only make both belligerents worse off.
None of the three explanations of the alleged democratic peace is persuasive as it stands. The interest of two potential belligerents in a peaceful resolution of disputes between them is not unique to democratic polities. Political-market failures create a wedge between the de jure and de facto operation of checks and balances, and informal substitutes for the latter exist in nondemocracies. Finally, trade can act as a strong deterrent to armed conflict only under much more restrictive conditions than is usually assumed.
It is not surprising, then, that the findings of recent empirical analyses are inconsistent with those of the democratic-peace literature. Nor is it surprising that these analyses assign a major explanatory role to interests. As reflected in alliance ties, changing patterns of common and conflicting interests seem to play a key role in explaining inconsistent dispute patterns across time (i.e., a lower war rate between members of pairs of democratic states and members of other pairs of states after 1945 but not before 1914). 40
As a consequence, the importance of Second Image variables to an understanding of serious international conflict remains to be demonstrated, and so also does the wisdom of a strategy designed to enhance prospects for peace by promoting the spread of democracy among members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization.
It may be more useful to build bridges, rather than democracies, abroad.
For comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to Robert J. Art, Benjamin J. Cohen, Henry S. Farber, Robert G. Gilpin Jr., Peter Gourevitch, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, Lisa Martin, and John S. Odell. I also acknowledge with gratitude the research assistance of Matthias Kaelberer and the financial support of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University.
This chapter was published previously as "Democratic States and International Disputes," International Organization 49 (3) (Summer 1995): 511-522. © 1995 by the IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Note 1: Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," Foreign Policy Statements (1993). Back.
Note 2: William Clinton, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World," Foreign Policy Statements (September 1993). Back.
Note 3: See, e.g., Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (June 1992): 309-341; Stuart Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict," International Interactions 18, no. 3 (1993): 231-249; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (December 1984): 616-648; Steve Chan, "Democracy and War: Some Thoughts on Future Research Agenda," International Interactions 18, no. 3 (1993): 205-214; William Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," American Political Science Review 88 (March 1994): 14-32; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-1169; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (March 1989): 3-35; Zeev Maoz and Bruce M. Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-86," American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624-638; Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 (Summer 1976): 50-68. Back.
Note 4: Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security 20 (Fall 1995): 123-146; Farber and Gowa, "Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace: Common Polities or Common Interests?" Journal of Politics (forthcoming). Back.
Note 5: See, e.g., Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict"; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace"; and Erich Weede, "Democracy and War Involvement," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (March 1993): 42-68. Back.
Note 6: Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," p. 14. Back.
Note 7: Maoz and Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict," p. 21. Back.
Note 8: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall"; Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; Jack Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 653-673; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?" International Interactions 17, no. 4 (1992): 305-320; R. J. Rummel, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior," in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968). Back.
Note 9: Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 18161976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (December 1984): 587. Back.
Note 10: Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Crisis in the Twentieth Century (New York: Pergamon, 1989), p. 5. Back.
Note 11: Maoz and Russett, "Structural and Normative Causes of the Democratic Peace," p. 632. Back.
Note 12: Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 62. Back.
Note 13: T. Clifton Morgan, "Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature," International Interactions 18, no. 3 (1993): 198. Back.
Note 14: Maoz and Russett, "Structural and Normative Causes of the Democratic Peace," p. 625, emphasis in the original. Back.
Note 15: Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 125. Back.
Note 16: John Finley Scott, Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. xiii. Back.
Note 17: James D. Fearon, "Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1992). Back.
Note 18: James Fearon suggests the imperfect process of signaling resolve as a candidate explanation (ibid.); James Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994): 577-592. Back.
Note 19: Farber and Gowa, "Polities and Peace." Back.
Note 20: Farber and Gowa, "Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace." Back.
Note 21: See, e.g., David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992): 24-37. For an exception, see T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (June 1991): 187-211. Back.
Note 22: Cited in Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part I," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983): 229. Back.
Note 23: I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggestions on this point. Back.
Note 24: For a more complete analysis of the political processes that lead to the adoption of tariffs, see, e.g., Susanne Lohmann and Sharon O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," International Organization 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 595-632. Back.
Note 25: Richard V. L. Cooper, "Military Manpower Procurement: Equity, Efficiency, and National Security," in Martin Anderson, ed., Registration and the Draft (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1982), pp. 343-376. Indeed, during World War I, the United States conscripted men on the basis of their " 'value to society,' with those of 'least value' drafted first" (363). Back.
Note 26: Cited in Robert B. Ekelund and Robert D. Tollison, Mercantilism in a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in a Historical Perspective (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981), p. 10. Back.
Note 27: This discussion is based on Gordon Tullock, Autocracy (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987). Back.
Note 29: Morgan and Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War." Back.
Note 30: Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," p. 1161. Back.
Note 31: See, e.g., Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Back.
Note 32: Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," American Political Science Review 87 (June 1993): 416. Back.
Note 33: Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel Bronson, "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade," American Political Science Review (forthcoming). Back.
Note 34: Although trade-related costs may accrue as a consequence of the reallocation of domestic resources incident on war, this is not unique to democratic states. Back.
Note 35: Harry G. Johnson, "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," Journal of Economic Studies 21 (1953/54): 142-153. Back.
Note 36: Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 25. Back.
Note 37: For a good discussion of these and other examples, see ibid. Back.
Note 38: For evidence about the trade case, see Gowa and Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade." Back.
Note 39: More precisely, controlling for contiguity, allies are less likely to engage in conflicts with each other than are non-allied states (Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"). Back.
Note 40: Farber and Gowa, "Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace." Back.
Email this citation