Liberalization and Foreign Policy, by Miles Kahler, editor

2. Legislative Influence and International Engagement

Lisa L. Martin

The process of political liberalization involves establishing a legislature with some degree of control over policy, including foreign policy. In spite of this observation, however, theories of international relations have tended to slight the study of legislatures, either by assuming that the state is a unitary actor or by concentrating on the activities of the executive branch, such as the president, prime minister, secretary of state, or bureaucracy. ₁   In contrast, students of American politics have developed numerous models of legislative-executive interaction and its impact on policy. This essay argues that such models are applicable to foreign as well as domestic policy settings and presents a case for extending the analytical framework to democracies other than the United States.

Work in comparative foreign policy has been hampered by lack of an overarching analytical framework. This lack has led to one of two pathologies. Sometimes scholars have treated each country as unique, asserting that processes found in one cannot be generalized, so that research has not actually been comparative in nature. At other times attempts to generalize without adopting an explicit analytical framework have led to the generation of lists of variables that may or may not have significance in some unspecified direction under some unspecified conditions. I argue that spatial models of policy making and consideration of the problem of delegation and principal-agent relationships provide a structure on which to hang more specific, comparative theories of the role of legislatures. This is not to argue that politics in Britain or Argentina, for example, is "the same as" politics in the United States but that models of delegation provide us with a unifying language with which to assess and measure the differences among established legislative systems.

Most models of legislative delegation focus on the U.S. House of Representatives. The applicability of such models to other countries remains an open question. I focus on Britain as a contemporary case because the conventional wisdom about British politics suggests that transporting American models to this setting should be especially difficult. The British system, unlike that of the United States, includes a parliamentary government with strong party discipline (although both countries have single-member districts, which creates a certain similarity in electoral and party incentives). ₂   The separation of powers and district-level sources of support for legislators in the United States combine to give Congress an influential role in the American policy-making process. In contrast, the development of the British party system since the mid-nineteenth century has contributed to a situation in which most analysts find that the House of Commons plays a passive role in policy making, having abdicated its powers to the government chosen by the majority party. Given these difficulties, it would be a promising start on building a general approach to legislatures and foreign policy if the framework developed in the U.S. case can be shown to have explanatory leverage in Britain as well.

Spatial models are a class of equilibrium models, which identify outcomes from which no actor has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. As used here, they assume a fixed constitutional setting with well-defined and respected roles for various bodies of government. These assumptions do not hold for regimes in transition, those undergoing a process of liberalization. In fact, much of the political debate surrounding transitional regimes has to do with precisely the question of defining institutional roles, such as that of the legislature. In nonliberal regimes, foreign policy is, almost without exception, the prerogative of the head of state. The story of liberalization is in large part the story of the assertion of popular control over policy, typically through a legislative body. To provide a comparison for contemporary cases of liberalization, in the first section I briefly examine the struggle for control of foreign policy in a historical case of liberalization. England in the seventeenth century illuminates the ways in which legislatures enhance their authority over foreign policy. Paradoxically, it appears that legislatures are most insistent on assert ing their right to influence foreign policy early in the process of liberalization. Because this process is about establishing property rights to policy making, legislators are reluctant to concede in the institutional power struggle by allowing the executive much discretion. In contrast, in established democracies we typically see extensive delegation (but rarely abdication) to the executive branch.

Turning to such established democracies, the second section discusses the common understanding of the key differences between the House of Commons and Congress in terms of their impact on policy. After mentioning models of delegation that may be most useful for U.S. foreign policy analysis, I argue that the observation of legislative behavior in the House of Commons is not sufficient, in and of itself, to prove that members of Parliament (MPs) have no influence on policy. The third section develops the general case for considering the influence of MPs on policy and offers simple spatial models that allow us to identify key differences between the U.S. and British patterns of legislative-executive interaction. The fourth section turns to empirical evidence on the British decision to join the European Community (EC) to bolster the case that the House of Commons is an important source of direction and constraint in contemporary British foreign policy. This essay highlights three types of arguments: the struggle for legislative influence in liberalizing states; the use of spatial models to assess the conditions for influence and contrasts between democratic systems; and the evidence for overlooked legislative influence on important foreign policy decisions.

Transitional Regimes and Control Over Foreign Policy

Processes of political liberalization are characterized by--perhaps defined by--debate about the authority of representative institutions in various policy areas. This debate extends to the realm of foreign policy, where it is often particularly intense, since the demands of international politics penalize states with ill-defined responsibilities for making foreign policy. ₃   During transitions, constraints established by international interactions, especially the threat of or actual engagement in war, interact with changes in domestic institutions. In established democracies, as discussed below, legislatures often have more influence on foreign policy than a casual observer would infer. In this first section, I ask how legislative involvement in foreign policy in transitional regimes responds to the simultaneous demands of international engagement and domestic liberalization.

To provide some historical context for current transitions, I turn to the example of England in the seventeenth century. England presents an interesting case for a number of reasons. First, the restructuring of English political institutions allowed the state to extract significant resources from the population and otherwise raise funds, while at the same time limiting the scope for arbitrary exercise of power. It thus set the groundwork that allowed Britain to become a major force in European politics during the eighteenth century. Second, shifting and dispersing responsibility for decisions had clear and immediate effects on foreign policy. Third, the pressures of international competition and engagement fed directly into the ongoing domestic political struggle, sometimes significantly changing the incentives facing key actors.

During the seventeenth century, English politics charted a difficult course from monarchy to representative government, with many retrenchments along the way. ₄   In 1660, following a failed experiment with new institutions after a civil war, the monarchy was restored. Over the next twenty-five years, the Crown responded to political and financial struggles by encroaching on the powers of other actors. By the late 1680s an organized opposition to the Crown arose and removed James II in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. During the revolution Parliament restructured political institutions, guaranteeing itself a say in policy matters and creating a structure that allowed the government as a whole to make credible commitments to others, including financial markets. ₅

During the transition to parliamentary ascendance, England was involved in three wars with the Dutch: in 1652-1654, 1665-1667, and 1672-1674. This observation should raise red flags for a simplistic expectation that democratizing processes will reduce the probability that states will go to war with one another, since England and the United Provinces were the only two major European states of this era with even partially representative institutions. ₆   In England the authority of Parliament was not firmly established until after the revolution, since the king could dissolve Parliament. Yet even during the transition, historians have noted, Parliament constrained the ability of the Crown to pursue foreign adventures. Usually, historians find that parliamentary influence was detrimental to English conduct of these wars. ₇   While formal authority for foreign policy decisions remained in the Crown's grasp, Parliament nevertheless found leverage through its control of financial resources. The source of parliamentary influence is quite straightforward: the monarch had to convene Parliament in order to raise funds to fight wars, and Parliament used its power of the purse as an opportunity to force the monarch to conduct war as it preferred. ₈

The first Dutch war, fought during a time of great domestic political turbulence in England with the intent of eliminating Dutch commercial competition, showed the complex ways in which domestic and international political struggles interacted with one another. This war was launched by one regime in England, continued by a second that took office after a coup in April 1653, and ended by a third. One study concludes that "these unexpected changes largely determined the outcome of the war, playing a more important part than actual operations at sea." ₉   The war was begun by a government (the Rump) attuned to mercantilist commercial interests. From the government's perspective, the war was the logical continuation of a policy of intense commercial competition and unwillingness to compromise, especially with an opponent that appeared to be vulnerable because of internal divisions. The second government (the Nominated Parliament) took a more strategic approach to foreign affairs and saw the Dutch war as one that could benefit the Catholic powers of Europe by disrupting the existing balance of power. The Nominated Parliament was thus less committed to total victory than was the previous government. The third government (under Oliver Cromwell) was also interested in maintaining a European balance of power and so was unwilling to demand punitive concessions from the defeated Dutch, anticipating that such demands would destabilize the already weak Dutch government. Critics called the resulting peace treaty unnecessarily lenient. In sum, the extent to which the English government represented commercial interests had a direct impact on the conduct of this first Anglo-Dutch war. As Mark Brawley argues, the more responsive to mercantilist interests the government was, the more it chose vigorously to pursue war with the Dutch. ₁₀

In the 1660s, mercantile interests still interested in ridding themselves of Continental competition took advantage of a lack of centralized control over policy to engage the Dutch in a second war. Although the monarch (Charles II) was not enthusiastic about war, he found himself unable to stop the slide to aggression once it had begun. During this second war, the government realized the importance of maintaining a show of unity in order to negotiate successfully with the Dutch. Maintaining harmony between the king and Parliament became a high priority and thus provided Parliament with a say in the conduct of negotiations and the war itself. ₁₁   However, lack of a consistent strategy and parliamentary reluctance to appropriate sufficient funds meant that the second war, like the first, did not achieve its commercial objectives.

From 1667 to 1688, the turbulence of domestic politics meant that no voice within the government carried any authority in foreign affairs:

Instability, factional divisions within ministries as well as in Parliament and the country, universal distrust and cynicism were to be the permanent characteristics of English politics up to the final crisis of 1688, while foreign policy was to be so tortuous and so governed by mercenary considerations that after a time neither Charles, James, their ministers nor their parliamentary opponents carried any independent influence or reputation. 12

During this period, a struggle for power was waged with financial weapons. Parliament was concerned that providing the king with forces to fight European wars would allow him to turn these same forces on them, establishing absolutism at home. Parliament was therefore reluctant to provide long-term military financing, instead keeping the king on a short leash. ₁₃   The Crown turned to other sources of funding, within Europe and at home, but an inability to guarantee repayment meant that these sources were limited and costly. ₁₄   Levels of taxes and national debt were high, but not as high as they would later grow after the ability to make credible commitments to repay was established. ₁₅

Nevertheless, England did engage the Dutch in a third war during 1670-1671. In preparation, Parliament approved additional taxes to pay off old debts and prepare the navy for combat. The lack of established patterns of accountability allowed the Crown to achieve approval of this money through deception. Ministers assured Parliament that these preparations for war were intended to balance against France; instead, they planned to ally with France, the strongest Continental power, to guarantee defeat of the Dutch. This deception quickly became obvious, and coming on top of a pattern of deception and intense distrust between the branches, it meant that the king could not return immediately to Parliament after the war started to request more funds. In fact, the king had sufficient resources to finance only a single campaign.

The king's gamble on a quick victory did not pay off. In February 1673 he was forced to convene Parliament in order to raise funds to send the fleet back out to sea, since he was unwilling to concede defeat to the Dutch. MPs took advantage of this opportunity to attack the methods with which the war was carried out, and they linked any new financing to dismantling of the king's government. Dissolution of Parliament was considered, but the only alternative source of funding was Louis XIV, and he opposed dissolution. So, ironically, Parliament succeeded in dismantling the ministry in order to allow its members to pursue their goal of continuing the war. As one historian concludes, "The Civil War, Commonwealth and Protectorate, together with the autocratic follies of James II, showed just how difficult it was for the monarch--or any head of the executive--to dispense with parliament." ₁₆

Lack of funds severely limited the ability to fight wars. In the 1680s, Britain remained aloof from most European conflicts for this reason. In fact, Charles II and his successor, James, promised France that they would remain inactive in exchange for remarkably small, irregular subsidies from Louis XIV, further tying their own hands in the foreign policy realm. James's dependence on Louis contributed to hostility toward James during the exclusion crisis of 1678-1683 and to loss of support during the 1688 revolution.

After the revolution, a division of authority similar to that developed during the transition was institutionalized, but the tide turned toward those who favored involvement in European wars. The Crown remained formally responsible for all foreign policy decisions, including those about alliances, treaties, and the conduct of war. ₁₇   Parliament retained a say in the exercise of these powers through its powers of the purse. During the Nine Years' War, beginning in 1689, William personally made many war decisions. However, he periodically had to return to Parliament to explain his actions in order to receive necessary funds to continue fighting. The Commons, with the power to reject funding proposals for the army and navy, took advantage of this power to propose deep cuts in military spending and in subsidies to Continental allies, both subjects of regular parliamentary debates. William's arguments about the importance of preventing the collapse of the alliance against France were convincing, and he managed to receive most of what he asked for. In exchange for financing the war, MPs gained an unusually high degree of oversight regarding its operations. ₁₈   Parliament forced William to maintain a smaller army and a larger navy than he would have preferred. ₁₉   And he paid another price for his success, in that immediately when the war ended Parliament forced most of the standing army to disband and impeached his ministers.

John Brewer argues that, paradoxically, the involvement of Parliament in decision making, which was necessitated by financial considerations created by international engagement, led to the development of a strong and legitimate central state capable of extracting high levels of resources from society. This transformation provided the necessary conditions for Britain to take its place as a great power in Europe and allowed it to become an active player in the Continental political struggles of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, consistent with the logic of delegation in established democracies. ₂₀   This picture of the state stands in stark contrast to that of the transitional period, when even the pursuit of diplomacy was severely hindered by monetary constraints. Ambassadors were left largely to their own devices to support themselves during the 1660s through the 1680s, and those who were unfortunate enough to be of modest means were dependent on their hosts for financial support, making any centralized direction of British diplomacy nearly impossible. ₂₁

Overall, the story of British domestic politics and foreign policy in the seventeenth century suggests a number of insights into the relationship between domestic liberalization and international engagement. Brawley argues that the triumph of Parliament led to a definitive turn away from the mercantilist motives of the Anglo-Dutch wars to forging a strong anti-French alliance, tracing this shift to the economic interests of Parliament versus the Crown. ₂₂   Although formal authority for foreign policy remained in the Crown's hands, through control of the state's purse strings Parliament gained a say in the conduct of war and diplomacy. Because this intrusion of the legislative voice was not yet institutionalized or accepted by the Crown, it was haphazard. The legislature, distrusting the monarch, was unwilling to delegate authority through the mechanism of long-term financing. These domestic struggles directly affected the way in which Britain fought the three Anglo-Dutch wars; they also served to keep Britain out of some European conflicts. Only after the pattern of authority had been regularized could the British state efficiently extract resources and make authoritative decisions that allowed it to become a major player in international politics.

The similarities between this historical case and contemporary examples of political liberalization, such as in Russia, are striking. Because control of foreign policy becomes part of a larger struggle for influence during transitions, newly powerful legislators refuse to allow the executive much discretion to pursue foreign policy. During this period the control of legislators over policy making appears extensive but also self-defeating. Lack of institutionalized patterns of authority means that the state cannot act as a unified actor on the international stage, a situation that the strategic interaction of international politics penalizes. As democracies become established, the need to make credible commitments and otherwise interact effectively with other states leads to delegation of authority. As the following sections argue, delegation can meet the demands of strategic interaction without depriving the legislature of the ability to influence foreign policy. Formal, regularized patterns of accountability allow simultaneous legislative influence and effective state action.

American Legislative Assertivenessand British Passivity

Political scientists have conflicting opinions about the role of Congress in the foreign policy process. Some studies argue that lack of public knowledge about foreign affairs, a need for secrecy, and a need to respond quickly to crises have contributed to the dominance of the executive branch in international politics. In the decades after World War II, the concept of the "imperial presidency" described the great discretion allowed the executive branch. ₂₃   On the other hand, other studies--and often even the same ones--note that in certain circumstances Congress can and has played a significant role, either constructive or destructive, in the policy process. Most textbooks on U.S. foreign policy devote a significant amount of space to the study of Congress and legislative-executive interactions. ₂₄   Formally, Congress plays a number of roles--appropriating funds (for military spending and foreign aid, for example), declaring war, ratifying treaties. The analytical question addressed in this section is whether these formal powers endow Congress with actual influence over policy. How do we make sense of those occasions on which Congress asserts itself in the foreign policy realm, such as the debate over assistance to the contras in Nicaragua, sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s, or the failure to ratify SALT II? How do we weigh them against the executive's discretionary powers embodied in approval of the Gulf War, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, or fast-track procedures for trade negotiations?

Those studying domestic policies in the United States have confronted similar issues in analyzing the relations between Congress and executive agencies. The use of principal-agent models and consideration of the logic of delegation has demonstrated that the observation of little congressional oversight activity does not always imply a lack of congressional influence. ₂₅   Lack of overt legislative activity is not necessarily equivalent to abdication to the executive branch. ₂₆   The logic underlying such models is that of anticipated reactions. Legislators, if rational and motivated by electoral considerations, want to achieve particular outcomes, such as low rates of inflation, public works projects in their districts, or tariffs for industries they represent. Sometimes these outcomes are best achieved, given limitations on organization, information, and other resources, by delegation under particular rules and conditions to executive branch actors.

Thus, in equilibrium, we should not expect to see Congress expending vast resources on oversight or micromanagement of particular activities. Instead, legislators achieve their objectives through careful manipulation of delegation regimes and the incentives facing their agents, such as the bureaucracy. ₂₇   Extensive legislative activity, like that on aid to the contras in Nicaragua, implies a failure of delegation, not an isolated instance of congressional influence. Delegation is a proxy for congressional policy making, and those interested in foreign policy should therefore pay as much attention to the reasons that underlie congressional decisions to delegate as to the decisions about actual policies.

Such a perspective on legislative influence has been characterized inaccurately as one of "congressional dominance." ₂₈   Particularly in the uncertain and complex world of international relations, we need to be aware of the agency losses that accompany legislative delegation to the executive branch. Once Congress surrenders its right to amend tariff levels, for example, the president gains leverage over the outcomes of international negotiations on trade. Sometimes, however, this is the best outcome Congress can hope for, and it does not imply the disappearance of legislative influence on tariffs. Legislators are aware of agency losses and typically do not decide to delegate authority without good reason, such as the need to encourage investment in specialized information or to engage in tough negotiations with other countries. Spatial models tell us that fast-track procedures, which are analogous to a closed rule in consideration of legislation, give rise to different outcomes than we would find under an open rule, where Congress could adopt any policy it chose through the amendment process. ₂₉   The same models, however, allow us to specify conditions under which a majority of congressmen prefer closed-rule procedures and concomitant agency losses to the result they would achieve without delegation, under micromanagement; they also specify how outcomes diverge from those that an unconstrained president might choose. ₃₀

In foreign affairs, models of delegation have been most extensively explored in trade policy, although even this work is at a preliminary stage. ₃₁   Because the microeconomic foundations of incentives facing legislators on trade issues are well understood, at least relative to those on other foreign policy issues, we have a good understanding of preferences in this area, and work has proceeded relatively quickly. Authors have offered a number of rationales to explain the variation we observe in the level of control Congress exerts over trade policy and the resulting levels of protection. Congress may delegate to solve its own collective action problems, ₃₂   to gain information about the economic effects of the policies it adopts, ₃₃   to enable successful negotiation with other countries, ₃₄   or to bind succeeding Congresses. These models allow us to develop expectations about the degree of delegation that will take place, given structural conditions and preferences, and about the effects of delegation on the policies chosen. For example, consideration of the collective action problem faced by Congress in adopting product-specific tariffs leads to the expectation that delegation will increase and tariff levels decrease when Congress and the presidency are controlled by the same party. ₃₅

Delegation, in the context considered here, though often a second-best solution, may be the best available to Congress. Delegation is not equivalent to abdication, meaning that it does not allow the agent complete control over the policy adopted. Frequently, procedural or substantive constraints are placed on the agent--such as a requirement to negotiate only reciprocal trade reductions, or to keep them within specified limits--or the policies proposed by the executive are subject to an up-or-down vote by Congress, as in fast-track legislation. At the same time, deciding to delegate pulls outcomes away from those that Congress would adopt on its own. Thus Congress confronts a trade-off between the benefits of delegation, such as increased information or strategic advantages vis-á-vis other countries, and maintaining tight control over policy. Models of delegation allow us to be more precise in specifying how legislators will evaluate this trade-off in different issue areas and under different political and economic conditions.

Overall, both theoretical work and empirical investigations now suggest that Congress is an influential foreign policy actor in the United States. Empirically, this seems particularly true since 1970, when disillusionment with the results of wide executive discretion catalyzed by the failures of Vietnam and Watergate led to an activist Congress reclaiming authority from the president. Models of delegation suggest why authority would have been reclaimed under these circumstances, while reminding us that the threat of such action served to constrain the executive's actions even during the period of the so-called imperial presidency.

The image of an assertive Congress is in direct contrast to the prevailing view of the role of Parliament in British foreign policy. The House of Commons, most observers find, has little influence in any issue area and is particularly weak in foreign policy. As evidence, authors point to the lack of amendment of government legislation by MPs and the overwhelming rate of passage of government legislation. Since 1945, on average, 97% of government legislation has passed into law; during at least eight parliamentary sessions, 100% of government bills passed. ₃₆   This pattern has led one British observer to conclude that "the present achievement of the evolution of our constitution has been to replace a despotic monarch with an autocratic government." ₃₇   Another refers to the British system as an "elective dictatorship" or "modern monarchy," concluding that "the office of the prime minister by the late twentieth century resembled nothing so much as the Continental absolute monarchies which the English had once prided themselves on rejecting." ₃₈   Even a more balanced accounting of the powers of Parliament finds that "there is little dispute, however, that in the normal run of British politics Parliament is a relatively weak influence in the foreign policy process." ₃₉

In contrast to studies of U.S. foreign policy, books on British foreign policy frequently bypass the House of Commons altogether. ₄₀   Formally, the Commons does not have to ratify treaties (although any necessary changes in domestic law require parliamentary assent), nor does it have the power to declare war. One author concludes that "the monopoly which is accorded the Executive in the sphere of foreign affairs de jure is consistent to a remarkable degree with the general supremacy of the contemporary Executive over Parliament de facto," leaving the executive unfettered, for all practical purposes. ₄₁   Although a fair amount of debate and questioning of ministers about foreign policy issues takes place on the floor of the Commons, authors do not find that this leads to any real influence. As a recent survey concluded, "The most obvious unchanging reality which persists over the years is the fact of executive dominance in the foreign policy process. . . . Foreign policy was always, and remains, in the hands of the executive." ₄₂

While some analyses credit the passivity of Parliament to British political culture or a tradition of bipartisanship, others find the source in the incentives created for MPs and party leaders by the electoral system. In the mid-nineteenth century, during the "golden age" of Parliament, MPs responded to small, easily defined constituencies, since the franchise was severely restricted. This responsiveness led to significant independence on the part of individual MPs and to a political process that seems to resemble U.S. politics today.

As the franchise expanded, however, MPs found that they had to rely more heavily on party labels to gain widespread recognition. ₄₃   As the number and complexity of issues on which government had to act increased, Parliament delegated more authority to the cabinet in order to solve its own collective action problems. Due to this delegation, a ministerial position was now sought-after and valuable, so that party leaders could use the promise of these positions as a reward to enforce party discipline. MPs found it in their own interest, as long as they cared about career advancement, to obey the dictates of party discipline and approve any legislation the government proposed, usually without amendment. Thus independence of MPs declined, and governments, with guaranteed majorities to support their agendas, gained a monopoly over policy. The "iron cage" of party discipline meant that Parliament became, and remains, minimally effective, ₄₄   and "modern British government is government by party leaders in Cabinet." ₄₅

If we were to take these statements at face value, there would seem to be little reason to pursue a study of the role of the legislature in British foreign policy. But just as discussions of the imperial presidency often contain qualifications noting the occasional act by Congress, most authors who accept that the cabinet is dominant nevertheless note that Parliament on occasion constrains or indirectly influences policy. Gary Cox finds that the Commons has retained veto power and some amendment power. ₄₆   David Vital notes that "while the ability of the Executive to ram through any policy of its choosing is hardly in doubt . . . the fact remains that it does not invariably do so." ₄₇   William Wallace finds that Parliament acts as a constraint on foreign policy. ₄₈   These qualifications suggest that the conventional wisdom on parliamentary impotence may rely on the same kind of equilibrium fallacy as the abdication hypothesis in U.S. politics, leading to the same kinds of inconsistencies in analysis. Simply put, the fact that the government rarely loses important votes or accepts amendments offered on the floor by MPs does not imply that MPs have no influence over policy. An alternative interpretation, one relying on anticipated reactions, is that the government skillfully anticipates what the Commons will and will not accept and accommodates these constraints while maintaining a public image of party solidarity and cabinet control, important for electoral reasons.

Consideration of rational, farsighted decisions to delegate authority and of equilibrium behavior of the legislature leads us to speculate that observation of sporadic legislative activity is not sufficient to prove that legislative influence on foreign policy is equally sporadic. Instead, those instances in which Congress or the Commons asserts itself may be best understood as unusual events, where the delegation process has gone awry and the legislature finds it necessary to assert its authority publicly. In normal practice, the executive will understand the conditions of legislative delegation and work within the constraints established by those conditions. As one author explains, "However much they [MPs] may blame governments for dominating their lives, in principle they have it in their power to change things. . . . That things are done as they are suggests that present arrangements suit many people." ₄₉   To use Kenneth Waltz's phrase, "the effectiveness of the cause may account for the invisibility of the result." ₅₀   Spatial models provide us with one mechanism to explore the variation in conditions and resulting policy outcomes in different political systems and under different patterns of interests. The next section discusses what impli cations such models have for legislative control over foreign policy in the United States and Britain.

The House of Commons and Foreign Policy

In order to understand the nature and degree of influence the Commons has on foreign policy, we need to understand the dynamics of legislative-executive interactions in Britain. This section discusses the rules and processes that govern policy making to put some flesh on the bones of the equilibrium argument outlined above. After further examining the plausibility of the notion that the Commons constrains foreign policy in a regular manner, I use a simple, one-dimensional spatial model to consider how processes in the Commons and the U.S. Congress lead to different patterns of delegation and policy outcomes in the two systems. This discussion allows us to begin resolving some of the inconsistencies in studies of legislative influence by specifying the necessary conditions for the legislature to pull policies in its preferred direction.

Opportunities for Influence

Formally speaking, the powers of the Commons in many ways exceed those of the U.S. Congress. The Commons is unconstrained by any supermajority requirements, such as the two-thirds vote needed for ratification of treaties by the Senate. Instead, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty means that, technically speaking, the Commons can do anything it likes by a majority vote. ₅₁   Thus it is just as easy for a standing Parliament to overturn existing legislation as to implement wholly new proposals. In contrast to the separation of powers and emphasis on checks and balances embodied in the U.S. Constitution, the unwritten British constitution provides for concentration of power in the hands of Parliament. ₅₂   As described above, Parliament has chosen to delegate much of this power to the cabinet, which is composed of ministers drawn from the majority party. A majority vote of no confidence can bring down the government and force a new general election. Thus, a key contrast between the United States and Britain is the fact that the executive is responsible to and dependent on Parliament in the British system. ₅₃   Paradoxically, the development of party government is claimed to have weakened par liamentary influence on policy in precisely the political system that concentrates power in the hands of Parliament.

While rarely exercised on the floor, the amendment powers of the Commons are formally similar to those of the U.S. Congress. Bills, which are introduced by the government, have three readings in the Commons. After the Third Reading, the bill is sent to the House of Lords. In the twentieth century, the House of Lords has lost power to do much except minimally delay legislation. A bill becomes law once it is passed in the same form by both Houses, or after a specified deadline in the form passed by the Commons even if the House of Lords does not pass identical legislation. The legislative process offers opportunities for MPs or ministers to make changes in legislation from the initial form proposed by the government, in committee or on the floor at the report stage, before the Third Reading. ₅₄

MPs rarely offer significant amendments to government legislation on the floor, in spite of these opportunities, and even more rarely succeed in gaining approval of them. For example, in one thirteen-year period the government moved 1,772 amendments, of which all but 2 were approved, while MPs moved 4,198 amendments without government support, of which only 210 were approved. ₅₅   However, the procedures for consideration of government bills closely resemble those for legislation considered under an open rule by Congress. We therefore need to seek an explanation for the lack of explicit amendment activity by MPs, in contrast to the behavior of members of Congress (MCs).

The traditional answer is that party discipline prevents MPs from offering amendments, since they anticipate retaliation from party leaders. In contrast, I argue that the explanation lies in the importance of the party label for electoral purposes and the highly developed information-sharing capacity and responsiveness of the cabinet. In my proposed framework, MPs are assumed to have significant potential influence. The importance of maintaining an appearance of party unity in the British electoral system, however, means that MPs exercise this influence outside the public spotlight, in party committees and other forums, rather than on the floor of the Commons. Government ministers do, indeed, offer nearly all of the amendments that are eventually incorporated into legislation, but the official source of amendments is irrelevant. Ministers offer these amendments as they acquire more precise information about the preferences of MPs, designing legislation that is as close as possible to the government's desires while still being acceptable to a majority of the party.

The authority to initiate the legislative process presents a starker contrast between the American and British systems. In the United States, legislation can be initiated by any of a number of sources within Congress, although gatekeeping power is often exercised by functionally defined committees. In the Commons, in contrast, the executive has acquired almost exclusive control over the legislative agenda. ₅₆   This means that gatekeeping power for significant policy issues lies with the government rather than with individual MPs or parliamentary committees. If the government anticipates that the legislative process, once started, will lead to an outcome it finds unacceptable relative to the status quo, it will keep the gates closed. The U.S. president, unless such authority has been specifically delegated, has no analogous power. Although procedures exist for Private Members' Bills, and a few such bills pass each year, the executive's control over the Commons' agenda means that the government can prevent consideration of such bills or otherwise obstruct their passage. Private Members' Bills thus deal with only minor, district-specific issues, or controversial issues such as abortion for which the government wishes to avoid responsibility and does not want to impose party discipline. ₅₇   Later in this section I consider the effect of gatekeeping power on the executive's influence over policy outcomes.

Not all legislation is considered by the Commons under the open-rule procedures just described. An alternative procedure exists: "delegated legislation" or "statutory instruments," by which government bills are considered under a closed rule, no amendments allowed. The existence of this alternative procedure itself should cast doubt on the claim that normal procedures give the cabinet a monopoly of decision-making power. If this were true, the use of statutory instruments would be irrelevant and superfluous, since the procedure would have no impact on the outcome of legislation. Instead, the use of statutory instruments has grown over time and remains the subject of significant controversy within Parliament. One MP claims that "in very many areas . . . Members find it extremely limiting that they do not have at their disposal the power to introduce amendments in the way they could do to the original Bill. . . . Clearly such a procedure delivers too many weapons into the hands of the government." ₅₈   Approximately two thousand statutory instruments go into effect each year. ₅₉   Interaction with the European Community has led to extensive use of statutory instruments for implementation of EC agreements.

Overall, unless the Commons has approved the use of statutory instruments, the amendment process provides MPs with opportunities to influence legislation, even if this influence is exercised out of public view. If MPs are unsuccessful in gaining approval of desired changes to bills, however, what recourse do they have? In the United States the answer is simple: refuse to vote for the legislation if its final form is unacceptable. Most analyses of the House of Commons suggest that party discipline has made this option unavailable to MPs. Unless they wish to sacrifice their careers, members of the majority party will follow the government's advice and vote in favor of the government's legislation. This guarantees the government a majority for its proposals. The government makes sure that backbenchers know its wishes through use of the "whip." By underlining parts of legislation up to three times, the government signals the importance it attaches to specific legislation. A "three-line whip" indicates that the government considers this legislation vital and demands party loyalty on the issue, with party-line voting in the divisions. The decision to dispense with the whip, allowing members to vote as they please, is known as allowing a "free vote."

Recent works have begun to call into serious question the proposition that MPs are unwilling to dissent. Philip Norton has collected data on the incidence of dissent. ₆₀   In the 1950s, the level of dissent was very low. During this decade, consistently less than 3% of divisions saw any dissenting votes from MPs of the majority party. However, the level of party voting has declined significantly since then. From 1970 to 1974, 20% of all divisions had dissents; in 1974-

1979, 28% did. ₆₁   Dissent did occasionally lead to government defeats--six times in 1970-1974, and forty-two times in 1974-1979. ₆₂   Initially, observers believed that the breakdown of party discipline expressed in dissenting votes was an issue only for the Labour Party. ₆₃   But the pattern begun during the Labour government of the late 1960s continued and intensified in the Conservative government of the early 1970s, ₆₄   then persisted into the 1980s and 1990s. As Norton finds, "What was remarkable--and unprecedented--during this period [the 1980s] was that there were occasions when a large overall majority was not sufficient to stave off defeat or the threat of defeat." ₆₅

It seems clear that a new equilibrium pattern of behavior has been established. Previously, open dissent was extremely rare and not tol erated by the government. Now, dissent is relatively common--although still far below the levels seen in the United States--and there is not much the government can do about it. Once widespread dissent, or voting on the basis of constituency interests in addition to party affiliation, is the norm among MPs, government threats of retaliation, refusing to promote dissenters, and making every vote a vote of confidence lose credibility. ₆₆   The single-member electoral districts that characterize both the British and the American political systems create incentives for representatives to pay attention to constituent demands if they care about reelection. ₆₇   While procedures in the Commons put more pressure on MPs to vote with the party majority than their counterparts in Congress feel, constituency characteristics explain a significant amount of variation in the willingness of MPs to dissent. ₆₈

As this evidence indicates, MPs do have a choice, and they sometimes exercise it by refusing to vote in favor of the legislation proposed by their party leaders. Party leaders are aware of this and anticipate it by doing their best to make sure their legislation will be acceptable to a majority. This consultation gives backbenchers a means through which to influence government policy even if they are reluctant to confront the government with hostile amendments on the floor. ₆₉   Norton concludes that the willingness to dissent forces the cabinet to anticipate parliamentary reaction and makes the prime minister responsive to MPs' opinions. ₇₀   Dennis Kavanagh argues that "the predictability of the division lists . . . failed to do justice to the ability of many back-benchers to force concessions from the party leaders." ₇₁

Parliamentary committees and caucuses provide forums for the discussion of disagreements on policy issues and proposed legislation. Some observers have noted that party whips are present at committee meetings, of both the party itself and the Commons as a whole, and infer that their presence inhibits the expression of dissenting opinions by MPs. Such an inference depends on the assumption that the major function of whips is to enforce party discipline through threats of disciplinary action. Studies suggest, however, that the actual level of disciplinary power wielded by whips is quite low. Ian Budge and David McKay, for example, find that "various Whips have publicly admitted their limited disciplinary powers and dissenters have boasted that they ignore them at will." ₇₂   In practice, threats to withdraw party affiliation or prevent promotion are rarely carried out. ₇₃   Instead, whips act as channels of information, sending reliable signals from MPs to ministers and vice versa. ₇₄   In order for the kind of "behind-the-scenes" influence that I posit here to operate, the cabinet must have good information about backbencher preferences so as to avoid costly floor fights. The party whips provide such information in a timely manner.

Consistent with the argument that solid party-line voting does not reflect lack of policy influence, Kavanagh concludes that "what is now clear is that back-bench MPs traditionally lacked not so much the means as the political will to defeat the party whips." ₇₅   Norton also argues that a new equilibrium that allows for backbench influence has emerged: "Once triggered, there was no returning to earlier practices of unthinking loyalty; and, indeed, as the incidence of dissent increased, so it encouraged a change of attitude on the part of many MPs, discarding their old deferential attitude toward government." ₇₆   A comprehensive study of dissent and whips in the 1950s and 1960s concluded that both rebels and whips

expect backbenchers to be able to influence party policy even though a high degree of solidarity is also required, and they agree that there are very few devices for punishing dissidents which can be effective in practice. Rebels and Whips both think that a private and subtle process of accommodation takes place in the Labour and Conservative parties and that rebellion and discipline are only public symptoms that this process has failed to operate. 77

This description is remarkably similar to anticipated-reaction analyses of congressional influence in the United States. The process of acquiring detailed information about MPs' preferences and accommodating them in legislation is constant. In an electoral system that places a high value on party solidarity, revelation of deep internal differences provides the Opposition with golden opportunities and could be devastating in elections. Thus, a system has evolved whereby the whip is a liaison, allowing ministers to estimate precisely what they can get away with without causing outright dissent within the party and allowing backbenchers to exercise influence over policy without having to vote against the party leadership.

Contrasting the American and British Systems

Careful consideration of the process of legislation and incentives facing legislators in the House of Commons suggests that the image of government supremacy is misleading. As one study concluded, "Any Prime Minister who thought he could dispense with consideration for the views of his party in Parliament would wholly misunderstand his position." ₇₈   Yet it would also be misleading to assume that the legislative process in Britain therefore leads to the same outcomes as in the United States. As discussed above, a fundamental difference in the two systems is that the government in Britain exercises gatekeeping power.

To consider how the two different systems may give rise to different outcomes, consider the one-dimensional spatial models illustrated in figures 2.1 and 2.2. In these figures, executive and legislative preferences over ideal outcomes are not identical. If they were, institutional features would have no impact on outcomes in a complete-information setting, since all actors would choose the same policies. Conflicting interests are easily generated in the United States, where the executive and legislative branches are independently elected. We also observe such conflicts in Britain. Factions exist within the parties, so there is no guarantee that a minister will agree with the preferences of the median party MP on every issue. Other than the issue of devolution, policy toward the EC has reflected the deepest split within parties. ₇₉   Without some conflict of interest between governing-party backbenchers and the cabinet, the question of "parliamentary power" would become meaningless. Thus, a necessary condition for the arguments I make here is the existence of some intraparty divisions. In the two figures here, "SQ" represents the status quo policy; "P" represents the ideal point (most-preferred policy) of the president or prime minister; "MP," the ideal point of the swing voter in the majority party in Parliament; and "MC," the ideal point of the median member of Congress. ₈₀

In these figures, the horizontal line represents a single policy issue, such as the preferred level of tariffs or foreign assistance to some other country. ₈₁   In the configuration of figure 2.1, the status quo could be, for example, a very low tariff. The president or prime minister prefers a slightly higher tariff, while the swing voter in the legislature prefers a significantly higher tariff. Assuming majority-rule voting, we can find the structure-induced equilibrium that is the predicted outcome under different rules, given this configuration of preferences. ₈₂   Consider first open-rule voting. In the United States, an open rule would lead to a tariff level of MC, since any bill would be amended on the floor to the ideal point of the median member of Congress. ₈₃

In the British system, however, the gatekeeping power of the government leads to a dramatically different outcome. Ministers anticipate that once the legislative process is set in motion, the need to accommodate members' preferences will lead to an outcome near MP. As drawn in figure 2.1, the status quo is closer to the prime minister's ideal point than is MP. Thus, the prime minister (or, if a specific ministry is exercising gatekeeping power, the relevant minister) will refuse to introduce a new tariff bill. ₈₄   Thus the predicted outcome in Britain is no change, for the policy to remain at SQ.

Under these conditions--open-rule voting and a status quo that is far from the swing member's ideal point but close to the president's or prime minister's--gatekeeping power leads to a large difference in outcomes in the United States and Britain. In the British system, gatekeeping power in the hands of the executive creates, in this situation, a status quo bias. It allows the executive to achieve outcomes closer to his ideal point than the president can achieve in the U.S. system. However, this result changes when we amend the rules to allow a closed-rule procedure. Now the executive is allowed to make any proposal he likes, and the House simply subjects this proposal to an up-or-down vote. If the proposal fails, the status quo remains in place. For example, on trade policy a closed rule is something like a fast-track procedure, where the president presents a completed deal to Congress with no possibility of amendment. Under these rules, the predicted outcome in both the U.S. and the British cases is P. The executive can present a proposal at his ideal point, and because the swing voter in the legislature prefers P to SQ, he will approve it.

As this example illustrates, the influence implicit in gatekeeping power is contingent on specific rules and patterns of preferences. In some cases it allows the British prime minister to achieve outcomes more to his liking than the U.S. president could achieve. On the other hand, exercising this influence under an open rule requires accepting the status quo even though Pareto-superior outcomes, which are preferred to the status quo by both the prime minister and the swing MP, exist. A solution to this problem of suboptimal outcomes resulting from gatekeeping power is to grant the prime minister a closed rule.

When we treat procedural rules as exogenous, as in the previous example, we find that they have a significant impact on the outcome and that the difference between the U.S. and British systems vanishes under closed-rule procedures. This simple example also suggests, however, a difference in the rules we should expect to see used in the two systems. Paradoxically, in the British case the swing voter in the Commons prefers the result under a closed rule to the result under an open rule, as does the executive: P is closer to MP than is SQ. Thus we should expect the swing voter to be willing to implement closed-rule procedures, such as those embodied in the use of statutory instruments or other delegated legislation. This is not true in the U.S. case, where the median member of Congress prefers the outcome under an open rule. ₈₅   Thus, when the status quo is strongly disliked by the swing voter in the legislature, as in figure 2.1, we should anticipate greater delegation of authority to the executive through closed-rule procedures in Britain than in the United States. This result can be seen as an attempt to avoid Pareto-inferior outcomes under conditions where the prime minister has gatekeeping power and may account for the observation of greater executive discretion in Britain than in the United States.

Figure 2.2 represents, for contrast, a different configuration of preferences. In this example, the status quo is very unsatisfactory from the executive's perspective but closer to the median legislator's ideal point. In this case, open-rule procedures give rise to the MC outcome in the United States and to MP in Britain. The prime minister will not exercise gatekeeping power, since the status quo is worse for him than is MP, and he is thus willing to accept the outcome of the accommodation process. A closed rule leads the executive to make a proposal that makes the swing voter indifferent between the proposal and the status quo. The executive will not propose P in this example, since it is farther from the median legislator's ideal point than is SQ and will therefore be defeated. The executive thus compromises by offering a proposal that will just barely beat the status quo while remaining as close to the executive's ideal point as possible. The predicted outcomes under a closed rule are therefore something like the point marked "x" in Britain and "y" in the United States.

In this example, gatekeeping power does the prime minister no good. When he intensely dislikes the status quo, he has no incentive to exercise gatekeeping power. Any difference in outcomes between the United States and Britain under these conditions results solely from different positions preferred by the swing voter in the legislature. In Britain, he prefers the outcome under an open rule (MP, his ideal point) to that under a closed rule (x). The same pattern holds in the United States. Thus, the configuration of preferences shown in figure 2.2 does not lead us to anticipate any systematic difference in delegation regimes across the two countries. Because different structures of rules give rise to different policy outcomes, the choice of a rule can be quite significant, as studies of congressional organization have found. ₈₆   In addition, we observe that legislators argue fiercely about choices of rules and complain when they are subject to rules of which they don't approve, suggesting the importance of procedure.

These simple examples illustrate how spatial models and consideration of delegation regimes can be used to analyze differences in the role of the legislature on foreign policy issues in established democracies. Examination of policy-making procedures and incentives in the United States and Britain suggests that a key difference lies in the gatekeeping power acquired by the executive in Britain. Under specifiable conditions, this constitutes a source of influence over policy outcomes; under others, it has no significant impact. If we are able to order the preferred outcomes of key players relative to the status quo, spatial models provide a tool for developing expectations about outcomes, choices of delegation regimes, and the role of the legislature.

The image of the House of Commons as an insignificant actor in policy making is misleading. Instead, the right to offer amendments, the willingness to dissent under some conditions, and the process of communication and accommodation with party leadership provide MPs with leverage over policy not wholly unlike that exercised by members of Congress, although it is exercised in private rather than in public. Spatial models allow us to begin sorting out the conditions under which the executive cannot act in an unconstrained manner and suggest conditions under which we will see increased delegation, as in the use of statutory instruments, to the executive. For example, they suggest that the gatekeeping power of the cabinet leads to decreased parliamentary influence when the executive is happier with the status quo than are most backbenchers. Because of the importance of party, it also appears that the potential for backbench influence is highest when there are deep internal differences on policy issues, such as Europe, and when the government's majority in Parliament is slim. While the argument thus far seems plausible in the abstract world of rules and models, further research must turn to studies of actual legislation to assess parliamentary influence. As a step in this direction, the next section examines the role of the legislature in the British decision to join the European Community.

Britain and EC Membership

As mentioned earlier, most analyses of British politics claim that Parliament is particularly ineffective when it comes to foreign policy issues. The lack of constituent interest and knowledge, monopoly over information by the executive, and tradition of bipartisanship are reasons offered to explain the low level of attention and influence exercised by MPs. Reflection on the impact of bipartisan traditions calls this assertion into question, however. Precisely because most voters usually make their choices in elections on issues other than foreign policy, international affairs may not clearly differentiate the two major parties from one another. When foreign policy issues do assume importance, as in the area of relations with the EC, cleavages as often run through parties as between them. Intraparty factions and governing party ministers often deeply disagree with one another on policy toward Europe. Thus, party discipline is especially difficult to enforce, or even to define.

If party discipline is the putative cause of minimal legislative influence, we should expect greatest influence precisely on those issues, such as the EC, where the parties are not clearly differentiated from one another and internal divisions exist. The conclusion that MPs cannot influence foreign policy does not follow from a pattern of bipartisanship--in fact, just its opposite does, since party discipline is less effective. Studies of dissent have found that rebellion sufficient to lead to government defeats often occurs on issues usually understood to involve relations with other countries. ₈₇   Recently, governments have lost on issues including immigration and policy toward the Middle East. The assertion that MPs do not engage in active opposition on foreign policy issues is often nothing more than a tautology, in that once political activism begins, analysts tend to redefine an issue as "domestic."

Perhaps the most significant foreign policy decision Britain has made since World War II was to join the European Community in 1973. Because negotiation of treaties is a Crown prerogative exercised by the prime minister and not subject to parliamentary control, the treaty of accession itself did not have to be ratified by the Commons. However, the treaty was meaningless until its provisions were enacted into British domestic law, which required an explicit majority vote. Thus the European Communities Bill of 1972 became the mechanism by which Britain officially joined the EC. Throughout the process of engagement, and ever since joining, the Commons has constrained British policy toward the EC. The Economist expressed the hope in April 1992 that "for the first time since Britain joined the EC in 1973, its role in Europe can be framed without regard to the minutiae of domestic politics." ₈₈   But the necessity of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty led other analysts to note that the House of Commons continues to involve itself in EC issues. ₈₉

When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951, Britain chose not to join, preferring to emphasize its Commonwealth ties and not believing that the ECSC would ever amount to much. As relative economic decline set in during the 1960s and the EC seemed to lead to economic growth for its members, however, interest in joining grew. Britain had attempted to gain similar benefits without the obligations of the EC by creating the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959. But EFTA did not include any of the EC countries, which were the economic powerhouses of the Continent, and so did not provide the benefits available through the EC. Two attempts were made to join the EC in the 1960s, both of which met with a veto from French president Charles de Gaulle.

De Gaulle's vetoes were not entirely exogenous, in that the conditions the British government was demanding, often under constraints set by the Commons, contributed to his actions. His veto allowed politicians retrospectively to exaggerate the chances that negotiations could have succeeded on terms acceptable to Parliament. ₉₀   Kenneth Waltz writes:

If there had been a change in the publicly and politically accepted definition of what British interests require, the government would have been able to enter negotiations with its hands free. Had the government in the absence of such change been able to maneuver freely in international negotiation, both its courage and its power would have been impressive. Neither of these conditional statements describes what actually took place. 91

British analyses of de Gaulle's vetoes from the 1960s show a keen appreciation of the ways in which the domestic political situation in Britain contributed to the vetoes, and perhaps saved the Conservative government from the immensely embarrassing situation of not being able to sell at home an important international agreement. One analysis suggests that de Gaulle saw Macmillan's weakness at home, along with political difficulties on other foreign policy issues, as "ample ground for the august and calculating bride [i.e., de Gaulle] to turn back from the altar." ₉₂   Another argues that the task of selling any agreement at home would have been so difficult that "the French decision to break off the negotiations may well have saved it [Britain] from one of the most agonizing decisions a British government has ever had to face." ₉₃   A Conservative MP, L. P. S. Orr, used much the same language, saying "he was 'saved from making the agonizing decision of voting against my own government at that time by the actions of President de Gaulle."' ₉₄    It was widely accepted in the government that any deal possibly agreed upon in Brussels could not be approved in Westminster. ₉₅

Both the Labour and the Conservative parties were deeply split on the principle of EC entry and the terms under which it should take place. ₉₆   This has meant that in many cases the discipline of party politics has not applied to policy toward the EC. ₉₇   These divisions had devastating effects on negotiations with the EC, since member states did not believe the British government to be able to make credible commitments. ₉₈   Prime Minister Harold Macmillan could not find a deal that simultaneously satisfied domestic interests and his negotiating partners in 1961. ₉₉   Even those, such as Bruce Lenman, who argue that Parliament nearly always lacks influence, concede that the terms negotiated in Brussels were strongly motivated by "unavoidable" political constraints back home and that Macmillan could not declare a commitment to entry without also committing political suicide. ₁₀₀   Pressure from backbenchers forced the British government to make unreasonably high demands on the original six EC members. ₁₀₁

Harold Wilson, although leading a Labour rather than a Conservative government, faced similar constraints in 1966-1967. He was aware that de Gaulle's veto was in part attributable to the British domestic situation, ₁₀₂   believed that Macmillan had made a mistake by avoiding debate in the Commons, and so called for votes on the principle of application. Although the Commons did approve the application, the negative votes of thirty-six Labour MPs and the abstention of approximately fifty others in spite of a three-line whip again created questions about the government's ability to commit credibly to ratification of international agreements. ₁₀₃   Wilson continued to face severe disciplinary problems within his party, forcing him to hold a series of party meetings. ₁₀₄

After the failure of Wilson's attempt to negotiate, many in the Labour Party turned against the idea of entry. Concern about the neoliberal economics and Christian Democratic politics of major EC partners made many in the Labour Party skeptical, while opponents to entry in the Conservative Party emphasized the importance of maintaining ties to the Commonwealth and the United States in preference to ties with the Continent. Wilson nevertheless decided to push for negotiations when Georges Pompidou replaced de Gaulle in June 1969. By the time of British general elections on 18 June 1970, preparations for negotiations were far advanced. The Conservative Party won the election and began negotiations twelve days later on the terms set in place by the outgoing government.

Edward Heath, who had been deeply involved in the previous Conservative attempt to negotiate EC entry, took over the position of prime minister. He was committed to entry and appointed a cabinet that was pro-entry, for the most part. Heath was, however, concerned about the prospects for success. One possibility was that terms acceptable to the cabinet "would be so distasteful to a sufficient number of Conservative anti-Marketeers and Labour MPs that the cabinet would lose heart and jib at presenting them to Parliament." ₁₀₅   An even more frightening possibility was that "Parliament might actually throw the Accession Treaty out, with or without the government to boot." ₁₀₆   These prospects led Heath to bargain for good terms of entry, gain ing Britain special exemptions for Commonwealth countries on tariff and quota treatment, and to engage in a campaign to persuade the public and sufficient numbers of MPs to approve of entry. For example, a White Paper on the terms of entry played up the tangible economic benefits of EC membership. But, "it was to the vote in the House that all energies had in the last resort to be directed." ₁₀₇

The first key vote, on the principle of accession, was timed strategically by Heath for October 1971. Party whips had warned in the spring against an early vote, since they estimated that the government stood a good chance of losing. The Conservatives' majority in the Commons was narrow, so defections had to be kept under a dozen unless support from other parties was forthcoming. Delay over the summer allowed MPs to talk to their local party associations to gain a better sense of their constituency interests, which Heath believed would tend to favor entry. A longer delay, however, would have jeopardized the negotiations themselves as the government's credibility was questioned.

Given the narrow government majority, party whips were constantly engaged in efforts to estimate as precisely as possible the number of likely defections. Over the summer, they guessed that between twenty and thirty votes were dependent on achieving a change in the EC's fisheries policy. ₁₀₈   One study found that the fisheries

issue was a politically dangerous one for the Government, not simply because of the inherent strength and attractiveness of the fishermen's case, but also because constituencies containing areas heavily dependent on inshore fishing included some whose Members would normally belong to the parliamentary majority favouring entry. 109

The basic problem was that the EC's common fisheries policy allowed free access to all territorial waters, and British inshore fishermen vociferously opposed allowing other EC members access to their waters, ports, and markets. In this instance, political constraints succeeded in gaining concessions from the EC, so that nearly all British waters within a twelve-mile limit of shore, including 95% of British territorial fishing grounds, were granted protection. The British government forced additional substantial changes in a fisheries policy that had just been renegotiated within the EC, due to domestic-parliamentary constraints.

As a result of Heath's efforts and progress on the fisheries issue, by the October Conservative Party conference only about thirty mem bers were believed to be willing to defy a whip and vote against the principle of entry. This number, however, would be sufficient to lead to a government defeat unless some members of the Labour and Liberal Parties could be enticed to vote for the government. Thus, Heath decided to allow a free vote, which encouraged pro-entry members of the Opposition to defy their party leaders and support the government. This decision shows the hollowness of the assumption that party discipline overrides all dissent. On 28 October, the Commons approved the principle of accession by a vote of 356 to 244. Thirty-nine Conservative MPs voted against the government, and two abstained. ₁₁₀   The free vote encouraged 69 Labour MPs to vote yes and 20 to abstain, significantly contributing to the government's majority.

In the summer of 1972, as the treaty of accession was completed and a vote to implement it into domestic law approached, the government maneuvered to overcome opposition. In addition to the fisheries issue, MPs demanded concessions on the EC budget, imports of Commonwealth sugar, and imports of dairy products from New Zealand. The government succeeded in getting such concessions. Without them, approval of the accession treaty was unlikely. The government attempted to avoid some parliamentary constraints by having the European Communities Bill considered in standing committee rather than on the floor. Since it had partial control over the makeup of the committee, the government could stack it with pro-Market MPs. Sending the bill "upstairs," however, required majority approval, which was not forthcoming, so the government was forced to deal with the entire bill on the floor. In the end, the EC Act passed by a vote of 301 to 284, and support from Labour in defiance of a party whip was essential to the legislation's passage.

Parliamentary influence on engagement with the EC did not end with the EC Act. Because the process of accession had split the Labour Party deeply, when it came into office in October 1974 it made continued membership contingent on a popular referendum. Again, domestic pressure led to concessions in the process of renegotiation. ₁₁₁   These concessions were enough to allow the Labour Party to recommend that MPs vote in favor of membership, although the cabinet itself voted only 16 to 7 in favor. In an unusual move, ministers were allowed to dissent from the party's position and lobby against continued membership in the run-up to the referendum.

Consideration of the logic of legislative action on foreign policy suggested that the conventional wisdom about the House of Commons' lack of influence contained logical flaws. Formally, MPs can block and amend government initiatives, and they have at times done so. Their influence may be even greater, however, when they do not have to vote against the government, since this can indicate successful government accommodation of members' preferences. If these statements are correct, the same methods used to study legislative-executive interactions in the United States should be applicable to Britain and provide a means to develop propositions about differences in delegation and policy outcomes in the two countries. Establishing the conditions and extent of Commons' influence will require further research, but an overview of the British decision to join the EC suggests that the Commons significantly constrained British policy and had an impact on the nature of the deals struck with the EC. Without the veto and amendment power of the Commons, Britain would not have joined the EC on the terms that it did.

This essay addresses one of the key institutional changes that emerge during political liberalization: the creation of a legislature with influence over policy. It considers three issues: the legislative role in foreign policy during the transition to liberalization; the use of spatial models and theories of delegation to specify the conditions for legislative influence in different types of democratic systems; and the case of British entry to the EC as an instance of underappreciated legislative influence on a major foreign policy decision. Systematic analysis of the role of legislatures in foreign policy requires that we adopt a set of tools and models that can be applied across countries and issues. Spatial models and models of delegation have the potential to provide the necessary analytical leverage to avoid some of the pitfalls of earlier forays into comparative foreign policy. Such models allow us to assess the impact of different configurations of preferences and procedures on policy outcomes and to develop hypotheses about the choice of delegation regimes by legislatures. However, these tools have been developed primarily by those studying domestic policy in the American context. ₁₁₂   Because most students of British politics assume that the House of Commons has little impact on policy because of the dictates of party discipline and that it is particularly handicapped in the area of foreign policy, Britain provides a difficult case for the development of delegation models in a non-U.S. setting.

Spatial models assume a fixed constitutional specification of powers, so that applications to transitional periods, when property rights over decision making are in flux, are probably misleading. The example of Britain in the seventeenth century suggests that during transitions, legislative bodies can exercise control over foreign policy through their power of the purse. In fact, until patterns of authority are firmly established, these legislative constraints can hamper a state's ability to develop foreign policy, as political actors fear that international struggles will be used to influence the outcome of domestic ones. Legislative "interference" in foreign policy appears to be particularly intense and disruptive during transitions, when policy making is consumed by a struggle to establish property rights over policies. This pattern appears to hold in seventeenth-century England as well as twentieth-century Russia.

In established democracies, the demands of international interaction lead to significant delegation of authority to the executive. However, the notion that the contemporary legislature in Britain has abdicated its influence to the executive suffers from the same logical weaknesses as similar assertions about the U.S. Congress. Consideration of the rules and incentives facing legislators and executives suggests that inactivity is not equivalent to impotence and allows us to specify the conditions for legislative influence. With conflicting policy preferences and good information about them, anticipated reactions can be expected to operate so that executives are constrained by the reactions they expect from the legislature. In Britain, the importance of party and the gatekeeping power of the executive lead to outcomes not generally consistent with what we would expect under similar conditions in the United States. This difference does not mean that the executive is unconstrained, nor does it invalidate the use of spatial models. Instead, these models provide a means by which to assess systematically similarities and differences across the two systems. Even in the "high politics" world of international negotiations, executives in Britain and the United States cannot act without considering the constraints on policy emanating from the legislature. In established democracies we observe a great deal of delegation to the executive and apparent passivity in the legislature, but this pattern of activity masks deeper patterns of institutionalized influence.

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My thanks for valuable comments and suggestions go to Jim Alt, John Ferejohn, Jeff Frieden, Judy Goldstein, Joanne Gowa, Miles Kahler, Bob Keohane, Bob Putnam, and participants in the Social Science Research Council Liberalization and Foreign Policy project. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the SSRC's Advanced Foreign Policy Fellowship Program and the Hoover Institution's National Fellows Program.

Note 1:  Robert D. Putnam, in "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-460, represents an exception to this pattern by suggesting an approach that integrates a role for the legislature or other ratifying bodies. Back.

Note 2:  Malcolm Walles, British and American Systems of Government (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1988). Back.

Note 3:  David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). Back.

Note 4:  Mark R. Brawley, Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and Their Challengers in Peace and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 41-55. For a rational-choice interpretation of electoral incentives in the early seventeenth century, see John Ferejohn, "Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early Stuart England," in Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 279-305. Back.

Note 5:  Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 803-832; Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815 (London: Longman, 1983): 46. Back.

Note 6:  J. R. Jones, Britain and the World, 1659-1815 (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 52. While these states were hardly representative by today's standards, they were the most representative in Europe at the time. See Charles Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 146. On transitional states and war, see Edward D. Mansfield and Jack T. Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 5-38. Back.

Note 7:  See, for example, Keith Feiling, British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672 (London: Frank Cass, 1968), p. 3. Back.

Note 8:  Charles Wilson, England's Apprenticeship, 1603-1763, 2d ed. (London: Longman, 1984), p. 93. Back.

Note 9:  Jones, pp. 68-69. Back.

Note 10:  Brawley, p. 55. Back.

Note 11:  Jones, p. 76. Back.

Note 12:  Ibid., p. 97. Back.

Note 13:  John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 9. Back.

Note 14:  North and Weingast, p. 822. Back.

Note 15:  Brewer, p. vii. Back.

Note 16:  Ibid., p. 21. Back.

Note 17:  Jones, p. 136. Back.

Note 18:  Brewer, p. 139. Back.

Note 19:  Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714 (New York: Norton, 1980), p. 237. Back.

Note 20:  Brewer, p. 137. A similar story can be told about early twentieth-century Russian reforms; see David MacLaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). Back.

Note 21:  Keith Feiling, British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672 (London: Frank Cass, 1968), p. 13. Back.

Note 22:  Brawley, p. 55. See also Hill, p. 226; McKay and Scott, p. 46. Back.

Note 23:  Aaron L. Friedberg, "Is the United States Capable of Acting Strategically? Congress and the President," Washington Quarterly 14 (Winter 1991): 5-23. Back.

Note 24:  For example, see Thomas L. Brewer, American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1992); Cecil V. Crabb Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992). Back.

Note 25:  Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms," American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (February 1984): 165-179; Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983): 765-800; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies," Virginia Law Review 75 (1989): 431-482. Back.

Note 26:  D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Back.

Note 27:  Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, in "Can Democracy Work? Persuasion, Enlightenment, and Democratic Institutions" (unpublished manuscript, University of California, San Diego, 1995), explore the informational conditions for effective delegation, finding that they are not terribly stringent. Back.

Note 28:  Terry M. Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, special issue (1990): 213-253. Back.

Note 29:  Elizabeth M. Martin, "Free Trade and Fast Track: Why Does Congress Delegate?" (Stanford University, November 1991, mimeographed). Back.

Note 30:  Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence," International Organization 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 595-632. Back.

Note 31:  See, for example, Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "Trade Wars and Trade Talks" (Princeton University, October 1992, unpublished manuscript). Back.

Note 32:  Lohmann and O'Halloran. Back.

Note 33:  E. M. Martin. Back.

Note 34:  Jongryn Mo, "The President and Congress in a Reciprocal Trade Negotiation Game: The Role of Delegated Authority" (University of Texas, Austin, and Hoover Institution, August 1991, mimeographed). Back.

Note 35:  Lohmann and O'Halloran. For similar stories about the rationales for delegation, particularly on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, see Stephan Haggard, "The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934," in John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., The State and American Foreign Economic Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), and I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics: System Under Stress (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986). The volume edited by Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno adopts an institutional approach similar to that used in this essay, although for the most part it does not concentrate on legislatures. Back.

Note 36:  Richard Rose, Politics in England: Change and Persistence, 5th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 112-113. Back.

Note 37:  John Garrett, Westminster: Does Parliament Work? (London: Victor Gollancz, 1992), p. 15. Back.

Note 38:  Bruce P. Lenman, The Eclipse of Parliament: Appearance and Reality in British Politics Since 1914 (London: Edward Arnold, 1992), p. 9. Back.

Note 39:  Michael Clarke, British External Policy-making in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 114. Back.

Note 40:  For example, see David Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1968). Back.

Note 41:  Ibid., p. 49. Back.

Note 42:  Michael Clarke, "The Policy-Making Process," in Michael Smith, Steve Smith, and Brian White, eds., British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Transformation (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 72-73. Back.

Note 43:  Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Back.

Note 44:  Rose, p. 121. Back.

Note 45:  Cox, p. 3. Back.

Note 46:  Ibid., p. 3. Back.

Note 47:  Vital, p. 79. Back.

Note 48:  William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975), p. 98. Back.

Note 49:  Robert Borthwick, "The Floor of the House," in Michael Ryle and Peter G. Richards, eds., The Commons Under Scrutiny (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 74. Back.

Note 50:  Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 44. Back.

Note 51:  Rose, pp. 19-21; Philip Norton, The Commons in Perspective (New York: Longman, 1981), pp. 1-2. Back.

Note 52:  See William S. Livingston, "Britain and America: The Institutionalization of Accountability," Journal of Politics 38, no. 4 (November 1976): 879-894. Back.

Note 53:  R. M. Punnett, British Government and Politics, 5th ed. (Aldershot: Gower, 1987), p. 186. Back.

Note 54:  Philip Norton, The British Polity, 3d ed. (New York: Longman, 1994), p. 274. Back.

Note 55:  Rose, p. 122. Back.

Note 56:  Norton, The Commons in Perspective, pp. 19-20. Back.

Note 57:  Rose, p. 112. Back.

Note 58:  Alan Beith, "Prayers Unanswered: A Jaundiced View of the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Statutory Instruments," Parliamentary Affairs 34, no. 2 (Spring 1981): 167, 169. Back.

Note 59:  Gavin Drewry, "Legislation," in Ryle and Richards, p. 139. Back.

Note 60:  See Norton, The Commons in Perspective; Norton, "Dissent in the British House of Commons: Rejoinder to Franklin, Baxter, Jordan," Legislative Studies Quarterly 12, no. 1 (February 1987): 143-156; Norton, "Behavioural Changes: Backbench Independence in the 1980s," in Norton, ed., Parliament in the 1980s (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 22-47; Norton, "The Changing Face of the British House of Commons In the 1970s," Legislative Studies Quarterly 5, no. 3 (August 1980): 333-357; Norton, Dissension in the House of Commons 1974-1979 (London: Oxford University Press, 1980); Norton, Conservative Dissidents: Dissent Within the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1970-74 (London: Temple Smith, 1978); Norton, "Dissent in Committee: Intra-Party Dissent in Commons' Standing Committees 1959-74," The Parliamentarian 57, no. 1 (January 1976): 15-25. Back.

Note 61:  Norton, The Commons in Perspective, p. 227. Back.

Note 62:  Ibid., p. 230. Back.

Note 63:  J. Richard Piper, "Backbench Rebellion, Party Government and Consensus Politics: The Case of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 1966-1970," Parliamentary Affairs 27, no. 4 (Autumn 1974): 384-396; Robert J. Jackson, Rebels and Whips: An Analysis of Dissension, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties (London: Macmillan, 1968). Back.

Note 64:  Norton, Conservative Dissidents. Back.

Note 65:  Norton, The British Polity, pp. 288-289. Back.

Note 66:  Dennis Kavanagh, British Politics: Continuities and Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 235. Back.

Note 67:  Ibid., p. 236. See also Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Responsiveness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). Back.

Note 68:  Brian Gaines and Geoffrey Garrett, "The Calculus of Dissent: Party Discipline in the British Labour Government, 1974-1979" (Stanford University, May 1992, mimeographed). Back.

Note 69:  James J. Lynskey, "The Role of Government Backbenchers in the Modification of Government Policy," Western Political Quarterly 23, no. 2 (June 1970): 333-347. Back.

Note 70:  Norton, "Opposition to Government," in Ryle and Richards, p. 113. Back.

Note 71:  Kavanagh, p. 235. Back.

Note 72:  Ian Budge and David McKay, The Changing British Political System: Into the 1990s, 2d ed. (London: Longman, 1988), p. 57. Back.

Note 73:  Jackson, p. 292. Back.

Note 74:  Punnett, p. 190. Back.

Note 75:  Kavanagh, p. 237. Back.

Note 76:  Norton, The British Polity, p. 289. Back.

Note 77:  Jackson, p. 200. Back.

Note 78:  Ronald Butt, The Power of Parliament (London: Constable, 1967), p. 427. Back.

Note 79:  Norton, Dissension, p. 429. Back.

Note 80:  In Congress, majority-rule voting means that the median member of the House as a whole is the swing voter. The influence of party discipline complicates the identification of the swing voter in the Commons. Many analyses suggest that the government wishes to assure passage of legislation without support from minority parties. Thus, on legislation where the whip is in place, the swing voter should be that party member who guarantees the government a majority. This MP may be quite radical, from the government's perspective, with an ideal point far from P. If, on the other hand, the government chooses to allow a free vote, the median member of the Commons should become the swing voter. The government, as a strategic actor, will choose the voting regime that gives it the outcome closest to its ideal point. These speculations should be explicitly modeled in further work. href="#txt80"> Back.

Note 81:  This assumes that one dimension is a reasonable simplification for this preliminary analysis, since even complicated issues can often be conceived of as leading to bargaining along a contract curve. Back.

Note 82:  For the concept of structure-induced equilibrium, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in Herbert Weisberg, ed., Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon, 1986); Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry Weingast, "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice," Public Choice 37 (1981): 503-519. Back.

Note 83:  This story is complicated if we allow for the exercise of veto power by the president. MC is no longer necessarily the unique structure-induced equilibrium if the president is willing to exercise his veto. To facilitate comparison between the British and U.S. cases, I do not consider the possibility of a veto in this discussion. Back.

Note 84:  The discussion thus far has assumed that the cabinet is a unitary actor. Factional disputes within parties are common and significant, however, and should be explicitly included in the models. See Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics," British Journal of Political Science 20 (October 1990): 489-507. Back.

Note 85:  This is true in the very simple example given here, which has assumed away a number of complications, such as collective action problems in Congress, the need to negotiate with other countries, or the desire to gain information about proposed policies from the executive. These factors are especially important in foreign policy and are necessary to explain the adoption of fast-track procedures, for example. Back.

Note 81: Note 86:  Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Delegation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). Back.

Note 87:  James J. Lynskey, "Backbench Tactics and Parliamentary Party Structure," Parliamentary Affairs 27, no. 1 (Winter 1973/74): 31. Back.

Note 88:  The Economist, 11 April 1992, p. 15. Back.

Note 89:  For example, see the New York Times, 17 May 1992, p. 8; Lisa L. Martin, "The Influence of National Parliaments on European Integration" (CFIA Working Paper 94-10, Harvard University, 1994). Back.

Note 90:  See Waltz, pp. 257-258. Back.

Note 91:  Ibid., p. 266. Back.

Note 92:  Christopher Layton, "Introduction," Journal of Common Market Studies 3, no. 3 (1965): 205. Back.

Note 93:  Roy Pryce, "Britain Out of Europe?" Journal of Common Market Studies 2, no. 1 (1964): 3. Back.

Note 94:  Cynthia W. Frey, "Meaning Business: The British Application to Join the Common Market, November 1966-October 1967," Journal of Common Market Studies 6, no. 3 (1968): 212. Back.

Note 95:  William Pickles, "The Choice and the Facts," Journal of Common Market Studies 4, no. 1 (1966): 27. Back.

Note 96:  Roy Jenkins, "The Disappointing Partnership Between British Governments and Europe" (Thirteenth Annual Paul-Henri Spaak Lecture, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 13 October 1994), p. 11. Back.

Note 97:  Philip Allott, "Britain and Europe: A Political Analysis," Journal of Common Market Studies 8, no. 3 (1970): 204. Back.

Note 98  Robert J. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites, and Pressure Groups (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 184; Richard Mayne, "Why Bother with Europe?" Journal of Common Market Studies 3, no. 3 (1965): 231-232. Back.

Note 99:  Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 34. Back.

Note 100:  Lenman, pp. 218-229. Back.

Note 101:  Pickles, p. 26. Back.

Note 102:  Frey, p. 198. Back.

Note 103:  George, p. 248. Back.

Note 104:  Frey, p. 205. Back.

Note 105:  Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), p. 105. Back.

Note 106:  Ibid., p. 105. Back.

Note 107:  Ibid., p. 159. Back.

Note 108:  Ibid., p. 170. Back.

Note 109:  Simon Z. Young, Terms of Entry: Britain's Negotiations with the European Community, 1970-72 (London: Heinemann, 1973), p. 99. Back.

Note 110:  Kitzinger, p. 188. Back.

Note 111:  Anthony King, Britain Says Yes: The 1975 Referendum on the Common Market (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977). Back.

Note 112:  For exceptions, see J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); John Huber, "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States," American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992): 675-687. Back.

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Liberalization and Foreign Policy