
Notes

Introduction

1. Address by Uri Savir, former director-general of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Seminar in Memory of General Aharon Yariv, Tel Aviv University Dayan Center, May 24, 1995. Reproduced in *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/speech/sta/950524s.sta>.
2. Remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker III at the Madrid Peace Conference, November 1, 1991, in *US Department of State Dispatch*, 2, no. 44 (November 4, 1991): 807.
3. Address by U.S. President George Bush at the opening session of the Madrid Peace Conference, October 30, 1991. The full address appears in *US Department of State Dispatch*, 2, no. 44 (November 4, 1991): 803–4.
4. Because regional cooperation before the completion of bilateral peace treaties between Israel and its Arab neighbors is extremely sensitive, the multilateral talks evolved in a low-profile manner. To date, very little has been published about how this process works or the activities undertaken by its working groups. While documentation from the process is not classified, it also is not public, making it difficult for researchers to learn about its proceedings absent interviews with officials who are familiar with the detailed proceedings of the groups. My extensive reliance on personal interviews in this study is the result of this constraint. Existing publications discussing the overall process include: Joel Peters, *Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996); Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Madrid’s Forgotten Forum: The Middle East Multilaterals,” *Washington Quarterly*, 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 167–86; and Robert J. Bookmiller and Kirsten Nakjavani Bookmiller, “Behind the Headlines: The Multilateral Middle East Talks,” *Current History*, 597 (January 1996): 33–37.

5. The full text of the Madrid letter of invitation appears in "Recent Developments in the Middle East Peace Process," *US Department of State Dispatch Supplement*, 4, supplement no. 4 (September 1993): 25–26.
6. Although the process does not include all regional parties (notably Syria and Lebanon), it nonetheless constitutes the only official Arab-Israeli forum to date that expressly addresses regional issues distinct from the bilateral negotiating tracks and includes Arab parties from the Gulf and North Africa who had never before taken part in a public cooperative forum with Israel. Previous attempts to create a "multilateral" negotiating framework between Arabs and Israelis had been both temporary and intended as a forum for bilateral settlements. A notable example was the Geneva peace conference of December 21, 1973, sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union to accelerate disengagement agreements between Israel and its neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) in the wake of the 1973 war. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained, "We strove to assemble a multilateral conference, but our purpose was to use it as a framework for an essentially bilateral diplomacy." See Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1982), p. 755.
7. For more details on the origins of the multilaterals, see remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward P. Djerejian, "The Multilateral Talks in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," in *US Department of State Dispatch*, 4, no. 41 (October 11, 1993): 696.
8. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states participating in the multilateral talks include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The North African (Maghreb) states represented are Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauritania. The "core" Arab participants are the Egyptians, Jordanians, and Palestinians. Turkey and Yemen also participate in the process. The absence of Syria and Lebanon is discussed in chapter 3.
9. Djerejian, "Multilateral Talks."
10. Concluding remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker, Moscow, January 28, 1992 in *US Department of State Dispatch Supplement*, 3, supplement no. 2 (February 1992): 27–28.
11. See Louise Fawcett, "Regionalism in Historical Perspective," in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Regionalism in World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 9–36. For the impact of regionalism on security studies, see David Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
12. See Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
13. This breakthrough included the first official contacts between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), leading to a declaration of principles

- (DoP) on Palestinian self-rule in 1993. This agreement was followed by a more substantive accord (Oslo II) signed in 1995, which led to Israeli troop withdrawals and redeployments from major Palestinian urban areas and the extension of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) rule beyond Gaza to parts of the West Bank territory. The final status of these territories is still subject to negotiation between Israel and the PA. For more on the Oslo Accords, see David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996).
14. My empirical cases include four of the five multilateral working groups. I do not include the Refugee working group, although I discuss this group to some extent in chapter 3, largely because the Refugee group, unlike the other four, depends primarily on a bilateral Israeli-Palestinian resolution, even though the ultimate solution to this problem will require multilateral agreement. In fact, the refugee issue is specified as a "final status" issue in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. For overviews of the refugee problem and the multilateral working group, see: George F. Kossai, *The Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return*, Information Paper No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, September 1996); Government of Israel, *The Refugee Issue: A Background Paper* (Israel: Government Press Office, October 1994); Salim Tamari, *Palestinian Refugee Negotiations: From Madrid to Oslo II* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997); Rex Brynen, "Much Ado About Nothing? The Refugee Working Group and the Perils of Multilateral Quasi-negotiation," *International Negotiation*, 2, no. 2 (November 1997): 279–302; and the Canadian (the group's gavelholder) web site: <<http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/mepp.html>>.
 15. See Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 173–94 and Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 60–84.
 16. On the importance of dependent variable variation in social science research design, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), esp. pp. 129–137.
 17. The formal aspects of the multilaterals were suspended after 1996, although many informal activities and intersessional meetings continued, particularly in the Water group. In February 2000 the multilaterals resumed at the official level with a meeting of the Steering Committee in Moscow.
 18. Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs at the End of the Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), p. 41.

Chapter 1

1. The Middle East is widely associated with the balance of power paradigm, even by scholars challenging the realist paradigm generally. See Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Shibley Telhami, *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
2. See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," *International Organization*, 24, no. 4 (Autumn 1970): 607–46 and Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
3. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 6.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
5. According to Lindblom, "A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in them, such that adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or counterbalanced or outweighed." Cited in Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 51.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
8. For example, Wayne Sandholtz's study of cooperation in Europe challenges functional accounts by focusing on cognitive variables, but he still maintains the policy adjustment definition of cooperation. For him, cognitive change occurs *before* decision-makers decide to cooperate, not while they are engaged in the cooperative process itself. See Wayne Sandholtz, *High-Tech Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
9. For a realist attempt to address questions of cooperation, see Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security*, 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994–95): 50–90 and Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security*, 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 42–63. For an explanation of why security cooperation is more difficult, though not impossible, see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization*, 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 357–78.
10. See Stacia E. Zabusky, *Launching Europe: An Ethnography of European Cooperation in Space Science* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
11. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 19, emphasis added.

13. See Zabusky, p. 18. She is drawing on Mead's *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples* [1937] (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).
14. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
15. On different types of learning, see Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization*, 41 (Summer 1987): 371–402. For a review of the learning literature in the organizational context, see James H. Lebovic, "How Organizations Learn: U.S. Government Estimates of Foreign Military Spending," *American Journal of Political Science*, 39, no. 4 (November 1995): 835–63.
16. See Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
17. See Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE's security community-building model," in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 119–60.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
19. See Zabusky, *Launching Europe*, p. 122.
20. See Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters*, and Fen Osler Hampson with Michael Hart, *Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). In contrast, Robert O. Keohane offers a nominal definition of multilateralism as "the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions." in "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," *International Journal*, 45, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 731–64.
21. Hampson and Hart, *Multilateral Negotiations*, p. 15.
22. See Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Walter C. Swap, "Small Group Theory: Forming a Consensus through Group Processes," in I. William Zartman, ed., *International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994), pp. 132–47.
23. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters*, pp. 3–47.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
26. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979) and Walt, *Origins of Alliances*.
27. See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World In Depression, 1929–39* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 317–45.

28. The general applicability of hegemonic stability theory has already suffered sharp criticism, both on a theoretical and empirical basis. See Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization*, 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 491–517; Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization*, 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1985): 579–614. For empirical critiques, see Oran Young and Gail Osherenko, "The Formation of International Regimes: Hypotheses and Cases," in Young and Osherenko, eds., *Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1–21 and Volker Rittberger and Michael Zürn, "Regime Theory: Findings from the Study of 'East-West' Regimes," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 26, no. 4 (1991): 165–83.
29. Oran R. Young, "Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society," *International Organization*, 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 281–308.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 283.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 289 (Young quote of Kindleberger).
33. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
35. See Peter Hall, ed., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).
36. Shimon Peres is the most visible example. His ideas, particularly the "New Middle East" concept, have generated a tremendous amount of controversy in both the Arab and Israeli press. See Shimon Peres, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993).
37. Most closely associated with forming this school are: Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) and Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).
38. Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1975).
39. If anything, loyalties are likely to shift to smaller units, such as ethnic or religious groupings, which have posed significant obstacles to nation-building in the Middle East.
40. See Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 141–71; Keohane, *After Hegemony*; and Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly*, 32 (December 1988): 379–96.
41. For the distinction between collaboration and coordination problems, see

- Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world," in Krasner, *International Regimes*, pp. 115–40.
42. See Dalia Dassa Kaye, *Banking on Peace: Lessons from the Middle East Development Bank*, Policy Paper No. 43 (San Diego, Calif.: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October 1998).
 43. For the classic discussion of the collective action dilemma, see Mancur Olsen, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
 44. For a critique of regime theory's neglect of domestic politics, see Haggard and Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes" and Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics*, 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466–96.
 45. Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 422–60.
 46. Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). For a domestic-based analysis of Egyptian alliance behavior, see Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: the Case of Egypt, 1962–1973," *International Organization*, 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 369–95.
 47. Etel Solingen, "Economic Liberalization, Political Coalitions, and Emerging Regional Orders," in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 68. For further elaboration of her theoretical framework, see Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
 48. See Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics*, 43, no. 2 (January 1991): 233–56.
 49. See Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
 50. See Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993). For further ideational work in political economy, see Peter A. Hall, ed., *The Political Power of Economic Ideas*; Henry R. Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy Into the 1990s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Judith Goldstein, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy," *International Organization*, 43, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 31–71; and Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

- 1991). In the national security realm, see Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization*, 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 101–45, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization*, 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 185–214.
51. See Christer Jönsson, "Cognitive Factors in Explaining Regime Dynamics," in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 202–22. Ernst B. Haas previously considered this variable in regime processes in "Is There a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence, and the Construction of International Regimes," *International Organization*, 29, no. 3 (Summer 1975): 827–76 and "Why Collaborate: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics*, 32, no. 3 (April 1980): 357–405.
 52. See especially Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: Analytical Framework," pp. 3–30, in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. Not all of the contributors to this edited volume, however, fall into this category, despite Goldstein and Keohane's advocacy for a rationalist method in the study of ideas.
 53. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
 54. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 55. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 56. John Kurt Jacobsen, "Much Ado about Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," *World Politics*, 47, no. 2 (January 1995), p. 286. For another critique of the Goldstein and Keohane approach to ideas, see John Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization*, 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 855–885.
 57. For more on this distinction, see Albert Yee, "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies," *International Organization*, 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 69–108.
 58. See Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations*, 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63 and Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security*, 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 71–81. For a sympathetic review of constructivism from a critical theory perspective, see Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations*, 4, no. 3 (1998): 259–94.
 59. Early integration theorists noted the critical role of intersubjective beliefs in shaping international outcomes. See Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964) or his later work focused on the role of knowledge in international

- organizations, *When Knowledge is Power*. Also see Karl Deutsch's work on security communities, including Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957) and Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953). For a revival and modification of Deutsch's work in this area, see Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.
60. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn In International Relations Theory," *World Politics*, 50, no. 2 (January 1998): 324–48 and Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?"
 61. Ibid.
 62. See Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization*, 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 335–70. Also see Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
 63. See Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?"
 64. Examples of empirical constructivist works include: Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*; Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 153–85; Audi Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: the Struggle against Apartheid* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO," in Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, pp. 357–99; Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, 114–52; and Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordanian Identity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
 65. Checkel, "Constructivist Turn," p. 339.
 66. To be fair, much constructivist work has focused on why and how questions, particularly those constructivists working with norms. See, for example: Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*; Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: the Struggle against Apartheid*; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'failure' of Internationalism," *International Organization*, 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 31–63; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887–917; and Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International*

Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

67. See John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," *International Security*, 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 82–93.

Chapter 2

1. This review does not consider unilateral embargoes initiated by a single power, such as during an armed conflict.
2. Tripartite Declaration, in *Department of State Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886; and in John Norton Moore, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 988–89.
3. See Yair Evron, *The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 4–6.
4. Excerpts from Address by President Lyndon B. Johnson, June 19, 1967, in *The Arab-Israeli Peace Process Briefing Book* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), p. 9.4. Also see *Department of State Bulletin*, July 10, 1967.
5. In the wake of the Gulf War, a conventional arms transfers register was established under the aegis of the UN Secretary General. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L, December 9, 1991 established the registry. For a review of the work of the UN Register of Conventional Arms in its first three years, see appendix 14D, "The 1994 review of the UN Register of Conventional Arms," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 556–68. The review notes the low participation of Middle East states in the arms registry, suggesting the need for a regional approach. Egypt, in particular, was displeased with the process (see p. 567), in part because its focus was limited to conventional weaponry.
6. Cited in Christopher D. Carr, "False Promises and Prospects: The Middle East Arms Control Initiative," in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Gregory J. Rattray, eds., *Arms Control Toward the 21st Century* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 256.
7. See Janne E. Nolan, "The U.S.-Soviet Conventional Arms Transfer Negotiations," in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 510–23. According to Nolan, "reducing the global arms trade was a matter of personal commitment for President Carter, a commitment shared by a number of his most senior advisors" (p. 510). This commitment was formally embodied in Presidential Directive 13 in 1977,

- calling for arms transfer limitations to all countries outside of NATO, ANZUS, and Japan.
8. For details on the Bush initiative, see "Fact Sheet: Middle East Arms Control Initiative," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 2, no. 22 (June 3, 1991): 393. For a critique of the Bush initiative and an alternative multilateral conventional arms limitation proposal, see the Congressional Budget Office, *Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1992).
 9. In his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 6, 1991, for example, Secretary Baker put the challenge of regional arms proliferation high on his agenda. See *US Department of State Dispatch*, 2, no. 6 (February 11, 1991): 81–85. Echoing similar themes one month later, on March 6, 1991, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and again emphasized the need to end the Middle East arms race; by May 1991, President Bush announced his arms control initiative. For President Bush's speech to Congress, see "The World After the Persian Gulf War," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 2, no. 10 (March 11, 1991): 161.
 10. By the time President Bush was promoting his arms control initiative, the United States had become the number one arms supplier to the Third World. See Richard Grimmet, *Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1984–1991* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 1992).
 11. For detailed accounts of these meetings, see: "Statement Issued After the Meeting of the Five on Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 2, no. 28 (July 15, 1991): 508; "Progress in Middle East Arms Control," Statement by Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Science of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., March 24, 1992, in *US Department of State Dispatch*, 3, no. 13, (March 30, 1992): 242; "Third Round of Arms Sales Talks Fails to Resolve Notification Issue," *Arms Control Today*, 22, no. 5 (June 1992): 21. For more details on the sticking points of the permanent five negotiations, see "President Bush's Middle East Arms Control Initiative: One Year Later," *Arms Control Today*, 22, no. 5 (June 1992): 11–16.
 12. See Aharon Klieman, "The Israel-Jordan Tacit Security Regime," in Efraim Inbar, ed., *Regional Security Regimes: Israel and its Neighbors* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 127–49. Also see Klieman, *Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1988) and *Israel and the World After 40 Years* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990).
 13. On this point, and for an overview of various bilateral CSBMs, see Yair Evron, "Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in the Arab-Israeli Context," in

- Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., *Middle Eastern Security: Prospects for An Arms Control Regime* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 152–72, esp. p. 161.
14. For a comprehensive study on measures to facilitate the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East predating ACRS, see *Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Region of the Middle East*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, October 10, 1990, Forty-fifth session. For an assessment of the prospects for a WMDFZ in the Middle East in light of peace process developments, see Jan Prawitz and James F. Leonard, *A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996).
 15. For a comprehensive study of NWFZ proposals from an Egyptian perspective, see Mahmoud Karem, *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). Also see Karem, “A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: A Historical Overview of the Patterns of Involvement of the United Nations,” in Tariq Rauf, ed., *Regional Approaches to Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia* (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1992), pp. 55–68. Karem’s writing is particularly significant because he has played an influential role in the formation of Egyptian arms control policy in general and ACRS in particular as Director of the Disarmament Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo. Also see Mohamed Nabil Fahmy (a senior Egyptian official in the Foreign Ministry), “Egypt’s Disarmament Initiative,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 46, no. 9: 9.
 16. For an analysis of Israel’s policy of ambiguity and its implications for regional arms control, see Avner Cohen, “Patterns of Nuclear Opacity in the Middle East: Understanding the Past, Implications for the Future,” in Rauf, *Regional Approaches*, pp. 13–54. On the general issue of Israel’s nuclear capability, see Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
 17. Israel proposed a NWFZ on October 30, 1980, to the General Assembly as a draft resolution. For the full text, see *Briefing Book*, pp. 9.8–9.9. In 1988, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir proposed a chemical-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East. See Address by Yitzhak Shamir to the UN General Assembly, June 7, 1988, reprinted in *Briefing Book*, pp. 9.9–9.14.
 18. Avner Cohen, “The Nuclear Issue in the Middle East in a New World Order,” in Inbar and Sandler, *Middle Eastern Security: Prospects for An Arms Control Regime*, p. 55.
 19. For an analysis of alternative economic arrangements among Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories under conditions of peace, see Patrick Clawson and Howard Rosen, *The Economic Consequences of Peace for Israel, the*

- Palestinians and Jordan*, Policy Paper No. 25 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991).
20. For details of the ALPHA operation, see *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1955–1957, vol. 14, The Arab-Israeli Dispute (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 1–401. Also see Evelyn Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez, Diaries 1951–56* (New York: Norton, 1987), esp. pp. 242–67.
 21. See Isaac Alteras, *Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953–1960* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 131.
 22. See *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. 13 (1992), The Arab-Israeli Dispute, pp. 2–5.
 23. Specifically, many believed any proposals that encouraged Arab unity, such as a development fund, would undermine the influence of oil companies in the region. This concern was made clear by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a conversation with John J. McCloy (Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank), when Dulles briefed McCloy on the U.N. proposed plan for a regional development fund: “Arab unity may make it more difficult for the oil companies to maintain a decent position there [the Middle East]. The Sec would not want to dissuade M[cCloy] from doing it [providing credits for regional projects] but throws out this warning. M said it has a lot of imponderables and he does not like to be associated with something so vague.” Quoted in *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. 12 (1993), Near East Region, p. 1.
 24. See Jonathan E. Sanford, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Multilateral Development Banks* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 57.
 25. For an account of the origins and evolution of the Arab boycott, see Aaron J. Sarna, *Boycott and Blacklist: A History of Arab Economic Warfare Against Israel* (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986).
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
 27. For a more detailed discussion of the implications of peace on foreign investment and foreign direct investment (FDI) in Israel, see Steve A. Yetiv, “Peace, Interdependence, and the Middle East,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 112, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 29–49.
 28. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott (assisted by Kimberly Ann Elliott), *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1985), p. 184.
 29. For an analysis of evolving economic relations among the triad since the Oslo Accords (and more specifically the Paris protocols of April 1994) and the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, see Hisham Awartani and Ephraim Kleiman, “Economic Interactions Among Participants in the Middle East Peace Process,” *Middle East Journal*, 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 215–29.
 30. Heba Handoussa and Nemat Shafik, “The Economics of Peace: The Egyptian Case,” in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik and Elias Tuma, eds., *The Economics*

of *Middle East Peace: Views From the Region* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), p. 36.

31. Ibid.
32. For more on the Egyptian-Israeli trade relationship in the wake of their peace treaty, including potential areas where economic relations can expand, see Meir Merhav, ed., *Economic Cooperation and Middle East Peace* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), pp. 16–21.
33. For examples of these views, see Ephraim Kleiman, “Some Basic Problems of the Economic Relationships between Israel, and the West Bank, and Gaza,” pp. 305–33, and Osama A. Hamed and Radwan A. Shaban, “One-sided Customs and Monetary Union: The Case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under Israeli Occupation,” pp. 19–54, both in Fischer, Rodrik, and Tuma, *Economics of Middle East Peace*.
34. Kleiman, “Some Basic Problems,” p. 309.
35. Hamed and Shaban, “One-sided Customs,” p. 121.
36. Ibid.
37. The total public sector investment in the territories from 1982 to 1987 averaged just \$60 million. See Fischer, Rodrik, and Tuma, *Economics of Middle East Peace*, p. 316.
38. See Awartani and Kleiman, “Economic Interactions,” p. 223. Also see Marlise Simons, “Gaza-Jericho Economic Accord Signed by Israel and Palestinians,” *New York Times*, April 30, 1994, p. A1.
39. For example, see Joyce R. Starr (with Addeane S. Caelleigh), *A Shared Destiny: Near East Regional Development and Cooperation* (New York: Praeger, 1983) and Merhav, *Economic Cooperation*.
40. On the Johnston Plan, see: “Jordan Waters,” chap. 5 in Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 173–224; “The Johnston Mission to the Middle East,” chap. 4 in Miriam R. Lowi, *Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 79–114; and Alteras, *Eisenhower and Israel*, esp. pp. 118–25.
41. See, for example, Daniel Hillel, *Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
42. Lowi, *Water and Power*, p. 105.
43. For a detailed discussion of the Israeli-Jordanian water sharing scheme, see Jeffrey K. Sosland, *Cooperating Rivals: The Politics of Water Scarcity, Protracted Conflict, and Complex Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin* (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1998).
44. See Hillel, *Rivers of Eden* and Miriam Lowi, “Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 49, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 123–45.

45. For more details on these negotiations, see Lowi, "Rivers of Conflict," esp. pp. 130–34.
46. See Robert B. Abel, *The Influence of Technical Cooperation on Reducing Tensions in the Middle East* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1997), p. 29.
47. For an analysis of the Mediterranean Action Plan drawing on the epistemic communities approach, see Peter M. Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); and P. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," *International Organization*, 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 377–403.

Chapter 3

1. Prepared statement by Secretary Baker for the organizational meeting for multilateral negotiations on the Middle East, Moscow, January 28, 1992, reproduced in *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/multi.2>. For Baker's delivered remarks to the conference (both opening and closing), see "Organizational Meeting for Multilateral Negotiations on the Middle East," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 3, no. 5 (February 3, 1992): 79–80.
2. See Nelson W. Polsby, "The Foreign Policy Establishment: Toward Professionalism and Centrism," in Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 208–215.
3. See Hecla, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp. 87–124. According to Hecla, an issue network exists where a group of experts with shared knowledge, in or out of government, focus on a particular policy area as policymaking becomes a much more complex and fluid process. The experts in the issue network do not require professional training; they need only be issue-skilled, or be "well informed about the ins and outs of a particular policy debate." (p. 103).
4. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 6, 1996, Washington, D.C.
5. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 8, 1996, Washington, D.C.
6. Shlomo Avineri, "From World Struggle to Regional Conflict," *Ha'aretz*, January 16, 1996, reproduced in *Israel Information Service*, February 20, 1996 <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/dps96/96021ba.dps>.
7. Muhammad Faour, *The Arab World After Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 118.

8. See, for example, Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
9. See Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
10. James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy* (New York: Putnam, 1995), p. 412.
11. Federal News Service, March 6, 1991. Printed in *The Arab-Israeli Peace Process Briefing Book* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), p. 2.1.
12. Author interview with Israeli official, August 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.
13. For early discussion of the two track idea, see "The Middle East Peace Process," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 3, supplement no. 2 (February 1992), esp. Baker's comments at a news conference en route from Riyadh to Cairo, March 10, 1991 (pp. 16–17).
14. The State Department, for example, issued a document as early as 1979 suggesting Arab-Israeli regional cooperation projects. See Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, *The Economics of Regional Security in the Middle East* (Cairo University, November 1994). Also see Joyce R. Starr (with Addeane S. Caellegh), *A Shared Destiny: Near East Regional Development and Cooperation* (New York: Praeger, 1983).
15. As the invitation states, "Those parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after the opening conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest." Reprinted in "Recent Developments in the Middle East Peace Process," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 4, supplement no. 4 (September 1993): 25–26. The fact that the Moscow organizational session did not occur until late January of 1992 (rather than two weeks after Madrid as the invitation stipulated) reflects in part the lack of thought and planning put into the process until after Madrid (although the breakup of the Soviet Union between Madrid and Moscow also slowed the process).
16. For details of peace process initiatives and diplomacy before the Madrid conference, see William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and The Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993).
17. On the U.S.-PLO dialogue and Reagan policy toward the Arab-Israeli peace process, see *ibid.*, pp. 367–80.
18. Baker, *Politics of Diplomacy*, p. 115.

19. For the full text of the Shamir Plan, see *Briefing Book*, p. 4.27. Also reprinted in *Jerusalem Post*, April 14, 1989, p. 8.
20. Author interviews with senior U.S. officials, January 3, 1996 and May 6, 1996, Washington, D.C.
21. However, Shamir denies that he viewed the multilaterals as an incentive to attend the Madrid conference. For him, the question of Palestinian representation was at the heart of the issue, and ultimately dictated his position on Israeli participation at the conference. Author interview with Yitzhak Shamir, August 28, 1996, Tel Aviv, Israel.
22. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 6, 1996, Washington, D.C.
23. For example, the EU, Japan, and Canada were given working groups to chair—REDWG, the Environment, and Refugees respectively.
24. According to one senior State Department official and former Baker aide—confirmed by Baker himself in an interview with the author—Baker was prepared to give up the multilaterals in exchange for Syrian acceptance to attend Madrid. Baker's aides avoided this by creating the compromise that attendance at the multilaterals would be optional, thus keeping the process afloat even without Syrian (and Lebanese) participation. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 8, 1996, Washington, D.C. Also see Baker, *Politics of Diplomacy*, p. 505.
25. Author interview with senior State Department official, January 3, 1996, Washington, D.C.
26. By the eve of the Moscow conference, the Palestinians changed their position on this and subsequently supported the inclusion of the Refugee group in the process. The Israelis continued to express concern about including this issue but had little choice given Baker's insistence on its inclusion.
27. Israel was also concerned that arms control would dominate the process. Author interview with senior State Department official, January 3, 1996, Washington, D.C.
28. The steering group included: the United States, Russia, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia (representing the GCC states), Tunisia, (representing the Arab Maghreb Union states), and the European Union, Japan, and Canada (all serving as lead organizers for various working groups).
29. For more details regarding the structure of the multilaterals and the operations of its various working groups, see Joel Peters, *Building Bridges: The Arab-Israeli Multilateral Talks* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), esp. pp. 6–11, and Peters, *Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).
30. Speech by Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Edward P. Djerejian, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 4, no. 41 (October 11, 1993): 696.

31. Israel was concerned about the arms control aspect of ACRS, particularly Arab pressure on the nuclear issue. The Arab parties, especially Egypt, were adamant that the arms control (and nuclear) aspects of the group predominate. The Refugee group was a concession to the Palestinians (although they were initially opposed to it) and received coolly by the Israelis, who boycotted the first meeting in May 1992 because of controversy over the participation of diaspora Palestinians. Still, to satisfy the Israelis, the mandate for this group was limited to improving the conditions of the refugees in their present locations; the issue of the right of return and resettlement was left for the final status talks in bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
32. For the Palestinian representation controversy at the Moscow conference, see David Makovsky, "US, Israel Deadlocked on Status of 'Outside' Palestinians in Regional Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, January 29, 1992, and Makovsky, "US, Russia Back Israeli Stand on Palestinian Delegation; Multilateral Talks Opening in Moscow Today," *Jerusalem Post*, January 28, 1992.
33. For expectations on the financing of the multilaterals, see Cairo MENA, November 17, 1991, " 'Sources' on Plan for Multilateral Talks in Rome," cited in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia-91-222* (hereafter *FBIS-NES*), November 18, 1991, p. 1 and Cairo *Al-Wafd*, November 18, 1991, p. 1, "Multilateral Talks to Examine Regional Concord," cited in *FBIS-NES-91-226*, November 22, 1991, p. 1. As David Makovsky explained, "The idea of the talks is that the richest industrialized countries will in time set aside a multi-billion dollar regional development fund, which will be offered to Arabs and Israelis as a potential benefit should they resolve their political conflicts." In Makovsky, "Levy Going to Moscow Today After Dedicating Embassy in Beijing," *Jerusalem Post*, January 26, 1992.
34. In negotiations between the Madrid and Moscow conferences to convene the multilateral talks, the linkage between bilateral progress and regional cooperation was a dominant theme. See, for example, David Makovsky, "International Funding for Regional Projects Linked to Peace Progress; 17 Non-Mideast States Likely to Join Multilateral Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, November 18, 1991.
35. Concluding remarks by Secretary Baker, Moscow, January 28, 1992. Reprinted in *US Department of State Dispatch*, 3 (February 1992): 27.
36. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 8, 1996, Washington, D.C.
37. Author interview with Israeli official, August 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.
38. From the outset, the Syrians (and consequently the Lebanese) refused to attend a regional forum with Israel before all bilateral disputes had been settled, which is why the United States made participation in the multilaterals voluntary in the Madrid letter of invitation. Since the Moscow conference, Syria has maintained this position and has attempted to convince other Arab states to follow

- suit. For an early statement of the Syrian position on the multilaterals, see London MBC Television, December 5, 1991, "Syrian Sees 'No Benefit' in Multilateral Talks," cited in *FBIS-NES-91-235*, December 6, 1991, pp. 2–3. Also see Baker, *Politics of Diplomacy*, p. 502.
39. See Jerusalem *Qol Yisra'el*, December 11, 1991, "U.S., Israel 'At Odds' Over Multilateral Talks," cited in *FBIS-NES-91-238*, December 11, 1991, p. 45 and Tel Aviv *Davar*, January 2, 1992, "Levi Sends Baker Position Paper on Multilaterals," cited in *FBIS-NES-92-001*, January 2, 1992, pp. 17–18. These points were also made in an author interview with a senior State Department official, January 3, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 40. Indeed, according to a senior U.S. official, Egypt was initially supportive of the multilaterals, expressing enthusiasm for a process which it believed vindicated its decision to make peace with Israel. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 6, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 41. Hearing before Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "CSCME: Prospects for Collective Security in the Middle East," One Hundred Third Congress, First Session, October 14, 1993. Crown Prince Hassan's plan is printed in the appendix, pp. 68–82.
 42. See Paris Radio Monte Carlo, November 9, 1991, "Al-Masri on Bilateral, Multilateral Talks," cited in *FBIS-NES-91-218*, November 12, 1991, p. 37.
 43. This dispute is what led to the Palestinian boycott of the Moscow conference and to the Israeli boycott of the first Refugee working group meeting in May 1992, when the cosponsors loosened restrictions on Palestinian participation and allowed diaspora Palestinians to participate. However, after Israeli elections the new Labor government agreed to include diaspora Palestinians in the Refugee group by the second plenary in November 1992 as long as they were not members of the PLO or the PNC. This issue became moot after Oslo.
 44. Jon Immanuel, "Both Sides Claim Moscow Victory, and Now Await Next Round of Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, January 31, 1992.
 45. As one Israeli official acknowledged, the Israeli participants knew the Palestinians were PLO members but did not publicly admit this. Author interview on September 27, 1995, Jerusalem.
 46. The World Bank subsequently drafted a more detailed plan for Palestinian aid the following spring. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Agency Offering a Detailed Plan of Palestinian Aid," *New York Times*, May 3, 1994, p. A1.
 47. This proposal was initiated with the Damascus Declaration of March 6, 1991, issued by the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. For analysis of the failure of the Damascus Declaration, see Kim Murphy and Robin Wright, "Setbacks Widen U.S. Role in Gulf Security," *Los Angeles Times*, May 12, 1991, p. A1; Peter F. Sisler, "All-Arab

- Defense of Gulf Unravels," *Washington Times*, May 9, 1991, p. A1; and "Damascus Declaration Put on Ice till April," in *Mideast Mirror*, November 12, 1991, p. 9.
48. Author interview with senior State Department official, January 3, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 49. For instance, Oman was the first Gulf country to sponsor a multilateral working group (Water), in April 1994. Qatar and Bahrain have also hosted plenary sessions. In contrast, the Saudis have yet to sponsor a multilateral session.
 50. *Mideast Mirror*, February 9, 1993. However, in private conversations with the author, other Arab officials noted that despite the Syrians' public stance on the multilaterals, they were extremely interested in the process, and were regularly briefed by other Arab participants on the proceedings of all working groups. The Americans encouraged these informal briefings because they hoped they would better prepare the Syrians for joining the process at a later stage without having to rework existing agreements.
 51. For instance, in the Gulf, the Damascus Declaration (an attempt to establish a regional security force) failed because GCC states ultimately preferred the political risks of bilateral security ties to the West to the creation of a regional, pan-Arab security regime. On the demise of the Damascus Declaration, see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Joseph Kostiner, "The Damascus Declaration: An Arab Attempt At Regional Security," in Efraim Inbar, ed., *Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 107–125. Israel also continued to depend on and strengthen its bilateral security relationship with the United States in the years following the Gulf War, and developed new bilateral security links and cooperation with Jordan and Turkey as well. One Palestinian critic observed the Israeli preference for bilateral security arrangements, arguing that bilateral deals are "maximizing its [Israel's] bargaining power in each bilateral track and making itself the primary locus of all regional arrangements. . . . Only the existence of collective institutions might limit its relative advantage at the regional level," in Yezid Sayigh, "Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and Security of the Palestinian State," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 15–16. While these bilateral alternatives do not preclude multilateral security cooperation, they underscore that such regional cooperation was not the preferred choice among regional players, and not highly valued among top security elites.
 52. For a guns versus butter argument, see Yahya M. Sadowski, *Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993).
 53. See, for example, Kenneth R. Timmerman, "The New World Arms Market," *Wall Street Journal*, April 3, 1997, p. A18.
 54. For example, Israel has been actively developing a missile defense system (the

- Arrow). For more on Israel's altering defense strategy and the development of the Arrow, see Peter Hirschberg, "Hitting Back," *Jerusalem Report*, March 21, 1996, pp. 20–22.
55. Hisham Awartani and Ephraim Kleiman, "Economic Interactions Among Participants in the Middle East Peace Process," *Middle East Journal*, 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 217
 56. This is Stanley Fischer's estimate for 1983, the last year complete data were available for all countries in the region. See Fischer, "Prospects for Regional Integration in the Middle East," in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya, eds., *New Dimensions in Regional Integration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 434. Alan Richards and John Waterbury have cited similar figures in Richards and Waterbury, eds., *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p. 366.
 57. Fischer, "Prospects for Regional Integration," p. 435.
 58. *Ibid.*, p. 436.
 59. Awartani and Kleiman, "Economic Interactions," p. 221.
 60. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper, *Is MENA a Region? The Scope for Regional Integration*, prepared by Mohamed A. El-Erian and Stanley Fischer, April 1996, p. ii.
 61. These claims, while prevalent in the Arab press, tend to be exaggerated. Author interview with Egyptian official, Washington, D.C., March 27, 1996. For an Israeli response to these charges, see Yossi Beilin, "The Economic Fruits of Peace," excerpts from Remarks to the Jerusalem Economic Forum, January 31, 1995. Reproduced as a Policy Paper in *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/speech/sta/950131b.sta>, February 9, 1995.
 62. For a more detailed account of the implications of a regional peace for Israeli economic activity in the region, see Nadav Halevi, "Economic Implications of Peace: The Israeli Perspective," in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., *The Economics of Middle East Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 87–115.
 63. One relatively successful example of such a joint venture is a garment plant established in Jordan producing, among other things, Victoria's Secret lingerie with a "Made in Israel" label. Israelis enjoy lower production costs (about 50 percent less than in Israel) while the Jordanians can take advantage of Israel's preferential trading status with key importers like the United States. See Douglas Jehl, "Whose Lingerie Is It? A New Mideast Secret," *New York Times*, December 25, 1996, p. A6.
 64. Interview with Deputy Under Secretary Oded Eran by *Zaman*, October 21, 1996, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-210*, October 21, 1996, p. 4 (emphasis added), located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
 65. Remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin to the Jerusalem Economic

Forum, January 31, 1995. Reproduced in *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/speech/sta/950131b.sta>.

66. David Rosenberg, "Someone Say Boycott?," *Jerusalem Report*, May 1, 1997, p. 41.
67. Ibid.
68. Among the most prevalent subregional cooperation alternatives considered by economists is a free trade zone among Israel, Jordan, and a future Palestinian entity, with some proposals including Egypt as well. See Patrick Clawson and Howard Rosen, *The Economic Consequences of Peace for Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan*, Policy Paper No. 25 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991). Former Israeli Finance Minister Dan Meridor raised this idea as well. See Israel Line, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/11/archive>, March 24, 1997.
69. El-Erian and Fischer, *Is MENA a Region?*, pp. ii, 14. For a similar argument that economic growth and prosperity depend on domestic policies and not peace process related activity, see Eliyahu Kanovsky, "The Middle East Economies: The Impact of Domestic and International Politics," *Middle East Report of International Affairs* (MERIA), journal 2, article 1 (June 1, 1997) <www.biu.ac.il/soc/besa/meria.html>.
70. The study group held a conference from November 14–16, 1991 which produced papers that eventually became the edited volume by Fischer, Rodrik, and Tuma, *Economics of Middle East Peace*. The regional participants included Egyptians, Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese, and from 1992 (after the Moscow organizational session for the multilaterals), several Gulf states.
71. Fischer, Rodrik, and Tuma, "Introduction," *Economics of Middle East Peace*, pp. 1–16.
72. For another example of this argument, see John Page, "Securing the Peace Dividend in the Middle East: External Finance and Domestic Effort," *Middle East Executive Reports*, 17, no. 10 (October 1994): 9. Also see Fischer, "Prospects for Regional Integration," pp. 423–449.
73. For a similar story concerning the establishment of a new Arab-Israeli regional institution—the Middle East Development Bank—see Dalia Dassa Kaye, *Banking on Peace: Lessons from the Middle East Development Bank*, Policy Paper No. 43 (San Diego, Calif.: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October 1998).
74. For opinion polls in the Arab Levant on normalization with Israel, documenting the negative attitude toward normalization among Arab publics despite growing acceptance of Israel at official levels, see Hilal Khashan, "The Levant: Yes to Treaties, No to Normalization," *Middle East Quarterly*, 2, no. 2 (June 1995): 3–13.

75. See, for example, William A. Orme, Jr., "Israeli Business Flies Like a Dove," *New York Times*, October 18, 1998, section 4, p. 3.
76. For a detailed account of this tacit cooperation, see Jeffrey K. Sosland, *Cooperating Rivals: The Politics of Water Scarcity, Protracted Conflict, and Complex Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin* (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1998). On the Johnston Plan, see: "Jordan Waters," chap. 5 in Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 173–224; "The Johnston Mission to the Middle East," chap. 4 in Miriam R. Lowi, *Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 79–114; and Issac Alteras, *Eisenhower and Israel* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), esp. pp. 118–25.
77. For an analysis of the Mediterranean Action Plan drawing on the epistemic communities approach, see Peter M. Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); and P. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," *International Organization*, 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 377–403.
78. Author interview with senior State Department official, January 3, 1996.
79. For an elaboration of this concept and empirical applications, see John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 195–231; Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3–47; and Steven Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," *International Organization*, 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 633–80.
80. For the agent problem in ideational analysis, see Thomas Risse Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization*, 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 185–214.
81. Polsby, "Foreign Policy Establishment," p. 210.
82. For an account of the old establishment, see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986). The six men referred to are: Robert Lovett; John McCloy; Averell Harriman; Charles Bohlen; George Kennan; and Dean Acheson. Also see Godfrey Hodgson, *The Colonel* (New York: Knopf, 1990). For an account of the establishment's position on the Middle East, see Clark Clifford (with Richard Holbrooke), *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991). In Clifford's words (pp. 4–5), the attitude of Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal (who opposed the policy of recognizing the new

state of Israel), “was typical of the foreign policy establishment, especially the pro-Arab professionals at the State Department, who, deeply influenced by the huge oil reserves in the Mideast, supported the side they thought would be the likely winner in the struggle between Arabs and Jews. . . . I sometimes felt, almost bitterly, that they preferred to follow the views of the British Foreign Office than those of the President.”

83. The term “Arabist” is usually associated with career Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) in the Near East Affairs Bureau of the State Department who speak Arabic and have served in the Arab world. They are traditionally viewed as not only Arab experts but as pro-Arab. See Robert D. Kaplan, “Tales From the Bazaar,” *The Atlantic Monthly* (August 1992), pp. 38–39, and William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 25–26.
84. Quoted in Laura Blumenfeld, “Three Peace Suits,” *Washington Post*, February 24, 1997, p. D1.
85. For a more extensive argument about the nature and evolution of this policy community, see Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Learning in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Emergence of an American Middle East Epistemic Community” (master’s thesis, University of California, Berkeley, April 1993).
86. See Christopher Madison, “Baker’s Inner Circle,” *National Journal* (July 13, 1991), pp. 1733–1738, and Morton Kondracke, “Baker’s Half Dozen,” *New Republic* (February 24, 1992), p. 11.
87. David Hoffman, “Little Known Aide Plays Major Role in Foreign Policy,” *Washington Post*, October 28, 1991, p. A1.
88. See, for example, Dennis Ross, *Acting With Caution: Middle East Policy Planning for the Second Reagan Administration*, Policy Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1984), p. 40, and Dennis Ross, “The Peace Process—A Status Report,” in *U.S. Policy and the Middle East Peace Process, Fourth Annual Conference* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), pp. 10–18.
89. Norman Kempster, “Insider; Baker Aide, Ex-Envoy to Syria, Pushes Doors Open in Mideast,” *Los Angeles Times*, World Report, November 19, 1991, p. H2.
90. See *Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988).
91. See, for example, the Washington Institute’s Study Group Report, *Pursuing Peace: An American Strategy for the Arab-Israeli Peace Process* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992). See *After the Storm: Challenges for America’s Middle East Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991).
92. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 6, 1996, Washington, D.C.

93. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 6, 1996. This point was repeated to the author in several interviews, when senior American officials emphasized the central role of Israeli integration and normalization above all else. Author interview with senior American official, Tel Aviv, October 19, 1995.
94. Author interview with senior U.S. official, May 8, 1996, Washington, D.C.

Chapter 4

1. For example, even after the Gulf War, the Middle East continued to lead the world in arms imports, accounting for over 30 percent of the world's arms market. See *Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, September 1992), pp. 7–10. For additional data on arms sales to the region, see *The Military Balance 1998/99* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).
2. For example, five states in the region have armed forces that approach or exceed half a million personnel (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, and Egypt), tank inventories are estimated at 25,000 (ten times those of Africa or Latin America), and combat aircraft number over 4,000 (roughly four times those of Africa or Latin America). See Alfred B. Prados, *Middle East Arms Supply: Recent Control Initiatives*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 16, 1992), p. 1. For more data on the region's military balance after the Gulf War, see Anthony H. Cordesman, *After the Storm: the Changing Military Balance in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), and *The Military Balance 1998/99*.
3. See Michael N. Barnett, "Regional Security After the Gulf War," *Political Science Quarterly*, 111, no. 4 (Winter 1996–97): 597–618.
4. For other detailed accounts of empirical developments in ACRS, see Bruce W. Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye, "Security Status: Explaining Regional Security Cooperation and Its Limits in the Middle East," *Security Studies* 8, no. 1 (autumn 1998): 204–38, and Bruce W. Jentleson, *The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Talks: Progress, Problems and Prospects*, IGCC Policy Paper No. 26 (San Diego: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1996). For a shorter account, see Shai Feldman, *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 7–15. For a strict chronological overview of ACRS's plenaries and intersessionals, see, "A Brief History of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group," in *The Arms Control Reporter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1996), pp. 453.A.6–453.A.13.

5. The Europeans were represented by the European Community. Israel agreed to European participation in ACRS in May 1992 (due to Israeli reservations, the EC was only an observer at the Moscow organizational conference), in return for a "non-interference pledge on sensitive security issues and EC efforts to improve cooperation with Israel." Initially, the Israeli Ministry of Defense opposed EC participation in ACRS. See David Makovsky, "Israel, EC in Agreement on Role in Arms Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, May 1, 1992. According to this report, Israeli Foreign Minister Levy viewed European participation as most critical in these early conceptual stages of ACRS, but did not envision an active European role "when talks get down to hard bargaining between Israelis and Arabs."
6. For a summary of the May 1992 and September 1992 plenaries, see "Middle East Peace, Arms Control Talks on Hold," *Arms Control Today*, 23, no. 1 (Jan./Feb., 1993): 25.
7. For a detailed discussion of applying the East-West arms control experience to the Middle East context (including the ACRS process), see Keith R. Krause, "The Evolution of Arms Control in the Middle East," in Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds., *Confidence Building in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 267–290.
8. See Alon Pinkas, "Ivri, Mitzna to head arms control panel at Moscow Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, January 23, 1992.
9. See, for example, Steven L. Spiegel and David J. Pervin, eds., *Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East*, vol. 1, Arms Control and Regional Security (New York: Garland, 1995).
10. See Alan Platt, ed., *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992).
11. For more details on the European CBMs and their application to the Middle East, see Richard E. Darilek and Geoffrey Kemp, "Prospects for Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Middle East," in Platt, *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East*, pp. 9–42. Also see Ambassador Lynn Hansen, "CSBMs: The Ugly Duckling Remains a Duck—but a Pretty Good One," in Fred Tanner, ed., *Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East* (Malta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, 1994), pp. 51–66.
12. Etel Solingen, "Arms Control Negotiations in the Middle East: The Issue of Sequencing," *Peace and Change*, 20, no. 3 (July 1995): 367.
13. It is important to note that this consensual view in the arms control community based on the European experience was not accepted by all regional ACRS parties, particularly Egypt. For example, Ahmed Fakhr, a member of the Egyptian delegation to ACRS, has written on the Egyptian perspective and has emphasized the Egyptian preference for arms reduction and disarmament

- agreements, not CBMs, because “the Middle East is not Europe. . . . First deal with arms control in the region because that is what is needed most urgently to enhance peace and security.” See Ahmed Fakhr, “An Egyptian Perspective on Arms Control,” in Richard Eisendorf, ed., *Arms Control and Security in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East, June 1995), p. 37.
14. For a discussion of the regional definition problem, see Abdullah Toukan, “The Middle East Peace Process and Arms Control and Regional Security.” Paper presented to the ACRS plenary in Washington, D.C., May 1993, p. 3.
 15. For an analysis of this problem in the context of the second ACRS plenary session in Moscow (September 1992), see Gerald Steinberg, “Trouble for Peace Process as Multilaterals Resume,” *Jerusalem Post*, September 18, 1992.
 16. For a discussion of the broader definition of arms control as a political, and not just a military, mechanism, see Abdullah Toukan, “The Middle East Peace Process and Arms Control and Regional Security.” Dr. Toukan served on the Jordanian delegation to ACRS, participated in numerous track two security initiatives, and served as an advisor to King Hussein. He also has written extensively about arms control in the Middle East as an academic. See, for example, Toukan, “The Middle East Peace Process, Arms Control, and Regional Security,” in Spiegel and Pervin, *Practical Peacemaking*, pp. 21–42, and Toukan, “A Jordanian Perspective on Arms Control,” in Eisendorf, *Arms Control and Security in the Middle East*, pp. 89–99.
 17. See Gerald Steinberg, “Major Boost for Arms Control Talks,” *Jerusalem Post*, April 7, 1993.
 18. Ibid.
 19. For example, because the Defense rather than Foreign Ministry ran ACRS, the group’s work tended to be less public than the other working groups’ activities. One expression of this is the fact that in the Israeli position paper on the eve of the Moscow organizing conference on multilateral regional cooperation, in late January 1992, a discussion of all issues except arms control was included. See Israeli Foreign Ministry Background Paper, “Multilateral Regional Cooperation,” January 27, 1992, Jerusalem, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/multi.6>.
 20. See Ambassador Eytan Bentsur, “Israel’s Vision of the Goals and Principles of the Regional Security and Arms Control Process,” in Tanner, *Arms Control*, pp. 69–75.
 21. For the text of Peres’s address, see Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., *Middle Eastern Security: Prospects for an Arms Control Regime* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 186–88.
 22. Ibid., p. 187.
 23. Feldman, *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control*, p. 8.

24. Bentsur, "Israel's Vision," p. 70.
25. Ibid., p. 71.
26. Ibid., p. 74.
27. Author interview with senior Egyptian official, Egyptian Foreign Ministry, October 12, 1995, Cairo.
28. Author interview with Israeli Ministry of Defense official, October 1, 1995, Tel Aviv.
29. Treaty of Peace Between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The State of Israel, October 26, 1994, Article Four, Section 1 (b). For the full text of the treaty, see *The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, October 26, 1994: What Is It?* (Jordan Media Group, August 1995).
30. Author interview with Israeli Ministry of Defense official, October 1, 1995, Tel Aviv. However, according to the official, Israel believed that this objection was based on an Arab misperception of Helsinki, since the territorial status quo could be changed according to CSCE language through "peaceful means."
31. This assessment of various regional vision papers is based on an author interview with an Israeli official, September 27, 1995, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem.
32. This point came up in a number of author interviews with regional security officials. Many officials noted how military-to-military contacts were much more productive, because military representatives tended to be less ideological than political officials, and were more willing to engage in substantive work.
33. Author interview with senior Jordanian official, February 16, 1996, Washington, D.C.
34. Author interview with U.S. official, February 16, 1996, Washington, D.C. According to the official, the Gulf states were much more comfortable with the CBM concept when they understood that CBMs were not just arms reduction measures. However, the Saudis were the most conservative among the Gulf participants, withholding addressing the Israelis directly until the last ACRS plenary in Tunis in December 1994.
35. The Palestinians—in contrast to other Arab parties—were the least interested in ACRS as a forum to further regional security interests (in their case, bilateral cooperation with Israel was most critical), particularly considering they had no standing army (only a Palestinian police force after Oslo), navy, or other military infrastructure embodied in statehood. Rather, the Palestinians were interested in ACRS as another means to legitimate their status as an independent actor vis-à-vis the Israelis, and to influence the group's activities so that ACRS's progress would always be sensitive and contingent on progress in the Palestinian negotiations. Based on author interview with senior Palestinian official, October 24, 1995, Jerusalem.
36. Choosing regional venues was particularly important to the Israelis because it underscored the political purpose of ACRS and other multilateral working

- groups in legitimizing Israel's presence in the regional order. Arab parties were often more than willing to host plenaries or intersessionals in their capitals, which was perceived as enhancing a state's status.
37. Editorial in *Al-Ahram* "Paper Praises Choice for Multilateral Seminar," July 13, 1993, cited in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia* (hereafter *FBIS-NES*)-93-132 July 13, 1993, p. 16.
 38. Author interview with senior Jordanian official, February 16, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 39. Jentleson, *Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Talks*, p. 8.
 40. "Analysis on the Appropriate Scope/Extent of the Middle East Region for Purposes of the Arms Control and Regional Security Process," Co-sponsor paper, ACRS plenary session, November 3-4, Moscow.
 41. For Palestinian and other Arab assessments of the January 30-February 3 meeting, see "Palestinians Reject US-Russian Arms Ideas," *Reuters*, February 2, 1994, p. 2. Also see *The Arms Control Reporter* (1994), p. 453.B.172 for a review of this Cairo intersessional.
 42. See Spokesman of the Ministry of Defense, "Regional Crisis Resolution Center to be Established," *Israeli Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/941017.mul>, October 17, 1994. For a detailed account of the October 9-14 Paris intersessional, including different proposed language by Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the United States for a WMDFZ in an ACRS conceptual text, see *The Arms Control Reporter* (1994), pp. 453.B.182-453.B.183.
 43. The full text of the DoP was published after the May 1994 ACRS plenary in Doha, Qatar. See *Mideast Mirror*, May 3, 1994, 8, no. 83, pp. 18-19.
 44. See Jerusalem *Qol Yisra'el*, "Israel Official: Qatar Talks 'Encumbered' by Saudis," May 7, 1994, cited in *FBIS-NES*-94-089, May 9, 1994, p. 5. According to this report, the Israeli delegation held meetings and conversations outside the formal talks with the Tunisians, Omanis, and Qataris, including the Qatari foreign minister.
 45. One Egyptian commented to an American official at Doha, for example, that he had not visited Qatar since Camp David, which underscored Egyptian isolation. This also might help explain Egypt's aggressive position in ACRS, given its long absence from its leadership position in the Arab world. Author interview with U.S. official, February 16, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 46. "Riyadh Says It Won't Host Multilaterals After Spearheading Opposition to 'Normalization' with Israel at Doha Round," *Mideast Mirror*, 8, no. 86, May 6, 1994, pp. 13-14.
 47. *Ibid.*
 48. See *The Arms Control Reporter* (1994), p. 453.B.176 for a summary of Arab positions at the Doha plenary.
 49. However, privately, the Saudis have taken more interest in a regional security

agenda. According to a senior Jordanian member of the delegation to ACRS, the Saudis expressed a desire at the Cairo intersessional (as did the UAE representative) to support Jordan's position in the talks. Author interview, February 16, 1996, Washington, D.C.

50. According to a U.S. official on the ACRS delegation, the Saudis were upset that the plenary was held in Qatar. However, he noted that the Israelis also interpreted the Saudis' objection as a positive development, in that it demonstrated they cared about the process itself. Author interview, August 25, 1995, Washington, D.C.
51. Excerpted from an address at Georgetown University, April 7, 1994, in Steve Rodan, "Talks Explore Indirect Path to Arms Pact," *Jerusalem Post*, May 2, 1994, p. 7.
52. See Jerusalem *Qol Yisra'el*, "Israel Official: Qatar Talks 'Encumbered' by Saudis," May 7, 1994, cited in *FBIS-NES-94-089*, May 9, 1994, p. 5.
53. Author interview with State Department Official, August 25, 1995, Washington D.C.
54. See "Riyadh Says It Won't Host Multilaterals," *Mideast Mirror*. Also see *Al Hayat*, London, "Saudi Arabia Refuses to Host Multilateral Committees," May 6, 1994, pp. 1, 4, cited in *FBIS-NES-94-089*, May 9, 1994, p. 5.
55. Author interview with State Department official, August 25, 1995, Washington, D.C.
56. Author interview with U.S. official, Feb. 16, 1996, Washington, D.C.
57. See Along Pinkas, "Ivri: Arms Control Talks Irrelevant Unless Syria Joins In," *Jerusalem Post*, December 14, 1994, p. 2.
58. See Hamida ben Saleh, "Nuclear Issue Blocks Talks on Mideast Arms Control," *Agence France Presse*, December 14, 1994.
59. See "Riyadh Says It Won't Host Multilaterals," *Mideast Mirror*.
60. Although I characterize the RSC as a conceptual basket project, once established it would cover both conceptual and operational activities.
61. See "Mideast Conflict Prevention Centre To Be Set Up in Amman," *Agence France Presse*, December 15, 1994.
62. According to a Jordanian document outlining its vision on a regional center, the RSC's mission is to "contribute to the efforts being made to enhance security and stability in the Middle East, within the framework of the Middle East peace process." The RSC's "Initial Functions" were stipulated as follows: "a) Facilitate and provide a venue for seminars on topics that support ACRS working group activities. b) Facilitate training and education in support of the ACRS's process. c) Facilitate and support work on Arms Control and Regional Security arrangements agreed or being pursued in the ACRS process. d) Function as an integral part of ACRS communications and databank system." Ultimately, the Jordanians envisioned the RSC as a regional institution facilitating

- the proposal for a CSCME, where security issues would be linked to issues like economic development or humanitarian concerns in order to promote a “Common Security Culture.”
63. According to a U.S. official present at the meeting, the Egyptians sent their representative to Amman with one prepared statement about the purpose of the center that deadlocked the entire process because it focused only on the nuclear issue. According to the official, much Arab division was apparent at the meeting, with Qatar joining Jordan in a desire to move ahead with the project against Egyptian opposition. Author interview with U.S. official, Feb. 28, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 64. Author interview with U.S. official, Feb. 28, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 65. Author interview with Jordanian official, February 16, 1996, Washington, D.C. The funds were minimal, however, totaling under \$200,000 according to this official’s estimate.
 66. See “Riyadh Says It Won’t Host Multilaterals,” *Mideast Mirror*.
 67. See Amman Radio Jordan, “Multilateral Armament, Security Talks Open,” November 8, 1994, cited in *FBIS-NES-94-216*, November 8, 1994, p. 1. Also see “Preparatory Arms-Control Talks in Jordan,” *Jerusalem Post*, November 8, 1994.
 68. See “Regional Military Communication Network Begins Operation,” Israel Line, *Israeli Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/is-line95/950413.isl>, April 13, 1995.
 69. See *The Arms Control Reporter* (1994), p. 453.B.185.
 70. See Geoffrey Kemp and Jeremy Pressman, “The Middle East: continuation of the peace process,” in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 192.
 71. Shai Feldman, *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control*, p. 14. Also see Sharon Sade (cited in Feldman, p. 34), “Arab Representatives Will Accept Ivri’s Invitation to Visit IDF Bases,” *Ha’aretz*, December 16, 1994, and Sade, “Israel Prepared to Permit Arab Representatives to Visit Defense Installations,” *Ha’aretz*, December 14, 1994.
 72. For a review of the December 12–15 Tunis plenary, see *The Arms Control Reporter* (1994), pp. 453.B.186–453.B.187.
 73. For the full text of this agreement as agreed to at the December Tunis plenary, see *The Arms Control Reporter* (1994), pp. 453.D.17–453.D.20.
 74. *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, p. 192. Also see “Israel, Arab Nations Reach Tension-Easing Pacts,” *Washington Post*, December 21, 1994, p. A21.
 75. Peter Jones, “Maritime Confidence-Building Measures in the Middle East,” in Jill R. Junnola, ed., *Maritime Confidence Building in Regions of Tension* (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996), p. 58. For a similarly detailed discussion and excellent analysis of maritime confidence-building, see

Peter Jones, "Maritime Confidence-Building in the Middle East," in Tanner, *Arms Control*, pp. 103–11.

76. In "Maritime Confidence-Building Measures," p. 59, Jones documents a series of incidents between 1972 and 1989, with three of them between regional navies (two between Israel and Egypt in the Suez before the 1973 war and one between Iran and Kuwait in 1985), eleven incidents between regional navy ships and those of an extraregional power (not including the U.S.-Libyan "tanker war" incidents), and ten recorded cases of regional navies (by and large Israel) firing on or capturing suspected terrorists. Moreover, according to background interviews Jones conducted with Israeli and Egyptian naval officers, many other unrecorded incidents have taken place between the Israeli, Egyptian, and Syrian navies, sometimes because of navigation mistakes but also often because of aggressive surveillance by one of the parties leading to friction and even conflict.
77. Jones, "Maritime Confidence-Building Measures," p. 61.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 62.
80. Ibid.
81. Similar disagreements over specific operational arrangements occurred with respect to detailing range limitations, or exclusion zones, which would specify how close regional ships could be to one another. In the end, the ACRS parties agreed not to include specific range limitation provisions or prohibit particular devices aboard ships. See Jones, "Maritime Confidence-Building Measures," p. 67.
82. Ibid., p. 64.
83. Ibid., p. 66.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., p. 69.
86. The formal title of this agreement, which was finalized at the April meeting, became "Guidelines for Operating Procedures for Maritime Cooperation and Conduct in the Prevention of Incidents on and over the Sea in the Middle East."
87. The head of the Israeli delegation to ACRS, David Ivry, revealed the plans for the joint naval demonstration in an interview with an Israeli newspaper in February 1995. See "Arab States Deny Plans for Naval Exercises with Israel," *Jerusalem Post*, February 21, 1995, p. 2. The exercise was supposed to include Israel and a number of Arab parties. The Arab navies scheduled to participate were: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. The news of such an exercise was negatively viewed in the Arab press, which argued that such activity went beyond normalization to treating Israel as a military ally, and also noted the poor timing of the exercise in the midst

- of the NPT controversy. See "Arab Commentators Aghast at Israeli Involvement in North African Security Plans," *Mideast Mirror*, February 20, 1995, 9, no. 35, pp. 21–22.
88. For an elaboration of this problem, as well as a good overview of other problems ACRS faced, see Michael D. Yaffe, "An Overview of the Middle East Peace Process Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security," in Tanner, *Arms Control*. Yaffe served on the American delegation to ACRS.
 89. On Israel's nuclear weapon capabilities and policy of ambiguity, see Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); "Patterns of Nuclear Opacity in the Middle East: Understanding the Past, Implications for the Future," in Rauf, ed., *Regional Approaches to Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia* (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1992), pp. 13–54. Also see Yair Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Shlomo Aronson and Oded Brosh, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992); Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, *Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994); and Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
 90. For an overview of the Egyptian-Israeli dispute on the nuclear issue and the NPT, see "Israel, the NPT, and the ACRS Talks," in *The Arms Control Reporter* (1994), pp. 453.B.184–453.B.185.
 91. For details on this dispute, see Gerald M. Steinberg, "The 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," *NonProliferation Review*, 1, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 17–29. Essentially, Egypt threatened to withhold its signature and bring the nonaligned movement along if Israel did not sign. In the end, U.S. pressure, including congressional threats to cut Egyptian aid and the personal intervention of Vice President Al Gore, forced the Egyptians to back down.
 92. See, for example, "Israel Has Agreed to Raise Level of Multilateral Talks on Arms Control," Israel Line, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/isline95/950428.isl>, April 28, 1995.
 93. See Fawaz Gerges, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour," *Foreign Affairs*, 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 69–78.
 94. Author interviews with Jordanian and American officials, February 16, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 95. Author interview with senior Israeli official, September 27, 1995, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem.
 96. For example, Yezid Sayigh (initially the head of the Palestinian delegation to ACRS) does not mention the nuclear issue in his review of threats to Palestinian security, and instead emphasizes nonmilitary threats like political, economic,

and social forces. See Sayigh, "Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and Security of the Palestinian State," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 5–19. The issue also arose in a discussion with a senior Palestinian official. As he put it, the Palestinians would be in the same boat as Israel under a nuclear attack, so they fear the use of unconventional weapons on Israel as much as the Israelis do. Author interview with senior Palestinian official, October 24, 1995, Jerusalem.

97. The role of personal contacts in reducing threat perceptions of the "other" is often emphasized by American officials, particularly those who have had experience in U.S.-Soviet arms control. See, for example, Ambassador Lynn Hansen, "CSBMs: Ugly Duckling," pp. 51–66. Hansen observes that despite his initial skepticism, confidence-building measures carried an important psychological component critical to improving his relations with and perceptions of his Soviet counterparts (see esp. pp. 65–66).
98. Author interview with senior Israeli official, October 23, 1995, Jerusalem.
99. Author interview, August 6, 1996, Jerusalem.
100. Author interview with U.S. official, February 28, 1996, Washington, D.C.
101. Ibid.
102. For an elaboration of the status argument, see Jentleson and Kaye, "Security Status."
103. For an interesting elaboration on the sources of Egypt's identity and its struggle to define itself, see "Egypt as State, as Arab Mirror," chap. 2 in Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977).
104. Ron McLaurin, Lewis W. Snider, and Don Peretz, *Middle East Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 54.
105. Ajami, *Arab Predicament*, p. 80.
106. A. I. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy* (New York: Wiley, 1976), p. 136. For another discussion of the role of dignity and honor in Egyptian foreign policymaking and negotiation style, see Raymond Cohen, *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 118–22.
107. Dawisha, for example, argues that prestige played a role in Egypt's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, which was "not merely a response to the withdrawal of American aid, but also a function of decision-makers' perception of the manner in which it was done, which was deemed 'insulting to the dignity of Egypt,' " in *Egypt in the Arab World*, p. 137. Fawaz A. Gerges argues that the main reason for Nasser's military intervention in Yemen in 1962 was "to improve his position in the Arab world, and his international standing, after suffering the humiliating secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic (UAR)," in "The Kennedy Administration and the Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in

- Yemen: Co-Opting Arab Nationalism," *Middle East Journal*, 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 292.
108. For a comprehensive study of NWFZ proposals from an Egyptian perspective, see Mahmoud Karem, *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988) and "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: A Historical Overview of the Patterns of Involvement of the United Nations," in Rauf, *Regional Approaches*, pp. 55–68. Also see Mohamed Nabil Fahmy (a senior Egyptian official in the Foreign Ministry), "Egypt's Disarmament Initiative," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 46, no. 9: 9. For a comprehensive study on measures to facilitate the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, see *Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone In the Region of the Middle East*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, October 10, 1990, Forty-fifth session. For an assessment of the prospects for a WMDFZ in the Middle East in light of peace process developments, see Jan Prawitz and James F. Leonard, *A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996), esp. chap. 4, "The Middle East as a NWFZ or WMDFZ." On Egypt's position toward the NPT, see Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security," *Survival*, 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 126–41.
 109. While the Egyptians ultimately backed down and Prime Minister Peres issued some ambiguous statements on Israel's nuclear capabilities to diffuse tension, the nuclear issue remains the primary obstacle to progress in ACRS. See Jerusalem *Qol Yisra'el*, "Peres: 'Will Give Up the Atom' if Peace Achieved," December 22, 1995, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-247*, December 26, 1995, p. 51.
 110. For an example of a traditional security perspective of Egyptian national security policy (focusing largely on military power considerations), see Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Egypt," in E. Kolodziej and R. Harkavy, eds., *Security Policies of Developing Countries* (Lexington, Ky.: Lexington Books, 1982), pp. 179–202.
 111. For an elaboration of these systemic changes and their impact on regional security cooperation, see Jentleson and Kaye, "Security Status."
 112. These fears were reflected in the Arab press, particularly at the time of the first regional economic summit in Casablanca when discussions of Israeli hegemony, both economic and military, were widespread. See, for example, *Al-Sha'b*, "Labor Party Rejects Morocco Economic Conference," October 4, 1994, p. 3, cited in *FBIS-NES-94-197*, October 4, 1994 and *Al-Sha'b*, "Opposition Parties Denounce Casablanca Conference," October 28, 1994, p. 3, cited in *FBIS-NES-94-212*, October 28, 1994 (both located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>).
 113. Statement by Mohamed Hasanayn Heikal, quoted in Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 87.

114. Quoted from an interview with El-Baz in *Al Ahram Weekly*, June 15–21, 1995, p. 1.
115. *Al Ahram*, “Egypt’s Musa Comments on Nuclear Arms, Peace Issues,” January 24, 1996, p. 9, cited in *FBIS-NES*, January 30, 1996, p. 5.
116. Thomas L. Friedman, “Exodus Part II,” *New York Times*, February 15, 1995, p. A21.
117. Fouad Ajami, “The Sorrows of Egypt,” *Foreign Affairs*, 74, no. 5 (September/October 1995): 86–87.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
119. Ze’ev Schiff, “An Israeli Umbrella for the Gulf,” *Ha’aretz*, January 31, 1996, p. B1, News Analysis, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/dps96/960131s.dps>, Feb. 8, 1996.
120. “Egypt Mounts Defense of Its Regional Role,” *Mideast Mirror*, 11, no. 42, February 28, 1997, p. 9.
121. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 10.
122. William B. Quandt, “Egypt: A Strong Sense of National Identity,” in Hans Binnendijk, ed., *National Negotiating Styles* (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1987), p. 121.

Chapter 5

1. However, some analysts have demonstrated the limited effect of peace process developments on enhancing economic development in the region, which is more contingent on the respective national economic and social policies of the states within the region. See, for example, Eliyahu Kanovsky, *Assessing the Mideast Peace Economic Dividend* (Ramat Gan, Israel: The BESA Center, Bar-Ilan University, 1994) and Kanovsky, “The Middle East Economies: The Impact of Domestic and International Politics,” *Middle East Report of International Affairs* (MERIA), Journal 2, Article 1, June 1, 1997 <www.biu.ac.il/soc/besa/meria.html>.
2. This term is associated with notions of an integrated Middle East following the European Union model and was presented by Shimon Peres in his book, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993).
3. The full REDWG membership, in addition to the European Union gavelholder, includes: the four core regional parties (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority); other regional parties (Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen); extraregional parties (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,

- Ukraine, United Kingdom, the United States; and three nonstate actors (the European Commission, United Nations, and World Bank).
4. See David Makovsky and Allison Kaplan, "Israel to Boycott Multilateral Talks over Palestinians from Abroad," *Jerusalem Post*, May 8, 1992.
 5. See Jerusalem Israel Television Network in Hebrew, "Crisis over Participation in Multilateral Talks: EC Finds Levi Meeting 'Inconvenient,'" April 27, 1992, cited in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia* (hereafter *FBIS-NES*)-92-082, April 28, 1992, p. 27.
 6. See Makovsky and Kaplan, "Israel to Boycott Multilateral Talks."
 7. David Makovsky and Alisa Odenheimer, "US: Israel Likely to Boycott Multilaterals," *Jerusalem Post*, March 27, 1992.
 8. See Moshe Zak, "The Peril of Pseudo-UN Forums," *Jerusalem Post*, May 22, 1992.
 9. Peres's writings, particularly *The New Middle East*, are replete with references to economic development following the European model. Also see David Makovsky, "Mixed Feelings in Ministry About Peres Appointment," *Jerusalem Post*, July 13, 1992. As Makovsky notes, "Peres will seek to make the multilateral peace talks on regional issues an integral part of Mideast peace talks, and not a footnote. On the campaign trail, Peres always spoke about the need for an economic 'common market' in the Middle East, and therefore they [foreign ministry officials] expect he will tackle regional issues with gusto."
 10. See David Makovsky, "Foreign Ministry Boss Preparing Extensive Organizational Changes," *Jerusalem Post*, May 5, 1993.
 11. See David Makovsky, "Multilaterals Okayed as Moussa Brokers Deal," *Jerusalem Post*, October 9, 1992.
 12. "Mr. Rabin, Meet Mr. Peres," Opinion Section, *Jerusalem Post*, August 7, 1992.
 13. Asher Wallfish and Dan Izenberg, "Upbeat Baker Leaves Israel in Search of New Arab Ideas; Speaks of 'New Opportunity to Move Forward,'" *Jerusalem Post*, July 22, 1992.
 14. See Evelyn Gordan, "Israeli Delegation Leaves for Paris for Multilateral Economic Talks," *Jerusalem Report*, October 29, 1992.
 15. Jerusalem *Qol Yisra'el*, "Peres Briefs Cabinet on Multilateral Talks," November 8, 1992, cited in *FBIS-NES*-92-217, November 9, 1992, p. 33.
 16. Author interview with U.S. official, August 26, 1996, Jerusalem.
 17. However, the bank idea resurfaced and developed into a concrete initiative in the aftermath of Oslo, as discussed later in the chapter.
 18. See David Makovsky, "Mideast Reconstruction Bank Proposed at Paris Multilaterals," *Jerusalem Post*, October 30, 1992.
 19. *Jordan Times*, "Chief Delegate Interviewed on Multilateral Talks," November 5-6, 1992, p. 3, cited in *FBIS-NES*-92-216, November 6, 1992, pp. 43-44.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

21. For more on various projects proposed by the extraregionals, see "Chief Delegate Interviewed on Multilateral Talks," p. 44.
22. See the World Bank study, *Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace* (Washington, D.C., November 1993).
23. Quoted in David Makovsky, "Beilin: Israel Likely to Attend Talks in Tunisia," *Jerusalem Post*, June 1, 1993.
24. See "The Copenhagen Action Plan for Regional Economic Development," in *Mideast Mirror*, November 11, 1993, 7, no. 219. For an update of the Copenhagen Action Plan, see Joel Peters, *Pathways to Peace* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), appendix 5, pp. 97–101.
25. "Multilateral Peace Talks Working Group on Regional Economic Development, Copenhagen," November 9, 1993, in the *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/multi.16>. Also see *Jerusalem Israel Television Network*, Interview by Hayim Yavin and Ehud Ya'ari, "Savir Views Progress in Economic Multilaterals," November 9, 1993, cited in *FBIS-NES-93-216*, November 10, 1993, pp. 2–3.
26. The projects included feasibility studies and workshops on the following types of areas: improving regional highway infrastructure, railways and ports; linking electricity grids of Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, and Egypt; hydro-electric canal projects (with the Mediterranean-Dead Sea and the Red-Dead Sea Canals as possible alternatives); an Egypt-Gaza gas pipeline; tourism ventures; training banking personnel in the Palestinian Authority; regional conferences on financial markets; increased regional business contacts; and cooperative networks among universities and the media, including symposia on regional education. For details of the canal project proposals, see Government of Israel, *Development Options for Cooperation: The Middle East/East Mediterranean Region 1996* (Israel: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Finance, August 1995, Version 4), chap. 16.
27. The EC provided \$125 million in funding for one of the projects focused on protecting natural resources like desert plants. For an overview of these projects, see Cairo MENA (in Arabic), "Economic Development Committee Approves Projects," December 15, 1993, cited in *FBIS-NES-93-240*, December 16, 1993, p. 1.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
29. However, it was not until May 1996 that the MC Secretariat was formally inaugurated and institutionalized.
30. Amman Declaration, October 31, 1995. For the text of the declaration, see *FBIS-NES*, November 1, 1995, pp. 11–13. The full text is also reproduced in the *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/pce/amman.pce>.
31. Author interview with U.S. official, August 26, 1996, Jerusalem.

32. The Mediterranean participants are: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta.
33. This process created a forum for economic, political, and social cooperation between the EU members and the Mediterranean parties, including Israel and Syria. The participants agreed to a final declaration at the end of the conference, which outlined a series of political, social, and economic principles to guide regional relations. See "Barcelona Declaration Emphasizes Regional Peace and Security," Israel Line, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/isline95/951129.isl>, November 29, 1995, and "Barcelona Conference," cited in *FBIS-NES*, November 29, 1995, pp. 1–3. For extended excerpts from the Declaration, see *Mideast Mirror*, November 29, 1995, pp. 11–12. A second follow-up meeting in Malta on April 15–16, 1997, followed this conference. For more detailed accounts of the Barcelona conference and subsequent Euro-Med partnership, see: Cairo MENA, "Foreign Minister on Barcelona Summit, Issues," cited in *FBIS-NES*-95-227, November 25, 1995, pp. 18–20 and *FBIS-NES*-95-228, November 28, 1995, pp. 1–2, 47. For more general overviews of recent European initiatives in the Middle East/Mediterranean region, see François D'Alancón, "The EC Looks to a New Middle East," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 41–51 and Rosemary Hollis, "Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?" *International Affairs*, 73, no. 1 (January 1997): 15–29.
34. See David Makovsky, "Saudis to Establish Ties After Peace with Syria," *Jerusalem Post*, October 14, 1994, p. 3A.
35. See Peters, *Pathways to Peace*, p. 47.
36. Quoted in David Makovsky, "Hot Air Keeps Regions Talks Afloat but Moving in Circles," *Jerusalem Post*, July 15, 1994, p. 3B.
37. The idea for a regional economic forum focused on private sector investment apparently originated with a conversation between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and King Hassan of Morocco. Author interview with a senior U.S. official, May 8, 1996, Washington, D.C.
38. After its next plenary in Bonn on January 18–19, 1995, the full REDWG plenary met less often, with yearly rather than semiannual meetings. The plenary after Bonn met the following year in May 1996 in Amman. The next REDWG plenary was scheduled for June 1997 in Cyprus, but was postponed.
39. For further details on REDWG's structure and the role of the MC secretariat, see the REDWG concept paper, "REDWG: Establishment of a Permanent, Regional Economic Institution for the Middle East." By October 1995, the secretariat began issuing the *REDWG Update*, a bimonthly newsletter, to keep parties involved in REDWG activities informed of meetings and progress across its four sectors (infrastructure, tourism, trade, and finance). Four individuals representing each core party played a particularly critical role in furthering the

secretariat's work. It was not uncommon for the secretariat's executive secretary (from the European Commission) to speak to each of these individuals several times a day in efforts to coordinate activities and agendas. The secretariat also issued its first *Annual Report* for the REDWG plenary meeting in Amman in May 1996, which provided an overview of all its subcommittees' work from December 1994 to May 1996. The secretariat's offices opened on the sidelines of the REDWG plenary on May 7, 1996 in an Amman suburb.

40. Finance dealt with the MENABANK; Trade covered the RBC; and Tourism directed MEMTTA. The MC's infrastructure subcommittee prepared reports on all other projects that were not embodied in a regional institution. This interpretation of REDWG's relationship to the MENA summits is based on an author interview with an American official, August 26, 1996, Jerusalem.
41. According to one account, Peres raised the idea as early as October 1993—in the wake of the Oslo Accord—in secret discussions with the Jordanians, whom he wanted to host the conference. However, given that Jordan had not yet signed a peace treaty with Israel, Peres turned to King Hassan of Morocco, who agreed to be the host. Peres wanted to have an Arab country host the summit to emphasize Arab acceptance of Israel in the region. Author interview with senior Jordanian official, August 19, 1996, Amman.
42. See Craig R. Whitney, "Hobnobbing at Very High Levels; Political and Corporate Elite Pay Handsomely at Davos," *New York Times*, January 28, 1997, p. C1.
43. Secretary Christopher, "Building the Structures of Peace and Prosperity in the New Middle East," Remarks at the Royal Palace, Casablanca, Morocco, October 30, 1994, issued by U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication.
44. See Statement by the Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf on the Cancellation by the GCC of the Secondary/Tertiary Arab Boycott of Israel, October 1, 1994. Reproduced in the *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/pce/941001.pce>, October 2, 1994. In the statement, the GCC notes the bilateral progress made on the Palestinian and Jordanian tracks, arguing that "for all practical purposes, secondary and tertiary boycotts are no longer a threat to the interests of these partners [the GCC's trading partners]."
45. Some parties, notably the Israelis, issued project books for widespread distribution. See Government of Israel, *Development Options for Regional Cooperation*, Submitted to the Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit, October, 1994.
46. See, for example, Government of Israel, *Development Options for Regional Cooperation*, p. II-3. The breakdown of the Israeli proposed financing, totaling between \$18 and \$27 billion, was as follows (in billions of dollars): water, 4–6; agriculture, 1–1.5; combating desertification, 1; tourism, 2–2.5;

- transportation, 3–4; energy, 3–6; communication, 1; environment, 0.5–1; industry, 0.5–1; and canal projects, 2–3.
47. “The Economic Summit Conference for the Middle East and North Africa, Casablanca, October 30–November 1, 1994: From Peace-Making to Peace-Strengthening,” *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/pce/941017.pce>, October 18, 1994.
 48. On this point, also see Oded Granot, “The Interconnection Between Statecraft and Economics,” *Ma’ariv*, October 28, 1994, p. 5. Reproduced in *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/dps/941028g.dps>, November 1, 1994.
 49. See “Eight Ministers Led by Peres and 130 Businessmen Head for Casablanca,” *Mideast Mirror*, 8, no. 209, October 28, 1994, pp. 2–14.
 50. As a senior IDF intelligence official explained, Israel “revealed its full economic potential and made a negative impression on Arabs” at Casablanca. Quoted in Ora Koren, “Lowering Their Profile Because of Jerusalem,” *Globes*, May 15, 1995, pp. 49–50.
 51. Address by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca, October 30, 1994. Reproduced in *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/speech/sta/94103or.sta>, November 1, 1994.
 52. Quoted in Koren, “Lowering Their Profile,” pp. 49–50.
 53. Casablanca Declaration, Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit, October 30–November 1, 1994 (State Department Copy). A full text of the Declaration was also printed in *Middle East Executive Reports*, 17, no. 11 (November 1994), p. 23.
 54. Casablanca Declaration, October 30–November 1, 1994.
 55. For further details about the MENA Summit Executive Secretariat and documents related to the MENA process, see the Secretariat’s home page on the World Wide Web: <<http://www.mena.org/newweb/general.html>>.
 56. See John Lancaster, “Beating Swords into Shares in the Future: Mideast Economic Summit Opens on Hopeful Note Despite Lingering Arab Concerns,” *Washington Post*, October 30, 1995, p. A12. For a complete list of all government and private sector participants attending the Amman summit, see the home page of the Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit Executive Secretariat, MENAnet: <<http://www.mena.org/newweb/general.html>>.
 57. Israel limited its delegation to one hundred individuals, with forty officials and sixty private sector representatives. See David Makovsky, “Beilin: Nation to Take a ‘Lower Profile’ at Summit,” *Jerusalem Post*, October 26, 1995, p. 12, in FBIS-NES-95–208, October 27, 1995, pp. 35–36.
 58. See, for instance, London *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, “Summit Seen as Attempt to Strengthen Israel,” October 30, 1995, p. 11, cited in FBIS-NES-261, November

1, 1995, p. 14 and "Amman Summit Aimed to Achieve Israeli 'Hegemony,'" cited in *FBIS-NES*, November 2, 1995, p. 51. For an excellent analysis of the Arab perception of Israeli hegemony, see Ze'ev Schiff, "The Arabs, In Their Own Eyes," *Ha'aretz*, February 1, 1995, p. B1. However, some Arab officials concede that the hegemony rhetoric is based more on the perception among the Arab public of the slow pace of economic development and their frustration with it than on hard economic facts, given the general consensus that Israel has little interest in dominating the Arab world economically or politically. One Jordanian official explained that the hegemony rhetoric was part of the "old literature" and a "silly concept." Author interview, August 19, 1996, Amman. In an interview on the eve of the Amman Summit, an Egyptian businessman brushed aside assertions of the Israeli desire for hegemony, arguing that Egypt has nothing to fear from Israeli economic competition and that Israel itself would be hesitant to integrate itself with an Arab state for fear of losing its own national identity. See interview by Ghada Ragab with Egyptian businessman Sherif Delawer, "Modest Goals, not Grand Designs," *Al Ahram Weekly*, October 12–18, 1995.

59. See "Government, Professional Associations Locked in Bitter Struggle About Normalization, Politicization," *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives*, no. 21 (Washington, D.C.: Jordan Information Bureau, September/October 1995), p. 12.
60. For an American overview of the Amman Summit, including its themes and agenda, see "Amman Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit," Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, October 25, 1995.
61. "Amman Economic Summit Seen as Milestone on Road to Achieving Economic Promise of Peace," *Jordan: Issues and Perspectives*, no. 21, p. 1.
62. "Modest Goals, not Grand Designs," p. 4.
63. Government of Jordan, *Building a Prosperous Peace, Amman '95, October 29–31, 1995* (Amman, Jordan: International Press Office, The Royal Hashemite Court, 1995), section 6, "Logistics."
64. The second Israeli volume prepared for the Amman Summit includes regional project proposals (none of which target Israel alone) for several subregions (the Jordan Rift Valley, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Southeast Mediterranean) as well as across a variety of economic sectors (water, agriculture, desertification, tourism, regional parks, transportation, energy, telecommunications, trade and industry, human resources, public health, environment, and canals). For detailed analysis of these numerous project proposals, see Government of Israel, *Development Options for Cooperation, 1996* (Version 4, August 1995).
65. See Government of Jordan, *Building a Prosperous Peace*, esp. section 4, "Jordan's MENA Conference Priority Projects," for a detailed review of the project proposals for the Amman summit. The proposals cover the following sectors:

- energy, environment, minerals and industry, transport, telecommunications, tourism, water.
66. Moreover, like most other parties at the MENA summits, Jordan encouraged its private sector to actively participate in the conference and offer its own initiatives to augment the official conference proposals, arguing that “the most important contacts will be far more numerous and on a smaller scale—in closed meeting rooms away from the public eye, between Jordanian businessmen and interested investors.” See Government of Jordan, *Building a Prosperous Peace*, section 3.
 67. Address by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the Amman Economic Summit, Amman, Jordan, October 29, 1995. Reproduced in *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/speech/sta/951029.sta>, October 29, 1995.
 68. For a Palestinian perspective on economic developments, see the press conference at the Amman Summit with Nabil Sha’th, *Amman Jordan Television Network*, October 31, 1995, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-211*, November 1, 1995, pp. 1–4.
 69. For a response to the publicity received by his remarks, see interview with Foreign Minister Moussa, *Cairo MENA*, October 31, 1995, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-210*, October 31, 1995, p. 39. For further clarification by Moussa on his statement, see *Cairo MENA*, “Musa Comments on Outcome of Amman Conference; Clarifies Reference to ‘Rushing,’ ” November 1, 1995, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-211*, November 1, 1995, pp. 41–42.
 70. See Lancaster, “Beating Swords Into Shares.”
 71. Ultimately, a compromise was reached whereby the parties agreed Egypt would host the 1996 conference, while Qatar would host the fourth summit in 1997. See *Amman Jordan Television Network*, “King Husayn Reconciles Qatari, Egyptian stands,” October 31, 1995, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-211*, November 1, 1995, p. 8.
 72. Quoted in John Lancaster, “Arabs, Israelis Talking Business at the 2nd Summit,” *Washington Post*, November 1, 1995, p. A21.
 73. Among the more visible deals emerging from Amman was the Israeli-Qatari natural gas agreement worth \$4.5–5 billion (via an American corporation, Enron), which would be the first time Israel purchased gas from a Gulf country. The gas project called for the building of a gas terminal, possibly in Jordan’s Aqaba port, which would receive liquefied natural gas exported on tankers from the Enron plant in Qatar, which could then be transported over land to Israel (and also meet natural gas demands in Jordan and the Palestinian territories). See *Amman Jordan Times*, “Further on Gas Memorandum,” November 1, 1995, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-212*, November 2, 1995, pp. 11–12. Also see “Qatar to Enter Into Natural Gas Deal With Israel,” Israel Line on *Israel*

Information Service <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/isline95/951025.isl>, October 25, 1995. In addition to the natural gas deal, the Israeli potash company agreed to extract bromine from the Dead Sea in a joint project with Jordan. See Tova Cohen, "Israel Sees Regional Acceptance, Trade as Reality," *The Reuters European Business Report*, October 31, 1995. Other economic ventures resulting from the summit included: textile and garment cooperation projects between Israeli and Jordanian companies; energy-related cooperation between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority; a \$2 million U.S.-financed study on laying a Jordan-Palestinian-Israeli fiber optics network to serve a Middle East "information highway"; a \$250 million fund announced by Qatar for the Palestinian territories. For more details on the outcome of the Amman Summit, see *Amman Jordan Times*, "Roundup of Amman Summit Accomplishments," November 4, 1995, pp. 1, 7, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-215*, November 7, 1995, pp. 45-47.

74. See "Planning for the Region," *Al Ahram Weekly*, February 1-7, 1996 and Tel Aviv *Davar Rishon* (in Hebrew), "Arab-Israeli Regional Economic Planning Talks Held in Holland," January 31, 1996, p. 2, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-021*, January 31, 1996, p. 8. The four regional ministers leading high-level delegations were: Egyptian Economic Minister Nawal Tatawi; Jordanian Planning Minister Rima Khalaf; Palestinian Minister of International Cooperation Nabil Shaath; and the Israeli Minister in charge of peace process affairs, Yossi Beilin.
75. See, for example, *Al Riyadh Al-Jazirah*, "Daily Criticizes Amman Economic Summit," October 30, 1995, p. 33, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-215*, November 7, 1995, pp. 30-31; *Al Quds Al-Arabi*, "Summit Seen as Attempt to Strengthen Israel," October 30, 1995, p. 11, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-211*, November 1, 1995, p. 14; *Al-Ba'th*, "Amman Summit Aimed to Achieve Israeli 'Hegemony,'" October 31, 1995, p. 3, cited in *FBIS-NES-95-212*, November 2, 1995, pp. 51.
76. Quoted from an editorial in the Saudi newspaper *al-Medina* by John Lancaster, "Arabs, Israelis Talking Business at the 2nd Summit," *Washington Post*, November 1, 1995, p. A21.
77. See "Cairo Threatens to Cancel the Party," *Middle East Economic Digest*, September 6, 1996, p. 6, and David Makovsky, "Mubarak Threatens Cancellation of Summit," *Jerusalem Post*, August 23, 1996, p. 1.
78. On Israeli reactions, see Summary of Editorials from the Hebrew Press, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/eds96/961104.eds>, November 4, 1996 and Avraham Tal, "Who Needs the Cairo Conference?" *Ha' Aretz*, August 12, 1996, p. B1. For Arab views, see "Cairo Struggles to Defend 'Normalization' Conference," *Mideast Mirror*, November 6, 1996, pp. 12-17, "Whatever Happened to Arab Linkage Between Normalization and Peace?" *Mideast Mirror*, November 12, 1996, pp. 9-13, and a debate

- between two Egyptian academics on the summit in *Mideast Mirror*, October 29, 1996, pp. 10–12.
79. “Cairo Threatens to Cancel the Party,” p. 6.
 80. Cairo ESC Television (in Arabic), “Egypt: Mubarak on Washington Summit, Economic Conference, Drill,” October 6, 1996, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-195*, October 6, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>. Also see, “Mubarak: Economic Summit to Proceed on Schedule,” Israel Line, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/isline96/961002.isl>, October 2, 1996; “Egypt to Hold Regional Summit,” *Washington Post*, September 13, 1996, p. A36; and Cairo Arab Republic of Egypt Radio Network (in Arabic), “Egypt: Mubarak on European Role in Peace Process, Arab Summit,” cited in *FBIS-NES-96-204*, October 21, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
 81. See “The Sinking Palestinian Economy,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1996, p. A24. While Israeli closures of the territories in the wake of terrorist activity are most associated with the plight of the Palestinian economy, other factors (particularly internal inefficiencies) have also contributed to the drastic economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza. See U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce Stuart E. Eizenstat, “Special Policy Forum Report.” For a Palestinian view, see *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, “Palestinian Affairs: Economy Minister Laments Falling Investments,” September 24, 1996, p. 12, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-188*, September 24, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
 82. See Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Jordan Business to Shy from Israel Ties in Summit,” *Reuters*, October 30, 1996.
 83. Jordanian officials and businessmen who had been involved with organizing the Amman summit were also widely displeased with Egypt’s handling of the conference, complaining that the Egyptians were shutting the Jordanians out of the planning process, and were focusing on promoting the Egyptian economy more than promoting a regional agenda. Author interview with senior Jordanian official, August 19, 1996, Amman.
 84. See Cairo Arab Republic of Egypt Radio Network (in Arabic), “Mubarak Addresses Parliamentary Session,” cited in *FBIS-NES-96-220*, November 10, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
 85. Two types of infrastructure projects were developed: 1) sectoral programs, including the Middle East Regional Transport Study and the Integration of Regional Electricity Grids; and 2) geographic-specific projects, including the Taba-Eilat-Aqaba region (TEAM), the South Eastern Mediterranean coastal region from El Arish in Egypt’s Northern Sinai through Palestinian Gaza to Israeli Ashdod (SEMED), and the Jordan Rift Valley region (JRV), which

includes Lake Tiberias, the Dead Sea, Southern Ghors, Wadi Araba, and the Northern Red Sea shore. For details, see REDWG Monitoring Committee Secretariat's *Annual Report*, December 1994–May 1996, pp. 19–22. These sub-regions served as the principal focus areas of Israel's project book for the conference, which outlined the following types of proposals: the interconnection of electricity grids between Egypt, the PA, and Israel; a natural gas pipeline from Egypt to Israel, Jordan, and the PA; an East Mediterranean Riviera; a Red Sea Riviera; several joint tourism projects; a Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal; a JRV telecommunications superhighway; and joint water conservation and development projects. See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Programs for Regional Cooperation*, 1997, reproduced on the World Wide Web <<http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/peace/projects/intro.html>>. For more on the Riviera idea, see Serge Schmemmann, "The Middle East Riviera That Isn't—Not Yet," *New York Times*, November 5, 1995, p. D2.

86. For the complete text of Egypt's project proposals, see the web site: <<http://www.cairo96.gov.eg>>. For Jordanian project proposals, see "New Realism Is Hallmark of Wish List," *Middle East Economic Digest*, November 15, 1996, pp. 17–18.
87. "Star Scheme to Link Egypt and Israel," *Middle East Economic Digest*, November 15, 1996, pp. 12–13.
88. Interview with Raouf Sa'ad by Ghadah Rajab in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 17–23, 1996, p. 4, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-210*, October 23, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
89. Author interview with State Department official, May 15, 1997, Washington, D.C.
90. Thomas L. Friedman, "Pyramid Power," *New York Times*, November 13, 1996, p. A23.
91. For the full text of President Mubarak's address to the conference, see *FBIS-NES-96-219*, November 12, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>. Other speeches by high-level political representatives are also included in this *FBIS* volume, including addresses by Klaus Schwab, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, Palestinian Minister of Finance Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi, and Jordanian Minister of Industry and Trade 'Ali Abul-Raghib.
92. See "Levy Meets with Egyptian, Qatari, European and American Counterparts," *Israel Information Service* <<gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/is-line96/961113.isl>>, November 13, 1996.
93. See "Mideast Conference Ends, Links Prosperity and Peace," *Reuters*, November 14, 1996.
94. See Ora Qoren, "Israelis Note 'Radical Change' in Business Ties to Egypt,

- Globes*, December 12, 1996, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-241*, December 12, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
95. David Lipkin and Ya'el Karmi-Daniyeli, "Egyptian-Turkish Gas Deal Seen as Result of Israel Stalling," *Ma'Ariv*, November 14, 1996, p. 7, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-221*, November 14, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>. For more on the Egyptian-Turkish gas deal, see "Gas Deal Sidelines Israel at Mideast Conference," *Reuters*, November 13, 1996.
 96. "Mideast Conference Ends, Links Prosperity and Peace."
 97. For the full text of the final Cairo communiqué, see *FBIS-NES-96-222*, November 14, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
 98. The fourth MENA summit convened in Doha, Qatar, from November 16–18, 1997. Despite tremendous pressure from the Syrians and other Arab states to cancel or at least postpone the summit given the political crisis on the Israeli-Palestinian track, the Qataris were determined to proceed. Washington firmly backed Qatar's position, and hosted a number of planning meetings in Washington, D.C. However, the decision by key states like Saudi Arabia and particularly Egypt to boycott the Doha summit (announced on the eve of the conference) proved a major setback to the process. For the Arab debate over Qatar's decision to move ahead with the summit, see: "Qatar Gears Up to Host 4th Mideast Economic Summit," *Mideast Mirror*, May 30, 1997, pp. 7–8; "The Gulf States and Normalization with Israel—How Far and How Fast?" *Mideast Mirror*, June 17, 1997, pp. 7–10; "Qatar Shoots for Islamic Summit," *Mideast Mirror*, July 28, 1997, pp. 7–8; "Syria's Regional Diplomacy: Right Substance, Wrong Style," *Mideast Mirror*, July 25, 1997, pp. 7–10; "The Make-or-Break Doha Summit," *Mideast Mirror*, July 23, 1997, pp. 8–10; Douglas Jehl, "Arabs Cool to Meeting with Israel to Improve Ties," *New York Times*, July 11, 1997, p. A3; "Moving Toward Regional Entente?," *Mideast Mirror*, July 2, 1997, pp. 10–11. On Egypt's decision to boycott Doha, see John Lancaster, "Cairo Snubs U.S.-Backed Trade Talks," *Washington Post*, November 12, 1997, p. A1.
 99. The Council on Foreign Relations sponsored one such meeting in June 1999, for example. See Council on Foreign Relations, *Calendar and Chronicle* (August 1999).
 100. Several significant studies on regional trade potential were conducted under REDWG's initiative, including: a German study, *New Potentials for Cooperation and Trade in the Middle East* (IFO); *Trade for Peace in the New Middle East: Measures to Enhance Trade between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories* (Cairo: Arab-German Chamber of Commerce, October 1995); and Washington's *Market Access Study: Approved by the Taba Trade*

Leaders, (Amman, Jordan, October 30, 1995). The first two studies were distributed at the Amman Economic summit in October 1995.

101. Casablanca Declaration, October 30–November 1, 1994.
102. See Jose Rosenfeld and Jon Immanuel, “Shaath: Closure Must End Before We Can Discuss Economic Cooperation,” *Jerusalem Post*, February 8, 1995, p. 2.
103. See Israel Line, April 18, 1995 <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/isline95/950418.isl> and Economic Survey, August 9, 1995 <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/econ/ecs/1995/950809.ecs>, both reproduced in *Israel Information Service*.
104. REDWG MC Secretariat, *Annual Report*, p. 33.
105. Author interview with State Department official, May 15, 1997, Washington, D.C.
106. STIMENA’s report is titled *Trade Relations Among the Core Parties and With Key Third Parties*.
107. MEMTTA focused its activities on gaining the interest and confidence of private sector companies in three critical regions: the Americas, Europe, and the Asia/Pacific area. See U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, “Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism.”
108. Casablanca Declaration, October 30–November 1, 1994.
109. U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, “Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association.”
110. Carla Hunt, “Areas Team Up to Promote Peace,” *Travel Weekly’s Guide to the Middle East/Mediterranean*, March 7, 1997.
111. Author interview with State Department official, May 15, 1997, Washington, D.C.
112. For a more detailed analysis of the birth and development of the bank, see Dalia Dassa Kaye, *Banking on Peace: Lessons from the Middle East Development Bank*, Policy Paper No. 43 (San Diego, Calif.: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October 1998).
113. See, for example, Robert R. Nathan and Jerome I. Levinson, “A Development Fund for the Near East,” in Joyce R. Starr with Addeane S. Caellegh, *A Shared Destiny: Near East Regional Development and Cooperation* (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 103–13.
114. James A. Baker III (with Thomas M. DeFrank), *The Politics of Diplomacy* (New York: Putnam, 1995), p. 413.
115. See Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “CSCME: Prospects for Collective Security in the Middle East,” One Hundred Third Congress, First Session, October 14, 1993. Crown Prince Hassan’s plan is printed in the appendix, pp. 68–82. See also an address delivered by Crown Prince El Hassan Bin Talal at the International Symposium, “Looking Beyond

- the Gulf War: A Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East," Prague, March 16, 1991.
116. Peres, *New Middle East*, p. 111.
 117. See Said El-Naggar and Mohamed El-Erian, "The Economic Implications of a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East," in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., *The Economics of Middle East Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 219–220. For another argument outlining the economic and financial rationale for the MENABANK, see Wafik Grais and Lorenzo Savorelli, "Economic and Financial Rationale for a New International Financial Institution for the Middle East and North Africa," June 1, 1998, on the MENABANK web site: <<http://www.menabank.org>>.
 118. Author interview with an Israeli official, October 23, 1995, Jerusalem.
 119. David Makovsky, "US Not Backing Peres' Bank Plan," *Jerusalem Post*, October 11, 1994, p. 2.
 120. See "Casablanca Parley Closes with Promise of 'New Partnership,'" *Mideast Mirror*, 8, no. 211, November 1, 1994, pp. 9–15.
 121. Author interview with Israeli official, October 23, 1995, Jerusalem.
 122. This work resulted in a joint "vision paper" offered by the core parties for consideration at Casablanca. The vision paper argued forcefully for the need to establish a regional bank, in order for the parties to "function effectively as a region," and to "create a viable and dynamic regional economic development programme in the region." See "Middle East Development Bank (MEDB): A Policy Position Paper," drafted by the regional parties in REDWG's Monitoring Committee (MC), Finance Subcommittee before the Casablanca Summit.
 123. It is not clear how the idea of the bank reached President Clinton, although there is speculation that Peres personally raised the proposal with him. Author interviews with senior U.S. officials, May 8, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 124. Casablanca Declaration, Section 9, Part (a).
 125. "Shared Prosperity in the Middle East: Toward a Regional Development Bank," Remarks by Lawrence H. Summers, Treasury Undersecretary for International Affairs, at the Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit, Casablanca, Morocco, October 31, 1994. See "Casablanca Parley Closes with Promise of 'New Partnership,'" *Mideast Mirror*, 8, no. 211, November 1, 1994, p. 12.
 126. Not all European Union member states opposed the bank, although the opposition of key states like France and Germany was significant. Moreover, the European Commission supported the proposal, and its representative who headed the MC Secretariat assisted the regional parties in advancing the institution.
 127. See "Casablanca Parley Closes with Promise of 'New Partnership,'" p. 12.
 128. For details of these projects, see Ambassador David J. Dunford, "MENABANK:

- Would U.S. Membership Help the Peace Process?" *Peacewatch*, no. 159 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 20, 1998).
129. See, for example, "Can the Middle East Bank on Bibi?" *U.S. News and World Report*, July 15, 1996, p. 20.
 130. Author interview with senior Israeli official, August 25, 1996, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem.
 131. The final Cairo conference communiqué included the following statement in reference to the bank: "They [the participants at Cairo] underscored the importance of the bank for economic cooperation and development in the Middle East and North Africa in Cairo and its potential contribution to the promotion of capital flow to the region, to building infrastructure projects, and to the development of the private sector in the region. The conclusion of the drafting of the agreement establishing the bank was welcomed. Countries were encouraged to sign the agreement and complete their funding and ratification procedures promptly in order to enable the bank to begin operations in 1997." For the full text of the communiqué, see *FBIS-NES-96-222*, November 14, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
 132. The United States holds 21 percent of the shares, which constitutes a \$52.5 million annual commitment for a five-year period. See Testimony of Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, April 18, 1996.
 133. For the debate over the conference and normalization, see "Cairo Struggles to Defend 'Normalization' Conference," *Mideast Mirror*, November 6, 1996, pp. 12–17, and *Mideast Mirror*, October 29, 1996, pp. 10–12 for pro-conference and anti-conference views from two Egyptian academics.
 134. See, for example, Fahmi Howeidi's editorial in *Asharq al-Aswat* in *Mideast Mirror*, November 11, 1996, pp. 9–11.
 135. Arab oil revenues, for example, declined from a peak of \$213 billion in 1980 to a low of \$53 billion in 1986. See Ishac Diwan and Nick Papandreou, "The Peace Process and Economic Reforms in the Middle East," in Fischer, Rodrik, and Tuma, *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, p. 223.
 136. From 1985 to 1995, the Middle Eastern economy contracted more rapidly than any other region's, including sub-Saharan Africa. See John Page, "Economic Prospects and the Role of Regional Development Finance Institutions" in *Regional Economic Development in the Middle East: Opportunities and Risks* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1995), p. 5. For an excellent overview of Middle Eastern economies and recent trends, see Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996). Also see the World Bank study,

- Claiming the Future: Choosing Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1995). For a comparative study of the impact of economic institutions in both labor- and oil-exporting Middle East states, see Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
137. For example, while 60 percent of global direct foreign investment goes to Asia, only 3 percent of the world flow reaches the Middle East. See Page, "Economic Prospects," p. 13.
 138. A popular symbol of this phenomenon has been the spread of McDonald's across the globe. The McDonald's example as a symbol of growing globalization effects on the Middle East and elsewhere was popularized by *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman in his so-called Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention. According to this tongue-in-cheek spin-off of democratic peace theory, "No two countries that both have a McDonald's have ever fought a war against each other." See Thomas L. Friedman, "Foreign Affairs Big Mac I," *New York Times*, December 8, 1996, p. 15. For another discussion of the impact of globalization on the Middle East, including its challenge to cultural identities, see Martin Kramer, "The Middle East, Old and New," *Daedalus* 126, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 89–112.
 139. Page, "Economic Prospects," p. 8.
 140. Whitney, "Hobnobbing at Very High Levels," pp. C1, C21.
 141. David Butter, "Reform Ready Economy for Real Growth," *Middle East Economic Digest*, 40, no. 16, April 19, 1996, pp. 25–26.
 142. Cairo ESC Television (in Arabic), "Mubarak Addresses Economic Conference," November 12, 1996, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-219*, November 12, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
 143. For an overview of the changing nature of the Israeli economy with respect to privatization and greater integration into the global economy, see Benjamin Gaon (of Koor Industries), "Israel and the Future of Middle East Economic Development," in *Peace Through Entrepreneurship: Practical Ideas from Middle Eastern Business Leaders* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 1994), pp. 9–13.
 144. Rami G. Khouri, "Voting with Our Stomachs: McDonald's, Markets, Culture and Sovereignty," *Jordan Times*, November 12, 1996, in *Mideast Mirror*, November 12, 1996, p. 15–16.
 145. For a review of the secret but limited Arab-Israeli trade record since the 1980s, see Ephraim Kleiman, "Is There a Secret Arab-Israeli Trade?" *Middle East Quarterly* (June 1998): 11–18.
 146. For a general analysis of the role of multilateral development banks that makes

such an argument, see Dani Rodrik, *Why Is There Multilateral Lending?*, International Macroeconomics and International Trade, Discussion Paper Series, No. 1207 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, July 1995).

147. See Serge Schmemmann, "Shalom (and Salaam) as Tourist Lure," *New York Times*, January 24, 1997, p. A6.

Chapter 6

1. For an overview of the water scarcity problem in the wider Middle East and North Africa region, see "Special Report Water" in *Middle East Economic Digest* (MEED), January 24, 1997, pp. 7–12. For a discussion of the scarcity issue in the Israeli-Palestinian context, including the River Jordan basin, see Alwyn R. Rouyer, "The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process," *Survival*, 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 57–81.
2. On epistemic communities, see Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization*, 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 1–35.
3. Examples include: Miriam R. Lowi, *Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jeffrey K. Soslund, *Cooperating Rivals: The Politics of Water Scarcity, Protracted Conflict, and Complex Cooperation in the Jordan River Basin* (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1998); Thomas Naff and Ruth Matson, eds., *Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Joyce Starr and Daniel Stoll, eds., *The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); Joyce Starr, "Water Wars," *Foreign Policy*, 82 (Spring 1991): 17–36; Natasha Beschoner, *Water and Instability in the Middle East*, Adelphi Paper 273 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1992/93); and Amikam Nachmani, "The Politics of Water in the Middle East," in Efraim Inbar, ed., *Regional Security Regimes* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 231–51.
4. For example, an Israeli position paper on the Environment and the Peace Process argued, "Among the issues being discussed at the multilateral talks, the environment is the least controversial. It does not deal with territorial problems, does not pose questions of national sovereignty, nor does it involve competition over limited resources. It serves objectives which enjoy almost complete consensus of opinion, that will produce common benefits and prevent mutual harm." In Dror Amir, "The Environment and the Peace Process," *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/govmin/envir/950100.evp>, January 1995.
5. Still, some issues—like making water data available—proved sensitive among

- the Jordan River basin riparians, particularly the Israelis, who were cautious about how such data would prejudice bilateral negotiations with the Palestinians and the Jordanians.
6. After the water rights issue nearly scuttled the water talks at the Geneva plenary in April 1993, the Israelis and Palestinians reached an agreement at their bilateral negotiations in Washington to set up a special bilateral working group to deal solely with the issue of water sharing and rights in the Palestinian territories. See David Makovsky, "Katz-Oz 'Not Disappointed' by Water Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, May 4, 1993.
 7. According to a U.S. official involved in these discussions, Oman came up with the idea to launch a desalination project on its own, an initiative that was enthusiastically embraced by Washington. Author interview with State Department official, August 22, 1995, Washington, D.C.
 8. Author interview with State Department official, July 11, 1996, Washington, D.C.
 9. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan Delegation to Middle East Multilateral Peace Talks, The Environment Working Group, Tokyo, May 18–19, 1992, Position Paper.
 10. This cautious attitude was expressed at the first plenary meeting in Tokyo in May 1992 when, according to one report, the Palestinian members of the delegation "anxiously rushed from the conference room after the meeting's conclusion." The report also noted that the delegation of Palestinian environmental experts left the meeting several times to consult with a senior PLO official waiting outside the conference room. See Laura Stern, "Environment Talks Hailed as Success," *Jerusalem Post*, May 20, 1992.
 11. Ibid.
 12. While Japan chaired the Environment group, Japanese and American officials worked closely together. Author interview with U.S. official, August 22, 1995, Washington, D.C.
 13. See Liat Collins, "First Face-to-Face Arab-Israel Meeting in Environment Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, October 23, 1992.
 14. For a description of this project and others related to the environment, see "The Environment in the Peace Process: The Multilateral Track," *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/950301.mul>, February 1995.
 15. Ibid.
 16. Ibid.
 17. Author interview with State Department official, August 21, 1995, Washington, D.C.
 18. See Youssef Azmeh, "Oman Leads the Arab World in Contacts with Israel," *Jerusalem Post*, April 19, 1994, p. 4; Liat Collins, "Omani Sands Are Shifting

Toward Israel,” *Jerusalem Post*, May 4, 1994, p. 8; and Press Conference with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Yossi Beilin (upon his return from Oman), Jerusalem, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/940421.mul>, April 21, 1994.

19. For a summary of the meeting's achievements, see the Statement of the Gavelholder (the United States), “Middle East Peace Process Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources, Muscat, Oman, April 17–19, 1994,” Near East Affairs home page, U.S. State Department web site: <<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/ppmwg5.html>>. Other gavelholder summaries of working group plenaries can be located from the Near East Affairs home page.
20. For example, in a development that mirrors the evolution of the REDWG MC, a smaller steering group emerged to better direct the agenda and projects of the working group, demonstrating greater regional initiative in shaping the development of the group. The steering group includes: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Tunisia from the region; and Germany, Norway, Russia, Japan, Canada, Italy, the European Union, and the United States from outside the region.
21. For example, at the June 1995 Water plenary in Amman, Jordan, the following pledges were made for regional projects: \$2.5 million from the United States and EU for a data bank for the Palestinians; \$3 million from Austria for brackish water irrigation; \$7 million from the Netherlands to build a dam for the Gaza Strip's aquifer; \$3 million each from the United States and Oman for a regional desalination center; and \$5 million each from the United States, Japan, and Israel to treat waste water in small communities, reduce water loss in cities, and desalinate brackish water. See AP story reprinted in *Jerusalem Post*, June 23, 1995, p. 2; Mohammed Hasni, “US, EU Offer 2.5 Million Dollars for Data Bank on Mideast Water,” *Agence France Presse*, June 22, 1995; and “Multilateral Working Group on Water Decides on Regional Projects,” Communication by the Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesman, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/950623.mul>, June 23, 1995.
22. For detailed project proposals presented at the MENA summits, see Government of Israel, *Development Options for Cooperation: The Middle East/East Mediterranean Region*, 1996 (Version IV, August 1995) and *Building a Prosperous Peace*, Jordanian project book prepared for the Middle East and North Africa Summit, October 29–31, 1995 (Amman, Jordan: International Press Office, The Royal Hashemite Court, 1995). Also see “Amman Eager to Know Where Israel Stands on ‘Red-Dead’ Canal and ‘Med-Dead’ Plan,” *Mideast Mirror*, 8, no. 123, June 29, 1994, pp. 9–11.
23. Details of the working group's progress in each of these areas is outlined in the Gavelholder's Summary (U.S.), Working Group on Water Resources, Hammamet, Tunisia, May 15–16, 1996.

24. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Middle East Regional Study on Water Supply and Demand Development (March 1995).
25. Author interview with Israeli Foreign Ministry official, August 27, 1996, Jerusalem.
26. See the Desalination Center's Newsletter, *Watermark*, Volume One, Issue One (July 1996).
27. See "Regional Center for Research in Desalination," *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/961222.mul>, December 23, 1996.
28. Excerpted from Text of Ambassador Frances D. Cook's Statement on the Occasion of the Signing of the Establishment Agreement for the Middle East Desalination Research Center in Muscat, December 22, 1996.
29. See Jerusalem *Qol Yisra'el* (in Hebrew), "Arab-Israeli Talks: Israel, Jordan, PA Sign Regional Water Document," February 13, 1996, cited in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia* (hereafter *FBIS-NES*)-96-031, February 14, 1996, p. 8.
30. See Liat Collins, "Delegation Leaves for Bahrain Environment Talks," *Jerusalem Post*, October 24, 1994, p. 2.
31. For a summary of the results of this meeting, see the Press Statement by the Gavelholder, "Middle East Peace Process, Multilateral Working Group on the Environment, Manama, Bahrain, October 25-26, 1994," reproduced by the U.S. State Department Office of Near East Affairs, <<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/ppmwg4.html>>.
32. According to Israeli reports, Foreign Ministry officials were initially opposed to Sarid's attendance at the plenary session because they were reluctant to raise the multilateral talks to the ministerial level, believing that its low-key format facilitated progress. See Liat Collins, "Israeli Officials Leave for Bahrain," *Jerusalem Post*, September 28, 1994, p. 2.
33. According to a State Department official involved in the talks, the postponement of the plenary session was due to logistical, not substantive, reasons. Author interview, July 11, 1996, Washington, D.C. In any case, the general trend after Oslo was movement away from large plenary sessions toward smaller, more project-focused cooperative forums with smaller, subregional participation.
34. Concluding Remarks by the Gavelholder, The Intersessional Meeting, The Environment Working Group, Muscat, June 26-27, 1996.
35. Ibid.
36. For an overview of regional environmental hazards in the Aqaba area, including oil spills, sewage, fish farming and aquatic tourism damage, and potential solutions, see Philip Warburg, *Middle East Environmental Cooperation*, IGCC Policy Brief No. 4 (San Diego: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, May 1995).

37. See Amir, "Environment and the Peace Process."
38. The Saudis did not participate in the project, although it was designed to include them at a later stage.
39. The Multilateral Middle East Peace Talks, Update Following the Fourth Round, October-November 1993, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/multi.13>, November 23, 1993.
40. Ibid.
41. The European Union financed Egypt's center and equipment while the Japanese financed Jordan's facility. Israel financed the procurement of its own equipment. By November 1996, the Japanese had supplied \$5.5 million in equipment to set up the Jordanian station in Aqaba. See *FBIS-NES-96-231*, November 27, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.
42. Author interview, July 11, 1996, Washington, D.C.
43. "Multilateral Steering Committee on Water Pollution Convenes Today," Communication by the Environment Ministry Spokesman, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il>, March 14, 1995.
44. "Tripartite Panel Meets on Aqaba Gulf Projects," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, April 4, 1995.
45. See "Progress in Multilateral Talks in Amman." Communicated by Foreign Ministry Spokesman, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/950622.mul>, June 22, 1995.
46. Author interview with U.S. official, September 29, 1995, Tel Aviv, and author interview with Israeli official, Ministry of the Environment, October 5, 1995, Jerusalem. Both confirmed that the contingency plan was implemented as joint forces combated the spill using a communication hotline developed in the planning workshops for the project.
47. "Cyprus, Egypt, Israel Sign Accord to Combat Threats to Mediterranean," *The Bureau of National Affairs International Environment Daily*, June 12, 1995.
48. The Multilateral Middle East Peace Talks, Update Following the Fourth Round, October-November 1993, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/mad/multi/multi.13>, November 23, 1993.
49. See Amir, "Environment and the Peace Process."
50. Ibid.
51. Author interview with Israeli official who took part in the "wise men" discussions, October 5, 1995, Jerusalem.
52. Ibid.
53. "Environment Gets Peace Dividends," *Jerusalem Post*, October 27, 1994, p. 16.
54. For an interesting critique of the epistemic community approach that discusses the problem of assuming that consensual scientific knowledge drives policy

- while neglecting the role of politics in policymaking, see Karen T. Litfin, *Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), esp. chaps. 1 and 2.
55. The misconception that the working groups are vastly different was commented on in a number of interviews, but two in particular emphasized this point. Author interview with U.S. official, July 11, 1996, Washington, D.C.; author interview with Jordanian official, October 9, 1995, Amman.
 56. For the widespread public sentiment against normalization, as reflected in the Arab press, see the following articles in *Mideast Mirror*: "Arab States Stand Up to Israel at Last . . . or Do They?" April 1, 1997; "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process, R.I.P.," March 24, 1997; "Time for the Arabs to Respond to Netanyahu with Actions Rather Than Words—but How?" March 21, 1997; "A Halt to Normalization with Israel Is Vital . . . but Doesn't Go Far Enough," March 27, 1997; "Time to Convene an Arab Summit and Halt Normalization with Israel," October 11, 1996; "Netanyahu Has Made Normalization Indefensible," October 10, 1996; "Dore Gold and the Likud's 'Daydreams,'" November 29, 1996. Also see "Arab States Threaten to Freeze Ties," *Jerusalem Post*, September 16, 1996; David Makovsky and Hillel Kutler, "Report: Syria Failed to Pass Anti-Israel Ultimatum," *Jerusalem Post*, September 17, 1996; "Oman Threatens to Sever Ties with Israel," Israel Line, *Israel Information Service* <gopher://israel-info.gov.il:70/00/archive/isline97/970325.isl>, March 25, 1997.

Chapter 7

1. See, for example, David Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) and Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Regionalism in World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). For a review of works focused on economic regionalism, see Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism," *International Organization*, 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 589–627.
2. See John Lancaster, "Arabs Balk at Convening with Israelis: Economic Forum Tied to Peace Negotiations," *Washington Post*, November 7, 1997, p. A28.
3. Examples of track two dialogues include discussions and workshops sponsored by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) since 1993 and less academic discussions and working groups formed by the Search for Common Ground's Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East (IPCME). For IGCC's work, see Steven L. Spiegel and David J. Pervin, eds., *Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East* (New York: Garland, 1995). Also see the many papers from IGCC-sponsored conferences on the IGCC web site on

multilateral cooperation: <<http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/igcc/memulti/multi-lat.html>>. While IPCME focuses more on fostering regional dialogues and less on producing papers, it has produced one significant report from its working group on security. See Ambassador Peter D. Constable, ed., *Common Ground on Re-deployment of Israeli Forces in the West Bank*, The Initiative Papers No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Search for Common Ground, 1994). The Initiative also produces an informative newsletter outlining the developments among its own regional working groups in addition to official processes in the region. See *Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East) or their web site: <<http://www.searchforcommonground.org>>.

4. Jordan's version was promoted by Crown Prince Hassan Bin Talal beginning in March 1991. See Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "CSCME: Prospects for Collective Security in the Middle East," One Hundred Third Congress, First Session (October 14, 1993). Crown Prince Hassan's plan is printed in the appendix, pp. 68–82. See also an Address delivered by Crown Prince Hassan at the International Symposium, "Looking Beyond the Gulf War: A Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East" (Prague: March 16, 1991). Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres outlined his own version of a CSCME which he presented to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in late May 1994, in addition to raising the idea in discussions with President Clinton. See Aluf Ben, Aquiva Eldar, and Nadav Shragay, "Peres Holds Meetings with UNSC Members, Clinton; Raises New Regional Security Initiative," *Ha'aretz* in Hebrew, Tel Aviv, May 26, 1994, pp. A1, A10, cited in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia* (hereafter *FBIS-NES*)-94–102, May 26, 1994, p. 36. Even before his proposal, Peres had discussed ideas for new regional security structures. See, for example, "Peres Views Regional Structure for Middle East," Paris *Le Monde* in French, November 11, 1993, p. 1, cited in *FBIS-NES*-93–221, November 18, 1993, p. 39. A Palestinian academic and the first head of the Palestinian delegation to ACRS, Yezid Sayigh, also offered a similar proposal for regional cooperation, the MASCME. See Yezid Sayigh, "The Multilateral Middle East Peace Talks: Reorganizing for Regional Security," in Spiegel and Pervin, *Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East*, pp. 207–229. And finally, in the fall of 1996, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his top foreign policy adviser, Dore Gold, began promoting—in response to a British proposal by Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind—a new regional security structure for the region drawing on the OSCE as a model. See the address by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Conference of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Lisbon (December 3, 1996), cited in *FBIS-NES*-96–234, December 3, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>. Also see Udi

Segal, "PM to Urge Middle East Security, Cooperation Organization," IDF Radio in Hebrew, Tel Aviv, December 1, 1996, cited in *FBIS-NES-96-232*, December 1, 1996, located in World News Connection <<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>>.

Appendix C

1. This version is based on the draft that was presented to the ACRS plenary session in Doha, Qatar, in May 1994 by the United States and Russia, the group's cosponsors. The text excludes Section I (Fundamental Principles Governing Security Relations Among Regional Participants in the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group), most of which was not agreed to by the group. A similar text was reprinted in *Mideast Mirror*, 8, no. 83 (May 3, 1994).